

# Secure Multi-Party Computation Without Agreement\*

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## Abstract

It has recently been shown that executions of authenticated Byzantine agreement protocols in which more than a third of the parties are corrupted, cannot be composed concurrently or in parallel. This result puts into question any usage of authenticated Byzantine agreement in a setting where many executions take place. In particular, this is true for the whole body of work of secure multi-party protocols in the case that a third or more of the parties are corrupted. This is because these protocols strongly rely on the extensive use of a broadcast channel, which is in turn realized using authenticated Byzantine agreement. We remark that it was accepted folklore that the use of a broadcast channel (or authenticated Byzantine agreement) is actually essential for achieving meaningful secure multi-party computation whenever a third or more of the parties are corrupted. In this paper we show that this folklore is false. We present a mild relaxation of the definition of secure computation allowing abort. Our new definition captures all the central security issues of secure computation, including privacy and correctness. However, the novelty of the definition is in *decoupling* the issue of agreement from these issues. We then show that this relaxation suffices for achieving secure computation in a point-to-point network. That is, we show that secure multi-party computation for this definition can be achieved for *any* number of corrupted parties and *without* a broadcast channel (or trusted preprocessing phase as required for running authenticated Byzantine agreement). An important corollary of our result is the ability to obtain multi-party protocols in a point-to-point network that compose.

## 1 Introduction

In the setting of secure multi-party computation, a set of  $n$  parties with private inputs wish to jointly and securely compute a function of their inputs. This computation should be such that each party receives its correct output, and none of the parties learn anything beyond their prescribed output. This setting encompasses computations as simple as coin-tossing and agreement, and as complex as electronic voting, electronic auctions, electronic cash schemes, anonymous transactions, and private information retrieval schemes.

### 1.1 Ground rules of the 80's

This problem was initiated and heavily studied in the mid to late 80's, during which time the following ground rules were set.

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**Security in multi-party computation.** A number of different definitions were proposed for secure multi-party computation. These definitions aimed to ensure a number of important security properties. The most central of these are:

- *Privacy:* No party should learn anything more than its prescribed output. That is, the only information that should be learned about other parties' inputs is what can be derived from the output itself.
- *Correctness:* Each party is guaranteed that the output that it receives is correct.
- *Independence of Inputs:* The corrupted parties must choose their inputs independently of the honest parties' inputs.
- *Guaranteed output delivery:* Corrupted parties should not be able to prevent honest parties from receiving their output. In other words, the adversary should not be able to carry out a denial of service attack.
- *Fairness:* Corrupted parties should receive their output if and only if honest parties do.

The standard definition today, [8] building on [26, 2, 32], formalizes the above requirements (and others) in the following general way. Consider an ideal world in which an external trusted party is willing to help the parties carry out their computation. An ideal computation takes place in this ideal world by having the parties simply send their inputs to the trusted party, who then computes the desired function and passes each party its prescribed output. Notice that all of the above security properties (and more) are ensured in such an ideal computation. The security of a real protocol is established by comparing the outcome of the protocol to the outcome of an ideal computation. Specifically, a real protocol that is run by the parties (in a world where no trusted party exists) is said to be secure, if an adversary controlling a coalition of corrupted parties can do no more harm in a real execution than in the above ideal execution. Since the adversary is unable to cause any harm in an ideal execution, this means that security is also guaranteed in a real protocol execution.

We remark that the above informal description is “overly ideal” in the following sense. It is a known fact that unless an honest majority is assumed, it is impossible to obtain general protocols for secure multi-party computation that guarantee output delivery and fairness. The definition is therefore *relaxed* when no honest majority is assumed. In particular, under certain circumstances, honest parties may not receive their prescribed output, and fairness is not always guaranteed. In fact, a number of different levels of fairness have been considered. On one extreme, *complete fairness* states that corrupted parties receive their outputs if and only if honest parties receive their outputs (this is the notion of fairness described above and is only achievable for the case of an honest majority). On the other extreme, *no fairness* states that corrupted parties may receive their outputs even if honest parties do not. An intermediate notion that we call *partial fairness* has the following property. There exists a specified party (say  $P_1$ ) such that if  $P_1$  is honest then complete fairness is achieved. However, if  $P_1$  is corrupt then no fairness is achieved. That is, sometimes fairness is obtained and sometimes it is not (and the fairness is thus partial).

**Broadcast:** In the construction of protocols, the ability to “broadcast” messages (if needed) was always assumed as a primitive, where broadcast takes on the meaning of the Byzantine Generals problem [30]. Namely, an honest party can deliver a message of its choice to all honest parties in a given round. Furthermore, all honest parties will receive the same message, even if the broadcasting party is corrupt. Let  $t$  be the number of corrupted parties controlled by the adversary. Then, from results obtained largely by the distributed computing community, it was known that:

1. For  $t < n/3$ , Byzantine agreement can be achieved by a deterministic protocol with  $O(t)$  round complexity [33], and by a randomized protocol with constant expected round complexity [16];
2. For  $t \geq n/3$ , broadcast is achievable using a protocol for *authenticated* Byzantine agreement, in which a public-key infrastructure for digital signatures is used [33, 30]. (This public-key infrastructure is assumed to be setup in a trusted preprocessing phase.) We note that an information theoretic analogue also exists [34]. The round complexity of the above protocols is  $O(t)$ .

Assuming broadcast as a primitive in a point-to-point network was seen as non-problematic. This is because Byzantine agreement is achievable for all values of  $t$  (with the added requirement of a trusted preprocessing phase in the case of  $t \geq n/3$ ).

## 1.2 Feasibility of secure computation

Wide reaching feasibility results regarding secure multi-party computation were presented in the mid to late 1980's. The most central of these are as follows (recall that  $t$  equals the number of corrupted parties):

1. For  $t < n/3$ , secure multi-party protocols (with complete fairness and guaranteed output delivery) can be achieved for any function in a point-to-point network and without any setup assumptions. This can be achieved both in the computational setting [25] (assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations), and in the information theoretic (private channel) setting [5, 14].<sup>1</sup>
2. For  $t < n/2$ , secure multi-party protocols (with complete fairness and guaranteed output delivery) can be achieved for any function assuming that the parties have access to a broadcast channel. This can be achieved in the computational setting [25] (with the same assumptions as above), and in the information theoretic setting [35].

Alternatively, without assuming a broadcast channel, it can be achieved in a point to point network assuming a trusted pre-processing phase for setting up a public-key infrastructure (which is then used for running authenticated Byzantine agreement).

3. For  $t \geq n/2$ , secure multi-party protocols with partial fairness (and without guaranteeing output delivery) can be achieved assuming that the parties have access to a broadcast channel and in addition assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations [36, 25, 22]. (In fact, it suffices to assume a broadcast channel and an oblivious transfer protocol [27, 28].) Some works attempting to provide higher levels of fairness have also appeared [36, 20, 26, 3].

We stress that all of the above results have been proven in the *stand-alone* model of computation where only a single execution takes place.

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<sup>1</sup>In the information theoretic setting of secure computation, the adversary is not bound to any complexity class (and in particular, is not assumed to be polynomial-time). Results in this model require no complexity or cryptographic assumptions and hold unconditionally. The only assumption used is that parties are connected via ideally private channels (i.e., it is assumed that the adversary cannot eavesdrop on the communication between honest parties).

In contrast, in the computational setting the adversary is assumed to be a probabilistic polynomial-time machine (or a polynomial-size family of circuits). Results in this model typically assume cryptographic assumptions like the existence of trapdoor permutations. We note that in this model, it is not necessary to assume that the parties have access to ideally private channels (because such channels can be implemented using public-key encryption).

### 1.3 Byzantine agreement and secure computation

There is a close connection between Byzantine agreement and secure multi-party computation. First, Byzantine agreement (or broadcast) is used as a basic and central tool in the construction of secure protocols. In particular, all the feasibility results described above assume a broadcast channel (and implement it using Byzantine agreement or authenticated Byzantine agreement). Second, the definition of secure computation that guarantees output delivery actually implies Byzantine agreement. Therefore, all the lower bounds for Byzantine agreement apply to this definition of secure multi-party computation as well. Specifically, it is known that the Byzantine agreement problem cannot be solved for any  $t \geq n/3$  [33]. Thus, in a point-to-point network it is also impossible to achieve general secure computation with guaranteed output delivery for  $t \geq n/3$ . The solution to this problem in the past has been to use a trusted setup phase which then enables the use of *authenticated* Byzantine agreement. However, it was recently shown that authenticated Byzantine agreement cannot be composed (concurrently or even in parallel) for  $t \geq n/3$  [31]. Therefore, in order to obtain secure computation that composes for the case of  $t \geq n/3$ , one must *relax* the definitions of secure computation.<sup>2</sup> As we have mentioned above, the relaxation classically taken is one which guarantees all of the security properties except for guaranteed output delivery and fairness. However, even for the relaxed definition, all known protocols for secure computation in this range make extensive use of a broadcast primitive. Therefore, the impossibility of composing authenticated Byzantine agreement implies that these *protocols* do not compose (even in parallel). In summary, the current state of affairs is that there are no known protocols for secure computation in a point-to-point network that compose in parallel or concurrently, for any  $t \geq n/3$  (even assuming a trusted setup phase).

### 1.4 Our Results

We present a further relaxation of the definition of secure multi-party computation where output delivery is not guaranteed. Our additional relaxation is very mild, yet has the effect of decoupling the issue of *agreement* from the issue of *security* in multi-party computation. Before describing our definition, we first recall the standard relaxation that is introduced for the case of  $t \geq n/2$ . In this case of an honest minority, guaranteed output delivery and fairness are not required. Therefore, some parties may conclude with a special abort symbol  $\perp$ , and not with their output. Previously, it was required that either *all* honest parties receive their outputs or *all* honest parties output  $\perp$  [22].<sup>3</sup> Thus the parties all *agree* on whether or not output was received. In contrast, in our new definition some honest parties may receive output while some receive  $\perp$ , and the requirement of agreement of abort is removed. We stress that this is the only difference between our definition and previous ones. All the other security properties (e.g., privacy, correctness and independence of inputs) are preserved.

Our main result is the construction of a protocol for secure computation according to the new definition for *any*  $t < n$  and *without* a broadcast channel or setup assumption. (Our protocol assumes the same computational assumptions made, if any, by corresponding protocols that assume a broadcast channel.) We note that our results hold in both the information theoretic and computational models.

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<sup>2</sup>Of course, one could assume a physical broadcast channel instead. However, this is not realistic in most settings. Another approach is to suggest a different (realistic) model of computation that does not suffer from this lower bound. We remark that no such model is known today.

<sup>3</sup>We note that in private communication, Goldreich stated that the requirement in [22] of having all parties abort or all parties receive output was only made in order to simplify the definition.

**A hierarchy of definitions.** In order to describe our results in more detail, we present a hierarchy of definitions for secure computation. The hierarchy that we present here relates to the issues of abort (or failure to receive output) and fairness.

1. *Secure computation without abort:* According to this definition, all parties are guaranteed to receive their output. (This is what we previously called “guaranteed output delivery”.) This is the standard definition for the case of honest majority (i.e.,  $t < n/2$ ). Since all honest parties receive output, complete fairness is always obtained here.
2. *Secure computation with unanimous abort:* In this definition, it is ensured that either all honest parties receive their outputs or all honest parties abort. This definition can be considered with different levels of fairness:

(a) *Complete fairness:* Recall that when complete fairness is achieved, the honest parties are guaranteed to receive output if the adversary does. Thus, here one of two cases can occur. Either all parties receive output or all parties abort. Thus, the adversary can conduct a denial of service attack, but nothing else. (This definition can only be achieved in the case of  $t < n/2$ .)

(b) *Partial fairness:* As in the case of complete fairness, the adversary may disrupt the computation and cause the honest parties to abort without receiving their prescribed output. However, unlike above, the adversary may receive the corrupted parties’ outputs, even if the honest parties abort (and thus the abort is not always fair). In particular, the protocol *specifies* a single party such that the following holds. If this party is honest, then complete fairness is essentially achieved (i.e., either all parties abort or all parties receive correct output). If the specified party is corrupt, then fairness may be violated. That is, the adversary receives the corrupted parties’ outputs first, and then decides whether or not the honest parties all receive their correct output or all receive abort (and thus the adversary may receive output while the honest parties do not).

Although fairness is only guaranteed in the case that the specified party is not corrupted, there are applications where this feature may be of importance. For example, in a scenario where one of the parties may be “more trusted” than others (yet not too trusted), it may be of advantage to make this party the specified party. Another setting where this can be of advantage is one where all the participating parties are trusted. However, the problem that may arise is that of an external party “hacking” into the machine of one of the parties. In such a case, it may be possible to provide additional protection to the specified party.

(c) *No fairness:* This is the same as in the case of partial fairness except that the adversary always receives the corrupted parties’ outputs first (i.e., there is no specified party).

We stress that in all the above three definitions, if one honest party aborts then so do all honest parties, and thus all are aware of the fact that the protocol did not successfully terminate. This feature of having all parties succeed or fail together may be an important one in some applications.

3. *Secure computation with abort:* The only difference between this definition and the previous one is that some honest parties may receive output while others abort. That is, the requirement of unanimity with respect to abort is removed. This yields two different definitions, depending on whether partial fairness or no fairness is taken. (Complete fairness is not considered here because it only makes sense in a setting where all the parties, including the

corrupted parties, either all receive output or all abort. Therefore, it is not relevant in the setting of secure computation with non-unanimous abort.)

Using the above terminology, the definition proposed by [22] for the case of  $t \geq n/2$  is that of secure computation with unanimous abort and partial fairness. Our new definition is that of secure computation with abort (and partial or no fairness), and as we have mentioned, its key feature is a decoupling of the issues of secure computation and agreement (or unanimity) of abort.

**Achieving secure computation with abort.** In this paper, we show that secure computation with abort and partial fairness can be achieved for any  $t < n$ , and without a broadcast channel or a trusted pre-processing phase. We achieve this result in the following way. First, we define a weak variant of the Byzantine Generals problem, called *broadcast with abort*, in which not all parties are guaranteed to receive the broadcasted value. In particular, there exists a single value  $x$  such that every party either outputs  $x$  or aborts. Furthermore, when the broadcasting party is honest, the value  $x$  equals its input, similarly to the validity condition of Byzantine Generals. We call this “broadcast with abort” because as with secure computation with abort, some parties may output the correct value while other honest parties abort. We show how to achieve this type of broadcast with a simple deterministic protocol that runs in 2 rounds. Secure multi-party computation is then achieved by replacing the broadcast channel in known protocols with a broadcast with abort protocol. Despite the weak nature of agreement in this broadcast protocol, it is nevertheless enough for achieving secure multi-party computation with abort. Since our broadcast with abort protocol runs in only 2 rounds, we also obtain a very efficient transformation of protocols that work with a broadcast channel into protocols that require only a point-to-point network. In summary, we obtain the following theorem:

**Theorem 1.1** (efficient transformation): *There exists an efficient protocol compiler that receives any protocol  $\Pi$  for the broadcast model and outputs a protocol  $\Pi'$  for the point-to-point model such that the following holds: If  $\Pi$  securely computes a functionality  $f$  with unanimous abort and with any level of fairness, then  $\Pi'$  securely computes  $f$  with abort and with no fairness. Furthermore, if  $\Pi$  tolerates up to  $t$  corruptions and runs for  $R$  rounds, then  $\Pi'$  tolerates up to  $t$  corruptions and runs for  $O(R)$  rounds.*

Notice that in the transformation of Theorem 1.1, protocol  $\Pi'$  does not achieve complete fairness or partial fairness, even if  $\Pi$  did. Thus, fairness may be lost in the transformation. Nevertheless, meaningful secure computation is still obtained, and at virtually no additional cost.

When obtaining some level of fairness is important, Theorem 1.1 does not provide a solution. We show that partial fairness *can* be obtained without a broadcast channel for the range of  $t \geq n/2$ . Recall that even with a broadcast channel, complete fairness cannot be obtained in this range; therefore, we do not lose any fairness even though we work in the point-to-point model only. This result is stated in the following theorem:

**Theorem 1.2** (partial fairness): *For any probabilistic polynomial-time  $n$ -party functionality  $f$ , there exists a protocol in the point-to-point model for computing  $f$  that is secure with abort, partially fair and tolerates any  $t < n$  corruptions.*

The theorem is proved by first showing that fairness can be boosted in the point-to-point model. That is, given a generic protocol for secure multi-party computation that achieves no fairness, one can construct a generic protocol for secure multi-party computation that achieves partial fairness.

(Loosely speaking, a generic protocol is one that can be used to securely compute any efficient functionality.) Applying Theorem 1.1 to known protocols for the broadcast model, we obtain secure multi-party computation that achieves no fairness. Then, using the above “fairness boosting”, we obtain Theorem 1.2. We note that the round complexity of the resulting protocol is of the same order of the “best” generic protocol that works in the broadcast model. In particular, based on the protocol of [4], we obtain the first constant-round protocol in the point-to-point network for the range of  $n/3 \leq t < n/2$ .<sup>4</sup> That is:

**Corollary 1.3** (constant round protocols without broadcast for  $t < n/2$ ): *Assume that there exist public-key encryption schemes (or, alternatively, assume the existence of one-way functions and a model with private channels). Then, for every probabilistic polynomial-time functionality  $f$ , there exists a constant round protocol in the point-to-point network for computing  $f$  that is secure with abort, partially fair and tolerates  $t < n/2$  corruptions.*

**Composition of secure multi-party protocols.** An important corollary of our new definition is the ability to obtain secure multi-party protocols for  $t > n/3$  that compose in parallel or concurrently, without a broadcast channel. (By composition here, we mean a scenario where the same protocol is run many times by the same set of parties.) Until now, it was not known how to achieve such composition. This is because previously the broadcast channel in multi-party protocols was replaced by authenticated Byzantine agreement, and by [31] authenticated Byzantine agreement does *not* compose even in parallel. (Authenticated Byzantine agreement was used because for  $t > n/3$  standard Byzantine agreement cannot be applied.) Since we do not need to use authenticated Byzantine agreement to obtain secure computation, we succeed in bypassing this problem. See Section 6 for more discussion on this issue.

Recently, a new framework for multi-party computation was proposed that guarantees security in a general setting where many arbitrary protocols are running concurrently [9]. Protocols that fulfill this new definition are called “universally composable”. The communication model considered by [9] is one where the adversary can block messages sent by the honest parties. Notice that in this model, the adversary can always prevent the parties from receiving output. Therefore, output delivery and fairness are not required. In this “blocking” model, universally composable multi-party computation for any  $t < n$  was demonstrated, using a broadcast channel and a common reference string [13]. We show that the broadcast channel used in [13] can be replaced by a variant of our “broadcast with abort” protocol. Therefore, universally composable multi-party computation can be obtained in the point-to-point model for any  $t < n$  and only assuming the existence of a common reference string.

**Discussion.** We propose that the basic definition of secure computation should focus on the issues of privacy and correctness (and independence of inputs). In contrast, the property of agreement should be treated as an additional, and not central, feature. The benefit of taking such a position (irrespective of whether one is convinced conceptually) is that the feasibility of secure computation is completely decoupled from the feasibility of Byzantine agreement. Thus, the lower bounds relating to Byzantine agreement (and authenticated Byzantine agreement) do not imply anything regarding secure computation. Indeed, as we show, “broadcast with abort” is sufficient for secure

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<sup>4</sup>For the range of  $t < n/3$ , the broadcast channel in the protocol of [4] can be replaced by the expected constant-round Byzantine agreement protocol of [16]. However, when  $n/3 \leq t < n/2$ , authenticated Byzantine agreement must be used. Since there are no known (expected) constant-round protocols for authenticated Byzantine agreement, we have that the resulting protocol for secure computation is not constant-round.

computation. However, it lacks any flavor of agreement in the classical sense. This brings us to an important observation. Usually, proving a lower bound for a special case casts light on the difficulties in solving the general problem. However, in the case of secure computation this is not the case. Rather, the fact that the lower bounds of Byzantine agreement apply to secure computation is due to marginal issues relating to unanimity regarding the delivery of outputs, and not due to the main issues of security.

## 1.5 Related Work

We have recently learned of two independent and concurrent results [18, 19] studying a problem similar to ours, although apparently for different motivation. In [18], the question of multi-party computation in the case that the number of corruptions is  $t < n/2$  is studied. They show that in this case, it is possible to achieve weak Byzantine agreement (where loosely speaking, either all honest parties abort or all honest parties agree on the broadcasted value). (We note that their protocol is randomized and therefore bypasses the  $t < n/3$  lower-bound on deterministic weak Byzantine agreement protocols of [29].) They further show how this can be used in order to obtain secure computation with unanimous abort and complete fairness for the case of  $t < n/2$ . Thus for the range of  $n/2 \leq t < n/3$ , their solution achieves complete fairness whereas ours achieves only partial fairness.

In subsequent work, [19] studied the question of Byzantine agreement for any  $t < n$  and whether its relaxation to weak Byzantine agreement can be achieved without preprocessing. They show that it is indeed possible to achieve (randomized) weak Byzantine agreement for *any*  $t < n$ , in  $O(t)$  rounds. They also show how their weak Byzantine agreement protocol can be used to obtain secure computation with unanimous abort and partial fairness for any  $t < n$ .

In comparison, we achieve secure computation with (non-unanimous) abort and partial fairness for any  $t < n$ . However, our focus is different. In particular, our results emphasize the fact that the issue of agreement is not central to the task of secure computation. Furthermore, removing this requirement enables us to remove the broadcast channel with almost no cost. Thus, we obtain a round-preserving transformation of secure protocols in the broadcast model to those in the point-to-point model. This is in contrast to [18, 19] who use their weak Byzantine agreement protocol in order to setup a public-key infrastructure for authenticated Byzantine agreement. They therefore incur the cost of setting up this infrastructure along with a cost of  $t + 1$  rounds for simulating every broadcast in the original protocol. Our protocols are therefore significantly more round efficient.<sup>5</sup> Finally we note that we can use the weak Byzantine agreement protocol of [19] to transform any generic  $r$ -round protocol for secure computation with abort into an  $(r + t)$ -round protocol with unanimous abort (and the same level of fairness). This is achieved by having the parties broadcast whether they received outputs or not after the protocol with abort concludes. It is enough to use weak Byzantine agreement for this broadcast. We therefore reduce the  $O(tr)$  round complexity of [19] to  $O(r + t)$ , while achieving the same level of security.

Recall that [9] introduced a communication model where the adversary has control over the delivery of messages. Essentially, this definition also decouples secure computation from agreement

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<sup>5</sup>We note one subtle, yet important caveat. Given a *generic* protocol for secure computation that uses a broadcast channel and runs for  $r$  rounds, we obtain an  $O(r)$ -round protocol that is secure with abort and partially fair (this is in contrast to the  $O(tr)$  round complexity of [18, 19]). However, given a protocol that solves a specific secure computation problem, our transformation does not achieve partial fairness. In order to achieve partial fairness, we must revert to a generic protocol. In contrast, the transformation of [18, 19] works for any protocol. Thus, given a very efficient protocol for a specific problem that achieves partial fairness, it may actually be “cheaper” to use the transformation of [18, 19].



because parties are never guaranteed to get output. In particular, the adversary is allowed to deliver output to whomever it wishes, and only these parties will ever receive output. However, the motivation of [9] is different; it aims to decouple the issue of guaranteed output delivery from the main issues of secure computation. In contrast, we focus on the question of agreement by the parties on whether or not output was delivered.

## 2 Definitions – Secure Computation

In this section we present definitions for secure multi-party computation. The basic description and definitions are based on [22], which in turn follows [26, 2, 32, 8]. We actually consider a number of definitions here. In particular, we present formal definitions for secure computation with *unanimous abort* and with *abort*, with *complete fairness*, *partial fairness*, and *no fairness*. In addition, we refer to *secure computation without abort*. This is the standard definition used when more than half the parties are honest. According to this definition, all parties receive the output and the adversary cannot disrupt the computation. However, we will not formally present this definition here.

**Notation:** We denote by  $U_k$  the uniform distribution over  $\{0, 1\}^k$ ; for a set  $S$  we denote  $s \in_R S$  when  $s$  is chosen uniformly from  $S$ ; we let  $[n]$  denote the set of integers  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ ; finally, computational indistinguishability is denoted by  $\stackrel{c}{\equiv}$  and statistical closeness by  $\stackrel{s}{\equiv}$ . The security parameter is denoted by  $k$ .

**Multi-party computation.** A multi-party protocol problem (for  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$ ) is cast by specifying a random process that maps vectors of inputs to vectors of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as an  $n$ -ary functionality and denote it  $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$ , where  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$ . That is, for a vector of inputs  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , the output-vector is a random variable  $(f_1(\bar{x}), \dots, f_n(\bar{x}))$  ranging over vectors of strings. The output for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party (with input  $x_i$ ) is defined to be  $f_i(\bar{x})$ .

**Adversarial behavior.** Loosely speaking, the aim of a secure multi-party protocol is to protect the honest parties against dishonest behavior from the corrupted parties. This “dishonest behavior” can manifest itself in a number of ways; in this paper we focus on *malicious* adversaries who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification. When considering malicious adversaries, there are certain undesirable actions that cannot be prevented. Specifically, parties may refuse to participate in the protocol, may substitute their local input (and enter with a different input) and may cease participating in the protocol before it terminates. Essentially, secure protocols limit the adversary to such behavior only.

Formally, the adversary is modeled by a non-uniform Turing machine: in the computational model this machine is polynomial-time whereas in the information-theoretic model it is unbounded. (We note that by standard arguments, we can assume that the adversary is deterministic.) For simplicity, in this work we consider a *static corruption* model. Therefore, at the beginning of the execution, the adversary is given a set  $I$  of corrupted parties which it controls. That is, the adversary obtains the views of the corrupted parties, and provides them with the messages that they are to send in the execution.

**Security of protocols (informal).** The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in the protocol to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition.

This is formalized by considering an *ideal* computation involving an incorruptible *trusted party* to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation. We begin by formally defining this ideal computation.

## 2.1 Execution in the ideal model

The ideal model differs for each of the definitions. We therefore present each one separately (see Section 1.4 for an outline of the different definitions).

**1. Secure computation with unanimous abort and complete fairness:** This definition requires complete fairness. That is, either all parties (including the corrupted parties) receive output or all parties abort. Therefore, the abort is also unanimous. We note that even assuming a broadcast channel, this definition is only achievable when the number of corrupted parties is less than  $n/2$  (i.e.,  $|I| < n/2$ ). Recall that a malicious party can always substitute its input or refuse to participate. Therefore, the ideal model takes these inherent adversarial behaviors into account; i.e., by giving the adversary the ability to do this also in the ideal model. An ideal execution proceeds as follows:

*Inputs:* Each party obtains its respective input from the input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

*Send inputs to trusted party:* An honest party always sends its input  $x$  to the trusted party. The corrupted parties may, depending on their inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ , either abort or send modified values  $x'_i \in \{0, 1\}^{|x_i|}$  to the trusted party. Denote the sequence of inputs obtained by the trusted party by  $\bar{x}' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_n)$  (for honest parties,  $x' = x$  always).

*Trusted party answers the parties:* In case  $\bar{x}'$  is a valid input sequence, the trusted party computes  $f(\bar{x}')$  and sends  $f_i(\bar{x}')$  to party  $P_i$  for every  $i$ . Otherwise (i.e., in case a corrupted party aborted or sent a non-valid input), the trusted party replies to all parties with a special abort symbol  $\perp$ .

*Outputs:* An honest party always outputs the message that it received from the trusted party and the corrupted parties output nothing. The adversary outputs an arbitrary function of the initial inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$  and the messages that the corrupted parties received from the trusted party.

**Definition 1** (ideal-model computation with unanimous abort and complete fairness): *Let  $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$  be an  $n$ -ary functionality, where  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$ , and let  $I \subset [n]$  be such that for every  $i \in I$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls  $P_i$  (this is the set of corrupted parties). Then, the joint execution of  $f$  under  $(\mathcal{A}, I)$  in the ideal model on input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and auxiliary input  $z$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , denoted  $\text{IDEAL}_{f, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}^{(1)}(\bar{x})$ , is defined as the output vector of  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  resulting from the above described ideal process.*

**2. Secure computation with unanimous abort and partial fairness:** As before, a malicious party can always substitute its input or refuse to participate. However, when there are a half or less honest parties, it is not possible to continue computing in the case that the adversary ceases prematurely. Thus, we cannot prevent the “early abort” phenomenon in which the adversary

receives its output, whereas the honest parties do not receive theirs (i.e., complete fairness cannot be achieved). Nevertheless, a partial notion of fairness can be achieved. That is, a party  $P_1$  is specified so that if it is honest, then complete fairness is achieved. In contrast, if it is corrupted, then the adversary receives the corrupted parties' outputs first and then can decide whether or not the honest parties receive output or abort. We note that the abort is unanimous and thus if one honest party aborts, then so do all honest parties. The only difference from the previous definition is in the “trusted party answers remaining parties” stage. An ideal execution proceeds as follows:

*Inputs:* Each party obtains its respective input from the input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

*Send inputs to trusted party:* An honest party always sends its input  $x$  to the trusted party. The corrupted parties may, depending on their inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ , either abort or send modified values  $x'_i \in \{0, 1\}^{|x_i|}$  to the trusted party. Denote the sequence of inputs obtained by the trusted party by  $\bar{x}' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_n)$  (for honest parties,  $x' = x$  always).

*Trusted party answers first party:* In case  $\bar{x}'$  is a valid input sequence, the trusted party computes  $f(\bar{x}')$  and sends  $f_1(\bar{x}')$  to party  $P_1$ . Otherwise (i.e., in case a corrupted party aborted or sent a non-valid input), the trusted party replies to all parties with a special symbol,  $\perp$ .

*Trusted party answers remaining parties:* If the first party is not corrupted (i.e.,  $1 \notin I$ ), then the trusted party sends  $f_j(\bar{x}')$  to party  $P_j$ , for every  $j$ .

In case the first party is corrupted, then for every  $i \in I$ , the trusted party sends  $f_i(\bar{x})$  to party  $P_i$  (i.e., the corrupted parties receive their outputs first). Then the corrupted  $P_1$ , depending on the views of all the corrupted parties, instructs the trusted party to either send  $f_j(\bar{x}')$  to  $P_j$  for every  $j \notin I$ , or to send  $\perp$  to  $P_j$  for every  $j \notin I$ .

*Outputs:* An honest party always outputs the message that it received from the trusted party and the corrupted parties output nothing. The adversary outputs an arbitrary function of the initial inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$  and the messages that the corrupted parties received from the trusted party.

**Definition 2** (ideal-model computation with unanimous abort and partial fairness): *Let  $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$  be an  $n$ -ary functionality, where  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$ , and let  $I \subset [n]$  be such that for every  $i \in I$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls  $P_i$  (this is the set of corrupted parties). Then, the joint execution of  $f$  under  $(\mathcal{A}, I)$  in the ideal model on input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and auxiliary input  $z$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , denoted  $\text{IDEAL}_{f, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}^{(2)}(\bar{x})$ , is defined as the output vector of  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  resulting from the above described ideal process.*

We note that this is the definition of [22] for the case of  $t \geq n/2$ .

**3. Secure computation with unanimous abort and no fairness:** This definition is very similar to the previous one, except that there is no specified party. Rather, the adversary first receives the output of the corrupted parties. Then, it decides whether all the honest parties receive output or they all abort. Formally,

*Inputs:* Each party obtains its respective input from the input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

*Send inputs to trusted party:* An honest party always sends its input  $x$  to the trusted party. The corrupted parties may, depending on their inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ , either abort or send modified values  $x'_i \in \{0, 1\}^{|x_i|}$  to the trusted party. Denote the sequence of inputs obtained by the trusted party by  $\bar{x}' = (x'_1, \dots, x'_n)$  (for honest parties,  $x' = x$  always).

*Trusted party answers adversary:* In case  $\bar{x}'$  is a valid input sequence, the trusted party computes  $f(\bar{x}')$  and sends  $f_i(\bar{x}')$  to party  $P_i$  for every  $i \in I$ . Otherwise (i.e., in case a corrupted party aborted or sent a non-valid input), the trusted party replies to all parties with a special symbol,  $\perp$ .

*Trusted party answers remaining parties:* The adversary, depending on the views of all the corrupted parties, instructs the trusted party to either send  $f_j(\bar{x}')$  to  $P_j$  for every  $j \notin I$ , or to send  $\perp$  to  $P_j$  for every  $j \notin I$ .

*Outputs:* An honest party always outputs the message that it received from the trusted party and the corrupted parties output nothing. The adversary outputs an arbitrary function of the initial inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$  and the messages that the corrupted parties received from the trusted party.

**Definition 3** (ideal-model computation with unanimous abort and no fairness): *Let  $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$  be an  $n$ -ary functionality, where  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$ , and let  $I \subset [n]$  be such that for every  $i \in I$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls  $P_i$  (this is the set of corrupted parties). Then, the joint execution of  $f$  under  $(\mathcal{A}, I)$  in the ideal model on input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and auxiliary input  $z$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , denoted  $\text{IDEAL}_{f, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}^{(3)}(\bar{x})$ , is defined as the output vector of  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  resulting from the above described ideal process.*

The above three definitions all relate to the case of secure computation with unanimous abort. We now present the analogous definitions for the case of secure computation with abort. The only difference between the definitions is regarding the “trusted party answers remaining parties” item. In the above definitions all honest parties either receive their output or they receive  $\perp$ . However, here some of these parties may receive their (correct) output and some may receive  $\perp$ . This is where our new definition differs from past ones. We only present definitions for partial and no fairness (complete fairness only makes sense if all parties, including the adversary, either receive their outputs or  $\perp$ ).

**4. Secure computation with abort and partial fairness:** As we have mentioned, the only difference between this definition and the analogous definition with unanimous abort is that if party  $P_1$  is corrupted, then it may designate who does and does not receive output. We repeat only the relevant item:

*Trusted party answers remaining parties:* If the first party is not corrupted (i.e.,  $1 \notin I$ ), then the trusted party sends  $f_j(\bar{x}')$  to party  $P_j$ , for every  $j$ .

In case the first party is corrupted, then for every  $i \in I$ , the trusted party sends  $f_i(\bar{x}')$  to  $P_i$  (i.e., the corrupted parties receive their output first). Then the corrupted  $P_1$ , depending on the views of all the corrupted parties, chooses a subset of the honest parties  $J \subseteq [n] \setminus I$  and sends  $J$  to the trusted party. The trusted party then sends  $f_j(\bar{x}')$  to  $P_j$  for every  $j \in J$ , and  $\perp$  to all other honest parties.

**Definition 4** (ideal-model computation with abort and partial fairness): *Let  $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$  be an  $n$ -ary functionality, where  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$ , and let  $I \subset [n]$  be such that for every  $i \in I$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls  $P_i$  (this is the set of corrupted parties). Then, the joint execution of  $f$  under  $(\mathcal{A}, I)$  in the ideal model on input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and auxiliary input  $z$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , denoted  $\text{IDEAL}_{f, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}^{(4)}(\bar{x})$ , is defined as the output vector of  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  resulting from the above described ideal process.*

**5. Secure computation with abort and no fairness:** This definition is the same as Definition 3 with respect to the fact that the adversary always receives the output of the corrupted parties first. However, as with Definition 4, the honest parties’ abort is not necessarily unanimous. That is, the adversary, designates which honest parties receive their output and which receive  $\perp$ . We repeat the only item in which this definition differs from Definition 3:

*Trusted party answers remaining parties:* The adversary, depending on the views of all the corrupted parties, chooses a subset of the honest parties  $J \subseteq [n] \setminus I$  and sends  $J$  to the trusted party. The trusted party then sends  $f_j(\bar{x}')$  to  $P_j$  for every  $j \in J$ , and  $\perp$  to all other honest parties.

**Definition 5** (ideal-model computation with abort and no fairness): *Let  $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$  be an  $n$ -ary functionality, where  $f = (f_1, \dots, f_n)$ , and let  $I \subset [n]$  be such that for every  $i \in I$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls  $P_i$  (this is the set of corrupted parties). Then, the joint execution of  $f$  under  $(\mathcal{A}, I)$  in the ideal model on input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and auxiliary input  $z$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , denoted  $\text{IDEAL}_{f, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}^{(5)}(\bar{x})$ , is defined as the output vector of  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  resulting from the above described ideal process.*

## 2.2 Execution in the real model

We now define a real model execution. In the real model, the parties execute the protocol in a *synchronous* network with *rushing*. That is, the execution proceeds in rounds: each round consists of a send phase (where parties send their message from this round) followed by a receive phase (where they receive messages from other parties). This means that the messages sent by an honest party in a given round depend on the messages that it received in previous rounds only. However, the adversary can compute its messages in a given round based on the messages that it receives from the honest parties in the same round. The term “rushing” refers to this additional adversarial capability.

In this work, we consider a scenario where the parties are connected via a fully connected point-to-point network (and there is no broadcast channel). We refer to this model as the *point-to-point model* (in contrast to the *broadcast model* where the parties are given access to a physical broadcast channel in addition to the point-to-point network). The communication lines between parties are assumed to be ideally authenticated and private (and thus the adversary cannot modify or read messages sent between two honest parties).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the delivery of messages between honest parties is guaranteed. Finally, we note that we do not assume any trusted preprocessing phase (that can be used to setup a public-key infrastructure, for example).<sup>7</sup> Most of the results in this paper relate to the above-described communication model. However, we also consider an *asynchronous* network model where the adversary has complete control over the timing and delivery of messages.

<sup>6</sup>We note that when the parties are assumed to be computationally bounded, privacy can be achieved over authenticated channels by using public-key encryption. Therefore, in such a setting, the requirement that the channels be private is not essential. However, we include it for simplicity.

<sup>7</sup>One can argue that achieving authenticated and private channels in practice essentially requires a trusted preprocessing phase for setting up a public-key infrastructure. Therefore, there is no reason not to utilize this preprocessing phase in the secure multi-party computation as well. In such a case, the preprocessing phase could be used in order to implement authenticated Byzantine agreement (and thereby achieve secure broadcast for any number of corrupted parties). However, we claim that the issue of achieving “secure communication channels” should be separated from the issue of achieving “secure broadcast”. An example of why this is important was demonstrated in [31], who showed that authenticated Byzantine agreement does not compose (in parallel or concurrently) when  $2/3$  or less of the parties are honest. In contrast, secure channels can be achieved without any limitation on the protocol using them [11]; in particular, without restrictions on composability and the number of faults.

(In particular, the adversary may decide to never deliver a certain message.) We stress that here the communication lines are also authenticated and private, and therefore the only thing that the adversary can do is delay or prevent a message from being sent. This network model is considered in Sections 3.2 and 6 in the context of universally composable protocols.

Throughout a real execution, the honest parties all follow the instructions of the prescribed protocol, whereas the corrupted parties receive their (arbitrary) instructions from the adversary. Likewise, at the conclusion of the execution, the honest parties output their prescribed output from the protocol, the corrupted parties output nothing and the adversary outputs an arbitrary function of its view of the computation (which contains the views of all the corrupted parties). Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary always outputs its view (and not some function of it). Formally,

**Definition 6** (real-model execution): *Let  $f$  be an  $n$ -ary functionality and let  $\Pi$  be a multi-party protocol for computing  $f$ . Furthermore, let  $I \subset [n]$  be such that for every  $i \in I$ , the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls  $P_i$  (this is the set of corrupted parties). Then, the joint execution of  $\Pi$  under  $(\mathcal{A}, I)$  in the real model on input vector  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and auxiliary input  $z$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , denoted  $\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x})$ , is defined as the output vector of  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  resulting from the protocol interaction, where for every  $i \in I$ , party  $P_i$  computes its messages according to  $\mathcal{A}$ , and for every  $j \notin I$ , party  $P_j$  computes its messages according to  $\Pi$ .*

**On synchronous versus asynchronous networks.** As we have mentioned above, most of the results of this paper are presented in the synchronous network model. However, this is for the sake of simplicity only. In fact, when output delivery is *not* guaranteed, asynchronous communication does not present any additional hardship. Specifically, the honest parties should merely wait until receiving all round  $i$  messages before sending their message for round  $i+1$ . This ensures that the only difference between a synchronous and an asynchronous execution is the ability of the adversary to prevent the parties from receiving output. When output delivery is not guaranteed, this is anyway allowed.

### 2.3 Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model

Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that the adversary can do no more harm in a real protocol execution than in the ideal model (where security trivially holds). This is formulated by saying that adversaries in the ideal model are able to simulate adversaries in an execution of a secure real-model protocol. The definition of security comes in two flavors. In the first, we consider polynomial-time bounded adversaries, and require that the simulation be such that the real-model and ideal-model output distributions are computationally indistinguishable. In the second, we consider unbounded adversaries and require that the simulation be such that the output distributions of the two executions are statistically close.

**Definition 7** (computational security): *Let  $f$  and  $\Pi$  be as above. We say that protocol  $\Pi$  is a protocol for computational  $t$ -secure computation with unanimous abort (resp., with abort) and with complete fairness (resp., with partial fairness or with no fairness), if for every non-uniform polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  for the ideal model, such that for every  $I \subset [n]$  with  $|I| < t$ ,*

$$\{\text{IDEAL}_{f, I, \mathcal{S}(z)}^{(\alpha)}(\bar{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \bar{x} \in (\{0,1\}^k)^n, z \in \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(k)}} \stackrel{c}{\equiv} \{\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \bar{x} \in (\{0,1\}^k)^n, z \in \{0,1\}^{\text{poly}(k)}}$$

where the value of  $\alpha \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$  depends on whether secure computation with unanimous abort or with abort is being considered, and whether complete fairness, partial fairness or no fairness is required.

**Definition 8** (information-theoretic security): Let  $f$  and  $\Pi$  be as above. We say that protocol  $\Pi$  is a protocol for information-theoretic  $t$ -secure computation with unanimous abort (resp., with abort) and with complete fairness (resp., with partial fairness or with no fairness), if for every non-uniform adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  for the ideal model such that for every  $I \subset [n]$  with  $|I| < t$ ,

$$\{\text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\mathcal{S}(z)}^{(\alpha)}(\bar{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \bar{x} \in \{0,1\}^k, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \stackrel{\text{S}}{\equiv} \{\text{REAL}_{\Pi,I,\mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \bar{x} \in \{0,1\}^k, z \in \{0,1\}^*}$$

where the value of  $\alpha \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$  depends on whether secure computation with unanimous abort or with abort is being considered, and whether complete fairness, partial fairness or no fairness is required.

### 3 Broadcast with Abort

In this section, we present a weak variant of the Byzantine Generals problem, that we call “broadcast with abort”. The main idea is to weaken both the agreement and validity requirements so that some parties may output the broadcast value  $x$  while others output  $\perp$ . Formally,

**Definition 9** (broadcast with abort): Let  $P_1, \dots, P_n$ , be  $n$  parties and let  $P_1$  be the dealer with input  $x$ . In addition, let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary who controls up to  $t$  of the parties (which may include  $P_1$ ). A protocol solves the broadcast with abort problem, tolerating  $t$  corruptions, if for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  the following three properties hold:

1. Agreement: If an honest party outputs  $x'$ , then all honest parties output either  $x'$  or  $\perp$ .
2. Validity: If  $P_1$  is honest, then all honest parties output either  $x$  or  $\perp$ .
3. Non-triviality: If all parties are honest, then all parties output  $x$ .

(The non-triviality requirement is needed to rule out a protocol in which all parties simply output  $\perp$  and halt.) We now present a simple protocol that solves the broadcast with abort problem for *any*  $t$ . As we will see later, despite its simplicity, this protocol suffices for obtaining secure computation with abort.

**Protocol 1** (broadcast with abort):

- **Input:**  $P_1$  has a value  $x$  to broadcast.
- **The Protocol:**

1.  $P_1$  sends  $x$  to all parties.
2. Denote by  $x^i$  the value received by  $P_i$  from  $P_1$  in the previous round. Then, every party  $P_i$  (for  $i > 1$ ) sends its value  $x^i$  to all other parties.
3. Denote the value received by  $P_i$  from  $P_j$  in the previous round by  $x_j^i$  (recall that  $x^i$  denotes the value  $P_i$  received from  $P_1$  in the first round). Then,  $P_i$  outputs  $x^i$  if this is the only value that it saw (i.e., if for every  $x_j^i$  that  $P_i$  receives, it holds that  $x_j^i = x^i$ ). Otherwise, it outputs  $\perp$ .

We note that if  $P_i$  did not receive any value in the first round, then it always outputs  $\perp$ .

We now prove that Protocol 1 is secure, for any number of corrupted parties. That is,

**Proposition 3.1** *Protocol 1 solves the broadcast with abort problem, and tolerates any  $t < n$  corruptions.*

**Proof:** The fact that the non-triviality condition is fulfilled is immediate. We now prove the other two conditions:

1. *Agreement:* Let  $P_i$  be an honest party such that  $P_i$  outputs a value  $x'$ . Then, it must be that  $P_i$  received  $x'$  from  $P_1$  in the first round (i.e.,  $x^i = x'$ ). Therefore,  $P_i$  sent this value to all other parties in the second round. Now, a party  $P_j$  will output  $x^j$  if this is the only value that it saw during the execution. However, as we have just seen,  $P_j$  definitely saw  $x'$  in the second round. Thus,  $P_j$  will only output  $x^j$  if  $x^j = x'$ . Furthermore, if  $P_j$  does not output  $x^j$ , then it outputs  $\perp$ .
2. *Validity:* If  $P_1$  is honest, then all parties receive  $x$  in the first round. Therefore, they will only output  $x$  or  $\perp$ .

■

### 3.1 Strengthening Broadcast with Abort

A natural question to ask is whether or not we can strengthen Definition 9 in one of the following two ways (and still obtain a protocol that tolerates  $t \geq n/3$  corruptions):

1. *Strengthen the agreement requirement:* If an honest party outputs a value  $x'$ , then all honest parties output  $x'$ . (note that the validity requirement remains unchanged.)
2. *Strengthen the validity requirement:* If  $P_1$  is honest, then all honest parties output  $x$ . (note that the agreement requirement remains unchanged.)

It is easy to see that the above strengthening of the agreement requirement results in the definition of weak Byzantine Generals. (The validity and non-triviality requirements combined together are equivalent to the validity requirement of weak Byzantine Generals.) Therefore, there exists no *deterministic* protocol for the case of  $t \geq n/3$ . For what can be done if one utilizes randomized protocols, see the section on recent *related work* in the introduction. Regarding the strengthening of the validity requirement, the resulting definition implies a problem known as “Crusader Agreement” (outputting  $\perp$  can be interpreted as “explicitly” knowing that the dealer is faulty). This was shown to be unachievable for any  $t \geq n/3$  in [15] (we note that this lower bound holds for randomized protocols as well). We therefore conclude that the “broadcast with abort” requirements cannot be strengthened in either of the above two ways (for deterministic protocols), without incurring a  $t < n/3$  lower bound.

### 3.2 Universally Composable Broadcast

In this section, we consider an *asynchronous* network setting with ideally authenticated communication lines. In such a setting, the adversary cannot modify messages sent by the honest parties, but does have control over the timing and delivery of these messages. We note that the adversary’s control is complete, and thus it may decide to never deliver certain messages. This is modeled in the following way: The parties send messages by placing them in an “out-box”, and the adversary



then delivers (or does not deliver) them at will. This capability is given to the adversary in both the real and ideal models (and thus the adversary also delivers – or does not deliver – messages between the honest parties and the trusted third party). This is very similar to our definition of secure computation with abort and no fairness. In particular, output delivery is not guaranteed. Furthermore, the adversary can choose to deliver outputs to any subset of the parties that it wishes to (and can decide after having seen the corrupted parties’ outputs). Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the notion of universally composable broadcast in this model and all the other works on Byzantine agreement in the asynchronous model where output is guaranteed [7, 12]. (As we have discussed at length in the introduction, this much weaker notion of broadcast nevertheless suffices for the purposes of secure computation with abort.)

In this section we show that it is possible to realize an ideal broadcast functionality in a universally composable way within the above-described model, for any  $t < n$ . Essentially this means that any protocol that uses a broadcast channel can be implemented in the point-to-point model while achieving the same effect. An important corollary of this result is the existence of universally composable multi-party computation for  $t \geq n/3$ , in a point-to-point network. This corollary is obtained by applying our secure realization of the broadcast functionality with known universally composable multi-party protocols; see Section 6. We refer the reader to Appendix A for an overview of the universal composition framework and to [8] for more details.

The ideal broadcast functionality is defined in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The ideal broadcast functionality

We now present our protocol for securely realizing universally composable broadcast. This protocol is a slightly modified version of Protocol 1 and is suited for an asynchronous setting:

**Protocol 2** (universally composable broadcast):

- **Input:**  $P_i$  has input  $(\text{broadcast}, x)$ .
- **The Protocol:**
  1.  $P_i$  sends  $x$  to all parties.
  2. Upon receiving a value  $x^j$  from  $P_i$ , party  $P_j$  sends the value  $x^j$  that it received to all other parties.
  3. Party  $P_j$  waits to receive a message from every party (other than party  $P_i$ ). Denote the message received from  $P_k$  by  $x_k^j$ . Then,  $P_j$  outputs  $(\text{broadcast}, P_i, x^j)$  if and only if for every  $k$ , it holds that  $x_k^j = x^j$  (i.e.,  $x^j = x_1^j = \dots = x_n^j$ ). Otherwise, it outputs nothing.

The main result of this section is the following proposition:

**Proposition 3.2** *Protocol 2 is a universally composable protocol for securely realizing the ideal broadcast functionality (in an asynchronous network).*

**Proof:** Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a real-model adversary attacking Protocol 2. We construct an ideal model adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  that internally incorporates  $\mathcal{A}$  and interacts with the trusted party in an ideal execution.  $\mathcal{S}$  forwards all messages unmodified between  $\mathcal{A}$  and the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ . In addition,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates a real execution for  $\mathcal{A}$ . We separately describe the simulation for the case that the dealer is corrupted, and thus is controlled by  $\mathcal{A}$ , and the case that it is honest (recall that  $P_i$  is the dealer in the execution):

- *Case 1 –  $P_i$  is corrupt:* In the first round,  $\mathcal{A}$  (controlling  $P_i$ ) sends messages to the honest parties.  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates the response of the honest parties to these messages and waits until all the first-round messages of the protocol have been delivered by  $\mathcal{A}$  in the simulation. Once these messages have been delivered,  $\mathcal{S}$  works as follows. If  $\mathcal{A}$  sent the same first-round message  $x$  to *all* the honest parties, then  $\mathcal{S}$  (controlling  $P_i$ ) sends (**broadcast**,  $x$ ) to the trusted party in the ideal execution. Following this,  $\mathcal{S}$  continues in the internal simulation for  $\mathcal{A}$  of the honest parties' messages until the protocol terminates. In addition,  $\mathcal{S}$  delivers output from the trusted party to a given honest party, whenever that honest party receives all of its second-round messages, and all of these messages equal  $x$ .

If  $\mathcal{A}$  did not send the same first-round message to all the honest parties, then  $\mathcal{S}$  internally simulates for  $\mathcal{A}$  all the messages that the honest parties would send, but does not send anything to the trusted party.

- *Case 2 –  $P_i$  is honest:*  $\mathcal{S}$  receives (**broadcast**,  $P_i, x$ ) from the trusted party and simulates a real execution for  $\mathcal{A}$  where  $P_i$  is the dealer. First,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates  $P_i$  sending  $x$  to all the parties. Then,  $\mathcal{S}$  receives back the messages sent by  $\mathcal{A}$  to the honest parties. As in the previous case,  $\mathcal{S}$  delivers output from the trusted party to an honest party, whenever the honest party receives all of its second-round messages, and all of these messages equal  $x$ .

We claim that the global output of an ideal execution with  $\mathcal{S}$  is *identically distributed* to the global output of a real execution with  $\mathcal{A}$ . This is demonstrated by showing that honest parties output a value  $x$  in the simulation by  $\mathcal{S}$  if and only if they would output  $x$  in a real execution with  $\mathcal{A}$ . First, consider the case that  $P_i$  is honest. In the protocol, an honest party outputs  $x$  if it received  $x$  in the first round and receives  $x$  from all other parties in the second round. Since  $P_i$  is honest, all honest parties indeed receive  $P_i$ 's input  $x$  in the first round. Furthermore,  $\mathcal{S}$  only delivers output from the trusted party to an honest party if this honest party receives all the second-round messages and they are all  $x$ , exactly as in the protocol. Therefore, the real and ideal executions are identical when  $P_i$  is honest.

Next, consider the case that  $P_i$  is corrupt. If  $P_i$ , controlled by  $\mathcal{A}$ , sends all the honest parties the same value  $x$  in the first round, then this is exactly the same as the case that  $P_i$  is honest. However, if  $P_i$  does not act in this way, then  $\mathcal{S}$  sends nothing to the trusted party. Thus, it remains to show that in a real execution with such a  $P_i$ , no honest party would output a value. If  $P_i$  sends two different messages in the first round (i.e., if there exist  $j$  and  $k$  such that  $x^j \neq x^k$ ), then by the protocol definition, all honest parties who output a value see both  $x^j$  and  $x^k$ . (Otherwise, they did not receive all second-round messages and so do not yet output anything.) Therefore, no honest party concludes with output. Thus, the real and ideal executions are also identical in the case that  $P_i$  is corrupt. This completes the proof. ■

In Section 6, we show how Proposition 3.2 is used to obtain universally composable protocols in a point-to-point network.

## 4 Secure Computation with Abort and No Fairness

In this section, we show that any protocol for secure computation (with unanimous abort and any level of fairness) that uses a broadcast channel can be “compiled” into a protocol for the point-to-point network that achieves secure computation with abort and no fairness. Furthermore, the fault tolerance of the compiled protocol is the same as the original one. Actually, we assume that the protocol is such that all parties terminate in the same round. We say that such a protocol has *simultaneous termination*. Without loss of generality, we also assume that all parties generate their output in the last round. The result of this section is formally stated in the following theorem:

**Theorem 1** *There exists a (polynomial-time) protocol compiler that takes any protocol  $\Pi$  (with simultaneous termination) for the broadcast model, and outputs a protocol  $\Pi'$  for the point-to-point model such that the following holds: If  $\Pi$  is a protocol for information-theoretic (resp., computational)  $t$ -secure computation with unanimous abort and any level of fairness, then  $\Pi'$  is a protocol for information-theoretic (resp., computational)  $t$ -secure computation with abort and no fairness.*

Combining Theorem 1 with known protocols (specifically, [35] and [25]<sup>8</sup>), we obtain the following corollaries:

**Corollary 2** (information-theoretic security – compilation of [35]): *For any probabilistic polynomial-time  $n$ -ary functionality  $f$ , there exists a protocol in the point-to-point model, for the information-theoretic  $n/2$ -secure computation of  $f$  with abort and no fairness.*

**Corollary 3** (computational security – compilation of [25]): *For any probabilistic polynomial-time  $n$ -ary functionality  $f$ , there exists a protocol in the point-to-point model, for the computational  $t$ -secure computation of  $f$  with abort and no fairness, for any  $t$ .*

We now proceed to prove Theorem 1.

**Proof of Theorem 1:** Intuitively, we construct a protocol for the point-to-point model from a protocol for the broadcast model, by having the parties in the point-to-point network simulate the broadcast channel. This simulation is not carried out using Byzantine Generals because this is not possible for  $t \geq n/3$ . Rather, it is simulated using a protocol for “broadcast with abort”, which as we have seen can be achieved for any  $t$ . Recall that in such a protocol, either the correct value is delivered to all parties, or some parties output  $\perp$ . The idea is to halt the computation in the case that any honest party receives  $\perp$  from a broadcast execution. The point at which the computation halts dictates which parties (if any) receive output. The key point is that if no honest party receives  $\perp$ , then the broadcast with abort protocol perfectly simulates a broadcast channel. Therefore, the result is that the original protocol (for the broadcast channel) is simulated perfectly until the point that it may prematurely halt.

### Components of the compiler:

1. Broadcast with abort executions: Each broadcast of the original protocol (using the assumed broadcast channel) is replaced with an execution of the broadcast with abort protocol.

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<sup>8</sup>Both the [35] and [25] protocols have simultaneous termination

2. **Blank rounds:** Following each broadcast with abort execution, a blank round is added in which no protocol messages are sent. Rather, these blank rounds are used to enable the parties to notify each other in the case that they abort. Specifically, if a party receives  $\perp$  in a broadcast with abort execution, then it sends  $\perp$  to all parties in the blank round that immediately follows and halts. Likewise, if a party receives  $\perp$  in a blank round, then it sends  $\perp$  to all parties in the next blank round and halts.

Thus each round of the original protocol is transformed into 3 rounds in the compiled protocol (2 rounds for broadcast with abort and an additional blank round). We now formally define the protocol compiler:

**Construction 3** (protocol compiler): *Given a protocol  $\Pi$ , the compiler produces a protocol  $\Pi'$ . The specification of protocol  $\Pi'$  is as follows:*

- *The parties use broadcast with abort in order to emulate each broadcast message of protocol  $\Pi$ . Each round of  $\Pi$  is expanded into 3 rounds in  $\Pi'$ : broadcast with abort is run in the first 2 rounds, and the third round is a blank round. Point-to-point messages of  $\Pi$  are sent unmodified in  $\Pi'$ . More exactly, the parties emulate  $\Pi$  according to the following instructions:*
  1. **Broadcasting messages:** *Let  $P_i$  be a party who is supposed to broadcast a message  $m$  in the  $j^{\text{th}}$  round of  $\Pi$ . Then, in the  $j^{\text{th}}$  broadcast simulation of  $\Pi'$  (i.e., in rounds  $3j$  and  $3j + 1$  of  $\Pi'$ ), all parties run an execution of broadcast with abort in which  $P_i$  plays the dealer role and sends  $m$ .*
  2. **Sending point-to-point messages:** *Any message that  $P_i$  is supposed to send to  $P_j$  over the point-to-point network in the  $j^{\text{th}}$  round of  $\Pi$  is sent by  $P_i$  to  $P_j$  over the point-to-point network in round  $3j$  of  $\Pi'$ .*
  3. **Receiving messages:** *For each message that party  $P_i$  is supposed to receive from a broadcast in  $\Pi$ , party  $P_i$  participates in an execution of broadcast with abort as a receiver. If its output from this execution is a message  $m$ , then it appends  $m$  to its view (to be used for determining its later steps according to  $\Pi$ ).  
If it receives  $\perp$  from this execution, then it sends  $\perp$  to all parties in the next round (i.e., in the blank round following the execution of broadcast with abort), and halts immediately thereafter.*
  4. **Blank rounds:** *If a party  $P_i$  receives  $\perp$  in a blank round, then it sends  $\perp$  to all parties in the next blank round and halts. In the 2 rounds preceding the next blank round, Party  $P_i$  does not send any point-to-point messages or messages belonging to a broadcast execution. (We note that if this blank round is the last round of the execution, then  $P_i$  simply halts.)*
  5. **Output:** *If a party  $P_i$  received  $\perp$  at any point in the execution (in an execution of broadcast with abort or in a blank round), then it outputs  $\perp$ . Otherwise, it outputs the value specified by  $\Pi$ .*

By the assumption in the theorem,  $\Pi$  is  $t$ -secure with unanimous abort (and any level of fairness). In order to prove that the compiled protocol  $\Pi'$  is  $t$ -secure with abort and no fairness, we first define a different transformation of  $\Pi$  to  $\tilde{\Pi}$  which is a hybrid protocol between  $\Pi$  and  $\Pi'$ . In particular,  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is still run in the broadcast model. However, it provides the adversary with the additional ability of prematurely halting honest parties. We now define the hybrid protocol  $\tilde{\Pi}$  and show that it is  $t$ -secure with abort and no fairness:

**Lemma 4.1** *Let  $\Pi$  be a protocol in the broadcast model that is computational (resp., information-theoretic)  $t$ -secure with unanimous abort and any level of fairness. Then, define protocol  $\tilde{\Pi}$  (also for the broadcast model) as follows:*

1. *Following each round of  $\Pi$ , add a blank round.*
2. *If in a blank round,  $P_i$  receives a  $\perp$  message, then  $P_i$  sends  $\perp$  to  $P_j$  for all  $j \neq i$  in the next blank round and halts.  $P_i$  also does not broadcast any message or send any point-to-point messages in the next round of  $\Pi$  (before the blank round where it sends all the  $\perp$  messages).*
3. *Apart from the above, the parties follow the instructions of  $\Pi$ .*
4. *Output: If a party  $P_i$  received  $\perp$  in any blank round, then it outputs  $\perp$ . Otherwise, it outputs the value specified by  $\Pi$ .*

*Then,  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is computational (resp., information-theoretic)  $t$ -secure with abort and no fairness.*

**Proof:** We prove this theorem for the case that  $\Pi$  is computationally  $t$ -secure with unanimous abort and partial fairness. The other cases (information theoretic security and security with complete fairness or no fairness) are proved in a similar way. Let  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  be a real-model adversary attacking  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Our aim is to construct an ideal-model simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  for  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . In order to do this, we must use the fact that for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  attacking protocol  $\Pi$ , there exists an ideal-model simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ . Unfortunately we cannot apply  $\mathcal{S}$  to  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  because  $\mathcal{S}$  is a simulator for protocol  $\Pi$  and  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  participates in protocol  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . We therefore first construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that attacks  $\Pi$  from the adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  that attacks  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . The construction of  $\mathcal{A}$  is such that the output distribution of an execution of  $\Pi$  with  $\mathcal{A}$  is very similar to the output distribution of an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . Having constructed  $\mathcal{A}$ , it is then possible to apply the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  that we know is guaranteed to exist. We therefore obtain a simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  for  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  by first “transforming”  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  into  $\mathcal{A}$  and then applying  $\mathcal{S}$ . As we will show, the resulting simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  is as required for  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Details follow.

We begin by defining the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who attacks  $\Pi$ . Adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  internally incorporates  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  and has internal communication with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  and external communication with the honest parties executing  $\Pi$ .

#### Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ for $\Pi$ :

- **Input:**  $\mathcal{A}$  receives an auxiliary input  $z$ , an input sequence  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$  and a series of random-tapes  $\{r_i\}_{i \in I}$ . (Recall that  $\mathcal{A}$  controls all the parties in the set  $I$ . Thus, corrupted party  $P_i$ 's input and random-tape equal  $x_i$  and  $r_i$ , respectively.)
- **Execution:**
  1. *Invoke  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ :*  $\mathcal{A}$  begins by invoking  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  upon auxiliary input  $z$ , input sequence  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$  and random-tapes  $\{r_i\}_{i \in I}$ .
  2. *Emulation before  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sends any  $\perp$  messages:*  $\mathcal{A}$  internally passes to  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  all the messages that it externally receives from the honest parties (through broadcast or point-to-point communication). Likewise,  $\mathcal{A}$  externally broadcasts in  $\Pi$  any message that  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  broadcasts in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , and  $\mathcal{A}$  externally sends  $P_j$  in  $\Pi$  any message that  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sends  $P_j$  in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ .
  3. *Emulation after  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sends a  $\perp$  message:* Once  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sends a  $\perp$  message in an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , the honest parties in  $\Pi$  and  $\tilde{\Pi}$  may behave differently (in particular, a party receiving  $\perp$  may continue to send messages in  $\Pi$ , whereas it would halt in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ ). Therefore,  $\mathcal{A}$  filters

messages sent by honest parties in  $\Pi$  so that  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ 's view equals what it would in an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . That is:

In the round of  $\Pi$  following the first  $\perp$  message sent by  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ , adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  forwards to  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  only the point-to-point and broadcast messages sent by a party  $P_j$  who did not receive  $\perp$  from  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  in the previous (simulated) blank round of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Furthermore,  $\mathcal{A}$  simulates for  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  the sending of all the  $\perp$  messages that would be sent in the next blank round of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  (if one exists), and halts.

4. *Output:*  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs whatever  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  does.

Before proceeding, we show that the only difference between an execution of  $\Pi$  with  $\mathcal{A}$ , and  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ , is that some additional honest parties may output  $\perp$  in the execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . That is, we claim that the joint distribution of the outputs of all parties not outputting  $\perp$  and the adversary is identical in  $\Pi$  and  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . We begin with some notation:

- Let  $\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})$  be the global output of an execution of  $\Pi$  with adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  with auxiliary input  $z$ , inputs  $\bar{x}$ , and random-tapes  $\bar{r}$  (i.e.,  $\bar{r} = (r_1, \dots, r_n)$  where  $P_i$  receives random-tape  $r_i$ ). (Thus,  $\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x}) = \{\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x}, U_{|\bar{r}|})\}$ .)
- For any subset  $J \subseteq [n]$ , denote by  $\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})|_J$ , the *restriction* of  $\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})$  to the outputs of  $\mathcal{A}$  and all parties  $P_j$  for  $j \in J$ . We stress that  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output is included in this restriction.
- In any execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , it is possible to divide the parties into those who output  $\perp$  and those who do not output  $\perp$ . We note that the set of parties outputting  $\perp$  is chosen by the adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  and is dependent solely on the auxiliary input  $z$  and the parties' inputs  $\bar{x}$  and random-tapes  $\bar{r}$ . We denote by  $J = J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})$  the set of parties who do not output  $\perp$  in an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  (and where the auxiliary input is  $z$  and the parties' inputs and random-tapes are  $\bar{x}$  and  $\bar{r}$ ). (Notice that  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}}$  is a deterministic function depending only on  $z$ ,  $\bar{x}$  and  $\bar{r}$ . This is because, without loss of generality, the adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  is deterministic.) We also denote by  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x})$  a random variable taking values over  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})$  for uniformly distributed  $\bar{r}$ .

We now consider the joint distribution of the outputs of the adversary and the parties in  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})$  (i.e., those not outputting  $\perp$ ). We claim that these distributions are identical in  $\Pi$  with  $\mathcal{A}$  and in  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . Using the above notation, we claim that for every adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  and set of corrupted parties  $I$ , for all auxiliary inputs  $z$ , and for all input and random-tape sequences  $\bar{x}$  and  $\bar{r}$ ,

$$\text{REAL}_{\Pi, I, \mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})} = \text{REAL}_{\tilde{\Pi}, I, \tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}, \bar{r})} \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathcal{A}$  is as defined above. We now prove Eq. (1). First, it is clear that  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ 's view in a real execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is identical to its view in the simulation by  $\mathcal{A}$ . Therefore,  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output in  $\Pi$  equals  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ 's output in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Next, notice that if there exists an honest party that does not output  $\perp$  in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , then it must be that  $\perp$  messages were sent in the last blank round only. However, this means that any honest party not receiving such a message has an identical view in  $\Pi$  and  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Therefore, the outputs of all such parties are identical in  $\Pi$  and  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Eq. (1) follows. We stress that the parties who output  $\perp$  in  $\tilde{\Pi}$  may have very different outputs in  $\Pi$  (and in particular may output their prescribed outputs). Nevertheless, at this stage we are only interested in those parties not outputting  $\perp$ .

We now proceed to construct a simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  for  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . Intuitively,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  works by using the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  for  $\mathcal{A}$ , where  $\mathcal{A}$  is derived from  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  as above. Recall that  $\mathcal{A}$  is an adversary for the secure protocol  $\Pi$ , and thus a simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  is guaranteed to exist for  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ :** First consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for  $\Pi$  constructed from the adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  as described above. By the security requirements of  $\Pi$ , for every adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists an ideal-model simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  for  $\mathcal{A}$ . Simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  for  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  works by emulating an ideal execution for this  $\mathcal{S}$ . This involves emulating the interaction that  $\mathcal{S}$  has with its trusted third party. Recall that  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  works in an ideal model for secure computation with abort and no fairness (i.e., according to Definition 5), whereas  $\mathcal{S}$  works in an ideal model for secure computation with unanimous abort and partial fairness (i.e., according to Definition 2). Thus, essentially  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  has “more power” than  $\mathcal{S}$ . Also, recall that where partial fairness holds, there are two cases depending on whether or not  $P_1$  is corrupted. If  $P_1$  is not corrupted, then essentially all parties receive output at the same time. If  $P_1$  is corrupted, then the adversary receives the corrupted parties’ outputs first and then decides whether the honest parties all receive output or all abort.

We now describe the simulator. Let  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ ’s auxiliary input be  $z$  and its input be a set of values  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ . Furthermore, let  $r$  be the contents of  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ ’s random tape. Then,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  sets  $\mathcal{S}$ ’s random tape to  $r$  and internally invokes  $\mathcal{S}$  upon auxiliary input  $z$  and input series  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ . Next,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  works as an intermediary between  $\mathcal{S}$  and the trusted party. That is,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  obtains the input values  $\{x'_i\}_{i \in I}$  sent by  $\mathcal{S}$  and externally sends these same values to the trusted party. Once  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  forwards these inputs to the trusted party, it receives back all the corrupted parties’ outputs (recall that  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  interacts in an ideal model with no fairness).  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  then forwards these outputs to  $\mathcal{S}$ . We distinguish two cases:

1.  *$P_1$  is not corrupted:* in this case,  $\mathcal{S}$  concludes its execution at this point, outputting some value.
2.  *$P_1$  is corrupted:* in this case,  $\mathcal{S}$  first instructs the trusted party to either send all the honest parties their outputs or send them all  $\perp$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  then concludes, outputting some value.

$\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  ignores the instruction sent to the trusted party in the second case, and sets its output to be whatever  $\mathcal{S}$  output. It remains to define the set  $J$  that  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  sends to the trusted party in the “trusted party answers remaining parties” stage of its ideal execution (recall that all honest parties in  $J$  receive their output and all others receive  $\perp$ ). First notice that the string output by  $\mathcal{S}$  is computationally indistinguishable to  $\mathcal{A}$ ’s output from a real execution. However, by the definition of  $\mathcal{A}$ , this output contains  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ ’s view of an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . Furthermore,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ ’s view fully defines which honest parties in an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  output  $\perp$  and which receive their output. In particular, if  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sent a  $\perp$  message before the last blank round, then all honest parties abort (and  $J = \emptyset$ ). Otherwise, all parties receive output except for those receiving  $\perp$  messages in the last blank round. Therefore,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  examines this view and defines the set  $J$  accordingly.<sup>9</sup> Once  $J$  is defined,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  sends it to the trusted party and halts. This completes the description of  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ .

We now wish to show that the output of an ideal execution with abort and no fairness with adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  is computationally indistinguishable to the output of a real execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . We begin by showing an analog to Eq. (1) in the ideal model. That is, we show that the outputs of parties not outputting  $\perp$  in an execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  are the same in an ideal execution (by Def. 2) with  $\mathcal{S}$  and in an ideal execution (by Def. 5) with  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ . Before claiming this formally, we introduce the following notation. Let  $\text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}^{(\alpha)}(\bar{x})$  denote the output of an ideal execution (by Definition  $\alpha$ ) with input series  $\bar{x}$  and where the ideal model adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ ’s auxiliary input and random tape equal  $z$  and  $r$ , respectively. Furthermore, for any subset  $J \subseteq [n]$ , let  $\text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}^{(\alpha)}(\bar{x})|_J$  be the restriction

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<sup>9</sup>This is the point in the proof where we need the original protocol to be such that all parties terminate simultaneously. Actually, it suffices that each party defines its output at a fixed and predetermined point. However, in such a case, simultaneous termination can anyway be achieved.

of  $\text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}^{(\alpha)}(\bar{x})$  to the output of  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  and the parties in  $J$ . Finally, let  $J = J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}(\bar{x})$  be the set of parties in the ideal execution with  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  who do not output  $\perp$  (this set is a deterministic function of  $z$ ,  $r$  and  $\bar{x}$ ), and let  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z)}(\bar{x})$  denote the associated random variable when  $r$  is chosen uniformly. Now, we claim that for every set  $I$ , every auxiliary input  $z$  and random tape  $r$  (for  $\mathcal{S}$  or  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ ), and every set of inputs  $\bar{x}$ ,

$$\text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}^{(5)}(\bar{x})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}(\bar{x})} = \text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\mathcal{S}(z,r)}^{(2)}(\bar{x})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z,r)}(\bar{x})} \quad (2)$$

where  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  are invoked with auxiliary input  $z$  and random-tape  $r$ . In order to see that Eq. (2) holds, notice the following. First,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  (upon auxiliary input  $z$ , random tape  $r$  and inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ ) sends exactly the same inputs to the trusted party as  $\mathcal{S}$  does (upon auxiliary input  $z$ , random tape  $r$  and inputs  $\{x_i\}_{i \in I}$ ). Next, the outputs of all honest parties not outputting  $\perp$  are fixed by  $\bar{x}$  and the inputs sent to the trusted party by the simulators  $\mathcal{S}$  or  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ . Therefore, if  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  send the same inputs, it follows that all parties not outputting  $\perp$  have exactly the same output. In addition,  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  outputs exactly the same string that  $\mathcal{S}$  outputs. Eq. (2) therefore follows.

By assumption,  $\Pi$  is computationally  $t$ -secure with unanimous abort and partial fairness. It therefore holds that for every set  $I \subset [n]$  such that  $|I| < t$ , and for every set  $J \subseteq [n]$

$$\left\{ \text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\mathcal{S}(z)}^{(2)}(\bar{x})|_J \right\}_{\bar{x},z} \stackrel{c}{\equiv} \left\{ \text{REAL}_{\Pi,I,\mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x})|_J \right\}_{\bar{x},z}$$

Next, notice that the sets  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}}$  and  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}}$  are fully defined given  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ 's outputs respectively. (Recall that  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}}$  equals the set of parties not outputting  $\perp$  in an ideal execution with  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ , and  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}}$  equals the set of parties not outputting  $\perp$  in a real execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ .) Furthermore, by the definitions of  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$ , it follows that their outputs also fully define  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}}$  and  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}}$ . Therefore,  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}}$  (resp.,  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}}$ ) is part of the global output  $\text{IDEAL}$  (resp.,  $\text{REAL}$ ). This implies that,

$$\left\{ \text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\mathcal{S}(z)}^{(2)}(\bar{x})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z)}(\bar{x})} \right\} \stackrel{c}{\equiv} \left\{ \text{REAL}_{\Pi,I,\mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x})} \right\} \quad (3)$$

(Otherwise, we could distinguish  $\text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\mathcal{S}(z)}^{(2)}(\bar{x})$  from  $\text{REAL}_{\Pi,I,\mathcal{A}(z)}(\bar{x})$  by considering the restriction to  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}}$  or to  $J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}}$ , respectively.) Combining Eq. (3) with Equations (1) and (2), we have that

$$\left\{ \text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z)}^{(5)}(\bar{x})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z)}(\bar{x})} \right\} \stackrel{c}{\equiv} \left\{ \text{REAL}_{\tilde{\Pi},I,\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x})|_{J_{\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x})} \right\}$$

It remains to show that the entire output distributions (including the honest parties *not* in  $J$ ) are computationally indistinguishable. However, this is immediate, because for every party  $P_i$  for which  $i \notin J$ , it holds that  $P_i$  outputs  $\perp$  (this is true for both the real and ideal executions). Therefore,

$$\left\{ \text{IDEAL}_{f,I,\tilde{\mathcal{S}}(z)}^{(5)}(\bar{x}) \right\} \stackrel{c}{\equiv} \left\{ \text{REAL}_{\tilde{\Pi},I,\tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}) \right\}$$

completing the proof of Lemma 4.1.  $\blacksquare$

Recall that our aim is to show the security of the compiled protocol  $\Pi'$  (and not  $\tilde{\Pi}$ ). However, intuitively, there is no difference between  $\tilde{\Pi}$  and  $\Pi'$ . The reason is as follows: the only difference between  $\Pi'$  and  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is that in  $\Pi'$  the adversary can cause a party  $P_i$  to receive  $\perp$  in a broadcast with abort execution. Now, when this happens,  $P_i$  sends  $\perp$  to all honest parties in the next blank round of  $\Pi'$ . However, the adversary for  $\tilde{\Pi}$  can just send  $\perp$  itself to all the honest parties in the next blank round. The same effect is therefore achieved. Formally:



**Lemma 4.2** *Let  $\Pi$  be any protocol in the broadcast model and let  $\tilde{\Pi}$  be the transformation of  $\Pi$  as described in Lemma 4.1. Then, for every real-model adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  for  $\Pi'$  of Construction 3, there exists a real-model adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  for  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , such that for every  $I \subset [n]$  with  $|I| < t$ ,*

$$\left\{ \text{REAL}_{\tilde{\Pi}, I, \tilde{\mathcal{A}}(z)}(\bar{x}) \right\} \equiv \left\{ \text{REAL}_{\Pi', I, \mathcal{A}'(z)}(\bar{x}) \right\}$$

**Proof:** We begin by describing the adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . Intuitively,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  works by simulating the executions of *broadcast with abort* for  $\mathcal{A}'$ . If a party receives  $\perp$  in  $\Pi'$  (in a broadcast with abort execution or in a blank round), then  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sends the appropriate  $\perp$  messages in a blank round of  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . This strategy works because in  $\Pi'$ , a party's output is the same if it receives  $\perp$  in a broadcast with abort execution or in the blank round that immediately follows it. Formally, adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  invokes  $\mathcal{A}'$  and in every round of the execution of  $\tilde{\Pi}$  works as follows:

1. *Receiving messages in rounds  $r, r + 1$ :*  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  receives the broadcast and point-to-point messages from the honest parties in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . For every message broadcast by an honest party,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  simulates a “broadcast with abort” execution, playing the honest parties' roles (where  $\mathcal{A}'$  plays the corrupted parties' roles). In addition,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  forwards any point-to-point messages unchanged to  $\mathcal{A}'$ .
2. *Sending messages in round  $r, r + 1$ :*  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  plays the honest parties' roles in “broadcast with abort” executions, in which  $\mathcal{A}'$  broadcasts messages to the honest parties. Consider a particular execution in which a corrupted party  $P$  plays the dealer. If all the honest parties receive  $\perp$  in this execution, then  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  broadcasts nothing in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ . However, if at least one honest party outputs a message  $m$ , then  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  broadcasts  $m$ . As before, point-to-point messages are forwarded unchanged.
3. *Blank round following round  $r + 1$ :* If an honest party  $P_i$  receives  $\perp$  in the simulated “broadcast with abort” execution of rounds  $r$  and  $r + 1$ , then  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  sends  $\perp$  to *all* the honest parties in this blank round.

At the conclusion of the execution,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  outputs whatever  $\mathcal{A}'$  does. This completes the description of  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ . The fact that  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  perfectly simulates an execution of  $\Pi'$  with  $\mathcal{A}'$  follows directly from the definition of  $\Pi'$ . That is, the only difference between  $\tilde{\Pi}$  and  $\Pi'$  is that in  $\Pi'$  the broadcast channel is replaced by broadcast with abort. This means that some parties may receive  $\perp$  instead of the broadcasted message. However, in this case,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  knows that this event occurred and can send  $\perp$  to all the honest parties in the following blank round, as would occur in an execution of  $\Pi'$ . The key point is that in  $\Pi'$  it *makes no difference* to an honest parties if it received  $\perp$  in a broadcast with abort execution or in the following blank round. We conclude that the outputs of all the honest parties and  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  in  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , are identically distributed to the outputs of the honest parties and  $\mathcal{A}'$  in  $\Pi'$ . ■

**Concluding the proof of Theorem 1:** Let  $\mathcal{A}'$  be an adversary attacking  $\Pi'$ . By Lemma 4.2, we have that there exists an adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  attacking  $\tilde{\Pi}$  such that the output distributions of  $\Pi'$  with  $\mathcal{A}'$ , and  $\tilde{\Pi}$  with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  are identical. Then, by Lemma 4.1, we have that for every real-model adversary  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  for  $\tilde{\Pi}$ , there exists an ideal-model simulator  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$  such that the output distribution of a real execution with  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  is computationally indistinguishable (or statistically close) to an ideal execution with abort and no fairness with  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ . We conclude that the output distribution of a real execution of  $\Pi'$  with

adversary  $\mathcal{A}'$  is computationally indistinguishable (or statistically close) to an ideal execution with abort and no fairness with  $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$ . That is,  $\Pi'$  is  $t$ -secure with abort and no fairness, as required. ■

**The complexity of protocol  $\Pi'$ :** We remark that the transformation of  $\Pi$  to  $\Pi'$  preserves the round complexity of  $\Pi$ . In particular, the number of rounds in  $\Pi'$  equals exactly 3 times the number of rounds in  $\Pi$ . Regarding the communication complexity (i.e., bandwidth), this is the same in  $\Pi$  and  $\Pi'$  except for the cost incurred in simulating the broadcast channel. Notice that in the “broadcast with abort” protocol, if a dealer sends a  $k$ -bit message, then the total bandwidth equals  $n \cdot k$ . (If the dealer cheats and sends “long” messages, then the bandwidth is upper-bound by the length of the longest acceptable message times  $n$ .) Therefore, the number of bits sent in an execution of  $\Pi'$  is at most  $n$  times that sent in an execution of  $\Pi$ .

## 5 Secure Computation with Abort and Partial Fairness

In this section we show that for any functionality  $f$ , there exists a protocol for the *computational*  $t$ -secure computation of  $f$  with abort and partial fairness, for any  $t$  (assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations). Furthermore, for any functionality  $f$ , there exists a protocol for the *information-theoretic*  $n/2$ -secure computation of  $f$  with abort and partial fairness (and without any complexity assumptions).

**Outline:** We begin by motivating why the strategy used in Section 4 to obtain secure computation with abort does not provide partial fairness. The problem lies in the fact that due to the use of a “broadcast with abort” protocol (and not a real broadcast channel), the adversary can disrupt messages that are broadcast by honest parties. Now, in the definition of security with abort and partial fairness, once an honest  $P_1$  receives its output, all honest parties must receive their output. Therefore, the adversary must not be allowed to disrupt the communication following the time that an honest  $P_1$  receives its output. If broadcast is utilized in the remainder of the protocol (as is indeed the case for known protocols), then the adversary will be able to disrupt the communication and prevent all other honest parties from receiving output.

We solve this problem here by having the parties compute a different functionality. This functionality is such that once  $P_1$  gets its output, it can supply all the other parties with their output directly and without broadcast. Of course, this functionality must not reveal anything about the other parties’ outputs to  $P_1$ . As a first attempt, consider what happens if instead of computing the original functionality  $f$ , the parties first compute the following:

**First attempt:**

*Inputs:*  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$

*Outputs:*

- Party  $P_1$  receives its own output  $f_1(\bar{x})$ . In addition, for every  $i > 1$ , it receives  $c_i = f_i(\bar{x}) \oplus r_i$  for a uniformly distributed  $r_i$ .
- For every  $i > 1$ , party  $P_i$  receives the string  $r_i$ .

That is, for each  $i > 1$ , party  $P_i$  receives a random pad  $r_i$  and  $P_1$  receives an “encryption” of  $f_i(\bar{x})$  with that random pad. Now, assume that the parties use a protocol that is secure with abort and *no* fairness in order to compute this new functionality. Then, there are two possible outcomes to such

a protocol execution: either all parties receive their prescribed output, or at least one honest party receives  $\perp$ . In the case that at least one honest party receives  $\perp$ , this party can notify  $P_1$  who can then immediately halt. The result is that no parties, including the corrupted ones, receive output (if  $P_1$  does not send the  $c_i$  values, then the parties only obtain  $r_i$  which contains no information on  $f_i(\bar{x})$ ). In contrast, if all parties received their prescribed output, then party  $P_1$  can send each party  $P_i$  its encryption  $c_i$ , allowing it to reconstruct the output by computing  $f_i(\bar{x}) = c_i \oplus r_i$ . The key point is that the adversary is unable to prevent  $P_1$  from sending these  $c_i$  values and no broadcast is needed in this last step. Of course, if  $P_1$  is corrupted, then it will learn all the corrupted parties' outputs first. However, under the definition of partial fairness, this is allowed.

The flaw in the above strategy arises in the case that  $P_1$  is corrupted. Specifically, a corrupted  $P_1$  can send the honest parties modified values, causing them to conclude with incorrect outputs. This is in contradiction to what is required of secure computation. Therefore, we modify the functionality that is computed so that a corrupted  $P_1$  is unable to cheat. In particular, the aim is to prevent the adversary from modifying  $c_i = f_i(\bar{x}) \oplus r_i$  without  $P_i$  detecting this modification. If the adversary can be restrained in this way, then it can choose not to deliver an output; however, any output delivered is guaranteed to be correct. The above-described aim can be achieved using standard (information-theoretic) authentication techniques, based on pairwise independent hash functions. That is, let  $\mathcal{H}$  be a family of pairwise independent hash functions  $h : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ . Then, the functionality that the parties compute is as follows:

**Functionality  $F$ :**

*Inputs:*  $\bar{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$

*Outputs:*

- Party  $P_1$  receives its own output  $f_1(\bar{x})$ . In addition, for every  $i > 1$ , it receives  $c_i = f_i(\bar{x}) \oplus r_i$  for a uniformly distributed  $r_i$ , and  $a_i = h_i(c_i)$  for  $h_i \in_R \mathcal{H}$ . (Note,  $P_1$  receives  $a_i$  but not the function description  $h_i$ .)
- For every  $i > 1$ , party  $P_i$  receives the string  $r_i$  and the description of the hash function  $h_i$ .

Notice that as in the first attempt,  $P_1$  learns nothing of the output of any honest  $P_i$  (since  $f_i(\bar{x})$  is encrypted with a random pad). Furthermore, if  $P_1$  attempts to modify  $c_i$  to  $c'_i$  in any way, then the probability that it will generate the correct authentication value  $a'_i = h_i(c'_i)$  is at most  $2^{-k}$  (by the pairwise independent properties of  $h_i$ ). Thus, the only thing a corrupt  $P_1$  can do is refuse to deliver the output. We now formally prove the above:

**Theorem 4** *For any probabilistic polynomial-time  $n$ -ary functionality  $f$ , there exists a protocol in the point-to-point model for the computational  $t$ -secure computation of  $f$  with abort and partial fairness, for any  $t$ . Furthermore, there exists a protocol in the point-to-point model for the information-theoretic  $n/2$ -secure computation of  $f$  with abort and partial fairness.*

**Proof:** We begin by describing the protocol for computing  $f$ , as motivated above.

**Protocol 4** (protocol for secure computation with abort and partial fairness for any  $f$ ):

1. **Stage 1 – computation:** *The parties use any protocol for secure (computational or information-theoretic) computation with abort and no fairness in order to compute the functionality  $F$*

defined above.<sup>10</sup> Thus,  $P_1$  receives  $f_1(\bar{x})$  and a pair  $(c_i, a_i)$  for every  $i > 1$ , and each  $P_i$  ( $i > 1$ ) receives  $(r_i, h_i)$  such that  $c_i = f_i(\bar{x}) \oplus r_i$  and  $a_i = h_i(c_i)$ .

2. **Stage 2 – blank round:** After the above protocol concludes, a blank-round is added so that if any party receives  $\perp$  for its output from Stage 1, then it sends  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in this blank round.
3. **Stage 3 – outputs:** If  $P_1$  received any  $\perp$ -messages in the blank round, then it sends  $\perp$  to all parties and halts outputting  $\perp$ . Otherwise, for every  $i$ , it sends  $(c_i, a_i)$  to  $P_i$  and halts, outputting  $f_1(\bar{x})$ .

Party  $P_i$  outputs  $\perp$  if it received  $\perp$  from  $P_1$  (it ignores any  $\perp$  it may receive from other parties). If it received  $(c_i, a_i)$  from  $P_1$  (and not  $\perp$ ), then it checks that  $a_i = h_i(c_i)$ . If yes, it outputs  $f_i(\bar{x}) = c_i \oplus r_i$ . Otherwise, it outputs  $\perp$ .

Intuitively, the security of Protocol 4 with abort and partial fairness is derived from the fact that Stage 1 is run using a protocol that is secure with abort (even though it has no fairness property). Consider the two cases regarding whether or not  $P_1$  is corrupted:

1.  $P_1$  is corrupt: in this case,  $\mathcal{A}$  receives all the outputs of the corrupted parties first. Furthermore,  $\mathcal{A}$  can decide exactly which parties to give output to and which not. However, this is allowed in the setting of secure computation with abort and partial fairness, and so is fine. We stress that  $\mathcal{A}$  cannot cause an honest party to output any value apart from  $\perp$  or its correct output. This is because the authentication properties of pairwise independent hash functions guarantee that  $\mathcal{A}$  does not modify  $c_i$ , and the correctness of the protocol of Stage 1 guarantees that  $c_i \oplus r_i$  equals the correct output  $f_i(\bar{x})$ .
2.  $P_1$  is honest: there are two possible cases here; either some honest party received  $\perp$  in the computation of Stage 1 or all honest parties received their correct outputs. If some honest party received  $\perp$ , then this party sends  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in Stage 2 and thus no parties (including the corrupted parties) receive output. (Similarly, if  $\mathcal{A}$  sends  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in Stage 2 then no parties receive output.) In contrast, if all honest parties received their outputs and  $\mathcal{A}$  does not send  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in Stage 2, then all parties receive outputs and the adversary cannot cause any honest party to abort. We therefore have that in this case complete fairness is achieved, as required.

In order to formally prove the security of the protocol, we use the sequential composition theorem of [8]. This theorem states that we can consider a model which is a hybrid of the ideal and real models. In this hybrid model, the parties all interact with a trusted party for the computation of Stage 1 (where the ideal model for this computation is that of secure computation with abort and no fairness). Then, Stages 2 and 3 take place as in a real execution. The result is a protocol that is a hybrid of real and ideal executions. In order to prove the security of the (real) protocol, it suffices to construct an ideal-model simulator for the hybrid protocol. Thus, the description of the parties and adversary below relate to this hybrid model (the parties send messages to each other, as in a real execution, and to a trusted party, as in an ideal execution). The proof of [8] is stated for secure computation without abort (and complete fairness); however it holds also for secure computation with abort and no fairness.

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary attacking Protocol 4 in the above-described hybrid model. We construct an adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  who works in the ideal model for  $f$  with abort and partial fairness.  $\mathcal{S}$  internally

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<sup>10</sup>By Corollaries 2 and 3 in Section 4, appropriate protocols exist. That is, information-theoretic secure protocols exist for  $t < n/2$ . Furthermore, assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations, computational secure protocols exist for any  $t$ .

incorporates  $\mathcal{A}$  and simulates the hybrid execution for  $\mathcal{A}$ . Therefore,  $\mathcal{S}$  has *external* communication with the trusted party of its ideal model and *internal*, simulated communication with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . In our description of  $\mathcal{S}$ , we differentiate between the cases that  $P_1$  is corrupt and  $P_1$  is honest:

1.  $P_1$  is corrupt:  $\mathcal{S}$  invokes  $\mathcal{A}$  and receives the inputs that  $\mathcal{A}$  intends to send to the trusted party of the hybrid model. Then,  $\mathcal{S}$  externally sends these inputs unmodified to the trusted party of its ideal model for computing  $f$ . If the inputs are not valid, then in the hybrid model all parties receive  $\perp$  as output. Therefore,  $\mathcal{S}$  internally hands  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  as its output from Stage 1 and simulates all honest parties sending  $\perp$  in Stage 2 (as would occur in a hybrid execution).  $\mathcal{S}$  then halts, outputting whatever  $\mathcal{A}$  does. Otherwise, if the inputs are valid,  $\mathcal{S}$  receives all the corrupted parties outputs  $\{f_i(\bar{x})\}_{i \in I}$  (this is the case because  $\mathcal{S}$  controls  $P_1$  and by partial fairness, when  $P_1$  is corrupt the adversary receives the corrupted parties' outputs first).  $\mathcal{S}$  then constructs the corrupted parties' outputs from Stage 1 that  $\mathcal{A}$  expects to see in the hybrid execution.  $\mathcal{S}$  defines  $P_1$ 's output as follows: First,  $P_1$ 's personal output is  $f_1(\bar{x})$ . Next, for every corrupted party  $P_i$ , party  $P_1$ 's output contains the pair  $(c_i = f_i(\bar{x}) \oplus r_i, h_i(c_i))$  for  $r_i \in_R \{0, 1\}^k$  and  $h_i \in_R \mathcal{H}$ . Finally, for every honest party  $P_j$ , party  $P_1$ 's output contains a pair  $(c_j, a_j)$  where  $c_j, a_j \in_R \{0, 1\}^k$ . This defines  $P_1$ 's output. We now define how  $\mathcal{S}$  constructs the other corrupted parties' outputs: for every corrupted  $P_i$ , simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  defines  $P_i$ 's output to equal  $(r_i, h_i)$  where these are the values used in preparing the corresponding pair  $(c_i, h_i(c_i))$  in  $P_1$ 's output. (We note that  $\mathcal{S}$  can prepare these values because it knows  $f_i(\bar{x})$  for every corrupted party  $P_i$ .)  $\mathcal{S}$  then internally passes  $\mathcal{A}$  all of these outputs. In the hybrid model, after receiving the outputs from Stage 1,  $\mathcal{A}$  sends a set  $J'$  to the trusted party instructing it to give outputs to the parties specified in this set (all other parties receive  $\perp$ ).  $\mathcal{S}$  obtains this set  $J'$  from  $\mathcal{A}$  and records it.

$\mathcal{S}$  continues by simulating  $P_l$  sending  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in the blank round, for every honest party  $P_l$  for which  $l \notin J'$  (as would occur in a hybrid execution). Then, in the last stage,  $\mathcal{A}$  (controlling  $P_1$ ) sends to each honest party  $P_j$  a pair  $(c'_j, a'_j)$  or  $\perp$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  receives these strings and defines the set of parties  $J$  to receive outputs to equal those parties in  $J'$  to whom  $\mathcal{A}$  sends the same  $(c_j, a_j)$  that  $\mathcal{S}$  gave  $\mathcal{A}$  in Stage 1. (These are the parties who do not see  $\perp$  in the execution and whose checks of Stage 3 succeed; they therefore do not abort.)  $\mathcal{S}$  concludes by externally sending  $J$  to the ideal-model trusted party and outputting whatever  $\mathcal{A}$  does.

2.  $P_1$  is honest: In this case,  $\mathcal{S}$  begins in the same way. That is,  $\mathcal{S}$  invokes  $\mathcal{A}$  and receives the inputs that  $\mathcal{A}$  intends to send the trusted party of the hybrid model. However, unlike in the previous case,  $\mathcal{S}$  does not forward these inputs to its trusted party; rather it just records them.<sup>11</sup> (If any of these inputs are invalid, then  $\mathcal{S}$  internally sends  $\perp$  to all corrupted parties, externally sends invalid inputs to the trusted party and halts. In the sequel, we assume that all inputs sent by  $\mathcal{A}$  are valid.) Now,  $\mathcal{A}$  expects to receive outputs from Stage 1 before it sends the trusted party the set  $J'$  of honest parties receive output from Stage 1. However,  $\mathcal{S}$  does *not* have the corrupted parties' outputs yet. Fortunately, when  $P_1$  is not corrupted,  $\mathcal{S}$  can perfectly simulate the corrupted parties outputs from Stage 1 by merely providing them with  $(r_i, h_i)$  where  $r_i \in_R \{0, 1\}^k$  and  $h_i \in_R \mathcal{H}$ . After internally passing  $\mathcal{A}$  the simulated corrupted parties' outputs,  $\mathcal{S}$  obtains a set  $J'$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ , instructing the trusted party of the hybrid model which parties should receive output.

<sup>11</sup> $\mathcal{S}$  cannot forward the inputs to the trusted party yet, because in the model of partial fairness as soon as it does this all parties receive output. However, in the execution of Protocol 4,  $\mathcal{A}$  can cause the execution to abort at a later stage.

$\mathcal{S}$  continues by simulating Stages 2 and 3 of the protocol. As above,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates every honest party  $P_l$  for which  $l \notin J'$  sending  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in Stage 2. Furthermore,  $\mathcal{S}$  obtains any messages sent by  $\mathcal{A}$  in this stage. If  $\mathcal{A}$  sends  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in Stage 2, then  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates  $P_1$  sending  $\perp$  to all parties, sends invalid inputs to the trusted party and halts. Likewise, if  $J'$  does not contain *all* the honest parties, then  $\mathcal{S}$  internally simulates  $P_1$  sending  $\perp$  to all the corrupted parties, and externally sends invalid inputs to the trusted party. (These cases correspond to the case that no parties receive their prescribed output.)

In contrast, if  $J'$  contains all the honest parties (i.e., no honest party received  $\perp$  from Stage 1) and  $\mathcal{A}$  did not send  $\perp$  to  $P_1$  in Stage 2 of the simulation, then  $\mathcal{S}$  externally sends the trusted party the inputs that it recorded from  $\mathcal{A}$  above, receiving back all of the corrupted parties outputs  $\{f_i(\bar{x})\}_{i \in I}$ . Then, for each corrupted party's output  $f_i(\bar{x})$ , simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  generates the pair that corrupted  $P_i$  would see in a hybrid execution. In particular, previously in the simulation  $\mathcal{S}$  provided  $P_i$  with a pair  $(r_i, h_i)$  where  $r_i \in_R \{0, 1\}^k$  and  $h_i \in_R \mathcal{H}$ . Now,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates  $P_1$  sending corrupted party  $P_i$  the pair  $(c_i, a_i)$  where  $c_i = f_i(\bar{x}) \oplus r_i$  and  $a_i = h_i(c_i)$ . ( $\mathcal{S}$  can do this because it knows the random-pad  $r_i$  and the hash function  $h_i$ .) Finally,  $\mathcal{S}$  outputs whatever  $\mathcal{A}$  does and halts.

The fact that the global output in the ideal execution with  $\mathcal{S}$  is identically distributed to the global output in a hybrid execution with  $\mathcal{A}$  is derived from the following observations. First,  $\mathcal{A}$ 's outputs from Stage 1 can be perfectly simulated, both when  $P_1$  is corrupt and when  $P_1$  is honest. Second, the honest parties' messages in Stage 2 can be perfectly simulated given only the set  $J'$  sent by  $\mathcal{A}$  to the hybrid-model trusted party in the ideal execution of Stage 1. Therefore,  $\mathcal{A}$ 's view in the hybrid-model execution is identical to its view in a real execution. It remains to show that the honest parties' outputs are also correctly distributed.

First, consider the case that  $P_1$  is corrupt. In this case, with overwhelming probability, the set of honest parties receiving output in the real model are exactly those parties  $P_j$  for whom  $P_1$  (controlled by  $\mathcal{A}$ ) sends the exact pair  $(c_j, a_j)$  that it received as output from Stage 1 (and who did not see  $\perp$  at any time in the execution). This is due to the authentication properties of pairwise independent hash functions. Likewise, in the ideal-model simulation,  $\mathcal{S}$  designates these same parties to be the ones receiving output. Therefore, except with negligible probability, the set  $J$  sent by  $\mathcal{S}$  to the trusted party contains exactly those parties who would receive output in a real execution.

Next, consider the case that  $P_1$  is honest. In this case, all parties receive output unless  $P_1$  sees  $\perp$  in Stage 2. This can happen if  $\mathcal{A}$  sends  $P_1$  such a value, or if any honest party received  $\perp$  from Stage 1. Both of these cases are detected by  $\mathcal{S}$  in the hybrid-model simulation, and therefore the case that all parties abort in the hybrid model corresponds to this case in the real model (and likewise for the case that all parties receive output). This completes the proof of Theorem 4  $\blacksquare$

## 6 The Composition of Secure Protocols

As we have discussed, one of our main aims in this research was to obtain secure protocols in the point-to-point network model that compose. (Of course, achieving secure computation without a trusted setup phase is also of importance. However, prior to this work, the possibility of obtaining secure protocols that compose was unknown, even assuming a trusted setup phase.) The notion of composition that we consider here is where the same protocol is run many times by the same set of parties. We consider both parallel composition (where all protocol executions begin at the

same time and proceed in a synchronized fashion) and concurrent composition (where the adversary controls both when protocols begin and at which rate they proceed).

We obtain secure protocols that compose in the point-to-point model by applying the results of Sections 3.2 and 5 to known protocols for the broadcast model. Before beginning we remark that Theorem 4 actually provides a transformation of *any* generic secure protocol. That is, any generic protocol for the broadcast model that is secure with abort and no fairness can be transformed into an analogous protocol for the point-to-point model, where the resulting protocol is secure with abort and partially fair. (The theorem was not stated in this way so that it would not be overly cumbersome.) The presentation in this section is rather informal; in particular, we do not formally define what is meant by protocol composition. We now present the results:

**Concurrent composition for  $t < n/2$ .** The broadcast-model protocol of [35] for the information-theoretic  $n/2$ -secure computation of any functionality has been shown to compose concurrently [9]. Therefore, Theorem 4 actually demonstrates the feasibility of obtaining secure protocols (with abort and partial fairness) that *compose concurrently*.

**Parallel composition for  $t \geq n/2$ .** A variant of the protocol of [25] for the broadcast model can be shown to compose in parallel. Specifically, consider a variant of [25] where the only rewinding that is carried out by the ideal-model simulator is in simulating zero-knowledge proofs and extracting witnesses from proofs of knowledge (we note that the protocol as described in [22] has this property). Then, if the zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of knowledge used compose in parallel, it follows that the entire secure protocol composes in parallel. It remains to demonstrate the existence of zero-knowledge proofs and proofs of knowledge that compose in parallel. The existence of zero-knowledge proofs that compose in parallel was proven in [23]. In contrast, we do not know of any published theorem stating the existence of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that composes in parallel (i.e., for which knowledge extraction succeeds even in the setting of parallel composition). Nevertheless, it is not difficult to show that the knowledge extractors for standard zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of  $\mathcal{NP}$  (e.g., [24, 6]) succeed under parallel composition. Given this observation, it is not difficult to obtain zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for which both the simulation and extraction succeed under parallel composition.<sup>12</sup> We thus conclude that in the broadcast model, there exist secure protocols for  $t \geq n/2$  that compose in parallel. By applying Theorem 4 to such protocols, we obtain secure protocols with abort and partial fairness in the point-to-point model that *compose in parallel*.

We remark that it is currently unknown whether or not concurrent composition can be achieved for the case of  $t \geq n/2$  (irrespective of the use of a broadcast channel).

**Universal composability for any  $t$ .** In Section 3.2, we showed that the ideal broadcast functionality can be securely realized in the framework of universal composability. Recall that in this framework, a completely asynchronous point-to-point network is considered and output delivery is not guaranteed. We now apply Proposition 3.2 (proven in Section 3.2) in order to obtain universally composable secure computation without a broadcast channel.

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<sup>12</sup>One possibility is to use a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in which the prover commits to a witness using a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Next, the prover proves a strong witness indistinguishable [21] proof of knowledge that it knows the decommitment. Finally, the prover proves that the committed value is indeed a valid witness, using a zero-knowledge proof of membership. The strong witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge can be obtained by many repetitions of the protocols of [24] or [6], and the zero-knowledge proof of membership used can be that of [23]. Parallel simulation and extraction are therefore obtained. We remark that this structure of a proof of knowledge was used in [1, Section 5.3]; see there for more details.

We first consider the scenario where a majority of the parties are honest, but this majority may be less than  $2/3$  (i.e.,  $n/3 \leq t < n/2$ ). For this range of corruptions, [9] (building on [35]) showed that universally composable protocols exist for any functionality, assuming that the parties are given access to an ideal broadcast functionality. Combining this with Proposition 3.2 we have that universally composable protocols exist for any functionality in the point-to-point model.

Next, we consider the setting of an honest *minority*. In this setting, universal composability cannot be achieved in the plain model [10, 9]. Nevertheless, it has been shown that in the common reference string model,<sup>13</sup> it is possible to securely compute any functionality in an asynchronous network with a *broadcast channel* [13]. Therefore, by combining this with Proposition 3.2, we obtain universally composable protocols for any multi-party functionality in an asynchronous point-to-point network augmented by a common reference string. We remark that the lower bound of [31] with respect to the composition of authenticated Byzantine agreement holds also in the common reference string model.

We conclude by noting that the above results on the composition of secure protocols are incomparable. On the one hand, the notion of composition considered in the framework of universal composability is very strong. In particular, it guarantees security when a protocol is run concurrently with arbitrary other protocols and arbitrary sets of parties. However, this result requires a common reference string to achieve. On the other hand, the type of composition discussed first is rather weak and only considers the case of the same protocol being run many times by a single set of parties. Furthermore, for the case of  $t \geq n/2$ , only parallel composition is obtained.

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<sup>13</sup>In this model, all the parties are given a common, public reference string that is ideally chosen from a given distribution.



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## A An Overview of the Universal Composition Framework

In this appendix we provide a brief overview of the framework of universal composability; for more details see [9]. The framework provides a rigorous method for defining the security of cryptographic tasks, while ensuring that security is maintained under a general composition operation in which a secure protocol for the task in question is run in a system concurrently with an unbounded number of other arbitrary protocols. This composition operation is called **universal composition**, and tasks that fulfill the definitions of security in this framework are called **universally composable (UC)**.

As in other general definitions (e.g., [26, 32, 2, 8]), the security requirements of a given task (i.e., the functionality expected from a protocol that carries out the task) are captured via a set of instructions for a “trusted party” that obtains the inputs of the participants and provides them with the desired outputs (in one or more iterations). We call the algorithm run by the trusted party an **ideal functionality**. Informally, a protocol securely carries out a given task if any adversary can gain nothing more from an attack on a real execution of the protocol, than from an attack on an ideal process where the parties merely hand their inputs to a trusted party with the appropriate functionality and obtain their outputs from it, without any other interaction. In other words, we

require that a real execution can be *emulated* in the above ideal process (where the meaning of *emulation* is described below). We stress that in a real execution of the protocol, no trusted party exists and the parties interact amongst themselves only.

In order to prove the universal composition theorem, the notion of emulation in this framework is considerably stronger than in previous ones. Traditionally, the model of computation includes the parties running the protocol, plus an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that controls the communication channels and potentially corrupts parties. Emulation means that for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  attacking a real protocol execution, there should exist an “ideal process adversary” or simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , that causes the outputs of the parties in the ideal process to be essentially the same as the outputs of the parties in a real execution. In the universally composable framework, an additional adversarial entity called the **environment**  $\mathcal{Z}$  is introduced. This environment generates the inputs to all parties, reads all outputs, and in addition interacts with the adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. (As is hinted by its name,  $\mathcal{Z}$  represents the external environment that consists of arbitrary protocol executions that may be running concurrently with the given protocol.) A protocol is said to **securely realize** a given ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$  if for any “real-life” adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that interacts with the protocol there exists an “ideal-process adversary”  $\mathcal{S}$ , such that *no environment*  $\mathcal{Z}$  can tell whether it is interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$  and parties running the protocol, or with  $\mathcal{S}$  and parties that interact with  $\mathcal{F}$  in the ideal process. (In a sense, here  $\mathcal{Z}$  serves as an “interactive distinguisher” between a run of the protocol and the ideal process with access to  $\mathcal{F}$ . See [9] for more motivating discussion on the role of the environment.) Note that the definition requires the “ideal-process adversary” (or simulator)  $\mathcal{S}$  to interact with  $\mathcal{Z}$  throughout the computation. Furthermore,  $\mathcal{Z}$  cannot be “rewound”.

The following *universal composition theorem* is proven in [9]: Consider a protocol  $\pi$  that operates in a *hybrid* model of computation where parties can communicate as usual, and in addition have ideal access to an unbounded number of copies of some ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$ . (This model is called the  $\mathcal{F}$ -hybrid model.) Furthermore, let  $\rho$  be a protocol that securely realizes  $\mathcal{F}$  as sketched above, and let  $\pi^\rho$  be the “composed protocol”. That is,  $\pi^\rho$  is identical to  $\pi$  with the exception that each interaction with the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$  is replaced with a call to (or an activation of) an appropriate instance of the protocol  $\rho$ . Similarly,  $\rho$ -outputs are treated as values provided by the functionality  $\mathcal{F}$ . The theorem states that in such a case,  $\pi$  and  $\pi^\rho$  have essentially the same input/output behavior. Thus,  $\rho$  behaves just like the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$ , even when composed with an arbitrary protocol  $\pi$ . A special case of this theorem states that if  $\pi$  securely realizes some ideal functionality  $\mathcal{G}$  in the  $\mathcal{F}$ -hybrid model, then  $\pi^\rho$  securely realizes  $\mathcal{G}$  from scratch.

The standard network model considered for this framework is one where the adversary sees all the messages sent, and delivers or blocks these messages at will. Note that although the adversary may block messages, it cannot modify messages sent by honest parties (i.e., the communication lines are ideally authenticated). Thus, real executions take place in an ideally authenticated asynchronous network. However, unlike other ideal model definitions, the adversary also delivers (or blocks) messages between the honest parties and the trusted party/ideal functionality. Among other things, this implies that output delivery is not guaranteed and that there is no fairness.