Protecting against Key Exposure:
Strongly Key-Insulated Encryption
with Optimal Threshold

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June 9, 2002

Abstract

A new framework for protection against key exposure was recently suggested by Dodis et. al. [16]. We take its realization further towards practice by presenting simple new schemes that provide benefits over previous ones in terms of scalability, performance and security. Our first contribution is a simple, practical, scalable scheme called SKIE-OT that achieves the best possible security in their framework. SKIE-OT is based on the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [10] and exploits algebraic properties of the latter. We also present a general transform which can be applied to yield alternative practical schemes with the same security characteristics as SKIE-OT, starting from other IBE schemes such as that of Cocks [14]. Finally, we show that the role of identity-based encryption is not coincidental by proving that IBE is equivalent to (not strongly) key-insulated encryption with optimal threshold and allowing random-access key updates.

Keywords: Key exposure, key update, encryption, identity-based encryption.

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1 Introduction

Intrusion is an important threat to many real-world computer systems that, if anything, is growing: CERT reports that we are seeing an increase in the speed, automation and sophistication of attacks, coupled with an increase in the frequency of vulnerability reports that makes it more difficult for system administrators to keep up to date with patches [13]. In this environment, the most important threat to the security of public-key encryption in practice is exposure of the decryption key due to compromise of the underlying system.

A new framework for protection against key exposure was recently suggested by Dodis et. al. [16]. We take its realization further towards practice by presenting simple new schemes that provide benefits over previous ones in terms of scalability, performance and security.

KEY-UPDATING SCHEMES AND THEIR SECURITY PARAMETERS. Splitting a decryption key into shares stored on different devices may make key exposure harder but also entails distributing the decryption operation (cf. [19, 12]), which is not always practical. A *key-updating encryption scheme* [16] combines key splitting with key evolution ideas as used in forward-secure signatures [2, 4], with the aim of obtaining some of the security benefits of splitting while leaving decryption a stand-alone user operation. Initialization involves providing an auxiliary *helper* (this could be a smartcard or a remote device) with a *master helper key hsk* and the user with a *stage 0 user secret key* usk_0. The user's public encryption key pk is treated like that of an ordinary encryption scheme with regard to certification, but its lifetime is divided into stages $i = 1, 2, \ldots, N$, with encryption in stage i performed as a function of pk, i and the plaintext, and decryption in stage i performed by the user using a *stage i user secret key* usk_i that is obtained by the following key-update process performed at the start of stage i: first, the helper sends to the user, over a secure channel, a *stage i helper key* hsk_i computed as a function of hsk and i; second, the user computes usk_i as a function of usk_{i-1} and hsk_i; and third, the user discards (erases) usk_{i-1}. The security intent is that: (1) if the helper is not compromised, user secret keys for more than t different stages must be exposed to compromise ciphertexts encrypted for any other stage, and (2) even if the helper is compromised, the user secret key of at least one stage must be exposed to compromise a ciphertext. The terminology of [16] is that a scheme satisfying (1) is *key insulated with threshold t* while a scheme satisfying both (1) and (2) is *strongly key insulated with threshold t.*[1]

PREVIOUS SCHEMES AND THEIR SCALABILITY. For any given value of the threshold parameter t, Dodis et. al. [16] present a strongly key-insulated encryption scheme with threshold t.[2] However it has costs proportional to t. Namely, the public key consists of $3t$ elements in a group whose discrete logarithm problem must be hard, while encryption in stage i requires $t^2 \lg(i)$ group multiplications (plus a few exponentiations). We suggest that this dependence on t represents a lack of scalability and leads to costs that could be prohibitive in practice. Here are some arguments to support this view.

First, the desired security threshold t depends on the particulars of the application, including the frequency of updates and the total number of stages. These parameters may not be known in advance to the scheme designer. Furthermore, they may change with time as the security demands of the application change, in which case usage of a scheme such as the above would require the application to certify a new public key for each such parameter change. Second, a realistic risk

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[1] Both these notions can be considered under either chosen-plaintext or chosen-ciphertext attack, but we consider only the latter due to the growing consensus that this is the more appropriate in practice [8, 38, 34, 23, 37]. Section 2 presents formalizations of the notions of security in detail.

[2] They have numerous schemes but only one secure against chosen-ciphertext attack. It is based on [15] and is the one to which we refer.

assessment leads one to desire security with a large value of t. The reason is that once the user's system is compromised, it is likely to stay compromised through numerous successive stages, until such time as the compromise is discovered, the hole is patched, the intruder is evicted, and the system is rebooted. As an example, suppose the public key is valid for a year and updates are performed once per hour. If we want to give a system a day to recover from compromise, and we want to tolerate 10 different compromises in the year, then t must be at least $10 \cdot 24 = 240$. The size of the public key in the above-mentioned scheme of [16] is then $3 \cdot 240 = 720$ group elements, which is quite prohibitive.

OUR TARGET. We suggest that in order to have a practical realization of key-updating encryption, we should target a scheme that is strongly key insulated with *optimal threshold*. This means that regardless of the number of user stages that are compromised, ciphertexts intended for any uncompromised stage remain secure. (This is the case where the helper is uncompromised, meaning it replaces condition (1) discussed above. Condition (2) stays the same as before.) This must be true even if the total number of user stages is not known in advance and may depend on the adversary. Notice that a scheme with this property is automatically scalable. There is no threshold parameter in the picture, and since the total number of stages is not fixed, the key sizes and the costs of encryption and decryption will not depend on the threshold or the total number of stages. With such a design, an application can dynamically change its update frequency and yet be able to tolerate compromise of the maximum possible number of user stages. The next question is how to design such a scheme.

WHY IBE ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. Recall that in an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [36], an entity's public key is its identity i, and a trusted authority, holding a master key s, can issue to this entity a secret decryption key s_i computed as a function of s and i. The security attribute is that encryption under the public key of an entity remains secure even in the face of exposure of the secret keys of any number of other entities. Such IBE schemes have been designed in [10, 14].

As noted in [16], any IBE scheme can be converted into a key-insulated encryption scheme in the following trivial way: let the master helper key be master key s of the IBE scheme, and let the user's stage i secret key be s_i, which is computed by the helper, using s, and sent to the user, at the start of stage i. This key-insulated scheme has optimal threshold, but as [16] go on to point out, it not *strongly* key insulated. Indeed, if the helper is compromised the master key s is revealed, and then the adversary can compute the user secret key for any stage. This means there is a single point of failure for the system, exactly what key splitting was supposed to avoid in the first place.

Although IBE does not directly yield a strongly key-insulated scheme with optimal threshold, our results illustrate that it plays a central (and unavoidable) role in the design of such schemes.

THE SKIE-OT SCHEME. In Section 3 we present a key-updating scheme called SKIE-OT that is strongly key insulated with optimal threshold. SKIE-OT is based on the secure against chosen-ciphertext attack version of the Weil-pairing based Boneh-Franklin [10] identity-based encryption scheme (BF-IBE), and exploits the algebraic structure of the latter. Key sizes in SKIE-OT are the same as in BF-IBE (quite short), and encryption and decryption in SKIE-OT have the same cost as in BF-IBE, meaning each is roughly three exponentiations plus some hashing.

We validate the security of SKIE-OT via proofs which show that SKIE-OT is secure (meaning strongly key insulated with optimal threshold) as long as the underlying BF-IBE scheme is secure (meaning a secure identity-based encryption scheme under chosen-ciphertext attack as per the definition of [10]). In particular, since Boneh and Franklin have shown that the BF-IBE scheme is secure in the random oracle model of [5] under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (bilinear DH) assumption, the same assumptions suffice to guarantee security of SKIE-OT.

SKIE-OT, like all the schemes in [16], allows "random-access key updates." Namely, for any $i \geq 1$ and $j \geq 0$, the user, given usk_j and hsk_i, can compute usk_i in polynomial time. (In particular, it does not need hsk_l for $l \neq i$.)

We remark that our design is simple, based on appropriately combining different known techniques rather than introducing any fundamentally novel technique. (We suggest, however, that the problem itself is nontrivial, and that our ability to provide a simple effective solution at this stage is in large part due to the availability of the powerful tools recently introduced by Boneh and Franklin [10].) However, for practical purposes it is important to note the solution and provide the supporting security analyses.

A GENERAL STRENGTHENING TRANSFORM. A second contribution of this paper is a general "strengthening" transform presented in Section 4. Given any (not strongly) key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold, and also given any standard secure (against chosen-ciphertext attack) public-key encryption scheme (eg. [6, 9, 15]), our transform combines them to produce a *strongly* key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold. (The constructed scheme treats the constituent ones as black boxes.) The security of the constructed scheme is proven assuming the security of the two component schemes.

This provides a generic way to obtain a strongly key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold from an IBE scheme. (Apply the transform with the base key-insulated encryption scheme being the one trivially derived from the IBE scheme as discussed above.) Applying this to the IBE scheme of Cocks [14] (whose algebra, unlike that of the BF-IBE scheme, does not seem easily exploitable for strongly key-insulated encryption) yields another strongly key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold. (Of course the transform could also be applied starting with BF-IBE, but we don't gain anything because the scheme given by the transform ends up being less efficient than SKIE-OT).

AN EQUIVALENCE RESULT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. A third contribution of this paper is a result that, although more on the theoretical side, helps shed light on the above. We have already seen that any IBE scheme trivially yields a (not strongly) key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold. But perhaps key-insulated encryption is easier than IBE. It turns out that it is not. Theorem 5.1 says that IBE is equivalent to random-access key update allowing, (not strongly) key-insulated encryption with optimal threshold. Not only does one exist if and only if the other exists, but, more pragmatically, we show that either of these objects can be easily transformed into the other. This means that the role played by IBE in our constructions is crucial and not coincidental.

RANDOM ORACLES. The proofs supporting the BF-IBE scheme [10], and thus ultimately supporting SKIE-OT, are in the random oracle model [5]. The proofs supporting the scheme of [16], not being in the random oracle model, are arguably providing better security guarantees (cf. [11, 31]). But proofs in the random oracle model do have significant value in practice (cf. [5]), and one must weigh what one gives up on provable guarantees against the practical benefits of the new schemes, which are considerable. Furthermore, obtaining an IBE scheme with a proof of security avoiding the random oracle model is an open problem, and, hence, by our equivalence result noted above, the same is true for (strongly or not strongly) key-insulated encryption with optimal threshold.

KEY-UPDATING SIGNATURE SCHEMES. This paper, following [16], has concentrated on public-key encryption. Designing signature schemes in the key-updating framework is simple in comparison. This is not surprising and reflects a general phenomenon, namely that signatures have been easier to achieve than encryption in numerous models. For example, identity-based signatures [35] are trivially achieved via certification techniques and were more efficiently achieved soon after their introduction via identity-based identification schemes [17, 32, 20], but identity-based encryption

remained open until [10]. Numerous forward-secure signature schemes are known [2, 4, 1, 24, 27, 28] but forward-secure encryption remained open until [26]. Key-insulated signature schemes with optimal threshold can be directly achieved via certification-based techniques or via identity-based signatures schemes, and then turned into strongly key-insulated signature schemes with optimal threshold by generic transforms based on ideas analogous to those in this paper. Signature schemes meeting even more demanding security requirements are provided in [25].

TOWARDS PRACTICE. The broad question of whether key-updating encryption could be practical can be viewed as having two parts. One is to investigate the practicality of the model and concept, independently of the cryptographic realization. The other is to find effective cryptographic realizations. Our work has addressed only the second part. It would be naive to think that this alone makes key-updating encryption practical, but it is an important step towards this end. Given the recognized importance of the key-exposure problem, we feel that the research community should endeavor to assess the potential of new ideas to address it.

As to whether the concept as a whole is practical, it seems too early to tell. Many of the important system level questions related to the model have yet to be seriously addressed. As a final contribution of this paper, we point to some of the important issues in Appendix E.

2 Definitions

We detail the components of a key-updating encryption scheme, and then provide definitions for security in the complexity-theoretic or "provable-security" framework.

We let $\mathbb{N} = \{1, 2, \ldots\}$ be the set of positive integers, and if $N \in \mathbb{N}$ then we let $[N] = \{1, \ldots, N\}$. The notation $x \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} S$ denotes that x is selected randomly from set S. If A is a possibly randomized algorithm then the notation $x \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} A(a_1, a_2, \ldots)$ denotes that x is assigned the outcome of the experiment of running A on inputs $a_1, a_2, \ldots$.

2.1 Key-updating encryption schemes

This follows [16], which in turn extended [4]. A *key-updating encryption scheme* $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is specified by five polynomial-time algorithms whose functionality is as follows:

- The randomized *key-generation algorithm* KG takes input security parameter k and returns (pk, usk_0, hsk) where pk is the user public key, usk_0 is the *stage 0 user secret key*, and hsk is the *master helper key*. The user is initialized with pk, usk_0 while the helper is initialized with pk, hsk.

- At the start of stage $i \geq 1$, the helper applies the *helper key-update algorithm* HKU to i, pk, hsk to obtain a *stage i helper key* hsk_i, which is then assumed to be conveyed to the user via a secure channel.

- At the start of stage $i \geq 1$, the user receives hsk_i from the helper and then applies the *user key-update algorithm* UKU to i, pk, hsk_i, usk_{i-1} to obtain the *stage i user secret key usk_i*. The user then discards (erases) usk_{i-1}.

- Anyone can apply the randomized *encryption algorithm* Enc to a stage number i, the user public key pk and message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ to obtain a ciphertext C intended for the user to decrypt in stage i.

- In stage i the user can apply the *decryption algorithm* Dec to i, pk, its stage i secret key usk_i, and a ciphertext C to obtain either a message M or the special symbol $\bot$ indicating failure.

We require that if C was produced by applying the encryption algorithm to i, pk, M then $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, C) = M$.

2.2   Security definitions

Readers not familiar with the provable-security approach might skip the current subsection and proceed directly to Section 3. The definitions here will be required only in conjunction with the security proofs of Appendices B and C.

We formalize the notion of a key-updating scheme being (strongly) key insulated with optimal threshold. This is based on the ideas of [16] but we introduce some simplifications. For readers familiar with [16], Appendix D shows that the simplifications do not weaken the security requirements.

Security considers two types of attacks, namely attacks on the user and attacks on the helper. In both cases we consider chosen-ciphertext attacks, not just chosen-plaintext attacks.

ATTACKS ON THE USER. The formalization of security for the user requires a strong form of privacy, namely indistinguishability as per [22, 33], in the face of key-exposure and chosen-ciphertext attacks. To define it we consider the following experiment related to key-updating encryption scheme $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, adversary A and security parameter k. The key-generation algorithm KG is run on input k to produce (pk, usk_0, hsk). Adversary A gets input pk and returns an integer $N \in \mathbb{N}$ specified in unary. A challenge bit b is chosen at random, and the execution of A is continued with A now being provided the following oracles:

- A decryption oracle $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \cdot)$ for each user stage $i = 1, \ldots, N$. This models a chosen-ciphertext attack.

- A *key-exposure oracle* $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, usk_0, hsk)$ which the adversary can query with any value $i \in [N]$ of its choice to get back the stage i user secret key usk_i and the stage i helper key hsk_i. This models the ability of the adversary to compromise any user stage of its choice. (We make the conservative assumption that when an adversary has compromised the user in stage i it not only obtains usk_i but has compromised the channel between user and helper and thus also gets hsk_i.)

- A *left-or-right oracle* $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$ [3] which given $j \in [N]$ and equal length messages M_0, M_1 returns a *challenge ciphertext* $C \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Enc}(j, pk, M_b)$.

The adversary may query these oracles adaptively, in any order it wants, subject only to the restriction that it make exactly one query to the left-or-right oracle. Let j denote the stage number of this query and let C denote the ciphertext returned by the left-or-right oracle in response to this query. Eventually, A outputs a guess bit d and halts. It is said to win if $d = b$, ciphertext C was not queried to $\mathsf{Dec}(j, pk, usk_j, \cdot)$ after it was returned by the left-or-right oracle, and j was not queried to the key-exposure oracle. The adversary's advantage is the probability that it wins minus $1/2$, and the key-updating scheme KUS is said to be *key insulated with optimal threshold* if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible.

We stress that the number of stages N is a random variable depending on the adversary, and that there is no upper bound on the number of user stages that the adversary is allowed to corrupt. This is in contrast to [16] where the total number of stages N, and the maximum number t of corrupted stages, are parameters of the scheme fixed in advance. One implication of our strengthened requirement is scalability. (This is directly implied by our definition and does not have to be a separate requirement.)

ATTACKS ON THE HELPER. Adversary A, given pk, is assumed to have compromised the helper

and thus be in possession of the master helper key hsk. The security requirement is that, as long as none of the user stages is compromised, ciphertexts intended for any user stage remain secure. The formalization follows the one above.

We consider the following experiment related to key-updating encryption scheme $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, adversary A and security parameter k. The key-generation algorithm KG is run on input k to produce (pk, usk_0, hsk). Adversary A gets input pk, hsk, and returns an integer $N \in \mathbb{N}$ specified in unary. A challenge bit b is chosen at random, and the execution of A is continued with A now being provided the decryption oracles and a left-or-right oracle as above. (But it is *not* provided a key-exposure oracle.) The adversary may query these oracles adaptively, in any order it wants, subject only to the restriction that it make exactly one query to the left-or-right oracle. Let j denote the stage number of this query and let C denote the ciphertext returned by the left-or-right oracle in response to this query. Eventually, A outputs a guess bit d and halts. It is said to win if $d = b$ and ciphertext C was not queried to $\mathsf{Dec}(j, pk, usk_j, \cdot)$ after it was returned by the left-or-right oracle. The adversary's advantage is the probability that it wins minus $1/2$, and the key-updating scheme KUS is said to be *secure against attacks on the helper* if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible. The scheme is *strongly key insulated with optimal threshold* if it is key insulated with optimal threshold and also secure against attacks on the helper.

3   The SKIE-OT scheme

Our strongly key-insulated scheme with optimal threshold is based on the Boneh-Franklin (BF) identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme and exploits some algebraic properties of the latter. In order to avoid taking the reader through the full BF-IBE scheme, we begin by presenting a simplified abstraction of it in which we detail only a few items that are necessary for our transformation and treat the rest as "black boxes." We then show how to build on this to construct SKIE-OT. This section concludes with an informal security analysis showing that SKIE-OT is strongly key insulated with optimal threshold, assuming the BF scheme is a secure IBE scheme under chosen-ciphertext attack as per [10]. Corresponding security theorems and proofs are provided in Appendix B.

WHAT BF SUPPLIES. For our purposes, we can view the BF-IBE scheme as providing us with a triple of algorithms $\mathsf{IBES} = (\mathsf{IBKG}, \mathsf{IBEnc}, \mathsf{IBDec})$, where

- The *key-generation* algorithm IBKG takes input security parameter k and returns a pair (pk, s) consisting of a *parameter list* $pk = (q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$ and a *master key* $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, where q is a prime number, $\mathbb{G}$ is (the description of) an additive (cyclic) group of order q, and $H \colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{G}^*$ is a hash function whose range is the nonzero elements of the group. The "$\ldots$" indicates that the parameter list pk contains a few other parameters, but for our purpose it does not matter what they are, so we do not detail them.[3]

- The randomized *encryption algorithm* IBEnc takes input an *identity i* which could be an arbitrary integer, the parameter list pk, and a message $M \in \{0,1\}^*$ and returns a ciphertext c.[4]

- A user holding the secret key $ibsk_i = s \cdot H(i) \in \mathbb{G}$ (this denotes the group element $H(i)$ added to itself s times via the group operation) can apply the *decryption algorithm* IBDec to its identity i, the parameter list pk, the secret key $ibsk_i$ and ciphertext c to recover the message M.

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[3] For a reader familiar with [10], we remark that the quantities include a prime number p such that $p = 6q - 1$, a generator of $\mathbb{G}$, and some more hash functions. $\mathbb{G}$ is the group of points on an elliptic curve over a field of order p.

[4] The basic version of the BF-IBE scheme only allows encryption of plaintext messages of a specific length which is a parameter of the scheme, but via standard hybrid encryption techniques we may extend the message space so that strings of any length may be encrypted. For simplicity we assume this is done here.

Algorithm $\mathsf{KG}(k)$	Algorithm $\mathsf{UKU}(i, pk, hsk_i, usk_{i-1})$
$(pk, s) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{IBKG}(k)$	Parse pk as $(q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$
Parse pk as $(q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$	Parse usk_{i-1} as $(usk, ibsk_{i-1})$
$usk \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$; $hsk \leftarrow (s - usk) \bmod q$	$ibsk_i \leftarrow usk \cdot H(i) + hsk_i$ in $\mathbb{G}$
$ibsk_0 \leftarrow s \cdot H(0)$ in $\mathbb{G}$; $usk_0 \leftarrow (usk, ibsk_0)$	$usk_i \leftarrow (usk, ibsk_i)$
Return (pk, usk_0, hsk)	Return usk_i

Algorithm $\mathsf{HKU}(i, pk, hsk)$	Algorithm $\mathsf{Enc}(i, pk, M)$	Algorithm $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, C)$
Parse pk as $(q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$	$c \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{IBEnc}(i, pk, M)$	Parse C as (j, c)
$hsk_i \leftarrow hsk \cdot H(i)$ in $\mathbb{G}$	$C \leftarrow (i, c)$	If $j \neq i$ then return $\perp$
Return hsk_i	Return C	Parse usk_i as $(usk, ibsk_i)$
		$M \leftarrow \mathsf{IBDec}(i, pk, ibsk_i, c)$
		Return M

Figure 1: The component algorithms of our SKIE-OT scheme $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, based on the algorithms $\mathsf{IBES} = (\mathsf{IBKG}, \mathsf{IBEnc}, \mathsf{IBDec})$ describing the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme.

DISCUSSION OF THE BF-IBE SCHEME. The identity i functions as the public key of the entity having this identity. In the BF-IBE scheme, the secret key $ibsk_i = s \cdot H(i)$ is computed by a trusted party who holds the master key s, and then given by this party to entity i. The details of how encryption and decryption are performed in the IBE scheme are not important for us. What we will exploit is the fact that the secret key $ibsk_i$ is computed as a linear function of the master key s, and that the scheme meets the notion of privacy against chosen-ciphertext attack defined in [10]. Under this notion, an adversary gets to compromise some number of entities of its choice and obtain their secret keys, and yet it remains computationally infeasible to obtain the secret key of any uncompromised entity, or even to obtain partial information about messages encrypted under that key, all this being under a chosen-ciphertext attack. It is shown in [10] that this security is achieved in the random oracle model under the bilinear DH assumption.

OUR SKIE-OT SCHEME. The component algorithms of our key-updating scheme, $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, are depicted in Figure 1. Here we briefly explain the ideas.

We recall that a key-updating encryption scheme that is key insulated with optimal threshold, but not strongly key insulated, can be trivially obtained from any IBE scheme, as indicated in [16]. The public key of a user is a parameter list $pk = (q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$ for the IBE scheme. The master helper key is the master key s of the IBE scheme. View the stage number i as an identity for the IBE scheme. The user secret key in stage i is $ibsk_i = s \cdot H(i)$, the secret key corresponding to entity i in the IBE scheme. Encryption is then performed as a function of i, pk as per the IBE scheme except that we additionally include the value of i in the ciphertext. Decryption in stage i uses $s \cdot H(i)$ as the secret key to run the decryption algorithm of the IBE scheme.

The weakness of the above scheme is that if the helper is compromised, then the attacker obtains s and the security of all user stages is compromised. We address this as follows. In our scheme, s is not held by the helper, but rather split into shares via a one-out-of-two secret-sharing scheme, with one share held by the user and the other by the helper. That is, $s \equiv usk + hsk \pmod{q}$, where the stage i user secret key is $usk_i = (usk, ibsk_i)$ with $ibsk_i = (usk + hsk) \cdot H(i)$, and the master helper key is hsk. Update of the user secret key must be performed without reconstructing s, since otherwise an adversary compromising the user at update time could obtain s and thus compromise

all stages. We perform update without reconstruction of s by exploiting the fact that for any i, the map $x \mapsto x \cdot H(i)$ is a homomorphism from the additive group $\mathbb{Z}_q$ to the additive group $\mathbb{G}$. At the start of stage i, the helper uses hsk to compute $hsk_i = hsk \cdot H(i)$ and sends it to the user. The latter, holding $usk_{i-1} = (usk, ibsk_{i-1})$, sets $ibsk_i = usk \cdot H(i) + hsk_i$ in $\mathbb{G}$. By the homomorphic property we have

$$usk \cdot H(i) + hsk_i \;=\; usk \cdot H(i) + hsk \cdot H(i) \;=\; (usk + hsk) \cdot H(i) \;=\; ibsk_i \;.$$

The user sets its updated secret key to $usk_i = (usk, ibsk_i)$ and erases usk_{i-1}.

KEY SIZES AND COSTS. The public key in SKIE-OT (which is the parameter list of the BF-IBE scheme) consists of two k-bit primes p, q, where k is the security parameter and $p = 6q - 1$, and two elements of $\mathbb{G}$ where the latter is an elliptic curve group. In addition, the scheme has several associated public hash functions. The sizes of the master helper key, the user secret key for any stage, and the helper key for any stage are all $O(k)$. Encryption in stage i involves performing encryption as per the BF-IBE scheme which requires two exponentiations, four hash function applications and one Weil paring computation [10]. Decryption requires one exponentiation, three hash function applications and one Weil paring computation. As observed in [10], the Weil paring can be computed efficiently using an algorithm due to Miller [30] whose running time is comparable to exponentiation in a prime-order field.

SECURITY OF SKIE-OT. Here we present a a very rough analysis which provides an intuitive security validation of our scheme. In order to highlight the main ideas, we ignore the chosen-ciphertext attack capability of the adversary and also focus on key recovery rather than indistinguishability. These informal arguments are supported by the security theorems and proofs provided in Appendix B which validate SKIE-OT with respect to the full and demanding definitions of Section 2.

As per Section 2 we must consider two types of attacks, namely attacks on the user and attacks on the helper.

First, consider an attack on the user. Since we wish security to hold for the optimal threshold, the adversary is allowed to compromise all but one stage, meaning it obtains $usk_j = (usk, ibsk_j)$ and $hsk_j = hsk \cdot H(j)$ for all $j \neq i$, for some value i of the adversary's choice. We let s denote the value $(usk + hsk) \bmod q$. The assumed security of the BF-IBE scheme tells us that possession of $\{ibsk_j : j \neq i\}$ does not compromise $ibsk_i$ as long as the adversary obtains no additional information regarding the master key s. The concern introduced by our modifications is that the additional information available to the adversary over and above $\{ibsk_j : j \neq i\}$, namely usk and $\{hsk_j : j \neq i\}$, can provide useful information about s. We argue that it cannot in two steps. First, usk is distributed uniformly and independently of s, and hence by itself is not helpful to the adversary. Second, hsk_j is not additional information to an adversary already possessing usk and $ibsk_j$, because $hsk_j = ibsk_j - usk \cdot H(j)$ in $\mathbb{G}$.

Now, consider an attack on the helper. The adversary obtains hsk. This, however, is distributed independently of $s = (usk + hsk) \bmod q$, and thus an adversary attempting to compromise the privacy of encryption in some stage i of the user is reduced to attempting to compromise the assumed secure IBE scheme.

4 General strengthening transform

Suppose we are given a key-updating encryption scheme $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ that is key insulated with optimal threshold but not secure against an attack on the helper. We wish to strengthen it so that attacks on the helper are prevented while maintaining user security at the

$$\begin{array}{l|l}
\text{Algorithm } \overline{\mathsf{KG}}(k) & \text{Algorithm } \overline{\mathsf{UKU}}(i, \overline{pk}, hsk_i, \overline{usk}_{i-1}) \\
\quad (pk_s, sk_s) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{SKG}(k) & \quad \text{Parse } \overline{pk} \text{ as } (pk_s, pk) \\
\quad (pk, usk_0, hsk) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{KG}(k) & \quad \text{Parse } \overline{usk}_{i-1} \text{ as } (sk_s, usk_{i-1}) \\
\quad \overline{pk} \leftarrow (pk_s, pk) \,;\, \overline{usk}_0 \leftarrow (sk_s, usk_0) & \quad usk_i \leftarrow \mathsf{UKU}(i, pk, hsk_i, usk_{i-1}) \\
\quad \text{Return } (\overline{pk}, \overline{usk}_0, hsk) & \quad \overline{usk}_i \leftarrow (sk_s, usk_i) \\
& \quad \text{Return } \overline{usk}_i
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l|l|l}
\text{Algorithm } \overline{\mathsf{HKU}}(i, \overline{pk}, hsk) & \text{Algorithm } \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}(i, \overline{pk}, M) & \text{Algorithm } \overline{\mathsf{Dec}}(i, \overline{pk}, \overline{usk}_i, \overline{C}) \\
\quad \text{Parse } \overline{pk} \text{ as } (pk_s, pk) & \quad \text{Parse } \overline{pk} \text{ as } (pk_s, pk) & \quad \text{Parse } \overline{pk} \text{ as } (pk_s, pk) \\
\quad hsk_i \leftarrow \mathsf{HKU}(i, pk, hsk) & \quad C \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{SEnc}(pk_s, M) & \quad \text{Parse } \overline{usk}_i \text{ as } (sk_s, usk_i) \\
\quad \text{Return } hsk_i & \quad \overline{C} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(i, pk, C) & \quad C \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \overline{C}) \\
& \quad \text{Return } \overline{C} & \quad \text{If } C = \bot \text{ then return } \bot \\
& & \quad M \leftarrow \mathsf{SDec}(sk_s, C) \\
& & \quad \text{Return } M
\end{array}$$

Figure 2: The component algorithms of our transformed scheme $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}} = (\overline{\mathsf{KG}}, \overline{\mathsf{HKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{UKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}, \overline{\mathsf{Dec}})$, constructed from the given (base) key-insulated encryption scheme $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ and the given standard encryption scheme $\mathsf{SES} = (\mathsf{SKG}, \mathsf{SEnc}, \mathsf{SDec})$.

same threshold as before. In this section we present a simple, general transform that accomplishes this by combining the given scheme with a standard encryption scheme.

THE TRANSFORM. Henceforth we refer to KUS as the *base* key-insulated scheme. We let $\mathsf{SES} = (\mathsf{SKG}, \mathsf{SEnc}, \mathsf{SDec})$ be any standard public-key encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attack, described as usual by its key-generation, encryption and decryption algorithms. We associate to these a new key-updating encryption scheme $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}} = (\overline{\mathsf{KG}}, \overline{\mathsf{HKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{UKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}, \overline{\mathsf{Dec}})$ whose component algorithms are defined in Figure 2. The public key $\overline{pk}$ of the new scheme contains a public key pk_s for the standard scheme as well as a public key pk for the base key-insulated scheme. Encryption in stage i is performed in a nested fashion, meaning by first encrypting the message under pk_s via the encryption algorithm of the standard scheme to get a ciphertext C called the *inner ciphertext*, and then encrypting C via the encryption algorithm of the base key-insulated scheme with input i and pk to get an *outer ciphertext* $\overline{C}$. The master helper key is the same as for the base scheme. The user secret key at stage i contains sk_s, the secret key corresponding to pk_s, as well as a stage i user secret key usk_i for the base scheme. The helper key for any stage is the same as for the base scheme. Update of the helper key is as per the base scheme, and the update for the user key consists of updating the base part and leaving the standard key unchanged.

SECURITY OF THE TRANSFORMED SCHEME. As before, we provide a rough, intuitive security validation of the transformed scheme that ignores the chosen-ciphertext attack capability of the adversary and focuses on key recovery rather than indistinguishability. These informal arguments are supported by the security theorems and proofs provided in Appendix C.

First, consider an attack on the user. We wish security to hold for the optimal threshold as in the base scheme. An adversary who compromises some t user stages obtains the corresponding user secret keys for the base scheme as well as the secret key sk_s of the standard scheme. The latter would enable it to decrypt the inner ciphertext if it were able to first decrypt the outer one, but the assumed security of the base scheme prevents the latter.

Second, consider an attack on the helper. The adversary obtains the master helper key of the base scheme. Since the base scheme is not assumed secure against helper attack, the adversary may now have the ability to decrypt any outer ciphertext. However, it does not know sk_s and thus will still find it computationally infeasible to decrypt the inner ciphertext so obtained.

APPLICATION. Cocks presents an identity-based encryption scheme, one variant of which appears to resist chosen-ciphertext attack [14]. (Security of schemes in [14] is not proven). It is natural to consider whether a strongly key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold can be derived from it. However, the algebra underlying Cocks' IBE scheme, in contrast to that underlying the BF-IBE scheme, does not appear to lend itself to simple key splitting (the master key is the prime factorization of a public number) and thus we do not appear to be able to use the types of methods we used to obtain SKIE-OT. However, we can obtain a strongly key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold from the Cocks IBE scheme via our general strengthening transform, as follows. First transform the IBE scheme into a (not strongly) key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold in the trivial manner we have discussed before. Then pick some standard public-key encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attack, such as RSA-OAEP [6] (which is supported by proofs of [18]), Boneh's simplified versions [9], or Cramer-Shoup [15]. Now apply the transform to these. Our results say that the resulting scheme is provably strongly key insulated with optimal threshold as long as Cocks' scheme is a secure IBE scheme. Furthermore, the final key-updating scheme is quite efficient.

5   An equivalence result

Let $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a key-updating scheme. Having obtained pk, usk_0, hsk by running KG on input k, we know that the user secret keys for stages $l = 1, \ldots, j$ can be computed based on the associated stage helper keys as follows:

For $l = 1, \ldots, j$ do: $hsk_l \leftarrow \mathsf{HKU}(l, pk, hsk)$; $usk_l \leftarrow \mathsf{UKU}(l, pk, hsk_l, usk_{l-1})$.

We say that key-updating scheme KUS allows *random-access key updates* if there is a polynomial-time *random-access user key-update algorithm* RUKU which takes input i, j, pk, hsk_i, usk_j and outputs usk_i for any $i \geq 1$ and $j \geq 0$.[5] This is useful for error recovery. Also, it allows the user to maintain its decryption capability for ciphertexts from the past, despite having to erase the secret key for one stage at the start of the next.

It is easy to see that SKIE-OT allows random-access key updates, as do all the schemes in [16]. Furthermore, our strengthening transform preserves this property, in the sense that if the base key-insulated encryption scheme allows random-access key updates then so does the transformed strongly key-insulated encryption scheme. All this indicates that random-access key update seems to be a natural property of key-updating schemes.

Our result is that a (not strongly) key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold that allows random-access key updates is essentially the same thing as an identity-based encryption scheme, in that either of these objects can be easily turned into the other. The following states it more formally. The definition of a secure identity-based encryption scheme used below is from [10] and is recalled in Appendix A. The theorem is true both for chosen-plaintext attacks and chosen-ciphertext attacks, although our formalization only refers to the latter.

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[5] This a somewhat stronger requirement than the one made in [16], who replace hsk_i as input to RUKU with a value $hsk_{i,j}$ computed by the helper based on another algorithm that takes inputs i, j, pk, hsk. We have preferred to simplify the definition to require just one algorithm, but the change makes no difference to any results. All known schemes, both ours and theirs, meet both definitions, and Theorem 5.1 is true for both definitions.

Algorithm IBKG(k)	Algorithm IBKI(pk, s, i)
$(pk, usk_0, hsk) \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{KG}(k)$	Parse s as (usk_0, hsk)
$s \leftarrow (usk_0, hsk)$	$hsk_i \leftarrow \mathsf{HKU}(i, pk, hsk)$
Return (pk, s)	$ibsk_i \leftarrow \mathsf{RUKU}(i, 0, pk, hsk_i, usk_0)$
	Return $ibsk_i$
Algorithm IBEnc(i, pk, M)	Algorithm IBDec($i, pk, ibsk_i, c$)
$c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(i, pk, M)$	$M \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, ibsk_i, c)$
Return c	Return M

Figure 3: The component algorithms of IBE scheme IBES = (IBKG, IBKI, IBEnc, IBDec) constructed from the given key-insulated encryption scheme KUS = (KG, HKU, UKU, Enc, Dec) and its random-access user key-update algorithm RUKU.

Theorem 5.1 *There exists a secure identity-based encryption scheme* **if and only if** *there exists a key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold that allows random-access key updates.* ▌

Proof of Theorem 5.1: The proof is constructive, showing how either object is easily transformed into the other.

First assume IBES = (IBKG, IBKI, IBEnc, IBDec) is an IBE scheme, specified according to the format of Appendix A, and meeting the notion of security specified there. We construct from it the trivial key-updating scheme that we have discussed often before. It is easy to see that this is a key-insulated scheme with optimal threshold that allows random-access key updates. The novel direction is the converse.

For the converse, assume KUS = (KG, HKU, UKU, Enc, Dec) is a key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold that allows random-access key updates, and let RUKU denote the random-access user key-update algorithm. We now design an IBE scheme IBES = (IBKG, IBKI, IBEnc, IBDec). The constituent algorithms are depicted in Figure 3. The idea is that the master secret key of the trusted party in the IBE scheme contains both the stage 0 user secret key usk_0 and the helper master key hsk. The entity with identity i is identified with stage i of the user. The trusted authority wants to issue usk_i to user i as its secret decryption key. In the absence of extra properties, the trusted authority could compute usk_i by starting from usk_0, hsk and computing $usk_1, \ldots, usk_i$ in turn via the user key update and helper key update algorithms. This, however, takes time polynomial in i, which is not polynomial time. (The trusted authority of the IBE scheme must issue $ibsk_i$ to i in time polynomial in $\lg(i)$ and k where k is the security parameter.) This problem is solved via the assumption that the key-updating scheme allows random-access key updates. The trusted authority can issue a decryption key to i by using the random-access key-update algorithms to directly compute $ibsk_i = usk_i$ given usk_0, hsk as shown in Figure 3. The encryption and decryption algorithms are unchanged.

Finally, we have to argue that our constructed IBE scheme is secure under the assumption that the key-updating scheme is key insulated with optimal threshold. This is easy, however, and details are left to the final paper. ▌

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A   Definitions for IBE

IBE SCHEMES. This follows [35, 10]. In general, an IBE scheme $\mathsf{IBES} = (\mathsf{IBKG}, \mathsf{IBKI}, \mathsf{IBEnc}, \mathsf{IBDec})$ is specified by four polynomial-time algorithms whose functionality is as follows:

- The *key-generation algorithm* IBKG takes input security parameter k and returns a pair (pk, s) consisting of a *parameter list* pk and a *master key* s.

- Given a user-identity $i \in \mathbb{N}$, the trusted center can apply the (deterministic) *decryption-key issuance algorithm* IBKI to pk, s, i to obtain a decryption key $ibsk_i$ that, along with pk, is then sent to user i over a secure channel.

- The randomized *encryption algorithm* IBEnc takes input an *identity* $i \in \mathbb{N}$, the parameter list pk, and a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and returns a ciphertext c.

- A user holding the secret key $ibsk_i$ can apply the (deterministic) *decryption algorithm* IBDec to its identity i, the parameter list pk, the secret key $ibsk_i$ and ciphertext c to recover the message M.

SECURITY OF AN IBE SCHEME. The formalization of security against chosen-ciphertext attack follows [10]. We consider the following experiment related to IBE scheme $\mathsf{IBES} = (\mathsf{IBKG}, \mathsf{IBKI}, \mathsf{IBEnc}, \mathsf{IBDec})$, adversary A and security parameter k. The key-generation algorithm IBKG is run on input k to produce (pk, s). Adversary A gets input pk and returns an integer $N \in \mathbb{N}$ specified in unary. A challenge bit b is chosen at random, and the execution of A is continued with A now being provided the following oracles:

- Decryption oracles $\mathsf{IBDec}(i, pk, ibsk_i, \cdot)$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, N$

- A *key-exposure oracle* $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, s)$ that when queried with $i \in [N]$ returns the decryption key $ibsk_i = \mathsf{IBKI}(pk, s, i)$ of user i. This models the ability of the adversary to compromise any user of its choice.

- A *left-or-right oracle* $\mathsf{IBEnc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$ which given $j \in [N]$ and equal length messages M_0, M_1 returns a *challenge ciphertext* $c \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{IBEnc}(j, pk, M_b)$.

The adversary may query these oracles adaptively, in any order it wants, subject only to the restriction that it make exactly one query to the left-or-right oracle. Let j denote the user identity of this query and let c denote the ciphertext returned by the left-or-right oracle in response to this query. Eventually, A outputs a guess bit d and halts. It is said to win if $d = b$, ciphertext c was not queried to $\mathsf{IBDec}(j, pk, ibsk_j, \cdot)$ after it was returned by the left-or-right oracle, and j was not queried to the key-exposure oracle. The adversary's advantage is the probability that it wins minus $1/2$. The IBE scheme IBES is said to be *secure against chosen-ciphertext attack* if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible.

B Security theorems and proofs for SKIE-OT

We adopt the convention that the *time complexity* of an adversary A is the execution time of the experiment used to define the advantage of A, including the time taken for key generation and initializations, and the time taken by the oracles to compute replies to the adversary's queries. This convention simplifies concrete security considerations.

The following two theorems show that the advantage of any adversary against the SKIE-OT scheme, performing an attack on the user in the first case, and an attack on the helper in the second, can be upper bounded by the advantage of a related adversary against the BF-IBE scheme.

Theorem B.1 *Let A be an adversary of time complexity T against SKIE-OT, attacking the user. Assume that the adversary compromises t user stages. Then there exists an adversary B performing a chosen-ciphertext attack against the underlying BF-IBE scheme with at least the same advantage. Furthermore, the time complexity of B is T and the number of entities compromised by B during its attack is t.* ∎

Proof: Let $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be the SKIE-OT scheme and $\mathsf{IBES} = (\mathsf{IBKG}, \mathsf{IBEnc}, \mathsf{IBDec})$ be the BF-IBE scheme. We construct an adversary B that uses A to perform a chosen-ciphertext attack against IBES. Fix $k \in \mathbb{N}$. The experiment that defines the advantage of B begins by running $\mathsf{IBKG}(k)$ to produce (pk, s). On input $pk = (q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$, adversary B randomly selects an element $usk \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. It then runs A on input pk until A outputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$, which B also returns. B is given access to decryption oracles $\mathsf{IBDec}(i, pk, ibsk_i, \cdot)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, N$, a key-exposure oracle $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, s)$, and a left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{IBEnc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, where the challenge bit b was chosen at random. The adversary's goal is to guess b.

When the execution of B proceeds, it continues to run A and uses its oracles to respond to A's queries. In response to a query (j, c) to the decryption oracle $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \cdot)$, where $j \neq i$, B returns $\perp$. In response to a query (j, c) to the decryption oracle $\mathsf{Dec}(j, pk, usk_j, \cdot)$, B forwards the query to its decryption oracle $\mathsf{IBDec}(j, pk, ibsk_j, \cdot)$ and returns the answer M to A. By the definition of algorithm Dec, in both cases, the answer is exactly what A's decryption oracle would have returned. In response to a query i to the key-exposure oracle $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, usk_0, hsk)$, B makes the query i to its key-exposure oracle $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, s)$, obtaining the decryption key $ibsk_i = s \cdot H(i)$. B then sets $usk_i \leftarrow (usk, ibsk_i)$ and $hsk_i \leftarrow ibsk_i - usk \cdot H(i)$ in $\mathbb{G}$, and returns usk_i as the stage i user secret key and hsk_i as the stage i helper key to A. Since usk was chosen at random, $hsk_i = (s - usk) \cdot H(i)$, and $ibsk_i = usk \cdot H(i) + hsk_i$, A's view is identical to its view in the attack against KUS. In response to A's query j, M_0, M_1 to the left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, B forwards the query to its left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{IBEnc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, obtaining a ciphertext c. It then sets $C \leftarrow (j, c)$ and returns this to A. By the definition of algorithm Enc, the answer is exactly what A's left-or-right oracle would have returned. When A outputs its guess bit d and halts, B returns d and halts.

Since B simulates A's environment in its attack against KUS perfectly, A behaves as it does there and B wins as long as A does. By our conventions for measuring time complexity, the time complexity of B is T. Furthermore, B makes the same number of queries to its key-exposure oracle, compromising that number of entities, as user stages A compromises by querying its key-exposure oracle. The conclusion follows. ∎

Theorem B.2 *Let A be an adversary of time complexity T against SKIE-OT, attacking the helper. Then there exists an adversary B performing a chosen-ciphertext attack against the underlying BF-*

IBE scheme with at least the same advantage. Furthermore, the time complexity of B is T and this adversary does not compromise any entities during its attack. ▮

Proof: Let $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be the SKIE-OT scheme and $\mathsf{IBES} = (\mathsf{IBKG}, \mathsf{IBEnc}, \mathsf{IBDec})$ be the BF-IBE scheme. We show how to construct an adversary B that runs A as a subroutine and performs a chosen-ciphertext attack against IBES. Fix $k \in \mathbb{N}$. The experiment that defines the advantage of B begins by running $\mathsf{IBKG}(k)$ to produce (pk, s). Adversary B is given input $pk = (q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$. In order to simulate A's environment in its attack against KUS, B must provide A with a master helper key corresponding to the public key pk. To do so, it selects an element $hsk \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random. It runs A on input pk, hsk until A outputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$, which B also returns. B is then given access to decryption oracles $\mathsf{IBDec}(i, pk, ibsk_i, \cdot)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, N$, a key-exposure oracle $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, s)$, and a left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{IBEnc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, where the challenge bit b was chosen at random. The adversary's goal is to guess b.

When the execution of B proceeds, it continues to run A and uses its oracles to respond to A's queries. In response to a query (j, c) to the decryption oracle $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \cdot)$, where $j \neq i$, B returns $\perp$. In response to a query (j, c) to the decryption oracle $\mathsf{Dec}(j, pk, usk_j, \cdot)$, B forwards the query to its decryption oracle $\mathsf{IBDec}(j, pk, ibsk_j, \cdot)$ and returns the answer M to A. By the definition of algorithm Dec, in both cases, the answer is exactly what A's decryption oracle would have returned. In response to A's query j, M_0, M_1 to the left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, B forwards the query to its left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{IBEnc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, obtaining a ciphertext c. It then sets $C \leftarrow (j, c)$ and returns this to A. By the definition of algorithm Enc, the answer is exactly what A's left-or-right oracle would have returned. When A outputs its guess bit d and halts, B returns d and halts.

It is easy to see that by the way hsk is chosen and the way B responds to A's oracle queries, A's view is identical to its view in the attack against KUS. Since the simulation is perfect, A behaves as it does there and B wins as long as A does. Our conventions for measuring time complexity imply that the time complexity of B is T. Furthermore, B does not make any queries to its key-exposure oracle, i.e., it does not compromise any entities during its attack. The conclusion follows. ▮

From these theorems we can obtain the following security result for our SKIE-OT scheme.

Corollary B.3 *If the BF-IBE scheme is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack then the key-updating scheme SKIE-OT is strongly key insulated with optimal threshold.* ▮

Proof: Let A be an adversary of polynomial time complexity against SKIE-OT, attacking the user. Assume that A compromises all but one stage. Then the adversary given by Theorem B.1 also has polynomial time complexity. The assumption that the BF-IBE scheme is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack implies that its advantage is negligible. Hence the advantage of A is negligible. This shows that any polynomial-time adversary attacking the user who compromises all stages but one has a negligible advantage, which implies that SKIE-OT is key insulated with optimal threshold. Similarly, Theorem B.2 implies that SKIE-OT is secure against attacks on the helper. The conclusion follows immediately. ▮

C   Security theorems and proofs for the general transform

We first recall the standard notion of security against chosen-ciphertext attack for public-key encryption schemes.

SECURITY OF A PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEME. The formalization of security against chosen-ciphertext attack follows [22, 33], adapted to use the left-or-right encryption formulation as per [3]. We consider the following experiment related to public-key encryption scheme $\mathsf{SES} = (\mathsf{SKG}, \mathsf{SEnc}, \mathsf{SDec})$, adversary A, security parameter k, and challenge bit b that A is trying to guess. The key-generation algorithm SKG is run on input k to produce (pk_s, sk_s). Adversary A gets input pk_s and is provided the following oracles:

- A decryption oracle $\mathsf{SDec}(sk_s, \cdot)$
- A *left-or-right oracle* $\mathsf{SEnc}(pk_s, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$ which given equal length messages M_0, M_1 returns a *challenge ciphertext* $C \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{SKG}(pk_s, M_b)$.

The adversary may query these oracles adaptively, in any order it wants. Eventually, A outputs a guess bit d and halts. It is said to win if $d = b$, and A never made a query C to $\mathsf{SDec}(sk_s, \cdot)$ such that C was previously returned by the left-or-right oracle. The adversary's advantage is the probability that it wins minus $1/2$. The public-key encryption scheme SES is said to be *secure against chosen-ciphertext attack* if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible.

Again, we adopt the convention that the time complexity of an adversary is the execution time of the experiment used to define the adversary's advantage, including the time taken for key generation and initializations, and the time taken by the oracles to compute replies to the adversary's queries.

The theorems below guarantee, respectively, that the transformed scheme $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$ is key insulated with optimal threshold, and that $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$ is secure against attacks on the helper if the standard public-key encryption scheme SES is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack.

Theorem C.1 *Let* KUS *be a key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold, let* SES *be a standard public-key encryption scheme, and let* $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$ *be the transformed key-updating encryption scheme defined in Figure 2. Let A be an adversary of time complexity T against $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$, attacking the user. Assume that the adversary compromises at most t stages. Then there exists an adversary B against* KUS*, attacking the user, with at least the same advantage. Furthermore, the time complexity of B is T and the number of stages compromised by B is equal to the number of stages compromised by A.* ∎

Proof: Let $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, $\mathsf{SES} = (\mathsf{SKG}, \mathsf{SEnc}, \mathsf{SDec})$, and $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}} = (\overline{\mathsf{KG}}, \overline{\mathsf{HKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{UKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}, \overline{\mathsf{Dec}})$. We construct an adversary B that uses A to perform a user attack against KUS. Fix $k \in \mathbb{N}$. The experiment that defines the advantage of B begins by running $\mathsf{KG}(k)$ to produce (pk, usk_0, hsk). On input $pk = (q, \mathbb{G}, H, \ldots)$, adversary B runs the key-generation algorithm SKG on k, obtaining (pk_s, sk_s). It sets $\overline{pk} \leftarrow (pk_s, pk)$ and it runs runs A on input $\overline{pk}$ until A outputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$, which B also returns. B is then given access to decryption oracles $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \cdot)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, N$, a key-exposure oracle $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, usk_0, hsk)$, and a left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, where the challenge bit b was chosen at random. The adversary's goal is to guess b.

When the execution of B proceeds, it continues to run A and uses its oracles to respond to A's queries. In response to a query $\overline{C}$ to the decryption oracle $\overline{\mathsf{Dec}}(i, \overline{pk}, \overline{usk}_i, \cdot)$, B forwards the query to its decryption oracle $\mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \cdot)$, obtaining a message C. If $C = \bot$ then B returns $\bot$ to A. Otherwise, it sets $M \leftarrow \mathsf{SDec}(sk_s, C)$ and returns this to A. By the definition of algorithm $\overline{\mathsf{Dec}}$, the answer is exactly what A's decryption oracle would have returned. In response to a query i to the key-exposure oracle $\overline{\mathsf{Exp}}(\cdot, \overline{pk}, \overline{usk}_0, hsk)$, B makes the query i to its key-exposure oracle $\mathsf{Exp}(\cdot, pk, usk_0, hsk)$, obtaining the stage i user secret key usk_i and the stage i helper key hsk_i. B then sets $\overline{usk}_i \leftarrow (sk_s, usk_i)$ and returns $\overline{usk}_i$ as the stage i user secret key and hsk_i as the stage i helper key to A. This is exactly the response that A expects. In response to A's query j, M_0, M_1 to the left-or-right oracle $\overline{\mathsf{Enc}}(\cdot, \overline{pk}, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, B makes the query $j, \mathsf{SEnc}(pk_s, M_0), \mathsf{SEnc}(pk_s, M_1)$

to its left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$ and returns the answer $\overline{C}$ to A. By the definition of algorithm $\overline{\mathsf{Enc}}$, the answer is exactly what A's left-or-right oracle would have returned. When A outputs its guess bit d and halts, B returns d and halts.

Since B simulates A's environment in its attack against $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$ perfectly, A behaves as it does there and B wins as long as A does. Our conventions for measuring time complexity imply that the time complexity of B is T. Furthermore, B makes the same number of queries to its key-exposure oracle, compromising that number of user stages, as A makes to its key-exposure oracle. The conclusion follows. ∎

Theorem C.2 *Let* KUS *be a key-insulated encryption scheme with optimal threshold, let* SES *be a standard public-key encryption scheme, and let* $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$ *be the transformed key-updating encryption scheme defined in Figure 2. Let A be an adversary of time complexity T against* $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$, *attacking the helper. Then there exists an adversary B performing a chosen-ciphertext attack against* SES *with at least the same advantage. Furthermore, the time complexity of B is $T + \mathrm{poly}(k)$.* ∎

Proof: Let $\mathsf{KUS} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{HKU}, \mathsf{UKU}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, $\mathsf{SES} = (\mathsf{SKG}, \mathsf{SEnc}, \mathsf{SDec})$, and $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}} = (\overline{\mathsf{KG}}, \overline{\mathsf{HKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{UKU}}, \overline{\mathsf{Enc}}, \overline{\mathsf{Dec}})$. We show how to construct an adversary B that runs A as a subroutine and performs a chosen-ciphertext attack against SES. Fix $k \in \mathbb{N}$. The experiment that defines the advantage of B begins by running $\mathsf{SKG}(k)$ to produce (pk_s, sk_s), and selecting a challenge bit b at random. Adversary B is given input pk_s and access to a decryption oracle $\mathsf{SDec}(sk_s, \cdot)$ and a left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{SEnc}(pk_s, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$. The adversary's goal is to guess b.

In order to simulate A's environment in its attack against $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$, B must provide A with a public key $\overline{pk}$ for the transformed key-updating encryption scheme and a corresponding master helper key hsk. To do so, it runs the key-generation algorithm KG on k, obtaining (pk, usk_0, hsk). It sets $\overline{pk} \leftarrow (pk_s, pk)$ and it runs A on input $\overline{pk}, hsk$ until A outputs $N \in \mathbb{N}$. B proceeds to use algorithms HKU and UKU to compute for $i = 1, \ldots, N$, a stage i user secret key usk_i that will allow it to answer A's decryption queries. For $i = 1, \ldots, N$, B sets $hsk_i \leftarrow \mathsf{HKU}(i, pk, hsk)$ and $usk_i \leftarrow \mathsf{UKU}(i, pk, hsk_i, usk_{i-1})$. B then continues the execution of A and uses its oracles to respond to A's queries. In response to a query $\overline{C}$ to the decryption oracle $\overline{\mathsf{Dec}}(i, \overline{pk}, \overline{usk}_i, \cdot)$, B sets $C \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(i, pk, usk_i, \overline{C})$. If $C = \bot$ then B returns $\bot$ to A. Otherwise, it makes the query C to its decryption oracle $\mathsf{SDec}(sk_s, \cdot)$ and returns the answer M to A. By the definition of algorithm $\overline{\mathsf{Dec}}$, the answer is exactly what A's decryption oracle would have returned. In response to A's query j, M_0, M_1 to the left-or-right oracle $\overline{\mathsf{Enc}}(\cdot, \overline{pk}, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, B makes the query M_0, M_1 to its left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{SEnc}(pk_s, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$, obtaining a ciphertext C. It then sets $\overline{C} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(j, pk, C)$ and returns this to A. By the definition of algorithm $\overline{\mathsf{Enc}}$, the answer is exactly what A's left-or-right oracle would have returned. When A outputs its guess bit d and halts, B returns d and halts.

Since the simulation is perfect, A behaves as it does during its attack against $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$, and B wins as long as A does. Furthermore, by our conventions for measuring time complexity, the time complexity of B is T plus the time to compute a stage i helper key hsk_i and a stage i user secret key usk_i, for $i = 1, \ldots, N$. This is $T + \mathrm{poly}(k)$. The conclusion follows. ∎

From these theorems we can easily obtain the following security result for the transformed scheme.

Corollary C.3 *If the base scheme KUS is key insulated with optimal threshold and the standard public-key encryption scheme SES is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack, then the transformed key-updating encryption scheme $\overline{\mathsf{KUS}}$ is strongly key insulated with optimal threshold.* ∎

The proof of this corollary is analogous to the proof of Corollary B.3 and is omitted.

D   On the notions of security for key-updating schemes

Types of attacks on the user. In our formulation of attacks on the user presented in Section 2, an adversary compromising stage i obtains not only the stage i user secret key usk_i but also the stage i helper key hsk_i. We consider this to be appropriate because in practice if user stage i is compromised then not only is usk_i exposed, but one should assume the channel from helper to user is compromised for the duration of that stage as well, and thus any communication over it, including hsk_i, should be assumed to be available to the adversary. This issue is recognized, but handled a little differently, in [16], who separate what we call attacks on the user into "key-exposure attacks," in which an adversary compromising stage i obtains usk_i, and "key-update attacks," in which the same adversary obtains hsk_i. We have lumped the two together both for simplicity and because of our contention that consideration of security against key exposure without security against key update is impractical.

Note it is assumed that as part of the process of discovering and ejecting intruders that leads us to consider the possibility of secure stages at some point after compromise, the secure channel, over which the helper key for each stage is communicated, is re-established as well.

Dodis et. al. [16] formalize security against key-update attacks by requiring that the information sent by the helper to the user in stage i be simulatable from the point of view of an adversary that has compromised stage i. Instead, we have simply packaged it into the same framework as key-exposure attacks, asking that an adversary obtaining the information in question still be unable to compromise encryption in un-compromised stages. The requirement of [16] is stronger, but it is hard to see why one should require it rather than just require the appropriate and natural end-goal of user security as we have done. In any cases all known schemes, both ours and theirs, meet their stronger requirement. For these reasons, coupled with a desire for simplicity, we did not require simulatability in the face of key-update attacks as part of our definition.

One challenge bit versus many. The formalization of security against attacks on the user given in [16] provides the adversary with a left-or-right oracle [3]

$$\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, \mathbf{b})) \text{ where } \mathbf{b} = (\mathbf{b}[1], \dots, \mathbf{b}[N]) \in \{0, 1\}^N$$

and N is the total number of stages. A query has the form j, M_0, M_1 where $j \in [N]$ and M_0 are equal-length messages, and in response the oracle returns $C \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Enc}(j, pk, M_{\mathbf{b}[j]})$. On the other hand, our formalization provides the adversary with a left-or-right oracle $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot, pk, \mathrm{LR}(\cdot, \cdot, b))$ where $b \in \{0, 1\}$. In response to query j, M_0, M_1 as above, it returns $C \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{Enc}(j, pk, M_b)$, but only a single query is allowed to the oracle. While our formulation is simpler, one might think the resulting security requirement is weaker. In fact, the two notions of security are equivalent in the sense that a key-updating scheme is secure against attacks on the user under the definition of [16] if and only if it is secure against attacks on the user under our definition. This can be proved via a standard hybrid argument. For completeness, details will be provided in the final paper.

E   Implementation and system issues

There are numerous issues that would need to be considered with regard to implementing a key-updating system. These issues are in some sense orthogonal to our paper since they are about the model and concept of [16]. We do not have answers to these questions, but we feel it is important for the future to at least raise them.

Obvious issues are the practicality of a two-device setup, and the practicality of dividing the lifetime of a key into stages, which implies that the person encrypting will have to be aware of the

current stage number.

An issue that we believe is tricky is the security of the channel from the helper to the user. The keys sent by the helper to the user *cannot* be sent in the clear. The very definition of key-updating encryption implies that this is insecure, because then if the adversary has corrupted just one user stage and not the helper, it can use the helper stage keys to compute user secret keys for all subsequent stages by applying the key-update algorithms. Dodis et. al. [16] are well aware of this, as reflected in their formal security model, on which ours is based. The model does not give the adversary the helper keys for uncompromised stages, which indicates they are assumed to be sent over a secure channel. The question that we feel needs to be pursued is how this assumption can be implemented. There might be settings where a secure channel from helper to user exists naturally, as in the case where the helper is a smartcard. But if the helper is simply some remote device, the channel may have to be implemented cryptographically. In that case, when a user compromise is discovered, the channel should be assumed to be compromised as well, and a secure channel must be re-established. This may involve distributing new keys to the parties.