

A More Secure and Efficacious TTS Signature Scheme

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Abstract

In 2002 ([7]) the new genre of digital signature scheme TTS (Tame Transformation Signatures) is introduced along with a sample scheme TTS/2. TTS is from the family of multivariate cryptographic schemes to which the NESSIE primitive SFLASH also belongs. It is a realization of T. Moh's theory ([37]) for digital signatures, based on Tame Transformations or Tame Maps. Properties of multivariate cryptosystems are determined mainly by their central maps. TTS uses Tame Maps as their central portion for even greater speed than C^* -related schemes (using monomials in a large field for the central portion), previously usually acknowledged as fastest.

We show a small flaw in TTS/2 and present an improved TTS implementation which we call TTS/4. We will examine in some detail how well TTS/4 performs, how it stands up to previously known attacks, and why it represents an advance over TTS/2. Based on this topical assessment, we consider TTS in general and TTS/4 in particular to be competitive or superior in several aspects to other schemes, partly because the theoretical roots of TTS induce many good traits. One specific area in which TTS/4 should excel is in low-cost smartcards. It seems that the genre has great potential for practical deployment and deserves further attention by the cryptological community.

Key Words: multivariate, public-key, digital signature, finite field, tame transformation.

Note from the authors

This is a slightly further edited version of a paper presented and published in the proceedings of ICISC '03 under the same name, which had been cut down due to space constraints. This is a "full version" in that some previously excised materials are reinstated. This document used to have an appendix that is an executive summary of the article "*Tame Transformation Signatures with Topsy-Turvy Hashes*" from the IWAP 2002 conference ([7]), but it has been deleted because the material is slightly outdated.

1 Introduction

Trapdoor mappings are central to Public-Key Cryptography. As such, cryptographers have studied trapdoor permutations and maps since the dawn of public key cryptography ([15]). A handful of the many schemes attempted reached practical deployment. However, *the critical trapdoor maps are often very slow, and that is frequently due to the sheer size of the algebraic structure*. Typical are the modular exponentiation in RSA or the discrete logarithms in ElGamal/DSA/ECC.

Multivariate public-key cryptosystems were born partly to circumvent this limitation. Great names like Shamir ([43]) and Diffie ([20]) abound among the pioneers, but the first scheme to show promise and grab everyone's attention was C^* by Imai and Matsumoto ([35]).

Unfortunately a few years later C^* was broken by Patarin ([44]) who in turn introduced many of his own innovations, some (HFE/ C^{*-} families) of which are still extant. The variations on this theme seem endless.

TTS (Tame Transformation Signatures) digital signature schemes belong to this extended family. We propose TTS/4, an improvement variant of TTS and discuss some design, performance, and security issues associated with the TTS genre. Multivariates mainly differ in their central maps, or *kernels*, that determine the trapdoors and hence their security. We aim to show that the Tame Transformation, a *biregular map*¹ first introduced by T. Moh to cryptography, is a viable kernel for trapdoor permutations with appreciable gains versus other schemes, and one that warrants further investigation.

Sec. 2 is a succinct summary of TTS with theory and example. Like other multivariate schemes, TTS can be flexible in terms of hash length and is easily adaptable to 256-bit or longer hashes if needed, but TTS/4 is designed to work with current 160-bit hashes like SHA-1. We will quantify how well TTS/4 does by various metrics of speed and key size in Sec. 3. It compares well with some better-known alternatives. We see that TTS/4 is especially fast in signing and should be suitable for use on a smartcard as seen in a point-by-point comparison with the SFLASH^{v2} scheme recommended by NESSIE² for the same purpose ([2, 42]).

What remains (Sec. 4 and Sec. 5) of this paper is an extensive discussion of possible attacks against TTS/4. Avoiding the pitfalls that ensnared other schemes should be central to design decisions taken in present and future schemes, hence the multitude of techniques presented serves as an illustrative backdrop to TTS/4.

2 Tame Transformation and TTS

While clock speeds went up according to Moore's law, unfortunately so did the complexity skyrocket and key lengths exponentiate. In a quarter-century, no alternative to the venerable RSA ever showed enough of a speed gain to become the heir apparent. Indeed, multivariate public-key cryptography arose out of this need for faster algorithms. Partly as due to the search for good multivariate PKC's, cryptographers also applied their considerable talents to seeking faster alternatives in *birational* permutations ([20, 50]) over two decades. Birational implies *being polynomial or rational, with a polynomial or rational inverse*. Regrettably, an explicit low-degree inverse that brings swiftness in execution often has the undesirable side effect of engendering vulnerabilities ([8, 9, 20]). What appears to be needed is a map with a high-degree yet easily (quickly) obtained inverse.

T. Moh first took *Tame Transformations* into the landscape of Cryptography from their native habitat of Algebraic Geometry ([37]). A Tame Transformation over a field K (hereafter $\text{GF}(2^8)$ unless otherwise specified), is either affine or given by a set of polynomial relations $\phi : \mathbf{x}(\in K^n) \mapsto \mathbf{y}(\in K^m)$:

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 &= x_1; \\ y_2 &= x_2 + q_2(x_1); \\ y_3 &= x_3 + q_3(x_1, x_2); \\ &\vdots \\ y_n &= x_n + q_n(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{n-1}); \\ y_{n+1} &= q_{n+1}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n); \\ &\vdots \\ y_m &= q_m(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n); \end{aligned}$$

When $n = m$, the tame transformation is bijective and also called a *tame automorphism*. Of course, the indices of the variables x_i and y_j can be permuted, it is not required that the variables appear in the order shown above. Basic properties of a tame transformation are:

¹a bijective map that is polynomial both ways.

²New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption, project homepage at www.cryptoneessie.org.

- it is injective and we can compute the preimage $\mathbf{x} = \phi^{-1}(\mathbf{y})$ as easily as $\mathbf{y} = \phi(\mathbf{x})$; but
- it is difficult to write \mathbf{x} explicitly as a function of \mathbf{y} :

$$\begin{aligned}
x_1 &= y_1; \\
x_2 &= y_2 - q_2(x_1) = y_2 - q_2(y_1); \\
x_3 &= y_3 - q_3(x_1, x_2) = y_3 - q_3(y_1, y_2 - q_2(y_1)); \\
&\vdots \\
x_n &= y_n - q_n(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{n-1}) = y_n - q_n(y_1, y_2 - q_2(y_1), \dots, y_{n-1} - q_{n-1}(\dots)).
\end{aligned}$$

As we solve for each x_i serially, the degree of the polynomials expressing x_i in y_j escalate quickly — exponentially, even if most q_k 's are merely quadratic.

In the rest of this paper we *loosely term a map tame-like or just tame when it is either a tame transformation, or if it retains, at least where it matters, the property of having at least one preimage with easy serial computation through substitution or the solution of only linear equations but not an explicit inverse of low degree.* So a tame-like map can be neither injective nor surjective.

In general the verification map of any TTS scheme is $V : \text{GF}(2^8)^n \rightarrow \text{GF}(2^8)^m$ where $n > m$ and use only a single tame map. In contrast TTM, the family of public-key encryption scheme that is companion to TTS, uses two tame maps. We give some background and an illustrative example first.

2.1 History of Tame Transformations

The inverse of a tame automorphism is also a tame automorphism. Tame transformations have a long and distinguished history in algebraic geometry. Thousands of papers on these subjects have been published studying *automorphism groups* for affine spaces and *embedding theory* in mathematics.

Let K be a field. Denote $\text{Auto}(K^n)$ the *automorphism group* of the affine space K^n . The *tame automorphism group*, $\text{Tame}(K^n)$, is the subgroup of $\text{Auto}(K^n)$ generated by all tame automorphisms. For $n = 2$, the beautiful theory of van der Kulk in 1953 ([32]) states that $\text{Auto}(K^2) = \text{Tame}(K^2)$, i.e., any automorphism of K^2 can be written as a canonical product of tame automorphisms.

There is a veritable chasm between our knowledge of $\text{Auto}(K^2)$ and $\text{Auto}(K^n)$ for $n \geq 3$. Can we generalize van der Kulk theory to higher-dimensional cases? So far there is no answer, either affirmative or negative. Even worse, we do not have a factorization theorem for $\text{Tame}(K^n)$ for $n \geq 3$. That is, if $n \geq 3$, every element π in $\text{Tame}(K^n)$ can be factored as $\pi = \phi_m \circ \dots \circ \phi_1$ by definition, but there is no known way to find one factorization let alone a canonical one.

In [40], Nagata constructed an automorphism for $n = 3$:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_1 &= x_1 \\
y_2 &= x_2 + x_1(x_1x_3 + x_2^2) \\
y_3 &= x_3 - x_2(x_1x_3 + x_2^2) - x_1(x_1x_3 + x_2^2)^2
\end{aligned}$$

and raised the question whether it is in $\text{Tame}(K^3)$. Note that if we have a factorization theorem for the elements in $\text{Tame}(K^3)$, one may simply assume that the above automorphism is in $\text{Tame}(K^3)$ and factor it. If one succeeds, it is naturally in $\text{Tame}(K^3)$, otherwise not. We can not answer Nagata's question after some forty years, simply because we do not know how to factor elements in $\text{Tame}(K^3)$.

For embedding theory ([1], [36], [40]), the simplest case, i.e., the (algebraic) embedding of affine line to affine plane of characteristic zero, had been an open problem for forty years when it was solved in [1] using difficult and long arguments. The result is that any embedding mapping is a composition of a trivial mapping of the affine line to x -axis and an element of $\text{Tame}(K^n)$, or we should say that any embedding mapping is a

tame transformation. It is unknown how to generalize the above argument to either higher-dimensional cases (i.e., affine lines to affine spaces or affine planes to affine spaces, etc.) of characteristic zero, or even affine lines to affine planes of positive characteristics. There are some conjectures and discussions about the latter cases in [36]. We will leave it at that, and return to the subject of TTS.

2.2 A Toy Example of TTS

We use a verification map $V = \phi_3 \circ \phi_2 \circ \phi_1 : \text{GF}(2)^5 \rightarrow \text{GF}(2)^3$ composed thusly:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \phi_3 & \phi_2 & \phi_1 \\ \begin{bmatrix} z_0 \\ z_1 \\ z_2 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{M}_3 \begin{bmatrix} y_2 \\ y_3 \\ y_4 \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{c}_3 & \begin{array}{l} y_2 = x_2 + a_2 x_0 x_1 \\ y_3 = x_3 + a_3 x_1 x_2 \\ y_4 = x_4 + a_4 x_2 x_3 \end{array} & \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{M}_1 \begin{bmatrix} w_0 \\ w_1 \\ w_2 \\ w_3 \\ w_4 \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{c}_1 \end{array}$$

Normally, in $\text{GF}(2^8)$, we choose arbitrarily the nonzero parameters a_i . Here each a_i has to be 1. We can pick any \mathbf{c}_1 , and the invertible matrices \mathbf{M}_1 and \mathbf{M}_3 , but we will compute a \mathbf{c}_3 so that all the constant terms vanish. Suppose

$$\mathbf{c}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}; \quad \mathbf{M}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}; \quad \mathbf{M}_3 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

We compose them to get $\mathbf{c}_3 = (0, 1, 0)$ and the following $\mathbf{z} = V(\mathbf{w})$. Note that $w_i^2 = w_i$ in $\text{GF}(2)$.

$$\begin{array}{l} z_0 = w_0 + w_1 + w_2 + w_3 + w_0 w_1 + w_0 w_2 + w_1 w_3 + w_1 w_4 + w_2 w_4 + w_3 w_4; \\ z_1 = w_2 + w_4 + w_0 w_3 + w_1 w_2 + w_1 w_3 + w_1 w_4 + w_2 w_3 + w_2 w_4 + w_3 w_4; \\ z_2 = w_0 + w_2 + w_0 w_2 + w_0 w_3 + w_0 w_4 + w_1 w_2 + w_1 w_3 + w_1 w_4 + w_2 w_3 + w_3 w_4. \end{array}$$

These quadratic polynomials form our verification function or public key. The private key would be the a_i 's, \mathbf{c}_1 , \mathbf{c}_3 , and the inverses \mathbf{M}_1^{-1} and \mathbf{M}_3^{-1} . Suppose a mini-hash value $\mathbf{z} = (1, 1, 0)$ is given, we will compute a set of $\mathbf{w} = (w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4)$ that satisfies these equations. We can compute the signature $S(\mathbf{z}) = \phi_1^{-1}(\phi_2^{-1}(\phi_3^{-1}(\mathbf{z})))$ by solving three sequential sets of solutions:

1. $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{M}_3^{-1}(\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{c}_3) = (1, 1, 1)$ is straightforward³.
2. The solution for \mathbf{x} is clearly not unique, but assigning values to x_0 and x_1 will force the rest and there are four possible values for \mathbf{x} : $(0, 0, 1, 1, 0)$, $(0, 1, 1, 0, 1)$, $(1, 0, 1, 1, 0)$, $(1, 1, 0, 1, 1)$.
3. As $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{M}_1^{-1}(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}_1)$, we can compute all four \mathbf{w} values, which turns out to be $(1, 1, 0, 1, 1)$, $(1, 0, 0, 1, 1)$, $(1, 0, 0, 0, 1)$, $(1, 1, 1, 0, 1)$. Each could be the signature attached to the message. The recipient can verify that the signature and the hash value indeed satisfy $\mathbf{z} = V(\mathbf{w})$.

In this toy example a brute-force search takes no time. However, assuming that V does not easily decompose into its original components, and that solving for \mathbf{w} is hard with real-life sized parameters then we have a secure signature that cannot easily be forged. We can see also that our trapdoor provides for a very fast signing procedure, taking not much more time than two matrix multiplications.

³Of course, all the minus signs in this section could just have been pluses because of characteristic 2.

To sign a message M : Compute the message digest $\mathbf{z} = H(M)$; compute $\mathbf{y} = (y_8, y_9, \dots, y_{27}) = M_3^{-1}(\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{c}_3)$; pick x_0, \dots, x_7 randomly, then solve sequentially for each of the x_i for $i = 8 \dots 27$; the signature is $\mathbf{w} = M_1^{-1}(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}_1)$.

To verify a signed message (M, \mathbf{w}) : Compare $V(\mathbf{w}) = \phi_3 \circ \phi_2 \circ \phi_1(\mathbf{w})$ against the hash $\mathbf{z} = H(M)$.

This variant was proposed in [7]. We shall propose some changes below and explain why.

2.5 The New: TTS/4, an Efficient and More Secure TTS

We use the following new $\phi_2 : \mathbf{x} = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{27}) \mapsto \mathbf{y} = (y_8, y_9, \dots, y_{27})$ given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_8 &= x_8 + a_8 x_0 x_7 + b_8 x_1 x_4 + c_8 x_2 x_6 + d_8 x_3 x_5; \\
&\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots \\
y_k &= x_k + a_k x_{k-8} x_{k-1} + b_k x_{k-7} x_{k-4} + c_k x_{k-6} x_{k-2} + d_k x_{k-5} x_{k-3}; \\
&\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots \\
y_{23} &= x_{23} + a_{23} x_{15} x_{22} + b_{23} x_{16} x_{19} + c_{23} x_{17} x_{21} + d_{23} x_{18} x_{20}; \\
y_{24} &= x_{24} + a_{24} x_{16} x_{23} + b_{24} x_{17} x_{20} + c_{24} x_{18} x_{22} + d_{24} x_4 x_{24}; \\
y_{25} &= x_{25} + a_{25} x_{17} x_{24} + b_{25} x_{18} x_{21} + c_{25} x_4 x_{23} + d_{25} x_5 x_{25}; \\
y_{26} &= x_{26} + a_{26} x_{18} x_{25} + b_{26} x_4 x_{22} + c_{26} x_5 x_{24} + d_{26} x_6 x_{26}; \\
y_{27} &= x_{27} + a_{27} x_4 x_{26} + b_{27} x_5 x_{23} + c_{27} x_6 x_{25} + d_{27} x_7 x_{27}.
\end{aligned}$$

Some particular design features (items 2, 4, and 5 are TTS security enhancements we made to [7]):

1. If we write $y_k = x_k + \mathbf{x}^T F_k \mathbf{x}$, there is no canonical (symmetric) form for F_k since $\text{char } K = 2$, but the matrix $F_k + F_k^T$ is unique. Here $F_k + F_k^T$ has rank 8 for every k because no x_i appear twice in a quadratic term of the same equation.
2. The last four equations deviate from the general form in that where variables $x_{19}, x_{20}, x_{21}, x_{22}$ would be expected, the variables x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7 are substituted so that *at least one index in each quadratic term will be between 4 and 18 inclusive*. We will explain why in Secs. 4.2.2 and 4.3.
3. The rules are set up such that all eighty quadratic terms $x_i x_j$ are distinct.
4. The formula of y_k is different from the initial proposed form (TTS/2 of the previous section) in [7]. The indices in a quadratic term differ by 2, 3, 4, or 7 instead of 1, 3, 5, or 7. Principally, this is to avoid a separation of the x_i into even and odd indexed parts (see Sec. 5.2).
5. The last four equations has its corresponding x_i in a quadratic term. However, *the entire collection of relations is still a tame-like map*. The reason is

$$(1 + d_k x_{k-20}) x_k = y_k + (\text{function in } (x_0, \dots, x_{k-1})) \text{ for } k = 24 \dots 27.$$

Since $x_4, x_5, x_6,$ and x_7 are random numbers independent of the message digest, we pick them so that $1 + d_{24} x_4, 1 + d_{25} x_5, 1 + d_{26} x_6,$ and $1 + d_{27} x_7$ are all non-zero⁵ which ensures that $x_{24} \dots x_{27}$ are easily solvable. See Secs. 2.6 and 5.1 for the reason for this change in design.

To generate a key pair and to verify a signed message (M, \mathbf{w}) : Unchanged from the above section.

To sign a message M : Compute digest $\mathbf{z} = H(M)$; compute $\mathbf{y} = (y_8, y_9, \dots, y_{27}) = M_3^{-1}(\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{c}_3)$; pick x_0, \dots, x_7 randomly such that $x_k \neq d_{k+20}^{-1}$ for $k = 4 \dots 7$ (see item 5 above), then sequentially solve for x_i (for $i = 8 \dots 27$); the signature is $\mathbf{w} = M_1^{-1}(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}_1)$, release (M, \mathbf{w}) .

⁵In a sense, x_{k-20} is a *variable constant* and $1 + d_k x_{k-20}$ the *variable constant coefficient* of x_k for $k = 24 \dots 27$.

2.6 Raison d’etre: Avoiding a Common Kernel

In [8, 9] Coppersmith *et al* exploited a sequence of decreasing kernels in one of Shamir’s Birational Permutation schemes, which meant that kernels of all quadratics in the public key must share a common intersection (see Sec. 5.1). The TTS/2 of [7] has a mild vulnerability of a similar type.

Proposition 1 *Kernels of symmetric matrices corresponding to each of the twenty quadratic polynomials of a TTS/2 public key intersect in a one-dimensional subspace which will yield x_{27} to the attacker. Kernels for the quadratics in TTS/4 intersect only in the origin.*

Proof. Take the symmetric matrix corresponding to $y_8 = x_8 + a_8 x_0 x_7 + b_8 x_1 x_6 + c_8 x_2 x_5 + d_8 x_3 x_4$.

We see that no matter how the quadratic part of y_8 is written as $(\mathbf{x}^T Q \mathbf{x})$, the matrix $(Q + Q^T)$ will be as shown to the right, and that its kernel is $x_0 = x_1 = \dots = x_7 = 0$. Indeed, it is easy to see that if a quadratic has the form $x_a x_b + x_c x_d + \dots$ with all the indices a, b, c, d, \dots distinct from each other, $\{\mathbf{x} : 0 = x_a = x_b = x_c = x_d = \dots\}$ will be the kernel of the corresponding symmetric matrix, hence $\{\mathbf{x} : x_{k-8} = \dots = x_{k-1} = 0\}$ will be the kernel of the quadratic part of y_k written in \mathbf{x} .

$$\left[\begin{array}{cccccccc|c} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & a_8 & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & b_8 & 0 & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & c_8 & 0 & 0 & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & d_8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & d_8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\ 0 & 0 & c_8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\ 0 & b_8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\ a_8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \\ \hline & & & & & & & & & \mathbf{0}^{20 \times 8} \\ & & & & & & & & & \mathbf{0}^{8 \times 20} \end{array} \right] \mathbf{0}^{20 \times 20}$$

We will take Q_k and \hat{Q}_k to be the matrices relating the quadratic portions of each z_k to \mathbf{w} and \mathbf{x} respectively. Since z_k ’s are full-rank linear combinations of the y_k ’s, we know that $\cap_{j=0}^{19} \ker(\hat{Q}_k + \hat{Q}_k^T) = \text{span}([0, \dots, 0, 1]^T)$ because in the intersection subspace each of the $x_i = 0$ except for x_{27} , which does not appear in any quadratic term of the TTS/2 kernel. But we also know the quadratic portion of z_k to be simultaneously $\mathbf{x}^T \hat{Q}_k \mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{w} Q_k \mathbf{w}$, hence we have $Q_k = M_1^T \hat{Q}_k M_1$, and the kernels are related by $\ker(Q_k + Q_k^T) = M_1^{-1}(\ker(\hat{Q}_k + \hat{Q}_k^T))$. Thus, we have $\cap_{j=0}^{19} \ker(Q_k + Q_k^T) = \text{span}(M_1^{-1}[0, \dots, 0, 1]^T)$, so we have the last column of M_1^{-1} up to some factor.

With TTS/4, by a similar reasoning we find the $\ker \hat{Q}_k$ ’s to intersect in only the zero vector. \square

It might be argued that one column does not completely shatter TTS/2, and indeed it does not seem to be so easy to eliminate any other variable, but we should still avoid such a problem if possible.

Note: TTS/4 is not the only way out of the above problem. Indeed, a much more straightforward tweak is to use the same central (kernel) map ϕ_2 as in TTS/2, *except that the last term in the last equation is changed to $d_{27} x_0 x_{27}$* . We call the TTS variant with such a central map TTS/2’.

However, there are other reasons for the modifications in TTS/4. On the technical side, (see item 2 in Sec. 2.5) is that we want to enable a partitioning of the twenty-eight variables x_i into sets of fifteen and thirteen such that any crossterm has at least one of its factors from the former, while avoiding a rough division of the variables according to the parity of the index (see item 4 in the preceding section). The corresponding security concerns are addressed in Secs. 4.2 and 5.2 respectively. There is also a non-technical reason, which is that we find a structure like TTS/4 easier to generalize should such need arise. Against the attacks enumerated in Sec. 4, TTS/2’ as given above appears to be as resistant as TTS/4, a tribute to the countless variations possible in multivariate cryptography.

3 Performance Evaluation

These days one usually turns to a better compiler, a better computer, or special-purpose hardware like Motorola’s *AltiVec* (see [34]) for more performance. However, a better algorithm never hurts.

We tabulate in Table 1 the better of timings from the vendor-submitted and NESSIE’s own binaries for all 5 second round NESSIE digital signature candidates⁶, normalized to a Pentium III at 500MHz from Table 37 in [42]. We also timed TTS/4 (written in reasonably portable C) on a PIII/500.

Scheme	Signature	Pub. Key	Priv. Key	Keys Setup	Signing	Verifying
RSA-PSS	1024 bits	128 B	320 B	2.7 sec	84 ms	2.0 ms
ECDSA	326 bits	48 B	24 B	1.6 ms	1.9 ms	5.1 ms
ESIGN	1152 bits	145 B	96 B	0.21 sec	1.2 ms	0.74 ms
QUARTZ	128 bits	71.0 kB	3.9 kB	3.1 sec	11 sec	0.24 ms
SFLASH ^{v2}	259 bits	15.4 kB	2.4 kB	1.5 sec	2.8 ms	0.39 ms
TTS/2	224 bits	8.6 kB	1.3 kB	5.3 ms	35 μ s	0.13 ms
TTS/4	224 bits	8.6 kB	1.3 kB	5.3 ms	36 μ s	0.13 ms

Table 1: TTS and NESSIE round 2 candidates signature schemes on a 500MHz Pentium III

Since our programs were mainly proof-of-concept with clarity and ease of maintenance as the goal, we did not optimize to the hilt and compiled with the old `gcc-2.96`. With the newer `gcc3` or Intel’s `icc`, better programming and aggressive optimizations, we estimate that TTS/4 can be at least $1.5\times$ to $2\times$ faster. Still, TTS⁷ performed credibly against the NESSIE candidates, and we note that:

- Multivariate schemes are fundamentally identical during verification — just substituting into polynomials. Here, TTS is faster than its multivariate relatives SFLASH^{v2} ([49]) and QUARTZ ([48]) due to its smaller dimensions. Of course, it can also be somewhat inconvenient if the dimensions are not divisible by 4, as in the FLASH family’s $K^{26} \rightarrow K^{37}$.

Signing is determined by the kernel (middle quadratic portion) action. QUARTZ is slow since it has to solve high-order equations. A FLASH-like scheme is faster. Any TTS variant runs especially fast because inverting a tame-like map is simple and straightforward.

- Comparison with RSA-PSS, ECDSA or ESIGN is a different kettle of fish altogether. Multivariate schemes⁸ is a lot faster than the more traditional contenders.

Here, we have the modular exponentiation in RSA, a well-understood problem painstakingly optimized by over a quarter-century of computer science. Yet SFLASH^{v2} is faster and TTS/4 even more pronouncedly so. Clearly, there are intrinsic advantages to multivariate PKC. Due to concerns of security (see [41]), NESSIE recommends RSA-1536 with higher exponents as opposed to RSA-1024 and $e = 3$, which surely would further cut down the speed by at least 50% or more without special hardware. This decision can be considered at least somewhat vindicated with news of recent advances (e.g. [51]) on factoring large numbers.

- While TTS/4 (and in general TTS) does very well speedwise, unfortunately (although predictably) it is not the best in every category. All variants of TTS suffer from that common bugbear of multivariate cryptography: large keys. ECDSA is the undisputed king in small key sizes, although it uses discrete logarithms and is also slower than the multivariates.

Thankfully, now smart cards can have on-card storage upward of 32kB. The TTS public keys, while not so trim, is smaller than that of its more robust French cousins and tolerable at 8.6kB. It was mentioned by the authors of SFLASH ([49]) that another choice is to have the private key on card and be able to spit out the public key when needed; the same holds true for TTS/4.

⁶NESSIE eventually recommended RSA-PSS, ECDSA and SFLASH^{v2}.

⁷TTS/2 and TTS/4 have almost identical times. The TTS/4 programs happen to need four extra lookups.

⁸With the exception of the slow signing action of QUARTZ.

A note about future extensibility. Eventually the world will move to 256-bit hashes, and a rough estimate is that an analog to TTS/4 will use about 2.5 times as many CPU cycles; in contrast, a RSA-based scheme gets to use longer hashes for free; ECDSA will be hurt grievously when forced up to a longer hash; SFLASH will probably scale slightly worse than a TTS-based scheme. All told, we expect TTS type schemes to be speed-competitive 1-2 generations of hashes down the road.

4 Cryptanalysis by General Algebraic Attacks

Solving generic quadratic equation systems is NP-hard ([21]), so barring an inherent flaw in TTS, there should be no sub-exponential time algorithms. But we should still take note of essentially brute-force solutions because some practical-sized systems may be solved that way, and in reasonable time.

Other ideas, some ingenious, are used to cryptanalyze other multivariate schemes. We examine all ideas known to us but each seems to fail against TTS/4 without substantial modification.

First we deal with the more general approaches, designed to be applicable against *all multivariate signature schemes*, and describe in order the state of the art methods of both brute force searches (Sec. 4.1) and the more circumspect techniques of linearization (Sec. 4.2) and Gröbner bases (Sec. 4.3), and how each functions against TTS/4. Then we complements the above content by discussing attacks applicable to particular multivariate signature schemes.

4.1 Search Methods

At PKC 2002, Courtois *et al* laid a bold claim to “most advanced search methods” against “underdetermined systems of quadratic equations” ([12]), which essentially meant multivariate quadratic signature schemes. Certainly the ideas deserve further attention if only because no more meritorious attack has been advanced since then. We summarize and test each given method in [12] against the current TTS/4. In each method, the aim is to solve m quadratic equations in $(w_i)_{i=1\dots n}$ over $\text{GF}(q)$.

Algorithm A The general idea is as follows: Pick $2k$ equations and divide the variables into groups of k and $n - k$. Separate the quadratic equations into crossterms involving variables of both groups and quadratics dependent in each group of variables only, i.e. without loss of generality:

$$z_i = g_i(w_1, \dots, w_k) + \sum_{j=1}^k w_j \cdot \left(\sum_{\ell=k+1}^n \beta_{ij\ell} w_\ell \right) + h_i(w_{k+1}, \dots, w_n).$$

We impose $2k^2$ linear relations $\sum_{\ell=k+1}^n \beta_{ij\ell} w_\ell = \gamma_{ij}$ on the variables w_{k+1}, \dots, w_n . If $n \geq 2k(k+1)$ and $m \geq 2k$, then we can find $\bar{k} = (n - k) - 2k^2 \geq k$ independent variables $\bar{w}_1, \dots, \bar{w}_{\bar{k}}$ such that $h_i(w_{k+1}, \dots, w_n) = h'_i(\bar{w}_1, \dots, \bar{w}_{\bar{k}})$. The equations become

$$g_i(w_1, \dots, w_k) + \sum_{j=1}^k \gamma_{ij} w_j = z_i - h'_i(\bar{w}_1, \dots, \bar{w}_{\bar{k}}).$$

By evaluating the left side for all possible q^k combinations and storing the results, then evaluating the right side for all $q^{\bar{k}}$ combinations, i.e. using a birthday attack and trading space for time, this can be solved in $\approx 2q^{\bar{k}} k \bar{k}^2$ time instead of $q^{k+\bar{k}} k \bar{k}^2$. The extra factor is of course the number of multiplications needed to evaluate $2k$ polynomials in \bar{k} variables.

The upshot is the search will take $\approx q^{-k}$ as long as it was originally. [12] gives the complexity as $C_A \approx q^{m-k}$ where $k = \min(m/2, \left\lfloor \sqrt{n/2} - \sqrt{n/2} \right\rfloor)$. Counting operations per search unit, it really should be $\approx mn^2 q^{m-k}$. For TTS/4 with $(q, n, m) = (2^8, 28, 20)$, $k = 3$, and $C_A \approx 2^{151}$.

Algorithm B The general thrust is that k variables are eliminated before embarking on a brute-force search: Treat all quadratic terms $w_i w_j$ with $i, j \leq k$ as variables and eliminated first, leaving a linear system of equations in $w_1 \dots w_k$ to be solved in terms of the other variables. To give an illustrative example, in the case of TTS/4, there are 28 variables and 20 equations, and we can use 15 of the equations as a linear system to solve for the 15 quadratic terms $w_0^2, w_0 w_1, \dots, w_3 w_4, w_4^2$, and eliminate them from the remaining 5. Now we run a brute-force search on the variables w_5, \dots, w_{27} , substituting each set of values into the five equations left above and solve the resulting system for w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4 before making the consistency check. Not only have we saved the number of variables we have to guess by $k (= 5)$, instead of doing mn^2 finite field multiplications (lookups) per guess we now only have $\approx k(m - k)^2 + k^3/3$.

[12] gives the complexity as $C_B \approx K \cdot q^{m-k}$, where $k = \lfloor \sqrt{2m+2} - 3/2 \rfloor$. The coefficient $K = \max(C_2, C_3)$ where C_3 is the number of operations needed to solve a system of k linear equations ($k^3/3$ multiplications) and C_2 is given as $\approx (k(m - k)^2)$. It appears that the authors of [12] were slightly careless in their presentation, because the requirement for k , the larger the better, is really $m - k(k + 1)/2 \geq k$ so for $m = 20$ as for TTS/4, instead of $k = 4$ and $q^{m-k} = 2^{128}$ we should have $q^{m-k} = 2^{120}$. They also probably should have written $C_2 + C_3$ instead of $\max(C_2, C_3)$. Anyway, $C_B \approx 2^{130}$.

Algorithm C The general approach of this attack is to reduce into XL/FXL, but it is inapplicable to TTS/4 just as it was to TTS/2 ([7]), because it requires $n \geq 2m$ ([12]).

The discussion of this section in fact carries over with no modifications to TTS/2 and TTS/2'.

4.2 Linearization-Type Attacks

Kipnis and Shamir first introduced ([31]) *relinearization*, refining the linearization techniques often used to solve systems of high-order polynomial equations by using relationships between monomials. The simplest variant, “degree-4 relinearization”, recursively substitutes the linear relations found by linearization into the obvious relations $(ab)(cd) = (ac)(bd) = (ad)(bc)$. Relinearization ameliorates somewhat the problem of too many extraneous solutions and is used against HFE. There are more complex higher-degree improvements, but the relinearization technique can be considered superseded by XL below (Sec. 4.2.1), because XL (or FXL) is expected to work in whenever relinearization does ([13]).

4.2.1 XL and FXL

XL (and its variant FXL) can be viewed as refinements of relinearization ([13]), although both normally work with more equations than variables. The procedure at degree- D on quadratic equations (l_j) is:

1. Generate all products of arbitrary monomials of degree $D - 2$ or less with each l_j ; linearize by considering every monomial as an independent variable.
2. Performing Gaussian elimination on the set of equations, ordering the set of variable such that monomials in a given variable (say the first variable w_0) will always be the last to go.
3. Solve for w_0 a la Berlekamp; repeat if any independent variable remains.

The FXL variant takes every possible guess at a number of variables then uses XL on the remainder. Normally, we want the number of equations to be at least one and usually 2 more than the number of variables. Simulations supposedly point to XL/FXL being effective on on randomly selected quadratics — which also points to its undoing, as we shall see below. It was claimed that XL variants can break HFE, although the first actual solution of a non-trivial HFE problem was the April 2002 cryptanalysis to the HFE-80 challenge by Faugère (see Sec. 4.3), using advanced Gröbner Bases techniques.

4.2.2 Hilbert-Serre Theory, Solution Sets at Infinity and Why XL/FXL Fails

Linearization type attacks such as XL and relinearization have a fatal weakness. They are only effective under certain circumstances, one where in a sense the set of equations is generic. In more mathematical terms, *the solution set at ∞ must be at most zero-dimensional*. This came from a venerable theory of Hilbert and Serre ([38]). Of course, a cryptographer will by definition be using non-generic quadratics *the infinity solution set thereof he or she can ensure to be positive-dimensional*.

Let $V = \phi_3 \circ \phi_2 \circ \phi_1$ be a verification map of some TTS variant. Given a message digest \mathbf{z} , forging a digital signature is equivalent to finding a solution to the system of equations $\mathbf{z} = V(\mathbf{w})$. We homogenize $\mathbf{z} = V(\mathbf{w})$ in the *projective space* and let H_∞ be its *solution set at infinity*. It so happens that $\dim H_\infty$ is an important parameter for multivariate schemes because it relates directly to security under XL/FXL and Gröbner bases attacks. We claim that $\dim H_\infty \geq 12$ for TTS/4.

Since both ϕ_1 and ϕ_3 are affine and invertible, we need to consider how ϕ_2 behaves at ∞ only. We can ignore linear terms in ϕ_2 , because to every non-highest-degree term is multiplied a positive power of an extra variable x_∞ during homogenization, and “at ∞ ” means precisely $x_\infty = 0$. Since all quadratic terms in ϕ_2 vanish when we set $x_4 = \dots = x_{18} = 0$, there are at least the 13 free variables $x_0, \dots, x_3, x_{19}, \dots, x_{27}$ in this solution set, hence $\dim H_\infty \geq 13 - 1 = 12$. The claim is proved.

If the attacker successfully guess at 8 variables, the number of variables n will reduce to 20 and $\dim H_\infty$ to 4. Of course, this is not guaranteed to work! Take the example in Sec. 2.2, for all \mathbf{w} in the solution set, $w_0 = w_4 = 1$. These are the *inessential* variables, and a randomly guessed assignment or restrictions on such a variable would likely lead to a contradiction.

Part of Heisuke Hironaka’s Fields Medal work was an algorithm to determine the essential variables thereof ([27]) over characteristic zero fields. Unfortunately we are working with characteristic two fields, so Hironaka’s methods (using many partial derivatives) fail in this case. Absent an oracle, *the attacker now must guess which variables to fix*, adding considerably to the running time.

Assuming that 8 variables *are* guessed correctly. Now $\dim H_\infty = 4$. Over $\text{GF}(2)$, XL/FXL can always work by including $w_i^2 = w_i$ for every i ([14]). Here, for each extra dimension in $H_\infty = 4$, the attacker needs to augment the set of equations by a number of quadratics equivalent to a Fröbenius relation $w_i^{256} = w_i$ for an essential variable w_i — maybe $w_i = p_1^2, p_1 = p_2^2, \dots, p_6 = p_7^2, p_7 = w_i^2$. In fact the XL/FXL attacker would need to add *32 extraneous equations and 28 more variables*.

[13] claims a running time of $Aq^\mu n^{c\sqrt{n}}$ for XL/FXL, where A is the time needed to evaluate a set of polynomials, or about $mn^2/2$ multiplications; μ is the number of variables in which must be assigned by exhaustive search (“F” is for to fix); and c “the order of the Gaussian reduction algorithm”, which was claimed to be $\log_2 7 \approx 2.8$. We have $n = 48, m = 52$ now, and at least 2^{108} complexity (times A , the amount of effort to evaluate one set of polynomials). In practice it should be a lot more.

Giving the best of all worlds to the attacker, he guesses again at 4 correct variables, and succeeds in reducing $\dim H_\infty$ to zero. Even with that much luck, $n = 16$. Since $A \approx mn^2/2$, we have $A \cdot (256)^4 \cdot (16)^{2.8 \times \sqrt{16}} \approx 2^{88}$. Thus TTS/4 need not worry about XL/FXL (and hence relinearization).

Note: This section carries over to TTS/2 and TTS/2’ with the indices divided even and odd.

4.3 Gröbner Bases

Gröbner Bases is a well-known way of solving polynomial equations. The classic algorithm for computing Gröbner bases, Buchberger’s algorithm, involves ordering all monomials (usually lexicographically) and takes some appropriate algebraic combinations of the equations to eliminate the top monomial serially, until only one variable remains and then solve for that variable (*a la* Berlekamp). This method has been extended into more powerful variants by J. Faugère, called \mathbf{F}_4 and \mathbf{F}_5 ([17, 18]). $\mathbf{F}_5/2$, an adaptation of \mathbf{F}_5 , was used to break an HFE challenge in April 2002 ([19]).

The linearization methods of Sec. 4.2.1 can be considered simplified versions of Gröbner bases, and the

latter are also affected by the underdeterminedness of the system. The attacker must guess at enough variables to make the program run faster. So there is the problem as is described in Sec. 4.2.2.

Similar to XL/FXL, Gröbner bases method is also affected by $\dim H_\infty$. But there is a difference: Since dependencies are located and collated at runtime, Gröbner bases method does not become non-functional if there is a non-zero $\dim H_\infty$. Luckily for us, it does add immensely to its time complexity.

Computing the Gröbner basis of a system of m polynomial equations of maximal degree d in n variables has time complexity $m^3 d^{O(n^3)}$ ([5]); when the solution set is of dimension ≤ 0 , this bound can be cut down to $d^{O(n^2)}$ ([6]). There is one significant theoretical exception ([33], theorem 3): *if (and essentially only if) $\dim H_\infty \leq 0$, we can find a Gröbner basis of degree $\leq (d - 1)n + 2$ and hence finish in time $O(d^n)$.* As a practical matter, with a suitable algorithm the exponent can be made smaller by a factor $L(q)$, where $L(2) \doteq 11.11$ and $L(3) \doteq 6.455$, but decreases quickly to 1 for larger values of q . So over *small* base fields — and this was the case for the HFE challenge 1 mentioned above — we can also finish computing a Gröbner basis in a lot less time ([3]).

We can sum up the above thus: computing a Gröbner basis takes time at least square-exponential in n when $\dim H_\infty > 0$. So for large base fields such as $\text{GF}(2^8)$, current Gröbner-based methods cannot be used to cryptanalyze well-designed multivariate schemes, e.g., the current TTS, effectively.

5 Cryptanalysis by Other Attacks

As contrasted with “general” attacks of the previous section that can function against any scheme with only the public key known, we herein discuss attacks designed for specific schemes.

5.1 The Coppersmith Attack vs Shamir’s Birational Permutations Schemes

Shamir proposed a family of birational permutation signature schemes in [50], but soon afterwards Coppersmith *et al* found a successful attack ([8]). One specific case⁹ attacked by Coppersmith *et al*, “sequentially linearized birational permutations”, has $y_1 = x_1$, and $y_k = \ell_k(x_1, \dots, x_{k-1})x_k + q_k(x_1, \dots, x_{k-1})$ for $k = 2 \dots n$ with ℓ ’s linear and q ’s homogeneously quadratic. Take two invertible \mathbb{Z}_N square matrices ($N = pp'$ with p, p' prime), and transform \mathbf{x} to \mathbf{w} , (y_2, \dots, y_n) to \mathbf{z} . The private key is the ℓ ’s, the q ’s, and the two invertible matrices; the user lets \mathbf{z} be the message digest and finds (y_2, \dots, y_n) , assigns a random x_1 , solves sequentially for the rest of \mathbf{x} , then finds the signature \mathbf{w} . The public key is the quadratic forms giving \mathbf{z} in \mathbf{w} .

Sketch of attack: take the symmetric matrices M_j of y_j considered as quadratic forms of \mathbf{x} . These have a decreasing sequence of kernels in \mathbf{x} -space (ditto their images in \mathbf{w} -space) that we will try to find. Take λ_i such that the characteristic polynomial for $\bar{z}_i = z_i - \lambda_i z_n$ has a double root. Run recursively on the \bar{z}_i , which all have at least the kernel of M_{n-1} . We will have found a set of quadratic forms that are essentially equal to the original ones and enables us to forge signatures.

One can only admire the ingenuity of Coppersmith, Stern, and Vaudenay in looking for common kernel spaces. Theobald took pains to issue a similar warning ([52]) that “varying ranks of quadratic forms” may cause security concerns. Thankfully a TTS designer can arrange for a kernel without an onion-like sequence of decreasing kernels. Still, we consider TTS/4 to be partly inspired by their work.

5.2 Separation of Oil and Vinegar

In a simplified illustrative example of Patarin’s *Oil and Vinegar* signature scheme, the private key is an invertible matrix $A \in K^{2n \times 2n}$ over a finite field K and n matrices $F_j \in K^{2n \times 2n}$ with zeroes in all of the upper left quarter $n \times n$ entries. The signer releases as the public key the matrices $G_j \equiv A^T F_j A$. To sign, take

⁹We invert Shamir’s notations to be parallel to ours.

the message digest to be $(m_1, \dots, m_n) \in K^n$. Assign random variables to the last n components (“vinegar”) of \mathbf{y} , and solve the equations $\mathbf{y}^T F_j \mathbf{y} = m_j$ for the first n components (“oil”) of $\mathbf{y} \in K^{2n}$. Since each F_j has its upper left quarter zero, the equations are linear in the oil variables, and $\mathbf{x} \equiv A^{-1} \mathbf{y}$ is the signature, verifiable via $\mathbf{x}^T G_j \mathbf{x} = m_j$.

Here each F_j maps the subspace with $y_{n+1} = y_{n+2} = \dots = y_{2n} = 0$ (“oil” subspace) to the subspace (“vinegar”) $y_1 = \dots = y_n = 0$. The cryptanalysis by Kipnis and Shamir builds on the corollary that each $F_j^{-1} F_i$ maps the “oil” subspace to itself, and each $G_j^{-1} G_i$ shares an eigenspace (the image of the oil subspace under A) for suitable (i, j) . This eigenspace can be determined, enabling forged signatures. See ([30]) for details on how K-S attacked Patarin’s original, more complete scheme.

“Unbalanced” Oil and Vinegar ([29]) is an attempt to use more vinegar variables to circumvent this weakness, but must tread a fine line: Too few vinegar variables, and there is still a successful reduction; too many, and brute force attacks of [12] (see Sec. 4.1) work. No such concerns exist in TTS/4. In TTS/2 we can see a separation of the variables into even and odd portions, and in TTS/4 we can also apportion the variables into x_4, x_5, \dots, x_{18} and $x_0, \dots, x_3, x_{19}, \dots, x_{27}$. But there are fundamental differences from the situation in [29, 30]:

1. In TTS, the vinegar (freely assigned) variables are x_0, \dots, x_7 . Suppose an attacker finds the common eigenspaces for the TTS/2. Where in OV or UOV he would have decomposed the signature space into dependent “Oil” and independent “Vinegar” components, here he finds himself with two identical and mutually codependent Creamy Italian portions of 4 vinegar to 10 oil (the x_i with even and odd indices respectively). The same successful determination for TTS/4 will result in dependent Vinaigrette (x_0, \dots, x_3 plus x_{19}, \dots, x_{27}) and independent Ranch (x_4, x_6, \dots, x_{18}) portions, neither of which seems particularly useful to him.
2. According to the analysis in [29], with more dependent “oil” variables than independent “vinegar” variables the attack of [30] carries over without modification¹⁰, but not with more vinegar than oil. The latter is the case for TTS/4 with more variables in Ranch than in Vinaigrette.

5.3 Attacks against SFLASH and other C^* Derivatives

Several attacks are specific to the C^*/C^{*-} family which includes SFLASH^{v2}.

- Patarin originally broke ([44]) Imai-Matsumoto’s C^* by finding (by brute force) bilinear relations of the form $\mathbf{w}^T D_i \mathbf{z} + \mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{c}_i + \mathbf{b}_i^T \mathbf{z} + a_i = 0$. Ding and Schmidt ([16]) adapted this against variants of the TTM encryption scheme whose central maps are not constructed well enough. We believe this attack to be inapplicable to TTS-like methods with sufficiently many crossterms in every equation. Clearly any relation between \mathbf{w} and \mathbf{z} will correspond to one between \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} , and thus we can locate all such bilinear relations by the method of undetermined coefficients on enough sets of $\mathbf{y} = \phi_2(\mathbf{x})$ via a straightforward Gaussian elimination. In a long simulation, nothing like $\sum_{i,j \geq k} F_{ijk} w_i z_j z_k + \sum_{i \geq j} E_{ij} z_i z_j + \sum_{i,j} D_{ij} w_i z_j + \sum_i c_i w_i + \sum_i b_i z_i + a = 0$ revealed itself in TTS/4 (and TTS/2’), which is in line with theory.
- Patarin *et al* claimed that one type of attack is “the best known” against C^{*-} variants, which is Patarin’s adaptation of C^* around his own attack ([47]). To forge signatures under this attack also requires finding bilinear relations between \mathbf{w} and \mathbf{z} . Since none such exists in TTS/4, this attack is inoperative and probably cannot be patched into service.
- The FLASH family of public-key digital signature schemes ([49]) are instances of C^{*-} . The original SFLASH scheme used a subfield of $\text{GF}(2)$ for all coefficients in its private and public keys. Gilbert and

¹⁰We find that hard to put into practice since the G_j ’s taken as square matrices are not invertible.

Minier found ([25]) this a vulnerability and broke the original SFLASH successfully, but their attack affects neither the current SFLASH^{v2} nor TTS/4.

- Geiselmann *et al* observed ([23, 24]) that the middle portion of any FLASH (and indeed any C^*) variant is *homogeneous of degree two*, and showed how to find the constant parts of both affine mappings cheaply. To be quite precise, if the public map is $V : \mathbf{w} \mapsto \mathbf{z}$, a set quadratic polynomials without constant parts, then [24] showed in detail how to find \mathbf{w}_0 and \mathbf{z}_0 such that $V' : \mathbf{w} \mapsto \mathbf{z} = V(\mathbf{w} + \mathbf{w}_0) + \mathbf{z}_0$ is homogeneous of degree 2. However, it does not entirely break SFLASH^{v2}, because C^* with linear (no constant) instead of affine maps is still unbroken. It is also inapplicable to a Tame Transformation type method since a tame map has linear terms.

5.4 The MinRank Attack

The MinRank attack ([26]) is a type of “intelligent brute-force approach” to find the final affine part of a multivariate cryptosystem’s public map. The claimed complexity of the method is $O(q^{\lceil \frac{m}{n} \rceil r m^3})$ where m, n, q, r are the length of the cipher or signature block, digest or plaintext block, the size of the base field, and the necessary minimum rank for the attack to be effective. The idea is that the quadratic part of each equation in the kernel can be represented as a matrix. This kernel has a rank that should be invariant under change of coordinates, and the probability that any given vector is in the kernel of any matrix is easily computed from its rank. The steps are (cf. [26]):

1. Using the same notations as in Sec. 2.3, we guess at a random k -tuple $(\mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_k)$ of vectors in $K^n (= \text{GF}(q)^n)$, where $k = \lceil \frac{m}{n} \rceil$.
2. Take an arbitrary linear combination of the homogeneous quadratic portions of the public keys with undetermined coefficients, that is $Q = \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i H_i$, with H_i the symmetric matrix relating z_i to \mathbf{w} . Try to solve for α_i with $P\mathbf{w}_1 = \dots = P\mathbf{w}_k = 0$ via Gaussian elimination. The equations will be almost uniquely solvable when Q represents the quadratic part of y_1 , “the equation that has the smallest rank”.
3. Assume the matrix corresponding to y_1 has a rank of r , then its kernel (the inverse image $y_1^{-1}(0)$) has dimension $n - r$, hence when we guess at $(\mathbf{w}_1, \dots, \mathbf{w}_k)$ randomly, they have a probability of at least q^{-kr} to be all in $y_1^{-1}(0)$. This P is the quadratic portion of y_1 and the coefficients λ_i the row of M_3^{-1} . According to [26] the scheme should unravel entirely after that one could find M_3 , and then M_1 with a little more analysis of the kernel spaces.

If MinRank is a viable attack against a signature scheme it should be very useful, since $k = 1$. However, discounting some careless mistakes ([39]) made by the authors of [26], we note that:

1. The parameter r is not always 2 as claimed. Current TTS has $r = 8$.
2. The above assumes that y_1 has the smallest rank r ; other y_i and even many linear combinations of the y_i (hence the H_i) can share the same minimum rank r . In TTS/4, $y_i + \alpha y_{i+1}$, $y_i + \alpha y_{i+2}$ all have rank 8 when $\alpha \neq 0$.
3. In a well-designed scheme, there is no onion-like effect where finding an unknown row of M_3^{-1} gives you everything, an attacker must *find then place* every y_i correctly (see above). Assume that the attacker has an oracle to ascertain when one of the y_i has been found. Since a given y_i will fail to surface in the expected number of trials with probability around $1/e$, the expected number of lookups needed is multiplied by a factor of $\int_0^\infty x d((1 - e^{-x})^{20}) \approx 3.6$.

Even if the details above are taken care of, it is easy to add another cross-term to each equation if needed, say use TTS/2' with $n = 30$, $m = 20$, making $r = 10$. This raises the complexity by a factor of 2^{16} and easily sidesteps this attack.

5.5 Attacks on 2R schemes

The recent “2-round schemes” proposed by Patarin drew lots of fire ([4, 53, 54]), but the general structure of 2R schemes were so different from TTS that it is improbable for any of the suggested attacks to function against TTS/4 without substantial modification.

For reference, the Ye-Dai-Lam attack of [53, 54] relies on the two central schemes in a 2R scheme being of D^* type, which uses a finite field of an odd modulus smaller than 256. The cryptanalysis depends on this point which is a quirk that TTS does not share.

The Biham attack ([4]) is more ingenious but depends on the properties of the S-Box structures. One of those properties is that there must be clashes (collisions) during the initial round. This is not true for TTS-like systems.

5.6 Patarin’s IP Approach

IP (Isomorphism of Polynomials, [45]) and the related MP (Morphism of Polynomials, see [47]) means to find two affine maps s, t such that $f = s \circ g \circ t$, for given polynomial maps f, g . This is used both to attack other problems and to create public-key cryptosystems. If all the parameters in the tame portion of a TTS variant were to be fixed, then its security will depend on the difficulty of the IP problem.

Patarin originally considered both the problem of finding both mappings s and t as above, and just one mapping s satisfying $f = s \circ g$. The latter, which Patarin called “IP with one secret” was said to be fast enough for practical use but turned out to be vulnerable to a “column-wise” attack by Geiselmann *et al* ([22]). In [46] Patarin *et al* imply that most generally effective way to search for solutions to the two-secret IP/MP problem is the “combined power attack”, essentially a birthday attack, with a complexity of $O(n^\alpha q^{n/2})$ for a constant $\alpha > 2$.

TTS/4 (and any other Tame Transformation based PKC) should not have to fear from an IP-based attack. The central portion of Tame Transformation based methods contain lots of parameters (in the private key). This approach therefore will be hard to patch to be working against any TTS variant. Even should such a patch be possible, for TTS/4 with $n = 28$ and $q = 2^8$ the complexity should be $> 2^{120}$. We conclude that IP is not effective against TTS/4 or other similar TTS instances.

6 Conclusions

Multivariate Public-Key Cryptography is clearly a burgeoning research area rich in surprises and new discovery. For example, we saw that trivial changes to the structure in the previous TTS formulations can make an attacker’s life harder and the scheme more secure, and made adjustments accordingly. We do not doubt that there shall be further attacks against multivariate schemes, attacks against the TTS genre and even specific attacks tailored against TTS/4, but we are confident that the myriad variations possible in the structure of tame and tame-like maps means that TTS will adapt and survive in the wilderness as a family of secure and fast signature schemes. In summary:

The just-proposed TTS/4 seems efficacious and impervious to known attacks. Tame Transformations, literally the centerpiece of TTS, seem to have many good properties required of a low-degree birational permutation without its drawbacks. A principal advantage is that the central quadratic portion of the scheme — a tame-like map — is easily mutable, variable with many parameters, nonhomogeneous, and very fast.

We feel justified in stating that the TTS family merits further attention.

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