Identity-Based Threshold Decryption

Joonsang Baek[1] Yuliang Zheng[2]

[1] School of Network Computing, Monash University, Frankston, VIC 3199, Australia
joonsang.baek@infotech.monash.edu.au
[2] Dept. of Software and Info. Systems, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223, USA
yzheng@uncc.edu

Abstract

In this paper, we examine issues related to the construction of identity-based threshold decryption schemes and argue that it is important in practice to design an identity-based threshold decryption scheme in which a private key associated with an identity is shared. A major contribution of this paper is to construct the first identity-based threshold decryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack. A formal proof of security of the scheme is provided in the random oracle model, assuming the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is computationally hard. Another contribution of this paper is, by extending the proposed identity-based threshold decryption scheme, to construct a mediated identity-based encryption scheme secure against more powerful attacks than those considered previously.

1 Introduction

Threshold decryption is particularly useful where the centralization of the power to decrypt is a concern. On the other hand, the motivation of identity (ID)-based encryption originally proposed by Shamir [17] is to provide confidentiality without the need of exchanging public keys or keeping public key directories. A major advantage of ID-based encryption is that it allows one to encrypt a message by using a recipient's identifiers such as an email address.

A combination of these two concepts will allow one to build an "ID-based threshold decryption" scheme. One possible application of such scheme can be considered in a situation where an identity denotes the name of the group sharing a decryption key. As an example, suppose that Alice wishes to send a confidential message to a committee in an organization. Alice can first encrypt the message using the identity (name) of the committee and then send over the ciphertext. Let us assume that Bob who is the committee's president has created the identity and hence has obtained a matching private decryption key from the Private Key Generator (PKG). Preparing for the time when Bob is away, he can share his private key out among a number of decryption servers in such a way that any committee member can successfully decrypt the ciphertext if, and only if, the committee member obtains a certain number of decryption shares from the decryption servers.

Another application of the ID-based threshold decryption scheme is use it as a building block to construct a mediated ID-based encryption scheme [7]. The idea is to split a private key associated with the receiver Bob's ID into two parts, and give one share to Bob and the other to the Security Mediator (SEM). Accordingly, Bob can decrypt a ciphertext only with the help

of the SEM. As a result, instantaneous revocation of Bob's privilege to perform decryption is possible by instructing the SEM not to help him any more.

The construction of an ID-based threshold decryption scheme which is efficient and practical while meets a strong security requirement is the focus of this paper. First, we briefly review Boneh and Franklin's ID-based encryption scheme [4] and its underlaying mathematical primitive in Section 2 for discussion throughout the paper. In the following section, we investigate issues related to the construction of ID-based decryption schemes and argue that when realizing a functional ID-based threshold scheme, it is more advantageous to share a private key associated with an identity than to share a master key of the PKG. Through Sections 4 and 5, we formulate a chosen ciphertext security notion for ID-based threshold decryption and present a concrete ID-based threshold decryption scheme which is provably secure against chosen ciphertect attack in the random oracle model [1], assuming that the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem [4] is computationally hard. Furthermore, we show in Section 6 that the chosen ciphertext security of our scheme plays an important role in constructing a mediated ID-based encryption scheme secure against strong attackers who are able to corrupt users within the system.

2 Preliminaries

We first review the "admissible bilinear map", which is the mathematical primitive that plays on central role in Boneh and Franklin's ID-based encryption scheme [4].

Bilinear Map. The admissible bilinear map $\hat{e}$ [4] is defined over two groups of the same prime-order q denoted by $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ in which the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. (By $\mathcal{G}^*$ and $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$, we denote $\mathcal{G}\backslash\{O\}$ where O is the identity element of $\mathcal{G}$, and $\mathbb{Z}_q\backslash\{0\}$ respectively.) We will use an additive notation to describe the operation in $\mathcal{G}$ while we will use a multiplicative notation for the operation in $\mathcal{F}$. In practice, the group $\mathcal{G}$ is implemented using a group of points on certain supersingular elliptic curves and the group $\mathcal{F}$ will be implemented using a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field. The admissible bilinear map, denoted by $\hat{e} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{F}$, has the following properties.

- Bilinear: $\hat{e}(aR_1, bR_2) = \hat{e}(R_1, R_2)^{ab}$, where $R_1, R_2 \in \mathcal{G}$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
- Non-degenerate: $\hat{e}$ does not send all pairs of points in $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G}$ to the identity in $\mathcal{F}$. (Hence, if R is a generator of $\mathcal{G}$ then $\hat{e}(R, R)$ is a generator of $\mathcal{F}$.)
- Computable: For all $R_1, R_2 \in \mathcal{G}$, the map $\hat{e}(R_1, R_2)$ is efficiently computable.

Throughout this paper, we will simply use the term "Bilinear map" to refer to the admissible bilinear map defined above.

*The "*BasicIdent*" Scheme.* We now describe Boneh and Franklin's basic version of ID-based encryption scheme called "BasicIdent" which only gives semantic security (that is, indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack).

In the setup stage, the PKG specifies a group $\mathcal{G}$ generated by $P \in \mathcal{G}^*$ and the Bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{F}$. It also specifies two hash functions $\mathsf{H}_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{G}^*$ and $\mathsf{H}_2 : \mathcal{F} \to \{0,1\}^l$, where l denotes the length of a plaintext.The PKG then picks a master key x uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes a public key $Y_{\mathrm{PKG}} = xP$. The PKG publishes descriptions of the group $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ and the hash functions H_1 and H_2. Bob, the receiver, then contacts the PKG to get his private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}} = xQ_{\mathtt{ID}}$ where $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$. Alice, the sender, can now encrypt her message $M \in \{0,1\}^l$ using the Bob's identity $\mathtt{ID}$ by computing $U = rP$ and $V = \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(Q_{\mathtt{ID}}, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r) \oplus M$,

where r is chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$. The resulting ciphertext $C = (U, V)$ is sent to Bob. Bob decrypts C by computing $M = V \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(D_{\mathtt{ID}}, U))$.

3 Related Work

3.1 Boneh and Franklin's "Distributed PKG"

In order to prevent a single PKG from full possession of the master key in ID-based encryption, Boneh and Franklin [4] suggested that the PKG's master key should be shared among a number of PKGs using the techniques of threshold cryptography, which they call "Distributed PKG". More precisely, the PKG's master key x is distributed into a number of PKGs in such a way that each of the PKG holds a share $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ of a Shamir's (t, n) secret–sharing [16] of $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and responds to a user's private key extraction request with $D_{\mathtt{ID}}^i = x_i Q_{\mathtt{ID}}$, where $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$. If the technique of [11] is used, one can ensure that the master key is jointly generated by PKGs so that the master key is not stored or computed in any single location.

As an extension of the above technique, Boneh and Franklin suggested that the distributed PKGs should function as decryption servers for threshold decryption. That is, each PKG responds to a decryption query $C = (U, V, W)$ in $\mathsf{BasicIdent}$ with $\hat{e}(x_i Q_{\mathtt{ID}}, U)$. However, we argue that this method is not quite practical in practice since it requires each PKG to be involved *at all times* (that is, *on-line*) in the generation of decryption shares because the value "U" changes whenever a new ciphertext is created. Obviously, this creates a bottleneck on the PKGs and also violates one of the basic requirements of an ID-based encryption scheme, "the PKG can be closed after key generation", which was envisioned by Shamir in his original proposal of ID-based cryptography [17]. Moreover, there is a scalability problem when the number of available distributed PKGs is not matched against the number of decryption servers required, say, there are only 3 available PKGs while a certain application requires 5 decryption servers.

Therefore, a better approach would be *sharing a private key associated with an identity* rather than sharing a master key of the PKG. In addition to its easy adaptability to the situation where an identity denotes a group sharing a decryption key as described in Section 1, an advantage of this approach is that one can fully utilize Boneh and Franklin's Distributed PKG method without the above-mentioned scalability problem, dividing the role of "distributed PKGs" from that of "decryption servers". That is, an authorized dealer (a representative of group, such as "Bob" described in Section 1, or a single PKG) may ask an identity to each of the "distributed PKGs" for a *partial* private key associated the identity. Having obtained enough partial private keys, the dealer can construct the whole private key and distribute it into the "decryption servers" in his domain at will while the master key remains secret from any parties.

3.2 Dodis and Yung, and Libert and Quisquiter's Work

To our knowledge, other papers that have treated "threshold decryption" in the context of ID-based cryptography are [8] and [14].

Dodis and Yung observed in [8] how threshold decryption can be realized in Gentry and Silverberg [12]'s "hierarchical ID-based encryption" setting. Interestingly, their approach is to share a private key (not the master key of the PKG) obtained from a user at a higher level. Although this was inevitable in the hierarchical ID-based encryption setting and its advantage in general ID-based cryptography was not mentioned in [8], it is more sound approach than sharing the master key of the PKG as we discussed above. However, their threshold decryption scheme is very-sketched and chosen ciphertext security for the scheme was not considered in [8].

In [14], Libert and Quisquater also constructed an ID-based threshold decryption scheme and discussed its application to mediated ID-based encryption [7]. However, their approach was to share a master key of the PKG, which is different from ours. Moreover, our scheme gives chosen ciphertext security while Libert and Quisquater's scheme does not. (For the discussions on their mediated ID-based encryption scheme, readers are referred to Section 6.)

3.3 Other Related Work

Although not being directly related to "ID-based threshold decryption", there have been interesting proposals on applications of Boneh and Franklin's Distributed PKG. Recently, Chen, Harrison, Soldera and Smart [6] illustrated how the use of multiple PKGs in Boneh and Franklin's ID-based encryption scheme can be applied to the real world situations. Furthermore, they dealt with general cases of disjunction and conjunction of the multiple PKGs/identities exploiting, the algebra of the bilinear maps. Subsequently, more complicated cases of the disjunction and conjunction of the multiple PKGs and their applications to access controls were discussed by Smart [19].

Khalili, Katz and Arbaugh [13] also discussed the use of the distributed PKGs in Boneh and Franklin's scheme, especially focusing on its application to ad-hoc networks.

3.4 Our Contribution

The above literature review shows that a complete solution for constructing an ID-based threshold decryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack has not yet given. As will be further discussed in Section 6.2, chosen ciphertext security for ID-based threshold decryption plays an important role in constructing a mediated ID-based encryption scheme [7] secure against *strong inside attackers.*

In this paper, we give a solution for the above problem. Namely, we construct the first ID-based threshold decryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model [1], assuming the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem [4] is computationally intractable. We also discuss how our scheme can be adapted to a mediated ID-based encryption scheme [7] and show our mediated ID-based encryption scheme is secure against strong inside attackers, which was left as an open problem by Libert and Quisquater [14].

4 Security Notion for ID-based Threshold Decryption

4.1 High Level Description of ID-based Threshold Decryption

We first denote a generic (t, n) ID-based threshold decryption scheme by "$\mathcal{IDTHD}$", which consists of sub-algorithms GC, EX, DK, E, D, SV, and SC.

Like other ID-based cryptographic schemes, we assume the existence of a trusted PKG. The PKG runs the key/common parameter generation algorithm GC to generate its master/public key pair and all the necessary common parameters. The PKG's public key and the common parameters are given to every interested party.

On receiving a user's private key extraction request which consists of an identity, the PKG then runs the private key extraction algorithm EX to generate the private key associated with the requested identity.

An authorized dealer who possesses the private key associated with an identity can run the private key distribution algorithm DK to distribute the private key into n decryption servers.

DK makes use of an appropriate secret-sharing technique to generate shares of the private key as well as verification keys that will be used for checking the validity of decryption shares. Each share of the private key and its corresponding verification key are sent to an appropriate decryption server. The decryption servers then keep their private key shares secret but publish the verification keys. It is important to note here that the entity that runs DK can vary flexibly depending on the cryptographic services that the PKG can offer. For example, if the PKG has an only functionality of issuing private keys, the authorized dealer that runs DK would be a normal user (such as Bob in the example given in Section 1) other than the PKG. However, if the PKG has other functionalities, for example, organizing threshold decryption, the PKG can run DK.

Given a user's identity, any user that wants to encrypt a plaintext can run the encryption algorithm E to obtain a ciphertext. A *legitimate* user that wants to decrypt a ciphertext gives it to the decryption servers requesting decryption shares. The decryption servers then run the decryption share generation algorithm D taking the ciphertext as input and send the resulting decryption shares to the user. Note that the validity of the shares can be checked by running the decryption share verification algorithm SV. When the user collects valid decryption shares from at least t servers, the plaintext can be reconstructed by running the share combining algorithm SC.

Below, we formally describe $\mathcal{IDTHD}$.

Definition 1 (ID-Based Threshold Decryption Scheme) $\mathcal{IDTHD}$ consists of the following algorithms.

- A randomized key/common parameter generation algorithm $\mathsf{GC}(k)$: Given a security parameter $k \in \mathbb{N}$, this algorithm computes the PKG's master/public key pair $(sk_{\mathrm{PKG}}, pk_{\mathrm{PKG}})$. Then, it generates necessary common parameters, e.g., descriptions of hash functions and mathematical groups. The output of this algorithm denoted by cp includes such parameters and the PKG's public key pk_{PKG}. Note that cp is given to all interested entities while the matching master key sk_{PKG} of pk_{PKG} is kept secret.

- A private key extraction algorithm $\mathsf{EX}(cp, \mathtt{ID})$: Given an identity $\mathtt{ID}$, this algorithm generates a private key associated with $\mathtt{ID}$, denoted by $sk_{\mathtt{ID}}$.

- A randomized private key distribution algorithm $\mathsf{DK}(cp, sk_{\mathtt{ID}}, n, t)$: Given a private key $sk_{\mathtt{ID}}$ associated with an identity $\mathtt{ID}$, a number of decryption servers n and a threshold parameter t, this algorithm generates n shares of $sk_{\mathtt{ID}}$ and provides each one to decryption servers $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \ldots, \Gamma_n$. It also generates a set of verification keys that can be used to check the validity of each shared private key. We denote the shared private keys and the matching verification keys by $\{sk_i\}_{1 \le i \le n}$ and $\{vk_i\}_{1 \le i \le n}$, respectively. Note that each (sk_i, vk_i) is sent to the decryption server Γ_i, then Γ_i publishes vk_i but keeps sk_i as secret.

- A randomized encryption algorithm $\mathsf{E}(cp, \mathtt{ID}, M)$: Given a public identity $\mathtt{ID}$ and a plaintext M, this algorithm generates a ciphertext denoted by C.

- A decryption share generation algorithm $\mathsf{D}(cp, sk_i, C)$: Given a ciphertext C and a shared private key sk_i of a decryption server Γ_i, this algorithm generates a decryption share $\delta_{i,C}$. Note that the value of $\delta_{i,C}$ can be a special symbol "*Invalid Ciphertext*".

- A decryption share verification algorithm $\mathsf{SV}(cp, \{vk_i\}_{1 \le i \le n}, C, \delta_{i,C})$: Given a ciphertext C, a set of verification keys $\{vk_i\}_{1 \le i \le n}$, and a decryption share $\delta_{i,C}$, this algorithm checks the validity of $\delta_{i,C}$. The output of this algorithm is either "*Valid Share*" or "*Invalid Share*".

- A share combining algorithm $\mathsf{SC}(cp, C, \{\delta_{i,C}\}_{i\in\Phi})$: Given a ciphertext C and a set of decryption shares $\{\delta_{i,C}\}$ where $\Phi \subset \{1,\ldots,n\}$ such that $|\Phi| \geq t$ ($|\cdot|$ denotes the cardinality), this algorithm outputs a plaintext M. Note that the combining algorithm is allowed to output a special symbol "*Invalid Ciphertext*", which is distinct from all possible plaintexts.

4.2 Chosen Ciphertext Security for ID-Based Threshold Decryption

We now define a security notion for the $\mathcal{IDTHD}$ scheme against chosen ciphertext attacks, which we call "IND-IDTHD-CCA".

Definition 2 (IND-IDTHD-CCA) Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ be an attacker assumed to be a probabilistic Turing machine. Suppose that a security parameter k is given to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ as input. Now, consider the following game in which the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ interacts with the "Challenger".

Phase 1: The Challenger runs the PKG's key/common parameter generation algorithm taking a security parameter k as input. The Challenger gives $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ the resulting common parameter cp which includes the PKG's public key pk_{PKG}. However, the Challenger keeps the master key sk_{PKG} secret from $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 2: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ issues a number of private key extraction queries. We denote each of these queries by $\mathtt{ID}$. On receiving the identity query $\mathtt{ID}$, the Challenger runs the private key extraction algorithm on input $\mathtt{ID}$ and obtains a corresponding private key $sk_{\mathtt{ID}}$. Then, the Challenger returns $sk_{\mathtt{ID}}$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 3: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ corrupts $t-1$ out of n decryption servers.

Phase 4: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ issues a target identity query $\mathtt{ID}^*$. On receiving $\mathtt{ID}^*$, the Challenger runs the private key extraction algorithm to obtain a private key $sk_{\mathtt{ID}^*}$ associated with the target identity. The Challenger then runs the private key distribution algorithm on input $sk_{\mathtt{ID}^*}$ with parameter (t, n) and obtains a set of private/verification key pairs $\{(sk_{\mathtt{ID}^*{}_i}, vk_{\mathtt{ID}^*{}_i})\}$, where $1 \leq i \leq n$. Next, the Challenger gives $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ the private keys of corrupted decryption servers and the verifications keys of all the decryption servers. However, the private keys of uncorrupted servers are kept secret from $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 5: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ issues arbitrary private key extraction queries and arbitrary decryption share generation queries to the uncorrupted decryption servers. We denote each of these queries by $\mathtt{ID}$ and C respectively. On receiving $\mathtt{ID}$, the Challenger runs the private key extraction algorithm to obtain a private key associated with $\mathtt{ID}$ and returns it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$. The only restriction here is that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ is not allowed to query the target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$ to the private key extraction algorithm. On receiving C, the Challenger runs the decryption share generation algorithm on input C to obtain a corresponding decryption share and returns it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 6: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ outputs two equal-length plaintexts (M_0, M_1). Then the Challenger chooses a bit β uniformly at random and runs the encryption algorithm on input cp, M_β and $\mathtt{ID}^*$ to obtain a target ciphertext $C^* = \mathsf{E}(cp, \mathtt{ID}^*, M_\beta)$. Finally, the Challenger gives $(C^*, \mathtt{ID}^*)$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 7: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ issues arbitrary private key extraction queries and arbitrary decryption share generation queries. We denote each of these queries by $\mathtt{ID}$ and C respectively. On receiving $\mathtt{ID}$, the Challenger runs the private key extraction algorithm to obtain a private

key associated with $\mathtt{ID}$ and returns it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$. As Phase 5, the only restriction here is that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ is not allowed to query the target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$ to the private key extraction algorithm. On receiving C, the Challenger runs the decryption share generation algorithm on input C to obtain a corresponding decryption share and returns it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$. Differently from Phase 5, the target ciphertext C^* is not allowed to query in this phase.

Phase 8: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ outputs a guess $\tilde{\beta} \in \{0,1\}$.

We define the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s success by

$$\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathcal{IDTHD},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\tilde{\beta} = \beta] - 1.$$

We denote by $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathcal{IDTHD}}(t_{IDCCA}, q_E, q_D)$ the maximum of the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s success over all attackers $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ having running time t_{IDCCA} and making at most q_E private key extraction queries and q_D decryption share generation queries. Note that the running time and the number of queries are all polynomial in the security parameter k. We say that the ID-based threshold decryption scheme $\mathcal{IDTHD}$ is IND-IDTHD-CCA secure if $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathcal{IDTHD}}$ (t_{IDCCA}, q_E, q_D) is negligible in k.

We now proceed to describe our ID-based threshold decryption scheme.

5 Our ID-Based Threshold Decryption Scheme

5.1 Building Blocks

First, we present necessary building blocks that will be used to construct our ID-based threshold decryption scheme. We remark that since our ID-based threshold decryption scheme is also of the Diffie-Hellman (DH)-type, it follows Shoup and Gennaro [18]'s framework for the design of DH-based threshold decryption schemes to some extent. However, our scheme has a number of features that distinguishes itself from the schemes in [18] due to the special property of the underlying group $\mathcal{G}$.

5.1.1 Publicly Checkable Encryption

Publicly checkable encryption is a particularly important tool for building threshold decryption schemes secure against chosen ciphertext attack as discussed by Lim and Lee [15]. The main reason is that in the threshold decryption, the attacker has decryption shares as additional information as well as a ciphertext, hence there is a big chance for the attacker to get enough decryption shares to recover the plaintext before the validity of the ciphertext is checked. (Readers are referred to [15] and [18] for more detailed discussions on this issue.)

Note that public checkability of ciphertexts in threshold decryption schemes is usually given by non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, e.g., [18, 10]. However, we emphasize that in our scheme, this can be done *without* a NIZK proof, by simply creating a tag on the ElGamal [9] ciphertext as follows.

Let $M \in \{0,1\}^l$ be a message. Then, encrypt M by creating a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W) = (rP, \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus M, r\mathsf{H}_3(U,V))$ where $\kappa = \hat{e}(\mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID}), Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r$ for hash functions $\mathsf{H}_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{G}^*$, $\mathsf{H}_2 : \mathcal{F} \to \{0,1\}^l$, and $\mathsf{H}_3 : \mathcal{G}^* \times \{0,1\}^l \to \mathcal{G}^*$. Without recovering M during the decryption process (that is, leaving the ciphertext C intact), the validity of C can be checked by testing if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$, where $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V) \in \mathcal{G}^*$. Note that this validity test exploits the

fact that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem can be solved in polynomial time in the group $\mathcal{G}$, and passing the test implies that (P, U, H_3, W) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple since $(P, U, H_3, W) = (P, rP, sP, rsP)$ assuming that $H_3 = sP \in_R \mathcal{G}^*$ for some $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

5.1.2 Sharing a Point on $\mathcal{G}$

Recall that the distributed PKGs of Boneh and Franklin's ID-based encryption scheme can be achieved by sharing the PKG's master key x. Indeed, this can be done using Shamir's secret-sharing technique [16] as the master key x is a single element in $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and hence Shamir's technique can directly be used to distribute an element in $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

However, in order to distribute a private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}} \in \mathcal{G}$, we need some trick. In what follows, we show one can easily share a point on $\mathcal{G}$ by modifying Shamir's (t, n) secret-sharing scheme. (Note that although "Shamir's secret-sharing over $\mathcal{G}$" was mentioned in [8], how to realize it was not described. So we explicitly describe it for clarity.)

> **Distribution Phase**: Let q be a prime order of a group $\mathcal{G}$ of points on elliptic curve. Let $S \in \mathcal{G}^*$ be a secret-point to share. Suppose that we have chosen integers t and n satisfying $1 \leq t \leq n < q$.
>
> First, we pick $R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_{t-1}$ at random from $\mathcal{G}^*$. Then, we define a function $F : \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\} \to \mathcal{G}$ such that $F(u) = S + \sum_{l=1}^{t-1} u^l R_l$.
>
> Now, we compute $S_i = F(i) \in \mathcal{G}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and send (i, S_i) to the i-th member of the group of cardinality n.
>
> **Reconstruction Phase**: Let $\Phi \subset \{1, \ldots, n\}$ be a set such that $|\Phi| \geq t$, where $|\cdot|$ denotes the cardinality of the given set. The function $F(u)$ can be reconstructed by computing
>
> $$F(u) = \sum_{j \in \Phi} c_{uj}^{\Phi} S_j \text{ where } c_{uj}^{\Phi} = \prod_{\iota \in \Phi, \iota \neq j} \frac{u - \iota}{j - \iota} \in \mathbb{Z}_q.$$

Notice that $c_{uj}^{\Phi} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient used in Shamir's secret sharing scheme: If we write $S = sP$ and $R_l = r_l P$ for for some $s, r_l \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $1 \leq l \leq t-1$ (but, we do not know s and r_l), we have $F(u) = sP + ur_1 P + \cdots + u^{t-1} r_{t-1} P = (s + r_1 u + \cdots + r_{t-1} u^{t-1})P$. Hence, the Lagrange coefficients c_{uj}^{Φ}'s reconstruct the original function $F(u)$. In practice, we recover the secret S directly (without reconstructing $F(u)$) by computing $\sum_{j \in \Phi} c_{0j}^{\Phi} S_j$ where $c_{0j}^{\Phi} = \prod_{\iota \in \Phi, \iota \neq j} \frac{\iota}{\iota - j}$. Note that the computation of $c_{ij}^{\Phi} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ can be done in polynomial time.

5.1.3 Zero Knowledge Proof for the Equality of Two Discrete Logarithms Based on the Bilinear Map

To ensure that all decryption shares are consistent, that is, to give robustness to threshold decryption, we need a certain checking procedure. In contrast to the validity checking method of ciphertexts discussed in Section 5.1.1, we need a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system since the share of the key κ is the element of the group $\mathcal{F}$, where the DDH problem is believed to be hard.

Motivated by [5] and [18], we construct a zero-knowledge proof of membership system for the language $L_{\mathsf{EDLog}_{P,\tilde{P}}^{\mathcal{F}}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(\mu, \tilde{\mu}) \in \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{F} | \log_g \mu = \log_{\tilde{g}} \tilde{\mu}\}$ where $g = \hat{e}(P, P)$ and $\tilde{g} = \hat{e}(P, \tilde{P})$ for generators P and $\tilde{P}$ of $\mathcal{G}$ (the groups $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ and the Bilinear map $\hat{e}$ are as defined in Section 2) as follows.

Suppose that $(P, \tilde{P}, g, \tilde{g})$ and $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) \in L_{\mathsf{EDLog}^{\mathcal{F}}_{P,\tilde{P}}}$ are given to the Prover and the Verifier, and the Prover knows a secret $S \in \mathcal{G}^*$. The proof system which we call "ZKBm" works as follows.

- The Prover chooses a non-identity element T uniformly at random from $\mathcal{G}$ and computes $\gamma = \hat{e}(T, P)$ and $\tilde{\gamma} = \hat{e}(T, \tilde{P})$. The Prover sends γ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ to the Verifier.
- The Verifier chooses h uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and sends it to the Prover.
- On receiving h, the Prover computes $L = T + hS \in \mathcal{G}$ and sends it to the Verifier. The Verifier checks if $\hat{e}(L, P) = \gamma\kappa^h$ and $\hat{e}(L, \tilde{P}) = \tilde{\gamma}\tilde{\kappa}^h$. If the equality holds then the Verifier returns "*Accept*", otherwise, returns "*Reject*".

We state the following lemma regarding the security of ZKBm.

Lemma 1 *The* ZKBm *protocol satisfies completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge against the honest Verifier.*

Proof. As preliminaries, we first prove the following two claims.

Claim 1 *Let P and $\tilde{P}$ be generators of $\mathcal{G}$. Then $\hat{e}(P, \tilde{P})$ is a generator of $\mathcal{F}$.*

Proof. The proof will use the basic fact from the elementary abstract algebra that if a is a generator of a finite cyclic group G of order n, then the other generators of G are the elements of the form a^r, where $gcd(r, n) = 1$.

First, note that the two groups $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ are cyclic because their order q is a prime. Since $\tilde{P}$ is another generator of $\mathcal{G}$ by assumption, we can write $\tilde{P} = uP$, where $gcd(u, q) = 1$. Then, by the bilinear property of $\hat{e}$, we have $\hat{e}(P, \tilde{P}) = \hat{e}(P, uP) = \hat{e}(P, P)^u$. Also, by the non-degenerate property of $\hat{e}$, $\hat{e}(P, P)$ is a generator of $\mathcal{F}$. Hence, $\hat{e}(P, \tilde{P})$ is also a generator of $\mathcal{F}$ since $\hat{e}(P, \tilde{P}) = \hat{e}(P, P)^u$ and $gcd(u, q)$=1. □

Claim 2 *Let P and $\tilde{P}$ be generators of $\mathcal{G}$. Then, $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) \in L_{\mathsf{EDLog}_{\mathcal{F}}}$ if and only if there exists a non-identity element $S \in \mathcal{G}$ such that $\kappa = \hat{e}(S, P)$ and $\tilde{\kappa} = \hat{e}(S, \tilde{P})$.*

Proof. By Claim 1, g and $\tilde{g}$ are generators of $\mathcal{F}$. Now, suppose that $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) \in L_{\mathsf{EDLog}^{\mathcal{F}}_{P,\tilde{P}}}$. Then, by definition of $L_{\mathsf{EDLog}^{\mathcal{F}}_{P,\tilde{P}}}$, there exists $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ such that $g^x = \tilde{g}^x$. Since $g = \hat{e}(P, P)$ and $\tilde{g} = \hat{e}(P, \tilde{P})$, $g^x = \tilde{g}^x$ implies $\hat{e}(P, P)^x = \hat{e}(P, \tilde{P})^x$. But, by the bilinear property of $\hat{e}$, we have $\hat{e}(P, P)^x = \hat{e}(P, xP)$ and $\hat{e}(P, \tilde{P})^x = \hat{e}(P, x\tilde{P})$. Hence letting $S = xP$, we obtain $\kappa = \hat{e}(S, P)$ and $\tilde{\kappa} = \hat{e}(S, \tilde{P})$. The proof of converse is also easy. □

Now, we show that the protocol is complete. That is, if the Prover and the Verifier follow the protocol without cheating, the Verifier accepts the Prover's claim with overwhelming probability: Assume that $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) \in L_{\mathsf{EDLog}^{\mathcal{F}}_{P,\tilde{P}}}$. By Claim 2, we have $\kappa = \hat{e}(S, P)$ and $\tilde{\kappa} = \hat{e}(S, \tilde{P})$ for some $S \in \mathcal{G}$. Assume that the Prover sends $(\gamma, \tilde{\gamma})$ where $\gamma = \hat{e}(T, P)$ and $\tilde{\gamma} = \hat{e}(T, \tilde{P})$ for random $T \in \mathcal{G}$ to the honest Verifier. Now, observe from the above protocol that $\hat{e}(L, P) = \hat{e}(T + hS, P)$ and that $\gamma\kappa^h = \hat{e}(T, P)\hat{e}(S, P)^h = \hat{e}(T, P)\hat{e}(hS, P)$. By the bilinear property of $\hat{e}$, we have $\hat{e}(T, P)\hat{e}(hS, P) = \hat{e}(T + hS, P)$. Thus, we obtain $\hat{e}(L, P) = \gamma\kappa^h$ and this implies that the above protocol satisfies completeness property.

Second, we show the soundness of the protocol: Assume that $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) \notin L_{\mathsf{EDLog}^{\mathcal{F}}_{P,\tilde{P}}}$. Namely, we have $\kappa = \hat{e}(S, P)$ and $\tilde{\kappa} = \hat{e}(S', \tilde{P})$ for some $S \neq S' \in \mathcal{G}$. Assume that a cheating Prover sends $(\gamma, \tilde{\gamma})$ where $\gamma = \hat{e}(T, P)$ and $\gamma = \hat{e}(T', \tilde{P})$ to the honest Verifier. If the Verifier is to accept this, we should have that $\hat{e}(L, P) = \gamma\kappa^h$ and $\hat{e}(L, \tilde{P}) = \tilde{\gamma}\tilde{\kappa}^h$, which implies $T + hS = T' + hS'$. Now suppose that $T = tP$, $T' = t'P$; $S = xP$ and $S' = x'P$ for $t, t', x, x' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. Then, $T + hS = T' + hS'$ implies $(t - t') + h(x - x') = 0$. However, this happens with probability $1/q$, since we have assumed that $S' \neq S$ which implies $x' \neq x$.

Finally, we can construct a simulator which simulates the communication between the Prover and the Verifier provided that the Verifier behaves *honestly*. More precisely, the simulator chooses $\bar{h}$ and $\bar{L}$ uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $\mathcal{G}$ respectively. Then, it computes $\bar{\gamma} = \hat{e}(\bar{L}, P)/\kappa^{\bar{h}}$ and $\bar{\tilde{\gamma}} = \hat{e}(\bar{L}, \tilde{P})/\tilde{\kappa}^{\bar{h}}$. The output of the simulator is a tuple $(\bar{\gamma}, \bar{\tilde{\gamma}}, \bar{h}, \bar{L})$. It can be easily verified that the simulated values are identically distributed as those in the real communication if the Verifier behaves honestly. As a result, the above protocol becomes a zero-knowledge proof against a honest Verifier. □

Notice that `ZKBm` can easily be converted to a NIZK proof, making the random challenge an output of a random oracle [1]. Note that the above protocol can be viewed as a proof that $(g, \tilde{g}, \kappa, \tilde{\kappa})$ is a Diffie-Hellman tuple since if $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) \in L_{\mathsf{EDLog}^{\mathcal{F}}_{P,\tilde{P}}}$ then $\kappa = g^x$ and $\tilde{\kappa} = \tilde{g}^x$ for some $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and hence $(g, \tilde{g}, \kappa, \tilde{\kappa}) = (g, \tilde{g}, g^x, \tilde{g}^x) = (g, g^y, g^x, g^{xy})$ for some $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

5.2 Description of the Scheme

We now describe our ID-based threshold decryption scheme. We call our scheme "`IdThdBm`", meaning "ID-based threshold decryption scheme from the bilinear map". `IdThdBm` consists of the following algorithms.

- $\mathsf{GC}(k)$: Given a security parameter k, this algorithm generates two groups $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ of the same prime order $q \geq 2^k$ and chooses a generator P of $\mathcal{G}$. Then, it specifies the Bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{F}$ and the hash functions H_1, H_2, H_3 and H_4 such that $\mathsf{H}_1 : \{0,1\}^* \to \mathcal{G}^*$; $\mathsf{H}_2 : \mathcal{F} \to \{0,1\}^l$; $\mathsf{H}_3 : \mathcal{G}^* \times \{0,1\}^l \to \mathcal{G}^*$; $\mathsf{H}_4 : \mathcal{F} \to \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, where l denotes the length of a plaintext. Next, it chooses the PKG's master key x uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes the PKG's public key $Y_{\mathrm{PKG}} = xP$. Finally, it returns a common parameter cp $= (\mathcal{G}, q, P, \hat{e}, \mathsf{H}_1, \mathsf{H}_2, \mathsf{H}_3, \mathsf{H}_4, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})$ while keeping the master key x secret.

- $\mathsf{EX}(cp, \mathtt{ID})$: Given an identity $\mathtt{ID}$, this algorithm computes $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID}} = xQ_{\mathtt{ID}}$. Then, it returns the private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ associated with $\mathtt{ID}$.

- $\mathsf{DK}(cp, \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID}}, t, n)$ where $1 \leq t \leq n < q$: Given a private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$, the number of decryption servers n and a threshold parameter t, this algorithm first picks $R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_{t-1}$ at random from $\mathcal{G}^*$ and constructs $F(u) = D_{\mathtt{ID}} + \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} u^j R_j$ for $u \in \{0\} \cup \mathbb{N}$. It then computes each server Γ_i's private key $S_i = F(i)$ and verification key $y_i = \hat{e}(S_i, P)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Subsequently, it secretly sends the distributed private key S_i and the verification key y_i to server Γ_i for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Γ_i then keeps S_i as secret while making y_i public.

- $\mathsf{E}(cp, \mathtt{ID}, m)$: Given a plaintext $M \in \{0,1\}^l$ and an identity $\mathtt{ID}$, this algorithm chooses r uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and subsequently computes $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$ and $\kappa = \hat{e}(Q_{\mathtt{ID}}, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r$. It then computes

$$U = rP; V = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus M; W = r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$$

and returns a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W)$.

- $\mathsf{D}(cp, S_i, C)$: Given a private key S_i of each decryption server and a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W)$, this algorithm computes $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ and checks if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$.

  If C has passed the above test, this algorithm computes $\kappa_i = \hat{e}(S_i, U)$, $\tilde{\kappa_i} = \hat{e}(T_i, U)$, $\tilde{y_i} = \hat{e}(T_i, P)$, $\lambda_i = \mathsf{H}_4(\kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i})$, and $L_i = T_i + \lambda_i S_i$ for random $T_i \in \mathcal{G}$, and outputs $\delta_{i,C} = (i, \kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i}, \lambda_i, L_i)$. Otherwise, it returns $\delta_{i,C} =$(i, "*Invalid Ciphertext*").

- $\mathsf{SV}(cp, \{y_i\}_{1 \le i \le n}, C, \delta_{i,C})$: Given a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W)$, a set of verification keys $\{y_1, \ldots, y_n\}$, and a decryption share $\delta_{i,C}$, this algorithm computes $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ and checks if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$.

  If C has passed the above test then this algorithm does the following:

  - If $\delta_{i,C}$ is of the form (i, "*Invalid Ciphertext*") then return "*Invalid Share*".
  - Else parse $\delta_{i,C}$ as $(i, \kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i}, \lambda_i, L_i)$ and compute $\lambda_i' = \mathsf{H}_4(\kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i})$.
    - Check if $\lambda_i' = \lambda_i$, $\hat{e}(L_i, U)/\kappa_i^{\lambda_i'} = \tilde{\kappa_i}$ and $\hat{e}(L_i, P)/y_i^{\lambda_i'} = \tilde{y_i}$.
    - If the test above holds, return "*Valid Share*", else output "*Invalid Share*".

  Otherwise, does the following:

  - If $\delta_{i,C}$ is of the form (i, "*Invalid Ciphertext*"), return "*Valid Share*", else output "*Invalid Share*".

- $\mathsf{SC}(cp, C, \{\delta_{j,C}\}_{j \in \Phi})$: Given a ciphertext C and a set of valid decryption shares $\{\delta_{j,C}\}_{j \in \Phi}$ where $|\Phi| \ge t$, this algorithm computes $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ and checks if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$.

  If C has not passed the above test, this algorithm returns "*Invalid Ciphertext*". (In this case, all the decryption shares are of the form (i, "*Invalid Ciphertext*").) Otherwise, it computes $\kappa = \prod_{j \in \Phi} \kappa_j^{c_{0j}^{\Phi}}$ and $M = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus V$, and returns M.

It is easy to see that if C is a valid ciphertext and $|\Phi| \ge t$ then $\mathsf{SC}(C, \{\delta_j\}_{j \in \Phi}) = m$: Indeed, if $C = (U, V, W)$ has passed all the validity checks above,

$$\begin{aligned}
\prod_{j \in \Phi} \kappa_j^{c_{0j}^{\Phi}} &= \prod_{i \in \Phi} \hat{e}(S_j, U)^{c_{0j}^{\Phi}} = \prod_{j \in \Phi} \hat{e}(S_j, rP)^{c_{0j}^{\Phi}} = \hat{e}(\sum_{j \in \Phi} c_{0j}^{\Phi} S_j, rP) \\
&= \hat{e}(D_{\mathtt{ID}}, P)^r = \hat{e}(xQ_{\mathtt{ID}}, P)^r = \hat{e}(Q_{\mathtt{ID}}, xP)^r \\
&= \hat{e}(Q_{\mathtt{ID}}, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r = d^r = \kappa,
\end{aligned}$$

where c_{0j}^{Φ} is the Lagrange coefficient defined in Section 5.1.2. Hence, $\mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus V = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus (\mathsf{H}_1(d^r) \oplus M) = M$.

5.3 Security Analysis

5.3.1 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem

Before analyzing our scheme, we review the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, which is a new class of computational problem introduced by Boneh and Franklin [4].

Definition 3 (BDH) Let $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ be two groups of order q where q is prime, as defined in Section 2. Let $P \in \mathcal{G}^*$ be a generator of $\mathcal{G}$. Suppose that there exists a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{F}$. Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$ be an attacker modelled as a probabilistic Turing machine.

The BDH problem refers to the computational problem in which $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$ tries to compute the BDH key $\hat{e}(P,P)^{abc}$ given $(\mathcal{G}, q, P, aP, bP, cP)$ and a security parameter k.

We define $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$'s success $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}}(k)$ by the probability $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$ outputs $\hat{e}(P,P)^{abc}$. We denote by $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G}}(t_{\mathsf{BDH}})$ the maximal success probability $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}}(k)$ over all attackers having running time bounded by t_{BDH} which is polynomial in the security parameter k. We say that the BDH problem is intractable if $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G}}(t_{\mathsf{BDH}})$ is negligible in k.

5.3.2 Proof of Security

Regarding the security of the `IdThdBm` scheme, we obtain the following theorem implying that the `IdThdBm` scheme is secure in the sense of IND-IDTHD-CCA in the random oracle model assuming that the BDH problem is intractable.

Theorem 1 *Suppose that an IND-IDTHD-CCA attacker for the scheme* `IdThdBm` *issues up to q_E private key extraction queries, q_D decryption share generation queries, q_{H_1}, q_{H_2}, q_{H_3} and q_{H_4} queries to to the random oracles H_1, H_2, H_3, and H_4 respectively. Using this attacker as a subroutine, we can construct a BDH attacker for the group $\mathcal{G}$, whose running time is bounded by t_{BDH}. Concretely, we obtain the following advantage bound.*

$$\frac{1}{q_{\mathsf{H}_3}}\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\texttt{IdThdBm}}(t_{IDCCA}, q_E, q_D, q_{\mathsf{H}_1}, q_{\mathsf{H}_2}, q_{\mathsf{H}_3}, q_{\mathsf{H}_4}) \leq 2\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G}}(t_{\mathrm{BDH}}) + \frac{q_D + q_D q_{\mathsf{H}_4}}{2^{k-1}},$$

where $t_{\mathrm{BDH}} = t_{IDCCA} + \max(q_E, q_{\mathsf{H}_3})O(k^3) + q_{\mathsf{H}_1} + q_{\mathsf{H}_2}O(k^3) + q_{\mathsf{H}_4}q_D O(k^3)$ for a security parameter k.

To prove the above theorem, we define an ordinary (non-ID-based) threshold decryption scheme called "`ThdBm`" by modifying the `IdThdBm` scheme, which will be described shortly. Then, we show in Lemma 2 that the IND-THD-CCA security of the `ThdBm` scheme, which will be defined after the description of `ThdBm`, implies the IND-IDTHD-CCA security of the `IdThdBm` scheme. Next, we show in Lemma 3 that the intractability of the BDH problem implies the THD-IND-CCA security of the `ThdBm` scheme. Combining Lemmas 2 and 3, we obtain Theorem 1.

As mentioned, we describe the `ThdBm` scheme. Actually, `ThdBm` is very similar to `IdThdBm` except for some differences in the key generation and encryption algorithm. We only describe these two algorithms here.

- $\mathsf{GC}(k,t,n)$: Taking a security parameter k as input, this algorithm generates two groups $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{F}$ of the same prime order $q \geq 2^k$ and chooses a generator P of $\mathcal{G}$. Then, it specifies the Bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \to \mathcal{F}$ and the following hash functions H_2, H_3, and H_4 such that $\mathsf{H}_2 : \mathcal{F} \to \{0,1\}^l$; $\mathsf{H}_3 : \mathcal{G}^* \times \{0,1\}^l \to \mathcal{G}^*$; $\mathsf{H}_4 : \mathcal{F} \to \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, where l denotes the length of a plaintext. Next, it chooses x uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes $Y = xP$. Then, it chooses Q uniformly at random from $\mathcal{G}^*$ and computes $D = xQ$. Note that (Y, D) will be a public/private key pair. Now, given a private key D, the number of decryption servers n and a threshold parameter t, this algorithm picks $R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_{t-1}$ at random

from $\mathcal{G}$ and computes $F(x) = D + \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} x^j R_j$. Then, it computes each server's private key $S_i = F(i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and verification key $y_i = \hat{e}(S_i, P)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Finally, it outputs a common parameter $cp = (\mathcal{G}, q, P, \hat{e}, \mathsf{H}_2, \mathsf{H}_3, \mathsf{H}_4, Y, Q)$, and sends the verification/private key pair (y_i, S_i) to each decryption server Γ_i for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Upon receiving (y_i, S_i), each decryption server publishes y_i where $1 \leq i \leq n$.

- $\mathsf{E}(cp, m)$: Given a plaintext message $m \in \{0,1\}^l$, this algorithm chooses r uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes $d = \hat{e}(Q, Y)$, $\kappa = d^r$ in turn. Then, it computes $U = rP$, $V = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus m$ and $W = r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$, and outputs a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W)$.

We now review the security notion for the threshold decryption scheme against chosen ciphertext attack. First, we call a generic (t, n) threshold decryption scheme in the ordinary (non-ID-based) public key setting "$\mathcal{THD}$". $\mathcal{THD}$ consists of a key/common parameter generation algorithm GC, an encryption algorithm E, a decryption share generation algorithm D, a decryption share verification algorithm SV and a share combining algorithm SC.

By running GC, a trusted dealer generates a public key and its matching private key, and shares the private key among a n decryption servers. The dealer also generates (public) verification keys that will be used for share verification. Given the public key, a sender encrypts a plaintext by running E. A user who wants to decrypt a ciphertext gives the ciphertext to the decryption servers requesting decryption shares. The decryption servers then run D to generate corresponding decryption shares. The user can check the validity of the shares by running SV. When the user collects valid decryption shares from at least t servers, the ciphertext can be decrypted by running SC.

We now review the security notion for the threshold decryption scheme against chosen ciphertext attack, which we call "IND-THD-CCA", defined in [18].

Definition 4 (IND-THD-CCA) Let $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ be an attacker that defeats the security of the scheme $\mathcal{THD}$ in the sense of IND-THD-CCA. We assume that $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ is a probabilistic Turing machine taking a security parameter k as input.

Consider the following game in which the attacker $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ interacts with the "Challenger".

Phase 1: $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ corrupts a fixed subset of $t-1$ servers.

Phase 2: The Challenger runs the key/common parameter generation algorithm taking a security parameter k. The Challenger gives $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ the resulting private keys of the corrupted servers, the public key, the verification key and the common parameter. However, the Challenger keeps the private keys of uncorrupted servers secret from $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 3: $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ adaptively interacts with the uncorrupted decryption servers, submitting ciphertexts and obtaining decryption shares.

Phase 4: $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ chooses two equal-length plaintexts (M_0, M_1). If these are given to the encryption algorithm then the Challenger chooses $\beta \in \{0,1\}$ at random and returns a target ciphertext $C^* = \mathsf{E}(cp, pk, M_\beta)$ to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Phase 5: $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ adaptively interacts with the uncorrupted decryption servers, submitting ciphertexts and obtaining decryption shares. However, the target ciphertext C^* is not allowed to query to the decryption servers.

Phase 6: $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ outputs a guess $\tilde{\beta} \in \{0,1\}$.

We define the attacker $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s success by

$$\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-THD-CCA}}_{\mathcal{THD},\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\tilde{\beta} = \beta] - 1.$$

We denote by $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-THD-CCA}}_{\mathcal{THD}}(t_{CCA}, q_D)$ the maximum of the attacker $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s success over all attackers $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ having running time t_{CCA} and making at most q_D decryption share generation queries. Note that the running time and the number of queries are all polynomial in the security parameter k. We say that the threshold decryption scheme $\mathcal{THD}$ is IND-THD-CCA secure if $\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-THD-CCA}}_{\mathcal{THD}}(t_{CCA}, q_D)$ is negligible in k.

We now prove the following lemma.

Lemma 2 *Suppose that an IND-IDTHD-CCA attacker for the* `IdThdBm` *scheme issues up to q_E private key extraction queries, q_D decryption share generation queries, q_{H_1}, q_{H_2}, q_{H_3} and q_{H_4} queries to the random oracles H_1, H_2, H_3, and H_4 respectively. Using this attacker as a subroutine, we can construct an IND-THD-CCA attacker for the* `ThdBm` *scheme, whose running time and the number of decryption share generation queries and the random oracle queries to H_2, H_3, and H_4 are bounded by t_{CCA}, q'_D and q'_{H_2}, q'_{H_3}, and q'_{H_4} respectively. Concretely, we obtain the following advantage bound.*

$$\frac{1}{q_{\mathsf{H}_1}}\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IDTHD-IND-CCA}}_{\mathtt{IdThdBm}}(t_{IDCCA}, q_E, q_D, q_{\mathsf{H}_1}, q_{\mathsf{H}_2}, q_{\mathsf{H}_3}, q_{\mathsf{H}_4}) \leq \mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{THD-IND-CCA}}_{\mathtt{ThdBm}}(t_{CCA}, q'_D, q'_{\mathsf{H}_2}, q'_{\mathsf{H}_3}, q'_{\mathsf{H}_4}),$$

where $t_{CCA} = t_{IDCCA} + \max(q_E, q_{\mathsf{H}_3})O(k^3)$, $q'_D = q_D$, $q'_{\mathsf{H}_2} = q_{\mathsf{H}_2}$, $q'_{\mathsf{H}_3} = q_{\mathsf{H}_3}$ and $q'_{\mathsf{H}_4} = q_{\mathsf{H}_4}$ for a security parameter k. Here, t_{IDCCA} denotes the running time of the IDTHD-IND-CCA attacker.

Proof. For notational convenience, we assume that the same group parameters $\{\mathcal{G}, q, \hat{e}, P\}$ and security parameter k are given to attackers for `IdThdBm` and `ThdBm`.

Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ denote an attacker that defeats the IND-IDTHD-CCA security of the `IdThdBm` scheme. We assume that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ has access to the common parameter $cp_{\mathtt{IdThdBm}} = (\mathcal{G}, q, P, \hat{e}, \mathsf{H}_1, \mathsf{H}_2, \mathsf{H}_3, \mathsf{H}_4, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})$ of the `IdThdBm` scheme, where $Y_{\mathrm{PKG}} = x'P$ for random $x' \in \mathbb{Z}^*_q$. We also assume that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ has access to its decryption servers and a set of verification keys.

Let $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ denote an attacker that defeats the THD-IND-CCA security of the `ThdBm` scheme. We assume that $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ has access to the common parameter $cp_{\mathtt{ThdBm}} = (\mathcal{G}, q, P, \hat{e}, \mathsf{H}_1, \mathsf{H}_2, \mathsf{H}_4, Y, Q)$ of the `ThdBm` scheme, where $Y = xP$ for random $x \in \mathbb{Z}^*_q$ and Q has been randomly chosen from $\mathcal{G}$. Also, we assume that $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ has access to its decryption servers and a set of verification keys.

Our aim is to simulate the view of $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ in the real attack game denoted by $\mathbf{G_0}$ until we obtain a game denoted by $\mathbf{G_1}$, which is related to the ability of the attacker $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ to defeat the THD-IND-CCA security of the `ThdBm` scheme.

- Game $\mathbf{G_0}$: As mentioned, this game is identical to the real attack game described in Definition 2. We denote by E_0 the event that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s output $\bar{\beta} \in \{0, 1\}$ is equal to $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ chosen by the Challenger. We use a similar notation E_i for all Games $\mathbf{G}_i$. Since Game $\mathbf{G_1}$ is the same as the real attack game, we have

$$\Pr[E_0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{IdThdBm},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k).$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_1}$: First, we deal with the simulation of $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in Phase 1 of the real attack game as follows. We replace Y_{PKG} of $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s common parameter $cp_{\mathtt{IdThdBm}}$ by Y of $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s common parameter $cp_{\mathtt{ThdBm}}$, that is, we set $Y_{\mathrm{PKG}} = Y$. We also replace $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s decryption servers by $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s decryption servers. Then, we randomly choose an index μ from the range $[1, q_E]$ where q_E is the maximum number of private key extraction queries made by $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$. We denote the μ-th private key extraction query by $\mathtt{ID}_\mu$.

  Now, we simulate $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s random oracle H_1, which can be queried at any time during the attack. To respond to queries to H_1, we maintain an "input-output" list $\mathsf{H_1List}$ whose entry is of the form $\langle(\mathtt{ID}, Q_{\mathtt{ID}}), \tau, c)\rangle$ as explained below. Whenever H_1 is queried at $\mathtt{ID}$, we perform the following. Note below that Q is from $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s common parameter $cp_{\mathtt{ThdBm}}$.

  - If the query $\mathtt{ID}$ exists in the entry $\langle(\mathtt{ID}, Q_{\mathtt{ID}}), \tau, c)\rangle$, we respond with $Q_{\mathtt{ID}}$.
  - Else we do the following.
    - If $\mathtt{ID} = \mathtt{ID}_\mu$ then we set $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = Q$, where Q is from $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s common parameter $cp_{\mathtt{ThdBm}}$.
      - Set $c = 1$; Return $Q_{\mathtt{ID}}$.
    - Else ($\mathtt{ID} \neq \mathtt{ID}_\mu$) do the following.
      - Choose τ uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
      - Compute $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \tau P$; Set $c = 0$; Return $Q_{\mathtt{ID}}$.

  We continue to deal with the simulation of $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in other phases of the real attack game.

  If $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ issues a private key extraction query $\mathtt{ID}$ in Phase 2 then we first run the simulator for the random oracle H_1 described above to obtain the corresponding entry $\langle(\mathtt{ID}, Q_{\mathtt{ID}}), \tau, c)\rangle$ in $\mathsf{H_1List}$. If $c = 1$ then we output "*Abort*" and make $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ terminate the game, otherwise we compute $D_{\mathtt{ID}} = \tau Y_{\mathrm{PKG}}$ and respond with it. Note here that, $D_{\mathtt{ID}} = \tau Y_{\mathrm{PKG}} = \tau Y = \tau x P = x \tau P = x Q_{\mathtt{ID}}$. Hence $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in this step of the game is identical to that in the real attack as long as $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ does not abort.

  If $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ corrupts $t-1$ decryption servers in Phase 3, that is, it obtains private keys $\{S_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq t-1}$ of corrupted decryption servers, we give them to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

  Next, if $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ submits a target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$ in Phase 4 then we run the simulator for the random oracle H_1 to obtain the corresponding entry $\langle(\mathtt{ID}^*, Q_{\mathtt{ID}^*}), \tau, c)\rangle$ in $\mathsf{H_1List}$. This time, if $c = 0$ then we output "*Abort*" and make $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ terminate the game, otherwise we continue to deal with the next game. Note that if $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ dose not terminate, we have $Q_{\mathtt{ID}^*} = Q_{\mathtt{ID}_\mu} = Q$. Since Q was randomly chosen from $\mathcal{G}$, $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in this step of the game is identical to that in the real attack as long as $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ doesn't abort.

  In Phase 5, if $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ issues private key extraction queries $\mathtt{ID} \neq \mathtt{ID}^*$, we respond to these queries as we did in the simulation for Phase 2 above. Note in this phase that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ submits a ciphertext (i, C) to the i-th uncorrupted decryption server and obtains a corresponding decryption share. (Recall that $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s decryption servers were provided as its decryption servers to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.)

  If $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ submits a pair of two equal-length plaintexts (M_0, M_1) in Phase 6, we give it to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$, then $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ uses (M_0, M_1) as its plaintext-pair to be challenged. After $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ queries (M_0, M_1) to its encryption oracle, it obtains a target ciphertext C^* such that

$C^* = (U, V, W) = (rP, M_\beta \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(Q, Y)^r), r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V))$, where r and β are chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $\{0, 1\}$ respectively.

Now, we return C^* to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ as its target ciphertext. Note here that

$$\begin{aligned} C^* &= (rP, M_\beta \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(Q_{\mathtt{ID}_\mu}, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r), r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)) \\ &= (rP, M_\beta \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(Q_{\mathtt{ID}^*}, Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r), r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)) \\ &= (rP, M_\beta \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(\mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID}^*), Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r), r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, C^* is exactly the same as the target ciphertext that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ acquires in Phase 6 of the real attack.

In Phase 7, we answer $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s queries in the same way we did in the simulation for Phase 5. Note however that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ is not allowed to query C^* to any of the uncorrupted decryption servers.

Finally, if $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ submits its guess $\tilde{\beta}$ in Phase 8, we give it to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$.

Now we quantitatively analyze the simulations above. Note that if $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ does not abort in the simulation of Phases 2, 3, 5 and 7, $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in the real attack game is identical to it's view in Game $\mathbf{G_1}$. Note also that the bit β is uniformly chosen. Hence we have

$$\Pr[E_1] - \frac{1}{2} \geq \epsilon\Big(\Pr[E_0] - \frac{1}{2}\Big),$$

where ϵ denotes the probability that $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ does not abort in Phases 2, 3, 5 and 7, that is, the chance that $\mathtt{ID}_\mu = \mathtt{ID}^*$. Since μ has been uniformly chosen from $[1, q_{\mathsf{H}_1}]$, we have $\epsilon = \frac{1}{q_{\mathsf{H}_1}}$.

Hence, by definition of $\Pr[E_0]$ and $\Pr[E_1]$, we obtain

$$\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-THD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{ThdBm},\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k) \geq \frac{1}{q_{\mathsf{H}_1}} \mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{IdThdBm},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k).$$

Finally note that the running time t_{CCA} of an arbitrary IND-THD-CCA attacker for the scheme ThdBm is lower-bounded by $t_{IDCCA} + \max(q_E, q_{\mathsf{H}_1})O(k^3)$. Note also that the number of queries to the random oracles H_2, H_3, H_4 and the decryption servers made by $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ are the same as the number of those $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ has made. Hence, we obtain the bound in the lemma statement. □

We then state and prove the following lemma.

Lemma 3 *Suppose that an IND-THD-CCA attacker for the* ThdBm *scheme issues up to q_D decryption share generation queries, q_{H_2}, q_{H_3} and q_{H_4} queries to the random oracles H_1, H_2, H_3, and H_4 respectively. Using this attacker as a subroutine, we can construct a BDH attacker for the group $\mathcal{G}$, whose advantage including running time is bounded by t_{BDH}. Concretely, we obtain the following advantage bound.*

$$\frac{1}{2}\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-THD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{ThdBm}}(t, q_{\mathsf{H}_2}, q_{\mathsf{H}_3}, q_{\mathsf{H}_4} q_D) \leq \mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G}}(t_{\mathrm{BDH}}) + \frac{q_D + q_D q_{\mathsf{H}_4}}{2^k},$$

where $t_{\mathrm{BDH}} = t_{\mathrm{CCA}} + q_{\mathsf{H}_2} + q_{\mathsf{H}_3} O(k^3) + q_{\mathsf{H}_4} q_D O(k^3)$ for a security parameter k.

Proof. For notational convenience, we assume that the same group parameters $\{\mathcal{G}, q, \hat{e}, P\}$ and security parameter k are given to attackers for `ThdBm` and the BDH problem.

Let $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ be an attacker that defeats the THD-IND-CCA security of the `ThdBm` scheme. Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$ be an attacker for the BDH problem given $(\mathcal{G}, q, \hat{e}, P, aP, bP, cP)$, as defined in Section 5.3.1. We provide a same security parameter k as input to both $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ and $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$.

We start with Game $\mathbf{G_0}$ which is the same as the real attack game associated with $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$. Then, we modify this game until we completely simulate the view of $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ and obtain a game in which $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$ is able to solve the BDH problem.

- Game $\mathbf{G_0}$: This game is actually the same as the real attack game. However, we repeat it for cleaning up notations.

  First, we run the key/common parameter generation algorithm of the `ThdBm` scheme on input a security parameter k, a threshold parameter t and a number of decryption servers n. We give $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ the resulting common parameter $cp_{\texttt{ThdBm}} = (\mathcal{G}, q, \hat{e}, P, \mathsf{H}_2, \mathsf{H}_3, \mathsf{H}_4, Y, Q)$ where $Y = xP$ for random $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and the set of verification keys $\{y_i\}$, where $1 \leq i \leq n$. But we keep the private key $D = xQ$ as secret.

  If $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ submits a pair of plaintexts (M_0, M_1), we choose a bit β uniformly at random and create a target ciphertext $C^* = (U^*, V^*, W^*)$ as follows.

  $$U^* = r^*P, V^* = H_2^* \oplus M_\beta, \text{ and } W^* = r^*H_3^*,$$

  where $\kappa^* = \hat{e}(Q, Y)^{r^*}$ for random $r^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, $H_2^* = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa^*)$ and $H_3^* = \mathsf{H}_3(U^*, V^*)$.

  Once all the decryption servers are set up, $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ can issue decryption share generation queries at its will. We denote those queries by $C = (U, V, W)$. Note that C is different from the target ciphertext C^*.

  On input C^*, $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ outputs $\tilde{\beta}$. We denote by E_0 the event $\tilde{\beta} = \beta$ and use a similar notation E_i for all $\mathbf{G}_i$. Since game $\mathbf{G_0}$ is the same as the real attack game, we have

  $$\Pr[E_0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\mathbf{Succ}^{\text{THD-IND-CCA}}_{\texttt{ThdBm},\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k).$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_1}$: First, we replace replace Y and Q in $cp_{\texttt{ThdBm}}$ by bP and cP respectively, all of which are given to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$. We denote bP and cP by Y_{BDH} and Q_{BDH} respectively. Now, we assume that a subset of $t-1$ decryption servers have been corrupted without loss of generality. Let $\Phi' = \{0, 1, \ldots, t-1\}$. Then, we choose $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_{t-1}$ uniformly at random from $\mathcal{G}$ and compute $y_i = \hat{e}(Q_{\text{BDH}}, Y_{\text{BDH}})^{c_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, P)^{c_{ij}^{\Phi'}}$, where $t \leq i \leq n$ and $c_{ij}^{\Phi'}$ denotes a Lagrange coefficient with respect to the set Φ'. We send S_i where $1 \leq i \leq t-1$ to each of the corrupted servers and send y_i where $t \leq i \leq n$ to each of the uncorrupted decryption servers. Then, $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ obtains access to $\{S_i\}$ and $\{y_i\}$.

  Now, we modify the target ciphertext $C^* = (U^*, V^*, W^*)$ as follows. First, we choose κ^+ uniformly at random from $\mathcal{F}$ and replace κ^* by κ^+. We also choose H_2^+ uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^l$, replace H_2^* by H_2^+ and V^* by $V^+ = H_2^+ \oplus m_\beta$. Accordingly, whenever the random oracle H_2 is queried at κ^+, we respond with H_2^+.

  Summing up, we obtain a new challenge ciphertext denoted by C_+^* such that $C_+^* = (U^*, V^+, W^*)$, where $V^+ = H_2^+ \oplus M_\beta$ and $H_2^+ = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa^+)$ for random $\kappa^+ \in \mathcal{F}$.

  Note that the attacker $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view has the same distribution in both Game $\mathbf{G_0}$ and Game $\mathbf{G_1}$, since we have replaced one set of random variables by another set of random variables which is different, yet has the same distribution.

Thus, we have

$$\Pr[E_1] = \Pr[E_0].$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_2}$: In this game, we restore the queries to the random oracle H_2. That is, if H_2 is queried at κ^+, we do not respond with H_2^+ any more but respond with an answer from the random oracle H_2 instead. We assume that this rule applies to all the forthcoming games.

  By the above rule, κ^+ and H_2^+ are used only in the target ciphertext C_+^*. Accordingly, the distribution of input to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ does not depend on β. Hence, we get $\Pr[E_2] = 1/2$.

  Note that Game $\mathbf{G_2}$ and Game $\mathbf{G_1}$ may differ if the random oracle H_1 is queried at κ^*. Let AskH_{2_2} denotes the event that, in game $\mathbf{G_2}$, H_2 is queried at κ^*. We will use the same notation AskH_{2_i} to denote such events in all other games.

  Now, we have

$$|\Pr[E_2] - \Pr[E_1]| \leq \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_2}].$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_3}$: In this game, we further modify the target ciphertext $C_+^* = (U^*, V^+, W^*)$. First, we replace U^* by aP. We keep $V^+ (= H_2^+ \oplus M_\beta = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa^+) \oplus M_\beta)$ as it is, but define κ^+ as the BDH key $\hat{e}(P,P)^{abc}$. Then, we choose s^+ uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$, compute s^+aP and replace W^* by s^+aP. Finally, we modify the computation of the random oracle H_3 as follows. Whenever H_3 is queried at (aP, V^+), we compute $H_3^+ = s^+P$ and respond with H_3^+. Namely, we set $H_3^+ = \mathsf{H}_2(aP, V^+)$.

  Summing up, we have obtained a new target ciphertext denoted by $C_{\mathrm{BDH}}^* = (U_{\mathrm{BDH}}, V_{\mathrm{BDH}}, W_{\mathrm{BDH}})$ such that

$$U_{\mathrm{BDH}} = aP;\ V_{\mathrm{BDH}} = V^+;\ W_{\mathrm{BDH}} = s^+aP,$$

  where $V^+ = \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(P,P)^{abc}) \oplus M_\beta$. Moreover, we have $\mathsf{H}_3(U_{\mathrm{BDH}}, V_{\mathrm{BDH}}) = H_3^+ = s^+P$.

  Note that we have replaced one set of random variables $\{U^*, W^*\}$ by another set of random variables $\{aP, s^+aP\}$ which is different, yet has the same distribution. Note also that C_{BDH}^* is a valid ciphertext since $\hat{e}(P, W_{\mathrm{BDH}}) = \hat{e}(U_{\mathrm{BDH}}, H_3^+)$ by the construction of H_3^+ and W_{BDH}. Hence, the attacker $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view has the same distribution in both Game $\mathbf{G_2}$ and Game $\mathbf{G_3}$, and we have

$$\Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_3}] = \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_2}].$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_4}$: In this game, we modify the random oracle H_3. Note that we have already dealt with the simulation of the random oracles H_3 appeared in the target ciphertext C_{BDH}^*, namely, the case when H_3 is queried at $(U_{\mathrm{BDH}}, V_{\mathrm{BDH}})$. In the following, we deal with the rest of simulation.

  Whenever H_3 is queried at $(U, V) \neq (U_{\mathrm{BDH}}, V_{\mathrm{BDH}})$, we choose s uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$, computes $H_3 = sY$ and respond with H_3. Let $\mathsf{H_3List}$ be a list of all "input-output" pairs of the random oracle H_3. Specifically, $\mathsf{H_3List}$ consists of the pairs $\langle (U, V), H_3 \rangle$ where $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V) = sY$. Notice that this list grows as $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s attack proceeds.

  Because H_3 is assumed to be a random oracle, the above generation of the outputs of H_3 perfectly simulates the real oracle. Hence, $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in this game remains the same as that in the previous game. Hence, we have

$$\Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_4}] = \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_3}].$$

Note that the decryption oracle has been regarded as perfect up to this game. The rest of games will deal with simulation of the decryption oracle.

- Game $\mathbf{G_5}$: In this game, we make the decryption oracle reject all ciphertexts $C = (U, V, W)$ such that $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ has *not* been queried. If C is a valid ciphertext while $\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ has *not* been queried, $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s view in Game $\mathbf{G_5}$ and Game $\mathbf{G_4}$ may differ.

  Note that if a ciphertext C is valid then it should be the case that $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$. However, since we have assumed that H_3 has not been queried in this game, the above equality holds with probability at most $1/2^k$ since output of the simulated random oracle H_3 is uniformly distributed in $\mathcal{G}$. Adding up all the decryption queries up to q_D, we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_5}] - \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_4}]| \leq \frac{q_D}{2^k}.$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_6}$: In this game, we modify the decryption oracle in the previous game to yield a decryption oracle simulator which decrypts a submitted decryption query $C = (U, V, W)$ without the private key. Note that the case when $\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ has not been queried are excluded in this game since it was already dealt with in the previous game. Hence, we assume that $\mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ has been queried at some point.

  Now we describe the complete specification of the decryption oracle simulator. On input a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W)$, the decryption oracle simulator works as follows.

  - Extract $\langle (U, V), H_3 \rangle$ from $\mathsf{H_3List}$.
  - If $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$
    - Compute $K = (1/s)W$. (Note here that $(1/s)W = (1/s)rsY = rY = rxP$.)
    - Compute $\kappa = \hat{e}(Q, K)$
    - For $t \leq i \leq n$, compute $\kappa_i = \kappa^{c_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, U)^{c_{ij}^{\Phi'}}$.
    - Return κ_i.
  - Else reject C.

  Note in the above construction that

$$\begin{aligned}
\kappa_i &= \kappa^{c_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, U)^{c_{ij}^{\Phi'}} = \hat{e}(Q, K)^{c_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, U)^{c_{ij}^{\Phi'}} = \hat{e}(Q, rxP)^{c_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, rP)^{c_{ij}^{\Phi'}} \\
&= \hat{e}(Q, xP)^{rc_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, P)^{rc_{ij}^{\Phi'}} = \left(\hat{e}(Q, Y)^{c_{i0}^{\Phi'}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \hat{e}(S_j, P)^{c_{ij}^{\Phi'}} \right)^r = y_i^r.
\end{aligned}$$

  Hence, κ_i is a correct i-th share of the BDH key $\kappa = \hat{e}(Q, Y)^r$. However, we need more efforts to simulate a decryption share δ_i containing κ_i completely. This can be done as follows.

  First, we simulate the random oracle H_4 in a classical way. That is, if H_4 is queried, we choose H_4 uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and respond with it. As usual, we maintain an "input-output" list $\mathsf{H_4List}$ for H_4 whose entry is of the form $\langle (\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}, \tilde{y}), H_4 \rangle$. Next, we choose L_i and λ_i uniformly at random from $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ respectively, and compute $\tilde{\kappa_i} = \hat{e}(L_i, U)/\kappa_i^{\lambda_i}$ and $\tilde{y_i} = \hat{e}(L_i, P)/y_i^{\lambda_i}$. Then, we set $\lambda_i = \mathsf{H}_4(\kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i})$. Finally, we check whether there exists an entry $\langle (\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}, \tilde{y}), H_4 \rangle$ in $\mathsf{H_4List}$ satisfying $H_4 = \lambda_i$ but $(\kappa, \tilde{\kappa}, \tilde{y}) \neq (\kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i})$. If such

entry exists then we return "*Abort*" message to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$. Otherwise, we return the simulated value $\delta_i = (i, \kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i}, L_i)$ to $\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ as a decryption share corresponding to C and save $\langle(\kappa_i, \tilde{\kappa_i}, \tilde{y_i},), \lambda_i\rangle$ to $\mathsf{H_4List}$.

Since H_3 are assumed to have already been queried in this game (i.e., these case were already dealt with in the previous game), the above simulated decryption share generation server perfectly simulates the real one except the error (collision) in the simulation of H_4 occurs. Note that this happens with probability $q_{\mathsf{H}_4}/2^k$, considering up to q_{H_4} queries to H_4. Adding up all the decryption queries up to q_D, we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_6}] - \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_5}]| \leq \frac{q_D q_{\mathsf{H}_4}}{2^k}.$$

Now, recall that the target ciphertext used so far is C^*_{BDH} that constructed in Game $\mathbf{G_3}$. Accordingly, AskH_{2_6} denotes an event that the BDH key $\hat{e}(P,P)^{abc}$ has been queried to the random oracle H_2. Note also that we have used the easiness of the DDH problem in the group $\mathcal{G}$ to simulate the decryption oracle.

Therefore, at this stage, $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}$ can solve the BDH problem by outputting the queries to the random oracle H_2. That is, we have

$$\Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_6}] \leq \mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}}(k).$$

Thus, putting all the bounds we have obtained in each game together, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{1}{2}\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-THD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{ThdBm},\mathsf{B}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k) &= |\Pr[E_0] - \Pr[E_2]| \leq \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_2}] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_5}] + \frac{q_D}{2^k} \\ &\leq \frac{q_D}{2^k} + \Pr[\mathsf{AskH}_{2_6}] + \frac{q_D q_{\mathsf{H}_4}}{2^k} \leq \frac{q_D + q_D q_{\mathsf{H}_4}}{2^k} + \mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{BDH}}_{\mathcal{G},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{BDH}}}(k).\end{aligned}$$

Considering the running time t_{BDH} and queries of an arbitrary BDH-attacker for the group $\mathcal{G}$, we obtain the bound in the lemma statement. □

6 Application to Mediated ID-Based Encryption Schemes

6.1 Security of Mediated ID-Based Encryption Schemes

The main motivation of mediated cryptography [3] is to revoke a user's privilege to perform cryptographic operations such as decrypting ciphertexts or signing messages *instantaneously*. In [3], Boneh et al. constructed the first mediated encryption and signature schemes using the RSA primitive. Their idea was to split a user's private key into two parts and give one piece to the on-line Security Mediator (SEM) and the other to the user. To decrypt or sign, the user must acquire a message-specific token which is associated with the SEM part of private key from the SEM. As a result, revocation is achieved by instructing the SEM not to issue tokens for the user.

Recently, the problem of realizing mediated encryption in the ID-based setting was considered by Ding and Tsudik [7]. They proposed an ID-based mediated encryption scheme based on RSA-OAEP [2]. Although their scheme offers good performance and practicality, from a security point of view, it has a drawback which stems from the fact that a common RSA modulus is used for all the users within the system and hence anyone obtained a single private/public key pair can factor the modulus by compromising the SEM. Therefore, to guarantee the security of Ding and Tsudik's scheme, one should assume that the SEM's private key must be protected throughout the life of the system.

As an alternative to Ding and Tsudik's scheme, Libert and Quisquater [14] proposed a new mediated ID-based encryption scheme. Due to its structural property (mainly because Boneh and Franklin's ID-based encryption scheme is used), their scheme does not suffer from the "common modulus" problem of Ding and Tsudik's scheme. That is, a compromise of the SEM's private key does not lead to a break of the whole system. In contrast to this positive result, Libert and Quisquater, however, observed that *even though the SEM's private key is protected*, their scheme as well as Ding and Tsudik's scheme are not secure against "inside attack" in which the attacker who possesses the user part of private key conducts chosen ciphertext attack. As a result, it should be strictly assumed in those schemes that users' private keys must be protected to ensure chosen ciphertext security. In practice, this assumption is fairly strong in that there may be more chance for users to compromise their private keys than the SEM does since the SEM is usually assumed to be a trusted entity configured by a system administrator.

According to Libert and Quisquater [14], the reason why the mediated schemes proposed so far (including their scheme) are not secure against inside attack is that in the SEM architecture of those schemes, there is no mechanism for checking the validity of a ciphertext before generating a token from it (that is, "publicly checkable" validity test is missing). To get an intuition for this, let us examine Libert and Quisquater's scheme which can be described as follows. In the setup stage, the common parameters including the PKG's public key $Y_{\mathrm{PKG}} = xP$ where x is the master key and hash functions H_1, H_2, H_3, and H_4 are generated. In the key generation stage, the PKG computes $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID}} = xQ_{\mathtt{ID}}$ on receiving a user's identity $\mathtt{ID}$. Then, it chooses a random point $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$ from $\mathcal{G}^*$ and computes $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} = D_{\mathtt{ID}} - D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$. The PKG gives the partial private key $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$ to the user and $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$ to the SEM. Given the user's identity $\mathtt{ID}$ and the common parameter, a sender can encrypt a message $M \in \{0,1\}^l$ by computing $C = (U, V, W)$ where $U = rP$, $V = \sigma \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(\hat{e}(Y_{PKG}, Q_{\mathtt{ID}})^r)$, $W = M \oplus \mathsf{H}_4(\sigma)$, and $r = \mathsf{H}_3(\sigma, M) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ for random $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^l$. On receiving $C = (U, V, W)$, the user forwards it to the SEM. Then, the SEM and the user perform the following in parallel.

- SEM (We call this procedure "SEM oracle"): Check if the user's identity $\mathtt{ID}$ is revoked. If it is, return "$\mathtt{ID}$ *Revoked*". Otherwise, compute $g_{sem} = \hat{e}(U, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem})$ and send it to the user.
- User (We call this procedure "User oracle"): Compute $g_{user} = \hat{e}(U, D_{\mathtt{ID},user})$. When receiving g_{sem} from the SEM, compute $g = g_{sem}g_{user}$. Then, compute $\sigma = V \oplus \mathsf{H}_2(g)$ and $M = W \oplus \mathsf{H}_4(\sigma)$. Finally, check $U = r'P$ for $r' = \mathsf{H}_3(\sigma, M)$. If it is, return M, otherwise, return "*Reject*".

Now, let us assume that a "strong" attacker has a target ciphertext $C^* = (U^*, V^*, W^*)$ which encrypts a message M_β where β is chosen at random from $\{0,1\}$, a target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$, and a private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,user}$ associated with $\mathtt{ID}^*$. The attacker can easily defeat the indistinguishability of C^* by conducting a simple chosen ciphertext attack as follows. The attacker just changes C^* into $C' = (U^*, V^*, W')$ for $W' \neq W^*$, and queries this to the SEM oracle. Upon receiving C', the SEM oracle will simply return $g^*_{sem} = \hat{e}(U^*, D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem})$. The attacker then computes $g^* = g^*_{sem}g^*_{user}$ where $g^*_{user} = \hat{e}(U^*, D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,user})$ using the user's private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,user}$. Obviously, this problem is caused by the fact that the validity of queried ciphertexts is not checked in the SEM oracle.

Libert and Quisquater remained removal of this drawback as an open problem, only providing a proof that their scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attack in a *weaker* sense – attackers are *not* allowed to obtain the user part of private key.

However, in the following section, we present a new mediated ID-based encryption scheme which is secure against ciphertext attack in a *strong* sense, that is, secure against chosen ciphertext attack conducted by the stronger attacker who obtains the user part of private key.

6.2 Our Mediated ID-Based Encryption Scheme

In what follows, we describe our mediated ID-based encryption scheme "mIdeBm", which is based on the IdThdBm scheme described in Section 5.2. mIdeBm consists of the following algorithms.

- A randomized key/common parameter generation algorithm $\mathsf{GC}(k)$: Given a security parameter k, the PKG runs the key generation algorithm of IdThdBm. The output of this algorithm $cp = (\mathcal{G},\ q,\ P,\ \hat{e},\ \mathsf{H}_1,\ \mathsf{H}_2,\ \mathsf{H}_3,\ \mathsf{H}_4,\ Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})$ is as defined in the description of IdThdBm. Note that cp is given to all interested parties while the master key x is kept secret within the PKG.

- A private key extraction algorithm $\mathsf{EX}(cp, \mathtt{ID})$: This algorithm is run by the PKG on receiving a private key extraction query from any user who wants to extract a private key that matches to an identity ID.

  - Given ID, compute $Q_{\mathtt{ID}} = \mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID})$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID}} = sQ_{\mathtt{ID}}$.
  - Output $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$.

- A randomized private key distribution algorithm $\mathsf{DK}(cp, D_{\mathtt{ID}})$: Given $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ which is a private key associated with an identity ID, the PKG splits $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ using $(2, 2)$ secret-sharing technique as follows.

  - Pick R at random from $\mathcal{G}^*$ and construct $F(u) = D_{\mathtt{ID}} + uR$ for $u \in \{0\} \cup \mathbb{N}$.
  - Compute $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} = F(1)$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID},user} = F(2)$.

  The PKG gives $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$ to the SEM and $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$ to the user.

- A randomized encryption algorithm $\mathsf{E}(cp, \mathtt{ID}, M)$: Given a plaintext $M \in \{0,1\}^l$ and a user's identity ID, a user creates a ciphertext $C = (U, V, W)$ such that

$$U = rP; V = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus M; W = r\mathsf{H}_3(U, V),$$

  where $\kappa = \hat{e}(\mathsf{H}_1(\mathtt{ID}), Y_{\mathrm{PKG}})^r$ for random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

- A decryption algorithm $\mathsf{D}(cp, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}, D_{\mathtt{ID},user}, C)$: When receiving $C = (U, V, W)$, a user forwards it to the SEM. The SEM and the user perform the following in parallel.

  - SEM (We call this procedure "SEM oracle"):
    1. Check if the user's identity ID is revoked. If it is, return "ID *Revoked*".
    2. Otherwise, do the following:
       * Compute $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ and check if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$. If C has passed this test, compute $\kappa_{sem} = \hat{e}(D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}, U)$ and send $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C} = (sem, \kappa_{sem})$ to the user. Otherwise, send $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C} = (sem,$ "*Invalid Ciphertext*") to the user.
  - User (We call this procedure "User oracle"):

1. Compute $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$ and check if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$. If C has passed this test, compute $\kappa_{user} = \hat{e}(D_{\mathtt{ID},user}, U)$. Otherwise, return "*Reject*" and terminate.
2. Get $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C}$ from the SEM and do the following:
   * If $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C}$ is of the form (sem, "*Invalid Ciphertext*"), return "*Reject*" and terminate. Otherwise, compute $\kappa = \kappa_{sem}^{c_{01}^{\Phi}} \kappa_{user}^{c_{02}^{\Phi}}$ where c_{01}^{Φ} and c_{02}^{Φ} denote the Lagrange coefficients for the set $\Phi = \{1, 2\}$ and $M = \mathsf{H}_2(\kappa) \oplus V$, and return M.

Notice that in the SEM oracle of our scheme, the validity of a ciphertext is checked before generating a token in the same way as the decryption share generation algorithm of `IdThdBm` does. Indeed, we show that the IND-IDTHD-CCA (Definition 2) security of the `IdThdBm` scheme with $(t, n) = (2, 2)$ is sufficient for the `mIdeBm` scheme to be secure against the *strong* attacker that conducts chosen ciphertext attack possessing the user part of private key, which we call "IND-mID-sCCA (indistinguishability of mediated ID-based encryption against strong chosen ciphertext attack, which is similar to Libert and Quisquater's "IND-mID-wCCA ("w" stands for "weak") but assumes a stronger attacker)" defined in [14]. The formal definition of IND-mID-sCCA is as follows.

Definition 5 (IND-mID-sCCA) Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ be an attacker that defeats the IND-mID-sCCA security of an mediated ID-based encryption scheme $\mathcal{MIDE}$ which consists of GK, EX, DK, E, and D. (For details of these algorithms, readers are referred to [7], [14] or the description of `mIdeBm` given in Section 6.2.) We assume that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ is a probabilistic Turing machine taking a security parameter k as input. Consider the following game in which the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ interacts with the "Challenger".

Phase 1: The Challenger runs the Setup algorithm taking a security parameter k. The Challenger then gives the common parameter to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$.

Phase 2: Having obtained the common parameter, $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ issues the following queries.

- "User key extraction" query `ID`: On receiving this query, the Challenger runs the Keygen algorithm to obtain the user part of private key and sends it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$.
- "SEM key extraction" query `ID`: On receiving this query, the Challenger runs the Keygen algorithm to obtain the SEM part of private key and sends it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$.
- "SEM oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C)$: On receiving this query, the Challenger runs to obtain a SEM part of private key. Taking the resulting private key as input, the Challenger runs the SEM oracle in the Decrypt algorithm to obtain a decryption token for C and sends it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$.
- "User oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C)$: On receiving this query, the Challenger runs to obtain a User part of private key. Taking the resulting private key as input, the Challenger runs the User oracle in the Decrypt algorithm to obtain a decryption token for C and sends it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$.

Phase 3: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ selects two equal-length plaintexts (M_0, M_1) and a target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$ which was not queried before. On receiving (M_0, M_1) and $\mathtt{ID}^*$, the Challenger runs the Keygen algorithm to obtain User and SEM parts of the private key associated with $\mathtt{ID}^*$. The Challenger then chooses $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ at random and creates a target ciphertext C^* by encrypting M_β under the target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$. The Challenger gives the target ciphertext and *the User part of the private key* to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$.

Phase 4: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ continues to issue "User key extraction" query $\mathtt{ID} \neq \mathtt{ID}^*$, "SEM key extraction" query $\mathtt{ID} \neq \mathtt{ID}^*$, "SEM oracle query" $(\mathtt{ID}, C) \neq (\mathtt{ID}^*, C^*)$, and "User oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C) \neq (\mathtt{ID}^*, C^*)$. The details of these queries are as described in Phase 2.

Phase 5: $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ outputs a guess $\tilde{\beta} \in \{0, 1\}$.

We define the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$'s success by

$$\mathbf{Succ}^{\text{IND-mID-sCCA}}_{\mathcal{MIDE}, \mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}}(k) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\tilde{\beta} = \beta] - 1.$$

We denote by $\mathbf{Succ}^{\text{IND-mID-sCCA}}_{\mathcal{MIDE}}(t_{CCA}, q_{E,user}, q_{E,sem}, q_{D,sem}, q_{D,user})$ the maximum of the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$'s success over all attackers $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ having running time t_{CCA} and making at most $q_{E,user}$ "User key extraction" queries, $q_{E,sem}$ "SEM key extraction" queries, $q_{D,sem}$ "SEM oracle" queries, and $q_{D,user}$ "User oracle" queries. Note that the running time and the number of queries are all polynomial in the security parameter k. We say that the mediated ID-based encryption scheme $\mathcal{MIDE}$ is IND-mID-sCCA secure if $\mathbf{Succ}^{\text{IND-mID-sCCA}}_{\mathcal{MIDE}}(t_{CCA}, q_{E,user}, q_{E,sem}, q_{D,sem}, q_{D,user})$ is negligible in k.

We now state and prove the following theorem which implies if the `IdThdBm` scheme is IND-IDTHD-CCA secure then the `mIdeBm` scheme is IND-mID-sCCA secure.

Theorem 2 *Suppose that an IND-mID-sCCA attacker for the* `mIdeBm` *scheme issues up to $q_{E,user}$ "User key extraction" queries, $q_{E,sem}$ "SEM key extraction" queries, $q_{D,sem}$ "SEM oracle" queries, and $q_{D,user}$ "User oracle" queries. Using this attacker as a subroutine, we can construct an IND-IDTHD-CCA attacker for the* `IdThdBm` *scheme with $(t, n) = (2, 2)$, whose running time, private key extraction queries, and decryption share generation queries are bounded by t_{IDCCA}, q_E, and q_D respectively. Concretely, we obtain the following advantage bound.*

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Succ}^{\text{IND-mID-sCCA}}_{\mathtt{mIdeBm}}(t_{CCA,E,user}, q_{E,sem}, q_{D,sem}, q_{D,user}) \\ \leq \mathbf{Succ}^{\text{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{IdThdBm}}(t_{IDCCA}, q_E, q_D),\end{aligned}$$

where $t_{IDCCA} = t_{CCA} + \max(q_{E,user}, q_{E,sem}, q_{D,sem}, q_{D,user})O(k^3)$, $q_E = O(1)(q_{E,user} + q_{E,sem} + q_{D,sem} + q_{D,user})$, $q_D = O(1)(q_{D,sem} + q_{D,user})$ for a security parameter k. Here, t_{CCA} denotes the running time of the ID-mID-CCA attacker.

Proof. For notational convenience, we assume that the same group parameter $cp = \{\mathcal{G}, q, \hat{e}, P, Y_{\text{PKG}}\}$ where $Y_{\text{PKG}} = xP$ and security parameter k are given to attackers for `mIdeBm` and `IdThdBm`.

Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ denote an attacker that defeats the IND-mID-sCCA security of the `mIdeBm` scheme.

Let $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ denote an attacker that defeats the IND-IDTHD-CCA security of the `IdThdBm` scheme with $(t, n) = (2, 2)$.

Our aim is to simulate the view of $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$ in the real attack game denoted by $\mathbf{G_0}$ until we obtain a game denoted by $\mathbf{G_1}$, which is related to the ability of the attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ to defeat the IND-IDTHD-CCA security of the `IdThdBm` scheme.

- Game $\mathbf{G_0}$: As mentioned, this game is identical to the real attack game described in Definition 5. We denote by E_0 the event that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}'}$'s output $\bar{\beta} \in \{0, 1\}$ is equal to $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ chosen by the Challenger. We use a similar notation E_i for all Games $\mathbf{G}_i$. Since Game $\mathbf{G_1}$ is the same as the real attack game, we have

$$\Pr[E_0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\mathbf{Succ}^{\text{IND-mID-sCCA}}_{\mathtt{mIdeBm}, \mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k).$$

- Game $\mathbf{G_1}$: First, we deal with the simulation of $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s view in Phase 1 of the real attack game as follows. On receiving $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s "User key extraction" query $\mathtt{ID}$ in Phase 1, we search $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$ which consists of ⟨identity, corresponding user part of private key⟩ pairs for an entry that is matched against $\mathtt{ID}$. If there exists one, we extract a corresponding user part of private key and return it to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ as an answer. Otherwise, we forward $\mathtt{ID}$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger as a private key extraction query. The Challenger then runs the private key extraction algorithm of $\mathtt{IdThdBm}$ taking $\mathtt{ID}$ as input and returns a private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ associated with $\mathtt{ID}$. We intercept $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ and split it into $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$ using the (2, 2) secret-sharing technique presented in Section 5.1.2. We then add $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},user} \rangle$ to $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$. We also add $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$ to $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ which consists of ⟨identity, corresponding SEM part of private key⟩ pairs.

  We answer $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s "SEM key extraction" query in a similar way as we do for the "User key extraction" query. Note that in this case, $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ and $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$ are also updated concurrently.

  On receiving $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s "SEM oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C)$ where $C = (U, V, W)$ in Phase 1, we searche $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ for an entry $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$. If it exists, we extract $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$. We then check if $\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(U, H_3)$ for $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$. If C has passed this test, we compute $\kappa_{sem} = \hat{e}(D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}, U)$ and return $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C} = (sem, \kappa_{sem})$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$. Otherwise, we return $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C} = (sem,$ "*Invalid Ciphertext*") to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$. If $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$ does not exist in $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$, we forward $\mathtt{ID}$ as a "private key extraction" query to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger to obtain a private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ associated with $\mathtt{ID}$. We then split it into $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$ using the (2, 2) secret-sharing technique. Then we generate a decryption share $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C}$ of C in the same way as we do for the case when $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$ exists in $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$, and return $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C}$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$. In this case, we add $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},user} \rangle$ to $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ and $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$ respectively.

  On receiving $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s "User oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C)$, we first search $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ for an entry $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$. If it exists, we also search $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$ for the corresponding entry $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},user} \rangle$. (Recall that $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ and $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$ are updated concurrently.) Having obtained $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$, we generate corresponding decryption shares $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C}$ and $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},user,C}$ in the same way as we do for "SEM oracle" query. Here, if C is invalid, that is, $\hat{e}(P, W) \neq \hat{e}(U, H_3)$ for $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$, we return "*Reject*". Otherwise, we combine the shares $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},user,C}$ and $\delta_{\mathtt{ID},sem,C}$ using the Lagrange interpolation technique and return the resulting value to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$. On the other hand, if $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$ does not exist in $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$, we query $\mathtt{ID}$ as a private key extraction query to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger to acquire $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$. Having obtained $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$, we split $D_{\mathtt{ID}}$ into $D_{\mathtt{ID},sem}$ and $D_{\mathtt{ID},user}$ using (2, 2) secret-sharing technique and update $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ and $\mathsf{UserKeyList}$ accordingly. We then perform the same routine as we do for the case when $\langle \mathtt{ID}, D_{\mathtt{ID},sem} \rangle$ exists in $\mathsf{SEMKeyList}$ and return a special symbol "*Reject*" or a certain value to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$.

  In Phase 3, if $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ issues two equal-length plaintexts (M_0, M_1) and a target identity $\mathtt{ID}^*$, we forward $(M_0, M_1, \mathtt{ID}^*)$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger. On receiving $(M_0, M_1, \mathtt{ID}^*)$, the Challenger runs the private key extraction algorithm of $\mathtt{IdThdBm}$ to get a private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}^*}$ associated with $\mathtt{ID}^*$ and runs the private key distribution algorithm of $\mathtt{IdThdBm}$ to split $\mathtt{ID}^*$ into S_1^* and S_2^*. The Challenger returns S_2^* to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$ as a corrupted party's private key. We then rename S_2^* as $D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,user}$ (let us then assume that S_1^* represents $D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem}$) and send this to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$. (That is, the *strong* attacker $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ possesses the user part of private key.) Now, the Challenger chooses $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ at random and runs the encryption algorithm E

of $\mathtt{IdThdBm}$ taking $(M_\beta, \mathtt{ID}^*)$ as input and gets a target ciphertext C^*. If the Challenger returns C^*, we send that to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$.

On receiving $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s "User key extraction" and "SEM key extraction" queries in Phase 4, we answer them in the same way we did in Phase 1.

Suppose now that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ issues a "SEM oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C) \neq (\mathtt{ID}^*, C^*)$ in Phase 4. If $\mathtt{ID} \neq \mathtt{ID}^*$, we answer it in the same way we did for the SEM oracle query in Phase 1. If $\mathtt{ID} = \mathtt{ID}^*$ (in this case, $C \neq C^*$), we query C to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger as a decryption share generation query. The Challenger then runs decryption share generation algorithm of $\mathtt{IdThdBm}$ taking $(S_1^*(= D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem}), C)$ as input, gets a corresponding decryption share $\delta_{1,C}$ and returns it. We then take κ_1 out from $\delta_{1,C}$ if $\delta_{1,C} \neq (1, \text{"}\textit{Invalid Ciphertext}\text{"})$. We rename κ_1 as κ_{sem} and send $\delta_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem,C} = (sem, \kappa_{sem})$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$. If $\delta_{1,C} = (1, \text{"}\textit{Invalid Ciphertext}\text{"})$, we send $\delta_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem,C} = (sem, \text{"}\textit{Invalid Ciphertext}\text{"})$ to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$.

Suppose now that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ issues a "User oracle" query $(\mathtt{ID}, C) \neq (\mathtt{ID}^*, C^*)$ in Phase 4. If $\mathtt{ID} \neq \mathtt{ID}^*$, we answer it in the exactly same way we did for the "User oracle" query in Phase 1. If $\mathtt{ID} = \mathtt{ID}^*$ (in this case, $C \neq C^*$), we query C to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger as a decryption share generation query. The Challenger then runs decryption share generation algorithm of $\mathtt{IdThdBm}$ taking $(S_1^*(= D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem}), C)$ as input and returns a corresponding decryption share $\delta_{1,C}$. If $\delta_{1,C} = (1, \text{"}\textit{Invalid Ciphertext}\text{"})$, we send "*Reject*" to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ and terminate the game. Otherwise, we take out κ_1 from $\delta_{1,C}$, rename it as κ_{sem}, and form $\delta_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem,C} = (sem, \kappa_{sem})$. We then compute another decryption share of C using the private key $D_{\mathtt{ID}^*,user}$ (recall that the $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s Challenger returned it as a corrupted party's private key). If C is invalid, that is, $\hat{e}(P, W) \neq \hat{e}(U, H_3)$ for $H_3 = \mathsf{H}_3(U, V)$, we return "*Reject*". Otherwise, we combine the shares $\delta_{\mathtt{ID}^*,user,C}$ and and $\delta_{\mathtt{ID}^*,sem,C}$ using the Lagrange interpolation technique and return the resulting value to $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$.

Finally, once $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$ outputs a guess $\beta' \in \{0, 1\}$, we returns it as $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}$'s guess.

Now we quantitatively analyze the simulations above.

Note from the simulation that $\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}$'s view in the real attack game is identical to it's view in Game $\mathbf{G_1}$. Note also that the bit β is uniformly chosen. Hence we have

$$\Pr[E_1] - \frac{1}{2} \geq \Pr[E_0] - \frac{1}{2}.$$

Hence, by definition of $\Pr[E_0]$ and $\Pr[E_1]$, we obtain

$$\mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-IDTHD-CCA}}_{\mathtt{IdThdBm},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}}}(k) \geq \mathbf{Succ}^{\mathrm{IND-mID-sCCA}}_{\mathtt{mIdeBm},\mathsf{A}^{\mathsf{CCA}\prime}}(k).$$

Considering the running time and the number of queries, we obtain the bound in the theorem statement. □

7 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we discussed the issues related to the realization of ID-based threshold decryption and proposed the first threshold ID-based decryption scheme provably secure against chosen ciphertext attack. We also showed how our ID-based threshold decryption scheme can result

in a mediated ID-based encryption scheme secure against "inside attack", whereby an attacker who possesses a user part of private key conducts chosen ciphertext attack.

Interesting future research would be finding more security applications where "ID-based threshold decryption" is particularly useful.

References

[1] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway, *Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols*, Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 1993, pages 62–73.

[2] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway, *Optimal Asymmetric Encryption*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of Eurocrypt '94, Vol. 950 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1994, pages 92–111.

[3] D. Boneh, X. Ding, G. Tsudik and C. Wong, *A Method for Fast Revocation of Public Key Certificates and Security Capabilities*, Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX, 2001.

[4] D. Boneh and M. Franklin, *Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO 2001, Vol. 2139 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 2001, pages 213–229.

[5] D. Chaum and T. Perderson, *Wallet Databases with Observers*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '92, Vol. 740 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1992, pages 89–105.

[6] L. Chen, K. Harrison, D. Soldera and N. P. Smart, *Applications of Multiple Trust Authorities in Pairing Based Cryptosysems*, Proceedings of InfraSec 2002, Vol. 2437 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 2002, pages 260–275.

[7] X. Ding and G. Tsudik, *Simple Identity-Based Cryptography with Mediated RSA*, Proceedings of Topics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2003, Vol. 2612 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 2003, pages 192–209.

[8] Y. Dodis and M Yung, *Exposure-Resilience for Free: The Hierarchical ID-based Encryption Case.*, Proceedings of IEEE Security in Storage Workshop 2002, pages 45–52.

[9] T. ElGamal, *A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms*, IEEE Trans. Information Theory, 31, 1985, pages 469–472.

[10] P. Fouque and D. Pointcheval, *Threshold Cryptosystems Secure Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2001, Vol. 2248 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 2001, pages 351–368.

[11] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin, *Secure Distributed Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystem*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of EUROCRYPT '99, Vol. 1592 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1999, pages 295–310.

[12] C. Gentry and A. Silverberg, *Hierarchical ID-Based Cryptography*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2002, Vol. 2501 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 2002, pages 548–566.

[13] A. Khalili, J. Katz and W. Arbaugh, *Toward Secure Key Distribution in Truly Ad-Hoc Networks*, Proceedings of IEEE Workshop on Security and Assurance in Ad-Hoc Networks, 2003.

[14] B. Libert and J. Quisquater, *Efficient Revocation and Threshold Pairing Based Cryptosystems*, Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC) 2003.

[15] C. Lim and P. Lee, *Another Method for Attaining Security Against Adaptively Chosen Ciphertext Attack*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '93, Vol. 773 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1993, pages 410–434.

[16] A. Shamir, *How to Share a Secret*, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, 1979, pages 612–613.

[17] A. Shamir, *Identity-based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes*, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '84, Vol. 196 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1984, pages 47–53.

[18] V. Shoup and R. Gennaro, *Securing Threshold Cryptosystems against Chosen Ciphertext Attack*, Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 15, Springer-Verlag 2002, pages 75–96.

[19] N. P. Smart, *Access Control Using Pairing Based Cryptography*, Proceedings of Topics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2003, Vol. 2612 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 2003, pages 111–121.