

Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption

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Abstract

We introduce a new type of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme that we call Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. A Fuzzy IBE scheme allows for a private key for an identity, ω , to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with another identity, ω' , if and only if the identities ω and ω' are close to each other as measured by some metric such as Hamming distance or set overlap. A Fuzzy IBE scheme can be applied to enable encryption using biometric inputs as identities; the error-tolerance property of a Fuzzy IBE scheme is precisely what allows for the use of biometric identities, which inherently will have some noise each time they are sampled.

In this paper we present our construction of Fuzzy IBE schemes. Our construction can be viewed as an Identity-Based Encryption of a message under several attributes that compose a (fuzzy) identity. Our scheme is both error-tolerant and secure against collusion attacks. Additionally, our basic construction does not use random oracles. We prove the security of our scheme under the Selective-ID security model.

1 Introduction

There has been recent interest about the challenge of generating cryptographic keys from biometric inputs. The primary difficulty in generating a strong key from a biometric input is that the measured value of a biometric can change slightly upon each sampling. This effect can be explained by differences in sampling devices, environmental noise, or small changes in the human trait itself. This inherent non-determinism makes it difficult to extract a cryptographic key from a biometric input.

Recent work has produced techniques to derive cryptographic keys from biometric inputs for symmetric key applications [19, 18, 17, 8, 14, 9, 6]. These techniques are useful for symmetric key cryptography applications such as password authentication and symmetric key encryption. However, there does not seem to be a clear way to move these techniques into the realm of public key cryptography. In particular, they do not fit into the paradigm of Identity-Based Encryption.

We propose a new type of Identity-Based Encryption that we call *Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption*. In a Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme a user with secret key for the identity ω is able to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with the public key ω' if and only if ω and ω' are within a certain distance of each other as judged by some metric. For the remainder of this paper we view identities as a set of n elements and we use the set overlap between two identities to measure their similarity.

Motivating Example The existence of a practical Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme allows for the encryption of data using a biometric input as the public key. We motivate IBE using biometrics in the following scenario. Consider a patient that is rushed into an emergency medical visit. A collection of medical data is created from the visit, including the results of tests that will not be ready until days later. The patient would like to be able to conveniently access this data later by retrieving it from a public storage server. However, since the privacy of medical information is considered to be very important, the data must be encrypted in such a way that only the patient could access it.

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Given the urgency of the initial visit it is unrealistic to require that the patient has on his person a device that can store a cryptographic key. Similarly, it is unpractical to require that he has registered and remembers a unique identifier (as might be required if we were to use Identity-Based Encryption in the traditional manner). However, the medical staff will be able to measure an inherent biometric identity from the patient. Using a Fuzzy IBE scheme the medical staff will use this biometric identity to encrypt information for the patient so that he could later retrieve it at his convenience.

Advantages of biometric-based IBE over traditional IBE In many situations, using biometric-based IBE has a number of important advantages over “traditional” IBE. We argue that the use of biometric identities fits the framework of Identity-Based Encryption very well and is a very valuable application of it.

First, the process of obtaining a secret key from an authority is very natural and straightforward. In traditional Identity-Based Encryption schemes a user with a certain identity, for example, “Bob Smith”, will need to go to an authority to obtain the private key corresponding to the identity. In this process the user will need to “prove” to the authority that he is indeed entitled to this identity. This will typically involve presenting supplementary documents or credentials. The type of authentication that is necessary is not always clear and robustness of this process is questionable (the supplementary documents themselves could be subject to forgery) Typically, there will exist a tradeoff between a system that is expensive in this step and one that is less reliable.

In contrast, if a biometric is used as an identity then the verification process for an identity is very clear. The user must demonstrate ownership of the biometric under the supervision of a well trained operator. If the operator is able to detect imitation attacks, for example playing the recording of a voice, then the security of this phase is only limited by the quality of the biometric technique itself. We emphasize that the biometric measurement for an individual need not be kept secret. Indeed, it is not if it is used as a public key. We must only guarantee that an attacker cannot fool the key authority into believing that an attacker owns a biometric identity that he does not.

Secondly, using a biometric as an identity has the advantage that identities are unique if the underlying biometric is of a good quality. Some types of traditional identities such as the name “Bob Smith” will clearly not be unique and this could lead to problems, although Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption [11, 13] does alleviate this problem.

Finally, the fact that a biometric identity is an inherent trait and therefore is always with a person is useful. In several situations, such as our medical example, the user might not have the foresight to carry a cryptographic device or even obtain a unique traditional identity.

Security Against Collusion Attacks In addition to providing error-tolerance in the set of attributes composing the identity any IBE scheme that encrypts to multiple attributes must provide security against collusion attacks. In particular, no group of users should be able to combine their keys in such a way that they can decrypt a ciphertext that none of them alone could.

The requirement of security against collusion attacks provides an interesting insight into role-based access control systems. If attributes are used as roles as opposed to traits of a biometric measurement then our scheme can be view as a non-interactive role-based access control system.

Our Contributions We formalize the notion of Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption and provide a construction for a Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme. Our construction uses groups for which an efficient bilinear map exists, but for which the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is assumed to be hard. We achieve our result by applying the techniques of Shamir Secret Sharing [23] where a polynomial can be reconstructed in the exponent of a group. The technique of using secret sharing within the exponent gives our scheme the crucial property of being both error-tolerant and resistant to collusion attacks.

In the basic version of our scheme, the public key size grows linearly with the number of potential attributes in the universe. The public parameter growth is manageable for a biometric

system where all the possible attributes are defined at the system creation time. However, this becomes a limitation in a more general system where we might like an attribute to be defined by an arbitrary string. To accommodate these more general requirements we additionally provide a Fuzzy-IBE system for large Universes [9], where an attribute is defined by an arbitrary string.

We prove our scheme secure under an adapted version of the Selective-ID security model first proposed by Canetti et al. [7]. Additionally, our construction does not use random oracles. We reduce the security of our scheme to an assumption that is similar to the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.

1.1 Related Work

Identity-Based Encryption Shamir [24] first proposed the concept of Identity-Based Encryption. Boneh and Franklin [4] presented the first Identity-Based Encryption scheme that was both practical and secure. Their solution also made use of groups for which there was an efficiently computable bilinear map, but for which the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to be hard.

Canetti et al. [7] proposed the first construction for IBE that was provably secure outside the random oracle model. To prove Security they described a slightly weaker model of security known as the Selective-ID model, in which the adversary declares which identity he will attack before the global public parameters are generated. Since their construction views identities as bit strings a bilinear map computation is required for each bit in the identity.

Boneh and Boyen [2] describe two IBE scheme that are also proven to be secure in the Selective-ID model. Additionally, their two constructions only require respectively two and one pairing computations per decryption and are thus significantly more efficient.

Biometrics Other work in applying biometrics to cryptography has focused on the derivation of a secret from a biometric. This secret can be then used for operations such as encryption or UNIX style password authentication.

Monrose et al. [19, 18, 17] examined the use of keystroke dynamics and later voice prints as biometrics for this purpose. The authors use a type of secret sharing in which the biometric is used to decide which keyshares from a stored set are used in reconstructing the secret. Some stored shares are bogus to prevent someone with the wrong biometric from unlocking the secret. Their scheme provides error-tolerance by storing two valid secrets for points in the biometric measurement that are not reliable for a particular user.

Davida et al. [8] proposed a scheme where they store the check bits for an error correcting code of a biometric input along with the hash of the input. The check bits are used to compute the original input from one that is reasonably close. Juels and Wattenberg [14] improve upon this work using a novel technique in which the biometric input is treated as a corrupted codeword.

Juels and Sudan [15] presented a scheme that uses set overlap as the measurement between biometric templates. Dodis, Rezyin, and Smith [9] describe a general primitive for extracting uniform randomness from biometric inputs. Additionally, they give constructions for the metrics of Hamming distance, set overlap, and edit distance. Boyen extended this work to construct Reusable Fuzzy Extractors[6].

The distinguishing feature of our work from the other related work on biometrics above is that we view the biometric input as public identity instead of a secret. Our only physical requirement is that the biometric cannot be imitated such that a trained human operator would be fooled.

Security Against Collusion Attacks Yao et al. [25] show how an IBE system that encrypts to multiple hierarchical-identities in a collusion-resistant manner implies a forward secure Hierarchical IBE scheme. They also note how their techniques for resisting collusion attacks are useful in role-based access control. However, the cost of their scheme in terms of computation, private key size, and ciphertext size increases exponentially with the number of attributes.

Additionally, Hidden Credentials [12, 21] have used IBE techniques for role-based access control. However, in these systems the attributes are tagged with a “nym” that is unique to

each user and the encryptor must interact with the receiver. We therefore can not view this as a form of identity-based encryption.

1.2 Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally define a Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme including the Selective-ID security model for one. In Section 3 we describe the security assumption our scheme reduces to. In Section 4 we show why two naive approaches do not work. We follow with a description of our construction in Section 5. In Section 6 we prove the security of our scheme. We describe some extensions to our scheme in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.

2 Definitions

In this section we define two Selective-ID models of security for Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption. The Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID game is very similar to the standard Selective-ID model for Identity-Based Encryption with the exception that the adversary is only allowed to query for secret keys for identities which have less than d overlap with the target identity.

In the second game, which we call Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID the adversary chooses several identities that are simultaneously targets. This model of security captures how an attack against a biometric identity will occur in practice. The attacker will want to target a certain biometric identity, but the identities with which the ciphertexts are encrypted will deviate slightly from the original identity. These deviations in practice will be from environmental noise and therefore will be independent of the public parameters. This game captures the case where a set of target identities are small random deviations from one identity.

We describe the two security games below and show that the security of the Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID game reduces to the Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID game in Section A of the Appendix.

Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID

Init The adversary declares the identity α that he wishes to be challenged upon.

Setup The challenger runs the setup phase of the algorithm and tells the adversary the public parameters.

Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to issue queries for private keys for an identity γ where $|\gamma \cap \alpha| < d$.

Challenge The adversary submits two equal length messages m_0, m_1 . The challenger flips a random coin b and encrypts m_b with α . The ciphertext is passed to the adversary.

Phase 2 Phase 1 is repeated.

Guess The adversary outputs a guess b' of b .

The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in this game is defined as $\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}$.

Definition 1 (Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID). *A scheme is secure in the Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID model of security if all computationally bound adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.*

Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID

Init The adversary declares l identities $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_l$ that he wishes to be challenged upon where l is bounded by a polynomial of the security parameter κ .

Setup The challenger runs the setup phase of the algorithm and tells the adversary the public parameters.

Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to issue queries for private keys for an identity γ where $|\gamma \cap \alpha_i| < d$ for all i .

Challenge The adversary submits $2l$ messages $m_{1,0}, \dots, m_{l,0}$ and $m_{1,1}, \dots, m_{l,1}$ where $m_{i,0}, m_{i,1}$ are of equal length for all i . The challenger flips a random coin b and encrypts $m_{1,b}, \dots, m_{l,b}$ with the respective identities $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_l$. The ciphertexts are passed to the adversary.

Phase 2 Phase 1 is repeated.

Guess The adversary outputs a guess b' of b .

The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in this game is $\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}$.

Lemma 1. *If a Fuzzy IBE scheme is secure according to the Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID model of security then it is also secure in the Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID model of security.*

We prove the lemma in Appendix A.

3 Complexity Assumption

Let \mathbb{G}_1 be a group of prime order p with an admissible bilinear map, e , into \mathbb{G}_2 and g be a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 . We define two assumptions.

Definition 2 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption). *Suppose a challenger chooses $a, b, c, z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random. The Decisional BDH assumption is that no adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple*

$$(A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c, Z = e(g, g)^{abc})$$

from the tuple

$$(A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c, Z = e(g, g)^z)$$

with more than a negligible advantage.

Definition 3 (Decisional Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) Assumption). *Suppose a challenger chooses $a, b, c, z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random. The Decisional Modified BDH assumption is that no adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple*

$$(A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c, Z = e(g, g)^{\frac{ab}{c}})$$

from

$$(A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c, Z = e(g, g)^z)$$

with more than a negligible advantage.

4 Other Approaches

Before describing our scheme we first show three potential approaches to building a Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme and show why they fall short. This discussion additionally motivates our approach to the problem.

Correcting the Error The first possible method we examine is to “correct” the errors of a biometric measurement and then use standard Identity-Based Encryption to encrypt a message under the corrected input. If the biometric input measured when creating the private key is corrected to the same value then the private key will be able to decrypt the ciphertext.

While, it is possible to correct some errors upon reading an input this approach relies upon the faulty assumption that each biometric input measurement is slightly deviated from some “true” value and that these “true” values are well known. In practice the only reasonable assumption is that two measurements sampled from the same person will be within a certain distance of each other.

This intuition is captured by previous work. Dodis, Rezyin, and Smith [9] use what they call a *fuzzy sketch* that contains information of a first sampling of a biometric that allows subsequent measurements to be corrected to it. If the correction could be done without any other information then we could simply do away with the fuzzy sketch.

Key per Attribute The second naive approach we consider is for an authority to give a user an Identity-Based Private key for each of the n separate attributes that describe the user. Such a system easily falls prey to simple collusion attacks where multiple users combine their keys to form identities that are a combination of their attributes.

Several Keys Suppose a key authority measures an input ω for a particular party. The authority could create a separate traditional IBE private key for every ω' such that $|\omega \cap \omega'| \geq d$, for some error-tolerance parameter d . However, the private key storage will grow exponentially in d and the system will be impractical for even modest values of d .

5 Our Construction

5.1 Intuition

Our approach is motivated by providing resistance to collusion attacks. Recall, that we view identities as sets of attributes and we let the value d represent the error-tolerance in terms of minimal set overlap. When an authority is creating a private key for a user he will associate a random $d - 1$ degree polynomial, $q(x)$, with each user with the restriction that each polynomial have the same valuation at point 0, that is $q(0) = y$.

For each of a user's n attributes the key generation algorithm will issue a private key component that is tied to the user's random polynomial $q(x)$. If the user is able to "match" at least d components of the ciphertext with their private key components then they will be able to perform decryption. However, since the private key components are tied to random polynomials, multiple user's are unable to combine them in any way that allows for collusion attacks.

A detailed description of our scheme follows.

5.2 Description

Let \mathbb{G}_1 be bilinear group of prime order p and g be a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 . Additionally, let $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ denote the bilinear map. A security parameter, κ , will determine the size of the groups.

We also define the Lagrange coefficient $\Delta_{i,S}$ for $i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a set, S , of elements in \mathbb{Z}_p :

$$\Delta_{i,S}(x) = \prod_{j \in S, j \neq i} \frac{x - j}{i - j}.$$

Identities will be n element sets where the elements are members of $\mathbb{Z}_p^* \in \mathcal{U}$ where \mathcal{U} is the universe of elements defined by the master-key holder. In practice, a biometric measurement will be a set of attributes and each attribute will be associated with some element of \mathcal{U} . Our construction follows:

Setup(n, d) First, define the Universe, \mathcal{U} of elements. For simplicity, we can take the first $|\mathcal{U}|$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_p^* to be the universe. Namely, the integers $1, \dots, |\mathcal{U}| \pmod{p}$.

Next, choose $t_1, \dots, t_{|\mathcal{U}|}$ uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_p . Finally, choose y uniformly at random in \mathbb{Z}_p . The published public parameters are:

$$T_1 = g^{t_1}, \dots, T_{|\mathcal{U}|} = g^{t_{|\mathcal{U}|}}, Y = e(g, g)^y.$$

The master key is:

$$t_1, \dots, t_{|\mathcal{U}|}, y.$$

Key Generation To generate a private key for identity $\omega \subset \mathcal{U}$ the following steps are taken. A $d - 1$ degree polynomial q is randomly chosen such that $q(0) = y$. The private key consists of n components, D_i , for all $i \in \omega$. The private key is: $\forall i \in \omega : D_i = g^{\frac{q(i)}{t_i}}$.

Encryption Encryption with the public key ω' and message $m \in \mathbb{G}_2$ proceeds as follows.

First, a random value $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ is chosen. The ciphertext is then published as:

$$E = (\omega', E' = mY^s, \{E_i = T_i^s\} \forall i \in \omega').$$

Decryption Suppose that a ciphertext, E , is encrypted with a key for identity ω' and we have a key for identity ω , where $|\omega \cap \omega'| \geq d$. Choose an arbitrary d -element subset, S , of $\omega \cap \omega'$.

Then, the ciphertext can be decrypted as:

$$\begin{aligned}
& E' / \prod_{i \in S} (e(D_i, E_i))^{\Delta_{i,S}(0)} \\
&= me(g, g)^y / \prod_{i \in \omega \cap \omega'} \left(e\left(g^{\frac{g(i)}{t_i}}, g^{st_i}\right) \right)^{\Delta_{i,S}(0)} \\
&= me(g, g)^y / \prod_{i \in \omega \cap \omega'} \left(e(g, g)^{sq(i)} \right)^{\Delta_{i,S}(0)} \\
&= m.
\end{aligned}$$

The last equality is derived from using polynomial interpolation in the exponents. Since, the polynomial $sq(x)$ is of degree $d - 1$ it can be interpolated using d points.

5.3 Computational Cost

Encryption of a message will consist of n exponentiations in the group \mathbb{G}_1 . The cost of decryption will be dominated by d bilinear map computations.

6 Proof of Security

We prove that the security of our scheme in the Selective-ID model reduces to the hardness of the Decisional Modified BDH assumption.

Lemma 2. *If an adversary can break our scheme in the Basic Fuzzy Selective ID Model, then a simulator can be constructed to play the Decisional Modified BDH game with a non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. Suppose there exists a computationally efficient adversary, \mathcal{A} , that can attack our scheme in the Selective-ID model with advantage ϵ . We build a simulator \mathcal{B} that can play the Decisional Modified BDH game with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2}$.

The simulation proceeds as follows:

We first let the challenger set the groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 with an efficient bilinear map, e and generator g . The challenger flips a fair binary coin μ outside of \mathcal{B} 's view. If $\mu = 0$, the challenger sets $(A, B, C, Z) = (g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^{\frac{ab}{c}})$; otherwise it sets $(A, B, C, Z) = (g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^z)$ for random a, b, c, z . The parameters of the universe of elements \mathcal{U} and size of identities n are given as the correctness of the proof does not depend upon the sizes of identities nor the universe size.

Init The simulator \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{A} and receives the challenge identity, α , an n element subset of \mathcal{U} .

Setup The simulator assigns the public key parameters as follows. It sets the parameter $Y = A = g^a$. For all $i \in \alpha$ it chooses random $\beta_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $T_i = C^{\beta_i} = g^{c\beta_i}$. For all $i \in \mathcal{U} - \alpha$ it chooses random $w_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $T_i = g_i^{w_i}$.

It then gives the public parameters to \mathcal{A} . Notice that from the view \mathcal{A} all parameters are chosen at random as in the construction.

Phase 1 \mathcal{A} makes requests for private keys where the identity set overlap between the identities for each requested key and α is less than d .

Suppose \mathcal{A} asks a private key γ where $|\gamma \cap \alpha| < d$. We first define three sets Γ, Γ', S in the following manner:

$$\Gamma = \gamma \cap \alpha,$$

Γ' be any set such that $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma' \subseteq \gamma$ and $|\Gamma'| = d - 1$, and

$$S = \Gamma' \cup \{0\}.$$

Next, we define the decryption key components, D_i , for $i \in \Gamma'$ as:

If $i \in \Gamma$: $D_i = g^{s_i}$ where s_i is chosen randomly in \mathbb{Z}_p .

If $i \in \Gamma' - \Gamma$: $D_i = g^{\frac{\lambda_i}{w_i}}$ where λ_i is chosen randomly in \mathbb{Z}_p .

The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a random $d - 1$ degree polynomial $q(x)$ by choosing its value for the $d - 1$ points randomly in addition to having $q(0) = a$. For $i \in \Gamma$ we have $q(x_i) = c\beta_i s_i$ and for $i \in \Gamma' - \Gamma$ we have $q(x_i) = \lambda_i$.

The simulator can calculate the other D_i values where $i \notin \Gamma'$ since the simulator knows the discrete log of T_i for all $i \notin \alpha$. The simulator makes the assignments as follows:

$$\text{If } i \notin \Gamma' : D_i = \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma} C^{\frac{\beta_j s_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)}{w_i}} \right) \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma' - \Gamma} g^{\frac{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)}{w_i}} \right) Y^{\frac{\Delta_{0,S}(i)}{w_i}}$$

Using interpolation the simulator is able to calculate $D_i = g^{\frac{q(x_i)}{T_i}}$ for $i \notin \Gamma'$ where $q(x)$ was implicitly defined by the random assignment of the other $d - 1$ variables $D_i \in \Gamma'$ and the variable Y .

Therefore, the simulator is able to construct a private key for the identity γ . Furthermore, the distribution of the private key for γ is identical to that of the original scheme.

Challenge The adversary, \mathcal{A} , will submit two challenge messages m_1 and m_0 to the simulator. The simulator flips a fair binary coin ν and returns an encryption of m_ν . The ciphertext is output as:

$$E = (\alpha, E' = m_\nu Z, E'' = C, \{E_i = B^{\beta_i}\} \forall i \in \alpha).$$

If $\mu = 0$, then $Z = g^{\frac{ab}{c}}$. If we let $r' = \frac{b}{c}$, then we have $E_0 = m_\nu Z = m_\nu g^{\frac{ab}{c}} = m_\nu g^{ar'} = m_\nu Y^{r'}$ and $E_i = B^{\beta_i} = g^{b\beta_i} = g^{\frac{b}{c}c\beta_i} = g^{r'c\beta_i} = (T_i)^{r'}$. Therefore, the ciphertext is a random encryption of the message m_ν under the public key α .

Otherwise, if $\mu = 1$, then $Z = g^z$. We then have $E' = m_\nu g^z$. Since z is random, E' will be a random element of \mathbb{G}_2 from the adversary's view and the message contains no information about m_ν .

Phase 2 The simulator acts exactly as it did in Phase 1.

Guess \mathcal{A} will submit a guess ν' of ν . If $\nu = \nu'$ the simulator will output $\mu' = 0$ to indicate that it was given a Modified BDDH-tuple otherwise it will output $\mu' = 1$ to indicate it was given a random 4-tuple.

As shown in the construction the simulator's generation of public parameters and private keys is identical to that of the actual scheme.

In the case where $\mu = 1$ the adversary gains no information about ν . Therefore, we have $\Pr[\nu \neq \nu' | \mu = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$. Since the simulator guesses $\mu' = 1$ when $\nu \neq \nu'$, we have $\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$.

If $\mu = 0$ then the adversary sees an encryption of m_ν . The adversary's advantage in this situation is ϵ by definition. Therefore, we have $\Pr[\nu = \nu' | \mu = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$. Since the simulator guesses $\mu' = 0$ when $\nu = \nu'$, we have $\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$.

The overall advantage of the simulator in the Modified Decisional BDH game is $\frac{1}{2}\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 0] + \frac{1}{2}\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 1] - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon) + \frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}\epsilon$. \square

Theorem 1. *Our scheme is Secure in the Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID model.*

Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2. \square

6.1 Chosen-Ciphertext Security

Our security definitions and proofs have been in the chosen-plaintext model. Our scheme can be extended to the chosen-ciphertext model by applying the technique of using simulation-sound NIZK proofs to achieve chosen-ciphertext security [20, 22, 16] as described by Canetti et al. [7] and later improved upon by Boneh and Katz [5].

Alternatively, if we are willing to use random oracles, then we can use the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [10].

6.2 Security in Full IBE Model

Boneh and Boyen [2] observed that the security of their Selective-ID encryption scheme could be extended to the full model with a factor of $\frac{1}{2^m}$ in the reduction, m where m is the bit-length of an identity. This observation essentially involves the simulator taking a guess at the target identity. They noted that for large enough groups the scheme could be viewed as secure in the full model.

We can make a similar observation for our basic scheme. If identities are of length, n , and we have a Universe of attributes, \mathcal{U} , then our scheme is secure in the full model with a factor of $\binom{|\mathcal{U}|}{n}$ in the reduction.

The original IBE scheme of Boneh and Franklin [4] and a later scheme of Boneh and Boyen [2] achieved IBE in the full model with non-exponential reductions. However, both methods achieve this by essentially removing the relationships between nearby identities. (In Boneh-Franklin [4] the authors do this by applying a random oracle to the identities and Boneh and Boyen [3] apply a complex mapping of identities into a new space in order to achieve Full IBE without Random Oracles.) In Fuzzy-IBE it is essential that there exists a relationship between nearby identities. Therefore, we conjecture that a scheme that has a non-exponential of security in the full model will require significantly different methods than those seen in prior work.

7 Extensions

In this section we discuss how our scheme can be extended to allow for a variable number of attributes, have more error-tolerance flexibility, and draw attributes from a large universe.

Variable Number of Attributes Up to this point for simplicity we restricted all identities to consist of the same number of attributes. However, we observe that this need not be the case. Our proof technique only relied on the fact that the set overlap between the challenge identity and any given private keys was less than some parameter d . Our scheme could easily accommodate identities of varying sizes for both encryption identities and private key identities.

Flexible Error-Tolerance In our scheme the error-tolerance is set to a value d . However, in practice a party constructing a ciphertext might want more flexibility. For example, if a biometric input device happens to be less reliable it might be desirable to relax the set overlap parameters.

The most obvious way to allow flexible error-tolerance is for the master secret holder to create multiple systems, each one with a different error-tolerance parameter. A party encrypting a message can choose which system he wants to encrypt under.

Unfortunately, for m different systems the size of the public parameters and private keys both increase by a factor of m . A more clever way to allow for flexible error-tolerance would be for the private key holder to reserve some attributes that it will issue to every key-holder. The party encrypting the message can increase the error-tolerance by increasing the number of these “default” attributes it includes in the encryption identity.

Large Universe Sizes In the construction we provided the size of the public parameters grows linearly with the number of possible attributes in the universe. We provide a more advanced version of our scheme which uses all elements of \mathbb{Z}_p^* as the universe, yet the public parameters only grow linearly in, n , the size of identities.

Besides the obvious efficiency benefits, having a large universe allows us to apply a collision-resistant hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and use arbitrary strings as attributes. This in turn has the advantage that attributes can be used that were not necessarily considered during the public key setup. For example, suppose instead of a biometric we were to describe people by some general set of criteria. Then we can add any verifiable attribute, such as “Ran in N.Y. Marathon 2005”, to a user’s private key.

Our large universe construction is built using similar concepts to the ones provided and uses an algebraic technique of Boneh and Boyen [2]. This scheme also has the advantage that we reduce the security of this scheme to the more standard Decisional BDH problem. Due to space restrictions we placed the scheme and its proof in the Appendices B and C respectively.

Role-Based Access Control As mentioned in the introduction we can also view our system as non-interactive role-based access control system. For example, we could let attributes be the roles such as “Management” or “Top Secret Clearance”. Even if the “fuzzy” aspect of our scheme in role-based access control is not necessarily required our techniques can still be useful. A user might have several attributes at any given time and an encryptor of a message may want to encrypt to any subset of them. Using traditional IBE the best obvious method is to give a user a separate private key for every proper subset of attributes he possesses. As mentioned above our scheme allows for a user to efficiently possess a variable number of attributes as part of his identity.

Using Other Distance Metrics A Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption scheme could in principal be built from other distance metrics. We note that a construction that uses the Hamming Distance metric is implied by a construction that uses the set overlap metric. We leave the problem of constructing Fuzzy IBE systems using other distance metrics as future work.

8 Conclusions and Open Problems

We introduced the concept of Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption, which allows for error-tolerance between the identity of a private key and the public key used to encrypt a ciphertext. Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption has a direct application to Identity Based Encryption using a biometric as a public key.

We presented a construction of a Fuzzy IBE scheme that uses set overlap as the distance metric between identities. Finally, we proved our scheme under the Selective-ID model by reducing it to an assumption that can be viewed as a modified version of the Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

This work motivates a few interesting open problems. The first is whether it is possible to create a Fuzzy IBE scheme where the attributes come from multiple authorities. While, it is natural for one authority to certify all attributes that compromise a biometric, in role-based access control systems there will often not be one party that can act as an authority for all attributes. Another, interesting problem is whether there exist a Fuzzy-IBE scheme that can hide the public key that was used to encrypt the ciphertext [1]. Such a system would be useful for when the public key itself is considered to be private.

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A Security Game Reduction

Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. Suppose we have an adversary \mathcal{A} that is successful with advantage ϵ in the Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID game for a certain scheme. Furthermore, suppose \mathcal{A} picks at most l target identities in the first phase. We can then build a simulator \mathcal{B} that is successful with advantage at least $\frac{\epsilon}{2l}$ in the Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID game.

We first define hybrid experiments for the Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID game.

For $0 \leq i \leq l$ we define H_i as a game in which the adversary \mathcal{A} is given an encryption of a random message for the first i ciphertexts (encrypted under the respective first i identities) and the rest of the ciphertexts are determined by the coin flip b as in the defined game. \mathcal{A} 's advantage in H_0 is ϵ by our assumption and \mathcal{A} 's advantage in H_l is 0 since the ciphertexts will be completely independent of b from the adversary's point of view. Therefore, by the triangle inequality there exists a $0 \leq j < l$ such that \mathcal{A} has a greater advantage in H_j than H_{j+1} by at least $\frac{\epsilon}{j}$.

We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that plays the Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID game in the following way:

Setup \mathcal{B} will first run \mathcal{A} and get $l' \leq l$ target identities $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{l'}$. \mathcal{B} will then submit α_{j+1} as the target identity for its game. \mathcal{B} then receives the public parameters for its scheme and passes these on to \mathcal{A} .

Phase 1 \mathcal{B} responds to private key queries of \mathcal{A} by passing the same private key queries to the challenger and passing the results back to \mathcal{A} . The only private key queries that \mathcal{B} is not allowed to make are within d Hamming distance of α_{j+1} . These are also not allowed by \mathcal{A} . Therefore, \mathcal{B} can respond to all legal queries made by \mathcal{A} .

Challenge In the challenge phase \mathcal{A} will submit $m_{1,0}, \dots, m_{l',0}$ and $m_{1,1}, \dots, m_{l',1}$. \mathcal{B} will select a random message, R , and flip a coin b . \mathcal{B} then submits $m_0 = R$ and $m_1 = m_{j+1,b}$ as the ciphertexts it wishes to be challenged on in its game. The challenger will flip a coin β outside \mathcal{B} 's view. \mathcal{B} will then receive back the ciphertext C which is an encryption of m_β with the key α_{j+1} from the challenger.

\mathcal{B} then assigns ciphertexts $c_1, \dots, c_{l'}$ in the following way. It creates c_1, \dots, c_j as the message R encrypted under the respective identities $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_j$. It assigns $c_{j+1} = C$. Finally, it creates $c_{j+2}, \dots, c_{l'}$ by encrypting $m_{j+2,b}, \dots, m_{l',b}$ under $\alpha_{j+2}, \dots, \alpha_{l'}$ respectively. (If $j \geq l'$ then only the first step needs to be taken.) The ciphertexts are then passed to \mathcal{A} .

Phase 2 Subsequent private key queries are then satisfied as in Phase 1.

Guess \mathcal{A} then outputs its guess b' . If $b = b'$ then \mathcal{B} outputs its guess $\beta' = 1$, otherwise it outputs $\beta' = 0$.

If $\beta = 1$ then C is an encryption of $m_{j+1,b}$ and \mathcal{A} will be playing the hybrid game H_j . Otherwise, if $\beta = 0$ then C is an encryption of R and \mathcal{A} is playing the hybrid game H_{j+1} . It follows that $\Pr[b' = b | \beta = 1] - \Pr[b' = b | \beta = 0] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{j}$. Since $\beta' = 1$ iff $b = b'$, we have

$\Pr[\beta' = 1 | \beta = 1] - \Pr[\beta' = 1 | \beta = 0] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{2l}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} has an advantage of at least $\frac{\epsilon}{2l}$ in the Basic Fuzzy Selective-ID game. \square

B Large Universe Construction

B.1 Description

Let \mathbb{G}_1 be bilinear group of prime order p and g be a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 . Additionally, let $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ denote the bilinear map. A security parameter, κ , will determine the size of the groups.

We also define the Lagrange coefficient $\Delta_{i,S}$ for $i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a set, S , of elements in \mathbb{Z}_p :

$$\Delta_{i,S}(x) = \prod_{j \in S, j \neq i} \frac{x - j}{i - j}.$$

Identities will be n element sets where the elements are members of \mathbb{Z}_p^* . Alternatively, we can describe an identity as a collection of n strings of arbitrary length and use a collision resistant hash function, H , to hash strings into members of \mathbb{Z}_p^* . Our construction follows:

Setup(n, d) First, choose $g_1 = g^y, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_1$.

Next, choose t_1, \dots, t_{n+1} uniformly at random from \mathbb{G}_1 . Let N be the set $\{1, \dots, n+1\}$ and we define a function, T , as:

$$T(x) = g_2^{x^n} \prod_{i=1}^{n+1} t_i^{\Delta_{i,N}(x)}.$$

We can view T as the function $g_2^{x^n} g^{\omega(x)}$ for some n degree polynomial ω .

The public key is published as: $g_1, g_2, t_1, \dots, t_{n+1}$ and the private key is g_2^y .

Key Generation To generate a private key for identity I the following steps are taken. A $d-1$ degree polynomial q is randomly chosen such that $q(0) = y$. The private key will consist of two sets. The first set, $D = \{D_i\} \forall i \in I$, where the elements are constructed as

$$D_i = g_2^{q(i)} T(i)^{r_i},$$

where r_i is a random member of \mathbb{Z}_p defined for all $i \in I$.

The other set is $d = \{d_i\} \forall i \in I$ where the elements are constructed as

$$d_i = g^{r_i}.$$

Encryption Encryption with the public key I' and message $m \in \mathbb{G}_2$ proceeds as follows.

First, a random value $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ is chosen. The ciphertext is then published as:

$$E = (I', E' = me(g_1, g_2)^s, E'' = g^s, \{E_i = T(i)^s\} \forall i \in I').$$

Decryption Suppose that a ciphertext, E , is encrypted with a key for identity I' and we have a key for identity I , where $|I \cap I'| \geq d$. Choose an arbitrary d -element subset, S , of $I \cap I'$.

Then, the ciphertext can be decrypted as:

$$\begin{aligned} M &= E' \prod_{i \in S} \left(\frac{e(d_i, E_i)}{e(D_i, E'')} \right)^{\Delta_{i,S}(0)} \\ &= me(g_1, g_2)^s \prod_{i \in I \cap I'} \left(\frac{e(g^{r_i}, T(i)^s)}{e(g_2^{q(i)} T(i)^{r_i}, g^s)} \right)^{\Delta_{i,S}(0)} \\ &= me(g, g_2)^{ys} \prod_{i \in S} \frac{1}{e(g, g_2)^{q(i)s \Delta_{i,S}(0)}} \\ &= m. \end{aligned}$$

The last equality is derived from using polynomial interpolation in the exponents. Since, the polynomial $sq(x)$ is of degree $d-1$ it can be interpolated using d points.

B.2 Computational Cost

Encryption of a message will consist of $n + 2$ exponentiations in the group \mathbb{G}_1 . The cost of decryption will be dominated by $2d$ bilinear map computations.

C Proof of Security

We prove that the security of our scheme in the Selective-ID model reduces to the hardness of the Decisional BDH assumption.

Lemma 3. *If an adversary can break our scheme in the Basic Fuzzy Selective ID Model, then a simulator can be constructed to play the Decisional BDH game with a non-negligible advantage.*

Proof. Suppose there exists a computationally efficient adversary, \mathcal{A} , that can attack our scheme in the Selective-ID model with advantage ϵ . We build a simulator \mathcal{B} that can play the Decisional BDH game with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2}$.

The simulation proceeds as follows:

We first let the challenger set the groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 with an efficient bilinear map, e and generator g . The challenger flips a fair binary coin μ outside of \mathcal{B} 's view. If $\mu = 0$, the challenger sets $(A, B, C, Z) = (g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^{abc})$; otherwise it sets $(A, B, C, Z) = (g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^z)$ for random a, b, c, z .

Init \mathcal{B} will run \mathcal{A} and receive the challenge identity, α , an n element set of members of \mathbb{Z}_p .

Setup The simulator assigns the public parameters $g_1 = A$ and $g_2 = B$. It then chooses a random n degree polynomial $f(x)$ and calculates an $n - 1$ degree polynomial $u(x)$ such that $u(x) = -x^n$ for all $x \in \alpha$ and where $u(x) \neq -x^n$ for some other x . Since $-x^n$ and $u(x)$ are two n degree polynomials they will either agree on at most n points or they are the same polynomial. Our construction assures that $\forall x u(x) = -x^n$ if and only if $x \in \alpha$.

Then, for i from 1 to n the simulator sets $t_i = g_1^{u(x)} g^{f(x)}$. Note that since $f(x)$ is a random $n - 1$ degree polynomial all t_i will be chosen at random from the adversaries view as in the construction.

Phase 1 \mathcal{A} makes requests for private keys where the identity set overlap between the identities for the requested keys and α is less than d .

Suppose \mathcal{A} asks a private key γ . We first define three sets Γ, Γ', S in the following manner:

$$\Gamma = \gamma \cap \alpha,$$

Γ' be any set such that $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma' \subseteq \gamma$ and $|\Gamma'| = d - 1$, and

$$S = \Gamma' \cup \{0\}.$$

Next, we define the decryption key components D_i and d_i for $i \in \Gamma'$ as:

$$D_i = g_2^{\lambda_i} T(i)^{r_i} \text{ where } s_i \text{ is chosen randomly in } \mathbb{Z}_p$$

and we let

$$d_i = g^{r_i}.$$

The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a random $d - 1$ degree polynomial $q(x)$ by choosing its value for the $d - 1$ points randomly in addition to having $q(0) = a$.

The simulator also needs to calculate the decryption key values for all $i \in \gamma - \Gamma'$. To produce these we use an algebraic method from Boneh and Boyen [2]. The key components are calculated as:

$$D_i = \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma'} g_2^{\lambda_j \Delta_{j, S(i)}} \right) \left(g_1^{\frac{-f(i)}{i^n + u(i)}} (g_2^{i^n + u(i)} g^{f(i)})^{r'_i} \right)^{\Delta_{0, S(i)}}$$

and

$$d_i = (g_1^{\frac{-1}{i^n+u(i)}} g^{r'_i})^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)}.$$

The value $i^n + u(i)$ will be non-zero for all $i \notin \alpha$, which includes all $i \in \gamma - \Gamma'$. This follows from our construction of $u(x)$.

To show that these are valid keys let $r_i = (r'_i - \frac{a}{i^n+u(i)})^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)}$ and let $q(x)$ be the $d-1$ degree polynomial for which $q(0) = a$ and $q(i) = \lambda_i \forall i \in \Gamma'$. We then have:

$$\begin{aligned} D_i &= \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma'} g_2^{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)} \right) \left((g_1^{\frac{-f(i)}{i^n+u(i)}}) (g_2^{i^n+u(i)} g^{f(i)})^{r'_i} \right)^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)} \\ D_i &= \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma'} g_2^{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)} \right) \left((g^{\frac{-af(i)}{i^n+u(i)}}) (g_2^{i^n+u(i)} g^{f(i)})^{r'_i} \right)^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)} \\ &= \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma'} g_2^{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)} \right) \left((g_2^a (g_2^{i^n+u(i)} g^{f(i)})^{\frac{-a}{i^n+u(i)}}) (g_2^{i^n+u(i)} g^{f(i)})^{r'_i} \right)^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)} \\ &= \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma'} g_2^{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)} \right) \left(g_2^a (g_2^{i^n+u(i)} g^{f(i)})^{r'_i - \frac{a}{i^n+u(i)}} \right)^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)} \\ &= \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma'} g_2^{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)} \right) g_2^{a \Delta_{0,S}(i)} (T(i))^{r_i} \\ &= g_2^{q(x)} T(i)^{r_i} \end{aligned}$$

Additionally, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} d_i &= (g_1^{\frac{-1}{i^n+u(i)}} g^{r'_i})^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)} \\ &= (g^{r'_i - \frac{a}{i^n+u(i)}})^{\Delta_{0,S}(i)} \\ &= g^{r_i} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the simulator is able to construct a private key for the identity γ . Furthermore, the distribution of the private key for γ is identical to that of the original scheme.

Challenge The adversary, \mathcal{A} , will submit two challenge messages m_1 and m_0 to the simulator. The simulator flips a fair binary coin ν and returns an encryption of m_ν . The ciphertext is output as:

$$E = (\alpha, E' = m_\nu Z, E'' = C, \{E_i = C^{f(i)}\} \forall i \in \alpha).$$

If $\mu = 0$, then $Z = g^{abc}$. Then the ciphertext is:

$$E = (\alpha, E' = m_\nu e(g, g)^{abc}, E'' = g^c, \{E_i = (g^c)^{f(i)} = T(i)^c\} \forall i \in \alpha).$$

This is a valid ciphertext for the message m_ν under the identity α .

Otherwise, if $\mu = 1$, then $Z = g^z$. We then have $E' = m_\nu g^z$. Since z is random, E' will be a random element of \mathbb{G}_2 from the adversary's view and the message contains no information about m_ν .

Phase 2 The simulator acts exactly as it did in Phase 1.

Guess \mathcal{A} will submit a guess ν' of ν . If $\nu = \nu'$ the simulator will output $\mu' = 0$ to indicate that it was given a BDH-tuple otherwise it will output $\mu' = 1$ to indicate it was given a random 4-tuple.

As shown in the construction the simulator's generation of public parameters and private keys is identical to that of the actual scheme.

In the case where $\mu = 1$ the adversary gains no information about ν . Therefore, we have $\Pr[\nu \neq \nu' | \mu = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$. Since the simulator guesses $\mu' = 1$ when $\nu \neq \nu'$, we have $\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$.

If $\mu = 0$ then the adversary sees an encryption of m_ν . The adversary's advantage in this situation is ϵ by definition. Therefore, we have $\Pr[\nu = \nu' | \mu = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$. Since the simulator guesses $\mu' = 0$ when $\nu = \nu'$, we have $\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$.

The overall advantage of the simulator in the Decisional BDH game is $\frac{1}{2}\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 0] + \frac{1}{2}\Pr[\mu' = \mu | \mu = 1] - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon) + \frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}\epsilon$. \square

Theorem 2. *Our scheme is Secure in the Multiple Fuzzy Selective-ID model.*

Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 3. \square