Identity Based Threshold Ring Signature

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Abstract. Threshold ring signature enables any group of t entities spontaneously conscripting arbitrarily $n - t$ entities to generate a publicly verifiable t-out-of-n signature on behalf of the whole group, yet the actual signers remain anonymous. The spontaneity of these schemes are desirable for ad-hoc groups such as mobile ad-hoc networks [6]. In this paper, we present in Identity based (ID-based) threshold ring signature scheme. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model [3] and provides trusted authority compatibility [22]. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based threshold ring signature scheme and the most efficient (in terms of number of pairing operations required) ID-based ring signature scheme (when $t = 1$).

Key words: Threshold ring signature, identity-based signature, anonymity

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Anonymity is becoming a major concern in many multi-user electronic commerce applications such as e-lotteries, e-cash and online games. Group-oriented cryptography [7] enables an entity of a group to produce an anonymous signature on behalf of the group. However, the group is predefined and there is a group manager that can revoke this anonymity. Ring signature scheme provides a similar feature with the additional advantage that no setup stage is needed to produce and distribute a group secret explicitly. It enables any individual *spontaneously* conscripting arbitrarily $n-1$ entities to generate a publicly verifiable 1-out-of-n signature on behalf of the whole group, yet the actual signer remains anonymous. *Threshold* ring signature is the t-out-of-n threshold version where t or more entities can jointly generate a valid signature but $t-1$ or fewer entities cannot. These schemes are getting more and more popular due to the increasing prevalence of pervasive computing applications and mobile ad-hoc networks, where ad-hoc groups are very common [6].

1.2 Motivation of ID-based Threshold Ring Signature

In traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), a user must pre-enroll the PKI or he/she cannot enjoy the cryptographic services provided by the PKI, e.g. no one can send them any encrypted message. Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography [18, 4] solves this problem: all users already have their corresponding public key before their enrollment since the public key can be derived via a public algorithm with input of a string that can uniquely identify each of them, such as an email address.

All previous threshold ring signature constructions are non ID-based, hence *real spontaneity* is not always possible: the public key of each member of the group is required to be published

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by the underlying public key infrastructure before it can be used to generate the signature. Removing this pre-requisite requirement motivates the construction of our ID-based threshold ring signature scheme, which provide a better alternative than non-ID based solutions[1].

1.3 Related Work

Ring signature was first formalized by Rivest *et. al.* in [16]. After that, several other ring signature schemes [1, 26] were proposed. Bresson *et. al.* extended [16] into a threshold ring signature or a threshold ring signature using the concept of partitioning [6]. Later, Wong *et. al.* proposed another threshold ring signature using tandem construction method [21]. Recently, Liu *et. al.* introduces *separability* to a threshold ring signature [14], which enables the use of various flavours of public keys in a single threshold ring signature.

In [14], a generic construction of threshold ring signature from any trapdoor-one-way type signature scheme and three-move type signature scheme is given. Yet, the authors have not illustrated the correctness and security of this construction except the specific instantiations from RSA [15] and Schnorr signature [17].

Using bilinear pairing to construct ring signature is not a new idea. [5] proposed a ring signature and [24] proposed a proxy ring Signature based on bilinear pairing. In [25], a ring signature is derived from the short signature proposed. ID-based ring signature is introduced in [23] and a more efficient version is proposed in [13], while another ring signature with formally proven security is proposed in [11]. In [20], a bilinear threshold ring signature is proposed; but the scheme is not ID-based and has not addressed the TA (Trusted Authority) compatibility [22] issue in which not all the users join the same TA.

1.4 Our Contributions

In this paper, we present an ID-based threshold ring signature scheme. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model [3] and provides *TA compatibility* [22]. To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based threshold ring signature scheme. Although some research has been done in analyzing the complexity and speeding up the computation of pairing function (for examples, [2], [10], [12] and [8]), pairing operations are still rather expensive. Our scheme is also the most efficient (in terms of number of pairing operations required) ID-based ring signature scheme (when $t = 1$) [2].

1.5 Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains some preliminaries about the formal definitions of an ID-based threshold ring signature scheme, bilinear pairing as well as the Gap Diffie-Hellman group. Formal definitions of security describing the adversary's capabilities are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the proposed ID-based threshold ring signature scheme. The security and efficiency analysis of our scheme are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

[1] Of course we assume that the trusted authority (the Private Key Generator) will not reveal any information about who has requested for his/her private key and who has not.

[2] When compared with [20], which is not ID-based and provides no TA compatibility, our scheme is as efficient as that scheme in terms of the number of pairing operations required.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Framework of ID-Based Threshold Ring Signature

An ID-based threshold ring signature scheme consists of four algorithms: `Setup`, `KeyGen`, `Sign`, and `Verify`.

- `Setup`: On an unary string input 1^k where k is a security parameter, it produces the common public parameters *params*, which include a description of a finite signature space, a description of a finite message space together with a description of a finite agreed information space.
- `KeyGen`: On an input of signer's identity $ID \in \{0,1\}^*$, it outputs the signer's secret signing key sk. (The corresponding public verification key pk can be computed easily by everyone.)
- `Sign`: On input of a message m, a group of n users' identities $\{ID_j\}$, where $1 \leq j \leq n$, and the secret keys of t members $\{S_{ID_{i_j}}\}$, where $1 \leq i_j \leq n$, $1 \leq j \leq t$ and $t < n$; it outputs a (t, n) id-based threshold ring signature σ on the message m.
- `Verify`: On a threshold ring signature σ, a message m, and the group of signers' identities $\{ID_j\}$ as the input, it outputs $\top$ for "true" or $\perp$ for "false", depending on whether σ is a valid signature signed by at least t members in the group $\{ID_j\}$ on a message m.

These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint of ID-based threshold ring signature scheme, i.e. if $\sigma = \texttt{Sign}(m, \{ID_j\}, \{S_{ID_{i_j}}\})$, we must have $\texttt{Verify}(\{ID_j\}, m, \sigma) = \top$. Security requirements will be described in Section 3.

2.2 Bilinear Pairing and Gap Diffie-Hellman Groups

Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive (see [5, 9, 11, 13, 20, 23–25]). Here, we describe some of its key properties.

Let $(\mathbb{G}_1, +)$ and $(\mathbb{G}_2, \cdot)$ be two cyclic groups of prime order q. The bilinear pairing is given as $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \to \mathbb{G}_2$, which satisfies the following properties:

1. *Bilinearity*: For all $P, Q, R \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $\hat{e}(P + Q, R) = \hat{e}(P, R)\hat{e}(Q, R)$, and $\hat{e}(P, Q + R) = \hat{e}(P, Q)\hat{e}(P, R)$.
2. *Non-degeneracy*: There exists $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$ such that $\hat{e}(P, Q) \neq 1$.
3. *Computability*: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute $\hat{e}(P, Q)$ $\forall P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$.

Definition 1. *Given a generator P of a group $\mathbb{G}$ and a 3-tuple (aP, bP, cP), the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH problem) is to decide whether $c = ab$.*

Definition 2. *Given a generator P of a group $\mathbb{G}$, (P, aP, bP, cP) is defined as a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple if $c = ab$.*

Definition 3. *Given a generator P of a group $\mathbb{G}$ and a 2-tuple (aP, bP), the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH problem) is to compute abP.*

Definition 4. *If $\mathbb{G}$ is a group such that DDH problem can be solved in polynomial time but no probabilistic algorithm can solve CDH problem with non-negligible advantage within polynomial time, then we call $\mathbb{G}$ a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group.*

We assume the existence of a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \to \mathbb{G}_2$ that one can solve Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH problem) in polynomial time.

3 Formal Security Model

Let $\mathbb{G}_1$ be a GDH group, $H(\cdot)$ and $H_0(\cdot)$ are two cryptographic hash functions where $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ and $H_0 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

3.1 Signature Non-Repudiation of ID-Based Threhsold Ring Signature

Signature non-repudiation of an ID-based threshold ring signature is formally defined in terms of the *existential unforgeability of ID-based threshold ring signature under adaptive chosen-message-and-identity attack* (EUF-IDTR-CMIA2) game played between a challenger $\mathcal{C}$ and an adversary $\mathcal{A}$.

EUF-IDTR-CMIA2 Game:

Setup: The challenger $\mathcal{C}$ takes a security parameter k and runs the `Setup` to generate common public parameters *param* and also the master secret key s. $\mathcal{C}$ sends *param* to $\mathcal{A}$.

Attack: The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner (that is, each query may depend on the responses to the previous queries). The types of queries allowed are described below.

- Hash functions queries: $\mathcal{A}$ can ask for the values of the hash functions $H(\cdot)$ and $H_0(\cdot)$ for any input.
- `KeyGen`: $\mathcal{A}$ chooses an identity ID. $\mathcal{C}$ computes $\texttt{Extract}(ID) = S_{ID}$ and sends the result to $\mathcal{A}$.
- `Sign`: $\mathcal{A}$ chooses a group of n users' identities $\{ID_j\}$, any t' signers indexed by $\{i_j\}$, where $1 \leq i_j \leq n$, $1 \leq j \leq t'$ and $t' < n$ and any message m. On input of $(m, \{ID_j\}, \{S_{ID_{i_j}}\})$, $\mathcal{C}$ outputs a (t', n) ID-based threshold ring signature σ.

Forgery: The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs (t', n) ID-based threshold ring signature σ, $\{ID_j\}$, a group of n users' identities $\{ID_j\}$, and any t' signers indexed by $i_1, \cdots, i'_t$, where $1 \leq i_j \leq n$, $1 \leq j \leq t'$ and $t' < n$. The only restriction is that $(m, \{ID_j\}, \{S_{ID_{i_j}}\})$ does not appear in the set of previous `Sign` queries and there is at least one secret key in $\{S_{ID_{i_j}}\}$ that is never returned by any `KeyGen` query. i.e. less than t' private keys of $\{S_{ID_{i_j}}\}$) are known. It wins the game if the $\texttt{Verify}(\{ID_j\}, m, \sigma)$ is equal to $\top$. The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ is defined as the probability that it wins.

Definition 5. *An ID-based threshold ring signature scheme is said to have the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message-and-identity attacks property (EUF-IDTR-CMIA2 secure) if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the EUF-IDTR-CMIA2 game.*

3.2 Signer Ambiguity of ID-Based Threshold Ring Signature

Definition 6. *An ID-based threshold ring signature scheme is said to have the unconditional signer ambiguity if for any group of n users' identities $\{ID_j\}$, any t' signers indexed by $\{i_j\}$, where $1 \leq i_j \leq n$, $1 \leq j \leq t'$ and $t' < n$, any message m and any signature σ, where $\sigma = \texttt{Sign}(m, \{ID_j\}, \{S_{ID_{i_j}}\})$, any verifier $\mathcal{A}$ (i.e. not the signer in the group $\{ID_{i_j}\}$, even with unbounded computing resources, cannot identify any of the signer with probability better than a random guess. That is, $\mathcal{A}$ can only output any member of $\{i_j\}$ with probability no better than $\frac{t'}{n}$.*

4 Our Proposed Scheme

In this section, we show how to adopt the techniques introduced in [14] with the elegancy of bilinear mapping to spawn an efficient ID-based threshold ring signature scheme with reasonable signature size.

4.1 Basic Construction

Define $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \hat{e}$ as in the previous section where $\mathbb{G}_1$ is a GDH group. $H(\cdot)$ and $H_0(\cdot)$ are two cryptographic hash functions where $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ and $H_0 : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

`Setup`: The trusted authority (TA) randomly chooses $s \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and kept it as the master secret key. The system parameters are $params = \{\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \hat{e}(\cdot,\cdot), q, P, P_{pub}, H(\cdot), H_0(\cdot)\}$.

`KeyGen`: The signer with identity $ID \in \{0,1\}^*$ submits ID to TA. TA sets the signer's public key Q_{ID} to be $H(ID) \in \mathbb{G}_1$, computes the signer's private signing key S_{ID} by $S_{ID} = sQ_{ID}$ Then TA sends the private signing key to the signer.

`Sign`: Let L be the set of all public keys of the n users, the t participating signers carry out the following steps.

1. For $i = t+1, \cdots, n$, choose x_i and $h_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and compute $U_i = x_i P - h_i P_{pub}$ and $V_i = x_i Q_{ID_i}$.
2. For $j = 1, \cdots, t$, choose $r_j \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and compute $U_j = r_j P$.
3. Compute $h_0 = H_0(L, t, m, \cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\})$ and construct a polynomial f of degree $n-t$ over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ such $f(0) = h_0$ and $f(i) = h_i$ for $t+1 \leq i \leq n$.
4. For $j = 1, \cdots, t$, compute $h_j = f(j)$ and $V_j = r_j Q_{ID_j} + h_j S_{ID_j}$.
5. Compute $V = \sum_{k=1}^{n} V_k$.
6. Output the signature for m and L as $\sigma = \{\cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\}, V, f\}$.
   (Note that the polynomial f only contain information for the hash values used and will not compromise the unforegeability and anonymity of the scheme.)

`Verify`: A verifier checks a signature $\sigma = \{\cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\}, V, f\}$ for the message m and a set of public keys L as follows.

1. Check if the degree of polynomial f is $n-t$ and $H_0(L, t, m, \cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\})$ is the constant term of f. If both conditions are true, proceed. Otherwise, reject.
2. For $k = 1, \cdots, n$, compute $h_k = f(k)$.
3. Check whether $\prod_{k=1}^{n} \hat{e}(Q_{ID_k}, U_k + h_k P_{pub}) = \hat{e}(P, V)$

4.2 TA Compatibility

In the reality, it is quite often that different user joined different trusted authorities (TAs). In [22], the notion of *TA compatibility* is introduced in the ID-based signcryption context. We extend their notion into TA compatibility in ID-based threshold ring signature. In ID-based threshold ring signature, spontaneity will be affected if the intended group of signers joined different TAs. However, our scheme can be easily extended to handle this situation without compromising the spontaneity. We just need to change the verification algorithm as follows.

`Verify`:

1. Check if the degree of polynomial f is $n-t$ and $H_0(L,t,m,\cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\})$ is the constant term of f. If both conditions are true, proceed. Otherwise, reject.
2. For $k=1,\cdots,n$, compute $h_k=f(k)$.
3. Check whether $\prod_{k=1}^{n}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_k},U_k+h_kP_{pub_k})=\hat{e}(P,V)$, where P_{pub_k} is the public key of the TA of the k-th user.

5 Analysis of the Proposed Scheme

5.1 Consistency

The consistency of our basic construction can be easily verified by the following equations.

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{e}(P,V) &= \hat{e}(P,\sum_{k=1}^{n}V_k)\\
&= \prod_{k=1}^{n}\hat{e}(P,V_k)\\
&= \prod_{i=1}^{t}\hat{e}(P,V_i)\prod_{j=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(P,V_j)\\
&= \prod_{j=1}^{t}\hat{e}(P,r_jQ_{ID_j}+h_jS_{ID_j})\prod_{i=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(P,x_iQ_{ID_i})\\
&= \prod_{j=1}^{t}\hat{e}(P,(r_j+h_js)Q_{ID_j})\prod_{i=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(x_iP,Q_{ID_i})\\
&= \prod_{j=1}^{t}\hat{e}((r_j+h_js)Q_{ID_j},P)\prod_{i=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_i},x_iP)\\
&= \prod_{j=1}^{t}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_j},(r_j+h_js)P)\prod_{i=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_i},x_iP-h_iP_{pub}+h_iP_{pub})\\
&= \prod_{j=1}^{t}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_j},r_jP+h_jP_{pub})\prod_{i=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_i},U_i+h_iP_{pub})\\
&= \prod_{j=1}^{t}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_j},U_j+h_jP_{pub})\prod_{i=t+1}^{n}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_i},U_i+h_iP_{pub})\\
&= \prod_{k=1}^{t}\hat{e}(Q_{ID_k},U_k+h_kP_{pub})
\end{aligned}$$

The consistency of our extended scheme with TA compatibility can be verified easily in a similar manner.

5.2 Efficiency Analysis

Pairing operation is usually the most computational intensive operation in pairing-based cryptography. Our scheme is the most efficient (in terms of number of pairing operations

required) ID-based ring signature scheme (when $t = 1$). Taken into account the computational costs for signature generation and verification, the schemes of [23] and [13] use $4n - 1$ and $2n+1$ operations, respectively. While the most efficient scheme before the birth of our scheme is [11], which uses $n + 3$ pairings in total i.e. signing and verification, our scheme only uses $n + 1$ pairing operations. Although the difference is not great, our scheme can be optimized further while [11] cannot, since the multiplication of a series of pairings in `Verify` can be optimized by using the concept of "Miller lite" of Tate pairing presented in [19].

Considering the signature size, our scheme is also up to the state-of-the-art. Signature sizes in [6] and [21] are $O(n \log n)$ and $O(C_t^n)$, respectively. We share the same order of space complexities as in [14] and [20]. However, due to the elegancy of elliptic curve, our scheme should achieve shorter signature size than [14].

5.3 Existential Unforgeability of our ID-based threshold ring Signature

Theorem 1 *In the random oracle model (the hash functions are modeled as random oracles), if there is an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ for an adaptively chosen message and ID attack to our scheme, then CDHP can be solved with non-negligible probability in polynomial time.*

Proof. See the appendix. □

5.4 Signer Ambiguity

Theorem 2 *Our ID-based threshold ring signature scheme satisfies the unconditional signer ambiguity property.*

Proof. See the appendix. □

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we present an ID-based threshold ring signature scheme. We prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle model [3]. Moreover, our scheme provides trusted authority compatibility [22].

To the best of authors' knowledge, our scheme is the first ID-based threshold ring signature scheme and the most efficient ID-based ring signature scheme (when $t = 1$) in terms of the number of pairing operations. Due to the elegancy of bilinear pairing, signatures generated by our scheme are much shorter and simpler than signatures from other previous threshold ring signature schemes. Future research directions include making a constant-size ID-based threshold ring signature scheme.

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Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose the challenger $\mathcal{C}$ receives a random instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDHP and has to compute if abP. $\mathcal{C}$ will run $\mathcal{A}$ as a subroutine and act as $\mathcal{A}$'s challenger in the EUF-IDTR-CMIA2 game. During the game, $\mathcal{A}$ will consult $\mathcal{C}$ for answers to the random oracles H and H_0. Roughly speaking, these answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the consistency and to avoid collision, $\mathcal{C}$ keeps three lists to store the answers used. We assume $\mathcal{A}$ will ask for $H(ID)$ before ID is used in any other queries.

$\mathcal{C}$ gives $\mathcal{A}$ the system parameters with $P_{pub} = bP$. Note that b is unknown to $\mathcal{C}$. This value simulates the master key value for the TA in the game.

H requests: When $\mathcal{A}$ asks queries on the hash values of identities, $\mathcal{C}$ checks the list L_1, If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to $\mathcal{A}$; otherwise, a value d_i from $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ will be randomly generated and d_iP will be used as the answer, the query and the answer will then be stored in the list. Note that the associated private key is d_ibP which $\mathcal{C}$ knows how to compute.

The only exception is that $\mathcal{C}$ has to randomly choose one of the H queries from $\mathcal{A}$, say the i-th query, and answers $H(ID_i) = aP$ for this query. Since aP is a value in a random instance of the CDHP, it does not affect the randomness of the hash function H. Since both a and b are unknown to $\mathcal{C}$, a `KeyGen` request on this identity will make $\mathcal{C}$ fails.

H_0 requests: When $\mathcal{A}$ asks queries on these hash values, $\mathcal{C}$ checks the corresponding list L_2. If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to $\mathcal{A}$; otherwise, a randomly generated value will be used as an answer to $\mathcal{A}$, the query and the answer will then be stored in the list.

`Sign` requests: $\mathcal{A}$ chooses a group of n users' identities $L = \{ID_j\}$, any t' signers indexed by $\{i_j\}$, where $1 \leq i_j \leq n$, $1 \leq j \leq t'$ and $t' < n$ and any message m. On input of $(L, \{i_j\}, m)$, $\mathcal{C}$ outputs a (t', n) ID-based threshold ring signature σ as follows.

1. For $i = 0, t', t'+1, \cdots, n$, randomly choose $h_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.
2. Construct a polynomial f over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ such that the degree of f is $n - t'$ and $f(i) = h_i$ for $i = 0, t', t'+1, \cdots, n$.
3. For $j = 1, \cdots, t$, compute $h_j = f(j)$.
4. For $k = 1, \cdots, n$, randomly choose h_k and compute $U_k = x_kP - h_kP_{pub}$
5. Compute $V = \sum_{k=1}^{n} x_kQ_{ID_k}$.
6. Random generate a value h_0 from $\mathbb{Z}_p$, assign h_0 as the value of $H_0(L, t, m, \cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\})$, if collision occurs, repeat the previous steps.
7. Output the signature for m and L as $\sigma = \{\cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\}, V, f\}$.

Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a forged signature $\sigma = \{U, V, f\}$ that is pretended to be signed by some t' members in the group $\{ID_j\}$, $Q_{ID_i} = H(ID_i) = aP \in \{ID_j\}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ only requested for the private key of some $t' - 1$ members in the group. It follows from the forking lemma that if $\mathcal{A}$ is a sufficiently efficient forger in the above interaction, then we can construct a Las Vegas machine $\mathcal{A}'$ that outputs two signed messages (U, V, f) and (U, V', f'). To do so we keep all the random tapes in two invocations of $\mathcal{A}$ the same except h_0 returned by H_0 query of the forged message.

Now we consider the probability that Q_{ID_i} is the chosen target of forgery. Let π be the index of $Q_{ID_i} = aP$ in L, to solve for CDHP, we need $f(\pi) \neq f'(\pi)$. Since $f(0) \neq f'(0)$ and

the degrees of f and f' are both $n - t'$, there is at least one value $1 \leq j \leq n$ such that $f'(j) \neq f(j)$, and the probability having $j = \pi$ is at least $\frac{1}{n}$

Given the machine $\mathcal{A}'$ derived from $\mathcal{A}$, we can solve the CDHP by computing $abP = (h_\pi - h'_\pi)^{-1}(V - V')$.

We calculate the probability of success of $\mathcal{C}$ as follows. For $\mathcal{C}$ to succeed, $\mathcal{A}$ did not ask a `KeyGen` query on ID_i. And the corresponding probability is at least $\frac{1}{q_H}$, as there are at most q_H entries in H. The probability of having a faithful simulation is at least $\frac{1}{nq_H}$.

□

Proof of Theorem 2

The polynomial f with degree $n - t$ can be considered as a function chosen randomly from the collection of all polynomials over $\mathbb{Z}_p$ with degree $n - t$ since $h_{t+1}, \cdots, h_n$ are randomly generated and h_0 is the output of the random oracle H_0.

For $i = t + 1, \cdots, n$, and for $j = 1, \cdots, t$, $\{x_i\}$ and $\{r_j\}$ are chosen independently and distributed uniformly over $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. So $\{U_i\} \cup \{U_j\}$ and hence $\cup_{k=1}^{n}\{U_k\})$ are also uniformly distributed.

The polynomial f is determined by $h_{t+1}, \cdots, h_n$ and h_0, then the distributions of $h_1, \cdots, h_t$ are also uniform over the underlying range, with the fact that $\{S_{ID_j}\}$ is independent of $\{r_j\}$ and $\{h_j\}$, we say that $\{V_i\} \cup \{V_j\}$ and hence V are also uniformly distributed.

To conclude, for any fixed message m and fixed set of public keys L, the distribution of $\{U, V, f\}$ are independent and uniformly distributed no matter which t participating signers are. So we conclude that even an adversary with all the private keys corresponding to the set of public keys L and unbounded computing resources has no advantage in identifying any one of the participating signers over random guessing. □