

Kaweichel, an Extension of Blowfish for 64-Bit Architectures

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May 16, 2005

Abstract

In this article the block cipher Kaweichel is presented. It is an extension of Blowfish for 64-bit architectures. Its aim is to present a cipher for modern 64-Bit processors which utilizes commonplace instructions. A main objective of the development was to harden the cipher against known attacks on Blowfish. The author does not claim intellectual property on Kaweichel and the cipher will remain unpatented. A C reference implementation is available on the web.

1 Introduction

Measures to protect privacy are today virtually everyone's business.¹ Since the mid-seventies, when open research in cryptography began, numerous encryption methods have been published. For connections with low error rates or for fault-tolerant protocols, like the Internet Protocol, so called block ciphers are the first choice for encryption routines. Block ciphers encrypt a given number (typically a power of 2 and 64 or higher) of bits simultaneously under the control of a key. Opposite to stream ciphers, where under the control of a key a pseudorandom sequence is generated and XORed (addition modulo 2) with the plaintext, the ciphertext of a block cipher depends on all the bits of the plaintext. As a result, in general the breaking of a block cipher is more difficult than the breaking of a stream cipher with the same key length. This is called diffusion, i.e. the spreading of one bit of the plaintext to all the bits of the ciphertext and was first proposed by Shannon [10]. Shannon also proposed the so called confusion, i.e.

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¹This article is the edited English translation of [4]

a bit of the ciphertext should depend in a complex manner on the bits of the plaintext and the key. Modern block ciphers realize these demands as a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for a secure encryption. Given the development by open cryptography since 1975, additional criteria have been developed, such as immunity from differential [2] or linear cryptanalysis [5] or the slide attack [3].

This paper is an attempt to develop a software-efficient and secure block cipher with the instructions typical for a modern 64-bit microprocessor (possible candidates are Alpha, G5, Hammer and Itanium and others). The starting point of the development is the block cipher Blowfish [9], which is free of claims of intellectual property. The typical instructions of a 64-bit microprocessor, that are used, are the loading of a register, addition, XOR, AND, rotation to the right and shift to the right. Given favourable circumstances, that is a level-1 cache hit for program code and data, these instructions are carried within one or two clock cycles.

2 Definitions

Let denote: \boxplus addition modulo 2^{64} , \oplus addition modulo 2 (XOR) of two 64-bit words, $\text{rotr } e$ the rotation of a 64-bit word by e positions to the right. This rotation can be written as multiplication $2^{64-e} \bmod 2^{64} - 1$ if the values of the 64-bit word is less than $2^{64} - 1$. S-box denotes a 8-bit to 64-bit substitutions-box, which can be expressed as indexed addressing of 8-bit values into a table of 64-bit values.

3 Description of the block cipher

Kaweichel is a generalized Feistel cipher. The first Feistel cipher published was the Data Encryption Standard (DES) of the U.S. government, which was based on work by IBM. It is published in [1, 2].

When using a Feistel cipher the plaintext is first divided into two equal halves. The size of the plaintext block is typically 64 bit or 128 bit, i.e. it is a power of 2. The left half of the plaintext block is used as the input for a so called round function (F-function), which modifies the input under the control of the round key. The output of the round function is added modulo 2 (XORed) to the right half of the plaintext block. After that, the two halves are exchanged and the procedure is repeated, until the defined number of iterations (rounds) is reached. After the last iteration, the two halves of the ciphertext block are not exchanged. Thus the whole construction is self-inverse except for the order of the round keys. This means that for encryption and

decryption the same hard- and software can be used, only the order of the round keys has to be inverted for decryption.

For the construction of the round function one chooses usually parallel substitutions (s-boxes). The output bits of these s-boxes are permuted in order to achieve diffusion. For the derivation of the round keys from the userkey one has to choose a key schedule.

The basic idea behind this construction is that a weak, iterated encryption function will result in a cryptographically strong cipher. But there minimum requirements for the round function (F-function). It should, for example, offer sufficient resistance against differential [2] and linear cryptanalysis [5].

The construction of Kaweichel (see figures 1 and 2) differs in several points from that of a classical Feistel ciphers.

- Before the left data block is used as input for round function, a key P_i is added modulo 2^{64} to that data block.
- Rather than using a round key for the round function, the s-boxes are key dependant. This method got first widely known with the block cipher Blowfish [9]. The advantage is, that differential [2] and linear cryptanalysis [5] are not applicable, since they require the knowledge of the s-boxes.
- After the output of the round function is added modulo 2 (XORed) to the right data block, the bits of the right block are rotated to the right by a fixed amount.
- The right and left halves are exchanged after the last iteration.
- After the last iteration a pair of keys P_{32}, P_{33} is added modulo 2^{64} to both halves (final transformation).

Each of the points 1 and 3 to 5 causes the cipher not to be self-inverse, i.e. for encryption and decryption separate hard- and software needs to be implemented.

Kaweichel works with a block size of 128 bit, thus each half is 64 bit long. The 64 bit input to the round function is first divided into eight equal units of eight bit (one byte). Each of these units is used as an index into a table of $256 = 2^8$ values (s-box) in such a manner, that the least significant byte is used as input for s-box 0, the next byte for s-box 1, and so on, and the most significant byte is used as input for s-box 7. The 64 bit results of two adjacent s-boxes are added modulo 2^{64} , e.g. the outputs of s-box 0 and s-box 1. This leaves four values. Two adjacent of these four values are added modulo 2(XORed). This leaves two 64 bit values. They are added modulo 2^{64} to form the




Figure 1: One iteration of the block cipher Kaweichel



Figure 2: The final transformation

output of the round function. If one denotes the output of the s-boxes by S_0 to S_7 , the output of the round function becomes:

$$\text{roundoutput} = ((S_0 \boxplus S_1) \oplus (S_2 \boxplus S_3)) \boxplus ((S_4 \boxplus S_5) \oplus (S_6 \boxplus S_7))$$

The combination of the output of the s-boxes was changed compared to Blowfish [9] to allow for a better parallelization in both hard- and software and to make Rijmen's attack [6] more difficult.

For the number of rounds the author recommends for the time being $N = 32$. The maximum key length is thus 30 (i.e. $N - 2$) words of 64 bits or 1920 bits. Shorter keys are appended with zeros to reach 1920 bit, but the length of key should not fall below 256 bits.

For the rotation the value 11 is used.

For the derivation of the round keys, the keys for the final transformation and the s-boxes, the following holds: First the round keys and the keys for the final transformation are assigned random or pseudo-random values. After that the s-boxes are assigned random or pseudo-random values, beginning with s-box 0 and Index (for details, see the function `init_cipher` in the reference implementation). In the reference implementation (see [7]) the binary digits of π (less the initial 3) are used for that purpose. After that, the 1920 bit long userkey is added modulo 2 (XORed) to the first 30 roundkeys $P_i, i = 0 \dots 29$. This limitation of the userkey ensures that in the following encryptions all outputbits depend on all the bits of the userkey. After that the plaintext block is assigned the all-zero string and encrypted once. The round keys P_0 and P_1 are then assigned the right half and the left half of the ciphertext block. The cipher is then employed in Output Feedback Mode (OFB) and the values generated are assigned the next round keys P_2 and P_3 . This is repeated, until all the round keys, the keys of the final transformation and the s-boxes have been assigned new values (see function `expand_key` of the reference implementation). The method for deriving the subkeys has been slightly changed compared to Blowfish, because in Blowfish the roundkeys for the third and fourth round do not depend on the first 64 bits of the userkey (for details, see [8])

4 Security

The individual output bits of a s-box can be described as Boolean function of the eight input bits. Since the s-box entries depend on the key and the initial values they are random. Thus a certain output bit of a s-box can be described as a random Boolean function of the eight input variables. If one selects a Boolean function with eight arguments, there are 2^{256} possibilities with $256=2^8$. The share of affine Boolean functions, which are especially unsuitable for cryptographic

purposes, decreases rapidly as the number of arguments increases. On the other hand, wider input sizes of the s-boxes mean an increase in memory requirements, so that a satisfactory compromise had to be reached. The following table gives the share A of affine Boolean functions and the memory requirement S of the round function as a function of the input width m of the s-boxes.

m/bit	A	S/kbyte
2	2^{-1}	1
4	2^{-11}	2
8	2^{-247}	16
16	2^{-65519}	2048

Given the limited size of the level-1 data cache in modern 64-bit processors the choice of m=8 is deemed feasible as well as sufficiently secure.

Another point of interest is the probability that a certain output bit of the round function is a constant (The possibility that a carry occurs in the five additions modulo 2^{64} is neglected). To this end consider the *algebraic normal form* (ANF) of a Boolean function. A Boolean function with eight arguments has $256=2^8$ coefficients in the ANF, which all can take the values 0 or 1. For an output bit of the round function to be a constant, the Boolean functions of two s-boxes must correspond in the last 255 coefficients of the ANF. This means, that for four s-boxes the coefficients of the ANF are free while the last 255 coefficients of the other four s-boxes are fixed. Thus the probability that a certain output bit of the round function is a constant is $w = (2^{255})^4 = 2^{1020}$. If one compares this to the key length of 1920 bit, the value seems to high. For this reason the rotation was introduced. Now each bit of one of the halves is combined modulo 2 (XORed) with 16 different output bits of the round function. The probability that any 16 output bits of the round function are constant is:

$$W = (16!)^{-1} * 64 * 2^{-1020} * 63 * 2^{-1020} * \dots * 49 * 2^{-1020} < 2^{-44} * 64^{16} * (2^{-1020})^{16} = 2^{52} * 2^{-16320} = 2^{-16268}$$

Another important point that must be considered when designing a modern block cipher is security from differential and linear cryptanalysis. Both methodes are not applicable to Kaweichel, since the s-boxes are newly determined with each key.

Vincent Rijmen published in [6] an analysis of Blowfish with second order differentials, that breaks four of the 16 rounds. His attack is not applicable to Kaweichel, since it requires that the operations performed on the two halves commute. This is not the case, because addition modulo 2^{64} and XOR do not commute. In addition to that, his attack calculates the s-boxes by approximating the addition in the

round function by XOR. In Kaweichel for each s-box two additions have to be approximated by XOR, making the attack more difficult.

Another analysis of Bowfish can be found in the article by Serge Vaudenay [11]. His attacks are not applicable to Kaweichel, since the rotation distributes the input difference to other s-boxes then the intended one.

5 Miscellaneous

The block cipher presented in this article is suitable for 64-bit processors with level-1 data cache larger then 16kbyte. For computers with limited resources like smartcard it is not recommended. The main area of use is bulk encryption of data. The key agility is rather poor. If one Megabyte of data is encrypted, the key expansion will use 1,5 % of the total time.

The author claims no intellectual property on Kaweichel and the cipher will remain unpatented. A C reference implementation is available from [7].

6 Acknowledgements

The author thanks Claus Grupen of Siegen University for continued encouragement and support.

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