

# Exclusion-Intersection Encryption and Its Application to Searchable Audit Log Encryption<sup>\*</sup>

Sherman S.M. Chow<sup>\*\*</sup>

Department of Computer Science  
Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences  
New York University, NY 10012, USA  
schow@cs.nyu.edu

**Abstract.** Identity (or identifier) based encryption has shown to be a useful cryptographic schema enabling secure yet flexible role-based access control. In this paper, we propose a new notion named as *exclusion-intersection encryption*: the sender can specify the targeted groups that are legitimated and interested in reading the documents in the encryption algorithm; there exists a trusted key generation centre generating *intersection* private decryption keys on request. This special private key can only be used to decrypt the ciphertext which is of all the specified groups' interests, its holders are *excluded* from reading the documents targeted to any subset of the groups (e.g. the ciphertext of only a single group's interest). One of the applications of this new notion is to support an ad-hoc joint project of two groups which needs extra helpers that are not from either group.

Another interesting application of the proposed scheme is an encrypted audit log that supports conjunctive field keyword searching, which is the first in the literature.

**Key words:** access control, applied cryptography, audit log

## 1 Introduction

Controlling the access of data via complex policies is always a challenging issue, especially for dynamic organizations where people assume different roles in different (possibly ad-hoc) projects and people's roles may change over time. Identity [4, 6] (or identifier) based has shown to be a useful cryptographic schema enabling secure yet flexible role-based access control [1, 8, 16, 17, 20], (in particular, the access of the plaintext message encrypted in a ciphertext).

In this paper, we propose a new notion named as *exclusion-intersection encryption*: the sender can specify the target groups (says  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ ) that are legitimated and interested to read the documents in the encryption algorithm; there exists a trusted key generation centre generating *intersection* private decryption keys (e.g.  $A \cap B \cap C$ ) on request. This special private key can only be used to decrypt the ciphertext which is of all the specified groups' ( $A$  and  $B$  and  $C$  following the above example) interests, its holders are *excluded* from reading the documents targeted to any subset of this set of groups (e.g. the ciphertext targeted to  $A \cap B$ ).

One of the applications of this new notion is to support an ad-hoc joint project of two groups which needs extra helpers that are not from either group. These new helpers only need to ask the key generation center (KGC) to generate the intersection private key, then both groups and those new helpers can decrypt the documents for this joint project, but these new helpers cannot decrypt the documents which are confidential to each group. The key

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<sup>\*</sup> A short note about an independent work "Searchable Keyword-Based Encryption" by Park-Cha-Lee was given in the 3.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Part of the research is done when the author is with Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong.

distribution is minimal as only these new helpers (instead of all related people of the project) need to get a new key. The scheme supports cryptographic workflow in the sense that sender can create the encrypted documents even the decryption key are yet to be generated by KGC and obtained by the related parties.

The proposed scheme is useful when the sender does not have the knowledge of the access-control policy nor the hierarchy of the groups in an organization. Consider an applicant for PhD programme who just gets a few more papers accepted for publication and wants to submit a more updated version of his curriculum vitae (CV) to a certain university so as to increase his chance of being admitted. The application committee usually consists of the staff members from both the graduate school and the department of interest, says Department of Computer Science (hereinafter referred as CS department). By using our proposed exclusion-intersection encryption, he can encrypt his CV to “*Graduate School*”  $\cap$  “*CS Department*”. As a result, the staff members at CS department, the staff members at graduate school, or a special group of people (hereinafter referred as “*Helpers*”) only handling graduate admission of CS (if exists) can decrypt and read his CV, irrespective of the private key issuing policy of the university.

One may argue that it is possible to achieve the same things by using hierarchical encryption [4, 9, 12, 15]. But the sender may not know the hierarchy of the groups in that university (for examples, whether the graduate school is at a level higher than the CS department or if there is a group of people handling graduate admissions under the CS department), or actually there is no such hierarchy. One of the possible solution is that both of the graduate school and the CS department generate the “children private key” for CS department and graduate school respectively, i.e. the helpers will get both the private key corresponding to “*Graduate School*”  $\rightarrow$  “*CS Department*” and “*CS Department*”  $\rightarrow$  “*Graduate School*” (where  $A \rightarrow B$  denotes  $A$  is at a level higher than  $B$ ). It seems that the same result can be achieved as (1) the sender does not need to know the hierarchy (i.e. he can use either “*Graduate School*”  $\rightarrow$  “*CS Department*” or “*CS Department*”  $\rightarrow$  “*Graduate School*” as the identifier), (2) the helpers cannot read the existing encrypted document for “*Graduate School*” and “*CS Department*” (as being at the lower level of the hierarchy), (3) the KGC only needs to generate private key for the helpers. However, this solution is not scalable if the number of different groups involved increases.

Interestingly the proposed scheme can be applied on searching encrypted audit logs too. A secure audit log should be tamper-resistant and encrypted such that no adversary can modify nor read the audit log. On the other hand, it should be efficiently searchable by authorized auditors, yet the searching power delegated to the auditors should be limited. Our scheme gives rise to an encrypted audit log that supports conjunctive field keyword searching, which is the first in the literature.

## 2 Related Work

### 2.1 Access Control from Elliptic Curve Pairings

Notions similar to our proposed exclusion-intersection encryption can be found in [8] and [20], which considered the “conjunction” and “disjunction” of private keys associated with multiple identities. By conjunction, any one who has all the private keys involved with an encrypted message can do the decryption; while disjunction means any one who has at least one of the private keys involved with an encrypted message can get the plaintext. However, the papers

provided neither security model nor formal proof. In a recent work [2], efficient multi-receiver identity-based encryption was proposed, together with a formal model and security proofs. However, to the best of authors' knowledge, there is no work addressing other special forms of access like the "exclusion-intersection" scenario considered in this paper.

## 2.2 Searchable Encryption of Audit Log

A closely related area of searchable encryption of audit log is searchable encryption in general. The majority of previous work in this area considers the scenario that a bandwidth constrained user, who stores documents on an untrusted server, delegates the searching power to that storage server. The question on how to perform searching on encrypted data was raised in [21], where a practical (in the sense of space and communication overhead) technique based on stream cipher was proposed as well. Their scheme works in a symmetric-key setting, which means the same key is used for encryption, decryption and searching of data.

Subsequently, index-based approaches [3, 7, 13] were proposed, where the restriction on the encryption mechanism of the document is removed. Basically, these work addressed the scenario where the encrypted data is stored in an untrusted remote server or any server outside the data owner's direct control (consider the scenarios of outsourcing the backup and the storage of enterprise's data to data warehousing companies and storage service for client to retrieve data using his/her wireless PDA), and the data owner wants to retrieve only the data satisfied with certain criteria (instead of the whole set of data) from the server when necessary, without delegating the decryption power or any power of distinguishing other encryption documents (except the above mentioned criteria). All these schemes are symmetric in the sense that the data owner builds the index.

The first public key scheme for keyword search over encrypted data were presented in [5], where every body can use the public key to create the encrypted indexes such that only the one holding the corresponding private key can generate trapdoor to search over these index. The schemes are made possible with the use of bilinear pairings. Subsequently, a pairing-based scheme for secure conjunctive keyword search over data encrypted by symmetric key was proposed in [14]. Their work pointed out the issue that the trivial solution of conjunctive keyword search using set intersection of two simple keyword search queries is insecure (as extra information about which set of encrypted documents match only one of the criteria will be leaked) and the use of meta-keyword defining for every possible conjunction of keywords are obviously unsatisfactory. Public key encryption with conjunctive field keyword search was recently proposed in [19].

A closely related work [22] proposed a searchable encrypted audit log system. Each record is encrypted with a random key, this key is which is in turn encrypted using identity-based encryption with each keyword as the identity (public key). A time-scoped searchable encrypted audit log system was subsequently proposed in [10], which can be regarded as building on top of the idea in [22]. Time-scoped searching is accomplished by storing a backpointer for each keyword which indicates the most recently logged record containing that keyword. At the same time the log server periodically creates a special kind of logs, namely anchor logs, which serve as boundaries for demarcating the time scopes of the records. Although [10] equipped a searchable encrypted audit log system with time-scoped searching, their construction cannot be trivially extended to support conjunctive keyword search as extensive use of identity-based encryption may result. On the other hand, our solution can be easily extended to support time-scoped searching by making the logging time as one of the searchable fields.

One may be tempted to use the conjunction version in [20] to build an audit log with conjunctive field keyword search. However, no formal treatment has been made to investigate the possibility and the security of this approach. Even it is possible, it provides a less efficient solution when compared with our proposed scheme.

### 3 Building Blocks

#### 3.1 Bilinear Pairings

Bilinear pairing is an important primitive for many cryptographic schemes. In particular, many access control schemes and searchable encryption are based on elliptic-curve pairings [1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 14, 19, 20, 22]. Here, we describe some of its key properties.

Let  $(\mathbb{G}_1, +)$  and  $(\mathbb{G}_2, \cdot)$  be two cyclic groups of prime order  $q$ . The bilinear pairing is given as  $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ , which satisfies the following properties:

1. *Bilinearity*: For all  $P, Q, R \in \mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $\hat{e}(P + Q, R) = \hat{e}(P, R)\hat{e}(Q, R)$ , and  $\hat{e}(P, Q + R) = \hat{e}(P, Q)\hat{e}(P, R)$ .
2. *Non-degeneracy*: There exists  $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$  such that  $\hat{e}(P, Q) \neq 1$ .
3. *Computability*: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute  $\hat{e}(P, Q) \forall P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$ .

We assume the existence of a bilinear map  $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$  with the property that the following problem is hard to compute.

**Definition 1.** *Given two groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  of the same prime order  $q$ , a bilinear map  $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$  and a generator  $P$  of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , the  $q$ -Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion Problem ( $q$ -DBDHIP) in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \hat{e})$  is to decide whether  $R = \hat{e}(P, P)^{1/x}$  given  $(P, xP, x^2P, \dots, x^qP)$  and an element  $R \in \mathbb{G}_2$ .*

#### 3.2 Symmetric Encryption

Let  $\{\mathcal{E}_{(\cdot)}(\cdot), \mathcal{D}_{(\cdot)}(\cdot)\}$  be a pair of symmetric encryption and decryption function with key space  $\mathbb{K}$ . We requires that the symmetric encryption functions are find-guess secure [11], i.e. any polynomially bounded adversary cannot distinguish between  $\mathcal{E}_K(m_0)$  and  $\mathcal{E}_K(m_1)$  for any  $K \in \mathbb{K}$  with a probability significantly greater than  $1/2$ , where  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  are two messages of the equal length chosen by the adversary. Note that the adversary has neither encryption oracle access nor decryption oracle access.

#### 3.3 Hash Functions

Our schemes will employ the following cryptographic hash functions, which we assume are modelled by random oracles in our security proof:

- $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$
- $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$
- $H_3 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$

where  $\mathbb{K}$  is the key space of the symmetric encryption function.

## 4 Exclusion-Intersection Encryption

### 4.1 Framework

- **Setup**( $1^k$ ): On an unary string input  $1^k$  where  $k$  is a security parameter, it produces the master secret key  $\mathcal{S}$  and the common public parameters  $params$ , which include a description of a finite plaintext space and a description of a finite ciphertext space. We omitted the inclusion of common public parameters as part of the input in the descriptions of the remaining algorithms.
- **EIE**( $m, \{W_i\}$ ): For a plaintext message  $m$  together with a list of targeted groups  $\{W_i\}$ , it produces an exclusion-intersection encryption  $S_{\{W_i\}}$  of  $m$ .
- **Trapdoor**( $\mathcal{S}, \{Q_i\}$ ): Taking  $\{Q_i\}$  as the input of a single group or a list of groups, it produces a trapdoor  $T_{\{Q_i\}}$  with the help of the master secret key  $\mathcal{S}$ , the resulting trapdoor is the private key for a single group or an “intersection private key” for the intersection of all the specified groups, depending on the number of groups specified in  $\{Q_i\}$ .
- **Decrypt**( $S, T_{\{Q_i\}}$ ): Given the exclusion-intersection encryption  $S_{\{W_i\}}$  of  $m$ , if the group associated with the trapdoor  $T_{\{Q_i\}}$  is a subset of the targeted groups associated with  $S_{\{W_i\}}$ , i.e.  $\{Q_i\} \subseteq \{W_i\}$ , then outputs  $m$ , ‘ $\perp$ ’ otherwise.

### 4.2 Security

Here we consider the de-facto standard of a secure public key encryption scheme, which is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext-and-identifier attacks.

Consider the following IND-EIE-CCIA2 game played between a challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Setup:* The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  takes a security parameter  $k$  and runs **Setup** to generate common public parameters  $param$  and the master secret key  $\mathcal{S}$ .  $\mathcal{C}$  sends  $param$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Phase 1:* The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries in an adaptive manner (that is, each query may depend on the responses to the previous queries). The types of queries allowed are described below.

- **Trapdoor:**  $\mathcal{A}$  chooses a list of groups  $\{Q_i\}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes **Trapdoor**( $\mathcal{S}, \{Q_i\}$ ) and sends the result to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- **Decrypt:**  $\mathcal{A}$  chooses a ciphertext  $S$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  computes a certain trapdoor that can decrypt  $S$  according to the auxiliary information  $\mathcal{L}$  contained in  $S$ , decrypt the ciphertext  $S$  and sends the resulting plaintext  $m$  or the symbol  $\perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Challenge:* The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  decides when Phase 1 ends. Then, it outputs two equal length plaintexts,  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , and a set of group identifiers  $\{ID_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t}$  on which it wishes to be challenged. The set  $\{ID_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t}$  or a subset of it should not appear in any **Trapdoor** queries in Phase 1. The challenger  $\mathcal{C}$  picks a random bit  $b$  from  $\{0, 1\}$ , computes  $S = \text{EIE}(m_b, \{ID_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t})$  and returns  $S$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

*Phase 2:* The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in Phase 1 with the similar restriction on **Trapdoor** query and the restriction that a **Decrypt** query to obtain the plaintext for  $S$  cannot be made.

*Guess:* The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  has to output a guess  $b'$ . It wins the game if  $b' = b$ .

The *advantage* of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as  $Adv(\mathcal{A}) = |2P[b' = b] - 1|$  where  $P[b' = b]$  denotes the probability that  $b' = b$ .

**Definition 2.** *An exclusion-intersection encryption scheme is said to have the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext-and-identifier attacks property (IND-EIE-CCIA2 secure) if no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the IND-EIE-CCIA2 game.*

Notice that the definition of IND-EIE-CCIA2 game is kind of similar to that of ILCR (indistinguishability of limited ciphertext from random) game defined in [19], which is essential for the security of the encrypted searchable audit log. Instead of choosing an identifier to be challenged, the adversary chooses the keyword in a certain position in the ILCR game. This challenge keyword is associated with either one of the messages  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , and the goal of the adversary is to distinguish these two messages without asking for the trapdoor that can distinguish  $m_0$  from  $m_1$ , which matches the restriction of the adversary in IND-EIE-CCIA2 game that no trapdoor queries on the challenge identifier is allowed. Moreover, we provide decryption queries, which are not applicable in their scenario.

## 5 Proposed Construction

- **Setup**( $1^k$ ): Let  $q$  be the order of the groups  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  which is determined by the security parameter  $k$ . The algorithm chooses random numbers  $s_1, s_2$  and  $s_3 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and a generator  $P$  of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . It outputs  $params = [P, X, Y = s_1P, Z_1 = s_2P, Z_2 = s_3P, g = \hat{e}(P, P)]$  and  $S = [s_1, s_2, s_3]$ .
- **EIE**( $m, \{W_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,n}$ ):
  1. Selects random numbers  $r_1, \dots, r_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ .
  2. Computes  $\{B_1, \dots, B_n\} = \{r_1Z_1, \dots, r_nZ_1\}$ .
  3. Computes  $r_0 = H_2(m || B_1 || \dots || B_n)$ , where each  $B_i$  is treated as a bit string and  $||$  represents the string concatenation operator.
  4. Computes  $\mathcal{K} = H_3(g^{r_0})$ .
  5. Encrypts message by  $E = \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{K}}(m)$ .
  6. Computes  $\{A_1, \dots, A_n\} = \{r_0(Y + H_1(W_1)P) + r_1P, \dots, r_0(Y + H_1(W_n)P) + r_nP\}$ .
  7. Outputs  $\text{EIE}(m, \{W_i\}) = [A_1, \dots, A_n, B_1, \dots, B_n, C, E, \mathcal{L}]$  where  $\mathcal{L}$  is a label that contains information about how “ $A_i$ ” is associated with each group.
- **Trapdoor**( $S, \{Q_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t}$ ): Selects a random number  $u \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and makes  $T_{\{Q_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t}} = [T_1, T_2, T_3]$  where
  - $T_1 = \left(\frac{1}{t \cdot s_1 + H_1(Q_1) + \dots + H_1(Q_t) + s_3 u}\right)P$
  - $T_2 = \frac{1}{s_2}T_1$
  - $T_3 = u$ .
- **Decrypt**( $S, T_{\{Q_i\}}$ ): Let  $S = [A_1, \dots, A_n, B_1, \dots, B_n, C, E, \mathcal{L}]$ , suppose  $I_1, I_2, \dots, I_t$  are the positions of the groups from  $\{Q_i\}$  in the list  $\{W_i\}$  specified by the auxiliary information  $\mathcal{L}$ .
  1. Computes  $\mathcal{K}' = \frac{\hat{e}(A_{I_1} + \dots + A_{I_t} + T_3 C, T_1)}{\hat{e}(B_{I_1} + \dots + B_{I_t}, T_2)}$ .
  2. Recover  $m' = \mathcal{D}_{(H_3(\mathcal{K}'))}(E)$ .
  3. If  $\mathcal{K}' = H_3(g^{H_2(m' || B_1 || \dots || B_n)})$ , output  $m'$ ; otherwise output  $\perp$ .

## 5.1 Analysis

We first give the motivation of the choice of hash function for hashing the group identifier. Similar to [19], the advantage of such choice is that computationally expensive admissible encoding scheme hashing to  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is not needed [6]. The construction is efficient in the sense that no pairing operation is needed for the generation of trapdoor and encryption while it only takes two pairing operations for decrypt operation.

For our solution of searchable encrypted audit log, both the encryption and decryption require one pairing operation in the solution of [22], while our solution removed the computation of pairing from the encryption. Notice that pairing operation is still needed if one use the conjunction version in [20] to build an audit log with conjunctive field keyword search, as described in our review section.

The following theorem summarizes the security of our proposed scheme.

**Theorem 1** *In the random oracle model (the hash functions are modeled as random oracles), we assume that we have an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that is able to win the IND-EIE-CCIA2 game (i.e.  $\mathcal{A}$  is able to distinguish ciphertxts given by the challenger), with an advantage  $\epsilon$  when running in a time  $t$  and asking at most  $q_H$  identifier hashing queries, at most  $q_T$  trapdoor generation queries, at most  $q_R$   $H_3$  queries, and  $q_D$  decryption queries. Then, there exists a distinguisher  $\mathcal{C}$  that can solve the  $(q_T + 1)$ -DBDHIP with non-negligible probability.*

*Proof.* On input of  $(P, xP, x^2P, \dots, x^{q_T+1}P, R)$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$ 's goal is to check whether  $R = \hat{e}(P, P)^{1/x}$ . We firstly describe the simulation of  $\mathcal{C}$ .

**Setup:**

1. Chooses  $\zeta_1, \zeta_2, \dots, \zeta_{q_T} \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .
2. Expands the term in  $f(z) = \prod_{j=1}^{q_T} (z + \zeta_j)$  by  $f(z) = \sum_{i=0}^{q_T+1} c_i z^i$ .
3. Computes  $U = f(x)P$  by  $\sum_{i=0}^{q_T+1} c_i x^i P$  and  $V = xU$  by  $\sum_{i=0}^{q_T+1} c_{i-1} x^i P$ .
4. For  $1 \leq i \leq q_T$ , computes  $\frac{1}{x+\zeta_i} U = \frac{f(x)}{x+\zeta_i} P = \sum_{j=0}^{q_T-1} d_j x^j P$ , these values are stored to be used in handling the **Trapdoor** queries.
5. Computes  $R_U = R^{c_0^2} \cdot \hat{e}((c_0 + \sum_{i=0}^{q_T} c_i x^i)P, \sum_{i=0}^{q_T-1} c_{i+1} x^i P)$ . If  $R$  is indeed the solution to the  $(q_T+1)$ -computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion problem (i.e.  $R = \hat{e}(P, P)^{1/x}$ ), we have  $R_U = \hat{e}(U, U)^{1/x}$ , this value will be embedded in the challenge ciphertxt.
6. Chooses  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma_1, \gamma_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ .
7. Computes  $Y = \alpha - \beta U$ .
8. Compute  $Z_1 = \gamma_1 U$ .
9. Compute  $Z_2 = \gamma_2 V$ .
10. Outputs  $params = [U, Y, Z_1, Z_2, g = \hat{e}(U, U)]$ . Notice that all part of the corresponding master secret key  $\mathcal{S}$  ( $[s_1 = \alpha x - \beta, s_2 = \gamma_1, s_3 = \gamma_2 x]$ ) are unknown  $\mathcal{C}$  except  $s_2$ .

$H_1$  queries: Roughly speaking, these answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the consistency and to avoid collision,  $\mathcal{C}$  keeps the list  $L_1$  to store the answers used (i.e. the same answer will be returned if the query has been made before). Besides, some extra information about the answers returned will be stored in the list too. Suppose  $H_1(W_i)$  has not been asked,

1. Randomly chooses  $c_i \in_R \{0, 1\}$ , where the probability for  $c_i = 0$  is  $\tau$  (to be determined).
2. If  $c_i = 0$ , randomly chooses  $h_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , otherwise set  $h_i = \beta$ . For either way,  $h_i$  will be returned as the answer and  $\langle W_i, h_i, c_i \rangle$  is stored in list  $L_1$ .

$H_2$  and  $H_3$  queries: When  $\mathcal{A}$  asks queries on these hash values,  $\mathcal{C}$  checks the respective list  $L_2$  or  $L_3$ . If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to  $\mathcal{A}$ ; otherwise, a randomly generated value will be used as an answer to  $\mathcal{A}$ , the query and the answer will then be stored in the list.

**Trapdoor queries:** Suppose  $\mathcal{A}$  asks for the trapdoor corresponding to the group  $\{Q_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t} = \{Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, \dots, Q_{i,t}\}$ .

1. Get the entries  $\langle Q_{i,j}, h_{i,j}, c_{i,j} \rangle$  in  $L_1$ , if  $c_{i,j} = 1 \forall j$ , aborts the simulation.
2. Computes  $E_i = ts_1 + h_{i,1} + h_{i,2} + \dots + h_{i,t} = t\alpha x + (h_{i,1} + h_{i,2} + \dots + h_{i,t} - t\beta)$ . For simplicity we let  $\alpha^* = t\alpha$  and  $\beta^* = (h_{i,1} + h_{i,2} + \dots + h_{i,t} - t\beta)$ , so  $E_i$  can be expressed as  $\alpha^*x + \beta^*$ .
3. Picks  $i$ -th pair  $(\zeta_i, \frac{1}{x+\zeta_i}U)$  generated at the **Setup** phase.
4. Computes  $u_i = ((\beta^*/\zeta_i - \alpha^*)/\gamma_2)$  and  $v_i = \beta^*/\zeta_i$  (such that the equation  $\frac{1}{(x+\zeta_i)} = \frac{v_i}{\alpha^*x+\beta^*+\gamma_2xu_i}$  holds).
5. Compute  $F_i = \frac{1}{v_i(x+\zeta_i)}$  (which is equal to  $\frac{1}{\alpha^*x+\beta^*+\gamma_2xu_i}$ ).
6. Output the trapdoor as  $[F_i, \frac{1}{\gamma_1}F_i, u_i]$  (which is valid since  $\frac{1}{\alpha^*x+\beta^*+\gamma_2xu_i} = \frac{1}{E_i+s_3u_i}$ ).

**Decrypt queries:** Suppose  $\mathcal{A}$  asks for the decryption of the ciphertext  $S_i$  corresponding to the group  $\{Q_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t} = \{Q_{i,1}, Q_{i,2}, \dots, Q_{i,t}\}$ .

1. Get the entries  $\langle Q_{i,j}, h_{i,j}, c_{i,j} \rangle$  in  $L_1$ , if there exists  $j$  such that  $c_{i,j} = 0$ , generates the trapdoor using the above simulation and decrypt the ciphertext.
2. Suppose  $S_i = [A_{i,1}, A_{i,2}, \dots, A_{i,n}, B_{i,1}, B_{i,2}, \dots, B_{i,n}, C_i, E_i, \mathcal{L}_i]$ , and  $I_1, I_2, \dots, I_t$  are the positions of the groups from  $\{Q_i\}$  in the list  $\{W_i\}$  specified by the  $\mathcal{L}$ .
3. Picks  $A_{I_1}, B_{I_1}$  and  $C_i$  which are in the form of  $r_0Y + r_0H_1(W_{I_1})U + r_1U$ ,  $r_1Z_1 = r_1\gamma_1U$  and  $r_0Z_2 = r_0\gamma_2V$  respectively. Compute  $r_0U = \frac{1}{(H_1(W_{I_1})-\beta)}[A_{I_1} - \frac{1}{\gamma_1}B_{I_1} - \frac{\alpha}{\gamma_2}C_i]$ .

The consistency can be shown by

$$\begin{aligned}
& (H_1(W_{I_1}) - \beta)^{-1}[A_{I_1} - \frac{1}{\gamma_1}B_{I_1} - \frac{\alpha}{\gamma_2}C_i] \\
&= (H_1(W_{I_1}) - \beta)^{-1}[r_0Y + r_0H_1(W_{I_1})U - r_0\alpha V] \\
&= (H_1(W_{I_1}) - \beta)^{-1}[r_0(\alpha V - \beta U) + r_0H_1(W_{I_1})U - r_0\alpha V] \\
&= (H_1(W_{I_1}) - \beta)^{-1}[-r_0\beta U + r_0H_1(W_{I_1})U] \\
&= (H_1(W_{I_1}) - \beta)^{-1}[r_0(H_1(W_{I_1}) - \beta)U] \\
&= r_0U
\end{aligned}$$

4. Recover  $m' = \mathcal{D}_{(H_3(\hat{e}(r_0U, U)))}(E_i)$ .
5. If  $H_2(m' || B_1 || \dots || B_n)U \neq r_0U$ , return  $\perp$ . Otherwise return  $m'$ .

**Challenge:** Eventually adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  produces a list of group identifier  $\{ID_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t}$  and a pair of message  $m_0, m_1$  on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenge is generated as follows.

1. Pick a random bit  $b$ .
2. Get  $\langle ID, h_i, c_i \rangle$  from list  $L_1$ . If  $c_i \neq 1$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  aborts.
3. Select random  $\rho, r_1, \dots, r_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ .
4. Compute  $A_i = \rho U + r_i U$  and  $B_i = r_i Z_1$  for  $1 \leq i \leq t$ ,  $C = \rho s_3 U$ ,  $E = \mathcal{E}_{(H_3(R_U^\rho))}(m_b)$ , and  $\mathcal{L} = \{ID_i\}_{i=1,2,\dots,t}$ . It is easy to see that the ciphertext is valid.

Notice that  $\mathcal{C}$  does not know the value of “ $r_0$ ” value associated with this challenge, which may make the simulation of  $H_2$  unfaithful. However, it is of negligible probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  will make such query. Furthermore, by memorizing the value of  $\rho$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$  can always check whether the output of  $H_2$  is the  $x$  associated with the underlying problem.

**Output:** Finally  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit  $b'$ . If  $b' = b$ , return “true”, “false” otherwise.

□

## 6 Audit Logs Encryption with Conjunctive Field Keyword Search

### 6.1 Relationship with Exclusion-Intersection Encryption

Our proposed exclusion-intersection encryption can be utilized to support audit logs encryption with conjunctive field keyword search. The idea is to use each identifier to act as a “`field_name = value`” pair. A subtle difference is that the groups involved are different for each time for exclusion-intersection encryption, so it is necessary to include the auxiliary information  $\mathcal{L}$  which enables one to take out the appropriate piece of ciphertext for decryption. In an audit log system, the keywords to be searched for are fixed for each system. Instead of including unnecessary auxiliary information  $\mathcal{L}$  in the ciphertext, the position of the searchable field supported by the trapdoor are included when the trapdoor is delegated to the auditor. Indeed, the auxiliary information  $\mathcal{L}$  must not be included in the ciphertext for the encrypted audit log scenario, since every one can know the content of the log entry by simply looking up the name and value of the field from this piece of information.

### 6.2 System Design

Our scheme shares a similar design as the construction in [22] to devise an encrypted audit logs that support conjunctive field keyword searching.

**Setup:** In our system, the private key is  $\mathcal{S}$  and the public key is  $params$  which is generated by **Setup**. The private key and the public key are distributed to the audit escrow agent and the logging server respectively.

**Encryption:** When the logging server wants to encrypt a log entry  $m$  with a list of keywords  $\{W_i\}$ , it runs **EIE** to generate the encrypted searchable indexes  $S$ , which is in turn stored in the logging server as an entry in the audit log.

**Search and Decryption:** When an investigator wants to search the entry which contains certain keywords  $\{Q_i\}$ , he sends the list of keywords to the audit escrow agent. If the audit escrow agent approves the requests, the agent in turn produces the trapdoor  $T_{\{Q_i\}}$  using the private key  $\mathcal{S}$ , the target keywords and their positions in log entries. Then for each entry, **Decrypt** will be used to get all the related log entries.

## 7 Conclusion

We introduce the notion of *Exclusion-Intersection Encryption*, with a concrete construction, which provides a flexible solution for the access control of the plaintext message encrypted in a ciphertext. We illustrate two sample scenarios that exclusion-intersection encryption provides a better solution than traditional PKI-based schemes and hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes. As a bonus result, our scheme gives rise to an encrypted audit log that supports conjunctive field keyword searching, which is the first in the literature. Our scheme

is provably secure under the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. We believe that exclusion-intersection encryption will give rise to other innovative applications other than those described in the paper.

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## Appendix: Attacking Park-Cha-Lee Searchable Keyword-Based Encryption

The first draft of this paper was completed on September 12, 2005 and was previously submitted to CT-RSA 2006 for consideration. In an independent and possibly subsequent work [18], the notion of *Searchable Keyword-Based Encryption* was proposed. This work is more or less the same as the application of our exclusion-intersection encryption in supporting searchable encrypted audit-log, and shares a similar construction with ours. However, their scheme does not satisfy their definition of security, in particular, their scheme is distinguishable under the chosen ciphertext attack.

The attack is outlined as follows. After obtained the challenge ciphertext, which is in the form  $[U, A_1, A_2, \dots, A_m, B_1, B_2, \dots, B_m, C, S, R]$ ; the adversary prepares a ciphertext  $[U, A_1, A_2, \dots, A'_m, B_1, B_2, \dots, B'_m, C, S, R]$  to the decryption oracle where

- $A'_m = rP_1$ , and
- $B'_m = rY_{m+1} = rs_{m+1}P_1$  where  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is randomly chosen.

The decryption oracle first computes  $h^{\tilde{r}_0} = \frac{\hat{e}(A_1 + \dots + A'_m + T_3^D C, T_1^D)}{\hat{e}(B_1 + \dots + B'_m, T_2^D)}$ . Notice that  $T_1^D = s_{m+1}T_2^D$  always hold in their scheme. The addition of component cancels each other since

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(rP_1, T_1^D) &= \hat{e}(rP_1, T_1^D) \\ &= \hat{e}(rP_1, s_{m+1}T_2^D) \\ &= \hat{e}(rs_{m+1}P_1, T_2^D) \\ &= \hat{e}(rY_{m+1}, T_2^D). \end{aligned}$$

As a result,  $h^{\tilde{r}_0}$  is the value to be calculated by the decryption oracle for the *challenge ciphertext*, the rest of the decryption algorithm will use this ephemeral value and do the decryption for the adversary. Since the rest of the step does not depends on the modified value of  $A'_m$  and  $B'_m$ , the decryption result is simply the decryption of the *challenge ciphertext*. Notice that it corresponds to the adaptive “test” queries if only searching but not decryption is considered. The source of this flaw may due to the lack of adaptive “test” queries in previous security model of public key encryption with keyword search like the one defined in [19].