

Sequential and Parallel Cascaded Convolutional Encryption with Local Propagation: Toward Future Directions in Symmetric Cryptography

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Abstract

Worldwide symmetric encryption standards such as DES (Data Encryption Standard), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), and EES (Escrowed Encryption Standard), have been – and some of them still are – extensively used to solve the problem of communication over an insecure channel, but with today’s advanced technologies, they seem to not be as secure as one would like.

In this paper, we propose efficient alternatives based on special classes of globally invertible cascaded convolutional transducers. The proposed symmetric encryption techniques have at least four advantages over traditional schemes based on Feistel ciphers. First, the secret key of a cascaded convolutional cryptosystem is usually much more easier to generate. Second, the encryption and decryption procedures are much simpler, and consequentially, much faster. Third, the desired security level can be obtained by just setting appropriate values for the parameters of the convolutional cryptosystem. Finally, they are much more parallelizable than symmetric encryption standards based on Feistel ciphers. **Keywords:** Block ciphers; Convolutional codes; Parallel algorithms; Symmetric encryption

1 Introduction

Symmetric cryptography has been – and still is – extensively used to solve the traditional problem of communication over an insecure channel. Well-known symmetric encryption standards such as DES [5], AES [1], and EES [7] have been designed using Feistel ciphers, but they seem to not be as practical as one would like.

DES was developed at IBM in 1977, and in the same year was adopted by NIST as the standard data encryption algorithm. It was recertified every five years until 1999, when the key size of 56 bits was considered too vulnerable to attacks. In 2001, DES was replaced by AES, which became effective May 26, 2002. AES supports key sizes of 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits, in contrast to the 56-bit key offered by DES, and is intended to remain secure well into the 21st century.

The algorithm at the core of AES, called Rijndael, has been designed to have very strong resistance against the classical approximation attacks such as linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis, but recent advances in applied cryptography seem to reduce significantly its lifetime. For example, in a recent paper [4] presented at Asiacrypt 2002, Courtois and Pieprzyk describe an attack that might break AES. Their attack, called XSL, is shown to be faster than the exhaustive search, and able to break Rijndael 256 bits and Serpent [3] for key lengths 192 and 256 bits. It is likely that their method will be studied further, and probably many other methods for breaking AES will appear in the near future. Thus, it is unlikely that AES will remain secure as originally conceived, and consequentially, there is a growing need of more efficient symmetric cryptosystems.

Moreover, even with today’s technology, block ciphers such as DES and AES are not as fast in software as one would like; this is another reason to seek alternatives for fast software encryption.

In this paper, we propose efficient alternatives based on special classes of globally invertible cascaded convolutional transducers. Our symmetric encryption techniques have at least four advantages over traditional schemes based on Feistel ciphers. First, the secret key of a cascaded convolutional cryptosystem is usually much more easier to generate. Second, the encryption and decryption procedures are much simpler, and consequentially, much faster. Third, the desired security level can be obtained by just setting appropriate values for the parameters of the convolutional cryptosystem. Finally, they are much more parallelizable than symmetric encryption standards based on Feistel ciphers.

The presentation is organized as follows. First, we provide a brief introduction to convolutional codes and show how to use a globally invertible convolutional transducer for data encryption and decryption (section 2). Second, we propose a new class of cascaded convolutional transducers, called *cascaded convolutional transducers with propagation*, and describe a parallel version of the corresponding encryption procedure using the well-known shared-memory model of computation (section 3). Then, in section 4, we discuss the security of our cryptosystems and provide experimental results. As we will see, our cryptosystems are much more faster than standard AES implementations. Finally, in the last section, we provide some conclusions and future work directions.

2 Convolutional transducers

Convolutional codes [6, 10, 11] are a well-known class of error-correcting codes, currently used in practice worldwide to encode digital data before transmission over noisy channels. During encoding, k input bits are mapped to n output bits to give a rate k/n coded bitstream. At the receiver, the bitstream can be decoded to recover the original data, correcting errors in the process. The optimum decoding method is *maximum-likelihood decoding*, where the decoder attempts to find the closest “valid” sequence to the received bitstream. The most popular algorithm for maximum-likelihood decoding is the *Viterbi algorithm* [12].

Even though convolutional codes have been primarily designed for error detection and correction, they can be successfully used in related areas such as cryptography, as we will see throughout this presentation. (Note that there is no previous work on this subject.) The aim of this section is to provide the reader with a brief introduction to convolutional codes.

As stated in [6], a key step in understanding convolutional codes is to distinguish between the convolutional encoder, the convolutional encoding operation, and the convolutional code. Rigorous definitions of all these concepts are provided below.

We denote by $\mathcal{B}_{i \times j}$ the set of $i \times j$ arrays with binary components. If $u \in \mathcal{B}_{i \times j}$, then the number of components of u is denoted by $|u|$, i.e., $|u| = ij$. Also, we denote by $u[q, -]$ the q -th row of u , and by $u[-, q]$ the q -th column of u . Note that $u[q, -] \in \mathcal{B}_{1 \times j}$ and $u[-, q] \in \mathcal{B}_{i \times 1}$. If u is a row vector (or a column vector), then we will denote by $u[i]$ the i -th element of u , and by $u_{i:j}$ the subvector $[u[i] \dots u[j]]$. If u_1, \dots, u_h are binary vectors, then we denote by $vect(u_1, \dots, u_h)$ the vector consisting of the components of u_1, \dots, u_h , in the same order. For example, $vect([0 \ 0], [1 \ 1]) = [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1]$.

Definition 2.1 *Let n, k , and m be nonzero natural numbers. An (n, k, m) convolutional transducer is a function $t : \cup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{B}_{1 \times ki} \mapsto \cup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{B}_{1 \times ni}$ given by*

$$t(u) = u\mathbf{G}_{t,|u|}, \tag{1}$$

where

$$\mathbf{G}_{t, kp} = \begin{bmatrix} G_{t,0} & G_{t,1} & \dots & G_{t,m} & & \\ & \ddots & & & \ddots & \\ & & G_{t,0} & G_{t,1} & \dots & G_{t,m} \end{bmatrix}$$

Example 2.2 Let t_1 and t_2 be $(2, 2, 2)$ convolutional transducers with

$$G_{t_1,0} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t_1,1} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t_1,2} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

and

$$G_{t_2,0} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t_2,1} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t_2,2} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The corresponding convolutional encoders are represented graphically in Fig. 2 (a) and (b), respectively. It is easy to see that only t_1 is globally invertible. For example, assume that $M_1^1 = 0, M_2^1 = 1, M_1^2 = 0, M_2^2 = 1$, and the two output bits being decrypted are 0 and 1, respectively. Given that the first output bit depends on M_2^1 and the first input bit, we conclude that the first input bit was a 1. Then, given that we already know the first input bit, we find that the second input bit was a 0. Thus, we conclude that t_1 is globally invertible, since at each step we can decode uniquely the current block of k output bits. The convolutional transducer t_2 is not globally invertible, since each of the two output bits depends on both input bits. Therefore, the current block of k output bits cannot be uniquely decoded into the corresponding input block.




Figure 2: (a) A globally invertible $(2, 2, 2)$ convolutional encoder, and (b) a $(2, 2, 2)$ convolutional encoder that is not globally invertible

Let $u = [0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0]$ be an input vector. More precisely, we have $p = 2$ blocks of size $k = 2$ each. One can verify that $t(u) = uG_{t_1, kp} = [0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1]$. We can encrypt u by $v = [0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1]$, i.e., the first $kp = 4$ bits of $t(u)$. Given that t_1 is globally invertible, we can uniquely decrypt v into u .

Definition 2.4 Let k, m , and q be nonzero natural numbers. A (k, k, m) q -cascaded convolutional transducer is a function $t : \cup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{B}_{1 \times ki} \mapsto \cup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{B}_{1 \times ki}$ given by

$$t(u) = uG_{t, kp}^1 G_{t, kp+km}^2 \cdots G_{t, kp+(q-1)km}^q \quad (2)$$

for all $u \in \mathcal{B}_{1 \times kp}$, where $G_{t, kp}^i \in \mathcal{B}_{kp \times (kp+mk)}$ for all $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, q\}$.

3 Sequential and parallel cascaded convolutional encryption with local propagation

In the previous section, we have described some symmetric encryption schemes based on globally invertible (k, k, m) (q -cascaded) convolutional transducers. In this section we propose a new class of convolutional transducers, called *cascaded convolutional transducers with local propagation*. Unlike most (if not all) of the symmetric cryptosystems that have been proposed and studied in the literature, our cryptosystems are *dynamic*, i.e., their structure changes during the encryption




Figure 3: A $(2, 2, 2)$ 2-cascaded convolutional encoder with propagation: (a) the initial structure of the cascaded encoder, and (b) the structure after encoding the first block $[1 \ 0]$

procedure. The purpose of adding such properties to a cascaded convolutional transducer is thus to increase the complexity of linear and differential cryptanalysis attacks (or even to completely eliminate the possibility of successfully applying such attacks that have been primarily developed in the context of *static* cryptosystems). After introducing the new concept, we will describe a parallel algorithm for cascaded convolutional cryptosystems with local propagation, using the well-known shared-memory model of computation [8]. As we will see, a cascaded convolutional cryptosystem with local propagation is highly parallelizable.

Definition 3.1 *Let k and m be nonzero natural numbers. A (k, k, m) q -cascaded convolutional transducer with propagation is an $(q + 1)$ -tuple $(t, \mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2, \dots, \mathcal{S}_q)$, where t is a function given by*

$$t(u) = u\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^1(v_0)\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^2(v_1)\dots\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^q(v_{q-1}), \quad (3)$$

for all $u \in \mathcal{B}_{1 \times kp}$, where $v_0 = u$, $v_i = v_{i-1}\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^i(v_{i-1})$ for all $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, q\}$, $\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^i(w)$ is the restriction of

$$\mathbf{G}_{t,kp}^i(z) = \begin{bmatrix} G_{t,0,z}^{i,0} & \dots & G_{t,m,z}^{i,m} \\ & \ddots & \\ & & G_{t,0,z}^{i,p-1} & \dots & G_{t,m,z}^{i,m+p-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

to the first kp columns, $z = \text{vect}(w, [\underbrace{0 \dots 0}_{mk}])$, $G_{t,j,z}^{i,0} = G_{t,j}^i(0)$, $G_{t,j,z}^{i,r} = G_{t,j}^i(f(r-1, z))$ for all $r \in \{1, 2, \dots, m+p-1\}$,

$$f(s, z) = (z_{sk+1:(s+1)k}[1] + \dots + z_{sk+1:(s+1)k}[k]) \bmod 2,$$

and

$$\mathcal{S}_i = \{G_{t,j}^i(0) \mid j \in \{0, 1, \dots, m\}\} \cup \{G_{t,j}^i(1) \mid j \in \{0, 1, \dots, m\}\}$$

is the set of state matrices corresponding to the i -th transducer of the cascade, $i = 1, \dots, q$. As usual, all the operations are performed over the binary field $GF(2)$.

Remark 3.1 *For convenience, a q -cascaded convolutional transducer with propagation will be denoted by the encryption function t .*

Example 3.1 Let $t : \cup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{B}_{1 \times 2^i} \mapsto \cup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{B}_{1 \times 2^i}$ be a $(2, 2, 2)$ 2-cascaded convolutional transducer with propagation, where

$$\begin{aligned} G_{t,0}^1(0) &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t,0}^1(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\ G_{t,1}^1(0) &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t,1}^1(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \\ G_{t,2}^1(0) &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t,2}^1(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\ G_{t,0}^2(0) &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t,0}^2(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\ G_{t,1}^2(0) &= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t,1}^2(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \\ G_{t,2}^2(0) &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, G_{t,2}^2(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

The initial structure of the corresponding cascaded convolutional encoder can be represented graphically as in Fig. 3 (a). By examining the matrices $G_{t,j}^i(b)$, one can remark that the cascaded encoder is globally invertible whatever its structure would be at the current step. Let $u = [1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1]$ be an input vector. The structure of the encoder after encoding the first block $[1 \ 0]$ is given in Fig. 3 (b). More precisely, the structure of the first encoder in the cascade changes after encoding the first input block, since the number of 1's in the first input block is odd. Regarding the second encoder in the cascade, its structure changes after encoding the first input block, since the number of 1's in the first input block is even. (Note that the input to the second encoder in the cascade is the output of the first encoder.) It is easy to verify that

$$t(u) = u\mathbf{H}_{t,4}^1(v_0)\mathbf{H}_{t,4}^2(v_1) = [0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1].$$

Thus, we encrypt u by $t(u)$, and given that t is globally invertible, we can uniquely decrypt $t(u)$ into u .

As we have already pointed out, we will show that cascaded convolutional transducers with propagation are highly parallelizable. More precisely, we will describe a parallel algorithm for cascaded convolutional cryptosystems with propagation using the shared-memory model of computation under the asynchronous mode of operation. (For a good introduction to the shared-memory model of computation, the reader is referred to [8].)

Let t be a globally invertible (k, k, m) q -cascaded convolutional transducer with propagation. Suppose that we have k processors, denoted p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k , and consider a binary vector $u \in \mathcal{B}_{1 \times kp}$. The processors work as follows. First, each processor copies (concurrently) the input vector u and the matrices $G_{t,j}^i(b)$ from the global memory into its local memory. Second, for all $l \in \{1, 2, \dots, q\}$, each processor p_j computes the columns

$$\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^l(u)[-j], \dots, \mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^l(u)[-j + (p-1)k],$$

then computes the products

$$u\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^l(u)[-j], \dots, u\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^l(u)[-j + (p-1)k],$$

and finally stores the corresponding output bits into the shared location v . The shared variable *Var* ensures that, at any time, each processor either works on the current vector-matrix product or stays idle. In other words, we do not allow the processors to work on different vector-matrix products. In line 20, each processor p_j copies (concurrently) the current output vector v into its local memory, since at the next iteration v becomes the new input vector. When the main loop

Input: Two binary row vectors u, v of size kp each, and the set of matrices $\{G_{t,j}^i(b) \mid i \in \{1, \dots, q\}, j \in \{0, \dots, m\}, b \in \{0, 1\}\}$ stored in the global memory; also, consider a shared variable Var initially set to 0.

Output: The product $u\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^1(v_0)\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^2(v_1)\dots\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^q(v_{q-1})$ stored in the shared location v .

```

1:  $X_j \leftarrow u$  {concurrent READ}
2: For each  $i_1 \in \{1, 2, \dots, q\}$  do
3:   For each  $i_2 \in \{0, 1, \dots, m\}$  do
4:     For each  $i_3 \in \{0, 1\}$  do
5:        $Local_{i_1, i_2, i_3}^j \leftarrow G_{t, i_2}^{i_1}(i_3)$  {concurrent READ}
6: For  $l \leftarrow 1$  to  $q$  do
7:   For  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $p$  do
8:     Compute the  $(j + (i - 1)k)$ -th column of  $\mathbf{H}_{t, kp}^l(X_j)$ 
9:     using the matrices  $Local_{i_1, i_2, i_3}^j$  and store it in the local
10:    variable  $Y_j$ .
11:     $Z_j \leftarrow X_j Y_j$ 
12:     $v[j + (i - 1)k] \leftarrow Z_j[1]$ 
13:   Endfor
14:    $Var \leftarrow Var + 1$  {concurrent WRITE}
15:   If  $Var = k$  then {concurrent READ}
16:      $Var \leftarrow 0$ 
17:   Else
18:     WAIT until  $Var = 0$  {concurrent READ}
19:   Endif
20:    $X_j \leftarrow v$  {concurrent READ}
21: Endfor

```

Figure 4: Asynchronous parallel cascaded convolutional encryption with propagation

(starting at line 6) is finished, the product $u\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^1(v_0)\dots\mathbf{H}_{t,kp}^q(v_{q-1})$ lies in the shared location v . A complete description of the parallel encryption algorithm (for processor p_j) is provided in Fig. 4. The parallel decryption algorithm is essentially the same sequence of operations, but in reverse order.

Lines 1,6,14,15,18, and 20 are executed *concurrently*, whereas the other lines are executed independently by each processor. Let us denote by W_1 the *maximum* amount of time spent by each processor to read (concurrently) the vector u (line 1, and also line 20 for v), by W_2 the amount of time spent by each processor to read the matrices $G_{t,j}^i(b)$ from the global memory (lines 2,3,4,5), by W_3 the *maximum* amount of time spent by each processor to execute (concurrently) the lines 14–19 at the current iteration, and by T_{seq} the runtime of the sequential algorithm (essentially, the time spent to compute equation (3)). Then, the parallel running time is at most

$$W_1 + W_2 + q(T_{seq}/qk + W_3 + W_1),$$

since each processor spends at most W_1 time to execute line 1, at most W_2 time to execute the lines 2–5, and at each of the q iterations starting at line 6, each processor spends exactly T_{seq}/qk time to execute the lines 7–13, at most W_3 time to execute the lines 14 through 19, and at most W_1 time to execute line 20.

4 Security and performance

The desired security level can be obtained by just setting appropriate values for the parameters of the convolutional cryptosystem. More precisely, we have $2q(m + 1) + 3$ parameters: $k, m, q, G_{t,0}^1(0), G_{t,0}^1(1), \dots, G_{t,m}^1(0), G_{t,m}^1(1), \dots, G_{t,0}^q(0), G_{t,0}^q(1), \dots, G_{t,m}^q(0), G_{t,m}^q(1)$. The highest level of security is obtained when all the parameters are kept secret, since this increases the complexity of any cryptanalytic attack. If the input vector has length pk , and if $d(pk)$ denotes the number of

Table 1: Comparisons between a cascaded convolutional cryptosystem with propagation (CCCP) and six well-known AES implementations

| | Method | Encryption (bytes/second) | Decryption (bytes/second) |
|--|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Intel Xeon CPU @ 2.8GHz | CCCP | 1,521,737,039 |
| | devine | 83,886,080 | 78,033,563 |
| | gladman | 101,680,097 | 95,869,806 |
| | gnupg | 45,343,827 | 44,150,568 |
| | libtc | 98,689,506 | 101,264,158 |
| | mkshen | 69,905,067 | 68,478,433 |
| | openssl | 108,240,103 | 39,016,781 |
| | Method | Encryption (bytes/second) | Decryption (bytes/second) |
| | Intel Pentium 4 CPU @ 2.4GHz | CCCP | 1,116,326,531 |
| | devine | 93,206,756 | 101,680,097 |
| | gladman | 50,840,048 | 55,924,053 |
| | gnupg | 37,701,609 | 37,282,702 |
| | libtc | 74,565,404 | 90,687,654 |
| | mkshen | 52,428,800 | 59,918,629 |
| | openssl | 98,689,506 | 95,869,806 |

divisors of pk that are less than or equal to k , then the maximum number of decoding attempts is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{d(pk)} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{l=1}^q [2^{i^2 2l(j+1)+1}],$$

since the maximum number of trials for k is $d(pk)$ and we have $2q(m+1)$ binary matrices of size k^2 each. Note that for each of the $2^{i^2 2l(j+1)}$ maximum trials for fixed values of i, j , and l , we have maximum two decoding attempts: one attempt for the case in which the number of 1's in the first input block is even, and another attempt for the case in which the number of 1's in the first input block is odd.

Regarding the runtime, we have made several comparisons between a globally invertible $(16, 16, 1)$ 2-cascaded convolutional transducer t with propagation and the well-known AES Encryption Benchmark [2], which consists of six AES implementations (some of them have been certified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology [9]): devine, gladman, gnupg, libtc, mkshen, and openssl. The runtimes shown in Table 1 have been obtained using a single Intel Xeon CPU on a 2.8GHz Linux server, and then a single Intel Pentium CPU on a 2.4GHz Linux server; the implementation of the cascaded convolutional cryptosystem has been compiled with gcc, v. 3.3.5. Regarding the cascaded convolutional transducer t , we have to mention that $k = 16$, $m = 1$, and $q = 2$. If these three parameters are kept public, then for an input vector of length 64 the maximum number of decoding attempts for our cryptosystem is $2^{[d(pk)]^2 2q(m+1)+1} = 2^{393}$. The six AES implementations have been tested with keys of 256 bits. Thus, our cryptosystem is much more complex than standard AES implementations, and also much faster. The parallel version (as described in Fig. 4) of our cryptosystem has been tested on the same platforms mentioned above, using 2 (and then 4) processors. As one can see, the runtime of the parallel version is reduced approximately x times, where x is the number of processors used. Thus, we conclude that our cryptosystems are faster and much more complex than standard AES implementations. Unlike *static* cryptosystems like DES, 3DES, and AES, our cryptosystems are *dynamic*, which means that standard cryptanalytic attacks such as linear and differential cryptanalysis (which have been developed in the context of *static* cryptosystems) are almost impossible to apply in this case.

Table 2: Parallel cascaded convolutional encryption/decryption with propagation: runtimes obtained using 2 (respectively 4) CPUs of a multiprocessor Linux server

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| No. of Intel Xeon CPUs @ 2.8GHz | Parallel CCCP Encryption (bytes/second) | Parallel CCCP Decryption (bytes/second) |
| 2 | 2,602,170,337 | 2,493,244,399 |
| 4 | 4,839,123,784 | 4,731,156,540 |
| No. of Intel Pentium 4 CPUs @ 2.4GHz | Parallel CCCP Encryption (bytes/second) | Parallel CCCP Decryption (bytes/second) |
| 2 | 1,913,076,391 | 1,866,841,471 |
| 4 | 3,715,240,974 | 3,573,255,179 |

5 Conclusions and future work

We have proposed symmetric encryption schemes based on special classes of globally invertible cascaded convolutional transducers. The proposed encryption techniques have at least four advantages over traditional schemes based on Feistel ciphers. First, the secret key of a convolutional cryptosystem is usually much more easier to generate (just generate the matrices $G_{t,j}^i(b)$ such that the cascaded encoder is globally invertible whatever its structure would be at the current step). Second, the encryption and decryption procedures are much simpler, and consequentially, much faster. Third, the desired security level can be obtained by just setting appropriate values for the parameters of the convolutional cryptosystem. Finally, they are much more parallelizable than symmetric encryption standards based on Feistel ciphers. There are a lot of interesting research directions which can be exploited further, and we mention three of them. First, we plan to develop special cryptanalytic methods for *dynamic* cryptosystems. Second, it is interesting to continue the study of sophisticated convolutional cryptosystems obtained by combining different classes of globally invertible convolutional transducers. Third, we plan to explore some classes of cascaded convolutional transducers augmented with error detection capabilities.

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