A method of construction of balanced functions with optimum algebraic immunity

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Abstract

Because of the recent algebraic attacks, having a high algebraic immunity is now an absolutely necessary (but not sufficient) condition for Boolean functions used in stream ciphers. A difference of only 1 between the algebraic immunities of two functions can make a big difference with respect to algebraic attacks. Very few examples of (balanced) functions with optimal algebraic immunity have been found so far, and the problem of achieving high nonlinearity with such functions is open. In this paper, we introduce a general method (for any number of variables) and an algorithm (for an even number of variables) for constructing (possibly) balanced functions with optimum algebraic immunity. We also give a new example of an infinite class of such functions. There are good chances that some of these functions are highly nonlinear and are robust against fast algebraic attacks as well.

Keywords: Boolean Functions, Nonlinearity, Algebraic immunity.

1 Introduction

The two main models of pseudo-random generators using Boolean functions, in stream ciphers, are the combiner model, in which the outputs to several LFSRs are combined by the nonlinear Boolean function to produce the keystream, and the filter model, in which the content of some of the flip-flops in a single (longer) LFSR constitute the input to the function. These models have been the objects of a lot of cryptanalyses and to resist those attacks, different design criteria have been proposed: balancedness, a high algebraic degree, a high nonlinearity and, in the case of the combiner model, a high correlation immunity (the filter model is theoretically equivalent to the combiner model, but the attacks do not work similarly on each system). A recent attack uses the fact that it is possible to obtain a very over-defined system of multivariate nonlinear equations whose unknowns are the bits of the initialization of the LFSR(s). This improvement

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of an idea due to C. Shannon [31] uses the existence of low degree multiples of the nonlinear function. It is called *algebraic attack* [4, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 29] and has deeply modified the situation with Boolean functions in stream ciphers. Given a Boolean function f on n variables, different kinds of scenarios related to low degree multiples of f have been studied in [17, 29]. The core of the analysis is to find out minimum (or low) degree nonzero annihilators of f or of f or of f that is, functions f such that f * f = 0 or f or

So far, the research of fastly computable Boolean functions that can resist algebraic attacks has not given full satisfactory results. It has produced:

- 1. in [21], an iterative construction of a 2k-variable Boolean function with algebraic immunity provably equal to k (that is, optimal). The produced function has been further studied in [13]. It has very high algebraic degree and there exists an algorithm giving a very fast way (whose complexity is linear in the number of variables) of computing the output to the function, given its input. But the function is not balanced and its nonlinearity is weak;
- 2. in [22] and [9], examples of symmetric functions (that is, of functions whose outputs depend on the Hamming weight of their input) achieving optimum algebraic immunities. Being symmetric, they present a risk if attacks using this peculiarity can be found in the future. Moreover, they do not have high non-linearities.

Last but not least drawback of all these functions: they behave badly with respect to fast algebraic attacks [2, 18, 8].

In the present paper, we give a general way of designing Boolean functions, which can be balanced, and whose algebraic immunity is at least k, where k is any integer upper bounded by $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$. We further specify this construction to obtain an algorithm for designing numerous functions with optimal algebraic immunity in even number of variables, among which exist balanced functions (the large number of these functions makes also plausible the fact that some of them can have high nonlinearities and be robust against fast algebraic attacks) and to exhibit an infinite class of such functions. We study the Walsh transforms of these functions.

2 Preliminaries

A Boolean function on n variables is a mapping from F_2^n into F_2 , the finite field with two elements. We denote by B_n the set of all n-variable Boolean functions. The basic representation of a Boolean function $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is by the output column of its truth table, i.e., a binary string of length 2^n , $f = [f(0,0,\ldots,0), f(1,0,\ldots,0), f(0,1,\ldots,0), f(1,1,\ldots,0),\ldots,f(1,1,\ldots,1)]$.

The Hamming weight wt(f) of a Boolean function f on n variables is the size of its support $supp(f) = \{x \in F_2^n; f(x) = 1\}$. The Hamming distance d(f,g) between two Boolean functions f and g is the Hamming weight of their difference f + g (by abuse of notation, we use + to denote the addition in F_2 , i.e., the XOR). We say that a Boolean function f is balanced if its truth table contains an equal number of 1's and 0's, that is, if its Hamming weight equals

 2^{n-1} .

The truth table does not give an idea of the algebraic complexity of the function. For instance, simple functions, as affine functions on the vector space F_2^n , have truth tables as complex as more general functions. This is why another representation is used. Any Boolean function has a unique representation as a multivariate polynomial over F_2 , called the algebraic normal form (ANF),

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \bigoplus_{I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}} a_I \prod_{i \in I} x_i,$$

where the a_I 's are in F_2 . The algebraic degree, $\deg(f)$, is the number of variables in the highest order term with non zero coefficient. Another possible representation of the ANF is

$$f(x) = \bigoplus_{u \in F_2^n} a_u \prod_{i=1}^n x_i^{u_i} = \bigoplus_{u \in F_2^n} a_u x^u,$$

where the a_u 's are in F_2 . The algebraic degree of f is then the highest Hamming weight of u (that is, the highest size of its $support supp(u) = \{i = 1, ..., n / u_i \neq 0\}$) such that $a_u \neq 0$.

A Boolean function is affine if it has degree at most 1 and the set of all affine functions is denoted by A_n .

Boolean functions used in cryptographic systems must have high nonlinearity to withstand linear and correlation attacks [24, 11]. The *nonlinearity* of an n-variable function f is its distance from the set of all n-variable affine functions, i.e.,

$$nl(f) = \min_{g \in A_n} (d(f, g)).$$

This parameter can be expressed by means of the Walsh transform. Let $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ both belonging to F_2^n and $x \cdot a = x_1 a_1 + \ldots + x_n a_n$. Let f(x) be a Boolean function on n variables. Then the Walsh transform of f(x) is an integer valued function over F_2^n which is defined as

$$W_f(a) = \sum_{x \in F_2^n} (-1)^{f(x) + x \cdot a}.$$

A Boolean function f is balanced if and only if $W_f(0) = 0$. The nonlinearity of f is given by $nl(f) = 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \max_{a \in F_2^n} |W_f(a)|$.

Any Boolean function should have also high algebraic degree to be cryptographically secure [24]. In fact, it must keep high degree even if a few output bits are modified. In other words, it must have high nonlinearity profile [14].

Another notion plays a role for the combiner model. A function is m-resilient (respectively m-th order correlation immune) if and only if its Walsh transform satisfies $W_f(a) = 0$, for $0 \le wt(a) \le m$ (respectively $1 \le wt(a) \le m$). Any combining function should be highly resilient to withstand correlation attacks [32].

Further, it has been identified recently that any combining or filtering function should not have a low degree multiple. More precisely, it is shown in [17] that, given any n-variable Boolean function f, it is always possible to get a Boolean function g with degree at most $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$ such that f * g has degree at most $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$. Here the functions are considered to be multivariate polynomials over F_2 and f * g is the polynomial multiplication over F_2 . Thus, while choosing a function f, the cryptosystem designer should be careful that it should not happen that the degree of f * g falls much below $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$ with a nonzero function g whose degree is also much below $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$. In fact, as observed in [17, 29], it is enough to check that f and f+1 do not admit nonzero annihilators of such low degrees.

Definition 1 Given $f \in B_n$, define $AN(f) = \{g \in B_n | f * g = 0\}$. Any function $g \in AN(f)$ is called an annihilator of f.

To check that a function has good algebraic immunity, it is necessary and sufficient to check that f and f+1 do not admit nonzero annihilators of low degrees. Indeed, if f or f+1 has an annihilator g of low degree d, then f*g either is null or equals g and therefore has degree at most d; conversely, if we have f*g=h where $g\neq 0$ and where g and h have degrees at most d, then either g=h, and then g is an annihilator of f+1, or $g\neq h$, and we have then f*g=h*g by multiplying both terms of the equality f*g=h by g, which proves that f*(g+h)=0 and shows that g+h is a nonzero annihilator of f of degree at most d.

Definition 2 Given $f \in B_n$, we define its algebraic immunity as the minimum degree of all nonzero annihilators of f or f + 1, and we denote it by AI(f).

Note that $AI(f) \leq \deg(f)$, since f * (1+f) = 0. Note also that the algebraic immunity and the degree, as well as the nonlinearity, are affine invariant (i.e. invariant under composition by an affine automorphism). As f or 1+f must have an annihilator at a degree $\leq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$, as proved in [17], we have $AI(f) \leq \lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$.

If a function has optimal algebraic immunity $\lceil n/2 \rceil$ with n odd, then it is balanced. If it has low nonlinearity, then it must have a low value of AI(f), whatever is n (see [13]). This implies that if one chooses a function with good value of AI(f), this will automatically provide a nonlinearity which is not low. However, it does not assure that the nonlinearity is very high. Hence, the algebraic immunity property takes care of three fundamental properties of a Boolean function, balancedness, algebraic degree and nonlinearity, but it does this incompletely in the case of nonlinearity (and also in the case of balancedness when n is even).

As shown in [2, 18, 8, 1], a high algebraic immunity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for robustness against all kinds of algebraic attacks. Indeed, suppose that one can find g of low degree and $h \neq 0$ such that fg = h, then a fast algebraic attack is feasible if the degree of h is not too high, see [18, 4, 26]. This has been exploited in [19] to present an attack on SFINKS [7]. Since fg = h implies fh = ffg = fg = h, we see that h is then an annihilator of f+1 and its

degree is then at least equal to the algebraic immunity of f. This means that having high algebraic immunity is not a property that allows resisting all kinds of algebraic attacks, but that it is a necessary condition for a resistance to fast algebraic attacks as well.

3 The general method and its consequences

The idea of our method is simple but efficient: if we know that a function has degree strictly less than k and that it is null on a flat of dimension at least k, except maybe at one vector of this flat, then it must be null on the whole flat. We exploit this idea for the annihilators of f and f + 1.

Proposition 1 Let k be any positive integer such that $k \leq \lceil n/2 \rceil$. A sufficient condition for a function f to have algebraic immunity at least k is that there exist two sequences of flats (i.e. of affine subspaces of F_2^n) $(A_i)_{1 \le i \le r}$, $(A'_i)_{1 \le j \le s}$ of dimensions at least k, such that:

$$\forall i \leq r, \, card(A_i \setminus [supp(f) \cup \bigcup_{i' \leq i} A_{i'}]) \leq 1$$
 (1)

$$\forall i \leq r, \ card(A_i \setminus [supp(f) \cup \bigcup_{i' < i} A_{i'}]) \leq 1$$

$$\forall j \leq s, \ card(A'_j \setminus [supp(f+1) \cup \bigcup_{j' < j} A'_{j'}]) \leq 1$$

$$(2)$$

$$F_2^n \setminus supp(f) \subseteq \bigcup_{i \le r} A_i \tag{3}$$

$$supp(f) \subseteq \bigcup_{j \le s} A'_j. \tag{4}$$

Proof. Relation (1) (resp. Relation (2)) allow proving by induction on i (resp. on j) that any annihilator g of degree at most k-1 of f (resp. of j+1) is null on A_i for every i (resp. on A'_i for every j), since we know that, for every flat A of dimension at least k, we have $\sum_{x \in A} g(x) = 0$. Then (3) and (4) show that g must be null on F_2^n .

We obtain with Proposition 1 a sub-class of the class of functions with algebraic immunity at least k. We do not know if this sub-class is in fact the whole class and we leave it as an open problem. Note that both classes are affine invariant.

Example 1 The main example of a symmetric function with optimal algebraic immunity (whatever is n) is the majority function, which takes value 1 at all vectors of weights at least $\lceil n/2 \rceil$ and 0 at all the other vectors¹. For instance, let us take n = 5. The support of the majority function is then the set of vectors of

¹Another possible choice of a majority function, which has been considered in [22], takes value 1 at all vectors of weights strictly greater than n/2; when n is even, this gives a different function, but which equals f(x + (1, ..., 1)) + 1 where f is the majority function considered here; this alternate majority function is therefore affine equivalent to f + 1.

weights at least 3. We consider an annihilator of degree at most 2. By hypothesis, it is null on the support of the function. We look for a sequence of flats A_i of dimensions at least 3 and such that, at each step, it contains exactly one new vector of weight at most 2, and which covers the set of all vectors of weight at most 2. We can take the set of all flats of the form $\{x \in F_2^n/supp(a) \subseteq supp(x)\}$ where a has weight at most 2 and where the order on the a's is by decreasing weights (whatever is the order for a fixed weight). By induction we see that the annihilator is also null at every vector of weight at most 2 and therefore is trivial. We look also for a sequence of flats A'_j of dimension at least 3 and such that, at each step, it contains exactly one new vector of weight at least 3, and which covers the set of all vectors of weight at least 3. We can take the set of all flats of the form $\{x \in F_2^n/supp(x) \subseteq supp(a)\}$ where a has weight at least 3 and where the order on the a's is by increasing weight.

In the general case, we can take for the A'_j 's the vector spaces $\{x \in F_2^n / supp(x) \subseteq supp(a)\}$ where a ranges over the set of vectors of weights at least $k = \lceil n/2 \rceil$, the order being by increasing weights (with any order for vectors of the same weight), and for the A_i 's the flats $\{x \in F_2^n / supp(a) \subseteq supp(x)\}$ where a ranges over the set of vectors of weights at most n-k, the order being by decreasing weights. Then, for every i, the set $A_i \setminus \bigcup_{i' < i} A_{i'}$ equals A_i if A_i has dimension n-k (and $A_i \setminus [supp(f) \cup \bigcup_{i' < i} A_{i'}]$ is then a singleton) and it equals the singleton containing the vector of minimum weight in A_i if A_i has dimension strictly smaller than n-k. Similarly, for every j, the set $A'_j \setminus \bigcup_{j' < j} A'_{j'}$ equals A'_j if A'_j has dimension k (and $A'_j \setminus [supp(f+1) \cup \bigcup_{j' < j} A'_{j'}]$ is then a singleton) and it equals the singleton containing the vector of maximum weight in A'_j if A'_j has dimension strictly greater than k.

Note that in the case n is even, the method of Proposition 1 illustrated in Example 1 works more generally for any function taking value 0 at all vectors of weight strictly smaller than n/2 and value 1 at all vectors of weight strictly greater than n/2, whatever are its values at the vectors of weight n/2. Indeed, if the support S of a function satisfying the hypotheses of Proposition 1 contains a k-dimensional flat A (resp. is disjoint of a k-dimensional flat A), then if we take off one vector belonging to A from S (resp. if we include such vector in S), we obtain a function which still satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 1: we can consider this flat as being the first item of the sequence of the A_i 's (resp. the A_i 's) and shift all the other flats in the same sequence (r, resp. s, being increased by 1). This can be applied iteratively.

Corollary 1 Let f be any function in an even number of variables n, such that f(x) = 0 if wt(x) < n/2 and f(x) = 1 if wt(x) > n/2 (or conversely). Then f has optimum algebraic immunity n/2.

Remark 1 A similar result has been independently obtained in [3] and is complementary of ours. The functions obtained there enter in the framework of Corollary 1 and are additionally such that the set of vectors of weight n/2 in their support is stable under translation by $(1, \ldots, 1)$. They satisfy then

a somewhat stronger condition and are potentially more robust against algebraic attacks. They all have the property that $f(x+(1,\ldots,1))=f(x)+1$ if $wt(x)\neq n/2$ and $f(x+(1,\ldots,1))=f(x)$ if wt(x)=n/2. This looks like a linear structure (a function f has the linear structure a if f(x+a) equals f(x) plus a constant, see [25, 12]) though it is different; it may however be a weakness. \square

Some of the functions of Corollary 1 are balanced. We are currently working at checking whether such functions can have high nonlinearities (see Section 4). These functions are not symmetric, but they are almost symmetric in the sense that their outputs vary while the weight of their input is constant only when this weight is n/2. This may be a weakness (see [1]). We shall give below further examples which do not present such almost symmetry.

Remark 2 The flats in Example 1 are the simplest possible ones that can be used in Proposition 1: the flats A'_i are the vector spaces of equations $x_j = 0$ (where j ranges over a set depending on i and of size at most $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$) and the flats A_i are their translates by the vector $(1, \ldots, 1)$.

Open problems:

- 1. Find an example of application of Proposition 1 in which some flats A_i (resp. A'_i) are vector spaces and some are not.
- 2. Find an example of application of Proposition 1 in which the flats A_i and A_i' have equations of the form $x_j+x_k=\epsilon$ ($\epsilon\in F_2$) and which is not affinely equivalent to functions related through Proposition 1 to flats of equations $x_j=\epsilon$. Note that, more generally, the A_i 's can be chosen as the cosets of the kernels of linear mappings $\phi: F_2^n \to F_2^k$ where $k \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$; for instance, using the structure of the field F_{2^n} , the flats A_i, A_j' would have equations $tr_{n/m}(ax) = b$, where $m \geq 2$ is a divisor of n, $tr_{n/m}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n/m-1} x^{2^{im}}$, $a \in F_{2^n}$ and $b \in F_{2^m}$.

Remark 3 In the case that n is even, it has been observed in [9] that the function equal to the majority function for input vectors of weights at most n-1 and null at the vector of weight n has optimum algebraic immunity. This is quite obvious with Proposition 1: we can take the same flats A_i and A'_j as for the majority function, since A_1 contains the vector of weight n and vectors of weights between n/2 and n-1, that is, belonging to the support of the function. \square

In fact, a much more general result can be stated.

Corollary 2 Let n be even and let $a^1, \ldots, a^{\binom{n}{n/2}}$ be an ordering of the set of all vectors of weight n/2 in F_2^n . For every $i \in \{1, \ldots, \binom{n}{n/2}\}$, let us denote by A_i (resp. A'_i) the flat $\{x \in F_2^n / \operatorname{supp}(a^i) \subseteq \operatorname{supp}(x)\}$ (resp. $\{x \in F_2^n / \operatorname{supp}(x) \subseteq \operatorname{supp}(a^i)\}$). Let I, J and K be three disjoint subsets of $\{1, \ldots, \binom{n}{n/2}\}$. For every $i \in I$ (resp. $i \in J$), let us choose in A_i (resp. in A'_i) a vector b^i (resp. c^i) of weight different from n/2 and such that $b^i \in A_i \setminus \bigcup_{i' \in I; i' < i} A_{i'}$ (resp.

 $c^i \in A'_i \setminus \bigcup_{i' \in J: i' < i} A'_{i'}$). Then the function whose support equals:

$$\{x \in F_2^n / wt(x) > n/2\} \cup \{c^i, i \in J\} \cup \{a^i, i \in I \cup K\} \setminus \{b^i, i \in I\}$$

has algebraic immunity n/2.

Proof: Let the sequence of the flats A_i of Proposition 1 begin with the flats A_i described above for $i \in I$ and be completed by all the other flats $\{x \in F_2^n \mid supp(a) \subseteq supp(x)\}$, ordered by decreasing weights of the vectors a of weights at most n/2. Let the sequence of the flats A_i' begin with the flats A_i' described above for $i \in J$ and be completed by all the other flats $\{x \in F_2^n \mid supp(x) \subseteq supp(a) \text{ ordered by increasing weights of the vectors } a \text{ of weights}$ at least n/2. Then the hypotheses of Proposition 1 are satisfied. For instance, for any $i \in I$, the set $A_i \setminus [supp(f) \cup \bigcup_{i' < i} A_{i'}]$ equals $\{b_i\}$ and for any $i \in J$, the set $A_i' \setminus [supp(f+1) \cup \bigcup_{i' < i} A_{i'}]$ equals $\{c_i\}$.

An alternate way of presenting the construction of Corollary 3 is, after choosing an ordering of the set of vectors of weight n/2 in F_2^n and two disjoint subsets I, J of $\left\{1,\ldots,\binom{n}{n/2}\right\}$, allow $b^i\in A_i,\ i\in I$ (resp. in $c^i\in A_i',\ i\in J$) to have weight n/2. The support of the constructed function equals then the union of $\{x\in F_2^n/wt(x)>n/2\}\cup\{c^i,\ i\in J\}\setminus\{b^i,\ i\in I\}$ and of a set of vectors of weight n/2, including all the vectors a^i such that b^i has not weight n/2 and excluding all those such that c^i has not weight n/2. Note that, whatever is the ordering of the set of vectors of weight n/2 in F_2^n , there is then a possible choice of the vectors b^i and c^i since in any case choosing $b^i=a^i$ and $c^i=a^i$ satisfies the condition that $b^i\in A_i\setminus\bigcup_{i'\in I;i'< i}A_{i'}$ (resp. $c^i\in A_i'\setminus\bigcup_{i'\in J;i'< i}A_{i'}$). Hence, this viewpoint leads to an algorithm for constructing (possibly balanced) functions in even number n of variables with algebraic immunity n/2:

Algorithm

- Choose two positive integers $k \leq l \leq \binom{n}{n/2}$;
- For i ranging from 1 to k, choose a vector a^i of weight n/2, different from a^1, \ldots, a^{i-1} , and a vector b^i such that $supp(a^i) \subseteq supp(b^i)$ and $\forall i' < i$, $supp(a'^i) \not\subseteq supp(b^i)$;
- For i ranging from k+1 to l, choose a vector a^i of weight n/2, different from a^1, \ldots, a^{i-1} , and a vector c^i such that $supp(c^i) \subseteq supp(a^i)$ and $\forall l \leq i' < i$, $supp(c^i) \not\subseteq supp(a'^i)$;
- The function has support $\{x \in F_2^n / wt(x) > n/2\} \setminus \{b^i, i = 1, ..., k\} \cup \{a^i, i = 1, ..., k\} \cup \{c^i, i = k + 1, ..., l\}.$

The weight of the function equals $2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \binom{n}{n/2}$, plus the number of b^i of weight n/2, plus l-k.

The number of functions with optimal algebraic immunity that we can obtain this way is difficult to evaluate, but it is large. It is upper bounded by $\left(2^{1+n/2}\right)^{\binom{n}{n/2}}$, but this upper bound is approximately in $\Omega\left(2^{\frac{\sqrt{n}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}2^{n/2}}\right)$, and is therefore asymptotically huge. Note that it is easy to produce balanced functions with this method. We are currently working at checking that it is also possible to reach high nonlinearities with it and that some of the functions it produces are robust against fast algebraic attacks (the large number of the functions satisfying the hypotheses of Proposition 1 makes plausible their existence, but finding them may be a difficult task).

In [9] is asserted that the function whose support equals the union of the set of vectors of weight n/2+4 and of the set of vectors of weights at least n/2 except those of weight n/2-4 has optimum algebraic immunity. This result is probably false (in her thesis, the author withdrawed it, as well as some other results stated in this same paper), but it is true up to some (even) value of n which has to be determined; we can deduce it from Corollary 2. We give now an example of an infinite class of functions, among which some differ slightly from the function just mentioned, and for which we can prove that the algebraic immunity equals n/2, thanks to Corollary 2. In this example, the ordering on the set of vectors of weight n/2 plays no role.

Corollary 3 Let n be even and u be any vector in F_2^n . Then any function whose support contains:

- 1. all vectors of weights strictly greater than n/2, except those of weight wt(u) + n/2 and whose supports contain the support of u,
- 2. all vectors of weight n/2 wt(u) and whose supports are disjoint of the support of u,
- 3. all vectors of weight n/2 and whose supports are disjoint of the support of u, 4. any additional vectors of weight n/2 and whose supports neither are disjoint of the support of u nor contain it, has algebraic immunity n/2.

Proof: For every vector a of weight n/2 and whose support is disjoint of the support of u, let $b_a = a \vee u$ be the vector whose support equals the union of those of a and u. Obviously, b_a has weight wt(u) + n/2 and its support contains the support of u. For every vector a of weight n/2 and whose support contains the support of u, let $c_a = a \setminus u$ be the vector whose support equals the difference between those of a and u. Obviously, c_a has weight n/2 - wt(u) and its support is disjoint of the support of u. For two distinct vectors a and a' of weight n/2 and whose supports are disjoint of the support of u, we have $supp(a') \not\subseteq supp(b_a)$, and for two distinct vectors a and a' of weight n/2 and whose supports contain the support of u, we have $supp(c_a) \not\subseteq supp(a')$. Corollary 2 proves then that f has algebraic immunity n/2.

Notation: We shall denote by $f_{u,L}$ the function described in Corollary 3, where L is the set of those vectors of weight n/2, whose supports neither are disjoint of the support of u nor contain it, and at which $f_{u,L}$ takes value 1.

Note that this function is not (quite) symmetric. It can be balanced:

Lemma 1 For every vector u and every subset L of the set of those vectors of weight n/2, whose supports neither are disjoint of the support of u nor contain it, the weight of function $f_{u,L}$ equals $2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \binom{n}{n/2} + \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2} + |L|$. Given u, there exists L such that $f_{u,L}$ is balanced if and only if $\binom{n}{n/2} \geq 2 \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2}$.

Proof: The number of those vectors corresponding to case 1 in Corollary 3 equals $\sum_{i=1+n/2}^n \binom{n}{i} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2} = 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \binom{n}{i} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2}$; the number of those corresponding to case 2 equals $\binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2-wt(u)} = \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2}$ and the number of those corresponding to case 3 equals this same number. Hence, the number of those corresponding to cases 1-3 equals $2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \binom{n}{n/2} + \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2}$. The number |L| of those vectors corresponding to case 4 in Corollary 3 can be any nonnegative number upper bounded by $\binom{n}{n/2} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2}$. Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a balanced function $f_{u,L}$ is that $\frac{1}{2} \binom{n}{n/2} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2} \geq 0$ since we have then $\frac{1}{2} \binom{n}{n/2} - \binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2} \leq \binom{n}{n/2} - 2\binom{n-wt(u)}{n/2}$.

4 Study of the Walsh transforms of the constructed functions

We study now the Walsh spectra of the functions of Corollary 1 and of the functions $f_{u,L}$. We first determine the Walsh spectrum of the majority function (its nonlinearity has been determined in [22] but not its Walsh spectrum; only the maximum magnitude of the Walsh spectrum and its values at vectors of even weights were studied).

Lemma 2 Let n be even. Set $\omega = e^{4\pi\sqrt{-1}/n}$ and $\omega' = e^{4\pi\sqrt{-1}/(n+2)}$. The Walsh transform of the majority function f equals, if wt(a) is even:

$$W_f(a) = -\sum_{j=0}^{\min(wt(a), n/2)} (-1)^j {wt(a) \choose j} {n - wt(a) \choose n/2 - j}$$
$$= 2 - \frac{2}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n/2 - 1} (1 - \omega^j)^{wt(a)} (1 + \omega^j)^{n - wt(a)};$$

and if wt(a) is odd:

$$W_f(a) = -\frac{n/2+1}{wt(a)} \sum_{j=0}^{\min(wt(a),n/2+1)} (-1)^j \binom{wt(a)}{j} \binom{n-wt(a)}{n/2+1-j}$$
$$= \frac{n/2+1}{wt(a)} - \frac{1}{wt(a)} \sum_{j=0}^{n/2} (1-\omega'^j)^{wt(a)} (1+\omega'^j)^{n-wt(a)}.$$

Proof: We know that, for every vector a of weight $i \neq 0$, we have

$$W_f(a) = -2\sum_{k=n/2}^{n} K_k(i,n)$$
 (5)

where K_k is the so-called Krawtchouk polynomial (see [28, Page 151, Part I]) defined by

$$K_k(X,n) = \sum_{j=0}^{n} (-1)^j {X \choose j} {n-X \choose k-j}, \quad k = 0, 1, \dots n,$$
 (6)

since it is known that

$$\sum_{wt(x)=k} (-1)^{a \cdot x} = K_k(i, n).$$

The Krawtchouk polynomials may also be defined by means of their generating function [30]: for all integer $i \in \{0, ..., n\}$ and $z \in \mathbb{C}$,

$$\sum_{k=0}^{n} K_k(i,n) z^k = (1-z)^i (1+z)^{n-i}.$$
 (7)

• If i is even, then we have $K_{n-k}(i,n) = K_k(i,n)$. Hence we have $W_f(a) = -\sum_{k=0}^n K_k(i,n) - K_{n/2}(i,n) = -K_{n/2}(i,n)$ (if i > 0), according to Relation (7). Note that this had been already observed in [22] (but the sign was opposite since the majority function considered there was different from the one considered here).

We deduce now an expression which can be more easy to use, in some cases. We have $\sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \sum_{k=0}^n K_k(i,n) \omega^{jk} = \sum_{k=0}^n K_k(i,n) (\sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \omega^{jk}) = \frac{n}{2} K_0(i,n) + \frac{n}{2} K_n(i,n) + \frac{n}{2} K_{n/2}(i,n) = \frac{n}{2} (2 + K_{n/2}(i,n))$. We deduce that $W_f(a) = 2 - \frac{2}{n} \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} (1 - \omega^j)^i (1 + \omega^j)^{n-i}$.

• If i is odd, then the method, that we shall present whatever is the evenness of i, is slightly more complex: we know (see [28]) that, for every $k = 0, \ldots, n - 2$ and every $i = 0, \ldots, n$ we have:

$$(k+2)K_{k+2}(i,n) - kK_k(i,n) = n[K_{k+1}(i,n) - K_k(i,n)] - 2iK_{k+1}(i,n).$$
(8)

Summing up Relation (8) with k ranging from n/2 to n-2 gives:

$$nK_n(i,n) + (n-1)K_{n-1}(i,n) - (\frac{n}{2}+1)K_{n/2+1}(i,n) - \frac{n}{2}K_{n/2}(i,n) =$$

$$n\left[K_{n-1}(i,n) - K_{n/2}(i,n)\right] - 2i\left[\sum_{k=n/2}^{n} K_k(i,n) - K_n(i,n) - K_{n/2}(i,n)\right].$$

We deduce:

$$\sum_{k=n/2}^{n} K_k(i,n) =$$

$$\frac{n/2+1}{2i}K_{n/2+1}(i,n) + \frac{2i-n/2}{2i}K_{n/2}(i,n) + \frac{2i-n}{2i}K_n(i,n) + \frac{1}{2i}K_{n-1}(i,n) = \frac{n/2+1}{2i}K_{n/2+1}(i,n) + \frac{2i-n/2}{2i}K_{n/2}(i,n),$$

using that, for all i, we have $K_0(i,n) = 1$, $K_1(i,n) = n-2i$ and $K_{n-k}(i,n) = (-1)^i K_k(i,n)$, and therefore $K_n(i,n) = (-1)^i$, $K_{n-1}(i,n) = (-1)^i (n-2i)$. In the case i is even, we checked that we obtain this way the same result as above. Let us consider now the i odd case. We have $K_{n/2}(i,n) = 0$ and we deduce:

$$W_f(a) = -2\sum_{k=n/2}^n K_k(i,n) = -\frac{n/2+1}{i}K_{n/2+1}(i,n).$$

We have $\sum_{j=0}^{n/2} \sum_{k=0}^n K_k(i,n) \omega'^{jk} = \sum_{k=0}^n K_k(i,n) (\sum_{j=0}^{n/2} \omega'^{jk}) = (n/2+1) K_0(i,n) + (n/2+1) K_{n/2+1}(i,n) = (n/2+1) (1+K_{n/2+1}(i,n)).$ We deduce, using Relation (7), that $W_f(a) = \frac{n/2+1}{i} - \frac{1}{i} \sum_{j=0}^{n/2} (1-\omega'^j)^i (1+\omega'^j)^{n-i}.$

Note that the Walsh spectrum of the function (considered in [22]) which takes value 1 at all vectors of weights strictly greater than n/2 equals the opposite of that of f when wt(a) is even and equals that of f when wt(a) is odd.

Lemma 3 Let f_L be the function in an even number of variables n whose support equals the union of the set $\{x \in F_2^n / wt(x) > n/2\}$ and of any set L of vectors of weight n/2 (see Corollary 1). Let a be any vector and let i = wt(a). Then

$$W_{f_L}(a) = (-1)^{i+1} W_f(a) - 2 \sum_{x \in L} (-1)^{a \cdot x}.$$

Lemma 4 Let u be any vector and L any set of vectors of weight n/2 whose supports neither are disjoint of the support of u nor contain it. Let a be any vector and let i = wt(a). Then:

- if i is even, then $W_{f_{u,L}}(a)$ equals

$$(-1)^{i+1}W_f(a) - 2\sum_{\substack{x \in F_2^n/wt(x) = n/2\\ supp(u) \cap supp(x) = \emptyset}} (-1)^{a \cdot x} - 2\sum_{x \in L} (-1)^{a \cdot x},$$

- if i = wt(a) is odd and $a \cdot u = 0$, then it equals

$$(-1)^{i+1}W_f(a) + 2\sum_{\substack{x \in F_2^n/wt(x) = n/2\\ supp(u) \cap supp(x) = \emptyset}} (-1)^{a \cdot x} - 2\sum_{x \in L} (-1)^{a \cdot x},$$

- if i = wt(a) is odd and $a \cdot u = 1$, then it equals

$$(-1)^{i+1}W_f(a) - 6 \sum_{\substack{x \in F_2^n/wt(x) = n/2\\ supp(u) \cap supp(x) = \emptyset}} (-1)^{a \cdot x} - 2 \sum_{x \in L} (-1)^{a \cdot x}.$$

Proof: The value at $a \in F_2^n$ of the Walsh transform of the indicator of vectors of weights strictly greater than n/2 being equal to $(-1)^{i+1}W_f(a)$, where i = wt(a), the Walsh transform of $f_{u,L}$ equals

$$(-1)^{i+1}W_{f}(a) + 2 \sum_{\substack{x \in F_{2}^{n}/wt(x) = n/2 + wt(u) \\ supp(u) \subseteq supp(x)}} (-1)^{a \cdot x}$$

$$-2 \sum_{\substack{x \in F_{2}^{n}/wt(x) = n/2 - wt(u) \\ supp(u) \cap supp(x) = \emptyset}} (-1)^{a \cdot x} - 2 \sum_{\substack{x \in F_{2}^{n}/wt(x) = n/2 \\ supp(u) \cap supp(x) = \emptyset}} (-1)^{a \cdot x} - 2 \sum_{x \in L} (-1)^{a \cdot x}$$

$$= (-1)^{i+1}W_{f}(a) + 2 \sum_{\substack{x \in F_{2}^{n}/wt(x) = n/2 \\ supp(u) \cap supp(x) = \emptyset}} \left[(-1)^{a \cdot (x+u)} - (-1)^{a \cdot (\overline{x}+u)} - (-1)^{a \cdot x} \right]$$

$$-2 \sum_{x \in L} (-1)^{a \cdot x},$$

where $\overline{x} = x + (1, \dots, 1)$. This completes the proof.

We leave as an *open problem* the question of determining examples of balanced functions f_L and $f_{u,L}$ achieving high nonlinearities and being robust against fast algebraic attacks.

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