

A Stronger Definition for Anonymous Electronic Cash

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Abstract We investigate definitions of security for previously proposed schemes for electronic cash and strengthen them so that the bank does need to be trusted to the same extent. We give an experiment-based definition for our stronger notion and show that they imply security in the framework for Universal Composability. Finally we propose a scheme secure under our definition in the common reference string (CRS) model under the assumption that trapdoor permutations exist. As a tool we define and prove the existence of simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK-PK) in the CRS-model under the assumption that a family of trapdoor permutations exists.

1 Introduction

Electronic payments is an interesting cryptographic task. In the most basic scheme there is a bank, users, and merchants. The bank issues coins to users. Users spend the coins at merchants, who deposit them at the bank. An anonymous scheme does not allow the identity of the spender to be revealed from a spent coin. Since an electronic coin is nothing but a bit-string, a user may duplicate a coin and spend it more than once. The common way to address this issue is by providing a mechanism to spot double-spending, and to reveal the identity of the guilty user. In this paper we do not deal with other variants, such as transferable coins or schemes with a trusted third party.

The concept of anonymous electronic cash was introduced by Chaum et al. [11] As was common at the time, the claimed security properties were not defined in a precise way. Many schemes [7,13,27,24,21,20,19,8] for anonymous electronic followed.

From the point of view of the bank, a scheme is secure if it is infeasible to construct valid coins by other means than withdrawing them. From the point of view of the merchant, a coin that has been spent should always be accepted by the bank. Finally, to be secure for a user, the anonymity property should hold even if the bank conspires with other users and merchants. In addition, the bank should not be able to claim that the user has withdrawn more coins than she has, or falsely accuse the user of double-spending.

In the recent years, several papers have focused on giving precise security definitions for tasks such as group signatures [2,3] and ring signatures [4]. In

this paper we suggest a definition of security of schemes for electronic cash. In addition to an experiment-based definition we construct an ideal functionality for electronic cash and show that security in the experiment setting implies simulation-based security in the framework for universal composability [9] using the ideal functionality.

We point out that previous definitions do not rule out a corrupt bank cheating a user. The scenario is that the bank claims that a user has withdrawn a coin, but the user denies this. We argue that the protocol should include a mechanism to solve such an issue. Our definition addresses this issue by requiring a proof of withdrawal from the bank.

Our security definition is based on four experiments, *unforgeability*, stating that valid coins can only be issued by the bank, *anonymity*, ensuring a user stays anonymous even if the complete system conspires against her, *non-frameability*, requiring that no honest user can be accused of double-spending even by a corrupt bank, and *exculpability*, ensuring that no user can be falsely accused of withdrawing a coin. Previously considered security properties, as well as the property mentioned above, follow from security under these four experiments. The fact the security in the UC-model follows from the four experiments is another argument that our definition cover the intuitive meaning of security for electronic cash.

We construct a scheme using general methods, which is secure under our definition in the common reference string (CRS) model assuming the existence of a family of trapdoor permutations. The scheme is not intended for practical use, but it is rather a proof of concept.

2 Notation and Definitions

We write $[a, b]$ to denote the set $\{x \in \mathbb{Z} \mid a \leq x \leq b\}$. We say that an element is chosen “randomly” instead of the more cumbersome “independently and uniformly at random”. By $r \leftarrow_R S$ we mean that r is chosen randomly in S . Throughout the paper, κ denotes the security parameter. A function $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is said to be negligible if for each $c > 0$ there exists a $\kappa_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\varepsilon(\kappa) < \kappa^{-c}$ for $\kappa > \kappa_0$. We say that a function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is non-negligible whenever it is not negligible.

We write \emptyset to denote both the empty set and the empty string, and we let \perp be a special symbol. All adversaries in this paper are modeled as polynomial time Turing machines with *non-uniform* auxiliary advice string. We denote the set of such adversaries by PT^* .

Informally a family of functions is called a family of *trapdoor permutations* if the permutation is hard to invert for an adversary in PT^* unless a trapdoor is known, in which case it can be efficiently inverted. The precise definition is given in Appendix A.

Any algorithm not explicitly stated to be deterministic is assumed to be randomized.

3 Protocol Definition and Security Model

Here we give a definition for a scheme for electronic cash as well as for its security.

While some security properties are obvious and dealt with from the very first scheme, others are more subtle. Naturally a scheme must not allow for a user to forge coins, and a double-spender must be detected. The schemes [8,28] require that a corrupt bank cannot accuse an honest user of double-spending, whereas this requirement is not explicit in some other papers, e.g., [19,18]. However, to our knowledge, no scheme discusses the possibility of a corrupt bank falsely claiming that an honest user has withdrawn a coin, or rejecting a deposition from a merchant of a legally spent coin. The tendency seems to be to, apart from anonymity, protect the interests of the bank rather than those of the user.

We give a definition requiring that the bank be able to prove withdrawals. Thus, after executing the withdrawal protocol, the output of the bank should be a proof of withdrawal and the output of the user should be a valid coin. However, the neither part may be able to benefit by aborting the protocol prematurely. While there exist protocols which address this issue, so called fair exchange [5], they are either based on gradual release of information and thus not very practical, or require the presence of a third trusted party. Since we would like a definition that can be instantiated with a practical protocol, we use a different approach. After the execution, the bank receives a withdrawal proof, and the user receives a coin secret data which can be used to spend the coin. The honest bank would send the withdrawal proof to the user, who can use it as a coin. Should the bank fail to do this, the user can challenge the transaction and force the bank to prove that a coin has indeed been withdrawn. Since the proof can be used a coin, the scheme is fair also from the point of view of the user. We call the bank's output the coin public data and we call the user's output the coin user secret data.

We require that spent coins be publicly verifiable to avoid the possibility of the bank rejecting a deposition and to ensure that a merchant cannot deny having received a payment. In particular the bank can verify a spent coin. Therefore there is no need for an interactive deposition protocol. The merchant simply hands the spent coin to the bank.

The merchants do not have a secret key in our setting. Instead the receiving merchant's identity mid is encoded into the spent coin together with a transaction identifier tid . Thus the merchant's consent is not necessary in order to spend a coin. We use this approach to make the definition cleaner. In practice, a user would require some sort of contract before handing the merchant a coin, but we feel this is best handled outside of our protocol. In standard banking systems it is indeed possible to wire money without the recipient's approval, although it is usually not very sensible to do so. Since there is no secret for the merchant and the resulting spent coin is publicly verifiable, the spending protocol is non-interactive.

Consider a scheme where the merchants have secret keys which are used to receive payments, deposit the coin at the bank, and prove the validity of a spent coin to a third party. Assume also that the scheme is secure, i.e., anonymous

with unforgeable coins, also for corrupt merchants. By revealing the secret key, we get a scheme with the properties we just described.

We assume the existence of a PKI, i.e., given a public key there exists a method to obtain the identity of the holder of the key. Since we have a PKI and assume the existence of trapdoor permutations, we can construct secure and authenticated communication. We do not explicitly define a protocol to register a user. If the protocol requires some secret information to be passed from the bank to the user, this can be done in the withdrawal protocol, since we have the existence of secure and authenticated channels. Therefore there is no loss of generality in not having a registration protocol.

In this paper we discuss payment schemes containing all basic properties, but there are many possible extensions. Examples of such alternative definitions include the presence of a trusted third party which can identify coin spenders, even when they have not double-spent. Such schemes are called *fair*. Another extension is the possibility to transfer a coin between users in several steps before it is deposited at the bank, and divisible coins. We leave it as an open problem to adjust the definition to handle also such cases.

3.1 Participants

The participants are the bank \mathcal{B} and users \mathcal{U}_i . Each merchant has an identity id , but they do not take active part in any of our protocols.

3.2 Algorithms and Protocols

We now define the algorithms and protocols that a scheme for electronic cash consist of. For non-interactive algorithms the definition is straight-forward. We define two-party protocols as a pair of algorithms, where each participant executes one algorithm. The algorithms take as input a message and a state. The state is initialized with the private input of the party. On startup of a protocol the initiating party executes the algorithm with \emptyset as message. Each algorithm outputs a pair $(\text{msg}, \text{state})$, where msg is handed as message to the other party's algorithm, and state is passed as input by the executing party the next round. When a party's algorithm outputs $p = \perp$ the protocol is finished, and the final value of each party's state is parsed as private output. The *transcript* of a protocol is defined as the list of messages exchanged.

Algorithm 1 illustrates the execution between two parties using algorithms A and B with private input sk_A, sk_B , respectively.

None of our subprotocols involve more than two parties, which allows us to use the simplified notation above for interactive subprotocols. As a matter of fact, the only protocols which involves exactly two parties is the withdrawal protocol.

There is an algorithm for creating a bank key pair and a user key pair. After the user has generated its keys, the public key is inserted into the PKI and hence tied to the user's identity.

Algorithm 1 An execution of a protocol with two parties.

```
stateA ← skA
stateB ← skB
while (msgA ≠ ⊥) ∧ (msgB ≠ ⊥) do
  (msgB, stateA) ← A(msgA, stateA)
  if msgB ≠ ⊥ then
    (msgA, stateB) ← B(msgB, stateB)
  end if
end while
return (stateA, stateB)
```

The merchants have no secret keys. Instead each merchant has an identity $\text{mid} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa/2}$, which together with a transaction identity $\text{tid} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa/2}$ uniquely identifies a transaction. The reason to have fixed-length identities can informally be described as follows. We would like a spent coin to have a fixed length, and we would like a scheme which is secure under general assumptions such as the existence of trapdoor permutations. If a user can create two inputs which result in the same spent coin, then she will not be caught as a double-spender. Therefore it must be infeasible to construct two such inputs. However, this is what is required from a collision-free hash functions. Hence such a scheme could be used to construct a collision-free hash function keyed on all other parameters of the scheme, which would solve the long-standing open problem of the existence of collision-free hash functions assuming only the existence of trapdoor permutations.

On the other hand, should we assume the existence of a collision-free hash function, we could have merchant and transaction identifiers of arbitrary length and hash them to a value of appropriate length.

Algorithm 2 (Bank Key Generation BKg).

INPUT: $\text{BKg}(1^\kappa)$, where κ is the security parameter.

OUTPUT: (bpk, bsk) , where bpk is a bank public key and bsk is a bank secret key.

Algorithm 3 (User Key Generation UKg).

INPUT: $\text{UKg}(1^\kappa)$, where κ is the security parameter.

OUTPUT: (upk, usk) , where upk is a user public key and usk is a user secret key.

Protocol 1 (Coin Withdrawal, (UWithdraw, BWithdraw)).

PARTIES: Bank \mathcal{B} , User \mathcal{U} .

PRIVATE INPUT OF \mathcal{B} : Bank public key bpk , bank secret key bsk .

PRIVATE INPUT OF \mathcal{U} : Bank public key bpk , user public key upk , user secret key usk .

PRIVATE OUTPUT OF \mathcal{B} : Coin public data cpd .

PRIVATE OUTPUT OF \mathcal{U} : Coin user secret data cUSD .

$(\text{UWithdraw}, \text{BWithdraw})$ is the protocol used when a user withdraws a coin. The private input of the user is a user private key usk , a user public key upk , and

a bank public key bpk . The private input of the bank is a bank secret key bsk and a bank public key bpk . The user's private output is a coin secret key cusd used when spending the coin, whereas the bank's output is interpreted as the coin public data, cpd , which we will sometimes simply refer to as a coin. Normally the bank would hand the public data to the user, but we do not address this in the protocol. If the bank fails to hand the coin public data to the user and still charge the user's account, the user would request a proof of the withdrawal. Since the coin public data is the proof, the bank would be forced to reveal it.

To simplify notation, we use a short notation for an honest execution of the protocol. We define $\text{Withdraw}(\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}, \text{upk}, \text{usk})$ to be the result, i.e., coin public data cpd and coin user secret data cusd , of a withdrawal where both party behaves according to the protocol.

Algorithm 4 (Coin Spending Spend).

INPUT: $\text{Spend}(\text{cpd}, \text{upk}, \text{usk}, \text{cusd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$, where cpd is a coin public data, upk is a user public key, usk is a user secret key, cusd is a coin user secret data, $\text{mid} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa/2}$ is a merchant identity, $\text{tid} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa/2}$ is a transaction identity, and bpk is a bank public key.

OUTPUT: spentcoin , where spentcoin is a (publicly verifiable) spent coin.

Informally $\text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \text{bpk})$ returns the public key upk of the double-spender if spentcoin_1 and spentcoin_2 are two spendings of the same coin. Otherwise it returns \perp .

We require that the spent coins handed to VfDoubleSpent have been verified, or the output of the algorithm is undefined. This requirement could be removed by including (mid, tid) for each coin in the call, but this would make the interface unnecessarily complex.

The bank secret key is not used in the below algorithm. If a key is indeed needed, and it is separate from the key used to issue coins, then it can be made public by including it into bpk . It is quite realistic to have double-spendings being publicly verifiable. In case of a double-spending, the bank would still need to be able to prove this to a third party. It also makes the definitions less cumbersome.

Algorithm 5 (Identifying a Double-Spender, VfDoubleSpent).

INPUT: $\text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \text{bpk})$, where spentcoin_1 as well as spentcoin_2 are two spent coins and bpk is a bank public key.

OUTPUT: upk , a (possibly empty) user public key.

In addition to the above, there are two algorithms which verify the validity of coins produced during withdrawal and spending, $\text{VfCoin}(\text{cpd}, \text{upk}, \text{bpk})$, $\text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$. The algorithms output 1 if the proof is valid with regards to the additional input parameters and 0 otherwise.

Algorithm 6 (Verifying a Withdrawal, VfCoin).

INPUT: $\text{VfCoin}(\text{cpd}, \text{upk}, \text{bpk})$, where cpd is the public data of a withdrawn coin, upk a user public key, and bpk a bank public key.

OUTPUT: $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Algorithm 7 (Verifying a Spent Coin, VfSpentCoin).

INPUT: VfSpentCoin(spentcoin, mid, tid, bpk), where spentcoin is a spent coin, tid $\in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa/2}$ is a transaction identity, mid is a merchant identity, and bpk is a bank public key.

OUTPUT: $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Each new coin public data cpd gives the bank the right to charge the account once. We must decide on what we mean by a two coin public data cpd₁ and cpd₂ being different. The most obvious choice would be to require the two bit-string to be equal. However, we allow the scheme to define the equivalence relation in a different way. This equivalence relation is implicitly used also in the security experiment, e.g., when building sets of coin public data. The reason to allow this is that a scheme may allow the bank to reform a cpd into a different cpd' in a certain pattern, e.g., by resigning some data with a probabilistic signing scheme. Rather than require a scheme to take additional steps to withstand such an attack, we allow it to simply define two such coins to be identical.

3.3 Correctness

By correctness we mean that the scheme works as expected when all participants are honest. Proving correctness is often straight-forward, and this property is sometimes not stated explicitly. Here we define correctness for a scheme as defined above.

Experiment 1 (Correctness, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC}, A}^{\text{correct}}(\kappa)$).

```

(bpk, bsk)  $\leftarrow$  BKg( $1^\kappa$ )
(upk, usk)  $\leftarrow$  UKg( $1^\kappa$ )
(cpd, cusd)  $\leftarrow$  Withdraw(bpk, bsk, upk, usk)
if VfCoin(cpd, upk, bpk) = 0 then
  return 0
end if
(mid, tid)  $\leftarrow$  A(guess, bpk, upk, cpd)
spentcoin  $\leftarrow$  Spend(usk, cpd, cusd, mid, tid, bpk)
if VfSpentCoin(spentcoin, mid, tid, bpk) = 0 then
  return 0
end if
return 1

```

The advantage of the adversary is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC}, A}^{\text{correct}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC}, A}^{\text{correct}}(\kappa) = 0] .$$

Definition 1 (Correctness). A scheme for electronic cash \mathcal{EC} is correct if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC}, A}^{\text{correct}}(\kappa)$ is negligible as a function of κ for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

Detection of double-spenders is not included in the definition of correctness. This may seem strange at first, but correctness only stipulates how the protocol works with honest parties, and an honest party does not double-spend. As we will see later, the definition of unforgeability implies that double-spenders are detected.

3.4 Security

We describe four experiments, or games, to define security for a scheme for electronic cash. In each experiment the adversary has access to a number of oracles defined below. They operate on the following global parameters.

- \mathfrak{U} contains all public keys inserted into the PKI.
- \mathfrak{C} contains the public keys of corrupt users. Obviously \mathfrak{C} is a subset of \mathfrak{U} .
- $(\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i)$ is the public and private key of the i th honest user.
- l is the number of coins withdrawn from the bank using the withdrawal oracle. It is initialized to 0.
- ds_i is the number of double-spendings that has been made on behalf of user upk_i using the spend oracle `HonestSpend`. It is initialized to 0.
- CSK_i is the set of coin user secret data for user upk_i produced when the withdrawal oracle is used. For a new user it is initiated as the empty set.

The oracles are defined as follows.

`HonestUKg`(1^κ) calls `UKg`(1^κ) to generate a key pair (upk, usk) . The public key upk is inserted into the PKI. The key pair (upk, usk) is stored in the key list. The public key upk is returned.

`AddCorruptU`(upk) inserts the key upk into the PKI and into the set \mathfrak{C} .

`HonestUWithdraw`(i, j, msg) executes one step of withdrawal session j for \mathcal{U}_i . More precisely, if session j has not been instantiated for \mathcal{U}_i , i.e., state_j^i is not defined, then $\text{state}_j^i \leftarrow (\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i, \text{bpk})$. Thereafter a call is made to `UWithdraw`($\text{msg}, \text{state}_j^i$) with output $(\text{msg}', \text{state}_j^i)$. The message msg' is returned, and state_j^i is stored for use in subsequent calls to the oracle. After the session has finished, state_j^i is parsed as a coin user secret data cusd_j^i . The key set for user i is updated $\text{CSK}_i \leftarrow \text{CSK}_i \cup \{\text{cusd}_j^i\}$.

`HonestBWithdraw`(j, msg) executes one step of withdrawal session j for \mathcal{B} . More precisely, if session j has not been instantiated, i.e., state_j is not defined, then $\text{state}_j \leftarrow (\text{bpk}, \text{bsk})$. Then a call is made to `BWithdraw`($\text{msg}, \text{state}_j$) with output $(\text{msg}', \text{state}_j)$. The message msg' is returned, and state_j is stored. After the session has finished, state_j is parsed as a coin cpd and returned. Each time a coin is returned the counter l is incremented.

`HonestSpend`($\text{cpd}, i, j, \text{mid}, \text{tid}$) spends cpd on behalf of \mathcal{U}_j using the secret key from withdrawal session j . The oracle first checks if the secret data from withdrawal session j , cusd_j^i , has been stored in CSK_i and returns \perp if this is not the case. Then it checks if (i, cpd) has been stored by the oracle and sets $\text{ds}_i \leftarrow \text{ds}_i + 1$ if this is the case. Then it stores (i, cpd) , calls `Spend`($\text{cpd}, \text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i, \text{cusd}_j^i, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk}$), and returns the output.

We let \mathfrak{Q}_O be the set of queries to oracle O and we let \mathfrak{R}_O be the set of responses.

Concurrency The adversary is given oracle access to the withdrawal protocol without any restrictions on how to access it. In particular it may execute several sessions in parallel. Therefore the scheme must be secure also under concurrent use to pass our definition.

Unforgeability The property of *unforgeability* informally says that one cannot create valid coins by other means than withdrawing them from the bank. A little more precisely it says that if a coalition of users spend more than they have legally withdrawn, then at least one of them will get caught as a double-spender. Recall that l is the number of withdrawn coins using the withdrawal oracle. Unforgeability corresponds to the property *balance* of [8].

Experiment 2 (Unforgeability, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{unforge}}(\kappa)$).

```

(bpk, bsk)  $\leftarrow$  BKg( $1^\kappa$ )
(spentcoin $_1, \dots, \text{spentcoin}_k$ )  $\leftarrow$  AAddCorruptU( $\cdot$ ), HonestBWithdraw( $\cdot, \cdot$ )(bpk)
if  $k \leq l$  then
  return 0
end if
if  $\exists i \in [1, k] : \text{VfCoin}(\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{bpk}) = 0$  then
  return 0
end if
if  $\exists (i, j) \in [1, k]^2 : \text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{spentcoin}_j, \text{bpk}) \in \mathfrak{C}$  then
  return 0
end if
return 1

```

In the above experiment, there is no method for creating honest user. If there is an adversary which would benefit from this, it could as well create the key pair itself and run `AddCorruptU`. Coins for the honest user could be withdrawn by playing the user part of the withdrawal protocol honestly.

The advantage of the adversary is defined as

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{unforge}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{unforge}}(\kappa) = 1] .$$

Definition 2 (Unforgeability). A scheme for electronic cash \mathcal{EC} has unforgeability if for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$ the advantage $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{unforge}}(\kappa)$ is negligible as a function of κ .

Non-Frameability A potential problem could be that a coalition of users and possibly the bank could accuse an honest user of double-spending. We say that a scheme has *non-frameability* if it is infeasible to frame an honest user in such a way.

In experiment below, \mathcal{DS} is the set of (indices of) double-spent coins that implicate the framed \mathcal{U}_j . The adversary wins if it creates more double-spending than ds_j , the number of double-spending the adversary has made on behalf of \mathcal{U}_j using the spending oracle. Intuitively this means that a user can only be accused of the actual number of double-spending she has performed.

Non-frameability corresponds to *strong exculpability* of [8]. The weak variant would guarantee that a user that has never double-spent cannot be accused of double-spending, but it would not prevent a double-spending user from being set up for additional double-spending. Which variant to prefer is a matter of

taste. One could argue that a user that double-spends has already breached her part of the contract, and the protocol should not protect her anymore. On the other hand, a double-spending could occur due to a technical malfunction rather than intentional misconduct, and in such a case it would be unreasonable for the protocol to allow an adversary to create additional double-spendings on behalf of the user. We choose the strong definition.

Since not even a dishonest bank should be able to frame a user, we allow the bank key to be chosen in an adversarial way.

Experiment 3 (Non-Frameability, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{non-frame}}(\kappa)$).

```

(bpk, state)  $\leftarrow$   $A(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ 
 $((\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{mid}_i, \text{tid}_i)_{i=1}^k, j) \leftarrow$ 
 $A_{\text{HonestUKg}(1^\kappa), \text{HonestUWithdraw}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot), \text{HonestSpend}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{guess}, \text{state})$ 
if  $\exists i : \text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{mid}_i, \text{tid}_i, \text{bpk}) = 0$  then
  return 0
end if
 $\mathcal{DS} \leftarrow \{i : \exists i' > i : \text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{spentcoin}_{i'}, \text{bpk}) = \text{upk}_j\}$ 
if  $|\mathcal{DS}| > \text{ds}_j$  then
  return 1
else
  return 0
end if

```

We do not provide an oracle to add corrupt users to the PKI, since we are not interested in exposing honest users as double-spenders. The advantage of the adversary is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{non-frame}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{non-frame}}(\kappa) = 1] .$$

Definition 3 (Non-Frameability). *A scheme for electronic cash \mathcal{EC} has non-frameability if for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$ the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{non-frame}}(\kappa)$ is negligible as a function of κ .*

Anonymity Informally a scheme for electronic cash is *anonymous* if it is infeasible for any player, including the bank, to decide the identity of a spender. We define anonymity in a very strong sense, namely that not even knowing the private key of the spender helps revealing the identity of the user. We cannot, however, give the adversary the coin secret user data, since in such a case the adversary could double-spend the coin and reveal the identity. For the same reason the adversary may not use the `HonestSpend` oracle to double-spend one of the challenge coins.

In the experiment we let the adversary choose the bank public key and use oracles to create users and withdraw coins before it selects two coins, one of which will be spent as the challenge. Together with the challenge `spentcoin` the adversary is given the private keys of all users. This corresponds to the scenario where the private key of a user is exposed. The privacy of the user should be kept also in such a case.

If the keys were given to the adversary in the first stage, it could withdraw coins itself using the protocol, and it would trivially win the experiment by double-spending the challenge coins.

Experiment 4 (Anonymity, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{anon}-b}(\kappa)$).

```

(bpk, state)  $\leftarrow$   $A(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ 
 $(i_0, j_0, i_1, j_1, \text{mid}, \text{tid}) \leftarrow$ 
 $A^{\text{HonestUKg}(1^\kappa), \text{HonestUWithdraw}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot), \text{HonestSpend}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{choose}, \text{state})$ 
spentcoin  $\leftarrow$   $\text{Spend}(\text{cpd}_{i_b}, \text{usk}_{i_b}, \text{cusd}_{j_b}^{i_b}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$ 
 $d \leftarrow A^{\text{HonestSpend}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{guess}, \text{state}, \text{spentcoin}, (\text{usk}_i)_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{U}|})$ 
if  $\exists \text{mid}, \text{tid} : (\{\text{cpd}_{i_0}, i_0, j_0, \text{mid}, \text{tid}\}, \{\text{cpd}_{i_1}, i_1, j_1, \text{mid}, \text{tid}\}) \cap \Omega_{\text{HonestSpend}} \neq \emptyset$ 
then
  return 0
end if
if  $d = b$  then
  return 1
else
  return 0
end if

```

The advantage of the adversary is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{anon}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{anon}-0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{anon}-1}(\kappa) = 1]| .$$

Definition 4 (Anonymity). A scheme for electronic cash \mathcal{EC} has anonymity if for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$ the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{anon}}(\kappa)$ is negligible as a function of κ .

Exculpability Exculpability states that the bank should not be able to create proofs of withdrawal, i.e., coins, which the user cannot spend. It should also not be able to produce more proofs than number of withdrawals made by the user.

Experiment 5 (Exculpability, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{exculp}}(\kappa)$).

```

(bpk, state)  $\leftarrow$   $A(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ 
 $(j, (\text{cpd}_i)_{i=1}^k, \text{mid}, \text{tid}) \leftarrow$ 
 $A^{\text{HonestUKg}(1^\kappa), \text{HonestUWithdraw}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot), \text{HonestSpend}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)}(\text{guess}, \text{state})$ 
if  $\exists i : \text{VfCoin}(\text{cpd}_i, \text{upk}_j, \text{bpk}) = 0$  then
  return 0
end if
if  $k > |\text{CSK}_j|$  then
  return 1
end if
if  $\forall \text{cusd} \in \text{CSK}_j : \text{Spend}(\text{cpd}_1, \text{upk}_j, \text{usk}_j, \text{cusd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk}) = \perp$  then
  return 1
end if
return 0

```

There is no loss of generality in only checking if cpd_1 is spendable, since the adversary can always reorder the coins to output an unspendable first.

The advantage of the adversary is defined as

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{exculp}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{exculp}}(\kappa) = 1] .$$

Definition 5 (Exculpability). *A scheme for electronic cash \mathcal{EC} has exculpability if for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$ the advantage $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{EC},A}^{\text{exculp}}(\kappa)$ is negligible as a function of κ .*

Finally we make the following definition.

Definition 6 (Secure Scheme for Electronic Cash). *A scheme for electronic cash is secure if it has unforgeability, non-frameability, anonymity, and exculpability.*

3.5 Comparison to Group Signatures

Electronic cash resembles group signatures in many ways. We assume the reader is familiar with the notion of group signatures, and refer to [2] and [3] for a formal introduction to the subject.

Both group signatures and electronic cash allow users to perform transactions while remaining anonymous. On a high level, the roles of the bank and the group manager are similar. Withdrawing a coin has similarities to joining the group of a group signature scheme, and spending is in some ways similar to signing. The major difference in terms of anonymity is that a group signature can always be opened by the group manager, but a spent coin is anonymous also to the bank. In this sense, a scheme for electronic cash can be seen as a group signature scheme with one-time keys and unrevocable anonymity.

It is not surprising that the security properties of the two tasks are similar in many ways. Let us compare our definition for electronic cash to the definitions for dynamic group signatures in [17,3].

Unforgeability Our definition of unforgeability resembles the misidentification attack of [17] and traceability of [3].

Non-Frameability Non-frameability is similar to both group signature definitions in that it requires that a user cannot be framed even if the complete system conspires against her. Although the adversary is given the secret keys of the group manager in [17,3], our definition is stronger, since we allow the adversary to construct the key itself.

Anonymity Anonymity of a group signature is different than that of a spent coin, since the opening key can always be used to open group signature. This is reflected in the experiments, which otherwise are quite similar.

Exculpability The exculpability property is not defined for any group signature scheme to our knowledge. The corresponding property would be that a group manager cannot falsely claim that it has included a certain member into the group. A scenario where this might pose a problem is if group members are allowed to download certain information and there is a price to join the group. Group signatures do not address the potential issue when a member claims that the group manager has not issued him a key.

4 Security in the Framework for Universal Composability

We now consider the relation between experiment-based security of a scheme for electronic cash as defined above and security in the framework for universal composability (UC) [9]. We describe an ideal functionality, discuss why it captures the notion of anonymous electronic cash, and show that a scheme that is secure according to Definition 6 also securely realizes the ideal functionality.

We use a model where the ideal functionality is linked to the players through a communication network $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$. The communication network forwards a message m from a player P as (P, m) to the ideal functionality. When $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$ receives (P, m) from the functionality, it forwards the message m to player P . Except for immediate functions, defined as a message from a player P immediately followed by a response to the same player P , the ideal adversary \mathcal{S} is informed of when a message is sent, but not of the content. The ideal adversary is allowed to delay the delivery of such a message, but not change its content.

The functionality described here has only one non-immediate function – the withdrawal protocol.

The adversary is allowed to choose an arbitrary number of players, including the bank \mathcal{B} , to corrupt at start-up.

The ideal *anonymous electronic cash* functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$ running with parties \mathcal{B} , $\mathcal{U} = \{\mathcal{U}_1, \mathcal{U}_2, \dots, \mathcal{U}_k\}$ is given in Figure 1. The ideal adversary \mathcal{S} corrupts a subset of the users and possibly the bank. We let \mathcal{C} be the set of corrupted parties.

We do not differentiate between users and merchants. In fact, any party (except for the bank \mathcal{B}) can act both as a merchant and as a user. In addition we assume every user is uniquely identified with an identifier $\text{mid} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa/2}$.

The ideal functionality stores the following values.

T_{coins} is the table of coins that the bank has issued.

cc is the number of coins that have been withdrawn by corrupt users. It is initialized to 0.

$T_{\text{spent-coins}}$ contains the coins that have been honestly spent.

$T_{\text{valid-coins}}$ holds the coins that have been verified to be correct, but which have not been spent by honest users.

T_{double} are the coin pairs that have been determined to be double-spendings.

ds is the number of coins that have been determined to be double-spent by corrupt users. It is initialized to 0.

Functionality 1 (Anonymous Electronic Cash).

1. Wait for the message $(\mathcal{S}, \text{Keys}, (\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}), (\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i)_{i=1}^k)$ where $\text{usk}_i = \perp$ if $\mathcal{U}_i \in \mathcal{C}$ and $\text{bsk} = \perp$ if $\mathcal{B} \in \mathcal{C}$. Store (bpk, bsk) and $(\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i)$.
2. Then handle incoming messages as follows.
 - **Withdraw.** Upon reception of $(\mathcal{B}, \text{AccWithdrawal}, \mathcal{U}_i)$ act as follows.
 - If $\mathcal{U}_i \notin \mathcal{C}$, then compute $(\text{cpd}, \text{cusd}) \leftarrow \text{Withdraw}(\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}, \text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i)$. Store $(\mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd}, \text{cusd})$ in T_{coins} . Then hand $((\mathcal{B}, \text{IssuedNewCoin}, \mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd}), (\mathcal{S}, \text{AccWithdrawal}, \mathcal{U}_i))$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$.
 - If $\mathcal{U}_i \in \mathcal{C}$, then hand $(\mathcal{S}, \text{AccWithdrawal}, \mathcal{U}_i)$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$. Upon reception of response $(\mathcal{S}, \text{IssuedNewCoin}, \mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd})$, store $(\mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd}, \perp)$ in T_{coins} . Set $\text{cc} \leftarrow \text{cc} + 1$. Hand $(\mathcal{B}, \text{IssuedNewCoin}, \mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd})$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$.
 - **Verify Coin.** Upon reception of $(P, \text{VfCoin}, \text{cpd}, \mathcal{U}_i)$, set $b \leftarrow \text{VfCoin}(\text{cpd}, \text{bpk}, \text{upk}_i)$ and hand $(P, \text{VfCoin}, \text{cpd}, \mathcal{U}_i, b)$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$.
 - **Spend.** Upon reception of $(\mathcal{U}_i, \text{Spend}, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid})$, execute $(\cdot, \text{VfCoin}, \text{cpd}, \mathcal{U}_i)$. If the result is 0, then hand $(\mathcal{U}_i, \text{Spend}, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \perp)$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$. Otherwise compute $(\text{upk}', \text{usk}') \leftarrow \text{UKg}(1^\kappa)$, $(\text{cpd}', \text{cusd}') \leftarrow \text{Withdraw}(\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}, \text{upk}', \text{usk}')$, $\text{spentcoin}' \leftarrow \text{Spend}(\text{cpd}', \text{usk}', \text{cusd}', \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$. Store $(\mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd}', \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{spentcoin}')$ in $T_{\text{spent-coins}}$.
 - **Verify Spent Coin.** Upon reception of $(P, \text{VfSpentCoin}, \text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid})$ proceed as follows.
 - If $\mathcal{B} \in \mathcal{C}$, then set $b \leftarrow \text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$.
 - If $(\cdot, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{spentcoin})$ has been stored in $T_{\text{spent-coins}}$, then set $b \leftarrow 1$.
 - If $(\cdot, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{spentcoin}) \notin T_{\text{spent-coins}}$, then do as follows.
 - * If there exists $\mathcal{U}_j \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $(\mathcal{U}_j, \text{cpd}, \perp) \in T_{\text{coins}}$, then set $b \leftarrow \text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$. If $b = 1$, then store $(\mathcal{U}_j, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{spentcoin})$ in $T_{\text{valid-coins}}$. Execute $\text{upk} = \text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{spentcoin}', \text{bpk})$ for each $\text{spentcoin} \in T_{\text{valid-coins}}$ and let \mathcal{U}_j be such that $\text{upk}_j = \text{upk}$. Insert $(\mathcal{U}_j, \{\text{spentcoin}, \text{spentcoin}'\})$ into T_{double} if $\mathcal{U}_j \in \mathcal{C}$. Let $\text{ds} \leftarrow \text{ds} + 1$ if at least one such double-spending is found. If $|T_{\text{valid-coins}}| - \text{cc} > \text{ds}$, then insert $(\mathcal{U}_j, \{\text{spentcoin}, \text{spentcoin}'\})$ into T_{double} for a random $\text{spentcoin}' \in T_{\text{valid-coins}} \setminus \{\text{spentcoin}\}$ and $\mathcal{U}_j \in \mathcal{C}$ and set $\text{ds} \leftarrow \text{ds} + 1$.
 - * If no such user exists, then set $b \leftarrow 0$.

Hand $(P, \text{VfSpentCoin}, \text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, b)$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$.

 - **Verify Double-Spending.** Upon reception of $(P, \text{VfDb1Spent}, \text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2)$, proceed as follows.
 - If $(\mathcal{U}_j, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{spentcoin}_1)$ and $(\mathcal{U}_j, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}', \text{tid}', \text{spentcoin}_2)$ for $(\text{mid}, \text{tid}) \neq (\text{mid}', \text{tid}')$ exist in $T_{\text{spent-coins}}$, then set $\mathcal{U} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_j$.
 - If $(\mathcal{U}_j, \{\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2\}) \in T_{\text{double}}$, then let $\mathcal{U} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_j$.
 - Otherwise let $\mathcal{U} \leftarrow \perp$.

Hand $(P, \text{VfDb1Spent}, \text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \mathcal{U})$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$.

Figure 1. The definition of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$.

4.1 About the Functionality

Let us discuss why $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$ captures what one would expect from a secure scheme for anonymous electronic cash.

Withdrawal For an honest user, the coin is created as in the protocol to ensure correct distribution. The coin is stored in the table for withdrawn coins T_{coins} and returned to the bank. For a corrupt user, the bank engages in the withdrawal protocol (via the simulator). If the result is indeed a coin, then it is stored in the coins table and the counter for coins withdrawn by corrupt users is incremented.

Coin Verification Coins are deemed valid when the protocol says so. This may seem overly simplified, but since the **Spend** algorithm requires valid coins to be spendable, this covers what one would expect from a valid coin. By the correctness of \mathcal{EC} , honestly withdrawn coins always pass the verification.

Spending Before a coin can be spent, it is verified that it is valid and the spender owns the coin. If so, then a spent coin is created by creating a new user, withdrawing a coin, and spending it. Thus the spent coin has no information about the owner to ensure anonymity. The coin is stored in the table for spent coins $T_{\text{spent-coins}}$.

Verification of Spent Coin If the bank is honest and the coin exists in the table for spent coins, then it is valid. If it does not exist in the table, it may still be valid, but only if it has been spent by a corrupt party and would implicate a corrupt party if double-spent. This is handled by including the spent coin in the list of potential double-spending by corrupt parties.

If the bank is corrupt, then any coin deemed valid by the protocol is accepted.

Identification of Double-Spenders The algorithm is constructed so that it may only point out an honest user if it has actually double-spent a coin by sending a **Spend** command twice for the same coin.

The algorithm also ensures that if more coins are spent than withdrawn by corrupt parties, then a double-spender will be revealed. If the two coins have been spent by corrupt parties, then they may only be cleared from double-spending if there are enough potential double-spending to cover the surplus of spent coins against withdrawn coins. As a special case a double-spending is never required to be exposed if the corrupt parties have not spent more coin than they have withdrawn.

4.2 On the Possibility of Simplifying the Functionality

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$ is rather complex, and it is natural question to ask whether it could be simplified. Let us consider how double-spenders are identified. Let \mathcal{Z} be an environment proceeding as follows:

- \mathcal{Z} runs with one corrupt user \mathcal{U}_1 .
- \mathcal{U}_1 withdraws three coins.
- \mathcal{U}_1 spends four times, creating $\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \text{spentcoin}_3, \text{spentcoin}_4$.

When only three coins have been spent, the functionality does not need to intervene if no double-spending is detected. If the fourth coin does not reveal a double-spending, then the functionality forces a double-spending to be reported. By using the T_{double} table, it is ensured that further queries are answered in a consistent way.

As the above example suggests, the functionality needs to keep track of which coins have been reported as double-spending, and which have not. It also needs to determine whether too many coins have been spent, forcing a double-spending if the number of spent coins exceeds the number of withdrawn coins. It seems that the functionality needs to be fairly complex.

4.3 The Real Protocol π_{AnonEC}

We describe how the protocol π_{AnonEC} is built from the algorithms of the scheme.

THE BANK

The bank \mathcal{B} generates $(\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}) \leftarrow \text{BKg}(1^\kappa)$ and broadcasts bpk . Then it waits for a message $(\text{Keys}, \text{upk}_i)$ for every user \mathcal{U}_i . Incoming messages are handled as follows:

- Upon reception of $(\text{AccWithdrawal}, \mathcal{U}_i)$, the bank engages in the withdrawal protocol with \mathcal{U}_i . After the protocol has terminated, the bank outputs the tuple $(\text{IssuedNewCoin}, \mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd})$.

USERS

The user \mathcal{U}_i generates $(\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i) \leftarrow \text{UKg}(1^\kappa)$ and broadcasts upk_i . Then it waits for a message $(\text{Keys}, \text{upk}_j)$ for every user \mathcal{U}_j and $(\text{Keys}, \text{bpk})$ from \mathcal{B} . Incoming messages are handled as follows:

- When challenged in the withdrawal protocol, run it according to the algorithm UWithdraw . After the protocol has terminated, store the output cusd_j .
- Upon reception of $(\text{Spend}, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid})$, set $\text{spentcoin} \leftarrow \text{Spend}(\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i, \text{cusd}_j, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$ for the corresponding coin secret data cusd_j . Output $(\text{Spend}, \text{cpd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{spentcoin})$.

ALL PARTIES

Incoming messages are handled as follows:

- Upon reception of the message $(\text{VfCoin}, \text{cpd}, \mathcal{U}_j)$, set $b \leftarrow \text{VfCoin}(\text{cpd}, \text{upk}_j, \text{bpk})$ and return $(\text{VfCoin}, \text{cpd}, \mathcal{U}_j, b)$.
- Upon reception of the message $(\text{VfSpentCoin}, \text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid})$, set $b \leftarrow \text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$ and return $(\text{VfSpentCoin}, \text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, b)$.

- Upon reception of the message $(\text{VfDb1Spent}, \text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2)$, set $\text{upk} \leftarrow \text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \text{bpk})$. If $\text{upk} = \perp$, then return $(\text{VfDb1Spent}, \text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \perp)$. Otherwise let \mathcal{U}_j be such that $\text{upk}_j = \text{upk}$, and return $(\text{VfDb1Spent}, \text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \mathcal{U}_j)$

4.4 Proof of Security

Theorem 1. *Let $\mathcal{EC} = (\text{BKg}, \text{UKg}, \text{UWithdraw}, \text{BWithdraw}, \text{VfCoin}, \text{Spend}, \text{VfSpentCoin}, \text{VfDoubleSpent})$ be a secure scheme for anonymous electronic cash according to Definition 6. Then π_{AnonEC} securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$.*

Proof. Defining the Hybrids. We prove the theorem with a hybrid argument. We build a polynomial-size chain of protocols $\pi_1^0, \pi_1^1, \dots, \pi_1^m, \pi_2^0, \pi_2^1, \dots, \pi_2^m, \pi_3^0, \pi_3^1, \dots, \pi_3^m$ such that $\pi_0^0 = \mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$ and $\pi_4^m = \pi_{\text{AnonEC}}$. Then we show that if there exists an adversary A which can distinguish between π_t and π_{t+1} for some t , then A can be used to break one of the underlying assumptions.

1. Let π_1^0 be $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$. We define π_1^t to be π_1^{t-1} with the difference that the t th call to **Spend** produces a spent coin according to the protocol rather than using a dummy user as in the functionality.
2. Let $\pi_2^0 = \pi_1^m$. We define π_2^t to be π_2^{t-1} with the difference that the t th call to **Spend** there is no call to **VfCoin** before the spent coin is constructed.
3. Let $\pi_3^0 = \pi_2^m$, and define π_3^t to be π_3^{t-1} with the difference that the t th call to **VfSpentCoin** returns the $\text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$ rather than the value stipulated by the functionality. The table are manipulated according to the functionality.
4. Let $\pi_4^0 = \pi_3^m$, and define π_4^t to be π_4^{t-1} with the difference that the t th call to **VfDb1Spent** is executed according to the protocol rather than to the functionality and no table are manipulated in **VfSpentCoin**.

Building the Simulator. By assumption \mathcal{Z} distinguishes between $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$ and π_{AnonEC} for any ideal adversary. In particular it distinguishes between the two protocols for the adversary defined as follows.

For each player P_i that the real-world adversary A corrupts, the ideal adversary \mathcal{S} corrupts the corresponding dummy player \tilde{P}_i . When a corrupted dummy player \tilde{P}_i receives a message m from \mathcal{Z} , the simulator \mathcal{S} lets \mathcal{Z}' send m to P_i . When a corrupted P_i outputs a message m to \mathcal{Z}' , then \mathcal{S} instructs the corrupted \tilde{P}_i to output m to \mathcal{Z} . This corresponds to P_i being linked directly to \mathcal{Z} .

The simulated real-world adversary \mathcal{A} is connected to \mathcal{Z} , i.e., when \mathcal{Z} sends m to \mathcal{S} , \mathcal{Z}' hands m to \mathcal{A} , and when \mathcal{A} outputs m to \mathcal{Z}' , \mathcal{S} hands m to \mathcal{Z} . All non-corrupted players are simulated honestly. The corrupted players run according to their respective protocols.

When all parties have broadcasted their keys, \mathcal{S} inspects the internal state of honest parties and intercepts the broadcast of corrupt parties to construct (bpk, bsk) and $(\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i)_{i=1}^k$ where $\text{bsk} = \perp$ and $\text{usk}_i = \perp$ only if \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{U}_i ,

respectively, is corrupt. It hands $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}, \text{Keys}, (\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}), (\text{upk}_i, \text{usk}_i)_{i=1}^k)$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$.

When \mathcal{S} receives the message $(\text{AccWithdrawal}, \mathcal{U}_i)$, it instructs \mathcal{Z}' to send $(\text{AccWithdrawal}, \mathcal{U}_i)$ to \mathcal{B} . If $\mathcal{U}_i \in \mathfrak{C}$, then on output $(\text{IssuedNewCoin}, \mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd})$ from \mathcal{B} , \mathcal{S} hands $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}, \text{IssuedNewCoin}, \mathcal{U}_i, \text{cpd})$ to $\mathcal{C}_{\mathcal{I}}$. All other functions are local and need not be simulated for \mathcal{A} .

We now handle the cases when \mathcal{Z} distinguishes between π_i^t and π_i^{t+1} for $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$.

1. Assume \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between π_1^t and π_1^{t+1} with non-negligible probability. Then we construct A_{anon} breaking the anonymity of \mathcal{EC} as follows. A_{anon} runs in Experiment 4 while simulating the protocol to \mathcal{Z} as by using its **HonestUKg** oracle to set up keys for honest users, interacts with **HonestBWithdraw** to simulate withdrawals, and uses the **HonestSpend** oracles to construct spent coins. Let the $(t+1)$ th **Spend** request be on behalf of user \mathcal{U}_i for data (mid, tid) . When executing Experiment 4, A_{anon} requests a spent coin by either \mathcal{U}_i or a user \mathcal{U}_j , which has never before spent a coin. The challenge coin **spentcoin** is returned on the **Spend** request.

If the challenge coin is by \mathcal{U}_i , then A_{anon} has run π_1^{t+1} , and if the coin is by \mathcal{U}_j , then the protocol simulated is π_1^t . Since, by assumption \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between the two, A_{anon} wins the anonymity experiment with non-negligible probability.

2. Assume \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between π_2^t and π_2^{t+1} with non-negligible probability.

We construct A_{exculp} breaking the exculpability property of \mathcal{EC} by running in Experiment 5 and simulating the protocol for \mathcal{Z} . A_{exculp} uses its oracles to create keys for the users, withdraw coins, and create spent coins. Since \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between π_2^t and π_2^{t+1} , the coin to be spent in call $t+1$ does not pass the **VfCoin**, but can still be spent. Then A' outputs this coin in the **guess** phase of the experiment. Since the coin cannot be spent, A_{exculp} wins the experiment with non-negligible probability.

3. Assume \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between π_3^t and π_3^{t+1} with non-negligible probability. We can assume $\mathcal{B} \notin \mathfrak{C}$, since otherwise **VfSpentCoin** is run identically in the protocol and the functionality. By the correctness of \mathcal{EC} , a coin issued by the bank and honestly spent is always accepted.

By the construction of the functionality, a **spentcoin** created by corrupt user will be detected as a double-spending if more coins are spent than has been withdrawn. Therefore \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between the protocol and the functionality only if the t th call to **Spend** will be revealed as a double-spending by the functionality but not by the protocol.

We use \mathcal{Z} to break the unforgeability of \mathcal{EC} as follows. We construct A_{unforge} running in Experiment 2. The keys of the users are created honestly and then “registered” using the **AddCorruptU** oracle. Withdrawals are simulated by interacting with the **HonestBWithdraw** oracle. When asked to output forged coins, it outputs $T_{\text{valid-coins}}$. By the assumption, the table contains more coins than have been withdrawn, thus breaking the unforgeability property of \mathcal{EC} .

4. Assume \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between π_4^t and π_4^{t+1} with non-negligible probability.

For double-spending attacks that point out a corrupt user as double-spender, the protocol and the functionality are identical. Therefore \mathcal{Z} , if able to distinguish between the functionality and the protocol, has found $(\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2)$ such that the functionality does not consider them a double-spending, but the protocol points out an honest party as double-spender.

We let $A_{\text{non-frame}}$ interact in Experiment 3 and simulate the protocol for \mathcal{Z} as follows. The bank keys are constructed honestly and the keys of the honest users are created using the `HonestUKg` oracle. Withdrawals are performed by interacting with the `HonestUWithdraw` oracle, and spent coins are constructed with the `HonestSpend` oracle. By construction of the functionality, \mathcal{Z} has found $(\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2)$ such that they were not both constructed using the `Spend`, but still form a double-spending. $A_{\text{non-frame}}$ breaks the non-frameability of \mathcal{EC} by outputting this pair.

As shown, for each hybrid pair we can construct an adversary breaking a security assumption of \mathcal{EC} . Therefore it follows that if \mathcal{EC} is secure, π_{AnonEC} securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$.

5 A Construction

In this section we describe a secure scheme for electronic cash based on general methods. We first define the primitives, then we give the algorithms, and finally we prove that our scheme is secure according to our definition.

5.1 Common Reference String Model

Our model is secure in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. In this model every player has access to a random string. The string is chosen at a setup phase which is not discussed explicitly.

5.2 Primitives

Our construction uses a signature scheme, a commitment scheme, and simulation sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZK). Here we briefly describe these notions, and refer to Appendix A for precise definitions of these well-known concepts.

Digital Signatures A signature scheme $\mathcal{SS} = (\text{Kg}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$ is *correct* if for (pk, sk) generated by `Kg` and any message m it holds that $\text{Vf}_{\text{pk}}(m, \text{Sig}_{\text{sk}}(m)) = 1$. \mathcal{SS} is secure against chosen-message attacks, *CMA*-secure [16], if, even if given access to a signing oracle $\text{Sig}_{\text{sk}}(\cdot)$, it is infeasible to produce valid message-signature pair for *any* message not signed by the oracle.

Commitment Schemes A commitment scheme $\mathcal{COM} = (\text{Commit}, \text{Reveal})$ for messages of length κ is secure if a commitment is both hiding and binding, i.e., that the adversary gains any useful information about the committed value from $(c, r) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m)$, and that given (c, r) it is infeasible to find (m', r') and (m, r) such that $\text{Reveal}(c, m', r') = 1$ but $m \neq m'$.

Non-interactive Proofs of Knowledge We use non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, or NIZKs, in our construction. Given a language $L \in \mathbf{NP}$ with witness relation R and $x \in L$, a NIZK (P, V) enables a prover P to prove to a verifier V that she knows a witness w such that $(x, w) \in R$.

A proof system is said to be zero-knowledge if there exists a simulator which produces proofs indistinguishable from real proofs, and the condition for it to be called non-interactive should be obvious. A NIZK is complete if for any $(x, w) \in R$ it holds that $V(x, P(x, w)) = 1$ and sound if for any algorithm A the probability that $V(x, \pi) = 1$ and $x \notin L$ is negligible, where $(x, \pi) \leftarrow A(\xi)$. A NIZK is a proof of knowledge (NIZK-PK) if there exists an extractor which, if allowed to choose the CRS, can extract a witness.

In the experiments we give the adversary access to oracles which sometimes produce simulated proofs. Potentially this could help the adversary in producing false proofs. The stronger notion of simulation sound NIZKs requires that no adversary can break the soundness even if given access to a simulator.

It has been shown [23,25] that a simulation sound NIZK exists for any \mathbf{NP} -relation if trapdoor permutations exist. Combined with the standard method of [1] we show how it can be turned into a NIZK-PK under the assumption that dense encryption schemes [1,26] exist. We detail the construction in Appendix A, where we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 2. *Given an \mathbf{NP} -language L there exists a proof system (P, V) for L which is extractable, adaptively indistinguishable, and unbounded simulation sound in the CRS-model if there exists a family of trapdoor permutations and a dense encryption scheme.*


We need NIZKs for languages on the form $L = \{x \in \text{Im}(f)\}$. Here the obvious witness relation is $R = \{(x, w) : f(w) = x\}$. For such a relation we use the notation $\text{NIZK}(\omega : f(\omega) = x)$ to denote a NIZK. We use Greek letters to denote variables in the witness, i.e., known only to the prover, and Latin letters for variables known both to the prover and to the verifier. We denote the verification algorithm by Vf . It will be clear from context for which relation the proof is.

5.3 The Protocol

Here we give the definitions for algorithms and protocols that form a scheme for electronic cash in the CRS-model. We begin by giving an informal description. In order to identify double-spenders, we use Ferguson's [13] trick of letting each coin contain a line $y = ax + \text{upk}$, such that the coordinate of its intersection

with the y -axis coincides with the identity upk of the owner. When spending the coin, one point on the line is revealed. Thus one spending of a coin gives no information about its owner. However, since we make sure different spendings reveal different points, the identity can be computed from two spendings of the same coin.

When withdrawing a coin, the user randomly selects the slope a . It computes a commitment \tilde{a} of a and a commitment \hat{a} of \tilde{a} with associated randomness r_a and $r_{\tilde{a}}$.



A two-step commitment \hat{b} of the user public key upk is also computed. Then \hat{a}, \hat{b} is sent to the bank and signed, and when a coin is spent, \tilde{a} is revealed together with a proof of knowledge that it is correctly formed, i.e., that it is indeed the middle element of a two-step commitment of a and the user knows the associated randomness and bank signature. Intuitively this gives anonymity, since \tilde{a}, \hat{b} cannot be linked to \hat{a}, \hat{b} . It also assures that double-spenders are detected, since it is infeasible to open \hat{a}, \hat{b} in more than one way. It can be noted that the signing mechanism is similar to the blind signature scheme found by Fischlin [14].

We let $\mathcal{SS} = (\text{Kg}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$ be a CMA-secure signature scheme and we let $\mathcal{COM} = (\text{Commit}, \text{Reveal})$ be a binding and hiding commitment scheme. Such signature schemes and commitment schemes exist if one-way functions exist [22,15], and thus certainly if trapdoor permutations exist.

We use NIZKs for two different relations in the withdrawal and the spending protocols. The NIZKs work in the common reference string model. We will denote the reference string ξ . Each proof system needs its own CRS, so we divide ξ into two parts so that $\xi = \xi_0 \parallel \xi_1$ such that both ξ_0 and ξ_1 are long enough. We let $S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ create both ξ_0 and ξ_1 , store the two secrets in simstate , and return $\xi_0 \parallel \xi_1$. Now S can simulate and extract proofs for both relations.

We start with the key generation algorithms. Key generation for the bank consists of generating a key for the signature scheme. The key for the user is created by drawing a value at random and computing a commitment to the value. The private key is the random value and coin tosses used in the commitment, and the public key is the commitment. As explained above, we do not include user registration at the bank as part of the protocol.

Definition 7 ($\text{BKg}(1^\kappa)$).

$(\text{bpk}, \text{bsk}) \leftarrow \text{Kg}(1^\kappa)$
return (bpk, bsk)

Definition 8 ($\text{UKg}(1^\kappa)$).

$t \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}^\kappa$

```

(upk, r_t) ← Commit(t)
usk ← (t, r_t)
return (upk, usk)

```

Merchant registration is straight-forward. Since our protocol does not use a merchant secret key, registration simply consists of handing the merchant identity to the bank, which registers the merchant.

The coin withdrawal protocol is a two-round protocol with the following steps.

1. The user draws a value a at random and commits to a in two steps, i.e., it computes a commitment \tilde{a} to a , and a commitment \hat{a} to \tilde{a} . In the same way it computes a two-step commitment \hat{b} to its public key upk . It also constructs a proof $\pi_{\mathcal{U}}$ of knowledge of a a and coin tosses used in the commitments. It hands \hat{a}, \hat{b} and $\pi_{\mathcal{U}}$ to the bank and stores a together with the coin tosses as the coin user secret data cusd .
2. The bank verifies that the user is allowed to withdraw a coin and that the proof of knowledge is valid. It then signs the user's public key concatenated with (\hat{a}, \hat{b}) . The coin consists of the signature, \hat{a}, \hat{b} , the user's public key upk , and the proof $\pi_{\mathcal{U}}$.

More precisely, the withdrawal protocols consists of the following two algorithms.

Definition 9 (UWithdraw(msg, state)).

```

Parse state as (upk, usk).
a ←R {0, 1}κ
(ã, r_a) ← Commit(a)
(â, r_ã) ← Commit(ã)
(b̃, r_upk) ← Commit(upk)
(b̂, r_b̃) ← Commit(b̃)
πU ← NIZK(α, ρ_α, ã, ρ_ã, τ, ρ_τ, ρ_upk, β̃, ρ_β̃ :
  Reveal(ã, α, r_a) = 1 ∧ Reveal(â, ã, r_ã) = 1 ∧ Reveal(upk, τ, ρ_τ) = 1 ∧
  Reveal(β̃, upk, ρ_upk) = 1 ∧ Reveal(b̂, β̃, ρ_β̃) = 1)
return ((a, ã, r_a, r_ã, b̃, r_upk, r_b̃), (upk, â, b̂, πU))

```

Definition 10 (BWithdraw(msg, state)).

```

Parse state as (bsk).
Parse msg as (upk, â, b̂, πU).
Quit if user with public key upk is not allowed to withdraw a coin.
if ∀f(πU) = 1 then
  return (reject, ∅)
end if
s ←R Sigbsk(upk, â, b̂)
cpd ← (s, â, b̂, upk, πU)
return (cpd, ∅)

```

We also need to be able to verify whether or not a coin has been withdrawn by a certain user by verifying the coin's signature and the user's proof of knowledge.

Definition 11 ($\text{VfCoin}(\text{cpd}, \text{upk}, \text{bpk})$).

Parse cpd as $(s, \hat{a}, \hat{b}, \text{upk}, \pi_{\mathcal{U}})$.
return $\text{Vf}_{\text{bpk}}((\text{upk}, \hat{a}, \hat{b}), s) \wedge \text{Vf}(\pi_{\mathcal{U}})$

We define two coin public data $\text{cpd} = (s, \hat{a}, \hat{b}, \text{upk}, \pi_{\mathcal{U}})$ and $\text{cpd}' = (s', \hat{a}', \hat{b}', \text{upk}', \pi_{\mathcal{U}'})$ to be equal if $\hat{a} = \hat{a}'$, $\hat{b} = \hat{b}'$, $\text{upk} = \text{upk}'$.

To spend a coin the user first checks that the coin is valid. Then it lets (x, y) be a point on the line $y = ax + \text{upk}$, where a is the coin user secret data and upk the public key of the user. The point x is chosen as the concatenation of the transaction identity and the merchant identity. The user reveals the values \tilde{a} and \tilde{b} . The spent coin consists of $(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}, x, y)$, and a proof of knowledge of a and upk such that (x, y) is indeed a point on the line and of a bank signature on $(\text{upk}, \hat{a}, \hat{b})$ as well as of coin tosses such that \hat{a} is a commitment of \tilde{a} and \hat{b} of \tilde{b} .

Definition 12 ($\text{Spend}(\text{cpd}, \text{usk}, \text{cusd}, \text{mid}, \text{tid}, \text{bpk})$).

Parse cpd as $(s, \hat{a}, \hat{u}, \text{upk}, \pi_{\mathcal{U}})$
Parse usk as (t, r_t)
Parse cusd as $(a, \tilde{a}, r_a, r_{\tilde{a}}, \tilde{b}, r_{\text{upk}}, r_{\tilde{b}})$
if $(\text{Vf}_{\text{bpk}}((\text{upk}, \hat{a}, \hat{b}), s) = 0) \vee (\text{Reveal}(\tilde{a}, a, r_a) = 0) \vee (\text{Reveal}(\hat{a}, \tilde{a}, r_{\tilde{a}}) = 0) \vee$
 $(\text{Reveal}(\text{upk}, t, r_t) = 0) \vee (\text{Reveal}(\tilde{b}, \text{upk}, r_{\text{upk}}) = 0) \vee (\text{Reveal}(\hat{b}, \tilde{b}, r_{\tilde{b}}) = 0)$ **then**
return \perp
end if
 $x \leftarrow \text{mid} \parallel \text{tid}$
 $y \leftarrow ax + \text{upk}$
 $\pi \leftarrow \text{NIZK}(\iota, \alpha, \rho_\alpha, \hat{\alpha}, \rho_{\tilde{a}}, \rho_{\text{upk}}, \hat{\beta}, \rho_{\tilde{b}}, \sigma, \tau, \rho_\tau :$
 $y = \alpha x + \iota \wedge \text{Reveal}(\tilde{a}, \alpha, \rho_\alpha) = 1 \wedge \text{Reveal}(\hat{\alpha}, \tilde{a}, \rho_{\tilde{a}}) = 1 \wedge \text{Reveal}(\tilde{b}, \iota, \rho_{\text{upk}}) \wedge$
 $\text{Reveal}(\hat{\beta}, \tilde{b}, \rho_{\tilde{b}}) = 1 \wedge \text{Vf}_{\text{bpk}}((\iota, \tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\beta}), \sigma) = 1 \wedge \text{Reveal}(\iota, \rho_\tau, \tau) = 1)$
 $\text{spentcoin} \leftarrow (\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}, x, y, \pi)$
return spentcoin

Verification of a spent coin is straight-forward:

Definition 13 ($\text{VfSpentCoin}(\text{spentcoin}, \text{tid}, \text{mid}, \text{bpk})$).

Parse spentcoin as $(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}, x, y, \pi)$.
if $x \neq \text{mid} \parallel \text{tid}$ **then**
return 0
end if
return $\text{Vf}(\pi)$

Finally we give the algorithm to identify a double-spender. A coin is double-spent if the values (\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}) appears twice with different values of x . Finding the double-spender is then simply a task of solving the two equations for upk .

Definition 14 ($\text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_1, \text{spentcoin}_2, \text{bpk})$).

```

Parse spentcoin1 as  $(\tilde{a}_1, \tilde{b}_1, x_1, y_1, \pi_1)$ .
Parse spentcoin2 as  $(\tilde{a}_2, \tilde{b}_2, x_2, y_2, \pi_2)$ .
if  $((\tilde{a}_1, \tilde{b}_1) \neq (\tilde{a}_2, \tilde{b}_2)) \vee (x_1 = x_2)$  then
  return  $\perp$ 
end if
upk  $\leftarrow \frac{x_1 y_2 - x_2 y_1}{x_1 - x_2}$ 
return upk

```

6 Proof of Security

In this section we prove the following theorem about the scheme $\mathcal{EC} = (\text{BKg}, \text{UKg}, \text{UWithdraw}, \text{BWithdraw}, \text{VfCoin}, \text{Spend}, \text{VfSpentCoin}, \text{VfDoubleSpent})$ as defined in Section 5.

Theorem 3. *If there exists a family of trapdoor permutations, then there exists a scheme for electronic cash which is correct and secure in the common reference string model.*

From Theorem 1 this implies the following, where \mathcal{F}_{CRS} is the common reference string functionality.

Theorem 4. *If there exists a family of trapdoor permutations, then there exists a protocol which securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AnonEC}}$ in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model.*

We prove the theorem by showing the five properties about the scheme defined in Section 5. Each lemma holds in the CRS-model under the assumption that a family of trapdoor permutations exists, although this is not stated explicitly.

Lemma 1 (Correctness). *The scheme \mathcal{EC} is correct.*

Proof. Follows by the construction of the algorithms.

Lemma 2 (Unforgeability). *The scheme \mathcal{EC} has unforgeability.*

Proof. Let A be an adversary that is successful in Experiment 2 with non-negligible probability. We show how to use A to construct either a machine A_{CMA} breaking the CMA-security of the signature scheme $\mathcal{SS} = (\text{Kg}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$, a machine A_{binding} breaking the binding property of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} , or a machine $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ breaking the simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK.

A_{CMA} is given a public key pk for the signature scheme as input. It passes pk as parameter bpk to A . The CRS is created using the simulator $(\xi, \text{simstate}) \leftarrow S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$. As in the experiment for CMA security, A_{CMA} has access to a signature oracle. The BWithdraw oracle is run honestly using the signature $\text{Sig}_{\text{bsk}}(\cdot)$ produced by calling the signature oracle.

Let k be the number of spentcoin produced by A . Recall A has made l withdrawals using its oracle. This implies A_{CMA} has made l calls to the CMA oracle. For each $\text{spentcoin}_i = (\tilde{a}_i, \tilde{b}_i, x_i, y_i, \pi_i)$, A_{CMA} calls $S(\text{extract}, (\hat{a}_i, \hat{b}_i, x_i, y_i), \pi_i, \xi, \text{simstate})$ to extract (among other parameters) $\sigma_i, \iota, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}, \rho_\beta$ such that $\text{Vf}_{\text{bpk}}((\iota, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}), \sigma) = 1$. We now have the following different cases:

1. Signatures on more than l distinct messages are extracted. Then there exists a message-signature pair $(\iota, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta})$ for which no signature has been generated by the CMA oracle. Hence A_{cma} is successful in breaking the CMA-security of \mathcal{SS} by returning $(\iota, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}), \sigma$.
2. At least one proof π_i cannot be extracted. In this case $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ uses π_i to break the extractable simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK in the following way. $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ takes part in Experiment 13 while running A . $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ creates the bank key pair honestly and answers queries to `HonestBWithdraw` honestly. When A has output `spentcoini` with the unextractable proof π_i , $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ returns `spentcoini`, thus winning in its experiment.
3. All proofs can be extracted, but two proofs yield signatures on the same message $(\iota, \hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta})$. Since no double-spending is detected, all $(\tilde{\alpha}, \tilde{\beta})$ are distinct. Hence there are two commitments with associated randomness $(\tilde{\alpha}_i, \rho_i)$ and $(\tilde{\alpha}_j, \rho_j)$ such that $\text{Reveal}(\hat{\alpha}, \tilde{\alpha}_i, \rho_i) = \text{Reveal}(\hat{\alpha}, \tilde{\alpha}_j, \rho_j) = 1$. A machine A_{binding} which lets the simulator generate the CRS, generates the bank keys honestly, answers `HonestBWithdraw` queries honestly wins Experiment 8, the binding experiment of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} , by extracting and outputting $(\hat{\alpha}, \tilde{\alpha}_i, \rho_i, \tilde{\alpha}_j, \rho_j)$.

Thus we have shown that an adversary which breaks unforgeability can be used to either break the CMA security of \mathcal{SS} , the extractable simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK, or break the binding property of \mathcal{COM} . Hence \mathcal{EC} has unforgeability.

Lemma 3 (Non-Frameability). *The scheme \mathcal{EC} has non-frameability.*

Proof. Let A be an adversary that succeeds in Experiment 3 with non-negligible probability. We show how to use A to construct either a machine A_{secrecy} breaking the secrecy property of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} , a machine A_{binding} breaking the binding property, or a machine $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$, which breaks the extractable simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK.

The machine A_{secrecy} takes part in Experiment 7. It creates a CRS using the simulator $(\xi, \text{simstate}) \leftarrow S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$. It randomly draws two message `msg0` and `msg1` which it returns to its experiment, receiving a challenge commitment c . Let the polynomial $p(\kappa)$ be an upper bound on the number of calls to `HonestUKg` by A . Since A runs in polynomial time, there exists such a polynomial. A_{secrecy} randomly selects $t \in [1, p(\kappa)]$. Intuitively A_{secrecy} guesses that A will frame user \mathcal{U}_t . All queries to `HonestUKg` are executed honestly except for query t , to which A_{secrecy} responds c .

When A queries `HonestUWithdraw` or `HonestSpend` for a user different from \mathcal{U}_t , the query is answered honestly. For \mathcal{U}_t , the NIZK-PK is constructed by invoking the simulator $S(\text{simulate}, \cdot, \xi, \text{simstate})$.

First consider the case when A behaves differently on simulated and honest proofs. If this is the case, then we can construct $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ running in Experiment 10 or 11 as follows. $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ receives the CRS from its experiment. It runs A simulating all oracles honestly, except that the NIZK-PKs are constructed by requesting an honest or simulated proof from its experiment. Note that the view

of A is identical to the view of A when used by A_{secrecy} . If A behaves differently on honest and simulated proofs, then $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ can distinguish between its two experiments, breaking the adaptive indistinguishability of the NIZK-PK.

A outputs a list of spent coins $(\text{spentcoin}_i)_{i=1}^k$. Let $\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{spentcoin}_j$ be spent coins such that $\text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{spentcoin}_j, \text{bpk}) \notin \mathcal{C}$ and at least one spent coin has not been produced by HonestSpend . Since A outputs more double-spent coins than was created by HonestSpend , such a pair of spent coins exists by the pigeon-hole principle. Let $\text{spentcoin}_i = (\tilde{a}_i, \tilde{b}_i, x_i, y_i, \pi_i)$ and $\text{spentcoin}_j = (\tilde{a}_j, \tilde{b}_j, x_j, y_j, \pi_j)$. By the assumption that they form a double-spending, we have that $(\tilde{a}_i, \tilde{b}_i) = (\tilde{a}_j, \tilde{b}_j)$ and $x_i \neq x_j$. With probability $1/p(\kappa)$, i.e., non-negligible, it holds that $\text{VfDoubleSpent}(\text{spentcoin}_i, \text{spentcoin}_j, \text{bpk}) = \text{upk}_t$. From now on, we will assume that this is the case.

From π_i and π_j the machine A_{secrecy} attempts to extract $(\bar{a}_i, \bar{r}_a^{(i)}, \bar{\text{upk}}_i, \bar{r}_{\text{upk}}^{(i)}, \bar{\text{usk}}_i, \bar{r}_{\text{usk}}^{(i)})$ and $(\bar{a}_j, \bar{r}_a^{(j)}, \bar{\text{upk}}_j, \bar{r}_{\text{upk}}^{(j)}, \bar{\text{usk}}_j, \bar{r}_{\text{usk}}^{(j)})$ such that $\text{Reveal}(\tilde{a}_i, \bar{a}_i, \bar{r}_a^{(i)}) = 1$, $\text{Reveal}(\tilde{b}_i, \bar{\text{upk}}_i, \bar{r}_{\text{upk}}^{(i)}) = 1$, $\text{Reveal}(\bar{\text{upk}}_i, \bar{\text{usk}}_i, \bar{r}_{\text{usk}}^{(i)}) = 1$ and $\text{Reveal}(\tilde{a}_j, \bar{a}_j, \bar{r}_a^{(j)}) = 1$, $\text{Reveal}(\tilde{b}_j, \bar{\text{upk}}_j, \bar{r}_{\text{upk}}^{(j)}) = 1$, $\text{Reveal}(\bar{\text{upk}}_j, \bar{\text{usk}}_j, \bar{r}_{\text{usk}}^{(j)}) = 1$. We now have the following cases and subcases:

1. None of the proofs were created by the simulator.
 - (a) At least one extraction fails. In such case we can construct a machine $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ using A and breaking the extractable simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK as follows. $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ takes part in Experiment 13. When A asks for a spent coin, $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ uses its simulation oracle to form the NIZK-PK of the spent coin. The un-extractable NIZK-PK of A is output by $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$, which wins the extractable simulation soundness experiment with non-negligible probability.
 - (b) Both extractions succeed but return $\bar{a}_i \neq \bar{a}_j$ or $\bar{\text{upk}}_i \neq \bar{\text{upk}}_j$. Let us assume the first inequality holds, since the other case is analogous. In such a case the extracted values can be used by the machine A_{binding} to break the binding property of \mathcal{COM} by letting A_{binding} run A while generating the keys and simulating the oracle honestly and output $(\tilde{a}, \bar{r}_a^{(i)}, \bar{a}_i, \bar{r}_a^{(j)}, \bar{a}_j)$ in Experiment 8.
 - (c) Both extractions succeed and return consistent values. Since the NIZK-PK also proves that $y_l = ax_l + \text{upk}$, it follows that $\bar{\text{upk}} = \text{upk}_t$. The machine A_{secrecy} breaking the secrecy of \mathcal{COM} by running in Experiment 7 is constructed as follows. Recall that $\text{msg}_0, \text{msg}_1$ are drawn by A_{secrecy} when generating a key for \mathcal{U}_t . Now A_{secrecy} finds d such that $\text{msg}_d = \text{cUSD}$ and returns d . Since A is successful with non-negligible probability, the so is A_{secrecy} .
If no such d is found, then a machine A_{binding} wins in Experiment 8 as follows. In runs as described with the difference that $(c, r) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\text{usk})$. It then outputs $(\text{upk}_t, \text{cUSD}, \bar{r}_{\text{upk}}, c, r)$, which forms a double opening of a commitment. Hence A_{binding} is successful with non-negligible probability.

2. One proof was created by the simulator. Without loss of generality we assume that the simulator created π_j , and let $a_j, r_a^{(j)}, \text{upk}_j, r_{\text{upk}}^{(j)}$ be the values used when responding to the oracle query.
 - (a) The extraction of the proof π_i fails. If this is the case, then $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ proceeds as in Step 1a to break the simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK.
 - (b) The extraction of π_i succeeds but yields $(\bar{a}_i, \bar{r}_a^{(i)}, \bar{\text{upk}}_i, \bar{r}_{\text{upk}}^{(i)}) \neq (a_j, r_a^{(j)}, \text{upk}_j, r_{\text{upk}}^{(j)})$. Then, as in Step 1b, the binding property of \mathcal{COM} is broken.
 - (c) The extraction π_i succeeds and gives consistent values. Then, as in Step 1c, the secrecy of \mathcal{COM} is broken.
3. Both proofs were created by the simulator. Since, by assumption, at least one coin was not created by an oracle query, this cannot happen.

We have shown that if A breaks the non-frameability property, then at least one of the machines A_{secrecy} , A_{binding} , and $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ is successful with non-negligible probability. Since this breaks the assumption, the scheme \mathcal{EC} has non-frameability.

Lemma 4 (Anonymity). *The scheme \mathcal{EC} has anonymity.*

Proof. Assume A wins in the anonymity experiment 4 with non-negligible probability. We show how to construct either A_{secrecy} breaking the secrecy of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} or a machine $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ breaking the adaptive indistinguishability of the NIZK-PK.

We define two variants of the scheme \mathcal{EC} . We let \mathcal{EC}' be \mathcal{EC} with the modification that the CRS is created by the simulator, $(\xi, \text{simstate}) \leftarrow S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ and that the NIZK-PK in the `Spend` algorithm is generated by the simulator. We let \mathcal{EC}'' be \mathcal{EC}' with the difference that the commitment scheme of `UWithdraw` used to produce \tilde{a} is replaced by a commitment scheme with perfect secrecy.

Since a `spentcoin` in \mathcal{EC}'' contains no information about the spender of a coin, the advantage of A when attacking \mathcal{EC}'' is 0. We now have the following two cases.

1. The advantage of A when attacking \mathcal{EC}' is non-negligible. We show how to use A to construct A_{secrecy} which successfully attacks the secrecy of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} . A_{secrecy} takes part in Experiment 7 while simulating Experiment 4 to A . All calls to `HonestUKg` and `HonestSpend` are answered honestly. When A outputs $(i_0, i_1, \text{mid}, \text{tid})$, A_{secrecy} outputs $(\text{upk}_{i_0}, \text{upk}_{i_1})$ to its experiment, receiving a commitment c in response. Then A_{secrecy} uses c as \tilde{a} when creating the challenge `spentcoin` and constructs the rest of the coin honestly. (Since \mathcal{EC}' only uses simulated NIZK-PKs, not knowing the message of c is not a problem.) A outputs a bit d , which A_{secrecy} outputs in its experiment.

From the construction it follows that A_{secrecy} is successful when A is, and hence breaks the secrecy of \mathcal{COM} with non-negligible probability.

2. The advantage of A when attacking \mathcal{EC}' is negligible. In such case we can use A to construct $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ breaking the adaptive indistinguishability of the NIZK-PK. $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ takes part in Experiment 10 and 11 while executing Experiment 4 for A . All parts of Experiment 4 are executed honestly, except that NIZK-PKs of `HonestSpend` are created by requesting a proof for $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ in the `choose` phase. If A is successful, $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ responds that it is interacting with Experiment 10, and otherwise that it is interacting with Experiment 11. Since A is successful only when NIZK-PKs are genuine, $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ has a non-negligible advantage.

We have shown that a machine breaking the anonymity of \mathcal{EC} can be made into a machine either breaking the secrecy of the commitment scheme or a machine breaking the adaptive indistinguishability of the proof system. Since such machines contradicts the assumptions, we conclude that \mathcal{EC} has anonymity.

Lemma 5 (Exculpability). *The scheme \mathcal{EC} has exculpability.*

Proof. Let A be an adversary which wins in Experiment 5 with non-negligible probability. Thus A either creates a coin public data which the owner cannot spend or creates a coin which has not been withdrawn. Let us consider the first case. We use A to construct either a machine A_{secrecy} breaking the secrecy property of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} , A_{binding} breaking the binding property of the \mathcal{COM} , or a machine $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ breaking the simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK.

We define the scheme \mathcal{EC}' being equal to \mathcal{EC} with the difference that the CRS is setup using the simulator $(\xi, \text{simstate}) \leftarrow S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ and the NIZK-PK of `UWithdraw` is created using the simulator.

First assume A has negligible probability of breaking the exculpability property of \mathcal{EC}' . Then we can use A to construct $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ in the following way. $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ takes part in Experiment 10 or 11. It invokes A , answering all queries honestly except that the NIZK-PK is created by requesting a proof in the `choose` phase of $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$. Hence, if $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ is run in Experiment 10, it will run \mathcal{EC} for A , but if it is run in Experiment 11, it will run \mathcal{EC}' . If A is successful, then $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ returns 0, and otherwise it returns 1. From the construction of $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ it follows that it breaks the adaptive indistinguishability of the NIZK-PK.

Now assume A has non-negligible probability in winning the exculpability experiment against \mathcal{EC}' . We use A in a similar way, letting $(\xi, \text{simstate})$ be constructed by the simulator. Proofs of knowledge for \mathcal{U}_t are constructed using the simulator.

1. The NIZK-PK $\pi_{\mathcal{U}}$ of `cpd` output by A has been constructed by the simulator. This implies that $\pi_{\mathcal{U}}$ was created by `HonestUWithdraw` for a certain user and coin secret key $\text{usk}_i, \text{cUSD}_i$. Hence the coin can be spent using $\text{usk}_i, \text{cUSD}_i$, contradicting the assumption that the exculpability property is broken.
2. The NIZK-PK $\pi_{\mathcal{U}}$ of `cpd` output by A has not been constructed by the simulator. In this case we can construct A_{secrecy} breaking the secrecy of the commitment scheme as follows. Let $p(\kappa)$ be an upper bound on the number

of calls to `HonestUKg`. Since A is polynomial, such a bound exists. Let $t \leftarrow_R [1, p(\kappa)]$. Informally A_{secrecy} guesses that A will frame \mathcal{U}_t . A_{secrecy} randomly chooses τ_0, τ_1 and requests a challenge commitment c on one of them from its experiment. It answers queries honestly, except that when asked to generate the public key for \mathcal{U}_t , it returns the challenge commitment c as upk_t .

With probability $1/p(\kappa)$ A produces a coin cpd that can be verified to belong to \mathcal{U}_t . Assume this is the case. Then A_{secrecy} uses the extractor to extract τ, r_τ such that $\text{Reveal}(\text{upk}_t, \tau, r_\tau) = 1$. We now have three cases.

- (a) There exists d such that $\tau_d = \tau$. Then A_{secrecy} returns d and breaks the secrecy of the commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} with non-negligible probability.
- (b) No such d exists. Then two openings of commitment upk_t has been found, allowing us to construct A_{binding} breaking the binding property of \mathcal{COM} as follows. A_{binding} runs A_{secrecy} (which in turn runs A) as above. When the challenge commitment c is created for τ_b , A_{binding} stores $c = \text{upk}_t$ and the associated randomness r_c . After A_{secrecy} has extracted τ, r_τ , A_{binding} outputs $\tau_b, \text{upk}_t, r_c, \tau, r_\tau$. Since $\tau \neq \tau_b$, A_{binding} breaks the binding property of \mathcal{COM} .
- (c) The extraction fails. Such an adversary A can be used by $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ breaking the extractable simulation soundness of the NIZK-PK of the withdrawal protocol which is constructed as follows. $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ runs in Experiment 13, using ξ as CRS. When A asks for a withdrawn coin, $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$ uses a simulated proof from its experiment, constructing the other parts of the coin honestly. The other oracles are simulated honestly. When the unextractable proof π is constructed, it is output by $A_{\text{ext-sim-sound}}$, which then is successful in its experiment. Since the view of A is the same as in the above cases, the probability of A constructing such a proof is non-negligible.

Let us now consider the case where A outputs more coins than executions of the withdrawal protocol. Since we can assume that all coins can be spent, otherwise the first case would hold, two distinct coins $\text{cpd}_1 = (s_1, \hat{a}_1, \hat{b}_1, \text{upk}_1, \pi_1)$, $\text{cpd}_2 = (s_2, \hat{a}_2, \hat{b}_2, \text{upk}_2, \pi_2)$ can be spent with the same coin secret data cusd . By the definition of equal coins, $(\hat{a}_1, \hat{b}_1) \neq (\hat{a}_2, \hat{b}_2)$. Since the probability that two honestly created coins can be spend using the same cusd is negligible, with overwhelming probability at least one of the coins has been constructed without using the withdrawal oracle of A . Without loss of generality we let cpd_1 be this coin. Then case 2 above holds if we use cpd_1 in place of cpd .

We can conclude that a machine breaking the exculpability property of \mathcal{EC} implies a machine breaking one of the assumptions. Therefore \mathcal{EC} has exculpability.

7 Conclusions and Future Work

We have given a definition of security that are stronger than what has previously been suggested. We also show that the requirements are realistic by giving a

scheme fulfilling them under the assumption of existence of a family of trapdoor permutations.

It remains an open problem to construct a practical scheme which is secure in our sense under some well-established number-theoretical assumptions such as the strong RSA assumption and the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.

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A Definitions

A.1 Trapdoor Permutations

Definition 15 (Trapdoor Permutation Family). A trapdoor permutation family is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines $\mathcal{F} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Invert})$ such that:

1. $\text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$ outputs a pair (f, f^{-1}) such that f is a permutation of $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$.
2. $\text{Eval}(1^\kappa, f, x)$ is a deterministic algorithm which on input f , where $(f, f^{-1}) \in \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$, and $x \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ outputs $y = f(x)$.
3. $\text{Invert}(1^\kappa, f^{-1}, y)$ is a deterministic algorithm which on input f^{-1} , where $(f, f^{-1}) \in \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$, and $y \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ outputs some $x = f^{-1}(y)$.
4. For all κ , $(f, f^{-1}) \in \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$, and $x \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ we have $f^{-1}f(x) = x$.
5. For all adversaries $A \in \text{PT}^*$, the following is negligible

$$\Pr[(f, f^{-1}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa), \quad x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa, \quad A(f, f(x)) = f^{-1}(y)] .$$

A.2 Signature Schemes

A signature scheme $\mathcal{SS} = (\text{Kg}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$ is secure against chosen-message attacks, CMA-secure [16], if it is infeasible to produce valid message-signature pair for *any* message not previously signed, even if the adversary has access to a signing oracle $\text{Sig}_{\text{sk}}(\cdot)$. Formally we use the following experiment for the definition. Recall that \mathcal{Q}_O is the set of queries passed to oracle O .

Experiment 6 (CMA, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{SS}, A}^{\text{cma}}(\kappa)$).

```

(pk, sk) ← Kg(κ)
(m, σ) ← ASigsk(·)(pk)
if (m ∉ QSig) ∧ (Vfpk(m, σ) = 1) then
  return 1
else
  return 0
end if

```

The advantage of the adversary is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SS}, A}^{\text{cma}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{SS}, A}^{\text{cma}}(\kappa) = 1] .$$

A signature scheme \mathcal{SS} is CMA-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SS}, A}^{\text{cma}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

A.3 Commitment Schemes

A (non-interactive) commitment scheme $\mathcal{COM} = (\text{Commit}, \text{Reveal})$ consists of two algorithms, the commitment algorithm and the reveal algorithm. The commitment algorithm takes as input a message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and outputs a pair

(c, r) . The reveal algorithm takes a commitment c , a message msg , and the secret r and determines whether or not c is a commitment to msg under commitment secret r .

The following two experiments defines secrecy and binding of a commitment scheme.

Experiment 7 (Secrecy, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{secrecy}-b}(\kappa)$).

```
(msg0, msg1, state) ← A(choose, 1κ)
(c, r) ← Commit(msgb)
d ← A(guess, c, state)
return d
```

The advantage of an adversary A is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{secrecy}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{secrecy}-0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{secrecy}-1}(\kappa) = 1]| .$$

The commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} has secrecy if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{secrecy}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

Experiment 8 (Binding, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa)$).

```
(c, r0, msg0, r1, msg1) ← A(guess)
if (Reveal(c, msg0, r0) = Reveal(c, msg1, r1) = 1) ∧ (msg0 ≠ msg1) then
  return 1
else
  return 0
end if
```

The advantage of an adversary A is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa) = 1] .$$

The commitment scheme \mathcal{COM} is binding if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{COM},A}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

One could give stronger a definitions, but in our case the above experiments suffice. As an example, they do not rule out malleability, i.e., the existence of an adversary which, after seeing one commitment, creates another commitment to a related value, which can be opened after the first commitment has been opened.

It is known that secret and binding commitment schemes exist if there exists a family of one-way permutations [15]. The construction even gives a perfectly binding scheme, i.e., even an unbounded adversary cannot decommit to more than one value.

A.4 Indistinguishable Encryption Schemes

Informally an encryption scheme $\mathcal{CS} = (\text{Kg}, E, D)$ is called indistinguishable if it is infeasible to distinguish between the encryptions of two plaintexts of the same length. The experiment below formalizes this assumption.

Experiment 9 (Indistinguishability, $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{CS},A}^{\text{ind}-b}(\kappa)$).

$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Kg}(1^\kappa)$
 $(\text{msg}_0, \text{msg}_1, \text{state}) \leftarrow A(\text{choose}, \text{pk})$
 $c \leftarrow E_{\text{pk}}(\text{msg}_b)$
 $d \leftarrow A(\text{guess}, c, \text{state})$
return d

The advantage of an adversary A is

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{CS},A}^{\text{ind}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{CS},A}^{\text{ind}-0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{CS},A}^{\text{ind}-1}(\kappa) = 1]| .$$

The encryption scheme \mathcal{CS} is indistinguishable if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{CS},A}^{\text{ind}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

The notion of indistinguishability is equivalent to the well-known definition of semantic security, which informally says that no information about the plaintext can be efficiently computed from the cipher-text. We use the terms “indistinguishable encryption scheme” and “semantically secure encryption scheme” interchangeably in this text.

A.5 Proofs of Knowledge

Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK) were introduced by Blum, Feldman, and Micali [6]. Several works have since refined and extended the notion in various ways. Following [2] we employ the definition of adaptive zero-knowledge for NIZK introduced by Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [12] and we use the notion of simulation soundness introduced by Sahai [23]. The notion of simulation soundness is strengthened by De Santis et al. [25]. In contrast to [2], the NIZK we use must be adaptive zero-knowledge for polynomially many statements, and not only for a single statement. The requirement on simulation soundness is in fact unchanged compared with [2], i.e., single statement simulation soundness suffices.

Definition 16 (NIPS). *A triple $(p(\kappa), P, V)$ is an efficient adaptive non-interactive proof system (NIPS) for a language $L \in \mathbf{NP}$ with witness relation R if $p(\kappa)$ is a polynomial and P and V are probabilistic polynomial time machines such that*

1. *Completeness.* $(x, w) \in R$ and $\xi \in \{0, 1\}^{p(\kappa)}$ implies $V(x, P(x, w, \xi), \xi) = 1$.
2. *Soundness.* For all functions A ,

$$\Pr_{\xi \in \{0, 1\}^{p(\kappa)}} [A(\xi) = (x, \pi) \wedge x \notin L \wedge V(x, \pi, \xi) = 1]$$

is negligible in κ .

We suppress p in our notation of a NIPS and simply write (P, V) .

Loosely speaking a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system is a NIPS, which is also zero-knowledge, but there are several flavors of zero-knowledge. We need a NIZK which is adaptive zero-knowledge (for a single statement) in the sense of Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [12].

Experiment 10 (Adaptive Indistinguishability, $\text{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ad-ind-0}}(\kappa)$).

```

 $\xi \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}^{f(\kappa)}$ 
(state,  $x, w$ )  $\leftarrow A(\text{setup}, \xi)$ 
while ( $x, w$ )  $\in R$  do
    (state,  $x, w$ )  $\leftarrow A(\text{choose}, P(x, w, \xi))$ 
end while
return  $A(\text{guess}, \text{state})$ 

```

Experiment 11 (Adaptive Indistinguishability, $\text{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ad-ind-1}}(\kappa)$).

```

( $\xi, \text{simstate}$ )  $\leftarrow S(1^\kappa)$ 
(state,  $x, w$ )  $\leftarrow A(\text{setup}, \xi)$ 
while ( $x, w$ )  $\in R$  do
    (state,  $x, w$ )  $\leftarrow A(\text{choose}, S(x, \xi, \text{simstate}))$ 
end while
return  $A(\text{guess}, \text{state})$ 

```

The advantage in the experiment is defined

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ad-ind}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ad-ind-0}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ad-ind-1}}(\kappa) = 1]|$$

and the notion of adaptive zero-knowledge is given below.

Definition 17 (Adaptive Zero-Knowledge (cf. [12])). A NIPS (P, V) is adaptive zero-knowledge (NIZK) if there exists a polynomial time Turing machine S such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ad-ind}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for all $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

In cryptographic proofs one often performs hypothetic experiments where the adversary is run with simulated NIZKs. If the experiment simulates NIZKs to the adversary, the adversary could potentially gain the power to compute valid proofs of false statements. For a simulation sound NIZK this is not possible.

Recall that \mathfrak{R}_O is the set of responses by oracle O .

Experiment 12 (Simulation Soundness, $\text{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{sim-sound}}(\kappa)$ (cf. [25])).

```

( $\xi, \text{simstate}$ )  $\leftarrow S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ 
( $x, \pi$ )  $\leftarrow A^{S(\text{simulate}, \cdot, \xi, \text{simstate})}(\text{guess}, \xi)$ 
if ( $\pi \notin \mathfrak{R}_S$ )  $\wedge$  ( $x \notin L$ )  $\wedge$  ( $V(x, \pi, \xi) = 1$ ) then
    return 1
else
    return 0
end if

```

Definition 18 (Simulation Soundness (cf. [23,25])). A NIZK (P, V) with polynomial time simulator S for a language L is unbounded simulation sound if

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{sim-sound}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{sim-sound}}(\kappa) = 1]$$

is negligible for all $A \in \text{PT}^*$.

De Santis et al. [25] extend the results in [12] and [23] and prove the following result.

Theorem 5. *If there exists a family of trapdoor permutations, then there exists a simulation sound NIZK for any language in \mathbf{NP} in the CRS-model.*

In the this paper we abbreviate “efficient non-interactive adaptive zero-knowledge unbounded simulation sound proof” by NIZK.

It is important to note that the above definition does not require that it is possible to extract the witness, i.e., they are not proofs of knowledge. To our knowledge, there are no results on the existence of simulation-sound proofs of knowledge, although signatures of knowledge [10] are similar.

One must be careful when defining the experiment for extractability. As for simulation-soundness, we want to give the adversary the ability to request simulated proofs for theorems of its choice, and if it outputs a valid proof, the extractor should be able to extract a witness. In the original definitions of NIZK proofs of knowledge [1,25], *soundness* and *validity*, i.e., the requirement on extractability, are two separate properties. Such a definition would be hard to use when designing protocols. In a protocol, we need to produce a single CRS which is used both for simulation and for extraction. Therefore it makes sense to combine the two properties in a single experiment.

Experiment 13 (Extractable Simulation Soundness, $\mathbf{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ext-sim-sound}}(\kappa)$ (cf. [25])).

```

( $\xi, \text{simstate}$ )  $\leftarrow S(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$ 
( $x, \pi$ )  $\leftarrow A^{S(\text{simulate}, \cdot, \xi, \text{simstate})}(\text{guess}, \xi)$ 
 $w \leftarrow S(\text{extract}, x, \pi, \xi, \text{simstate})$ 
if ( $\pi \notin \mathfrak{R}_S$ )  $\wedge$  ( $(x, w) \notin R$ )  $\wedge$  ( $V(x, \pi, \xi) = 1$ ) then
  return 1
else
  return 0
end if

```

Definition 19 (Extractable Simulation Soundness). *A NIZK (P, V) with polynomial time simulator S for a language L is unbounded extractable simulation sound if*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ext-sim-sound}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_{(P,V,S),A}^{\text{ext-sim-sound}}(\kappa) = 1]$$

is negligible for all $A \in \mathbf{PT}^$.*

We now give a construction of an extractable simulation sound proof system based on an unbounded simulation sound proof system. The idea behind the construction is the same as for [1], which is also used in [10], namely to encrypt the witness using a semantically secure encryption scheme where the public key is derived from the common reference string. Extraction is performed by letting the extractor choose the CRS in such a way that it knows the private key.

Let L be a language with witness relation R , i.e., $x \in L$ exactly when there exists w such that $(x, w) \in R$. We define a proof system (P, V) with simulator S and prove that it is an unbounded simulation sound zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. Note that S plays the role both of the simulator and the extractor.

In all the below experiments, we let the common reference string ξ consist of two parts, ξ_0 and ξ_1 , where ξ_0 is long enough to be used as CRS for a NIZK of [25]. We let pk be a public key for the encryption scheme $\mathcal{CS} = (\text{Kg}, E, D)$ of the appropriate length defined by ξ_1 , and we let sk be the corresponding secret key. We also let $L'_{\xi_1} = \{(x, c) \mid x \in L \wedge (x, D_{\text{sk}}(c)) \in R\}$ with witness relation $R'_{\xi_1} = \{((x, c), (w, r)) \mid (x, w) \in R \wedge E_{\text{pk}, r}(w) = c\}$. Let (P'_{ξ_1}, V'_{ξ_1}) be an unbounded simulation sound proof system for L'_{ξ_1} , and let S'_{ξ_1} be its simulator guaranteed to exist by [25].

Definition 20 (Prover $P(x, w, \xi)$).

```

pk ← ξ1
(c, r) ← Epk(w)
π' ← P'_{ξ1}(x, c, (w, r), ξ0)
π ← (c, π')
return π

```

Definition 21 (Verifier $V(x, \pi, \xi)$).

```

Parse π as (c, π')
return V'_{ξ1}(x, c, π', ξ0)

```

Definition 22 (Simulator $S(\text{tag}, \text{params})$).

```

if tag = setup then
  Parse params as 1κ
  (pk, sk) ← Kg(1κ)
  ξ1 ← pk
  (ξ0, simstate') ← S'(setup, 1κ)
  simstate ← (sk, simstate')
  ξ ← (ξ0, ξ1)
  return (ξ, simstate)
else if tag = simulate then
  Parse params as (x, ξ, simstate)
  Parse simstate as (sk, simstate')
  c ← Epk(0)
  π' ← S'(simulate, (x, c), ξ0, simstate')
  π ← (c, π')
  return π
else if tag = extract then
  Parse params as (π, x, ξ, simstate)
  Parse simstate as (sk, simstate')
  Parse π as (c, π')
  w ← Dsk(c)
  return w

```

```

else
  return  $\perp$ 
end if

```

We now prove Theorem 2.

Proof. We prove, in order, the properties adaptive indistinguishability and extractable simulation-soundness.

ADAPTIVE INDISTINGUISHABILITY Assume (P, V) is not adaptively indistinguishable. Let A be an adversary such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{(P, V, S), A}^{\text{ad-ind}}(\kappa)$ is non-negligible. We will use A to construct $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$, breaking either the adaptive indistinguishability of (P', V') , or $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$, breaking the semantic security of \mathcal{CS} .

Let $(\xi_0, \text{simstate}') \leftarrow S'(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$, and let ξ_1 be chosen at random. Let pk be the public key defined by ξ_1 . Consider the proof system (\tilde{P}, \tilde{V}) , which is identical to (P, V) except that instead of outputting (c, π') , the prover \tilde{P} outputs $(c, S'(\text{simulate}, (x, c), \xi_0, \text{simstate}'))$. Assume A wins the Experiments 10, 11 with non-negligible probability when Experiment 10 is run with P and S is replaced by \tilde{P} in Experiment 11. Then $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ running in Experiment 10 can use A as follows. When A asks for a proof, simulated or honest, of $(x, w) \in R$, then $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ computes $(c, r) \leftarrow E_{\text{pk}}(w)$ and asks its experiment for a proof of $(x, c), (w, r)$. When the answer π' is received, it prepends c and returns the answer to A . If $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ is run with P' , then this is what P would return, and if run with S' , then the answer is that of \tilde{P} . When A returns its guess, the same guess is forwarded by $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$. By construction $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ is successful when A is.

If A does not distinguish between P and \tilde{P} , then it distinguishes between \tilde{P} and S with non-negligible probability. Let us define a chain of machines $\tilde{P}_0, \dots, \tilde{P}_k$ such that \tilde{P}_t answers the t first queries as S and the remaining queries as \tilde{P} , i.e., $\tilde{P}_0 = S$ and $\tilde{P}_k = \tilde{P}$ for k such that A makes at most k queries. Then A can distinguish between \tilde{P}_t and \tilde{P}_{t+1} for some t with non-negligible probability. Fix such a t . We show how such a machine A can be used by $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$ in the following way. $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$ receives a public key pk as input in Experiment 9, and lets ξ_1 be the CRS corresponding to pk and defines $(\xi_0, \text{simstate}') \leftarrow S'(\text{setup}, 1^\kappa)$. When A make query $t + 1$ on (x, w) , then $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$ requests an encryption c of either w or 0 from its experiment, and returns $(c, S'(\text{simulate}, (x, c), \xi_0, \text{simstate}'))$ to A . If A responds that it is executed with \tilde{P}_t , then $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$ guesses that 0 was encrypted, and otherwise that w was encrypted. By construction $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$ is successful when A is.

Since, by assumption, (P', V') has adaptive indistinguishability and \mathcal{CS} is semantically secure, the existence of either $A_{\text{ad-ind}}$ or $A_{\text{sem-sec}}$ with the above properties is a contradiction. Hence (P, V) has adaptive indistinguishability.

EXTRACTABLE SIMULATION-SOUNDNESS Assume (P, V) does not have extractable simulation-soundness, and let A be an adversary which wins in Experiment 13 with non-negligible probability. We describe how to construct an adversary $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ which breaks the simulation soundness of (P', V') .

$A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ runs A in Experiment 13, while taking part in Experiment 12 itself. When $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ receives the CRS ξ it uses it as ξ_0 in Experiment 13,

while ξ_1 is generated as in the definition of S . $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ answers queries to S by the algorithm in Definition 22, using its oracle S' where necessary. When A outputs (x, π) on the call $A(\text{guess}, \xi)$, $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ parses π as (c, π') and outputs $((x, c), \pi')$ on its call $A_{\text{sim-sound}}(\text{guess}, \xi)$. If $w \leftarrow D_{\text{sk}}(c)$ is not a witness of x , then $(x, c) \notin L'$. Thus $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ wins in its experiment exactly when A wins. Thus $A_{\text{sim-sound}}$ breaks the simulation-soundness of (P', V') , which is a contradiction. We conclude that (P, V) is extractable simulation sound.

In this paper we write NIZK-PK for unbounded simulation sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.