

# Chameleon-Based Deniable Authenticated

## Key Agreement Protocol

Chunbo Ma<sup>1,3</sup>, Jun Ao<sup>2</sup>, and Jianhua Li<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>School of Information Security Engineering  
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200030, P. R. China  
machunbo@sjtu.edu.cn

<sup>2</sup>State Key Laboratory for Radar Signal Processing,  
Xidian University, Xi'an, Shanxi, 710071, P. R. China  
[Junjunaol@263.net](mailto:Junjunaol@263.net)

<sup>3</sup>The State Key Laboratory of Information Security,  
Beijing, 100049, P. R. China

**Abstract:** As a useful means of safeguarding privacy of communications, deniable authentication has received much attention. A Chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol is presented in this paper. The protocol has following properties. Any one of the two participants can't present a digital proof to convince a third party that a claimed agreement has really taken place. Once a forgery occurs, the original entity can present a digital proof to disclose the forgery.

**Keywords:** Chameleon, Deniability, Authentication, Key Agreement

## 1. Introduction

Key agreement is one of most important security mechanisms in the area of secure communications. Such protocols allow two entities to exchange information between them and establish a shared secret over an insecure open channel. Later, they can encrypt actual data using a fast symmetric cipher keyed by the shared secret. The first two-party key agreement is the Diffie-Hellman protocol given in their seminal paper [1]. Currently, how to design an efficient and secure key agreement protocol have received much attention.

Due to the lack of authentication, the original Diffie-Hellman protocol is vulnerable to "man-in-the-middle" and some other attacks. In order to solve this issue, many two-party authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed [2][3][4][5]. Authenticated two-party key agreement allows two users to establish a common secret key and ensures nobody besides them can possibly learn the secret key.

However, in some applications [6], deniability is needed to prevent an authorized user from disclosing information it receives legitimately. For example, Alice and Bob have complemented an authenticated key agreement protocol and established a session key (shared secret). Later, Bob presents a digital proof to convince Carol that Alice once sent some message to him. In this process, Bob discloses Alice's some information without Alice's authorization and impinges upon Alice's privacy.

To solve above issue, Alice and Bob can use deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. Under such circumstances, Bob can't present proof to convince the third party Carol that there is a certain key agreement protocol occurred between them. The deniable

authenticated key agreement protocol is seldom investigated, though there is a lot of research on deniable authentication technology, such as [7] and followed by a series of papers including [8][9]. Raimondo et al. [10] recently extended the work of Dwork from deniable authentication to deniable agreement protocol, and proved the deniability features of SKEME [11] and SIGMA [12].

We can't prevent a deniable key agreement protocol from being forged even though we design it with some secure technologies. One of the reasons is that we don't have a method to prove the protocol secure against any attacks including known and unknown. In other words, after completing the deniable key agreement protocol, Bob can produce a forged protocol using the message once transmitted and announces that the protocol has executed between him and Alice. And then, Bob submits corresponding information to convince the third party Carol that the forged protocol is true. Alice's privacy may be impinged while Carol can't judge the protocol's reality. Hence, we need a mechanism to disclose a forgery in case of occurrence.

Chameleon Hash has some special properties, and can be used to design signature and some other cryptography mechanism. To the Chameleon-based signature, the recipient can't convince the third party of the identity of the signer, as the recipient has the ability to forge the signature. In the case of forgery occurrence, the original signer can disclose the forgery in non-interactive manner. The first to present the Chameleon Hash were Krawczyk [13] in 2000, followed by papers [14][15]. The properties of Chameleon Hash are very useful to our designing two-party deniable authenticated key agreement protocol.

Motivated by above statement, we design a two-party key agreement protocol with Chameleon Hash and signature. In our mechanism, either sender or recipient has ability to deny his communication. Furthermore, any one of them can disclose a forgery. For example, if Bob forges the protocol between Alice and him, Alice can get Bob's private key with the forged message, and consequently presents a digital proof to disclose the forgery.

## 2. Related works

At present, recipient in many crypto schemes is designated, i.e. only the designated recipient can validly execute the schemes. Some signature schemes with designated recipient are proposed in [20] [21]. In these schemes, only the designated recipient can verify the signature. Another important property about these schemes is that the recipient can't convince the third party of the identity of the signer as well as the content that signed by the signer. Hence, this kind of signature has the property of deniability. An interesting signature, ring signature, is proposed in [18]. It can hide the identity of signer and achieve the goal of deniability.

Deniable key agreement protocol is studied in [16] and also can be found in [17] [11]. Dwork et al. [7] first formally treat the deniable authentication problem, followed by paper [16] [19]. Raimondon et al. [10] extend the work of Dwork and carry on thorough analysis to the deniable authenticated key agreement protocol. Krawczyk first presented the Chameleon function in 2000. Due to the interesting properties of Chameleon function, it is used to design some crypto schemes [14] [15].

### 3. Background

#### 3.1 Preliminaries

Let  $G_1$  be a cyclic multiplicative group generated by  $g$ , whose order is a prime  $q$  and  $G_2$  be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order  $q$ . Assume that the discrete logarithm in both  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map  $e: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  and satisfies the following properties:

1. *Bilinear*:  $e(g^a, p^b) = e(g, p)^{ab}$ . For all  $g, p \in G_1$  and  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , the equation holds.
2. *Non-degenerate*: There exists  $p \in G_1$ , if  $e(g, p) = 1$ , then  $g = O$ .
3. *Computable*: For  $g, p \in G_1$ , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute  $e(g, p)$ .

Typically, the map  $e$  will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. Pairings and other parameters should be selected in proactive for efficiency and security.

#### 3.2 Chameleon Hash

Let  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  be two groups that support a bilinear map as defined in section 2.1. PKG random chooses  $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  as the private key of the system, and computes the matching public key  $PK_{pub} = g^v$ , and then random chooses  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and generates Alice's key pair  $(SK_A = g^{va}, PK_A = g^a)$ . Similarly, PKG generates Bob's key pair  $(SK_B, PK_B) = (g^{vb}, g^b)$ . Alice chooses  $x_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and  $R_A \in G_1$  uniformly at random, and generates Chameleon Hash.

$$T_A(PK_A, x_A, R_A) = e(R_A, g)e((PK_A)^{x_A}, PK_{pub}).$$

The Chameleon Hash function has following properties.

- a) Alice who has known  $(T_A, x_A, R_A)$  random chooses  $x'_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and computes

$$R'_A = g^{a \cdot v \cdot (x_A - x'_A)} \cdot R_A, \text{ which satisfies } T_A(PK_A, x_A, R_A) = T_A(PK_A, x'_A, R'_A). \text{ We}$$

have

$$\begin{aligned} & T_A(PK_A, x'_A, R'_A) \\ &= e(g^{a \cdot v \cdot (x_A - x'_A)} \cdot R_A, g)e(g^{a \cdot x'_A}, PK_{pub}) \\ &= e(g^{a \cdot (x_A - x'_A)}, PK_{pub})e(R_A, g)e(g^{a \cdot x'_A}, PK_{pub}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= e(g^{a \cdot x_A}, PK_{pub})e(R_A, g) \\
&= T_A(PK_A, x_A, R_A).
\end{aligned}$$

In the circumstances of having known  $(x_A, R_A)$ , if Alice can compute another  $(x'_A, R'_A)$  that satisfies above relationship, we say that Alice can successfully forge  $(T_A, x_A, R_A)$ .

- b) To the given  $T_A(PK_A, x_A, R_A) = T_A(PK_A, x'_A, R'_A)$ , anyone can compute and get Alice's private key as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
T_A(PK_A, x_A, R_A) &= T_A(PK_A, x'_A, R'_A) \\
e(R_A, g)e(g^{a \cdot x_A}, g^v) &= e(R'_A, g)e(g^{a \cdot x'_A}, g^v) \\
R_A \cdot g^{a \cdot v \cdot x_A} &= R'_A \cdot g^{a \cdot v \cdot x'_A} \\
g^{a \cdot v} &= (R_A \cdot (R'_A)^{-1})^{(x'_A - x_A)^{-1}}
\end{aligned}$$

### 3.3 Deniable Key Agreement Protocol

Our definition of the notions of deniability follows essentially the definition from Dwork et al. [7] and Raimondon et al. [10].

A protocol is deniable if a recipient Bob can't convince a third party Carol that a given sender Alice once executed a claimed key agreement protocol with him. In other words, a key agreement protocol is deniable if the recipient's view of the protocol can be perfectly simulated by a simulator  $SIM$  that doesn't know the secret key of the sender Alice. When Bob tries to convince Carol that he has executed a protocol with Alice, he will be failed since Carol knows he can simulate the view by manipulating the simulator  $SIM$ .

Assume that there exists an adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  in the protocol, acting as the recipient on input any auxiliary input  $aux \in AUX$ , where  $AUX$  is a set that comprises some extra information that  $\mathbb{A}$  might have gathered in some other form, such as eavesdropping. We denote the interaction between  $\mathbb{A}$  and sender as  $View_{\mathbb{A}}^S(PK, aux)$ , where  $PK$  is the public key of sender.

**Definition 1 [7].** We say that  $(KG, S, R)$  is a deniable key agreement protocol if for any adversary  $\mathbb{A}$ , acting as the recipient on input  $PK$  and any auxiliary input  $aux \in AUX$ , there exists a simulator  $SIM_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  running on the same inputs, produces a simulated view which is indistinguishable from the real one. In other words, we have the following two probability distributions.

$$\text{Real}(\text{aux}) = [(\text{SK}, \text{PK}) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^n); (\text{aux}, \text{PK}, \text{View}_{\mathbb{A}}(\text{PK}, \text{aux}))]$$

$$\text{Sim}(\text{aux}) = [(\text{SK}, \text{PK}) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^n); (\text{aux}, \text{PK}, \text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}(\text{PK}, \text{aux}))].$$

For all probabilistic polynomial time machine  $\mathbb{P}$  and all  $\text{aux} \in \text{AUX}$ , we have

$$\left| \Pr_{x \in \text{Real}(\text{aux})}[\mathbb{P}(x) = 1] - \Pr_{x \in \text{Sim}(\text{aux})}[\mathbb{P}(x) = 1] \right| \leq \varepsilon.$$

Then we say that the key agreement protocol is deniable.

**Definition 2 [10].** We say an encryption scheme is PA-1 plaintext-aware if for any adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  that on input  $\text{PK}$  can produce a valid ciphertext  $c$ , there exists a “companion” machine  $\mathbb{A}^*$  that, running on the same inputs, outputs the matching plaintext.

**Definition 3 [22].** We say an encryption scheme is PA-2 plaintext-aware if for any adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  on input  $c \notin \text{AUX}$ , the “companion” machine  $\mathbb{A}^*$  is defined to yield matching plaintext. Otherwise the machine  $\mathbb{A}^*$  outputs  $\perp$ .

## 4. Key Agreement Protocol

When Alice and Bob want to establish a session key, they can execute the following protocol as shown in Figure 1.




Fig.1. Proposed two-party deniable authenticated key agreement protocol

Let  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  be two groups that support a bilinear map as defined in section 2.1. The

keys distribution is as defined in section 2.2. Assume that there exists a secure signature  $Sign$  and IND-CCA2 encryption algorithm  $(Enc, Dec)$ . The two entities Alice and Bob will execute the protocol as following steps.

1. Alice chooses  $r_A, z_A, x_A, y_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  uniformly at random, and computes  $T_B = e(g^{y_A}, g)e(g^{b \cdot x_A}, g^v)$ , and then signs  $T_B$  using secure signature algorithm  $Sign$ . Alice sends  $\sigma_A = Sign_{sk_A}(T_B)$  to Bob. Similarly, Bob produces  $\sigma_B = Sign_{sk_B}(T_A)$  and sends it to Alice.
2. Alice encrypts  $x_A$  and  $g^{y_A}$  using Bob's public key, and sends  $c_A = Enc_{PK_B}(g^{y_A}, x_A)$  to Bob. Bob does the same things as Alice, and sends  $c_B = Enc_{PK_A}(g^{y_B}, x_B)$  to Alice.
3. Alice gets  $(x_B)'$  and  $(g^{y_B})'$  by decrypting  $c_B$ , and then verifies the values as follows.

$$T_A \stackrel{?}{=} e((g^{y_B})', g)e(g^{a \cdot (x_B)'}, g^v) \quad (1).$$

If above equation holds, Alice produces the session key  $Key = (T_A)^{x_B} (T_B)^{x_A}$ . Bob does the same things as Alice, and verifies  $(x_A)'$  and  $(g^{y_A})'$  by the following equation.

$$T_B \stackrel{?}{=} e((g^{y_A})', g)e(g^{b \cdot (x_A)'}, g^v) \quad (2).$$

If above equation holds, Bob produces the session key  $Key = (T_A)^{x_B} (T_B)^{x_A}$ .

## 5. Security

Neither Alice nor Bob can convince the third party Carol that a claimed key agreement protocol has really taken place. To Bob's signature  $\sigma_A = Sign_{sk_A}(T_B)$ , and the values  $x_A$  and  $g^{y_A}$ , Carol can distinguish whether the signature really comes from Alice, and verifies the equation  $T_B \stackrel{?}{=} e(g^{y_A}, g)e(g^{b \cdot x_A}, g^v)$ , but she can't judge whether the two values  $x_A$  and  $g^{y_A}$  come from Alice since Bob has the ability to forge the two values. Bob can random choose  $x_A'$  and forge  $g^{y_A'} = g^{a \cdot v \cdot (x_A - x_A')} \cdot g^{y_A}$  as we have mentioned in the section 2.2. Obviously,  $x_A'$  and  $g^{y_A'}$  satisfy the equation (2). Therefore, Carol can't tell whether there is a claimed key agreement between Alice and Bob, also she can't work out whether the session key  $Key = (T_A)^{x_B} (T_B)^{x_A}$  is generated by them. We have following result.

**Theorem 1.** we say a key agreement protocol is deniable if Enc is a PA-2 and IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.

**Proof.** The adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  acting as a recipient will manipulate the simulator  $SIM_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  to

simulate a protocol between him and the sender Alice. The simulator will use Alice as oracle to yield the signature.

The simulator  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  chooses  $r_A, z_A, x_A, y_A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  uniformly at random and computes  $T_B$ , then uses Alice as an oracle to generate matching signature  $\sigma_A = \text{Sign}_{\text{SK}_A}(T_B)$ . The simulator  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  sends  $(T_B, \sigma_A)$  to the adversary  $\mathbb{A}$ . Upon receiving the signature,  $\mathbb{A}$  sends the signature  $(T_A, \sigma_B)$  to the simulator  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$ . Due to the publicly verifiability, the signatures can be verified by adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  and  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$ . Since the signature from  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  is indistinguishable from that of Alice, the protocol executed between simulator and adversary is indistinguishable from that of a real protocol executed between adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  and sender Alice.

The adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  sends  $c_B$  to the simulator  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$ . The simulator recalls machine  $\mathbb{A}^*$  to yield matching plaintext. If  $c_B \in \text{AUX}$ , the machine  $\mathbb{A}^*$  outputs  $\perp$ . In this situation, the adversary doesn't know the plaintext of  $c_B$  since  $c_B$  may be gathered in some other form as defined in section 3.3 rather than generated by himself. If  $c_B \notin \text{AUX}$ , i.e.  $c_B$  is generated by the adversary himself, the simulator recalls  $\mathbb{A}^*$  and outputs the matching plaintext  $(g^{y_B}, x_B)$ . Since the response from  $\mathbb{A}^*$  is indistinguishable from those of real decryption oracle then the simulation between adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  and simulator  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  is indistinguishable from the simulation between adversary  $\mathbb{A}$  and the real sender Alice. The simulator  $\text{SIM}_{\mathbb{A}}^S$  can verify the plaintext gotten from  $\mathbb{A}^*$  by the equation  $T_A = e(g^{y_B}, g)e(g^{x_B}, g^v)$  and generate the session key  $\text{Key} = (T_A)^{x_B} (T_B)^{x_A}$ .

It is easy to see that the above simulation is perfect, so the key agreement protocol is deniable.

**Theorem 2.** We say that either sender or recipient can disclose a forgery, if the signature  $\text{Sign}$  is unforgeable, the encryption is IND-CCA2 and the CDH assumption holds.

**Proof.** Assume that if Bob can forge a key agreement protocol and get the message  $(T_B, x_A, g^{y_A})$  after his agreement with Alice, we can say that Alice can compute Bob's private key in the case of having known  $(T_B, x_A, g^{y_A})$ . Considering the assumptions,  $T_B$

must be a value that Alice has signed and sent to Bob, so Alice can find corresponding  $(T_B, x_A, g^{y_A})$  in her recorder. Then we have

$$e(g^{y_A}, g)e(g^{b \cdot x_A}, g^v) = e(g^{y_A}, g)e(g^{b \cdot x_A}, g^v)$$

$$g^{y_A} \cdot g^{b \cdot v \cdot x_A} = g^{y_A} g^{b \cdot v \cdot x_A}$$

$$g^{b \cdot v} = (g^{y_A} / g^{y_A})^{(x_A - x_A)^{-1}}$$

Therefore, Alice has the ability to get Bob's private key  $g^{b \cdot v}$ , and work out other two values  $g^{y_A}$  and  $x_A$  that make  $(T_B, x_A, g^{y_A})$  satisfies the equation (2). Alice can find the values in this way. First she chooses  $x_A \in Z_q^*$  uniformly at random and then computes  $g^{y_A} = g^{b \cdot v \cdot (x_A - x_A)} \cdot g^{y_A}$ . We have

$$T_B = e(g^{y_A}, g)e(g^{b \cdot v \cdot x_A}, g^v)$$

If Alice presents  $(T_B, x_A, g^{y_A})$  that satisfies above equation, then we can say that Bob forges a protocol with  $(T_B, x_A, g^{y_A})$ .

## 6. Conclusion

In some communication scenarios, deniability is playing an important role in protecting privacy. A Chameleon-based deniable authenticated key agreement protocol is presented in this paper. In our mechanism, the two-party who participant the communication can't present digital proof to convince the third party that a claimed key agreement protocol is executed between them. If any participant forges a key agreement protocol and produces a session key, the original entity can work out the forger's private key and then discloses the forgery by giving other two values that satisfy the requirement. The key agreement protocol has such properties due to Chameleon hash function.

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