

A NEW MAC: LAMA

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Abstract

In this paper, we will propose a MAC called LAMA with output size of 128 bits, there have not been found a attack better than the exhaustive search attack for the MAC, which has a implementation in about *5 cycles / byte*.

Keywords: MAC, hash function, pre-image resistant, 2^{nd} pre-image resistant, collision, MAC forgery.

1. Introduction

Hash functions play a very important role in data integrity, message authentication and digital signature. MAC (message authentication codes) is one of keyed hash functions with the specific purpose of message authentication. There are two kinds of general methods to construct a MAC, one is that applying a block cipher as a compression function, and the other is that remoulding a ready unkeyed hash function. For the detail materials about these aspects may refer to see [2]. In this paper, we will propose a MAC called LAMA, which means the main tools applied are key-defined transformations in linear algebra. LAMA has the security strength of 128 bits and a fast implementation in about 5 cycles/byte .

2. Construction

Denoted by \mathbb{F} the finite field consisted of the two elements $\{0,1\}$, that is, the finite field $GF(2)$, and $\mathbb{F}[x]$ is the polynomial ring of unknown x over the field \mathbb{F} , the symbol \oplus represents the addition in the field \mathbb{F} .

Let $p(x) \in \mathbb{F}[x]$, $p(x) = x^8 \oplus x^6 \oplus x^5 \oplus x \oplus 1$, which is a primitive polynomial of degree eight, and $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}[x]/p(x)$ is a finite field $GF(2^8)$. In LAMA will apply a S-box defined as following

$$S_0(x) = 5 \cdot (x \oplus 3)^{127}, \quad x \in \mathbb{K}. \quad (2.1)$$

We also adopt the representation $S_0(\zeta)$ for a bytes string ζ to represent that S-box S_0 substitute each byte of the string ζ .

Now we show a result related to the construction later. Denoted by Ω_u and Ω_l the sets of the non-singular upper-triangular $n \times n$ matrices and the lower-triangular $n \times n$ matrices on the finite field \mathbb{F} respectively. Suppose that P is a permutation matrix of order n , denoted by $\mathcal{M}_p = \{A \cdot P \cdot B \mid A \in \Omega_l, B \in \Omega_u\}$. We will also use the same symbol P to represent the corresponding permutation on the indices (of rows or columns).

Proposition 1 Suppose that P is a permutation matrix, let $\tau(P)$ be the number of the pairs (i, j) , $0 \leq i < j < n$, with that $P(i) > P(j)$, then

$$|\mathcal{M}_p| = 2^{n^2 - n - \tau(P)}. \quad (2.2)$$

Moreover, if P and R are two distinct permutation matrices, then

$$\mathcal{M}_P \cap \mathcal{M}_R = \emptyset . \quad (2.3)$$

Proof. Suppose that there are $A, X \in \Omega_l$ and $B, Y \in \Omega_u$ such that $APB = XPY$, then

$P^{-1}(X^{-1}A)P = YB^{-1}$. Let $\Delta = (P^T \cdot \Omega_l \cdot P) \cap \Omega_u$, then we have

$$|\mathcal{M}_P| = |\Omega_u| \cdot |\Omega_l| / |\Delta| = 2^{n^2-n} / |\Delta|.$$

Hence, to prove formula (2.2) is suffice to prove the equation

$$|\Delta| = 2^{\tau(P)}. \quad (2.4)$$

Suppose that $A \in \Omega_l$, $(P^T AP) = B \in \Delta$, $A = (a_{i,j})$, $B = (b_{i,j})$, it has

$$b_{P(i),P(j)} = a_{i,j}, \quad 0 \leq i, j < n .$$

Thus, it must be that

$$P(i) > P(j), \quad i < j, \quad \text{if } a_{i,j} = 1.$$

In other words, a entry $a_{i,j}$, $0 \leq i < j$, may take the values 0, or 1, iff $P(i) > P(j)$, otherwise

$a_{i,j} = 0$. This has proven the equation (2.4) and so (2.2).

Now we come to prove (2.3). On the contrary, if (2.3) is not true, from the shown above, then

there are $A \in \Omega_l$ and $B \in \Omega_u$ such that

$$P^T AR = B .$$

Suppose that $A = (a_{i,j})$ and $B = (b_{i,j})$, then it has that

$$b_{P(i),R(j)} = a_{i,j}, \quad 0 \leq i, j < n .$$

Especially,

$$b_{P(i),R(i)} = a_{i,i} = 1, \quad 0 \leq i < n.$$

As the assumption $B \in \Omega_u$, we deduce that

$$P(i) \leq R(i), \quad \forall 0 \leq i < n.$$

But

$$\{P(i)\}_0^{n-1} = \{i\}_0^{n-1} = \{R(i)\}_0^{n-1} .$$

Thus we conclude that

$$P(i) = R(i), \quad 0 \leq i < n.$$

That is, $P = R$. □

In the next is the description of the detail construction. Firstly, we will introduce a key-defined transformation $F(\zeta)$, which is the main cryptographic transformation applied in present algorithm.

The expression $(x_1 x_2 \cdots x_r)$ as usual stands for the circular permutation. Suppose that a and b are two non-negative integers, denoted by

$$(a \cdots b) = \begin{cases} (a(a+1) \cdots b) & \text{if } a < b, \\ (a(a-1) \cdots b) & \text{if } a > b. \end{cases}$$

For an 8-bits vector v with weight s , denoted by $I_v = \{i \mid v[i] = 1, 0 \leq i < 8\}$,

$i_1 < i_2 < \cdots < i_s \in I_v$. From the vector v , we make a permutation P_v as following

$$P_v = \begin{cases} (i_1 \cdots i_2)(i_3 \cdots i_4) \cdots (i_{s-1} \cdots i_s) & \text{if } s \text{ even,} \\ (i_1 \cdots i_2) \cdots (i_{s-2} \cdots i_{s-1})(i_s \cdots i_{s-1}) & \text{if } s \text{ odd.} \end{cases} \quad (2.5)$$

The symbol P_v will be also used to represent the corresponding permutation matrix.

For a string ρ of 8 bytes, we define an 8-bits vector v_ρ and a non-singular 8×8 matrix M_ρ :

$$v_\rho[i] = \rho[8i + i]_{bit}, 0 \leq i < 8, \quad M_\rho = T_u \cdot P_{v_\rho} \cdot T_l. \quad (2.6)$$

where $T_u = (a_{i,j})_{8 \times 8}$ and $T_l = (b_{i,j})_{8 \times 8}$ are the upper-triangular matrix and the lower-triangular matrix respectively,

$$a_{i,j} = \begin{cases} \rho[8i + j]_{bit} & \text{if } i < j, \\ 1 & \text{if } i = j, \\ 0 & \text{if } i > j, \end{cases} \quad b_{i,j} = \begin{cases} \rho[8i + j]_{bit} & \text{if } i > j, \\ 1 & \text{if } i = j, \\ 0 & \text{if } i < j, \end{cases} \quad (2.7)$$

Suppose that K is the secret key, let $\lambda = K[0,15]_{byte} \oplus K[16,31]_{byte}$, if $|K| = 256$, else

$\lambda = K[0,15]_{byte}$, and $\lambda' = \lambda[0,7]_{byte}$, $\lambda'' = \lambda[8,15]_{byte}$, define two affine transformations on \mathbb{K}

$$A(x) = M_{\lambda'}(x), \quad B(x) = M_{\lambda''}(x), \quad x \in \mathbb{K}. \quad (2.8)$$

Denoted by $V_1 = V_{\lambda'} \oplus V_{\lambda''}$, and $V_2 = V_{\lambda'} \oplus ROTL8(V_{\lambda''}, 1)$, and then define a new S-box

$S(x)$ and a transformation L on \mathbb{K}^4 ,

$$S(x) = S_0(x \oplus V_2) \oplus V_1, \quad L = \begin{pmatrix} A & B & A & A \oplus B \\ B & A & A \oplus B & A \\ A & A \oplus B & A & B \\ A \oplus B & A & B & A \end{pmatrix}. \quad (2.9)$$

Suppose that ζ is a 16-bytes string, which is also viewed as a 4×4 matrix of bytes in the ordinary way, and ζ^T is the transposition of the matrix ζ . Let

$$F(\zeta) = L \cdot S(\zeta^T). \quad (2.10)$$

Denoted by x_t the message with size of 128 bits in the time t , ($t > 0$). We will apply internal chaining variables H'_t and H_t , both are with size of 128 bits, and $h(x)$ is the hash value. As usual, denote \bar{x} as the *complement* of a binary string x . Let $K_1 = K[0,15]_{byte}$, $K_2 = K[16,31]_{byte}$ if $|K| = 256$ and $K_2 = \bar{K}_1$ if $|K| = 128$, IV is a value for the initialization with size 128 bits or 256 bits, and denoted by $IV_1 = IV[0,15]_{byte}$, $IV_2 = \bar{IV}$ if $|IV| = 128$, else $IV_2 = IV[16,31]_{byte}$. Let $\mathcal{G}_1 = F(F(IV_1) \oplus IV_2)$, $\mathcal{G}_2 = F(F(IV_2) \oplus IV_1)$,

the recurrence relations of H'_t and H_t are defined as following

$$\begin{aligned} H_0 &= F(F(F(IV_1) \oplus K_1) \oplus K_2), & H'_0 &= F(F(F(IV_2) \oplus K_2) \oplus K_1), \\ H'_i &= F(H'_{i-1} \oplus x_i), & H_i &= F(H'_i \oplus H_{i-1}), \quad 1 \leq i \leq t, \\ h(x) &= F(F(H_t \oplus \mathcal{G}_1) \oplus \mathcal{G}_2). \end{aligned} \quad (2.11)$$

Note: If for the simplicity, the permutation matrix P_v may be simply taken as *id*.

3. Security Analysis

We know that a secure MAC should be forgery-proof, so it should be pre-image resistant, 2nd pre-image resistant, and collision resistant. For the presented MAC, the transformation F is a bijective map and also key-defined, so it is easy to know that the hash function $h(x)$ is pre-image resistant and 2nd pre-image resistant. In the following we will give a discussion about some possible attacks.

MAC forgery attack

This kind of attack usually is applying the birthday paradox to find an internal collision, and then

made a MAC forgery by the found collision. In this aspect, Bart Preneel and P.C. van Oorschot [3] show two generic attacks as following

Proposition 2 Let h be an iterated MAC with n -bit chaining variable and m -bit result. An internal collision for h can be found using u known text-MAC pairs and v chosen texts. The expected values for u and v as following: $u = \sqrt{2} \cdot 2^{n/2}$ and $v = 0$ if output transformation is a permutation; otherwise, v is approximately

$$2 \cdot 2^{n-m} + 2 \cdot \left\lceil \frac{n}{m} \right\rceil.$$

Proposition 3 Let h be an iterated MAC with n -bit chaining variable, m -bit result, a compression function f which behaves like a random function (for fixed x_i), output transformation g . An internal collision for h can be found using u known text-MAC pairs, where each text has same substring of $s \geq 0$ trailing block, and v chosen texts. The expected values for u and v as following: $u = \sqrt{2/(s+1)} \cdot 2^{n/2}$; $v = 0$ if output transformation is a permutation or $s+1 \geq 2^{n-m+6}$, and otherwise v is approximating

$$2 \cdot \frac{2^{n-m}}{s+1} + 2 \cdot \left\lceil \frac{n - \log_2(s+1)}{m} \right\rceil.$$

It is noted that in LAMA the compression function should be taken as (H'_i, H_i) rather than H_i , so to find an internal collision will require about $O(2^{112})$ known text-MAC pairs and $O(2^{96})$ chosen text queries with the bit-length of the texts more than 2^{32} , or require about $O(2^{96})$ known text-MAC pairs and $O(2^{64})$ chosen text queries with the bit-length of the texts more than 2^{64} (taking $s = 2^{32}$ or $s = 2^{64}$ in Proposition 3 respectively), hence the complexity is more than 2^{128} operations.

Correlation attack

The main idea of correlation attack is that by cryptanalysis to find significant advantage of some correlations between the input and output, and then find linear equations of the secret key in a number of statistic tests, and so recover the secret key by solving the found linear system. This kind of attacks may occur in the scenarios of chosen-plaintext attacks and chosen-IV attacks. In LAMA the transformation F is key-defined, and the advantage of a linear approximation will be

key-dependent, so an adversary is not able to form a definitive correlation attack.

Algebraic attack

As the highest degree of the Boolean functions appeared in the hash function is at least equal to 49, so the number of variables after linearization is about 2^{115} , hence require 2^{108} text-MAC pairs, and so about $O(2^{248})$ operations to solve the linear system. About this kind of attack, in the paper [1] we gave a little more detail discussion.

4. Implementation

The performance of LAMA is in a rate about *80 cycles/block* or *5 cycles/byte* (have not included about *64 cycles* spent by the output function $h(x)$), and with the startup time about of *7000 cycles*.

References

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