# Families of genus 2 curves with small embedding degree 

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#### Abstract

Hyperelliptic curves of small genus have the advantage of achieving the same security in the group while working over a smaller field than with elliptic curves. Pairing-friendly curves are those whose Jacobian is divisible by a large prime and whose embedding degree is small enough for computations to be feasible, but large enough for the discrete logarithm problem in the embedding field to be difficult. We give a sequence of $\mathbb{F}_{q}$-isogeny classes for a family of Jacobians of genus 2 curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, for $q=2^{m}$, and their corresponding small embedding degrees. We give examples of the parameters for such curves with embedding degree $k<(\log q)^{2}$, such as $k=8,13,16,23,26,37,46$. For efficient implementation of pairing-based cryptography on genus g curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, it is desirable that the ratio $\rho=\frac{g \log _{2} q}{\log _{2} N}$ be approximately unity, where $N$ is the order of the subgroup with embedding degree $k$. We show that for our family of curves, $\rho$ is often near 1 and never more than 2 . We also give a sequence of $\mathbb{F}_{q}$-isogeny classes for a family of Jacobians of genus 2 curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ whose minimal embedding field is much smaller than the field indicated by the embedding degree $k$. That is, the field exponents differ by a factor of $m$, demonstrating that the embedding degree is an inaccurate indicator of security. As a result, we use a security parameter $k^{\prime}=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N^{2}}}{g}$ to examine the cryptographic security of our family of curves.


Keywords: embedding degree, genus 2, hyperelliptic curves, binary curves, pairingbased cryptosystems.

## 1 Introduction

The computational intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is the mathematical basis for security of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Elliptic (and hyperelliptic) curves are especially attractive for cryptography as there is currently no sub-exponential algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on properly chosen curves. Thus they provide greater security and more efficient performance than first generation public key techniques, such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman. The result is faster implementations, bandwidth and storage savings, and reduced energy consumption. The performance of such cryptosystems depends essentially
on efficient arithmetic in the underlying finite field, and applications usually focus on prime fields or binary fields. Binary finite fields, $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$, have the advantage of "carry-free" addition and are more interesting for hardware implementation. [7] gives formulas for fast arithmetic on hyperelliptic curves, garnering more support for their use in cryptosystems. With hyperelliptic curves of small genus (that is, whose associated Jacobian abelian variety is of low dimension), it is possible to work over a smaller field while achieving the same security in the group. Thus hyperelliptic curves can offer the benefits of having comparable levels of security with smaller key sizes than other finite abelian groups.

Pairings on groups have been used constructively to design cryptographic protocols and to solve problems that have been open for many years, such as identitybased encryption, one-round three-party key agreement, and short signatures. On the other hand, pairings have been used destructively to attack cryptographic security. For example, the Frey-Rück attack (or MOV attack) uses the Tate pairing (or Weil pairing) to map the discrete logarithm problem on the Jacobian of a curve to the discrete logarithm in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*}$, where there are more efficient methods for solving the DLP. So for pairing-based cryptosystems, it is important to find curves where the embedding degree $k$ is small enough that the pairing is efficiently computable, but large enough that the DLP in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*}$ is hard.

This leads to the understanding of a pairing-friendly curve over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ as one that satisfies the following two conditions: (1) $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$ should be divisible by a sufficiently large prime $N$ so that the DLP in the order- $N$ subgroup of $J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$ is resistant to Pollard's rho attack (and other known attacks), and (2) The embedding degree $k$ should be sufficiently large so that the DLP in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*}$ withstands index-calculus attacks, but small enough that the arithmetic in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}$ can be efficiently implemented.

We know that $k \leq 6$ for supersingular elliptic curves, as first shown in [9]. [3] gives an upper bound of 12 on $k$ for supersingular genus 2 curves, which is attained in characteristic two. It has also been shown in [2] that one can obtain $k=12$ for ordinary genus 2 curves in characteristic two. However in general, for a "random" curve, one expects $k \sim N$, and for cryptographic applications, $N \sim 2^{160}$, so $k$ would be much too large for the computation of pairings to be feasible.

In this paper, we consider genus 2 curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, where $q=2^{m}$, whose associated Jacobian is neither supersingular (2-rank 0), nor ordinary (2-rank 2), but rather has 2 -rank 1. [1] gives formulas for fast arithmetic on 2-rank 1 curves, so such curves are interesting to consider. We let $C$ be a genus 2 curve over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ of the form

$$
y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+b x^{3}+c x^{2}+d x
$$

where $b, c, d \in \mathbb{F}_{q}^{*}$, and with characteristic polynomial $f(t)=t^{4}+a_{1} t^{3}+a_{2} t^{2}+$ $q a_{1} t+q^{2} \in \mathbb{Z}[t]$. In Section 3, we give a parametrization of a family of large primes,
$N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}}+1}$ for $r \geq 0$ and odd $L>7$, and we determine the embedding degrees for subgroups having these prime orders. In Section 4, we associate with each of these primes a sequence of genus 2 curves over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$, whose Jacobian order is divisible by the prime $N_{r}$. For example, for each $m$ in the interval $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1$, we get $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{x}\left(2^{2^{r}}+1\right) N_{r}$, where $x=2 m-2^{r}(L+2)$. We describe the curves by the $\mathbb{F}_{q}$-isogeny class of their Jacobians, such as having $a_{1}=-1$, and $a_{2}=2^{m}+2^{x}$ in the case mentioned above (where $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$ are the coefficients of the zeta function). We give examples of the parameters for such curves with embedding degree $k=8,13,16,23,26,37,46$.

For efficient implementation of pairing-based cryptography it is important to consider the ratio between the size of the curve group and the order of the subgroup with embedding degree $k$. For genus $g$ curves, it is ideal for the ratio of bit lengths, $\rho=\frac{g \log _{2} q}{\log _{2} N_{r}}$, to be approximately 1 . We show that for our family of curves the ratio is such that $\rho$ is often near 1 and is never more than 2 . In Section 5, we show that the embedding degree $k$ is always "small," that is, $k<(\log q)^{2}$, so that computations in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}$ may be feasible. In Section 6 , we give an example of another family of curves, whose minimal embedding field exponent is smaller by a factor of $m$ than the exponent of the field indicated by the embedding degree $k$. This demonstrates that the embedding degree may be an inaccurate indicator of security, and so we use a security parameter $k^{\prime}=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2}{g}$ to examine the cryptographic security of our family of 2 -rank 1 curves.

## 2 Preliminaries

Let $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ be a finite field with $q=p^{m}$ for some prime $p$ and positive integer $m,{ }^{1}$ and let $C$ be a smooth projective curve over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$. The Jacobian of $C$ over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, denoted $J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$, is an abelian variety whose points are degree zero divisors on $C$ modulo principal divisors. For a curve of genus $g$, its Jacobian has dimension $g$. Assume there exists a prime $N$ dividing the order of $J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$, with $q<N<q^{2}$. A pairing can embed the subgroup of order $N$ into the multiplicative group of a degree $k$ extension of $\mathbb{F}_{q}$. So a subgroup of $J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$ with order $N$ is said to have embedding degree $k$ if $N$ divides $q^{k}-1$, but does not divide $q^{i}-1$ for all $0<i<k$.

The Tate pairing is a (bilinear, non-degenerate) function

$$
J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}\right)[N] \times J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}\right) / N J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}\right) \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*} / \mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{* N}
$$

$\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*} / \mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{* N}$ can then be mapped isomorphically into the set of $N$ th roots of unity, $\mu_{N}$, by raising the image to the power $\frac{q-1}{N}$.

[^0]Pairing-based attacks can transport the discrete logarithm problem in $J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$ to the discrete logarithm in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*}$, where there are sub-exponential methods for solving the DLP. So for pairing-based cryptosystems, one would like to find curves where the embedding degree $k$ is small enough for computations to be feasible, but large enough for the DLP in the embedding field to be difficult. For most non-supersingular curves, the embedding degree is enormous. We will give a sequence of (non-supersingular, non-ordinary) 2-rank 1 curves with small embedding degree.

The fact that there exist simple abelian surfaces with characteristic polynomial $f(t)=t^{4}+a_{1} t^{3}+a_{2} t^{2}+q a_{1} t+q^{2} \in \mathbb{Z}[t]$ is shown in [10], but that there exists a Jacobian of a curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ with such a characteristic polynomial is due to [8]. So we have that $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ determines the $\mathbb{F}_{q}$-isogeny class of the Jacobian of a smooth projective curve $C$ of genus 2 defined over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, with $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)=q^{2}+a_{1} q+a_{2}+a_{1}+1$.

We let $C$ be a curve of genus 2 over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ of the form $y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+b x^{3}+c x^{2}+d x$, where $b, c, d \in \mathbb{F}_{q}^{*}$. We consider when $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}$ is a prime ${ }^{2}$ for some $r \geq 0$ and odd $L>1$. We have seen experimentally that for $r \leq 3, N_{r}$ is very often prime, though it appears that primality does not occur for $r \geq 4$. Our families of curves will be those whose (absolutely simple) Jacobian has order divisible by $N_{r}$, and whose $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ have a specific description to be explicitly given later.

## 3 Family of primes and their embedding degrees

We must first prove several lemmas that will enable us to achieve our main result. We begin by noting that $r=1$ never yields a prime.

Lemma 1. Let $L>1$ be odd. $N_{1}=\frac{2^{2(L+2)}+1}{2^{2}+1}$ is not a prime.
Proof. We first note that $N_{1}=2^{2(L+1)}-2^{2(L)}+2^{2(L-1)}-2^{2(L-2)}+\cdots-2+1$, so $N_{1} \in \mathbb{Z}$. Let $P=\frac{2^{L+2}+1}{2+1}=N_{0}$. We see that $9 P^{2}=2^{2(L+2)}+2^{L+3}+1$. So $N_{1}=\frac{9 P^{2}-2^{L+3}}{2^{2}+1}$. Now $L$ is odd, so $L+3$ is even. So $N_{1}=\frac{\left(3 P-2^{\frac{L+3}{2}}\right)\left(3 P+2^{\frac{L+3}{2}}\right)}{2^{2}+1}$. Now $N_{1} \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $2^{2}+1$ is prime, so either $\left(\frac{3 P-2^{\frac{L+3}{2}}}{2^{2}+1}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $\left(3 P+2^{\frac{L+3}{2}}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}$, or $\left(3 P-2^{\frac{L+3}{2}}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $\left(\frac{3 P+2^{\frac{L+3}{2}}}{2^{2}+1}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}$. Either way, $N_{1}$ is not prime.

We now determine the embedding degree for a general prime $N$ over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$. We let $\operatorname{ord}_{N} p$ be the smallest $x$ such that $p^{x} \equiv 1 \bmod N$.

[^1]Lemma 2. Let $q=p^{m}$ for some prime $p$ and positive integer $m, N$ be prime, and $k$ be the smallest integer such that $q^{k} \equiv 1 \bmod N$. Then

$$
k=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} p, m\right)} .
$$

Proof. Clearly $k \left\lvert\, \frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} p, m\right)}\right.$, since

$$
1 \equiv p^{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p} \equiv\left(p^{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}\right)^{m / \operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} p, m\right)} \equiv\left(p^{m}\right)^{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p / \operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} p, m\right)} \bmod N .
$$

Now let $D=\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} p, m\right)$. So we have $k \left\lvert\, \frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{D}\right.$.
We also know that $\operatorname{ord}_{N} p \mid m k$, and this implies $\left.\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{D} \right\rvert\, \frac{m}{D} k$. But $\operatorname{gcd}\left(\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{D}, \frac{m}{D}\right)=$ 1 , therefore it must be that $\left.\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{D} \right\rvert\, k$. Thus we have $k=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} p}{D}$ and the proof is complete.

Motivated by this understanding of $k$, we determine $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2$ via the following lemmas.

Lemma 3. Let $L$ be odd. If $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}$ is prime for some $r \geq 0$, then $L+2$ is prime.

Proof. $L+2$ is odd, so if $L+2$ is not prime, then $L+2=a b$, where $a, b$ are odd. If $a \geq 3$ and $a \mid L+2$, then $2^{a}+1 \mid 2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1$. This implies that $2^{a}+1 \mid\left(2^{2^{r}}+1\right) N_{r}$. But $\operatorname{gcd}\left(2^{2^{r}}+1, N_{r}\right)=1$. Now $2^{a}+1 \nmid 2^{2^{r}}+1$ for $a$ odd and $2^{a}+1 \nmid N_{r}$, since $N_{r}$ is prime. Therefore $a=1$, and hence $L+2$ is prime.

Lemma 4. Let $L$ be odd. If $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}}+1}$ is prime for some $r \geq 0$, then $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2=$ $2^{r+1}(L+2)$.

Proof. We have $\left(2^{2^{r}}+1\right) N_{r}=2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1$. So $2^{2^{r}(L+2)} \equiv-1 \bmod N_{r}$. This implies $2^{2^{r+1}(L+2)} \equiv 1 \bmod N_{r}$. So $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2 \mid 2^{r+1}(L+2)$. But by Lemma 3 we know that $L+2$ is prime, so it must be that either $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2 \mid 2^{r+1}$ or $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2 \mid 2^{r+1}(L+2)$. The former cannot happen since $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}>2^{2^{r+1}}$. It follows that $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2=2^{r+1}(L+2)$.

We are now able to state the embedding degree $k$ of a group of order $N_{r}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, where $q=2^{m}$ for a specific range of $m$. (The upper bound is required so that $q<N_{r}$, and the choice for lower bound will be evident in Proposition 1).

Lemma 5. Let $L$ be odd, and let $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}$ be prime for some $r \geq 0$, and let $k$ be the embedding degree of curve $C$ with respect to $N_{r}$. Let $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq$ $2^{r}(L+1)-1$, and also allow $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1$ in the case that $r=0$. Then $k=2^{r+1-i}$ when $\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2, m\right)=2^{i}(L+2)$ for $i \in\{0, \ldots, r-2\}$, and $k=2^{r+1-i}(L+2)$ when $\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2, m\right)=2^{i}$ for $i \in\{0, \ldots, r+1\}$.

Proof. By Lemma 2, we know $k=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2}{\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2, m\right)}$. By Lemma 4, we know that $\operatorname{ord}_{N_{r}} 2=$ $2^{r+1}(L+2)$. The results follow immediately, with the possible $i$ 's determined by the size restriction on $m$.

We note that the embedding degree $k$ is unbounded as $L$ is unbounded. We now seek to find curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ associated with Jacobians whose order is divisible by $N_{r}$.

## 4 Genus 2 curves for a given $\mathbb{F}_{q}$-isogeny class of Jacobians

We know that the $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ determines the $\mathbb{F}_{q}$-isogeny class of the Jacobian of a curve of genus 2, and the following theorem found in [8] gives the conditions for a curve associated with such a Jacobian to exist.

Theorem 1. There exists a curve of the form $y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+b x^{3}+c x^{2}+d x$, $b, c, d \in \mathbb{F}_{q}^{*}$, with characteristic polynomial $f(t)=t^{4}+a_{1} t^{3}+a_{2} t^{2}+q a_{1} t+q^{2}$ and having simple Jacobian if and only if

1. $a_{1}$ is odd
2. $\left|a_{1}\right| \leq 4 \sqrt{q}$
3. there exists an integer $a_{2}$ such that
(a) $2\left|a_{1}\right| \sqrt{q}-2 q \leq a_{2} \leq a_{1}^{2} / 4+2 q$
(b) $a_{2}$ is divisible by $2^{[m / 2\rceil}$
(c) $\Delta=a_{1}^{2}-4 a_{2}+8 q$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}$
(d) $\delta=\left(a_{2}+2 q\right)^{2}-4 q a_{1}^{2}$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$ (the 2-adic integers).

We use this theorem to establish the existence of genus 2 curves with specific conditions on $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$. We then show these are the conditions needed so that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$ is divisible by $N_{r}$.

Proposition 1. Let $q=2^{m}, L>1$ be odd, and $r \geq 0$. When $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1 \geq 5$, let $a_{1}=1$ and $a_{2}=-2^{m}$, and when $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1$, let $a_{1}=-1$ and $a_{2}=2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}$. For $L \geq 7$, these $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$ satisfy the conditions for the existence of the genus 2 curves in Theorem 1.

We give the proof in the appendix.
We are now able to state our main result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let $L \geq 7$ be odd, and $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}$ be a prime for some $r \geq 0$. If $r=0$, then for $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1$ there exists a genus 2 curve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$ with the property that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2 \cdot 3 \cdot N_{0}$, and $a_{1}=1, a_{2}=-2^{m}$. If $r \geq 0$, then for each integer $m$ in the interval $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1$, there exists a genus 2 curve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$ with the property that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{x}\left(2^{2^{r}}+1\right) N_{r}$, where $x=2 m-2^{r}(L+2)$, and $a_{1}=-1, a_{2}=2^{m}+2^{x}$.

Proof. Let $L \geq 7$ be odd. Let $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}}+1}$ be a prime for some $r \geq 0$.
Let us first consider when $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1$ and $r=0$. We will find $a_{1}, a_{2}$ so that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2 \cdot 3 \cdot N_{0}$. Suppose $a_{1}=1$. Then we need an $a_{2}$ such that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=$ $2^{2 m}+2^{m}+a_{2}+2=2 \cdot 3 \cdot N_{0}$. That is, such that $2^{2 m}+2^{m}+a_{2}+2=2^{L+3}+2$. Since $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1$, then $L=2 m-3$, so we have $2^{2 m}+2^{m}+a_{2}=2^{2 m}$. Thus $a_{2}=-2^{m}$. So we see that $a_{1}=1$ and $a_{2}=-2^{m}$ satisfy $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2 \cdot 3 \cdot N_{0}$.

Now let $r \geq 0$ be any integer not equal to 1 , and let us consider when $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq$ $m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1$. We will find $a_{1}, a_{2}$ so that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{2 m}+a_{1} 2^{m}+a_{1}+a_{2}+1=$ $2^{x}\left(2^{2^{r}}+1\right) N_{r}$ for some integer $x$. Suppose $a_{1}=-1$. Then we need an $a_{2}$ such that $2^{2 m}-2^{m}+a_{2}=2^{2^{r}(L+2)+x}+2^{x}$. Suppose $2^{2 m}=2^{2^{r}(L+2)+x}$, and so $-2^{m}+a_{2}=2^{x}$. Then $x=2 m-2^{r}(L+2)$, and $a_{2}=2^{m}+2^{x}$. Thus we have found an $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ that satisfy $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{x}\left(2^{2^{r}}+1\right) N_{r}$. Now, by Proposition 1 , these $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ above, with $m$ in the specified range, satisfy the conditions for the existence of a genus 2 curve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$. Thus the theorem is complete.

Now let $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)=h N_{r}$. For the most efficient implementation of a pairingbased cryptosystem, we would like the cofactor $h$ to be small. So we examine the approximate ratio between the size (in bits) of the curve group and the subgroup of prime order $N_{r}$. Since $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)=q^{2}+a_{1}(q+1)+a_{2}+1$, we let the parameter that measures this ratio be $\rho=\frac{2 \log _{2} q}{\log _{2} N_{r}}$. The ideal situation is to have $\rho \sim 1$. For our family of curves, we see that $\rho \sim \frac{m}{2^{r-1}(L+1)}$, which is often near 1 and at most 2. In particular, when $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1$, we get $\rho \sim \frac{L+3}{L+1}$. When $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq$ $2^{r}(L+1)-1$, the ratio can be as small as $\rho \sim \frac{4(L+2)}{3(L+1)}$ and at most $\rho \sim 2-\frac{2}{2^{r}(L+1)}$.

In [6], an algorithm for point compression is proposed when the order of an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$ is divisible by a power of two. In our case, since $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)$ is divisible by a high power of two, these curves may lend themselves to point compression using methods similar to those in [6].

Table 1 gives some examples of the parameters for curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ yielding small embedding degrees $k=8,13,16,23,26,37,46$. A systematic way of determining the explicit coefficients of a curve when given the $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ parameters that distinguish the isogeny class of its Jacobian is not yet established. As such, in Example 1 we have used brute force with MAGMA code to generate some examples of these curves over small $\mathbb{F}_{q}$.

Example 1. We give examples over small $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ for $r=0$. We let $g$ be a primitive element of $\mathbb{F}_{q}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& L=9, m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1=6, k=11, \rho \sim 6 / 5, \\
& \quad C: y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+g^{8} x^{3}+g^{3} x^{2}+g x, \\
& L=9, m=\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil=8, k=11, \rho \sim 8 / 5 \\
& \quad C: y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+g^{7} x^{3}+g^{7} x \\
& L=9, m=2^{r}(L+1)-1=9, k=22, \rho \sim 9 / 5 \\
& \quad C: y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+g^{8} x^{3}+g^{3} x \\
& L=11, m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1=7, k=26, \rho \sim 7 / 6 \\
& \quad C: y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+g^{92} x^{3}+g^{7} x^{2}+g x \\
& L=15, m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1=9, k=34, \rho \sim 9 / 8 \\
& \quad C: y^{2}+x y=x^{5}+g^{103} x^{3}+g^{5} x^{2}+g x
\end{aligned}
$$

## 5 Size of the embedding degrees

We examine the size of the embedding degrees of the family of curves from Theorem 2 . We find that these curves always yield embedding degrees such that $k<(\log q)^{2}$, which suggests that the embedding degree may be small enough so that computations are feasible.

Proposition 2. Let $q=2^{m}, L>1$ be odd, $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}$ be prime for some $r \geq 0$, and $k$ be the embedding degree of curve $C$ with respect to $N_{r}$. If $L \geq 9$, then for each integer $m$ in the interval $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{L^{3}}\right\rceil \leq m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1, k<(\log q)^{2}$. If $L \geq 13$, then when $r=0$ and $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1, k<(\log q)^{2}$.

Proof. Let $\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1$. By Lemma 5, the largest that $k$ can be is $k=2^{r+1}(L+2)$, so it suffices to consider this case. Given the acceptable range

| k | L | r | m | $a_{1}$ | $a_{2}$ | $\rho$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 8 | 35 | 2 | 111 | -1 | $2^{111}+2^{74}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 8 | 87 | 2 | 267 | -1 | $2^{267}+2^{178}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 8 | 147 | 2 | 447 | -1 | $2^{447}+2^{298}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 13 | 11 | 3 | 80 | -1 | $2^{80}+2^{56}$ | $5 / 3$ |
| 16 | 11 | 3 | 91 | -1 | $2^{91}+2^{78}$ | 2 |
| 23 | 21 | 2 | 64 | -1 | $2^{64}+2^{36}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 23 | 21 | 2 | 72 | -1 | $2^{72}+2^{52}$ | $5 / 3$ |
| 23 | 21 | 2 | 80 | -1 | $2^{80}+2^{68}$ | $9 / 5$ |
| 26 | 11 | 3 | 72 | -1 | $2^{72}+2^{40}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 26 | 11 | 3 | 88 | -1 | $2^{88}+2^{72}$ | $9 / 5$ |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 104 | -1 | $2^{104}+2^{60}$ | $7 / 5$ |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 112 | -1 | $2^{112}+2^{76}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 120 | -1 | $2^{120}+2^{92}$ | $5 / 3$ |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 128 | -1 | $2^{128}+2^{108}$ | $9 / 5$ |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 136 | -1 | $2^{136}+2^{124}$ | 2 |
| 46 | 21 | 2 | 68 | -1 | $2^{68}+2^{44}$ | $3 / 2$ |
| 46 | 21 | 2 | 76 | -1 | $2^{76}+2^{60}$ | $7 / 4$ |
| 46 | 21 | 2 | 84 | -1 | $2^{84}+2^{76}$ | 2 |
| 52 | 11 | 3 | 76 | -1 | $2^{76}+2^{48}$ | $5 / 3$ |
| 52 | 11 | 3 | 88 | -1 | $2^{88}+2^{64}$ | $7 / 4$ |
| 52 | 11 | 3 | 92 | -1 | $2^{92}+2^{80}$ | 2 |

Table 1. Examples of parameters for families of curves over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$ with small embedding degree $k$.
for $m$, it is enough to show $k<(\log q)^{2}$ for $m=\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil$.

$$
\begin{gathered}
k<(\log q)^{2} \Leftrightarrow 2^{r+1}(L+2)<\left(\log 2^{\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}}\right)^{2} \\
\Leftrightarrow 2^{r+1}(L+2)<\left(\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right)^{2}(\log 2)^{2} \\
\Leftrightarrow 9 \cdot 2^{r+1}(L+2)<2^{2 r+2}\left(\log ^{2} 2\right)(L+2)^{2} \\
\Leftrightarrow 0<2^{r+1}\left(\log ^{2} 2\right)(L+2)-9 .
\end{gathered}
$$

This holds if $L>\frac{9}{2^{r+1}\left(\log ^{2} 2\right)}-2$, that is, if $L \geq 8$ for $r=0$, and $L \geq 1$ for $r \geq 2$. Since we require $L$ to be odd, we can say that $L \geq 9$ for any $r \geq 0$ gives the result. Now let $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1$ and $r=0$. By Lemma 5 , it suffices to consider $k=2(L+2)$.

$$
\begin{gathered}
k<(\log q)^{2} \Leftrightarrow 2(L+2)<\left(\log 2^{(L+1) / 2+1}\right)^{2}=((L+1) / 2+1)^{2}\left(\log ^{2} 2\right) \\
\Leftrightarrow 2(L+1)+2<\frac{\log ^{2} 2}{4}(L+1)^{2}+\left(\log ^{2} 2\right)(L+1)+\log ^{2} 2 \\
\Leftrightarrow 0<\frac{\log ^{2} 2}{4}(L+1)^{2}+\left(\left(\log ^{2} 2-2\right)\right)(L+1)+\left(\log ^{2} 2-2\right) .
\end{gathered}
$$

This holds if $L+1>\frac{-\left(\log ^{2} 2-2\right)+\sqrt{\left(\log ^{2} 2-2\right)^{2}-\left(\log ^{2} 2\right)\left(\log ^{2} 2-2\right)}}{\frac{\log ^{2} 2}{2}}$, that is, if $L \geq 13$.

We note that the latest results, in [5], give an algorithm for computing discrete $\operatorname{logs}$ in finite fields $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}$ with heuristic complexity $L_{q^{k}}(1 / 3)=\exp \left(o\left(\log q^{k}\right)^{1 / 3}\left(\log \log q^{k}\right)^{2 / 3}\right)$. So in order for an attack to be sub-exponential in $q$, one needs $k \in o\left(\left(\frac{\log q}{\log \log q}\right)^{2}\right)$.

## 6 Minimal embedding field

In [4], the author noted that the notion of embedding degree $k$ is not the appropriate indicator of cryptographic security, as the actual minimal embedding field (where solving the DLP would take place) can be much smaller than suggested by $k$. In particular, if $q=p^{m}$, then the pairings embed into $\mu_{N}$ which lies in $\mathbb{F}_{p^{\text {ord }_{N}}}$, not merely in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*}$. This difference in the size of the groups can be quite large, by as much as a factor of $m$.

Let $\Delta=\frac{m}{\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} p, m\right)}$, so that $\Delta=1$ corresponds to $k$ being an accurate indicator of the minimal embedding field, and $\Delta=m$ corresponds to $k$ being the least accurate indicator of the minimal embedding field. To illustrate the discrepancy, we now give a family of curves whose parameter $\Delta=m$. This family of curves is such that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$ is divisible by a Mersenne prime $N$.

Proposition 3. Let $q=2^{m}$, and $p \geq 5$ be a prime. If $N=2^{p}-1$ is prime, then for each integer $m$ such that $\left\lceil\frac{2 p}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq p-1$, there exists a genus 2 curve $C$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$ with the property that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{2 m-p} N$, where $a_{1}=-1$ and $a_{2}=2^{m}-2^{2 m-p}$. The embedding degree $k$ is $k=p$ and the additional parameter is $\Delta=m$.

We give the proof in the appendix. This family of curves demonstrates a case when the notion of embedding degree $k$ is quite an inaccurate indicator of security, as pairings on this group embed into $\mathbb{F}_{2^{p}}^{*}$, not merely into $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}^{*}=\mathbb{F}_{2^{m p}}^{*}$.

So we examine $\Delta$ for the families of genus 2 curves corresponding to the prime $N_{r}$ 's given in Theorem 2. As we mentioned, it is desirable for $\Delta$ to be near 1, and far from $m$. We find $\Delta$ is often close to 1 , and is at most $m / 4$ for the curves in Table 1.

Galbraith in [3] notes that for a genus $g$ curve, $k / g$ is a more accurate indicator of the security, as it reflects the applicability of sub-exponential algorithms for solving the DLP in the finite field. So in light of the observation of [4], in order to properly indicate the minimal embedding field, we let a security parameter be $k^{\prime}=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2}{g}$. Table 2 gives the examples of our curves with the sizes (in bits) of the field $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}$ and prime order subgroup, along with $g k^{\prime}$, thus providing a more accurate security comparison between the DLP on the curve and in the finite field.

We recall that the difficulty of solving a DLP in a subgroup of prime 160 -bit order on a curves is roughly equivalent to solving a DLP in a (subgroup of a) finite field of around 1024-bits. As security increases, one has the respective correspondence of the DLP as above being approximately 256 -bits to 3072 -bits and 512 -bits to $15360-$ bits. We present the numerical data in Table 2, recognizing that for some of these examples, the DLP on the curve is easy, so the difficulty of the DLP in the finite field is irrelevant.

| k | L | r | m | $a_{1}$ | $a_{2}$ | $\log _{2} N_{r}$ | $k \log _{2} q$ | $g k^{\prime}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 8 | 35 | 2 | 111 | -1 | $2^{111}+2^{74}$ | 143 | 888 | 296 |
| 8 | 87 | 2 | 267 | -1 | $2^{267}+2^{178}$ | 351 | 2136 | 712 |
| 8 | 147 | 2 | 447 | -1 | $2^{447}+2^{298}$ | 591 | 3576 | 1192 |
| 13 | 11 | 3 | 80 | -1 | $2^{80}+2^{56}$ | 95 | 1040 | 208 |
| 16 | 11 | 3 | 91 | -1 | $2^{91}+2^{78}$ | 95 | 1456 | 208 |
| 23 | 21 | 2 | 64 | -1 | $2^{64}+2^{36}$ | 87 | 1472 | 184 |
| 23 | 21 | 2 | 72 | -1 | $2^{72}+2^{52}$ | 87 | 1656 | 184 |
| 23 | 21 | 2 | 80 | -1 | $2^{80}+2^{68}$ | 87 | 1840 | 184 |
| 26 | 11 | 3 | 72 | -1 | $2^{72}+2^{40}$ | 95 | 1872 | 208 |
| 26 | 11 | 3 | 88 | -1 | $2^{88}+2^{72}$ | 95 | 2288 | 208 |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 104 | -1 | $2^{104}+2^{60}$ | 143 | 3848 | 296 |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 112 | -1 | $2^{112}+2^{76}$ | 143 | 4144 | 296 |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 120 | -1 | $2^{120}+2^{92}$ | 143 | 4440 | 296 |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 128 | -1 | $2^{128}+2^{108}$ | 143 | 4736 | 296 |
| 37 | 35 | 2 | 136 | -1 | $2^{136}+2^{124}$ | 143 | 5032 | 296 |
| 46 | 21 | 2 | 68 | -1 | $2^{68}+2^{44}$ | 87 | 3128 | 184 |
| 46 | 21 | 2 | 76 | -1 | $2^{76}+2^{60}$ | 87 | 3496 | 184 |
| 46 | 21 | 2 | 84 | -1 | $2^{84}+2^{76}$ | 87 | 3864 | 184 |
| 52 | 11 | 3 | 76 | -1 | $2^{76}+2^{48}$ | 95 | 3952 | 208 |
| 52 | 11 | 3 | 88 | -1 | $2^{88}+2^{64}$ | 95 | 4368 | 208 |
| 52 | 11 | 3 | 92 | -1 | $2^{92}+2^{80}$ | 95 | 4784 | 208 |

Table 2. Examples of families of curves over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}$ with parameters for comparison of security.

## 7 Concluding remarks

Hyperelliptic curves are receiving increased attention for use in cryptosystems, which involves the search for pairing-friendly curves. We have given a sequence of $\mathbb{F}_{q^{-}}$ isogeny classes for a family of Jacobians of genus 2 , 2-rank 1 curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, for $q=2^{m}$, and their corresponding small embedding degrees. In particular, we gave examples of the parameters for such curves with embedding degree $k<(\log q)^{2}$, such as $k=8,13,16,23,26,37,46$, so that the computations in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k}}$ may be feasible.

For efficient implementation of pairing-based cryptography on genus g curves, it is desirable that the ratio $\rho=\frac{g \log _{2} q}{\log _{2} N}$ be approximately unity, where $N$ is the order of the subgroup with embedding degree $k$. Our family of curves yields $\rho$ often near 1 and never more than 2.

We also gave another family of curves over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$, whose minimal embedding field is much smaller than the one indicated by the embedding degree $k$. That is, the field exponents differ by a factor of $m$, which demonstrates that the embedding degree may be an inaccurate indicator of security. As a result, we used a security parameter $k^{\prime}=\frac{\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2}{g}$ to examine the cryptographic security of our family of curves.

A systematic way of determining the explicit coefficients of a curve when given the ( $a_{1}, a_{2}$ ) parameters that distinguish the isogeny class of its Jacobian is not yet established. This is an area to be explored in future research, so that one can construct such curves of cryptographic size.

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## A Proof of Proposition 1

We give the proof of Proposition 1, which establishes the existence of genus 2 curves with specific conditions on $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$. Theorem 2 showed that the Jacobian of each of these curves is divisible by the prime $N_{r}=\frac{2^{2^{r}(L+2)}+1}{2^{2^{r}+1}}$, for odd $L>1$ and $r \geq 0$.

Proof. Clearly $a_{1}$ is odd and $\left|a_{1}\right| \leq 4 \sqrt{q}$.
Let us show $2\left|a_{1}\right| \sqrt{q}-2 q \leq a_{2} \leq a_{1}^{2} / 4+2 q$. Clearly the first case (when $a_{1}=1$ and $a_{2}=-q$ for $m=\frac{L+1}{2}+1 \geq 5$ ) giving $2 \sqrt{q}-2 q \leq-q \leq 1 / 4+2 q$ is true. Now consider the second case (when $a_{1}=-1$, and $a_{2}=2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}$ ):

$$
\begin{gathered}
2 \sqrt{q}-2 q \leq a_{2} \leq 1 / 4+2 q \\
\Longleftrightarrow 2^{m / 2+1}-2^{m+1} \leq 2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)} \leq 1 / 4+2^{m+1} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Clearly the first inequality holds. The second inequality holds if and only if $2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)} \leq$ $2^{m}$, which holds if and only if $m \leq 2^{r}(L+2)$. This is true since $m \leq 2^{r}(L+1)-1$.

Let us show $2^{\lceil m / 2\rceil} \mid a_{2}$. Clearly the first case is true: $2^{\lceil m / 2\rceil} \mid-2^{m}$. Now consider the second case:

$$
\begin{gathered}
2^{\lceil m / 2\rceil} \mid 2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)} \\
\Longleftrightarrow 2 m-2^{r}(L+2) \geq\lceil m / 2\rceil \\
\Longleftrightarrow\lfloor 3 m / 2\rfloor \geq 2^{r}(L+2) \\
\Longleftrightarrow m \geq\left\lceil\frac{2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}\right\rceil
\end{gathered}
$$

Thus the condition holds.
Now we show $\Delta=a_{1}^{2}-4 a_{2}+8 q$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}$. The first case yields $\Delta=1+3 \cdot 2^{m+2}$. Suppose $\Delta=1+3 \cdot 2^{m+2}=x^{2}$ for some integer $x$. Since $1+3 \cdot 2^{m+2}$ is odd, then $x$ is odd, so let $x=2 k+1$ for some integer $k$. Then $\Delta$ is a square if and only if $3 \cdot 2^{m}=k(k+1)$. Now, either $k$ or $k+1$ is odd. If $k=3$, then $k+1=4=2^{m}$, so $m=2$. If $k+1=3$, then $k=2=2^{m}$, so $m=1$. Thus $\Delta$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}$ for $m \geq 3$. The second case yields $\Delta=2^{2\left(m+1-2^{r-1}(L+2)\right)}\left(2^{2^{r}(L+2)-m}-1\right)+1$. For contradiction, suppose $\Delta=2^{2\left(m+1-2^{r-1}(L+2)\right)}\left(2^{2^{r}(L+2)-m}-1\right)+1=x^{2}$ for some integer $x$. Since $\Delta$ is odd, then $x$ is odd, so let $x=2 k+1$ for some integer $k$. Then
$\Delta$ is a square if and only if $2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}\left(2^{2^{r}(L+2)-m}-1\right)=k(k+1)$. That is, if and only if $2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}$ and $\left(2^{2^{r}(L+2)-m}-1\right)$ differ by one. But such powers of two can never be this close, so $\Delta$ is not a square.

Now we show $\delta=\left(a_{2}+2 q\right)^{2}-4 q a_{1}^{2}$ is not a square in the 2 -adic integers, $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$. That is, for $\delta=2^{x} b$, we must show that either $b \not \equiv 1 \bmod 8$ or $x \equiv 1 \bmod 2$. The first case yields $\delta=q^{2}-4 q=2^{m+2}\left(2^{m-2}-1\right)$. So $b=2^{m-2}-1 \equiv-1 \bmod 8$ for $m \geq 5$. Therefore $\delta$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$ for $m \geq 5$.
Now consider the second case:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\delta=\left(2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}+2^{m+1}\right)^{2}-2^{m+2} \\
=\left(2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}\right)^{2}+2^{m+2}\left(2^{m}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}\right)+2^{2 m+2}-2^{m+2} \\
=2^{2 m+3}+2^{2 m}+2^{3 m-2^{r}(L+2)+2}+2^{3 m-2^{r}(L+2)+1}+2^{4 m-2^{r+1}(L+2)}-2^{m+2} \\
=2^{m+2}\left(2^{m+1}+2^{m-2}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)}+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)-1}+2^{3 m-2^{r}(L+2)-2}-1\right) \\
\Rightarrow b=2^{m-2}\left(2^{3}+1\right)+2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)-1}(2+1)+2^{3 m-2^{r+1}(L+2)-2}-1
\end{gathered}
$$

For $m \geq 5$, we have
$b \equiv 2^{2 m-2^{r}(L+2)-1}(3)+2^{3 m-2^{r+1}(L+2)-2}-1 \equiv 2^{3 m-2^{r+1}(L+2)-2}\left(2^{2^{r}(L+2)-m-1} 3+1\right)-1$
Now, suppose $b \equiv 1 \bmod 8$. Then

$$
\begin{gathered}
b \equiv 2^{3 m-2^{r+1}(L+2)-2}\left(2^{2^{r}(L+2)-m-1} 3+1\right) \equiv 2 \bmod 8 \\
\Rightarrow 3 m-2^{r+1}(L+2)-2=1 \\
\quad \Rightarrow m=\frac{3+2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3}
\end{gathered}
$$

But $L+2$ is prime, so $m=\frac{3+2^{r+1}(L+2)}{3} \notin \mathbb{Z}$. This is a contradiction, so $b \not \equiv 1 \bmod 8$. Thus $\delta$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$.

Therefore the all the conditions for the existence of genus 2 curves $C$ over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ are satisfied for the given $\left(a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$ described in the proposition.

## B Proof of Proposition 3

We give a proof of Proposition 3, which establishes the existence of a family of curves whose Jacobian is divisible by a Mersenne prime. The proposition also determines the embedding degree and measures the difference between the size of the actual minimal embedding field and the one suggested by the embedding degree.

Proof. First let us show that the conditions of Theorem 1 are met for the existence of genus 2 curves $C$ when $a_{1}=-1$ and $a_{2}=2^{m}-2^{2 m-p}$. Clearly $a_{1}$ is odd, and $\left|a_{1}\right| \leq 4 \sqrt{q}$. Let us show $2 \sqrt{q}-2 q \leq a_{2} \leq 1 / 4+2 q$, that is,

$$
2^{m / 2+1}-2^{m+1} \leq 2^{m}-2^{2 m-p} \leq 1 / 4+2^{m+1} .
$$

Clearly the second inequality holds. The first inequality holds if

$$
2^{m / 2+1}+2^{2 m-p}=2^{m}\left(2^{1-m / 2}+2^{m-p}\right) \leq 2^{m} 3 .
$$

This holds if $m-p \leq 1$. But our restriction that $\left\lceil\frac{2 p}{3}\right\rceil \leq m \leq p-1$ implies $m-p \leq-1$, so we see this condition holds true.

Now let us show that $2^{\lceil m / 2\rceil}$ divides $a_{2}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
2^{\lceil m / 2\rceil} \mid 2^{m}- & 2^{2 m-p} \Longleftrightarrow 2 m-p \geq\lceil m / 2\rceil \\
& \Longleftrightarrow\lfloor 3 m / 2\rfloor \geq p \\
& \Longleftrightarrow m \geq\left\lceil\frac{2 p}{3}\right\rceil
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus the condition holds.
Now let us show $\Delta=a_{1}^{2}-4 a_{2}+8 q$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}$.
For contradiction, suppose $\Delta=1-2^{m+2}+2^{2 m-p+2}+2^{m+3}=1+2^{2 m-p+2}+2^{m+2}=x^{2}$ for some integer $x$. Since $\Delta$ is odd, then $x$ is odd, so let $x=2 n+1$ for some integer $n$. Then $\Delta$ is a square if and only if $2^{2 m-p}\left(2^{p-m}+1\right)=n(n+1)$, if and only if $2 m-p=p-m$, that is, $m=2 p / 3$. But $p \geq 5$ is prime, so $m$ is not an integer, thus this cannot happen. Therefore $\Delta$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}$.

Now let us show $\delta=\left(a_{2}+2 q\right)^{2}-4 q a_{1}^{2}$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$. That is, for $\delta=2^{x} b$, we must show that either $b \not \equiv 1 \bmod 8$ or $x \equiv 1 \bmod 2$. Now

$$
\begin{gathered}
\delta=\left(2^{m}-2^{2 m-p}+2^{m+1}\right)^{2}-2^{m+2} \\
=\left(2^{m}-2^{P} 2 m-p\right)^{2}+2^{m+2}\left(2^{m}-2^{2 m-p}\right)+2^{2 m+2}-2^{m+2} \\
=2^{2 m+3}+2^{m}-2^{3 m-p+2}-2^{3 m-p+1}+2^{4 m-2 p}-2^{m+2} \\
2^{m+2}\left(2^{m+1}+2^{m-2}-2^{2 m-p}-2^{2 m-p-1}+2^{3 m-2 p-2}-1\right) \\
\Rightarrow b=2^{m-2}\left(2^{3}+1\right)-2^{2 m-p-1}(2+1)+2^{3 m-2 p-2}-1
\end{gathered}
$$

For $m \geq 5$, we have

$$
b \equiv-2^{2 m-p-1} 3+2^{3 m-2 p-2}-1 \equiv 2^{3 m-2 p-2}\left(1-2^{p-m+1} 3\right)-1
$$

Now, suppose $b \equiv 1 \bmod 8$. Then

$$
\begin{gathered}
b \equiv 2^{3 m-2 p-2}\left(1-2^{p-m+1} 3\right) \equiv 2 \bmod 8 \\
\Rightarrow 3 m-2 p-2=1 \\
\Rightarrow m=\frac{3+2 p}{3}
\end{gathered}
$$

But $p$ is prime, so $m=\frac{3+2 p}{3} \notin \mathbb{Z}$. This is a contradiction, so $b \not \equiv 1 \bmod 8$. Thus $\delta$ is not a square in $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$. Therefore the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied for the existence of a curve $C$ over $\mathbb{F}_{q}$.

Now let us show that $\# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{2 m-p} N$ whenever $a_{1}=-1$ and $a_{2}=2^{m}-$ $2^{2 m-p}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=q^{2}+a_{1} q+a_{2}+a_{1}+1=2^{2 m}-2^{2 m-p} \\
& \quad \Rightarrow \# J_{C}\left(\mathbb{F}_{2^{m}}\right)=2^{2 m-p}\left(2^{p}-1\right)=2^{2 m-p} N
\end{aligned}
$$

Now we find the embedding degree $k$ with respect to $N=2^{p}-1$. We see that $\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2=p$, so $\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2, m\right)=1$ since $m \leq p-1$. Therefore by Lemma $2, k=p$, and the difference in field exponents is $\frac{m}{\operatorname{gcd}\left(\operatorname{ord}_{N} 2, m\right)}=m$. Thus the proof of the proposition is complete.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ We view $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ as a general field extension, though for practical cryptographic applications, one usually restricts to prime degree field extensions in order to avoid Weil descent attacks.

[^1]:    

