TET: A wide-block tweakable mode based on Naor-Reingold

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Abstract

This work describes a mode of operation, TET, that turns a regular block cipher into a length-preserving enciphering scheme for messages of (almost) arbitrary length. When using an n-bit block cipher, the resulting scheme can handle input of any bit-length between n and 2^n and associated data of arbitrary length.

The mode TET is a concrete instantiation of the generic mode of operation that was proposed by Naor and Reingold, extended to handle tweaks and inputs of arbitrary bit length. The main technical trick in this mode is a construction of invertible "universal hashing" on wide blocks which is as efficient to compute and invert as polynomial-evaluation hash.

1 Introductions

Adding secrecy protection to existing (legacy) protocols and applications raises some unique problems. One of these problems is that existing protocols sometimes require that the encryption be "transparent", and in particular preclude length-expansion. One example is encryption of storage data "at the sector level", where both the higher-level operating system and the lower-level disk expect the data to be stored in blocks of 512 bytes, and so any encryption method would have to accept 512-byte plaintext and produce 512-byte ciphertext.

Clearly, insisting on a length-preserving (and hence deterministic) transformation has many drawbacks. Indeed, even the weakest common notion of security for "general purpose encryption" (i.e., semantic security [GM84]) cannot be achieved by deterministic encryption. Still, there may be cases where length-preservation is a hard requirement (due to technical, economical or even political constrains), and in such cases one may want to use some encryption scheme that gives better protection than no encryption at all. The strongest notion of security for a length-preserving transformation is "strong pseudo-random permutation" (SPRP) as defined by Luby and Rackoff [LR88], and its extension to "tweakable SPRP" by Liskov et al. [LRW02]. A "tweak" is an additional input to the enciphering and deciphering procedures that need not be kept secret. This report uses the terms "tweak" and "associated data" pretty much interchangeably, except that "associated data" hints that it can be of arbitrary length.

Motivated by the application to "sector level encryption", many modes of operation that implement tweakable SPRP on wide blocks were described in the literature in the last few years. The current modes, however, are either rather inefficient (ABL4 [MV04] and PEP [CS06]) or potentially



Figure 1: The Naor-Reingold generic mode: the universal hashing must be invertible, and its job is to prevent collisions in the ECB layer.

covered by IP claims (CMC/EME [HR03, HR04, Hal04], XCB [FM04], and a slight variant of XCB called HCTR [WFW05]).

The motivation for this work was therefore to present an efficient and patent-free mode. The result is a mode that I call TET (for linear-Transformation; ECB; linear-Transformation). The TET mode is a concrete instantiation of the generic Naor-Reingold mode [NR97], extended to handle tweaks and inputs of arbitrary bit length.

Recall that the Naor-Reingold construction from [NR97] involves a layer of ECB encryption, sandwiched between two layers of universal hashing, as described in Figure 1. The universal hashing layers must be invertible (since they need to be inverted upon decryption), and their job is to ensure that different queries of the attacker will almost never result in "collisions" at the ECB layer. Namely, for any two plaintext vectors $\vec{p} = \langle p_1, \ldots, p_m \rangle$, $\vec{q} = \langle q_1, \ldots, q_m \rangle$ and two indexes i, j (such that $(\vec{p}, i) \neq (\vec{q}, j)$) it should hold with high probability (over the hashing key) that the i'th block of hashing $\vec{p}$ is different from the j'th block of hashing $\vec{q}$.

From a technical perspective, the main contribution of this note is a construction of an invertible universal hashing on wide blocks, which is as efficient to compute and invert as polynomial-evaluation hash. In a nutshell, the hashing family works on vectors in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)^m$, and it is keyed by a single random element $\tau \in_R \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, which defines the following $m \times m$ matrix:

$$A_\tau \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \tau & \tau^2 & & \tau^m \\ \tau & \tau^2 & & \tau^m \\ & & \ddots & \\ \tau & \tau^2 & & \tau^m \end{pmatrix}$$

Set $\sigma \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 1 \oplus \tau \oplus \tau^2 \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^m$, we observe that if $\sigma \neq 0$ then the matrix $M_\tau = A_\tau \oplus I$ is invertible and its inverse is $M_\tau^{-1} = (A_\tau/\sigma) \oplus I$. Thus multiplying by M_τ for a random τ (subject to $\sigma \neq 0$) is an invertible universal hashing, and computing and inverting this hash function is

about as efficient as computing polynomial evaluation. This invertible hashing construction may find uses beyond wide-block tweakable encryption.

The starting point of this work is an implementation of the generic Naor-Reingold mode of operation using the above for the universal hashing layers. We then extend that mode to handle associated data and input of arbitrary length, thus getting the TET mode. Specifically, TET takes a standard cipher with n-bit blocks and turns it into a tweakable enciphering scheme with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{n..2^n-1}$ (i.e., any string of at least n and at most $2^n - 1$ bits) and tweak space $\mathcal{T} = \{0,1\}^*$. The key for TET consists of two keys of the underlying cipher (roughly one to process the tweak and another to process the data). Compared to previous modes, TET offers the same performance characteristics as XCB. Namely, it is significantly more efficient than PEP and ABL4, and almost as efficient as EME*.

A word on notations. Throughout this note we use $\oplus$ to denote addition over a characteristic-two field (i.e., an exclusive-or), and we use $+$ to denote addition in other fields/rings (e.g., integer addition). The sum operator $\sum$ is used to denote characteristic-two addition, so $\sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i = x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus x_m$. Also, multiplication and exponentiation are almost always in the finite field $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ where n is the block size of the underlying cipher, or in vector spaces that are defined over that field. (One of the few exceptions is the use of 2^n to denote the integer two to the n'th power.)

Organization. Some standard definitions are recalled in Appendix A (which is taken almost verbatim from [HR04, Hal04]). Section 2 describes the hashing scheme that underlies TET, Section 3 describes the TET mode itself, and Section 4 contains a proof of security for this mode.

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2 The underlying hashing scheme

The universality property that is needed for the Naor-Reingold mode of operation is defined next.

Definition 1 *Let $H : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}^m$ be a hashing family from some domain $\mathcal{D}$ to m-vectors over the range $\mathcal{R}$, with keys chosen uniformly from $\mathcal{K}$. We denote by $H_k(x)$ the output of H (which is an m-vector over $\mathcal{R}$) on key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and input $x \in \mathcal{D}$. We also denote by $H_k(x)_i$ the i'th element of that output vector.*

For a real number $\epsilon \in (0,1)$, we say that $\mathcal{H}$ is "ϵ-blockwise-universal" if for every $x, x' \in \mathcal{D}$ and integers $i, i' \le m$ such that $(x,i) \neq (x',i')$, it holds that $\Pr_k[H_k(x)_i = H_k(x')_{i'}] \le \epsilon$, where the probability is taken over the uniform choice of $k \in \mathcal{K}$.

We say that $\mathcal{H}$ is "ϵ-xor-blockwise-universal" if in addition for all fixed $\Delta \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ it holds that $\Pr_k[H_k(x)_i \oplus H_k(x')_{i'} = \Delta] \le \epsilon$.

It was proven in [NR99] that the construction from Figure 1 is a strong PRP on wide blocks provided that the hashing layers are blockwise universal and invertible, and the underlying cipher E is a strong PRP on narrow blocks.

2.1 BPE: A blockwise universal hashing scheme

To get an invertible blockwise universal hash function, Naor and Reingold proposed in [NR97] to use an unbalanced Feistel network with standard universal hashing. For example, use polynomial-evaluation hash function applied to the first $m-1$ blocks, xor the result to the last block, and then derive $m-1$ "pairwise independent" values from the last block and xor them back to the first $m-1$ blocks. This solution, however, is somewhat unsatisfying in that it entails inherent asymmetry (which is likely to raise problems with implementations).

Below we propose a somewhat more elegant blockwise universal hashing based on a simple algebraic trick. As described in the introduction, we consider the $m \times m$ matrix $M_\tau \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} A_\tau \oplus I$ for an element $\tau \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, where

$$A_\tau \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \tau & \tau^2 & & \tau^m \\ \tau & \tau^2 & & \tau^m \\ & & \ddots & \\ \tau & \tau^2 & & \tau^m \end{pmatrix} \tag{1}$$

It is easy to check that the determinant of M_τ (over a characteristic-2 field) is $\sigma \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=0}^{m} \tau^i$, and so M_τ is invertible if and only if $\sigma \neq 0$. We observe that when it is invertible, the structure of M_τ^{-1} is very similar to the structure of M_τ itself.

Observation 1 *Let $\tau \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ be such that $\sigma \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=0}^{m} \tau^i \neq 0$, let A_τ be an $m \times m$ matrix with $A_{i,j} = \tau^j$, and let $M_\tau \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} A_\tau \oplus I$. Then $M_\tau^{-1} = (A_\tau/\sigma) \oplus I$.*

Proof We first note that $A^2 = A(1 \oplus \sigma)$ (over a characteristic-2 field), since for all i, j we have

$$(A^2)_{i,j} \;=\; \sum_{k=1}^{m} \tau^{k+j} \;=\; \tau^j \left(1 \oplus \sum_{k=0}^{m} \tau^k\right) \;=\; A_{i,j} \cdot (1 \oplus \sigma)$$

Therefore, assuming $\sigma \neq 0$ we get

$$(A \oplus I) \cdot (\frac{A}{\sigma} \oplus I) \;=\; \frac{A^2}{\sigma} \oplus A \oplus \frac{A}{\sigma} \oplus I \;=\; \frac{A(1 \oplus \sigma) \oplus A \cdot \sigma \oplus A}{\sigma} \oplus I \;=\; I$$

■

It follows that computing $\mathbf{y} = M_\tau \mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{x} = M_\tau^{-1} \mathbf{y}$ can be done as efficiently as computing polynomial-evaluation hash. Namely, to compute $\mathbf{y} = M_\tau \mathbf{x}$ we first compute $s = \sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i \tau^i$ and set $y_i = x_i \oplus s$, and to invert $\mathbf{x} = M_\tau^{-1} \mathbf{y}$ we re-compute s as $s = \sum_{i=1}^{m} y_i (\tau^i/\sigma)$ and set $x_i = y_i \oplus s$. Moreover, since τ and σ depend only the hashing key, one can speed up the multiplication by τ and τ/σ by pre-computing some tables (cf. [Sho96]).

The blockwise-universal family BPE**.** Given the observation from above, we define the hashing family BPE (for Blockwise Polynomial-Evaluation) and its inverse BPE^{-1} as follows:

Input: An m-vector of elements from $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, $\mathbf{x} = \langle x_1, \ldots, x_m \rangle \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)^m$.
Keys: Two elements $\tau, \beta \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, such that $\sum_{i=0}^{m} \tau^m \neq 0$.

Output: Let α be some fixed primitive element of $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, and denote by $\mathbf{b} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \beta, \alpha\beta, \ldots, \alpha^{m-1}\beta \rangle$ the m-vector over $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ whose i'th entry is $\alpha^{i-1}\beta$. The two hash functions $\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})$ and $\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})$ are defined as

$$\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} M_\tau \mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{b} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} M_\tau^{-1}(\mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{b}) \tag{2}$$

By construction if follows that $\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})) = \mathbf{x}$ for all $\mathbf{x}$ and all τ, β (provided that $\sum_{i=0}^{m} \tau^m \neq 0$). We now prove that these two families (BPE and its inverse) are indeed "blockwise universal".

Claim 1 *Both the family* BPE *and the family* BPE^{-1} *are ϵ-xor-blockwise universal with $\epsilon \leq \frac{m}{2^n - g}$ where $g = GCD(m+1, 2^n - 1)$ when m is odd and $g = GCD(m+1, 2^n - 1) - 1$ when m is even.*

Proof Fix some $m \leq 2^n - 3$ and $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}' \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)^m$ and indexes $i, i' \leq m$ such that $(x, i) \neq (x', i')$. We distinguish between the case where $i \neq i'$ and the case where $i = i'$ but $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{x}'$.

Case 1, $i \neq i'$. In this case we have $[\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})]_i \oplus [\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}')]_{i'} = (\alpha^{i-1} \oplus \alpha^{i'-1})\beta \oplus (M_\tau \mathbf{x})_i \oplus (M_\tau \mathbf{x}')_{i'}$ which is equal to any fixed Δ with probability exactly 2^{-n} over the choice of $\beta \in_R \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ (since α is primitive and $0 < i \neq i' < 2^n$ so $\alpha^{i-1} \neq \alpha^{i'-1}$). Similarly

$$\begin{aligned}
[\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})]_i \oplus [\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}')]_{i'} &= \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)(\mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{b})\right)_i \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)(\mathbf{x}' \oplus \mathbf{b})\right)_{i'} \\
&= (\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma}\mathbf{b})_i \oplus \mathbf{b}_i \oplus (\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma}\mathbf{b})_{i'} \oplus \mathbf{b}_{i'} \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)\mathbf{x}\right)_i \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)\mathbf{x}'\right)_{i'} \\
&= (\alpha^{i-1} \oplus \alpha^{i'-1})\beta \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)\mathbf{x}\right)_i \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)\mathbf{x}'\right)_{i'}
\end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows since $(A_\tau \mathbf{b})_i = (A_\tau \mathbf{b})_{i'}$ (because all the rows of A_τ are the same). Again, this sum equals Δ with probability exactly 2^{-n}.

Case 2, $i = i'$ and $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{x}'$. In this case we have $[\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})]_i \oplus [\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}')]_i \oplus \Delta = (x_i \oplus x'_i \oplus \Delta) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m}(x_j \oplus x'_j)\tau^j$, which is zero only when τ is a root of this specific non-zero degree-m polynomial. Similarly for $\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}$ we have

$$\begin{aligned}
[\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x})]_i \oplus [\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}')]_i \oplus \Delta &= \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)(\mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{b})\right)_i \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)(\mathbf{x}' \oplus \mathbf{b})\right)_i \oplus \Delta \\
&= \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)\mathbf{x}\right)_i \oplus \left((\frac{A_\tau}{\sigma} \oplus I)\mathbf{x}'\right)_i \oplus \Delta = (x_i \oplus x'_i \oplus \Delta) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m} \frac{\tau^j}{\sigma}(x_j \oplus x'_j) \\
&\stackrel{*}{=} \frac{1}{\sigma}\left((x_i \oplus x'_i \oplus \Delta)(\sum_{j=0}^{m}\tau^j) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m}\tau^j(x_j \oplus x'_j)\right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sigma}\left((x_i \oplus x'_i \oplus \Delta) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m}\tau^j(x_j \oplus x'_j \oplus x_i \oplus x'_i \oplus \Delta)\right)
\end{aligned}$$

where the equality $\stackrel{*}{=}$ holds since $\sigma = \sum_{i=0}^{m}\tau^j$. The last expression is zero when τ is a root of the parenthesized polynomial. That polynomial is non-zero since (a) if $x_i \oplus x'_i \neq \Delta$ then it has

non-zero constant term, and (b) if $x_i \oplus x'_i = \Delta$ then there is some index j such that $x_j \neq x'_j$, and in this case the coefficient $x_j \oplus x'_j \oplus x_i \oplus x'_i \oplus \Delta$ of τ^j is non-zero.

We conclude that for both $\mathrm{BPE}_{\tau,\beta}$ and $\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}$, a collision in this case implies that τ must be a root of some fixed non-zero degree-m polynomial. Such polynomials have at most m roots, and τ is chosen at random in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ subject to the constraint that $\sigma \neq 0$. Since σ itself is a non-zero degree-m polynomial, then there are at least $2^n - m$ elements $\tau \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ for which $\sigma \neq 0$, and so the collision probability is at most $m/(2^n - m)$.

Moreover, for most values of m we can actually show that there are fewer than m values of τ for which $\sigma = 0$. Specifically, we note that $\sigma = (1 \oplus \tau^{m+1})/(1 \oplus \tau)$, so $\sigma = 0$ implies that also $1 \oplus \tau^{m+1} = 0$, which means that τ is an $m+1$'st root of unity in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$. We know that the number of $m+1$'st roots of unity in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ is exactly $GCD(m+1, 2^n - 1)$, and one of them is the trivial root $\tau = 1$. The trivial root $\tau = 1$ is also a root of σ if and only if m is odd (since there are $m+1$ terms in the sum that defines σ), and all the other $m+1$'st roots of unity are also root of σ. Hence τ is chosen at random from a set of size $2^n - g$, where $g = GCD(m+1, 2^n - 1)$ when m is odd and $g = GCD(m+1, 2^n - 1) - 1$ otherwise. ■

A variant of BPE**.** It is easy to see that the same claim can be proven also for the variant of BPE that adds the vector $\mathbf{b}$ before multiplying by M_τ, namely if we define

$$\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} M_\tau(\mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{b}) \quad \text{and} \quad \widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}^{-1}_{\tau,\beta}(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} M_\tau^{-1}\mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{b} \tag{3}$$

then also the hash families $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}$ and $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}^{-1}$ are ϵ-blockwise universal for the same ϵ.

3 The TET mode of operation

The BPE hashing scheme immediately implies a mode of operation for implementing a fixed-input-length, non-tweakable enciphering scheme for block-sizes that are a multiple of n bits: namely the Naor-Reingold construction from [NR97] with BPE for the hashing layers. In this section I describe how to extend this construction to get a tweakable scheme that supports arbitrary input lengths (and remains secure also when using the same key for different input lengths).

3.1 Tweaks and variable input length

Incorporating a tweak into the basic mode turns out to be almost trivial: Instead of having the element β be part of the key, we derive it from the tweak using the underlying cipher. For example, if we are content with n-bit tweaks then we can just set $\beta \leftarrow E_k(T)$ where k is the cipher key and T is the tweak. Intuitively, this is enough since the multiples of β will be used to mask the input values before they arrive at the ECB layer, so using different pseudo-random values of β for different tweak values means that the ECB layer will be applied on different blocks.

To handle longer tweaks we can replace the simple application of the underlying cipher E with a variable-input-length cipher-based pseudo-random function (e.g., CBC-MAC, PMAC, etc.), using a key which is independent of the cipher key that is used for the ECB layer.[1] In Section 3.3 I describe

[1] It is likely that using the same key for the PRF and the ECB layer would still remain secure. However trying to prove it would make the analysis more complicated, and it is not clear that using less key material provides any practical advantage in this context.

a particular CBC-MAC-like implementation that suits our needs.

The same fix can be applied also to handle variable input length: namely we derive β from both the tweak and the input length. If we are content with input length of no more than 2^ℓ and tweaks of size $n-\ell$ bits, then we can use $\beta \leftarrow E_k(L,T)$ where T is the tweak value and L is the input length, or else we can use $\beta \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_K(L,T)$ for some variable-input-length pseudo-random function. Another issue with using BPE for variable-length input is that the hashing key τ must satisfy $\sigma_m = 1 \oplus \tau \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^m \neq 0$ for every possible input length m. One way to ensure this is to choose τ as a random primitive element in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, and then we know that τ is not an $m+1$'st root of unity and therefore also not a root of σ_m (for any $m < 2^n - 2$).

3.2 Odd-size input

It appears harder to extend the mode to handle input whose bit length is not a multiple of n (which I refer to as "odd-size input"). Ideally, we would have liked an elegant way of extending BPE to handle lengths that are not a multiple of n-bits, and then use ciphertext-stealing to handle the odd size at the ECB layer. Unfortunately, I did not see any way of extending BPE to handle odd-size input while maintaining invertibility (except going back to the unbalanced Feistel idea).

Instead, I borrowed a technique that was used in EME* to handle odd-size input: When processing an odd-size input, one of the block cipher applications in the ECB layer is replaced with two consecutive applications of the cipher, and the middle value (between the two calls to the underlying cipher) is xor-ed to the partial block. (In addition, the partial block is added to the polynomial-evaluation, so that its value effects all the other blocks.)

In more details, let $\mathbf{x} = \langle x_1, \ldots, x_m \rangle$ be all the full input blocks and let x_{m+1} be a partial block, $\ell = |x_{m+1}|$, $0 < \ell < n$. Instead of just computing $\mathbf{y} = \mathrm{BPE}(\mathbf{x})$, we set the i'th full block to $y_i \leftarrow \mathrm{BPE}(\mathbf{x})_i \oplus (x_{m+1}10..0)$, while leaving x_{m+1} itself unchanged. Then we apply the ECB layer, computing $z_i \leftarrow E_k(y_i)$ for the first $m-1$ full blocks, and computing $u \leftarrow E_k(y_m)$ and $z_m \leftarrow E_k(u)$ for the last full block. The first bits of u are then xor-ed into the partial block, setting $w_{m+1} = x_{m+1} \oplus u|_{1..\ell}$. Then we do the final BPE layer (adding $(w_{m+1}10..0)$ to each full block), thus getting $w_i \leftarrow \mathrm{BPE}(\mathbf{z})_i \oplus (w_{m+1}10..0)$ and the TET output is the vector $w_1, \ldots, w_m, w_{m+1}$.

3.3 The PRF function

It is clear that any secure pseudo-random function can be used to derive the element β. We describe now a specific PRF, which is a slight adaptation of the OMAC construction of Iwata and Korasawa [IK03], that seems well suited for our application. We assume that the input length is less than 2^n bits, and we denote by L the input length in bits encoded as an n-bit integer. Also denote the tweak by $T = \langle T_1, \ldots, T_{m'} \rangle$ where $|T_1| = \cdots = |T_{m'-1}| = n$ and $1 \leq |T_{m'+1}| \leq n$.

To compute $\beta \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_K(L,T)$ we first compute $X \leftarrow E_K(L)$, then compute β as a CBC-MAC of T, but before the last block-cipher application we xor either the value αX or the value $\alpha^2 X$ (depending on whether the last block is a full block or a partial block). In more details, we set $V_0 = 0$ and then $V_i \leftarrow E_K(V_{i-1} \oplus T_i)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m'-1$. Then, if the last block is a full block ($|T_{m'}| = n$) then we set $\beta \leftarrow E_K(\alpha X \oplus V_{m'-1} \oplus T_{m'})$, and if the last block is a partial block ($|T_{m'}| < n$) then we set $\beta \leftarrow E_K(\alpha^2 X \oplus V_{m'-1} \oplus (T_{m'}10..0))$.

Notice that the only difference between this function and the OMAC construction is that OMAC does not have the additional input L and it sets $X \leftarrow E_K(0)$. Proving that this is a secure pseudo-random function is similar to the proof of OMAC [IK03], and is omitted here.

If the input length is	then these elements are bad values for τ	Bad key probability
512 bytes	$\alpha^{(2^{128}-1)/3},\ \alpha^{2\cdot(2^{128}-1)/3}$	2^{-127}
1024 bytes	$\alpha^{i\cdot(2^{128}-1)/5}$ for $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$	2^{-126}
4096 bytes	$\alpha^{i\cdot(2^{128}-1)/257}$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, 256$	2^{-120}
65536 bytes	$\alpha^{i\cdot(2^{128}-1)/17}$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, 16$	2^{-124}

Table 1: Bad τ values for various input lengths, assuming $n = 128$

We point out that on one hand, the input length L is needed only before processing the last tweak block, so this pseudo-random function is suited for streaming applications where the length of messages is not known in advance.[2] On the other hand, if used with a fixed input length (where L is known ahead of time) then the computation of X can be done off line, in which case we save one block-cipher application during the on-line phase.

3.4 Some other details

To get a fully-specified mode of operation one needs to set many other small details. Below I explain my choices for the details that I set, and describe those that are still left unspecified.

The element $\alpha \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$. Recall that BPE uses a fixed primitive element $\alpha \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$. If the field $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ is represented with a primitive polynomial, then this fixed element should be set as the polynomial x (or $1/x$), in which case a multiplication by α can be implemented with an n-bit shift and a conditional xor.[3]

The two hashing layers. I chose to use the same hashing keys τ, β for both hashing layers. The security of the mode does not seem to be effected by this (and in particular this has no effect on the proof in Section 4.1). On the other hand, having different keys for the two hashing layers adds a considerable burden to an implementation, especially it if optimizes the GF multiplications by preparing some tables off line.

The hashing key τ. I also chose to derive the hashing key τ from the same cipher key as the hashing key β, rather than being a separate key. (This decision is rather arbitrary, I made it because I could not see any reason to keep τ as a separate key.) Specifically, it can be set as $\tau \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_K(0, 0^n) = E_K(\alpha \cdot E_K(0))$. Note that this is not a duplicate of any $\mathrm{PRF}_K(L, T)$, since the input length L is always at least n bits.[4]

Of course, τ must be chosen so that for any message length m it holds that $\sigma_m \neq 0$ (where $\sigma_m = \sum_{i=0}^{m} \tau^m$). Hence if setting $\tau \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_K(0, 0)$ results in a bad value for τ then we can keep trying $\mathrm{PRF}_K(0, 1)$, $\mathrm{PRF}_K(0, 2)$, etc. When using TET with fixed input length (containing m complete blocks), we can just include a list of all the "bad τ values" for which $\sigma_m = 0$ with

[2] As explained in Section 3.5, TET is not a very good fit for such cases, but this PRF functions can perhaps be used in applications other than TET.

[3] The choice between setting $\alpha = x$ or $\alpha = 1/x$ depends on the endianess of the field representation, and it should be made so that multiplication by α requires left shift and not right shift.

[4] Setting $\tau \leftarrow E_K(0)$ would work just as well in this context, but the effort in proving it is too big for the minuscule saving in running time.

the implementation. This list is fairly easy to construct: Denoting $g = GCD(m+1, 2^n-1)$, when m is even the lists consists of $\alpha^{i\cdot(2^n-1)/g}$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, g-1$ (where α is a primitive element). When m is odd it consists of the same elements and also of the element $\alpha^0 = 1$. In Table 1 we list the "bad τ values" for various input lengths assuming $n = 128$.

The approach of having a fixed list of "bad τ values" may not work as well when using TET with variable-input length. One way to handle this case is to insist on τ being a primitive element in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, in which case we know that $\sigma_m \neq 0$ for all length m. (We can efficiently test is τ is a primitive element given the prime factorization of $2^n - 1$). But a better way of handling variable length is to allow different τ's for different input lengths. Specifically, when handling a message of with m full blocks, we try $\mathrm{PRF}_K(0,0)$, $\mathrm{PRF}_K(0,1)$, ... and set τ to the first value for which $\sigma_m \neq 0$. It is not hard to see that this is just as secure as insisting on the same τ for all lengths (since we only use τ to argue about collisions between messages of the same length, cf. item 1 in the list on page 17 in the proof of Theorem 1).

Ordering the blocks for polynomial-evaluation. I chose to order the blocks at the input of BPE in "reverse order", evaluating the polynomial as $\sum_{i=1}^{m} x_i \tau^{m-i+1}$. The reason is to allow processing to start as soon as possible in the case where the input arrives one block at a time. We would like to use Horner's rule when computing $\mathrm{BPE}(\mathbf{x})$, processing the blocks in sequence as

$$s = (\ldots((x_1\tau \oplus x_2)\tau \oplus x_3)\tau \ldots \oplus x_m)\tau$$

which means that x_1 is multiplied by τ^m, x_2 is multiplied by τ^{m-1}, etc. Similarly when computing $\mathrm{BPE}^{-1}(\mathbf{y})$ we would implement the polynomial-evaluation as

$$s = (\ldots((y_1\tau \oplus y_2)\tau \oplus y_3)\tau \ldots \oplus y_m)(\tau/\sigma)$$

which means that y_1 is multiplied by τ^m/σ, y_2 is multiplied by τ^{m-1}/σ, etc.

The hashing direction. For each of the two hashing layers, one can use either of BPE, BPE^{-1}, $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}$, or $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}^{-1}$. For the encryption direction, I chose to use $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}^{-1}$ for the first hashing layer and BPE^{-1} for the second layer. This means that on decryption we use BPE as the first hashing layer and $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}$ for the second layer.

I chose the inverse hash function on encryption and the functions themselves on decryption because inverting the functions may be less efficient than computing them in the forward direction (since one needs to multiply also by τ/σ). In a typical implementation for storage, one would use encryption when writing to storage and decryption when reading back from storage. As most storage is optimized for read (at the expense of the less-frequent write operations), it makes sense to allocate the faster operations for read in this case too.

As for the choice between BPE and $\widetilde{\mathrm{BPE}}$, I chose to add the vector $\mathbf{b}$ in the middle, right before and after the ECB layer. The rationale here is that it is possible to do the computation $\beta \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_K(L,T)$ concurrently with the multiplication by M_τ (or its inverse).

Given the choices above, the specification of the TET mode is given in Figure 2. Other details that are not specified here are the choice of the underlying cipher and the block-size n, and the representation of the field $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ (including endianess issues).

function $\mathrm{PRF}_K(L, T_1 \cdots T_{m'})$ // $|L| = |T_1| = \cdots = |T_{m'-1}| = n,\ 1 \le |T_{m'}| \le n$

001 $V_0 \leftarrow 0,\ X \leftarrow E_K(L)$
002 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** $m' - 1$ **do** $V_i \leftarrow E_K(V_{i-1} \oplus T_i)$
003 **if** $|T_{m'}| = n$ **then return** $E_K(V_{m'-1} \oplus T_{m'} \oplus \alpha X)$
004 **else return** $E_K(V_{m'-1} \oplus T_{m'} \oplus \alpha^2 X)$

Algorithm $\mathrm{TET}_{K_1,K_2}(T; P_1 \cdots P_m P_{m+1})$

// $|P_1| = \cdots = |P_m| = n,\ 0 \le |P_{m+1}| < n$

101 $L \leftarrow mn + |P_{m+1}|$ // input size (bits)
102 $i = 0$
103 $\tau \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_{K_1}(0, i),\ \sigma \leftarrow 1 \oplus \tau \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^m$
104 **if** $\sigma = 0$ **then** $i \leftarrow i + 1$, **goto** 103
105 $\beta \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_{K_1}(L, T),\ SP \leftarrow 0,\ SC \leftarrow 0$
110 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do** $SP \leftarrow (SP \oplus P_i) \cdot \tau$
111 $SP \leftarrow SP/\sigma$
112 **if** $|P_{m+1}| > 0$ **then**
113 $\quad SP \leftarrow SP \oplus P_{m+1}$ padded with 10..0
120 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do**
121 $\quad PP_i \leftarrow P_i \oplus SP$
122 $\quad PPP_i \leftarrow PP_i \oplus \alpha^{i-1}\beta$
123 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** $m - 1$ **do**
124 $\quad CCC_i \leftarrow E_{K_2}(PPP_i)$
125 **if** $|P_{m+1}| > 0$ **then**
126 $\quad MM \leftarrow E_{K_2}(PPP_m)$
127 $\quad CCC_m \leftarrow E_{K_2}(MM)$
128 $\quad C_{m+1} \leftarrow P_{m+1} \oplus (MM$ truncated$)$
129 **else** $CCC_m \leftarrow E_{K_2}(PPP_m)$
130 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do**
131 $\quad CC_i \leftarrow CCC_i \oplus \alpha^{i-1}\beta$
132 $\quad SC \leftarrow (SC \oplus CC_i) \cdot \tau$
133 $SC \leftarrow SC/\sigma$
134 **if** $|P_{m+1}| > 0$ **then**
135 $\quad SC \leftarrow SC \oplus C_{m+1}$ padded with 10..0
140 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do**
141 $\quad C_i \leftarrow CC_i \oplus SC$
150 **return** $C_1 \ldots C_m C_{m+1}$

Algorithm $\mathrm{TET}^{-1}_{K_1,K_2}(T; C_1 \cdots C_m C_{m+1})$

// $|C_1| = \cdots = |C_m| = n,\ 0 \le |C_{m+1}| < n$

201 $L \leftarrow mn + |C_{m+1}|$ // input size (bits)
202 $i = 0$
203 $\tau \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_{K_1}(0, i),\ \sigma \leftarrow 1 \oplus \tau \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^m$
204 **if** $\sigma = 0$ **then** $i \leftarrow i + 1$, **goto** 203
205 $\beta \leftarrow \mathrm{PRF}_{K_1}(L, T),\ SP \leftarrow 0,\ SC \leftarrow 0$
210 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do** $SC \leftarrow (SC \oplus C_i) \cdot \tau$
212 **if** $|C_{m+1}| > 0$ **then**
213 $\quad SC \leftarrow SC \oplus C_{m+1}$ padded with 10..0
220 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do**
221 $\quad CC_i \leftarrow C_i \oplus SC$
222 $\quad CCC_i \leftarrow CC_i \oplus \alpha^{i-1}\beta$
223 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** $m - 1$ **do**
224 $\quad PPP_i \leftarrow E^{-1}_{K_2}(CCC_i)$
225 **if** $|C_{m+1}| > 0$ **then**
226 $\quad MM \leftarrow E^{-1}_{K_2}(CCC_m)$
227 $\quad PPP_m \leftarrow E^{-1}_{K_2}(MM)$
228 $\quad P_{m+1} \leftarrow C_{m+1} \oplus (MM$ truncated$)$
229 **else** $PPP_m \leftarrow E^{-1}_{K_2}(CCC_m)$
230 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do**
231 $\quad PP_i \leftarrow PPP_i \oplus \alpha^{i-1}\beta$
232 $\quad SP \leftarrow (SP \oplus PP_i) \cdot \tau$
234 **if** $|C_{m+1}| > 0$ **then**
235 $\quad SP \leftarrow SP \oplus P_{m+1}$ padded with 10..0
240 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m **do**
241 $\quad P_i \leftarrow PP_i \oplus SP$
250 **return** $P_1 \ldots P_m P_{m+1}$

Figure 2: Enciphering and deciphering under TET, with plaintext $P = P_1 \ldots P_m P_{m+1}$, ciphertext $C = C_1 \cdots C_m C_{m+1}$, and tweak T. The element $\alpha \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ is a fixed primitive element.

Mode	Block-cipher calls	GF multiplies	Passes over input
EME*	$m' + 2m + \lceil m/n \rceil$	–	2
XCB	$m + 1$	$2(m + m' + 2)$	3
TET	$m' + m$	$2m$ or $2m - 2$	3

Table 2: Comparison between tweakable wide-block enciphering modes on m-block input and m'-block associated-data.

3.5 Performance of TET

As specified above, the TET mode can be used with variable input length, and in Section 4 we prove that it is secure when used in this manner. However, its efficiency (at least in software) depends crucially on pre-processing that is only possible when used with fixed input length (or at least with a small number of possible lengths). The reason is that on encryption one needs to multiply by τ/σ, which depends on the message length (since $\sigma = \sum_{i=0}^{m} \tau^i$). When used with fixed input length, the value τ/σ can be computed off line, and some tables can be derived to speed up the multiplication by τ/σ. When used with variable input length, however, the value τ/σ must be computed on-line, which at least for software implies a considerable cost. Hence, TET is not very appealing as a variable-input-length mode.

We stress, however, that the motivating application for TET, namely "sector-level encryption", is indeed a fixed-input-length application. Also, there are some limited settings where one can use variable input length without suffering much from the drawback above. For example, a "write once / read many times" application, where the data is encrypted once and then decrypted many times, would only need to worry about computing σ in the initial encryption phase (since σ is not used during decryption). Also, the same value of σ is used for every bit-length from mn to $(m+1)n-1$, so length variability within this limited range in not effected.[5]

Below we analyze the performance characteristics of TET only for fixed input length. With this assumption, the computation of the PRF function from above takes exactly m' applications of the cipher, where m' is the number of blocks of associated data (full or partial). (This is because the computation of the mask value $X \leftarrow E_K(L)$ can be done off line.) Then we need either m or $m-1$ GF-multiplies for the polynomial evaluation (depending if we have m or $m-1$ full blocks), followed by m block-cipher applications for the ECB layer, and again m or $m-1$ GF multiplies. Altogether, we need $m + m'$ block-cipher applications and either $2m$ or $2m - 2$ GF multiplies. (The shift and xor operations that are also needed are ignored in this description, since they are insignificant in comparison.)

Table 2 contains a brief comparison of efficiency parameters in EME*, XCB and TET. It should be noted that in the application to "sector-level encryption" we typically have $m' = 1$, so the numbers for TET and XCB are almost the same.

3.6 Roads not taken

Before moving to the security analysis, I would like to explicitly discuss some alternatives to the design choices that I made in TET.

[5] For example, an implementation can handle both 512-byte blocks and 520-byte blocks with a single value of σ (assuming block length of $n = 128$ bits).

Unbalanced Feistel. As mentioned above, the original note of Naor and Reingold [NR97] proposed using unbalanced Feistel to get an invertible blockwise-universal hashing. This is also somewhat similar to the approach that was taken in XCB [FM04]. The main reason that I did not choose this approach was that BPE looks more elegant to me, but it is clear that one can devise a workable mode using the unbalanced Feistel idea.

Using BPE **also for the tweak.** Rather than processing the tweak with the PRF function, one could also process it via the polynomial evaluation, similarly to the way this is done in XCB. Namely, instead of computing $s \leftarrow \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} x_{i+1}\tau^{m-i}$, we can set $s' \leftarrow s \oplus \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} t_{i+1}\tau^{m+\ell-i}$, where $T = \langle t_1, \ldots t_\ell \rangle$ is the tweak. (It should be clear that this has no effect on the invertibility of the hash function.)

An advantage of using this alternative approach is that we do away with the need to specify also a PRF function. Some drawbacks of this approach, however, is that it leads to slightly weaker security bounds (since the polynomial is of higher degree and so it may have more roots), and more importantly it is no longer possible to process the tweak and the input concurrently.

4 Security of TET

We relate the security of TET to the security of the underlying primitives from which it is built as follows:

Theorem 1 [TET security] *Fix $n, s \in \mathbb{N}$. Consider an adversary attacking the* TET *mode with a truly random permutation over $\{0,1\}^n$ in place of the block cipher and a truly random function instead of* PRF*, such that the total length of all the queries that the attacker makes is at most s blocks altogether.*

The advantage of this attacker in distinguishing TET *from a truly random tweakable length-preserving permutation is at most $1.5s^2/\phi(2^n-1)$ (where ϕ is Euler's totient function). Using the notations from Appendix A, we have*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\pm\widetilde{\mathrm{prp}}}_{\mathrm{TET}}(s) \leq \frac{3s^2}{2\phi(2^n-1)}$$

A minor comment. Note that the value $\phi(2^n-1)$ in the denominator can be improved somewhat. The quoted value assumes that the hashing key τ is chosen as a primitive element in $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ (there are $\phi(2^n-1)$ such elements), and therefore is not a "bad value" for any input length. But as we explained in Section 3.4, if the τ value that was chosen happens to be bad for some input length, it is better to just allow using a different value of τ for that length. Hence we choose τ from a set larger than the primitive elements, and the denominator improves accordingly. (Note that for $n = 128$ we have $\phi(2^{128}-1) \approx 2^{-127}$, so using the weaker bound costs us only about a factor of two in the probability.)

Corollary 1 *With the same setting as in Theorem 1, consider an attacker against* TET *with a specific cipher E and a specific* PRF *F, where the attack uses at most total of s' blocks of associated data. Then*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\pm\widetilde{\mathrm{prp}}}_{\mathrm{TET}[E]}(t,s,s') \;\leq\; \frac{3s^2}{2\phi(2^n-1)} + \;2(\,\mathbf{Adv}^{\pm\mathrm{prp}}_{E}\left(t',s\right) + \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{prf}}_{\mathrm{PRF}}\left(t',s'\right))$$

where $t' = t + O(n(s + s'))$. □

4.1 Proof of Theorem 1

The intuition for the proof is that as long as there are no block collisions in the hash function, then the random permutation in the ECB layer will be applied to new blocks, so it will will output random blocks and the answer that the attacker will see is therefore random. To make this formal, we go through the usual "game hopping" argument as follows:

A random process. Fix the parameters $n, s \in \mathbb{N}$ and an attacker A that makes queries of total length at most s blocks altogether (full and partial). Assume (wlog) that the attacker A never makes a query for which it already knows the answer (such as a duplicate of previous query, a decryption of some value that it got from the encryption oracle with the same tweak, etc.).

Given this assumption, consider a random process in which all the queries of the attacker are answered with just random and independent bits. Clearly this experiment differs from a truly random tweakable permutation only in that it can return the same output on different queries, which happens rarely (we will account for this difference at the end of the proof). For the rest of the proof we show that interacting with TET is indistinguishable from interacting with this random process (upto the specified error).

We first describe a specific implementation of the random process. Namely, we choose at random some element $\tau \in \mathrm{GF}(2^n)$ subject to the condition that $1 \oplus \tau \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^m \neq 0$ for all valid input-lengths m (this can be done, e.g., by choosing τ as a primitive element). Then for any encryption query (of length L and with tweak T), we choose at random $\beta_{L,T}$ (or use a previous value if these T, L where used before) and then simulate the "second half" of the TET mode as follows: We choose at random all the blocks that are supposed to be the output of the underlying block cipher (i.e., the *CCC* blocks on encryption or the *PPP* blocks on decryption, and in addition the *MM* block if there is a partial block). Given these random bits and the values of τ and $\beta_{L,T}$ we compute the output just as it is done by the TET mode itself. Note that for any fixed τ (such that $\sigma \neq 0$) and any $\beta_{L,T}$, the transformation from the cipher-outputs to the output of the mode is bijective. It follows that since the "cipher outputs" are all chosen at random then the output that is returned to the adversary is just L random bits, so this is indeed an implementation of the random process.

Next we add to this implementation of the random process a notion of a "bad event". To define this event, we add to the implementation as described above also the "first half" of TET. Namely, after setting τ and $\beta_{L,T}$, we also compute the *PPP* blocks on encryption or the *CCC* blocks on decryption. Note that these blocks are uniquely determined by all the choices that we did before, and that at this point we do not modify any of the other values (so in particular this is still an implementation of the random process). Roughly, we define the "bad event" to be the case where any of the block values already appeared earlier in the execution. Specifically we consider the following conditions:

- One of the *PPP* blocks equals any previous *PPP* or *MM* block.
- One of the *CCC* blocks equals any previous *CCC* or *MM* block.
- The *MM* block equals any previous *PPP*, *CCC* or *MM* block.

Subroutine Choose-$\pi(X)$:

010 $Y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$; **if** $Y \in$ Range **then** $bad \leftarrow$ true , $Y \xleftarrow{\$} \overline{\text{Range}}$

011 **if** $X \in$ Domain **then** $bad \leftarrow$ true , $Y \leftarrow \pi(X)$

012 $\pi(X) \leftarrow Y$, Domain $\leftarrow$ Domain $\cup \{X\}$, Range $\leftarrow$ Range $\cup \{Y\}$; **return** Y

Subroutine Choose-$\pi^{-1}(Y)$:

020 $X \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$; **if** $X \in$ Domain **then** $bad \leftarrow$ true , $X \xleftarrow{\$} \overline{\text{Domain}}$

021 **if** $Y \in$ Range **then** $bad \leftarrow$ true , $X \leftarrow \pi^{-1}(Y)$

022 $\pi(X) \leftarrow Y$, Domain $\leftarrow$ Domain $\cup \{X\}$, Range $\leftarrow$ Range $\cup \{Y\}$; **return** X

Figure 3: The procedures for choosing π values in the random and TET processes. The shaded statements are executed in TET but not in the random process.

The TET **process.** We now modify the random process, starting by just re-arranging the computation of the various blocks to match the order in which they are assigned values by the TET mode. Namely, on encryption we first compute the *PPP* blocks, then choose the *MM* block (if needed) and then choose the *CCC* blocks. Similarly, on decryption we first compute the *CCC* blocks, then choose the *MM* block (if needed) and then choose the *PPP* blocks.

Also, we introduce a table π (which is meant to eventually hold a "random permutation", but for now does yet not have any semantics): When processing a query, we fill the entry corresponding to $\pi(PPP_i)$ with the value of CCC_i for all $i < m$, and for $i = m$ we do as above if there is no partial block and otherwise we set $\pi(PPP_m) \leftarrow MM$ and $\pi(MM) \leftarrow CCC_m$. Note that so far π may not correspond to any well-defined function (since we may reset entries of π), and also there may be duplicate entries in it. However, both of these cases only happen if the "bad event" from above occurs.

So far we still did not change the random process at all. Next we modify this process, so that when the "bad event" happens it ensures that π is consistent with a well-defined permutation. Specifically, we do the following changes:

- On encryption, whenever we pick a new value for any CCC_i, $i < m$, we check if the entry $\pi(PPP_i)$ is already defined, and if it is we use that value for the value CCC_i rather than choosing a new random value. We do a similar test before picking a value for CCC_m and for *MM* (if applicable) by checking either $\pi(PPP_m)$ or $\pi(MM)$, as appropriate.

- Still on encryption, if the entry of π is not defined yet, then we pick a new random value for the *CCC* or *MM* block, and then we check to see if this value already exists in the table. If if does, we try again, this time choosing it at random from the co-range (i.e., from the set of values that are not yet in the table π).

- On decryption, whenever we pick a new value for any *PPP* or *MM* block, $i < m$, we check if the corresponding entry $\pi(PPP)$ or $\pi(MM)$ is already defined, and if it is we reset our choice, this time choosing at random from the co-domain (i.e., , from the set of values X for which $\pi(X)$ is not defined yet).

- Still on decryption, after choosing PPP_i for $i < m$ we check if the value of CCC_i already appears in the table π, and if it does we reset the value of PPP_i to $\pi^{-1}(CCC_i)$ (i.e, the

Initialization:

010 Domain $\leftarrow$ Range $\leftarrow \emptyset$; $bad \leftarrow$ false
011 **for** all $X \in \{0,1\}^n$ **do** $\pi(X) \leftarrow$ undef
012 **for** all $T, L \in \{0,1\}^*$ **do** $\beta_{L,T} \leftarrow$ undef
013 $\tau \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$ subject to $1 \oplus \tau \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^m \neq 0$ for all m

Respond to the j-th adversary query as follows:

Encryption query $(T^j; P_1^j \cdots P_{m^j}^j P_{m^j+1}^j)$

100 $L^j \leftarrow m^j n + |P_{m^j+1}^j|$ // input size (bits)
101 **if** $\beta_{L^j,T^j} =$ undef **then** $\beta_{L^j,T^j} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$
102 $\sigma^j \leftarrow 1 \oplus \tau \oplus \ldots \oplus \tau^{m^j}$
103 $SP^j \leftarrow 0$, $SC^j \leftarrow 0$

110 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do** $SP^j \leftarrow (SP^j \oplus P_i^j) \cdot \tau$
111 $SP^j \leftarrow SP^j / \sigma^j$
112 **if** $|P_{m^j+1}^j| > 0$ **then**
113 $\quad SP^j \leftarrow SP^j \oplus P_{m^j+1}^j$ padded with 10..0

120 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do**
121 $\quad PP_i^j \leftarrow P_i^j \oplus SP^j$
122 $\quad PPP_i^j \leftarrow PP_i^j \oplus \alpha^{i-1} \beta_{L^j,T^j}$
123 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** $m^j - 1$ **do**
124 $\quad CCC_i^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi(PPP_i^j)$
125 **if** $|P_{m^j+1}^j| > 0$ **then**
126 $\quad MM^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi(PPP_{m^j}^j)$
127 $\quad CCC_{m^j}^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi(MM^j)$
128 $\quad C_{m^j+1}^j \leftarrow P_{m^j+1}^j \oplus (MM^j$ truncated$)$
129 **else** $CCC_{m^j}^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi(PPP_{m^j}^j)$

130 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do**
131 $\quad CC_i^j \leftarrow CCC_i^j \oplus \alpha^{i-1} \beta_{L^j,T^j}$
132 $\quad SC^j \leftarrow (SC^j \oplus CC_i^j) \cdot \tau$
133 $SC^j \leftarrow SC^j / \sigma^j$
134 **if** $|P_{m^j+1}^j| > 0$ **then**
135 $\quad SC^j \leftarrow SC^j \oplus C_{m^j+1}^j$ padded with 10..0

140 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do**
141 $\quad C_i^j \leftarrow CC_i^j \oplus SC^j$

150 **return** $C_1^j \ldots C_{m^j}^j C_{m^j+1}^j$

Decryption query $(T^j; C_1^j \cdots C_{m^j}^j C_{m^j+1}^j)$

200 $L^j \leftarrow m^j n + |C_{m^j+1}^j|$ // input size (bits)
201 **if** $\beta_{L^j,T^j} =$ undef **then** $\beta_{L^j,T^j} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$
203 $SP^j \leftarrow 0$, $SC^j \leftarrow 0$

210 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do** $SC^j \leftarrow (SC^j \oplus C_i^j) \cdot \tau$
212 **if** $|C_{m^j+1}^j| > 0$ **then**
213 $\quad SC^j \leftarrow SC^j \oplus C_{m^j+1}^j$ padded with 10..0

220 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do**
221 $\quad CC_i^j \leftarrow C_i^j \oplus SC^j$
222 $\quad CCC_i^j \leftarrow CC_i^j \oplus \alpha^{i-1} \beta_{L^j,T^j}$
223 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** $m^j - 1$ **do**
224 $\quad PPP_i^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi^{-1}(CCC_i^j)$
225 **if** $|C_{m^j+1}^j| > 0$ **then**
226 $\quad MM^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi^{-1}(CCC_{m^j}^j)$
227 $\quad PPP_{m^j}^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi^{-1}(MM^j)$
228 $\quad P_{m^j+1}^j \leftarrow C_{m^j+1}^j \oplus (MM^j$ truncated$)$
229 **else** $PPP_{m^j}^j \leftarrow$ Choose-$\pi^{-1}(CCC_{m^j}^j)$

230 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do**
231 $\quad PP_i^j \leftarrow PPP_i^j \oplus \alpha^{i-1} \beta_{L^j,T^j}$
232 $\quad SP^j \leftarrow (SP^j \oplus PP_i^j) \cdot \tau$
234 **if** $|C_{m^j+1}^j| > 0$ **then**
235 $\quad SP^j \leftarrow SP^j \oplus P_{m^j+1}^j$ padded with 10..0

240 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** m^j **do**
241 $\quad P_i^j \leftarrow PP_i^j \oplus SP^j$

250 **return** $P_1^j \ldots P_{m^j}^j P_{m^j+1}^j$

Figure 4: The random TET processes. The only differences between them is in the implementation of Choose-π and Choose-π^{-1} procedures from Figure 3.

unique value such that $\pi(PPP_i) = CCC_i$). We similarly check after choosing the value for the MM block (if appropriate) and for PPP_m.

If any of these checks forces us to reset our choices, then we record that the "bad event" occurred. Also, we always update the table π with the new values that were chosen.

The resulting process proceeds just like the TET mode (with the cipher replaced by a random permutation), so we call it the TET process. Figure 3 contains a pseudo-code describing the way the random and TET processes pick values for π. In that figure, the shaded statements are executed in the TET process but not the random process. Figure 4 include pseudo-code for the random and TET processes (which are identical except for the differences in choosing values of π). In this pseudo-code, all the quantities that correspond to processing the j'th query of the adversary are marked with superscript j. (For example, the query contains m^j full blocks, the plaintext is $P_1^j, \ldots, P_{m^j}^j, P_{m^j+1}^j$, etc.)

Since the random and TET processes differ only when the bad event occurs, then the attacker A can only distinguish between them when that event occurs. Namely we have

$$\left| \Pr_{\text{random}}[A \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr_{\text{TET}}[A \Rightarrow 1] \right| \leq \Pr_{\text{random}}[bad = \mathsf{true}] \tag{4}$$

The rest of the proof is therefore devoted to bounding the probability that the bad event occurs (in the random process).

Bounding the bad-event probability. We partition the bad event into two sub-events: one is where we choose a block at random and discover that the same value was already used before (cf. lines 010 and 020 in Figure 3), and the other where it turns out that the point for which we intend to define π or its inverse is already defined (cf. lines 011 and 021 in Figure 3). In more details, we have the following two events:

Bad1. A value of CCC or MM that we choose on encryption is equal to some previous CCC or MM value, or a value of PPP or MM that we choose on decryption is equal to some previous PPP or MM value.

Bad2. On encryption, some values of PPP that are computed are equal to a previous PPP or MM value, or the MM value is equal to a previous PPP value. On decryption, some values of CCC that are computed are equal to a previous CCC or MM value, or the MM value is equal to a previous CCC value.

Bounding the probability of the Bad1 sub-event is easy. Over the course of the attack we choose at random at most s blocks, and when choosing the i'th block there are at most $i-1$ values that it can collide with under Bad1, and these blocks are all n-bit long. Hence

$$\Pr_{\text{random}}[\mathsf{Bad1}] \leq \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{2^n} \tag{5}$$

To bound the probability of the Bad2 sub-event we use the blockwise-universality of the BPE function. Before we can do that, however, we must address the problem that the input to the BPE hash function may not appear to be independent of the hashing key. (This is because the input to the next query is chosen by the adversary after seeing the output from the previous one, which

depends on the hashing key.) We observe that in fact the input to the hash function is independent of its key, since even when the hashing keys are all fixed, the random process still returns uniformly random bits to the adversary.

We can make this even more explicit by switching back to the implementation of the random process in which the answers to the attacker are chosen at random and the other quantities are computed from them (and from the hashing keys). In this alternative implementation we can choose all the random bits that the attacker sees ahead of time (thus fixing also the queries of the attacker) and only then choose the hashing keys.[6] Once we are back in this implementation of the random process, we observe the following:

1. Two blocks that correspond to queries of different lengths or with different tweaks collide with probability 2^{-n}, since in this case we use different random values for the $\beta_{L,T}$ hashing key.

2. Collisions of the form $MM^j = PPP_i^{j'}$ or $MM^j = CCC_i^{j'}$ also have probability 2^{-n}, since the PPP or CCC block depends on the $\beta_{L,T}$ that was used in query j' while MM^j does not.

3. Collisions of the form $PPP_i^j = PPP_{i'}^{j'}$ where $i \neq i'$ have probability 2^{-n}, even for the same query length and the same tweak (this is Case 1 in the proof of Claim 1). The same holds for $CCC_i^j = CCC_{i'}^{j'}$ with $i \neq i'$.

4. Collisions of the form $PPP_i^j = PPP_i^{j'}$ where queries j, j' have the same length (with m full blocks) and the same tweak, occur with probability at most $m/\phi(2^n - 1)$ (this is Case 2 in the proof of Claim 1). The same holds for $CCC_i^j = CCC_i^{j'}$.

Note that last two items above actually use the fact that the hash functions are xor-universal (not just universal), since when partial blocks are present then the attacker by selecting partial block P_{m+1}^j $P_{m+1}^{j'}$ can add the constant $\Delta = (P_{m+1}^j 10..0) \oplus (P_{m+1}^{j'} 10..0)$ to the sum $PPP_i^j \oplus PPP_{i'}^{j'}$.

We therefore have bounds for all the possible collision events in $\mathsf{Bad2}$, and the only thing left is to sum them up using the union bound. Clearly, we have exactly $\binom{s}{2}$ potential collision events, but now some of these events have probability of upto $m/\phi(2^n - 1)$ (where m is the length of the relevant query), while the others are still bounded by 2^{-n}.

Denote by $\mathcal{M}$ the set of message lengths that the attacker used in the attack (expressed in number of full blocks in the query). For any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, let q_m be the number of queries that have exactly m full blocks, and denote $s_m = m \cdot q_m$. (That is, s_m is the total number of full blocks in all the queries that have m full blocks.) Then we know that $\sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} s_m \leq s$. The number of potential collision events corresponding to item 4 above for messages with m full blocks is at most $m \cdot \binom{q_m}{2} = m \cdot \binom{(s_m/m)}{2} \leq \binom{s_m}{2}/m$, and the probability of all these events sums up to at most $\frac{\binom{s_m}{2}}{m} \cdot \frac{m}{\phi(2^n-1)} = \frac{\binom{s_m}{2}}{\phi(2^n-1)}$. Recalling that $\sum_m s_m \leq s$ we get that the sum over all the potential collision events corresponding to item 4 (over all message lengths) is at most

$$\frac{\sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \binom{s_m}{2}}{\phi(2^n - 1)} \leq \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{\phi(2^n - 1)}$$

[6] See the comment after the proof for some further discussion of this argument.

Clearly, the sum over all the other potential collision events in Bad2 is at most $\binom{s}{2}/2^n$, so the total probability of the event Bad2 is bounded by

$$\Pr_{\text{random}}[\mathsf{Bad2}] \leq \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{2^n} + \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{\phi(2^n-1)} \tag{6}$$

Putting this all together we get that the advantage of the adversary in distinguishing between the TET process and the random process is at most $2 \cdot \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{2^n} + \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{2^n - \phi(2^n-1)}$.

We still need to account for the distinguishing probability between the random process and a random tweakable permutation, but we note that the distinguishing event (where the random process returns the same answer on two different queries) implies that the bad event occurred in the random process, so we do not need to count it again. Thus, the total advantage of the attacker can be bounded by

$$2 \cdot \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{2^n} + \frac{\binom{s}{2}}{\phi(2^n-1)} < \frac{3s^2}{2\phi(2^n-1)}$$

■

A comment. At a first glance, one may feel uneasy about the argument that switches back to the view of the random process as choosing the answers to the attacker at random and computing the relevant *CCC*, *PPP* and *MM* blocks from that output (after Eq. (5)), since in this implementation it is not clear that our bound on the probability of Bad1 holds. Indeed, the various blocks are now computed using a hash function that is only ϵ-blockwise-universal for some $\epsilon > 2^{-n}$, so how can we claim that the previous bound that we derived by assigning 2^{-n} probability for each collision event still holds in this case?

A formalistic answer is that because these hash functions are bijective, then the two implementations induce identical probability spaces over their variables, so the bound that we proved with respect to one implementation must hold also for the other. A more informative answer is that in this case we do not need to look at the collision probability for any two messages, but rather than collision between one fixed message and another message which is chosen at random. Indeed, it is not hard to see that in this case the "collision probability" that we get is exactly 2^{-n} (and this indeed follows just from the fact that the hash function is bijective, regardless of its "universality").

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A Preliminaries

A *tweakable enciphering scheme* is a function $\mathbf{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{M}$ where $\mathcal{M} = \bigcup_{i \in I} \{0,1\}^i$ is the *message space* (for some nonempty index set $I \subseteq \mathbb{N}$) and $\mathcal{K} \neq \emptyset$ is the *key space* and $\mathcal{T} \neq \emptyset$ is the *tweak space*. We require that for every $K \in \mathcal{K}$ and $T \in \mathcal{T}$ we have that $\mathbf{E}(K, T, \cdot) = \mathbf{E}_K^T(\cdot)$ is a length-preserving permutation on $\mathcal{M}$. The inverse of an enciphering scheme $\mathbf{E}$ is the enciphering scheme $\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{E}^{-1}$ where $X = \mathbf{D}_K^T(Y)$ if and only if $\mathbf{E}_K^T(X) = Y$. A *block cipher* is the special case of a tweakable enciphering scheme where the message space is $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^n$ (for some $n \geq 1$) and the tweak space is the singleton set containing the empty string. The number n is called the

blocksize. By $\mathrm{Perm}(n)$ we mean the set of all permutations on $\{0,1\}^n$. By $\mathrm{Perm}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{M})$ we mean the set of all functions $\pi : \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{M}$ where $\pi(T,\cdot)$ is a length-preserving permutation.

An *adversary* A is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm with access to some oracles. Oracles are written as superscripts. By convention, the running time of an algorithm includes its description size. The notation $A \Rightarrow 1$ describes the event that the adversary A outputs the bit one.

Security measure. For a tweakable enciphering scheme $\mathbf{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{M}$ we consider the advantage that the adversary A has in distinguishing $\mathbf{E}$ and its inverse from a random tweakable permutation and its inverse: $\mathbf{Adv}^{\pm\widetilde{\mathrm{prp}}}_{\mathbf{E}}(A) =$

$$\Pr\left[K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} :\ A^{\mathbf{E}_K(\cdot,\cdot)\,\mathbf{E}_K^{-1}(\cdot,\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\pi \xleftarrow{\$} \mathrm{Perm}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{M}) :\ A^{\pi(\cdot,\cdot)\,\pi^{-1}(\cdot,\cdot)} \Rightarrow 1\right]$$

The notation shows, in the brackets, an experiment to the left of the colon and an event to the right of the colon. We are looking at the probability of the indicated event after performing the specified experiment. By $X \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X}$ we mean to choose X at random from the finite set $\mathcal{X}$. In writing $\pm\widetilde{\mathrm{prp}}$ the tilde serves as a reminder that the PRP is tweakable and the $\pm$ symbol is a reminder that this is the "strong" (chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack) notion of security. For a block cipher, we omit the tilde.

Without loss of generality we assume that an adversary never repeats an encipher query, never repeats a decipher query, never queries its deciphering oracle with (T,C) if it got C in response to some (T,M) encipher query, and never queries its enciphering oracle with (T,M) if it earlier got M in response to some (T,C) decipher query. We call such queries *pointless* because the adversary "knows" the answer that it should receive.

When $\mathcal{R}$ is a list of resources and $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{xxx}}_{\Pi}(A)$ has been defined, we write $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{xxx}}_{\Pi}(\mathcal{R})$ for the maximal value of $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{xxx}}_{\Pi}(A)$ over all adversaries A that use resources at most $\mathcal{R}$. Resources of interest are the running time t, the number of oracle queries q, and the total number of n-bit blocks in all the queries s. The name of an argument (e.g., t, q, s) will be enough to make clear what resource it refers to.

Finite fields. We interchangeably view an n-bit string as: a string; a nonnegative integer less than 2^n; a formal polynomial over GF(2); and an abstract point in the finite field $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$. To do addition on field points, one xors their string representations. To do multiplication on field points, one must fix a degree-n irreducible polynomial. We choose to use the lexicographically first primitive polynomial of minimum weight. For $n = 128$ this is the polynomial $\mathsf{x}^{128}+\mathsf{x}^7+\mathsf{x}^2+\mathsf{x}+1$. We note that with this choice of field-point representations, the point $\mathsf{x} = 0^{n-2}10 = 2$ will always have order 2^n-1 in the multiplicative group of $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, meaning that $2, 2^2, 2^3, \ldots, 2^{2^n-1}$ are all distinct. Finally, we note that given $L = L_{n-1} \cdots L_1 L_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$ it is easy to compute $2L$. We illustrate the procedure for $n = 128$, in which case $2L = L{\ll}1$ if $\mathsf{firstbit}(L) = 0$, and $2L = (L{\ll}1) \oplus \mathrm{Const87}$ if $\mathsf{firstbit}(L) = 1$. Here $\mathrm{Const87} = 0^{120}10^41^3$ and $\mathsf{firstbit}(L)$ means L_{n-1} and $L{\ll}1$ means $L_{n-2}L_{n-3}\cdots L_1L_00$.