

Public Key Encryption Which is Simultaneously a Locally-Decodable Error-Correcting Code

Brett Hemenway* Rafail Ostrovsky†

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a Public-Key Encryption (PKE) Scheme that is also a Locally-Decodable Error-Correcting Code. In particular, our construction simultaneously satisfies all of the following properties:

- Our Public-Key Encryption is semantically secure under a certain number-theoretic hardness assumption (a specific variant of the Φ -hiding assumption).
- Our Public-Key Encryption function has *constant expansion*: it maps plaintexts of length n (for any n polynomial in k , where k is a security parameter) to ciphertexts of size $\mathcal{O}(n + k)$. The size of our Public Key is also linear in n and k .
- Our Public-Key Encryption is also a *constant rate* binary error-correcting code against any polynomial-time Adversary. That is, we allow a polynomial-time Adversary to read the entire ciphertext, perform any polynomial-time computation and change an arbitrary (i.e. adversarially chosen) constant fraction of *all* bits of the ciphertext. The goal of the Adversary is to cause error in decoding any bit of the plaintext. Nevertheless, the decoding algorithm can decode **all** bits of the plaintext (given the corrupted ciphertext) while making a mistake on *any* bit of the plaintext with only a negligible in k error probability.
- Our Decoding algorithm has a **Local Decodability** property. That is, given a corrupted ciphertext of $E(x)$ the decryption algorithm, for any $1 \leq i \leq n$ can recover the i 'th bit of x (i.e., x_i) with overwhelming probability reading at most $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ bits of the corrupted ciphertext and performing computation polynomial in k . Thus, for large plaintext messages, our Public Key Decryption algorithm can decode and error-correct any x_i with sublinear (in $|x|$) computation.

We believe that the tools and techniques developed in this paper will be of independent interest in other settings.

Keywords: Public Key Cryptography, Locally Decodable Codes, Error Correcting Codes, Bounded Channel Model, Chinese Remainder Theorem, Private Information Retrieval.

*Department of Mathematics, University of California, Los Angeles. E-mail: brett@math.ucla.edu

†Department of Computer Science and Department of Mathematics, University of California, Los Angeles 90095.
E-mail: rafail@cs.ucla.edu, rostrov@math.ucla.edu.

1 Introduction

Error correction has been an important field of research since Shannon laid the groundwork for a mathematical theory of communication in the forties. An error correcting code is thus a pair of algorithms C and D such that given a message x , $C(x)$ is a codeword such that, given a string y , if the Hamming Distance between $d(C(x), y)$ is “small”, then $D(C(x)) = x$. When speaking of an error correcting code, two of the most important characteristics are the *information rate*, which is the ratio of the message size to the codeword size $\frac{|C(x)|}{|x|}$, and the *error rate* which is the smallest ϵ such that if $d(C(x), y) > \epsilon|C(x)|$ then $D(C(x))$ fails to recover x uniquely. Since the field’s inception, many codes have been found that exhibit both constant information rate, and constant error rate, which, in a sense, is optimal. These codes all share the property that to recover even a small portion of the message x from the codeword y , you must decrypt the entire codeword. In [14], Katz and Trevisan posed the question: can codes be found in which a single bit of the message can be recovered by decrypting only a small number of bits from the codeword? Codes of this type are called *locally-decodable*, and would be immensely useful in encoding large amounts of data which only needs to be recovered in small portions, such as any kind of database or archive. Currently the best known locally-decodable codes are due to Yekhanin [25] and that can tolerate a constant error rate, have exponentially small information rates.

It was shown by Katz and Trevisan [14], that any information-theoretic Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme can be transformed into a locally-decodable code. While this provides a new approach to the problem of constructing efficient locally-decodable codes, so far it has not lead to any codes with sub-exponential size codewords, as we are still unable to construct efficient information-theoretic Private Information Retrieval schemes.

Recently, Micali, Peikert, Sudan and Wilson [24] showed that by changing the model of how errors are introduced, existing error correcting codes could be significantly improved. Their work used the Computationally Bounded Channel Model, first proposed by Lipton [15]. In this model, errors are not introduced in codewords at random, but in a worst case fashion *by a computationally bounded adversary*. This realistic restriction on the power of the channel allowed for the introduction of cryptographic tools into the problem of error correction. After seeing the dramatic improvement of error-correcting codes in this model, a natural question then becomes whether locally-decodable codes can be improved in the computationally bounded channel model.

The first real progress in this setting was recently accomplished by Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai [21], where they showed how to construct a constant information-rate, constant error-rate locally-decodable code in the case where the sender and receiver share a private key. This left open the question whether the same can be accomplished in the Public-Key setting, which does not follow from their results. Indeed, a naïve proposal (that does not work) would be to encrypt the key needed by [21] separately and then switch to the private-key model already solved by [21]. This however leaves unresolved the following question: how do you encrypt the [21] key in a locally-decodable fashion? Clearly, if we allow the adversary to corrupt a constant fraction of all the bits (including encryption of the key and the message), and we encrypt the key separately, then the encryption of the key must consume a constant fraction of the message, otherwise it can be totally corrupted by an Adversary. But if this is the case all hope for local decodability is lost. Another suggestion is to somehow hide the encryption of the key inside the encryption of the actual message. It is not clear how this can be achieved. Thus, a new, and completely different, approach must be taken. Indeed, in this paper, we show a Public-Key Encryption which achieves constant information-rate and constant error-rate code with local decodability.

High Level Idea of Our Construction. At a very high level, our approach is as follows: Gentry and Ramzan [7] described a computational PIR scheme that allows the sender to retrieve remainders of the database modulo hidden moduli. Our approach is to build upon the Gentry and Ramzan machinery and to encrypt the message by computing it over multiple hidden moduli, then doing Chinese Remaindering over the hidden moduli, and using the fact that we can error-correct individual blocks using the Chinese Remainder Error Correcting Code Theorem (CRT-ECC), see for example [8]. This introduces a large alphabet error-correcting code, however using the ideas of concatenated-codes we reduce this to a binary alphabet (by applying standard error correcting codes inside the CRT-ECC Code) to obtain binary error-correcting code with asymptotically optimal rate which is also a semantically secure public key cryptosystem.

1.1 Previous Work

While the notion of a computationally bounded channel has existed for over ten years, it was only comparatively recently that it was shown to have substantial benefits. The first real success in the computationally bounded channel model was not until 2005. In [24], Micali et al demonstrated a class of binary error correcting codes with positive information rate, that can uniquely decode from $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ error rate, under the assumption that one-way functions exist. These codes decode from an error rate above the proven upper bound of $\frac{1}{4} - \epsilon$ in the the (unbounded) adversarial channel model. Here, again, we emphasize the reasonableness of the computationally bounded channel model, since under the assumption that one-way functions exist, Micali et al show that *all* channels (that don't hold the messages for an exponential amount of time) must be computationally bounded, or they could be used as inverters of the one-way function.

In [21], Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai applied the computationally bounded channel model to locally-decodable codes, and were able to produce private locally decodable codes with constant information rate, and able to recover from a constant error rate, a significant improvement over the best known locally-decodable codes in the unbounded adversarial channel model, which require exponential size codewords to recover from constant error rate.

In this paper, we also consider locally-decodable codes, in the computationally bounded channel model but in the *public key setting*. Specifically we show that our cryptosystem has constant ciphertext expansion, i.e. constant information rate, and is locally decodable from constant error rate in the computationally bounded channel model.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

This paper brings together a number of different cryptographic building blocks, which, unfortunately, have conflicting names and notations. To minimize confusion we use the following naming conventions for our variables.

- x will denote a plaintext message, which will usually be n bits in length.
- $\pi_i = p_i^{c_i}$ will denote a prime-power modulus used for Chinese Remaindering.
- m will denote an RSA modulus, which, i.e. a product of two approximately equal size primes, and m will usually be k bits in length.

- k will denote our security parameter.
- $\nu(k)$ will denote a function which is negligible in k .
- G_m will denote the largest cyclic subgroup of $(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$. Since m will always be an RSA modulus, this gives $|G_m| = \varphi(m)/2$.

2.2 The Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption

The Φ -Hiding Assumption is a relatively new computational hardness assumption, which relates to the difficulty of finding small prime factors of $\varphi(m)$, where φ is the Euler Totient Function. If a prime p divides $\varphi(m)$, we say that m Φ -hides p . The Φ -Hiding assumption was first proposed by Cachin, Micali and Stadler in [3], and a variant was proposed by Gentry and Ramzan in [7]. Our constructions require only the security of the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme, and so we make the following variant of the Φ -Hiding Assumption

Let \mathcal{P}_k denote the set of primes of bit-length $\frac{k}{2}$, \mathcal{H}_k be the set of products of two primes in \mathcal{P}_k , and let $\mathcal{H}_k^\pi \subset \mathcal{H}_k$ denote the set of composite moduli that Φ -hide π , i.e.

$$\mathcal{H}_k^\pi = \{m : m = pq, \{p, q\} \subset \mathcal{P}_k, p \equiv 1 \pmod{\pi}\}.$$

Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption. For all small prime powers, π_0, π_1 such that $3 < \pi_0 < \pi_1 < 2^{\frac{k}{4}-1}$, given $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$, for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A , we have

$$\Pr[A(\pi_0, \pi_1, m) = b] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k),$$

for some negligible function $\nu(k)$, where the probability is taken over all $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$, $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and the internal randomness of A .

Thus we are asserting that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can determine which prime power a given modulus Φ -hides. We will sometimes find it convenient to use a slightly different form. Specifically, we assert that given two moduli m_0, m_1 which Φ -hide two prime powers π_0, π_1 , no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can tell whether $\pi_0 = \pi_1$ with probability better than one half.

Lemma 1. Under the Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption, if $3 < \pi_0 \leq \pi_1 < 2^{\frac{k}{4}-1}$, $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $m_0 \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$ and $m_1 \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_{1-b}}$ Then for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A ,

$$\Pr \left[A(m_0, m_1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \pi_0 = \pi_1 \\ 1 & \text{if } \pi_0 \neq \pi_1 \end{cases} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k),$$

for some negligible function $\nu(k)$, where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of A .

Proof. Assume there exists a polynomial-time adversary A which can correctly determine whether $\pi_0 = \pi_1$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$ for some non-negligible function $\epsilon(k)$. Given π_0, π_1 and m such that $\pi_b \mid \varphi(m)$, we wish to construct an algorithm A' that guesses b , as follows: Pick a random $b' \in \{0, 1\}$, and generate $m' \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_{b'}}$. Then run A on (m, m') . If A returns 0 then A' returns b' , otherwise A' returns $1 - b'$. Since A succeeds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$, A' succeeds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(k)$ which is still non-negligible in k , and thus a violation of the Φ -Hiding assumption \blacksquare

In particular, we are asserting that there is no efficient algorithm which can match the π_i to the moduli m_i significantly better than by guessing randomly. There are a few caveats. First, the p_i must be greater than 3, since every odd number Φ -hides 2, and $m \equiv 2 \pmod 3$, only if m Φ -hides 3. Second, the π_i cannot be greater than $\sqrt[4]{m_i}$, this is to prevent the lattice based attack described in [5], [4]. When the p_i 's and the π_i 's are chosen subject to these restrictions, there are no efficient algorithms known for breaking the Φ -Hiding assumption.

3 Computationally Locally Decodable Codes

3.1 Modelling Noisy Channels

When discussing error correcting, or locally-decodable codes, it is important to consider how the errors are introduced by the channel. While it may be natural to assume the errors are introduced “at random”, small changes in the exact nature of these errors can result in substantial changes in the bounds on the best possible codes. The first definition of a noisy channel is due to Claude Shannon [23]. Shannon defined the *symmetric channel* where each message symbol is independently changed to a random different symbol with some fixed probability, called the error rate. An alternative definition of a noisy channel is Hamming’s *adversarial channel*, where one imagines an adversary corrupting bits of the message in a worst-case fashion, subject only to the total number of bits that can be corrupted per block. Most error correcting and locally-decodable codes were designed for this model. Lipton [15] observed in 1994 that the adversarial channel model assumes that the adversarial channel itself is computationally unbounded. In that paper, Lipton proposed a new model of *computationally bounded noise*, which is similar to Hamming’s adversarial channel, except the adversary is restricted to computation which is polynomial in the block length of the code. This restriction on the channel’s ability to introduce error is a natural one. In fact, this is implied by our hardness assumption, since we show that any channel which introduces noise in a strictly worst-case fashion could be used to break the Φ -hiding assumption.

3.2 Definitions

We extend the standard definition of computational indistinguishability for public key encryption to include the size of the plaintext as a function of the security parameter. That is, we set the plaintext x to be of length k^α , where k is the security parameter and $\alpha > 1$. To make our definition more robust, we allow the adversary A to pass some state information γ , which could include information about the plaintexts x^0, x^1 , which might be of use in determining which plaintext is encrypted by $E(PK, x^b, r)$.

The primary difference between this definition and the standard definition of semantic-security, see Appendix A, is that this definition includes the local decodability property of the cryptosystem. Roughly, this says that given an encryption c of a message x , and a corrupted encryption c' such that the hamming distance of c and c' is less than $\delta|c|$, the decoder can decode any bit x_i of the plaintext x from c' in time significantly less than $\mathcal{O}(k^\alpha)$.

Definition 1. We call *Public Key Cryptosystem semantically secure (in the sense of indistinguishability) and δ -computationally locally-decodable* if for all k and for all α sufficiently large; there is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (G, E, D) , where

- $(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k, \alpha)$,

- $c \leftarrow E(PK, x, r)$ (where $|x| = k^\alpha$ is a plaintext message of length polynomial in k , and r is the randomness of the encryption algorithm);
- $b' \leftarrow D(SK, c', i)$

so that for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A :

$$\Pr[(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k, \alpha); \{x^0, x^1\} \leftarrow A(PK); A(E(PK, x^b, r)) = b] < \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k),$$

where x^0 and x^1 must both be of length k^α , and the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm's randomness, b , randomness r used in the encryption algorithm E and the internal randomness of A . Furthermore, it is computationally, locally-decodable. That is, for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A' and A'' ,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[& (PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k, \alpha); \\ & (m, \gamma) \leftarrow A'(PK); \\ & c \leftarrow E(PK, x, r); \\ & \{c', i\} \leftarrow A''(c, \gamma) : \\ & D(SK, c', i) = x_i] > 1 - \nu(k), \end{aligned}$$

where x_i denotes the i th bit of x , x must be of the length k^α , c' and c must be of the same length and the hamming distance between c' and c is at most $\delta|c|$, and where the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm's randomness, r used in the encryption algorithm E and the internal randomness of both A' and A'' . The information-rate is $\frac{|m|}{|c|}$ and we call the decryption algorithm *locally-decodable* if its running time is $o(k^\alpha)$, and the *efficiency* of the local decodability is measured as a function of k and α .

4 Construction

4.1 A Φ -hiding based Semantically Secure Encryption Protocol

Here, we describe a simple semantically-secure public key encryption scheme, that will be an essential building block of our construction. The encryption protocol consists of three algorithms, G, E, D described below.

To generate the keys, $G(1^k)$ first selects a small prime-power π , then generates $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, i.e. $m = pq$, where $p, q \in \mathcal{P}_k$, and $\pi \mid p - 1$. The public key will be $PK = (g, m, \pi)$ where g is a generator for the cyclic group G_m , and $SK = \frac{\varphi(m)}{\pi}$.

To encrypt a message $x \in \mathbb{Z}/\pi\mathbb{Z}$, we have

$$E(x) = g^{x+\pi r} \pmod{m},$$

for a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$. To decrypt, we do

$$D(y) = y^{\varphi(m)/\pi} = g^{x\varphi(m)/\pi} \pmod{\varphi(m)} \pmod{m} = \left(g^{\varphi(m)/\pi}\right)^x \pmod{m},$$

then, using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm in the group $\langle g^{\varphi(m)/\pi} \rangle$, we can recover $x \pmod{\pi} = x$. If $\pi = p^c$, the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm runs in time $c\sqrt{p}$. Thus

the decryption requires $\mathcal{O}(\log(m/\pi) + c\sqrt{p})$ group operations in G_m which is acceptable for small primes p . It is worth noticing that this scheme is additively homomorphic over the group $\mathbb{Z}/\pi\mathbb{Z}$, although we do not have an explicit use for this property. When $\pi = 2$, this is just Goldwasser-Micali Encryption [9], for larger π it was described in [2] and [1]. An extension of this scheme is described in [20].

While this protocol is not new, none of the previous descriptions of this protocol make use of the Φ -hiding assumption, and instead their security is based on a composite residuosity assumption, i.e. it is impossible to tell whether a random group element h belongs to the subgroup of order π in G_m . We are able to prove security under the Φ -hiding assumption because the Φ -hiding assumption is strictly stronger than these other assumptions. The reduction is simple, for suppose there exists an adversary A which can determine whether a group element $h \in G_m$ is a π th power. Noticing that if $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$ exactly 1 in π elements will be π th powers, while if $\gcd(\pi, \varphi(m)) = 1$, then *every* element is a π th power, by simply sending random group elements h_i to A , and measuring the probability which A says that h_i is a π th power, we can distinguish whether $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$. Our proof essentially follows this reduction.

We now prove the semantic security of this protocol under the Φ -hiding assumption. For clarity we have broken the proof of security into lemmas 2-5.

Lemma 2. For any adversary A , which, given $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, can determine whether $h \in G_m$ is π th power with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, must reply that h is *not* a π th power with probability at least $\frac{3}{8}$ when h is selected uniformly at random from G_m .

Proof. Since exactly $\frac{1}{\pi}$ of the elements in G_m are π th powers, a simple counting argument shows that if A guesses correctly with probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$, then A must guess that at least a $1 - \frac{\pi}{2\pi+2}$ fraction of the elements are not π th powers. Since we require $\pi \geq 5$, we conclude that A must guess that a uniformly chosen group element is not a π th power with at least probability $\frac{3}{8}$. ■

Now, we notice that even if A is given an element from an “impostor” group, it must behave in almost the same manner.

Lemma 3. For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A , such that A that guesses whether $h \in G_m$ is a π th power with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, then for a uniformly chosen $h' \in G_{m'}$ where $m' \in \mathcal{H}_k \setminus \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, i.e. $\pi \nmid \varphi(m')$, A must guess that h is not a π th power with probability at least $\frac{3}{8} - \nu(k)$ for some negligible function ν .

Proof. Assume A guesses that a uniformly chosen $h' \in G_{m'}$ is not a π th residue with probability less than $\frac{3}{8} - \epsilon(k)$ for some non-negligible function ϵ . Then we can use A to break the Φ -hiding assumption. Given a modulus m where we wish to determine if $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$, we simply choose a random element in $h \in G_m$, and run A on h . If A says that h is a π th power in G_m , i.e. $A(h) = 1$, we say that $\pi \nmid \varphi(m)$. We denote the output of A on the input h by

$$A(h) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } h \text{ is a } \pi\text{th power,} \\ 1 & \text{if } h \text{ is not a } \pi\text{th power.} \end{cases}$$

Then, calculating the probabilities, we have

	$\pi \nmid \varphi(m)$	$\pi \mid \varphi(m)$
$A(h) = 1$	$\frac{5}{8} + \epsilon$	$< \frac{5}{8}$
$A(h) = 0$	$\frac{3}{8} - \epsilon$	$> \frac{3}{8}$

From this, we can calculate the conditional probabilities,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\pi \nmid \varphi(m) : A(h) = 0] &\geq \frac{\frac{5}{8} + \epsilon}{\frac{5}{8} + \frac{5}{8} + \epsilon} \\
&\geq \frac{\frac{5}{8} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{4} + \frac{\epsilon}{5}}{\frac{5}{4} + \epsilon} \\
&\geq \frac{\frac{5}{8} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{4} + \frac{\epsilon^2}{5}}{\frac{5}{4} + \epsilon} \\
&= \frac{(\frac{5}{4} + \epsilon) (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{5})}{\frac{5}{4} + \epsilon} \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{5}.
\end{aligned}$$

A similar calculation holds in the other case, and since $\epsilon(k)$ is non-negligible, we conclude that we break the Φ -hiding assumption with non-negligible probability. \blacksquare

Lemma 4. If there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can guess whether $h \in G_m$ is a π th power with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$, where $\epsilon(k)$ is non-negligible, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A' that guesses correctly with probability greater than $\frac{3}{4}$.

Proof. This is clear, since we can amplify A 's probability of success by running A a polynomial number of times on hr^π for randomly chosen $r \in G_m$. \blacksquare

We are now ready to prove the semantic security of our encryption scheme.

Lemma 5. This protocol is semantically secure under the Small Primes Φ -Hiding Assumption.

Proof. Since this cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, to show that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish $E(x_0)$ from $E(x_1)$ it suffices to show that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish $E(x)$ from $E(0)$, for any $0 \neq x \in \mathbb{Z}/\pi\mathbb{Z}$. Now, notice that $E(0) = g^{\pi r} = (g^r)^\pi$ is a random π th power in G_m . We now proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A such that

$$\Pr \left[A(E(x)) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x = 0, \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \right] > \frac{3}{4}$$

We can use A to construct an algorithm A' which breaks the Φ -hiding assumption. Suppose A' wishes to determine whether some $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$, i.e. whether $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$. Then, A' chooses an $h \in G_m$ at random, and computes h^π . If $\pi \nmid \varphi(m)$, then h will still be a uniformly chosen element from G_m . On the other hand, if $\pi \mid \varphi(m)$ then h^π will be a π th power. By Lemma 3, in the first case A must say that h^π is not a π th power with probability at least $\frac{3}{8} - \nu(k)$, while in the second case, by the definition of A , A must say that h^π is not a π th power with probability at most $\frac{1}{4}$. The conditional probabilities become

	$\pi \nmid \varphi(m)$	$\pi \mid \varphi(m)$
$A(h) = 0$	$> \frac{3}{4}$	$< \frac{5}{8} + \nu$
$A(h) = 1$	$< \frac{1}{4}$	$> \frac{3}{8} - \nu$

Then we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\pi|\varphi(m) : A(h) = 0] &\geq \frac{\frac{3}{4}}{\frac{3}{4} + \frac{5}{8} - \nu} \\
&\geq \frac{\frac{3}{4} - \nu \left(\frac{11}{8} - \frac{6}{11} + \nu \right)}{\frac{11}{8} + \nu} \\
&= \frac{\left(\frac{6}{11} - \nu \right) \left(\frac{11}{8} + \nu \right)}{\frac{11}{8} + \nu} \\
&= \frac{6}{11} - \nu \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{22} - \nu.
\end{aligned}$$

Since ν is negligible, we see that we are correct with probability significantly greater than $\frac{1}{2}$. A similar calculation holds in the other case, so we can break the Φ -hiding assumption with non-negligible probability. \blacksquare

The protocol described above requires the user to know π to encrypt a message x , which is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Φ -hiding assumption. The key fact that will use is that given π_0, π_1 and $m_0 \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_b}$, $m_1 \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi(1-b)}$, we can encrypt x modulo both π_0, π_1 by calculating

$$g_0^{x+r\pi_0\pi_1} \pmod{m_0} \text{ and } g_1^{x+r\pi_0\pi_1} \pmod{m_1}.$$

Thus we have two encryptions, $E(x \pmod{\pi_0})$ and $E(x \pmod{\pi_1})$, but the sender cannot distinguish between them. It is exactly this property that allows the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme to function, and it will be this property that prevents any adversarial channel from destroying any bit of the message in our encryption scheme.

4.2 Binary Error Correction

A drawback of many error-correcting codes, and locally-decodable codes is that they are defined over large alphabets. In practice, all these codes are implemented on computers, where the natural alphabet is $\{0, 1\}$. Thus when we say that a code like the CRT ECC or Reed-Solomon codes can tolerate a constant fraction of errors, we mean a constant fraction of errors in their natural alphabet. In the CRT ECC, if one bit of each remainder corrupted, there are no guarantees that the message will not be corrupted. Binary error correcting codes do exist, but they are generally not as efficient as codes over larger alphabets.

To allow our code to tolerate a constant fraction of errors in the *bits* of the ciphertext, we will make use of a binary error correcting code ECC, with two properties

- $|\text{ECC}(x)| = c|x|$ for some constant c ,
- ECC can recover from an error-rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$ in the *bits* of $\text{ECC}(x)$.

Such codes exist, for $\delta > \frac{1}{4}$ in the unbounded adversarial channel model, and $\delta > 0$ in the computationally bounded channel model. See Appendix B for a more in-depth discussion.

4.3 Error Correcting Public Key Encryption

We are now ready to describe our construction. Given a message $X \in \{0, 1\}^n$, we first divide X into blocks X_i of size ℓk . As in the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme, we view each block as a number in the range $\{0 \dots 2^{\ell k}\}$. Our public key will be $\frac{\rho n}{k}$ RSA moduli m_α such that each moduli Φ -hides a prime power π_{ij} for $1 \leq i \leq \lceil \frac{n}{\ell k} \rceil$ and $1 \leq j \leq \lceil \frac{\rho \ell}{d} \rceil$. Exactly which prime is hidden by which moduli will be chosen at random at the time of key generation, and is part of the receiver's secret key. Then, for each block X_i , the sender encrypts $X_i \bmod \pi_{ij}$ for $j = 1 \dots \lceil \frac{\rho \ell}{d} \rceil$ where each π_{ij} is roughly of size dk . Notice here that we have used ρ times as many moduli as necessary, thus for each block X_i we have effectively calculated an encoding of X_i under the CRT ECC which can tolerate $(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}) \frac{\ell}{d}$ corrupted moduli, see Appendix C. We do this for each block, and thus the resulting encryption is $\frac{\rho \ell}{d} \cdot \frac{n}{\ell k}$ residues. Since each residue is of size k , the the encryption of the whole message is now of $\frac{n}{\ell k} \frac{\rho \ell}{d} = \frac{\rho n}{dk}$ encryptions of size k . Finally, we encode each of the $\frac{\rho n}{kd}$ encryptions independently using the error correcting code in §4.2. So our final encryption is of size $\frac{\rho cn}{d}$ bits, which is a constant multiple of n . This encryption is error correcting because as long as no more than $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$ of the residues that encode a given block are corrupted, the block can be recovered correctly by first decrypting each residue, and then reconstructing the CRT ECC. This cryptosystem is also locally-decodable since to decrypt a given block, it suffices to decrypt the $\frac{\rho \ell}{d}$ encryptions that encode it. We now define a triple of algorithms G, E, D for our encryption scheme.

First, we describe key generation $G(1^k, \alpha)$

- Let p_1, \dots, p_t be primes with $5 \leq p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_t$, and choose $c_i = \lfloor \frac{k}{4 \log p_i} \rfloor$, thus c_i is the largest integer such that $\log(p_i^{c_i}) < dk$, for some $d < \frac{1}{4}$. Set $\pi_i = p_i^{c_i}$. To encrypt n -bit messages, we will need to choose $t = \frac{\rho n}{dk}$. Since $n = k^\alpha$, this becomes $t = \frac{\rho k^{\alpha-1}}{d}$.
- Generate a random permutation $\sigma \in S_t$, the symmetric group on t elements.
- Generate moduli m_1, \dots, m_t such that $m_i \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_{\sigma(i)}}$, i.e. m_i Φ -hides $\pi_{\sigma(i)}$.
- Find generators g_i of the cyclic groups G_{m_i} .

The public key will then be

$$PK = ((g_1, m_1, \pi_1), \dots, (g_t, m_t, \pi_t)),$$

and the secret key will be

$$SK = \left(\sigma, \frac{\varphi(m_1)}{\pi_{\sigma(1)}}, \dots, \frac{\varphi(m_t)}{\pi_{\sigma(t)}} \right).$$

Encryption then works as follows, given an n -bit message X ,

- Break X into $\frac{n}{\ell k}$ blocks X_i of size ℓk , and treat each X_i as an integer in the range $\{0 \dots 2^{\ell k}\}$.
- For block X_i , we will use the s prime powers $\pi_{(i-1)s}, \dots, \pi_{is-1}$ to encode X_i . To do this, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, generate \tilde{X} such that $\tilde{X} = X_i \bmod (\pi_{(i-1)s+1} \dots \pi_{is})$. To recover from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$, we set $s = \frac{\rho \ell}{d}$.
- Generate a random $r \in \{0, \dots, \pi_1 \dots \pi_t\}$.

- Then calculate $h_i = g_i^{\tilde{X} + r\pi_1 \cdots \pi_t} \pmod{m_i}$ for each $i \in \{1, \dots, t\}$. Thus

$$h_i = E\left(\tilde{X} \pmod{\pi_{\sigma(i)}}\right) = E(X_j \pmod{\pi_{\sigma(i)}}),$$

where $(j-1)s+1 \leq \sigma(i) \leq js$, and E is the encryption protocol described in §4.1.

- Apply the binary Error Correcting Code ECC to each h_i individually.
- The encryption is then the t -tuple $(\text{ECC}(h_1), \text{ECC}(h_2), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_t))$.

To decrypt the i th block, of a message X from the t -tuple (h_1, \dots, h_t)

- Select the s encryptions that encode X_i , $\{\text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}(is)})\}$.
- Decode each $\text{ECC}(h_j)$ to find obtain $\{h_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}, \dots, h_{\sigma^{-1}(is)}\}$.
- Decrypt each of the s encryptions using the decryption algorithm from §4.1. This gives a_1, \dots, a_s where $a_j = X_i \pmod{(\pi_{(i-1)s+j})}$.
- Using the Chinese Remainder Code Decoding Algorithm, reconstruct X_i from the s remainders a_1, \dots, a_s . Note that if there are no errors introduced, this step can be replaced by simple Chinese Remaindering.

We have introduced many parameters in the definition of this scheme, and their roles can be summarized as follows

n	the number of bits in the message X .
k	the security parameter.
t	the total number of moduli used. We will set $t = \frac{\rho n}{dk}$.
d	the fraction of bits that can be Φ -hidden, d is a fixed constant $d < \frac{1}{4}$.
ℓ	a parameter which affects the “spread” of the code. We will choose $\ell \approx k$.
s	the number of π_i encoding each block, for us $s = \frac{\rho \ell}{d}$.
c	is the expansion factor of the error correcting code ECC.
ρ	is the expansion factor of the CRT ECC we set $\rho = \frac{1}{2\delta}$, to recover from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$.

There is an unfortunate tradeoff between the public key size, which is proportional to the message size, and the usefulness of the local-decodability. If the message X is very long, the local-decodability of this code makes it significantly more robust against concentrated errors than a simple error-correcting code, while if X is very short, the public key remains short, but the local-decodability becomes meaningless if $|X| < \ell k$. If $\ell \approx k$, this means that we need $\alpha > 2$ to achieve local decodability.

4.4 Local-Decodability

One of the most interesting features of our construction is the local-decodability. To recover a small portion of the message X , only a small portion of the ciphertext $(\text{ECC}(h_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_t))$ needs to be decoded. During encryption the message X is broken into blocks of length ℓk bits, and this is the smallest number of bits that can be recovered at a time. To recover a single bit of X , or equivalently the entire block X_i that contains it, we must read s blocks of the ciphertext

$\{\text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}((i-1)s+1)}), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_{\sigma^{-1}(is)})\}$. Since $|h_j| = k$ and $|\text{ECC}(h_j)| = ck$, we must read a total of $sck = \frac{\rho c \ell k}{d}$. Since the probability of error will be negligible in ℓ , we set $\ell \approx k$, and since $d < \frac{1}{4}$, we find that we need to read $5c\ell k^2$ bits of the ciphertext to recover one bit of the plaintext, where c and ρ are parameters that determine the error-rate of our code. Thus our system only achieves local-decodability for $n = \mathcal{O}(k^{2+\epsilon})$. For $n \approx k^3$, our system already offers a significant improvement over standard error-correcting codes. It should also be noted, that for any semantically-secure cryptosystem, to recover one bit of the plaintext, you must read at least $\mathcal{O}(k)$ bits of the ciphertext. It is an interesting question whether the locality of such a scheme can be improved from $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ to $\mathcal{O}(k)$.

4.5 Running Time

We now show that the three algorithms G, E, D probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms in the security parameter k .

We begin by analyzing G . Choosing the π_i and the permutation σ , can clearly be done in polynomial-time, so it only remains to show that generating $m_i \in \mathcal{H}_k^{\pi_i}$ can be done in polynomial-time. We can find primes $p \in \mathcal{P}_k$ in polynomial-time, by simply choosing random numbers and testing them for primality using an algorithm like the Rabin-Miller primality test [22] or the deterministic algorithm presented in [19]. The Prime Number Theorem tells us that the density of primes of length $\frac{k}{2}$ is asymptotic to $\frac{2}{k}$, so we expect to find a prime after only a polynomial number of guesses. A similar theorem, also proven by de la Valée Poussin, gives the density of primes of length $\frac{k}{2}$ in the arithmetic progression $1 + \pi n$ to be asymptotic to $\frac{2}{\varphi(\pi)k}$, so, in either case we expect to find a prime p such that $p \equiv 1 \pmod{\pi}$ after $\mathcal{O}(k)$ guesses. This allows us to generate $m \in \mathcal{H}_k^\pi$.

The encryption algorithm E will be polynomial-time in k , \tilde{X} can be computed in polynomial-time using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and $\log \tilde{X} \approx 2 \log X$. Thus the encryptions can $g^{\tilde{X} + r\pi_1 \cdots \pi_i}$ can be done in polynomial time using the square-and-multiply algorithm.

Finally, the decryption will be polynomial-time because decrypting each h_i to $\tilde{X} \pmod{\pi_{\sigma(i)}}$ involves a single exponentiation, which can be done in polynomial-time via the square-and-multiply algorithm. Then recovering the block X_i is done via the polynomial-time CRT-ECC algorithm described in [11].

4.6 Proof of Security

The semantic security of our system follows immediately from the semantic security of the underlying cryptosystem. So here, we only show correctness, i.e. that the system is computationally locally-decodable up to a constant fraction of errors. By an encryption of a message X , we mean a t -tuple $(\text{ECC}(h_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_t))$ where $t = \frac{2n}{dk}$, and each h_i is an element of G_{m_i} . We show that our decoding algorithm decodes correctly with all but negligible probability, at most a $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ fraction of the bits of the encryption have been corrupted by a polynomial-time adversary A . Notice that our algorithm will decode a block X_i correctly whenever no more than $\frac{1}{4} \frac{2\ell}{d}$ of the h_i that encode it are corrupted. Thus we will show that any polynomial-time adversary that corrupts a $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ fraction of the bits, only corrupts more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the h_i that encode a given block of the message with negligible probability. We prove this through a series of lemmas.

We begin by noticing that any adversary A that corrupts at most $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ fraction of the *bits* of the message, can only corrupt at most a $\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2$ fraction of the h_i .

Lemma 6. Given $(\text{ECC}(h_1), \dots, \text{ECC}(h_t))$, where ECC recovers from a binary error-rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$, any adversary A that corrupts at most $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ bits of the entire codeword, can corrupt no more than $\frac{1}{2} - \delta + \delta^2$ of the h_i

Proof. This is simply counting. A can corrupt a total of $(\frac{1}{4} - \delta)ct|h_i|$ bits, and to corrupt one h_i A needs to spend $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta)c|h_i|$, thus A can corrupt at most $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2)t$ of the h_i since

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(\frac{1}{4} - \delta) ct|h_i|}{(\frac{1}{2} - \delta) c|h_i|} &\leq \frac{\frac{1}{4} - \frac{\delta}{2} - \frac{\delta}{2} + \delta^2 - \frac{\delta^2}{2} + \delta^3}{\frac{1}{2} - \delta} t \\ &= \frac{(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2) (\frac{1}{2} - \delta)}{\frac{1}{2} - \delta} t \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2\right) t. \end{aligned}$$

■

For the rest of the proof of correctness, we assume that A is restricted to corrupting a $\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2$ fraction of the h_i , rather than $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ bits of the message.

Now, we show that any such corrupting adversary cannot detect whether inputs are “well-formed”, i.e. A behaves in an indistinguishable manner whether the t -tuple (h_1, \dots, h_t) is a valid encryption or not.

Lemma 7. For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A , such that A introduces errors in t -tuples (h_1, \dots, h_t) , where each $h_i \in G_{m_i}$ and each m_i Φ -hides a distinct prime-power π_i , then A will also introduce errors in t -tuples (h_1, \dots, h_t) where each m_i Φ -hides *the same* prime-power π_i .

Proof. Instead of running A on a t -tuple where each modulus m_i Φ -hides a distinct π_i , we provide A with t -tuple in which each modulus m_i Φ hides *the same* π . If A fails to introduce errors on this malformed input with non-negligible probability ϵ . Now we proceed via hybrid argument. Since the probability the A fails on t moduli Φ -hiding the same π , is ϵ greater than when each m_i Φ -hides a different prime, then triangle inequality tells us that there must be some $t^* < t$ such that,

$$|\Pr[A \text{ fails when } t^* m_i \Phi\text{-hide the same } \pi] - \Pr[A \text{ fails when } t^* + 1 m_i \Phi\text{-hide the same } \pi]| > \frac{\epsilon}{t}.$$

We can now use A to break the Φ -hiding assumption. Given a modulus m^* such that m^* Φ -hides π^* where π^* equals π_0 or π_1 , we construct t^* moduli m_1, \dots, m_{t^*} that Φ -hide π_0 , and $t - t^* - 1$ moduli $m_{t^*+1}, \dots, m_{t-1}$ that Φ -hide primes other than π_0, π_1 . We then run A , on the t -tuple $(h_1, \dots, h_{t-1}, h^*)$ where $h_i \in G_{m_i}$ for $1 \leq i < t$, and $h^* \in G_{m^*}$. If A fails to introduce errors on this t -tuple, we say that m^* Φ -hides π_0 . This algorithm correctly distinguishes whether m^* Φ -hides π_0 or π_1 with probability at least $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2t}$. Although, we do not know the exact value of t^* , we can we can guess it with probability $\frac{1}{t}$, to obtain an algorithm which decides whether m^* Φ -hides π_0 with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2t^2}$ which is a violation of the Φ -hiding assumption. ■

If each m_i Φ -hides the same π , then A must distribute errors randomly among the blocks, since the notion of blocks in this case is completely arbitrary. Since A must behave identically when each m_i Φ -hides the same modulus as when they all Φ -hide different moduli, we obtain the following lemma.

Lemma 8. If A is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine, the distribution of the errors among the Φ -hidden moduli π_i is indistinguishable from random.

Proof. Suppose there exists a distinguisher D that can distinguish the corruptions A introduces among the h_i from random with advantage ϵ . Then we run D on A 's output when A is given moduli that Φ -hide between one and t distinct π s. When we run A on a t -tuple (h_1, \dots, h_t) where each m_i Φ -hides the same π , in this situation A must distribute errors randomly, since A has *no* information about the underlying blocks. Thus in this situation, D cannot distinguish A 's corruptions from random with probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$, since in this case A 's corruptions *are* random. Now we proceed via a hybrid argument. When A is run on moduli that Φ -hide t distinct π_i , then D can distinguish A 's corruptions from random with advantage ϵ , thus by the triangle inequality, there exists a $t^* < t$ such that D can distinguish A 's output when A is run on moduli, t^* of which are then same, from A 's output when A is run on moduli, $t^* + 1$ of which are the same, with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{t}$. This allows us to break the Φ -hiding assumption in exactly the manner described before. Given a modulus m^* that Φ -hides either π_0 or π_1 , we construct t^* moduli m_1, \dots, m_{t^*} which all Φ -hide π , and $t - t^* - 1$ moduli $m_{t^*+1}, \dots, m_{t-1}$ which all Φ -hide different moduli. Then we run D on A 's output, when A is given $(m_1, \dots, m_{t-1}, m^*)$. By the definition of t^* D succeeds in distinguishing whether m^* Φ -hides π_0 with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2t}$. Thus by guessing a random value in $\{1, \dots, t-1\}$ for t^* , we break the Φ -hiding assumption with advantage $\frac{\epsilon}{2t^2}$, a contradiction. ■

Lemma 9. If A distributes $(\frac{1}{4} - \delta)t$ errors at random, the probability that A destroys any given block X_i is negligible in ℓ .

Proof. If A distributes errors at random, then we can view A as selecting remainders at random to corrupt. The adversary A destroys a block X_i exactly when A corrupts more than $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$ of the remainders that encode that block, the probability that A destroys a block is exactly the probability that more than $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta)\frac{\rho\ell}{d}$ moduli that encode X_i are corrupted. This distribution is then the Hypergeometric Distribution, where $\frac{\rho\ell}{d}$ items are selected and $(\frac{1}{2} - \delta - \delta^2)t$ of which are corrupted. In [13], Hush and Scovel give the bound

$$\Pr \left[\# \text{ of errors in encoding of block } X_i > \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta \right) \frac{\rho\ell}{d} \right] < e^{-2\left(\frac{d}{\rho\ell+d}\right)\left(\frac{\delta^4\rho^2\ell^2}{d^2}-1\right)},$$

which is clearly negligible in ℓ . ■

Lemma 10. If at most $(\frac{1}{4} - \delta)t$ of the t encryptions are corrupted by a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A , then the probability that any bit of the message fails to decode properly is negligible in k .

Proof. For a given block X_i the probability that that block is damaged under the corruptions created by A is negligibly different in k than if A produced the corruptions at random, which itself would damage X_i with only negligible probability in ℓ . Taking $\ell \approx k$, we have that the block X_i is damaged with at most negligible probability in k . The union bound then gives that the probability that *any* block X_i is damaged is at most t times the probability that a specific block is damaged, which remains negligible in k . ■

4.7 Extensions

It should be clear that choosing to encode each block by twice as many moduli as necessary was fairly arbitrary. By increasing the redundancy of the CRT ECC we would increase the error-tolerance, and also the ciphertext expansion. This scheme also benefits nicely from the methods described in [24]. By first signing each block using a Public Key Signature Scheme, and then encoding with the CRT ECC, we could use the list decoding properties of the CRT ECC described in [8] [11] and decode somewhat beyond the error bounds allowed by the standard CRT ECC.

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Appendix

A Semantic Security

By a *Public Key Cryptosystem*, we mean a triple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms G, E, D , such that $(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k)$, $c \leftarrow E(PK, x, r)$ $x' \leftarrow D(SK, c)$ Where PK, SK denote the public and secret keys and $x' = x$ w.h.p for the same message. A public key encryption system is semantically secure if, given two messages x^0 and x^1 , and an encryption of one of the messages, $E(PK, x^b)$, no polynomial time adversary can determine b with probability significantly greater than one half. That is:

Definition 2. A Public Key Cryptosystem, G, E, D , with security parameter k is called *semantically secure* (in the sense of indistinguishability) if for all message pairs $\{x^0, x^1\}$ and for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A , and for all $b \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$\Pr[(PK, SK) \leftarrow G(1^k); \{x^0, x^1\} \leftarrow A(PK); A(E(PK, x^b, r)) = b] < \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k)$$

Where x^0 and x^1 must be of equal length, and the probability is taken over the key generation algorithm's randomness, b , randomness r used in the encryption algorithm E and the internal randomness of A .

B Constant Rate Binary Error Correcting Codes

For our scheme to have constant information rate, we need to find a *binary* error-correcting code which can tolerate an error-rate of $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$.

One method for creating such a code, uses the notion of Concatenated Codes, originally described by Forney in [6]. By combining a Reed-Solomon Code and a Random Linear Code as described in [12], it is possible to obtain a binary error correcting code which recovers from $\frac{1}{4} - \delta$ error-rate, but the information-rate of the resulting code is very, about 10^{-4} for their construction.

Since we are working in the computationally bounded channel model, we can take advantage of the constructions described in [24], to create a binary code with error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$, and significantly better information rates than in the unbounded channel model. Applying their construction to the binary codes with list-decoding rate $\frac{1}{2}$ and information rate δ^4 described in [10], we obtain a code which uniquely decodes from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$, and has information rate about $\frac{1}{\delta^4}$.

C CRT-Based Error Correction

It was observed in the 1970s [16], [17], [18], that the Chinese Remainder Theorem could be used to make efficient Error Correcting Codes. The encoding process is very simple. If $\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n, \pi_{n+1}, \dots, \pi_{n+t}$ an increasing sequence of pairwise coprime integers, i.e. $\pi_1 < \pi_2 < \dots < \pi_{n+t}$, and $\gcd(\pi_i, \pi_j) = 1$ whenever $i \neq j$. Then for any integer x with $x < \prod_{i=1}^n \pi_i$, we encode x as the $(n+t)$ -tuple $\{x \bmod p_1, \dots, x \bmod p_{n+t}\}$. If x and x' are distinct integers less than $\prod_{i=1}^n \pi_i$, then the two vectors $E(x) = \{x \bmod \pi_1, \dots, x \bmod \pi_{n+t}\}$ and $E(x') = \{x' \bmod \pi_1, \dots, x' \bmod \pi_{n+t}\}$ must differ in at least $t+1$ coordinates since the residue of x modulo *any* n of the moduli π_i uniquely determines x . Thus the minimum distance in this code is t , and so it can correct $\lfloor \frac{t}{2} \rfloor$ errors. Thus if we take $n+t = \rho n$, this code can recover from error-rate $\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\rho}$, in the digits of the code.

This code differs significantly from most other error correcting codes in that each "digit", i.e. each remainder, of the codeword carries a different amount of information. Thus the Hamming

distance between two codewords, measured as the number of remainders in which they differ is not the natural distance to consider for this code. This fact made finding an efficient decoding algorithm a nontrivial task. In his original paper in 1972, Mandelbaum proposed an algorithm that ran in expected polynomial-time. Since then, many variants of that algorithm have appeared, but it was not until 2001 [11] that the first polynomial-time decoding algorithm was found. While we will not have an explicit use for this property, it should be noted that the standard techniques of list-decoding of errors beyond half the minimum distance can be implemented for the CRT ECC as well, see [8], [11].

D Gentry-Ramzan PIR

While our scheme does not explicitly rely on the Gentry-Ramzan PIR scheme, our protocol was inspired by their use of the Φ -hiding assumption to do “hidden” Chinese Remaindering. In the interest both of giving some context for our scheme, and of showing what else can be achieved by hidden Chinese Remaindering, we briefly sketch the Gentry-Ramzan Private Information Retrieval scheme [7]. This scheme allows computationally private single database PIR with constant communication rate under the Φ -hiding assumption. Here “constant” means proportional to the security parameter. The scheme allows retrieval of entire blocks at once, and the scheme we describe will retrieve an ℓ -bit block from an n -bit database.

The scheme assumes some initial set-up. First, sequence of small primes p_1, \dots, p_t are fixed in advance. Then we set $\ell = \lceil n/t \rceil$, and $c_i = \lceil \log_{p_i} \ell \rceil$. Setting $\pi_i = p_i^{c_i}$, we have that $\pi_i > 2^\ell$ for all i , and the integers π_1, \dots, π_t are pairwise relatively prime. This initial set-up is assumed to be known to both the user and the database, and is not included in the communication complexity of the scheme.

To begin the scheme, the database must do some pre-processing. Instead of viewing the database as a single n -bit string, we instead view it as a concatenation of t ℓ -bit integers a_1, \dots, a_t . Recall that we have chosen our π_i such that $a_i < \pi_i$ for each i . Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the database can find an integer $e < \prod_{i=1}^t \pi_i$, such that $e \bmod \pi_i = a_i$.

To retrieve the j th block of the database, a_j , the user then chooses an RSA modulus $m = pq$ that Φ -hides π_j , and a g for cyclic the group G_m , i.e. g has order $\frac{\varphi(m)}{2}$ in $(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$. Since $\pi_j | \varphi(m)$, we have that G_m has a subgroup of order π_j . Letting $q = \frac{\varphi(m)}{2\pi_j}$, this subgroup is generated by g^q . The user then sends both m , and g to the database. The database calculates $g^e \bmod m$ and returns the result.

Given $g^e \bmod m$, the user then calculates $(g^e)^q = (g^q)^e = g^{e \bmod \pi_j} \bmod m$ since g^q has order π_j in G_m . Then by performing (a tractable) discrete-log computation in the subgroup of order π_j generated by g^q the user recovers $e \bmod \pi_j = a_j$. Using Pohlig-Hellman algorithm this discrete-log computation can be calculated in $\mathcal{O}(c_j \sqrt{p_j})$ time.

If $\log_2(m) = k$, then the user sends $2k$ bits to the database, and the database replies with k bits, so the total communication complexity is $3k$ bits. To avoid the lattice-based attacks described in [5] and [4], we must choose m such that $\pi_i < m^{\frac{1}{4}}$ for all i , i.e. $\ell < 4k$.