A Note on Square Roots in Binary Fields

Roberto Maria Avanzi

Faculty of Mathematics and Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security Ruhr University Bochum, Germany Roberto.Avanzi@ruhr-uni-bochum.de

Abstract. In this note we present a family of irreducible polynomials that can be used to speed up square root extraction in fields of characteristic two. This generalizes one of the families of trinomials presented by Fong et al. and the results are not limited to trinomials. In fact, we show for the first time pentanomials (polynomials of weight 5) and eptanomials (polynomials of weight 7) allowing fast square root computation.

The obvious application is to point halving methods for elliptic and divisor halving methods for hyperelliptic curves.

We also prove the existence of such polynomials in the case a trinomial of a different form already exists and formulate a conjecture on some properties of such polynomials when an irreducible polynomial does not exist for the given degree.

1 Introduction

This paper collects some results on efficient square root computation in binary fields. In the seminal work [11] it has been shown how to compute square roots very efficiently in polynomial basis representation when the field is defined by an irreducible trinomial. In this paper we show sufficient conditions for an irreducible polynomial of a given odd degree d to allow fast square root computation. In particular, our results are applied to pentanomials, but in at least one case, that of $\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$, that can be defined by trinomials, we show how one can perform square root computations even faster than in [11].

Since the motivation comes from elliptic curve cryptography, in particular from point halving based methods for scalar multiplication, we begin in Section 2 by recalling point halving and how square root computation comes into play. Then, in Section 3 our sufficient conditions are introduced. Section 4 shows several good polynomials for several useful (and often used in practice) binary fields, a result about the existence of irreducible trinomials which are good for fast square root computation, and a conjecture about such pentanomials are given, together with some additional open questions.

2 Halving and Square Roots

2.1 Point and Divisor Halving

Let E be a generic elliptic curve defined over \mathbb{F}_{2^d} by a Weierstrass equation of the form

$$E : y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$$

with $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^d}$ and having a subgroup $G \leq E(\mathbb{F}_{2^d})$ of large prime order. For any given point P, formulas to compute the double of a point, i.e. 2P are well known, and an important direction of research consists in optimizing these formulae, possibly by computing under a different coordinate system, even at the price of increasing the cost of an addition, since the doubling is the most common operation in a scalar multiplication performed by double-and-add methods (see for example Chapter 9 of [4] for a survey, and references therein).

Point halving [12, 17], on the other hand, consists in computing a point Q such that 2Q = P.

To a point P with affine coordinates (x, y) we associate the quantity $\lambda_P = x + \frac{y}{x}$. Let P = (x, y) and R = (u, v) be points of $E(\mathbb{F}_{2^d}) \setminus \{0\}$ with 2R = P. The affine coordinates of P and R are related as follows:

$$\lambda_R = u + \frac{v}{u} \tag{1}$$

$$x = \lambda_R^2 + \lambda_R + a \tag{2}$$

$$y = u^2 + x(\lambda_R + 1) \tag{3}$$

Given P, point halving consists in finding R. To do this, we have to solve (2) for λ , (3) for u, and finally (1) for v. After some simple manipulations, we see that we have to perform the following operations:

(i) Solve
$$\lambda_R^2 + \lambda_R = a + x$$
 for λ_R (4)

(ii) Put $t = y + x(\lambda_R + 1)$ (iii) Find a mith $x^2 = t$

(iii) Find
$$u$$
 with $u^2 = t$ (5)

(iv) Put $v = t + u\lambda_R$.

Point halving, being the inverse operation of the doubling, is an automorphism of G. Therefore, given a point $P \in G$, there is a unique $R \in G$ such that 2R = P. In other words, the equations (4) and (5) can always be solved in \mathbb{F}_{2^d} . But, they do not determine a *unique* point R with 2R = P. In fact, solving them will always yield two distinct points R_1 and R_2 such that $R_1 - R_2$ is the unique point of order 2 of the curve. It is possible, by performing an additional check, to determine the point $R \in G$. Knudsen [12] and Schroeppel [16, 17] show how to perform all these steps in an efficient way. According to the very thorough analysis in [11], halving is about two times faster than doubling. We refer the interested reader to [11, 12, 16, 17] for details, including methods to use the halving in place of the doubling in scalar multiplication algorithms.

Birkner [8] has provided a similar algorithm for divisor halving on genus two curves based on Lange and Stevens efficient doubling formulae [14]. Birkner and Thériault [9] also have efficient halving for genus three divisors based on the new genus three doubling formulae by Avanzi, Thériault and Wang [7]. The performance of all these formulae also depends from the performance of square root extraction, even though to a smaller degree than the elliptic halving method.

Further uses of point halving to speed up scalar multiplication on the special class of elliptic Koblitz Curves [13] are found in [3, 5] and [6].

2.2 Square Root Computation

In what follows will be only concerned with square root extraction for binary fields represented via a polynomial basis: Let p(X) be an irreducible polynomial of degree d, the field \mathbb{F}_{2^d} be costructed as the quotient ring $\mathbb{F}_2[X]/(p(X))$, and let us identify X with its own image in this ring. In what follows the extension degree d will be odd.

The reason behind this is that in software applications it is customary to use a polynomial basis representation for the field extension $\mathbb{F}_{2^d}/\mathbb{F}_2$ instead of a normal basis [2], because in the latter representation the cost of a software multiplication is much higher than with a polynomial basis.

But, whereas with normal basis a square root computation is just a shift of the bits internal representation of the field element by one position, matters are more complicated with polynomial bases.

In fact, even the cost of a squaring is not completely negligible with polynomial bases If

$$\alpha = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_i X^i$$

then

$$\alpha^2 = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_i X^{2i}$$

which, as a polynomial in X, has degree no longer necessarily bounded by d, and modular reduction modulo p(X) is necessary. Its cost is very low, but not completely negligible.

Things are more complicated for square root computation. In fact, squaring just consists in "spacing" the bits of the original element with zeros, but the bits of a generic element cannot be "squeezed".

The classic method for computing $\sqrt{\alpha}$, is based on Fermat's little theorem $\alpha^{2^d} = \alpha$, hence $\sqrt{\alpha} = \alpha^{2^{d-1}}$. This requires d-1 squarings. In general, the cost of this operation is still than

A more efficient method stems from the observation that $\sqrt{\alpha}$ can be expressed in terms of $\zeta := \sqrt{(X)}$. If

$$\alpha = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} a_i X^i$$

then we separate the even and odd exponents

$$\alpha = \sum_{i=0}^{(d-1)/2} a_{2i} X^{2i} + \sum_{i=0}^{(d-3)/2} a_{2i+1} X^{2i+1} = \sum_{i=0}^{(d-1)/2} a_{2i} X^{2i} + X \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{(d-3)/2} a_{2i+1} X^{2i}$$

and by the linearity of square roots in even characteristic

$$\sqrt{\alpha} = \sum_{i=0}^{(d-1)/2} a_{2i} X^i + \zeta \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{(d-3)/2} a_{2i+1} X^i \quad . \tag{6}$$

Therefore, once ζ has been computed once for all, the computation of a generic square root is reduced to "bits extraction and packing", the computation of a "rectangular" multiplication of a degree $\leq d-1$ polynomial ζ with a polynomial $\sum_{i=0}^{(d-3)/2} a_{2i+1}X^i$ of degree $\leq (d-1)/2$, and a modular reduction. Intuitively, the cost should approach a half of the cost of a field multiplication, and this is confirmed by the analysis in [11, 12].

3 New Defining Polynomials

As we have just seen, efficient square root computation depends on the efficiency of the multiplication of a generic degree $\leq (d-1)/2$ polynomial by $\zeta = \sqrt{X}$. If ζ is a very sparse element, for example of weight 3, then this product can be computed by a few shift and xor operations. In [11] two types of trinomials have been shown that allow this. The kind that interests us is the following.

$$p(X) = X^d + X^m + 1$$

with m odd. Then, $X = X^{d+1} + X^{m+1}$, with d+1 and m+1 even, hence

$$\zeta = X^{(d+1)/2} + X^{(m+1)/2}$$

In fact, this idea is much more general.

Assume we have an irreducible polynomial p(X) defining \mathbb{F}_{2^d} over \mathbb{F}_2 of the form

$$p(X) = X\mathcal{U}(X)^2 + 1 \tag{7}$$

where, of course, \mathcal{U} is a polynomial of degree (d-3)/2 and of even weight. Then, ζ has a very simple form in \mathbb{F}_{2^d} : from

$$X^2 \mathcal{U}(X)^2 + X = 0$$

we obtain

$$\zeta = xU(x) \ .$$

Note at this point that the *polynomial* product

$$\zeta \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{(d-3)/2} a_{2i+1} X^i$$

has degree bounded by $(1 + \frac{d-3}{2}) + \frac{d-3}{2} = d - 1$, therefore no polynomial reduction is necessary!

Examples of such polynomials abound. For example $X^{163} + X^{65} + X^{35} + X^{33} + 1$ is irreducible, and under this representation ζ has weight 4. On the other hand, the standard NIST polynomial [15] $X^{163} + X^7 + X^6 + X^3 + 1$. Changing polynomial is in fact easy without introducing incompatibilities in the practical use: we just change the base used for representation of the field elements before and after the whole scalar multiplication. The cost is comparable to a polynomial basis multiplication, and the conversion routines require each a matrix that occupies $O(d^2)$ bits of storage, see for example [10], where the particular base change is to and from a normal basis representation, but the results are the same. Therefore this overhead is essentially negligible with respect to the full cost of the operation that is in the order of magnitude of thousands of field multiplications. The bulk of the computation is then performed in the "easy" representation, the inputs and outputs are given in the "standard" representation.

The cost of a square root extraction implemented by using the sparse version of ζ offered by the above polynomials can be roughly estimated using, for example, already published results. For example in [11], Example 3.12, the NIST-recommended trinomial $p(X) = X^{233} + X^{74} + 1$

for the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{233}}$ is used. Even though X^{74} does not have an even exponent, ζ has a sparse representation

$$\zeta = (X^{32} + X^{117} + X^{191})(X^{37} + 1)$$

and by using this representation finding a root via equation (6) requires roughly 1/8 of the time of a field multiplication. We shall show in the next section that we can choose also $p(X) = X^{233} + X^{159} + 1$ for which $\zeta = X^{117} + X^{80}$: in this case it is clear that less and smaller shift operations, and much less XOR operations are required to multiply by ζ . Furthermore, there is no need to perform a reduction modulo p(X) as already remarked. First implementation results show the cost of square root to be about 8% of that of a multiplication.

Similar formulae for cube root computations are found in [1] – their results are easily partially generalised to any odd characteristic.

4 Search, Existence and Distribution

There is plenty of such polynomials. For example, for extension degree d = 163, a simple magma program immediately yields several examples. In Table 1 we report some examples for a few extension degrees d. The degrees have been taken from the NIST list of extension degrees for binary curves and from the extension degrees in [7]. Then no trinomial is available, a pentanomial is used. We always report the polynomial with least degree sediment. In particular, observe that also efficient trinomials are available. All these extension degrees are interesting because they are either used in standards for elliptic curve cryptography or they represent good choices for extension degrees for defining hyperelliptic curve for cryptographic applications. Only in a handful of cases is the "square rootnice" irreducible polynomial with least degree sediment the standard one, where the standard polynomial is the irreducible polynomial with least degree sediment but without the restriction on the non-vanishing exponents to be all odd.

Theorem. Let d be an odd positive integer. If an irreducible trinomial p(X) over \mathbb{F}_2 of degree d exists, then p(X) can be chosen of the form (7), i.e. where all the non-vanishing exponents are odd.

Proof. Let

$$X^d + X^m + 1$$

Degree	Irreducible polynomial	$\zeta = \sqrt{X}$	Standard?
47	$X^{47} + X^5 + 1$	$X^{24} + X^3$	Yes
53	$X^{53} + X^{19} + X^{17} + X^{15} + 1$	$X^{27} + X^{10} + X^9 + X^8$	No
59	$X^{59} + X^{21} + X^{17} + X^{15} + 1$	$X^{30} + X^{11} + X^9 + X^8$	No
67	$X^{67} + X^{25} + X^{17} + X^5 + 1$	$X^{34} + X^{13} + X^9 + X^3$	No
71	$X^{71} + X^9 + 1$	$X^{36} + X^5$	No
73	$X^{73} + X^{25} + 1$	$X^{37} + X^{13}$	Yes
79	$X^{79} + X^9 + 1$	$X^{40} + X^5$	Yes
83	$X^{83} + X^{29} + X^{25} + X^3 + 1$	$X^{42} + X^{15} + X^{13} + X^2$	No
89	$X^{89} + X^{51} + 1$	$X^{45} + X^{26}$	No
97	$X^{97} + X^{33} + 1$	$X^{49} + X^{17}$	No
101	$X^{101} + X^{35} + X^{31} + X^3 + 1$	$X^{51} + X^{18} + X^{16} + X^2$	No
107	$X^{107} + X^{37} + X^{33} + X^{23} + 1$	$X^{54} + X^{19} + X^{17} + X^{12}$	No
109	$X^{109} + X^{43} + X^{41} + X^{23} + 1$	$X^{55} + X^{22} + X^{21} + X^{12}$	No
127	$X^{127} + X + 1$	$X^{64} + X$	Yes
131	$X^{131} + X^{45} + X^{41} + X^9 + 1$	$X^{66} + X^{23} + X^{21} + X^5$	No
137	$X^{137} + X^{21} + 1$	$X^{69} + X^{11}$	Yes
139	$X^{139} + X^{53} + X^{33} + X^{25} + 1$	$X^{70} + X^{27} + X^{17} + X^{13}$	No
149		$X^{75} + X^{26} + X^{24} + X^5$	No
157	$X^{157} + X^{55} + X^{47} + X^{11} + 1$		No
163	$X^{163} + X^{57} + X^{49} + X^{29} + 1$	$X^{82} + X^{29} + X^{25} + X^{15}$	No
179	$X^{179} + X^{61} + X^{57} + X^{41} + 1$		No
199	$X^{199} + X^{67} + 1$	$X^{100} + X^{34}$	No
211	$X^{211} + X^{73} + X^{69} + X^{35} + 1$	$X^{106} + X^{37} + X^{35} + X^{18}$	No
233	$X^{233} + X^{159} + 1$	$X^{117} + X^{80}$	No
239	$X^{239} + X^{81} + 1$	$X^{120} + X^{41}$	No
251	$X^{251} + X^{89} + X^{81} + X^3 + 1$	$X^{126} + X^{45} + X^{41} + X^2$	No
269	$X^{269} + X^{91} + X^{87} + X^{61} + 1$		
283	$X^{283} + X^{97} + X^{89} + X^{87} + 1$		No
409	$X^{409} + X^{87} + 1$	$X^{205} + X44$	Yes
571	$X^{571} + X^{193} + X^{185} + X^5 + 1$	$X^{286} + X^{97} + X^{93} + X^3$	No

 Table 1. Irreducible polynomials for efficient square root computation.

be an irreducible trinomial with m even. Then it is easy to prove that the polynomial

$$X^d + X^{d-m} + 1$$

is also irreducible and d-m is odd. In fact, let q(X) be a monic polynomial over \mathbb{F}_2 with q(X) = 1, i.e. non-vanishing constant term. Define

$$\hat{q}(X) = X^{\deg p} p(X^{-1})$$

to be the *inversion* of q(X). It is easy to see that $\hat{q}(X)$ is a monic polynomial with non-vanishing constant term. Then, a factorization q(X) = g(X)h(X) implies $\hat{q}(X) = \hat{g}(X)\hat{h}(X)$. Applying this observation to $q(X) = X^d + X^{d-m} + 1$ proves that it must be irreducible, otherwise $p(X) = \hat{q}(X)$ would be reducible, too.

Existence results for pentanomial-defined fields are still an open question. However, on the basis of the above table and further experimental results, we formulate the following conjecture:

Conjecture. Let d be an odd prime integer such that there exist no irreducible trinomials of degree d over \mathbb{F}_2 , but irreducible pentanomials of degree d exist. Then irreducible pentanomials of the form

$$X^d + X^c + X^b + X^a + 1$$

where d > c > b > a > 0, and a, b, c are odd, also exist. Furthermore, let p(X) be such a polynomial with c smallest. Then $c \approx d/3$.

Further open questions are: how to find polynomials like the above that are also efficient for almost-inverse computations; to balance the possibly increased modular reduction cost with the savings obtained in other parts of the computations. These will be the subject of future work.

Acknowledgement. The author is grateful to Darrel Hankerson and Alfred Menezes for fruitful conversations on the matter in the month of March, 2005, as well as to Nicolas Thériault and Peter Birkner for further discussions on the matter during a stay at the Fields Institute, Toronto, in September, 2006.

References

O. Ahmadi, D. Hankerson, and A. Menezes Formulas for cube roots in F_{3^m}. Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (3), 260–270.

- D. W. Ash, I.F. Blake and S. Vanstone. Low complexity normal bases. Discrete Applied Math. 25 (1989), pp. 191–210.
- R. M. Avanzi, M. Ciet, and F. Sica. Faster Scalar Multiplication on Koblitz Curves combining Point Halving with the Frobenius Endomorphism. Proceedings of PKC 2004, LNCS 2947, 28–40. Springer–Verlag, 2004.
- 4. R. Avanzi, H. Cohen, C. Doche, G. Frey, T. Lange, K. Nguyen, and F. Vercauteren. The Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography. CRC Press, 2005.
- R. M. Avanzi, C. Heuberger, and H. Prodinger. Scalar Multiplication on Koblitz Curves Using the Frobenius Endomorphism and its Combination with Point Halving: Extensions and Mathematical Analysis. Algorithmica 46 (2006), 249–270
- R. M. Avanzi, C. Heuberger, and H. Prodinger. On Redundant τ-adic Expansions and Non-Adjacent Digit Sets. To appear in proceedings of SAC 2006.
- R. M. Avanzi, N. Thériault, and Z. Wang. Rethinking Low Genus Hyperelliptic Jacobian Arithmetic over Binary Fields: Interplay of Field Arithmetic and Explicit Formulæ. CACR Technical Report 2006-07.
- 8. P. Birkner: *Efficient Divisor Class Halving on Genus Two Curves*. To appear in: Proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography SAC 2006. Springer Verlag LNCS.
- 9. P. Birkner, and N. Thériault. *Efficient Divisor Class Halving on Genus Three Curves*. In preparation.
- J.-S. Coron, D. M'Raihi, and C. Tymen. Fast generation of pairs (k, [k]P) for Koblitz elliptic curves. In Proceedings of SAC 2001, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2259, pp. 151–164. Springer, 2001.
- K. Fong, D, Hankerson, J, López, A, Menezes:. Field Inversion and Point Halving Revisited. IEEE Trans. Computers 53(8), 1047–1059, 2004.
- E. W. Knudsen. *Elliptic Scalar Multiplication Using Point Halving*. Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 1999, LNCS 1716, 135–149. Springer, 1999.
- N. Koblitz. CM-curves with good cryptographic properties. In: Proceedings of CRYPTO 1991, LNCS 576, pp. 279–287. Springer, 1991.
- T. Lange and M. Stevens. Efficient doubling for genus two curves over binary fields. In: Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2004. LNCS 3357, 170–181, Springer-Verlag, 2005.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use. NIST Special Publication, July 1999. Available from: http://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/fedstandards.html
- R. Schroeppel. Point halving wins big. Talks at: (i) Midwest Arithmetical Geometry in Cryptography Workshop, November 17–19, 2000, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and (ii) ECC 2001 Workshop, October 29–31, 2001, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
- 17. R. Schroeppel. *Elliptic curve point ambiguity resolution apparatus and method.* International Application Number PCT/US00/31014, filed 9 November 2000.