

# Provable password-based tripartite key agreement protocol

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**Abstract.** A password-based tripartite key agreement protocol is presented in this paper. The three entities involved in this protocol can negotiate a common session key via a shared password over insecure networks. In the case of without actually running a dictionary attack, proofs are given to show that the proposed protocol is secure against forging and chosen message attacks.

**Keywords.** Password, Tripartite key agreement, Authentication, Pairing

## 1. Introduction

Key agreement protocol is receiving more and more attention as the increasing requirement of data exchange over networks. The first protocol for key agreement was presented by Diffie and Hellman [1]. It allows two entities to agree upon a shared session key over an adversary controlled channel. However, the protocol is vulnerable to man-in-middle attack, since it is unauthenticated. To overcome this disadvantage, lots of authenticated two-party key agreement protocols [2][3][4] were presented in recent years.

Multi-party key agreement protocol [5][6][7][11] can be considered as the generalization of two-party protocol. Among them, Joux's tripartite one round key agreement protocol [5] using pairing on elliptic curve arrested much attention. To negotiate a common session key, it only requires each entity to broadcast a single message. However, as the original Diffie-Hellman protocol, it is also authenticated. To provide authenticity, some protocols based on different techniques [8][9][10] were proposed.

As an important authentication means, password-based technique has been studied for a long time. Recently, lots of key agreement protocols [12][13][14] were presented based on password. To the password-based protocols, a human is only required to remember a low entropy password shared between the participants. In fact, password-based schemes are suitable for implementation in many scenarios,

especially those where no device is capable of securely storing high-entropy long-term secret key.

In this paper, we present a password-based tripartite key agreement protocol using pairings on elliptic curve. It allows three parties to negotiate a common session key via a shared password over an adversary controlled channel. In the case of without actually running a dictionary attack, the proposed protocol is secure against forging and chosen message attacks.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce some related works. In section 3, we give the security model and some complexity assumptions. Our protocol is presented in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the security under the random oracle model. Finally we draw conclusions in section 6.

## 2. Related works

Seo and Sweeney [12] proposed an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement (SAKA) based on password. In contrast to traditional key agreement, the two communicating entities share a common pre-distributed password. Combining password technique and Diffie-Hellman, Yeh and Sun [13] presented another key agreement protocol, which is similar to SAKA.

Kwon et al. [14] proposed a provably secure verifier-based PAKE protocol which is suitable to the Transport Layer Security protocol. They claimed that their protocol withstood Stolen-verifier and know-key attacks. Moreover, it also provides forward secrecy.

Joux [5] presented a three-party key agreement protocol using pairing on elliptic curve. This is the first positive application of pairing in cryptography. Due to lack of authentication, Joux's protocol is susceptible to the man-in-the-middle attacks. Some researchers have further investigated the scheme and proposed group key agreement [15][16] based on ternary tree by extending the basic Joux's protocol.

Al-Riyami and Paterson [17] presented four tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols, which provided authentication using ideas from MTI [18] and MQV [19]. They used certificates of the parties to bind a party's identity with his static keys. The authenticity of the static keys provided by the signature of CA assures that only the parties who possess the static keys are able to obtain the session key. However, since the participants involved in the protocol should verify the certificate of the parties, a huge amount of computing time and storage is needed.

In [20], Nalla and Reddy proposed authenticated tripartite ID-based key agreement protocols. The security of the protocol is discussed under the possible attacks. However, Nalla and Reddy's protocol is not secure as they have claimed. Chen [21] and Shim [22] showed the flaw of the protocol.

Zhang, Liu and Kim [23] designed an ID-based one round authenticated tripartite key agreement protocol and provided heuristic security analysis. The authenticity is assured by Hess' [24] ID-based signature mechanism.

### 3. Background

#### 3.1 Bilinear Maps

Let  $G_1$  be a cyclic multiplicative group generated by  $g$ , whose order is a prime  $q$  and  $G_2$  be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order  $q$ . Assume that the discrete logarithm in both  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map  $e: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  and satisfies the following properties:

1. *Bilinear*:  $e(g^a, p^b) = e(g, p)^{ab}$ . For all  $g, p \in G_1$  and  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ , the equation holds.
2. *Non-degenerate*: There exists  $p \in G_1$ , if  $e(g, p) = 1$ , then  $g = O$ .
3. *Computable*: For  $g, p \in G_1$ , there is an efficient algorithm to compute  $e(g, p)$ .

Typically, the map  $e$  will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. Pairings and other parameters should be selected in proactive for efficiency and security.

#### 3.2 Complexity Assumptions

##### *Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption*

Given  $g^a$  and  $g^b$  for some  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , compute  $e(g, g)^{abc} \in G_2$ . A  $(\tau, \varepsilon)$ -CDH attacker in  $G_2$  is a probabilistic machine  $\Omega$  running in time  $\tau$  such that

$$\text{Succ}_{G_1}^{\text{cdh}}(\Omega) = \Pr[\Omega(g, g^a, g^b, g^c) = e(g, g)^{abc}] \geq \varepsilon$$

where the probability is taken over the random values  $a, b$  and  $c$ . The CDH problem is  $(\tau, \varepsilon)$ -intractable if there is no  $(\tau, \varepsilon)$ -attacker in  $G_2$ . The CDH assumption states that it is the case for all polynomial  $\tau$  and any non-negligible  $\varepsilon$ .

#### 3.3 Security Notions

The usual security model [25] built on prior work from the two-party setting [26] [27] has been widely used to analyze group key agreement protocol. In this model, several queries are available to the attacker to model his capability. We will use the model to discuss the security of our proposed protocol.

We assume that the users in set  $S = \{Alice, Bob, Carol\}$  will negotiate a session key using the key agreement protocol. An attacker can make following three queries.

By accessing to the following oracles, Carol can get, modify and replay the messages transmitted over the Internet.

- *Send*( $U, m$ ) **query**. Carol issues a query on  $(U, m)$ . Carol is allowed to modify or replay any message he got from the answer of the query in active attack model.
- *Reveal*( $i$ ) **query**. Carol gets the session key  $K_i$ . We suppose that the session key is unique under the given condition.

Above queries can be asked several times. When Carol decides above queries are finished, he issues the query *Test*.

- *Test*( $j$ ) **query**. The oracle chooses a random number  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . If  $b = 0$ , the attacker is given the session key  $K_j$ , and otherwise given a random number with the same length.

The only restrict to the query is that the query must be fresh, i.e. it has not been asked for a *Reveal*( $j$ ) query. After receiving the reply of the query *Test*, Carol outputs his guess  $b'$ . If  $b' = b$ , Carol wins the game. We say that if Carol can win the game in a non-negligible probability  $\varepsilon$ , then Carol has ability to break the protocol by active attack in a non-negligible probability.

#### 4. Our protocol

Let  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  be two groups that support a bilinear map as defined in section 3.1. We assume that there exist three strong one way functions  $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$ ,  $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q^*$  and  $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ , where  $l$  is a secure parameter. Three clients A, B and C who keep a common *password* will agree upon a shared session key over an insecure channel. Let  $a || b$  denote the concatenate of  $a$  and  $b$ . The clients perform the following steps.


##### Step1.

- Client A chooses a random number  $x_A \in Z_q^*$  and computes  $Q_A = g^{x_A}$ . And then he computes  $V_A = H_1(ID_A || password)$ ,  $r_A = H_2(ID_A || password)$  and  $Z_A = (V_A)^{x_A r_A}$ . Thereafter, client A sends  $(Q_A, Z_A)$  to the client B and C.
- Client B chooses a random number  $x_B \in Z_q^*$  and computes  $Q_B = g^{x_B}$ . And then he computes  $V_B = H_1(ID_B || password)$ ,  $r_B = H_2(ID_B || password)$  and  $Z_B = (V_B)^{x_B r_B}$ . Thereafter, client B sends  $(Q_B, Z_B)$  to the client A and C.
- Client C chooses a random number  $x_C \in Z_q^*$  and computes  $Q_C = g^{x_C}$ . And then he computes  $V_C = H_1(ID_C || password)$ ,  $r_C = H_2(ID_C || password)$  and  $Z_C = (V_C)^{x_C r_C}$ . Thereafter, client C sends  $(Q_C, Z_C)$  to the client A and B.

**Step2.**

- After receiving  $(Q_B, Z_B)$ , client A computes  $r_B$  and  $V_B$ , and then verifies  $e(Z_B, g) = e(V_B, Q_B^{r_B})$ . Similarly, he can verify  $(Q_C, Z_C)$  via  $e(Z_C, g) = e(V_C, Q_C^{r_C})$ . If the results are both **True**, client A computes  $U_A = e(Q_B, Q_C)^{x_A}$  and draws the shared session key  $K = H_3(U_A \parallel Q_A \parallel Q_B \parallel Q_C)$ , otherwise, outputs error message and stops the protocol.
- After receiving  $(Q_C, Z_C)$ , client B computes  $r_C$  and  $V_C$ , and then verifies  $e(Z_C, g) = e(V_C, Q_C^{r_C})$ . Similarly, he can verify  $(Q_A, Z_A)$  via  $e(Z_A, g) = e(V_A, Q_A^{r_A})$ . If the results are both **True**, client B computes  $U_B = e(Q_A, Q_C)^{x_B}$  and draws the shared session key  $K = H_3(U_B \parallel Q_A \parallel Q_B \parallel Q_C)$ , otherwise, outputs error message and stops the protocol.
- After receiving  $(Q_B, Z_B)$ , client C computes  $r_B$  and  $V_B$ , and then verifies  $e(Z_B, g) = e(V_B, Q_B^{r_B})$ . Similarly, he can verify  $(Q_A, Z_A)$  via  $e(Z_A, g) = e(V_A, Q_A^{r_A})$ . If the results are both **True**, client C computes  $U_C = e(Q_A, Q_B)^{x_C}$  and draws the shared session key  $K = H_3(U_C \parallel Q_A \parallel Q_B \parallel Q_C)$ , otherwise, outputs error message and stops the protocol.

The protocol can be illustrated as **Fig. 1**.



**Fig. 1** The proposed protocol

## 5. Security

The attacker Eve is allowed to invoke the key agreement protocol and obtain, modify and replay any message transmitted over the Internet in our security model. In this section, we will discuss its security under the random oracle model.

**Theorem 1.** We assume that an attacker Eve1 has ability to forge a valid output of client A to B with non-negligible probability  $\varepsilon$ , and then there exists another attacker Eve2 can solve the **CDH** problem with the same probability.

**Proof.** We assume Eve1 can forge a valid output of client A to B with non-negligible probability  $\varepsilon$  by choosing a random number to generate  $Q$ , and then given  $g^m$  and  $g^n$ , the attacker Eve2 can compute  $g^{m \cdot n}$  by running Eve1 as a subroutine.

Eve2 initializes the system, and sets  $g^m = g^{r_A}$  and  $g^n = V_A$ . As we have assumed, Eve1 chooses a random number  $x_A \in Z_q^*$  and computes  $Q = g^{x_A}$ , and then outputs a valid  $(Q, Z)$  which will be transmitted from A to B. Thereby, Eve2 gets

$$Z = (V_A)^{x_A r_A} = (g^{n \cdot m})^{x_A}$$

Since Eve2 implements Eve1 as a subroutine, he can obtain the random number  $x_A$  chosen by Eve1 and computes

$$g^{n \cdot m} = Z^{(x_A)^{-1}}$$

with a non-negligible probability  $\varepsilon$ .

□

**Theorem 2.** We assume that an attacker Eve who can, with success probability  $\varepsilon$ , break the protocol within a time  $\tau$  by asking **H<sub>3</sub>** and **Send** oracles at most  $q_H$  and  $q_s$  queries respectively, then there exists an attacker Carol who running in a time  $\tau'$  can solve the **CDH** problem with success probability  $\varepsilon'$ , where

$$\varepsilon' \geq q_H \cdot \varepsilon, \quad \tau' \leq \tau + 3(2q_s + 1)t_{pm}.$$

Here  $t_{pm}$  is the time for a point scalar multiplication evaluation in  $G_1$

**Proof.** If an attacker Eve can break the protocol via chosen message attack, then there exists an attacker Carol can solve **CDH** problem by running Eve as a subroutine, i.e. given  $g^m, g^n, g^w \in G_1$ , Carol can decide whether  $T = e(g, g)^{m \cdot n \cdot w}$ . Eve is allowed to query oracles **H<sub>3</sub>** and **Send**. To Eve's queries, Carol gives simulative answers. In our protocol,  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  are just used to generate more secure values based on password, so we don't give more consideration about them. Carol chooses a random number  $\lambda_i \in Z_q^*$ , and sets  $V_{i \in \{A, B, C\}} = g^{\lambda_i}$ . Moreover, since Carol runs Eve as a subroutine, we assume that Carol knows the *password*, and can obtain  $r_{i \in \{A, B, C\}}$ .

**H<sub>3</sub>** queries. Carol initializes an empty *List1*. To the query on message  $m_i$ , Carol checks the records in *List1*. If there exists matching record, Carol outputs it as the answer, otherwise chooses a random string  $Str_i \in \{0, 1\}^l$  as the answer, and then preserves  $(m_i, Str_i)$  in *List1*.

**Send** queries. Attacker Eve can issue following queries.

- Eve issues at most  $q_s$  queries to client A, i.e.  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_s$ . Carol initializes an empty *List2* and chooses a random number  $r \in [1, s]$ .

- To the query  $q_{i \neq r}$ , Carol checks the records in *List2*. If there exists matching record, Carol outputs it as the answer, otherwise, chooses a random number  $x_A \in Z_q^*$ , computes  $Q_A = g^{x_A}$  and  $Z_A = (V_A)^{x_A r_A}$ , and then feedbacks to Eve. Finally, Carol preserves  $(q_i, x_A, Q_A, Z_A)$  in *List2*.
  - To the query  $q_r$ , Carol sets  $Q_A = g^m$ , computes  $Z_A = (g^m)^{\lambda_{A r_A}}$ , and then feedbacks to Eve. Finally, Carol preserves  $(q_r, Q_A, Z_A)$  in *List2*.
- Eve issues at most  $q_s$  queries to client B, i.e.  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_s$ . Carol initializes an empty *List3*.
- To the query  $q_{i \neq r}$ , Carol checks the records in *List3*. If there exists matching record, Carol outputs it as the answer, otherwise, chooses a random number  $x_B \in Z_q^*$ , computes  $Q_B = g^{x_B}$  and  $Z_B = (V_B)^{x_B r_B}$ , and then feedbacks to Eve. Finally, Carol preserves  $(q_i, x_B, Q_B, Z_B)$  in *List3*.
  - To the query  $q_r$ , Carol sets  $Q_B = g^n$ , computes  $Z_B = (g^n)^{\lambda_{B r_B}}$ , and then feedbacks to Eve. Finally, Carol preserves  $(q_r, Q_B, Z_B)$  in *List3*.
- Eve issues at most  $q_s$  queries to client C, i.e.  $q_1, q_2, \dots, q_s$ . Carol initializes an empty *List4*.
- To the query  $q_{i \neq r}$ , Carol checks the records in *List4*. If there exists matching record, Carol outputs it as the answer, otherwise, chooses a random number  $x_C \in Z_q^*$ , computes  $Q_C = g^{x_C}$  and  $Z_C = (V_C)^{x_C r_C}$ , and then feedbacks to Eve. Finally, Carol preserves  $(q_i, x_C, Q_C, Z_C)$  in *List4*.
  - To the query  $q_r$ , Carol sets  $Q_C = g^w$ , computes  $Z_C = (g^w)^{\lambda_{C r_C}}$ , and then feedbacks to Eve. Finally, Carol preserves  $(q_r, Q_C, Z_C)$  in *List4*.

**Reveal** queries. When Eve queries on  $i \neq r$ , Carol outputs the matching  $i$ -session key. Of course, if there is not matching key, Carol outputs error message.

Since above simulation is perfect, the attacker Eve can't distinguish the simulated outputs from the actual results. Eve is allowed to ask above two oracles several times. When he decides this phase is over, he outputs **Test** query.

**Test** query. Carol chooses a random number  $b \in \{0,1\}$ . If  $b=1$ , Carol outputs  $r$ -th session key, otherwise, outputs a random string with the same length as the answer. Note that the **Test** query can be asked only once. After receiving the answer of Test query, Eve outputs a guess bit  $b'$ .

We assume that the attacker Eve running in time  $\tau$  can break the protocol with probability  $\varepsilon$  and asks  $\mathbf{H}_3$  at most  $q_H \in Z^*$  queries. If Eve can guess  $b'=b$  with an non-negligible probability, then he must have queried  $\mathbf{H}_3$  on  $m = e(g, g)^{mmw}$  with probability  $\varepsilon' \geq q_H \cdot \varepsilon$ . Thereby, Eve2 can solve **CDH** problem by finding the matching value in *List1*.

□

## 6. Conclusions

The password-based authenticated technique has been studied for a few years. Recently, two-party key agreement protocols based on password have received much attention. In this paper, we design a password-based tripartite key agreement protocol that is suitable for the user who has no place to store the high-entropy long-term secret key or has not support from public key infrastructure.

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