Fully Anonymous Group Signatures without Random Oracles

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Abstract

We construct a new group signature scheme using bilinear groups. The group signature scheme is practical, both keys and group signatures consist of a constant number of group elements, and the scheme permits dynamic enrollment of new members. The scheme satisfies strong security requirements, in particular providing protection against key exposures and not relying on random oracles in the security proof.

Keywords: Group signatures, certisignatures, bilinear groups.

1 Introduction

Group signatures make it possible for a member of a group to sign messages anonymously so that outsiders and other group members cannot see which member signed the message. The group is controlled by a group manager that handles enrollment of members and also has the ability to identify the signer of a message. Group signatures are useful in contexts where it is desirable to preserve the signer's privacy, yet in case of abuse we want some authorities to have the means of identifying her.

Group signatures were introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [CvH91] and have been the subject of much research. Most of the proposed group signatures have been proven secure in the random oracle model [BR93] and now quite efficient schemes exist in the random oracle model [ACJT00, BBS04, CL04, CG04, FI05, KY05]. The random oracle model has been the subject of criticism though. Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [CGH98] demonstrated the existence of an insecure signature scheme that has a security proof in the random oracle model. Other works showing weaknesses of the random oracle model are [Nie02, GK03, BBP04, CGH04].

There are a few group signature schemes that avoid the random oracle model. Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [BMW03] suggested security definitions for group signatures and offered a construction based on trapdoor permutations. Their security model assumed the group was static and all members were given their honestly generated keys right away. Bellare, Shi and Zhang [BSZ05] strengthened the security model to include dynamic enrollment of members. This security model also separated the group manager's role into two parts: issuer and opener. The issuer is responsible for enrolling members, but cannot trace who has signed a group signature. The opener on the other hand cannot enroll members, but can open a group signature to see who signed it. Moreover, it was required that this opener should be able to prove that said member made the group signature to avoid false accusations of members. [BSZ05] demonstrated that trapdoor permutations suffice also for constructing group signatures in this model. Both of these schemes use general and complicated primitives and are very inefficient. Groth [Gro06] used bilinear groups to construct a group signature scheme in

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the BSZ-model, with nice asymptotic performance, where each group signature consists of a constant number of group elements. Still the constant is enormous and a group signature consists of thousands or perhaps even millions of group elements.

There are also a few practical group signature schemes with security proofs in the standard model. Ateniese, Camenisch, Hohenberger and de Medeiros [ACHdM05] give a highly efficient group signature scheme, where each group signature consists of 8 group elements in prime order bilinear groups. This scheme is secure against a non-adaptive adversary that never gets to see private keys of honest members. If a member's key is exposed, however, it is easy to identify all group signatures she has made, so their scheme is not secure in the BMW/BSZ-models.

Boyen and Waters [BW06, BW07] suggest group signatures that are secure against key exposure attacks. Their constructions are secure in a restricted version of the BMW-model where the anonymity of the members relies on the adversary not being able to see any openings of group signatures. In the latter scheme [BW07], the group signatures consist of 6 group elements in a composite order bilinear group. The public key in [BW07] grows linearly in the size of the message space though and will for practical purposes typically contain a couple of hundred group elements.

OUR CONTRIBUTION. We propose a new group signature scheme based on prime order bilinear groups. All parts of the group signature scheme, including the group public key and the group signatures, consist of a constant number of group elements. The constants are reasonable for practical purposes; for instance using 256-bit prime order bilinear groups, a group public key would be less than 1kB and a group signature less than 2kB.

We prove under some well-known assumptions, the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [BB04] and the decisional linear assumption [BBS04], as well as a new assumption that the scheme is secure in the BSZ-model. This means the scheme permits dynamic enrollment of members, preserves anonymity of a group signature even if the adversary can see arbitrary key exposures or arbitrary openings of other group signatures, and separates the role of the issuer and opener such that they can operate independently.

CERTISIGNATURES. One of the tools we use in our group signature scheme is what we will call a certisignature scheme. A certisignature scheme allows a user to pick keys for a signature scheme and use them to sign messages. The user can ask a certification authority to certify her public verification key for the signature scheme. The verification algorithm checks both the certificate and the signature and accepts if both of them are acceptable. A trivial way to build certisignature schemes is just to let the certification authority output a standard signature on the user's public verification key. Non-trivial solutions such as for instance using an aggregate signature scheme [BGLS03] also exist. Certisignature schemes may be more efficient though since the certificate does not have to be unforgeable. In a certisignature scheme, the requirement is just that it is infeasible to forge a certificate together with a valid signature. We refer to Section 3 for a formal definition.

In our group signature scheme, enrolling members will create a key for a signature scheme and ask the issuer to issue a certificate on their verification key. To make a group signature, the member will make a certisignature. To be anonymous she will encrypt the certisignature and use non-interactive witness-indistinguishable and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to demonstrate that the ciphertext contains a valid certisignature.

In order to have efficient non-interactive proofs, it is essential to preserve as much of the bilinear group structure of the encrypted certisignature as possible. In particular, using cryptographic hash-functions or using group elements from one part of the certisignature as exponents in other parts of the certisignature does not work. We will combine the signature scheme of Boneh and Boyen [BB04] with the signature scheme of Zhou and Lin [ZL06] to get a certisignature scheme that is both efficient and relies only on generic group operations.

2 Setup

Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that generates $(p, G, G_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)$ such that:

- p is a k-bit prime.

- G, G_T are groups of order p.

- g is a randomly chosen generator of G.

- e is a non-degenerate bilinear map, i.e., $e(g, g)$ is a generator of G_T and for all $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ we have $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab}$.

- Group operations, evaluation of the bilinear map, and membership of G, G_T are all efficiently computable.

We will now present some of the security assumptions that will be used in the paper.

DLIN assumption. The decisional linear assumption was introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04]. The DLIN assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$, when it is hard to distinguish for randomly chosen group elements and exponents (f, g, h, f^r, g^s, h^t) whether $t = r + s$ or t is random.

q-SDH assumption. The strong Diffie-Hellman assumption was introduced by Boneh and Boyen [BB04]. The q-SDH assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$, when it is hard to find a pair $(m, g^{\frac{1}{1+x}}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p \times G$ when given $g, g^x, g^{x^2}, \ldots, g^{x^{q(k)}}$ as input. In the paper, it suffices to have q being a polynomial.

q-U assumption. We will now define the unfakeability assumption. The q-U assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}$ if for any non-uniform polynomial time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[(p, G, G_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) ; \ x_1, r_1, \ldots, x_{q(k)}, r_{q(k)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p ;$$
$$f, h, z \leftarrow G ; \ T := e(f, z) ; \ a_i := f^{r_i} ; \ b_i := h^{r_i} g^{x_i r_i} z ;$$
$$(V, A, B, m, S) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(p, G, G_T, e, g, f, h, T, x_1, a_1, b_1, \ldots, x_{q(k)}, a_{q(k)}, b_{q(k)}) :$$
$$V \notin \{g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_{q(k)}}\} \ \wedge \ e(A, hV)e(f, B) = T \ \wedge \ e(S, Vg^m) = e(g, g)\Big] \approx 0.$$

Theorem 1 *The q-U assumption holds in the generic group model when q is a polynomial.*

Proof. We will show that an unbounded adversary cannot break the q-U assumption when restricted to using only a polynomial number of generic group operations. In the generic group model, we do not give the adversary access to the group elements themselves. Instead we pick random bijections $[\cdot] : \mathbb{Z}_p \to G$ and $[[\cdot]] : \mathbb{Z}_p \to G_T$ and give the adversary access to the representation of the group elements as random encodings of their discrete logarithms. Picking random group elements and computing group operations can be handled by calling an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ that works as follows:

- On $(\exp, x)$ return $[x]$.

- On $(\text{multiply}, [x], [y])$ return $[x + y]$.

- On $(\text{multiply}, [[x]], [[y]])$ return $[[x + y]]$.

- On $(\text{bilinear}, [x], [y])$ return $[[xy]]$.

Given elements $[\xi_1], \ldots, [\xi_n]$ the oracle for instance enables $\mathcal{A}$ to pick $a_0, \ldots, a_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and compute linear combinations $[a_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i \xi_i] = a_0[1] + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i[\xi_i]$.

We can reformulate the theorem in the generic group model as follows:

$$\Pr\Big[(p, G, G_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; x_1, r_1, \ldots, x_{q(k)} r_{q(k)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \; ;$$
$$\gamma, \phi, \eta, \zeta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \; ; \; [\cdot] \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \leftrightarrow G \; ; \; [[\cdot]] \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \leftrightarrow G_T \; ;$$
$$([v], [a], [b], m, [s]) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(p, G, G_T, [\gamma], [\phi], [\eta], [[\phi\zeta]],$$
$$x_1, [\phi r_1], [\eta r_1 + x_1 \gamma r_1 + \zeta], \ldots, x_{q(k)}, [\phi r_{q(k)}], [\eta r_{q(k)} + x_{q(k)} \gamma r_{q(k)} + \zeta]) :$$
$$[v] \notin \{[\gamma x_1], \ldots, [\gamma x_{q(k)}]\} \;\wedge\; [[a(\eta + v) + \phi b]] = [[\phi\zeta]] \;\wedge\; [[s(v + \gamma m)]] = [[\gamma^2]]\Big] \approx 0.$$

To prove the theorem, observe first that the elements $\mathcal{A}$ can generate in G and G_T using the oracle encode low degree polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_p[\gamma, \phi, \eta, \zeta, r_1, \ldots, r_{q(k)}]$. The resulting condition for success $[[a(\eta + v) + \phi b - \phi\zeta]] = [[0]]$ and $[[s(v + m\gamma) - \gamma^2]] = [[0]]$ corresponds to having low-degree polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_p[\gamma, \phi, \eta, \zeta, r_1, \ldots, r_{q(k)}]$ evaluate to 0 for randomly chosen $\gamma, \phi, \eta, \zeta, r_1, \ldots, r_{q(k)}$. The Schwarz-Zippel theorem says that a low-degree polynomial has negligible probability of evaluating to 0 in randomly chosen $\gamma, \phi, \eta, \zeta, r_1, \ldots, r_{q(k)}$ unless it is identical zero. What remains in the proof if to rule out that generic group oracle enables $\mathcal{A}$ to actually construct $[v], [a], [b], m, [s]$ such that $a(\eta + v) + \phi b - \phi\zeta$ and $s(v + m\gamma) - \gamma^2$ are the zero-polynomials, and at the same time $v \notin \{\gamma x_1, \ldots, \gamma x_{q(k)}\}$.

Let us start with the requirement that $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $[v], m, [s]$ so $s(v + \gamma m) - \gamma^2 = 0$. We will show this can only be done by picking $v_g \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and using the oracle to compute $[v_g \gamma]$. For this part of the proof, assume we even give $\phi, \eta, \zeta, r_1, \ldots, r_{q(k)}$ to $\mathcal{A}$ as extra input. We can now write $v = v_d + v_g \gamma$ and $s = s_d + s_g \gamma$, for known $v_d, v_g, s_d, s_g \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. We have the equation

$$(s_d + s_g \gamma)(v_d + (v_g + m)\gamma) - \gamma^2 = 0.$$

Assume for contradiction that $v_d \neq 0$. Looking at the constant of the polynomial we have $s_d v_d = 0$ so we have $s_d = 0$. Looking at the coefficient for γ we have $s_g v_d = 0$, which implies $s_g = 0$. This means $s = 0$ and $s(v + m\gamma) = \gamma^2$ gives us a contradiction. We conclude that $\mathcal{A}$ can only be successful by picking $v = v_g \gamma$.

We will now use the equation

$$a(\eta + v_g \gamma) + \phi b - \phi\zeta = 0.$$

Since a and b are constructed with calls to $\mathcal{O}$ we can write them as

$$a = a_d + a_f \phi + a_g \gamma + a_h \eta + \sum_{i=1}^{q(k)} a_{a_i} \phi r_i + \sum_{i=1}^{q(k)} a_{b_i}(\eta r_i + x_i \gamma r_i + \zeta)$$

$$\text{and} \quad b = b_d + b_f \phi + b_g \gamma + b_h \eta + \sum_{i=1}^{q(k)} b_{a_i} \phi r_i + \sum_{i=1}^{q(k)} b_{b_i}(\eta r_i + x_i \gamma r_i + \zeta),$$

for known $a_d, a_f, a_g, a_h, a_{a_i}, a_{b_i}, b_d, b_f, b_g, b_h, b_{a_i}, b_{b_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. Looking at the coefficient for $\phi\zeta$ we have $\sum_{i=1}^{q(k)} b_{b_i} = 1$ so there exists some $b_{b_i} \neq 0$. The coefficient for $\phi\eta r_i$ gives us $a_{a_i} + b_{b_i} = 0$ so $a_{a_i} = -b_{b_i}$. The coefficient for $\phi\gamma r_i$ tells us $a_{a_i} v_g + b_{b_i} x_i = b_{b_i}(x_i - v_g) = 0$ so $v_g = x_i$. This implies $v \in \{\gamma x_1, \ldots, \gamma x_{q(k)}\}$. $\square$

3 Defining Certisignatures

Typically, using a signature in a public key infrastructure works like this: A user that wants to set up a signature scheme, generates a public verification key vk and a secret signing key sk. She takes the public key to a certification authority that signs vk and possibly some auxiliary information such as name, e-mail address, etc. We call this the certificate. Whenever the user wants to sign a message, she sends both the certificate and

the signature to the verifier. The verifier checks that the certification authority has certified that the user has the public key vk and also checks the user's signature on the message.

In the standard way of certifying verification keys described above, the process of issuing certificates and verifying certificates is separate from the process of signing messages and verifying signatures. We suggest combining the two processes into one in order to improve efficiency. We do not need to worry about forgeries of the certificate itself, we only need to prevent the *joint* forgery of both the certificate and the signature.

A certisignature scheme, is a combined scheme for signing messages and producing certificates for the verification keys. Formally, a certisignature scheme consists of 6 probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.

Setup: $\mathcal{G}$ takes a security parameter as input and outputs a description gk of our setup.

Certification key: CertKey on input gk outputs a pair (ak, ck), respectively a public authority key and a secret certification key.

User key: UserKey on input gk outputs a pair (vk, sk), respectively a public verification key and a secret signing key.

Certificate: Cert on input ck, vk outputs a certificate $cert$ on the verification key.

Signature: Sign gets a signing key and a message m as input. It outputs a signature σ.

Verification: Ver takes as input $gk, ak, vk, cert, m, \sigma$ and outputs 1 if accepting the certificate and the signature on m. Otherwise it outputs 0.

The certisignature scheme must be correct, unfakeable and unforgeable as defined below.

Perfect correctness: For all messages m we have

$$\Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; (ak, ck) \leftarrow \text{CertKey}(gk) \; ; \; (vk, sk) \leftarrow \text{UserKey}(gk) \; ; \; cert \leftarrow \text{Cert}_{ck}(vk) \; ;$$
$$\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{sk}(m) : \text{Ver}(gk, ak, vk, cert, m, \sigma) = 1\Big] = 1.$$

Unfakeability: We want it to be hard to create a signature with a faked certificate. Only if the verification key has been generated correctly and been certified by the certification authority should it be possible to certisign a message. For all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we require:

$$\Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; (ak, ck) \leftarrow \text{CertKey}(gk) \; ; \; (vk, cert, m, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{CertUserKey}}(gk, ak) :$$
$$vk \notin Q \text{ and } \text{Ver}(gk, ak, vk, cert, m, \sigma) = 1\Big] \approx 0,$$

where CertUserKey is an oracle that on query i runs $(vk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{UserKey}(gk) \; ; \; Q := Q \cup \{vk_i\} \; ; \; cert_i \leftarrow \text{Cert}_{ck}(vk_i)$ and returns $(vk_i, sk_i, cert_i)$.

In the definition, we let CertUserKey generate the signing keys according to the protocol. A stronger definition would be to let CertUserKey take randomness for UserKey as input. This corresponds to a registered key model, where the adversary can get a certificate for any correctly generated verification key. Even stronger we could let it take vk_i as input. This corresponds to a model, where the adversary can pick any malicious public key vk_i and get it certified. In this paper, we only need the weaker definition of unfakeability presented above.

Existential M-unforgeability: Let M be a stateful non-uniform polynomial time algorithm. We say the certisignature scheme is existentially M-unforgeable if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; (vk, sk) \leftarrow \mathrm{UserKey}(gk) \; ; \; (ak, cert, m, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{MessageSign}(\cdot)}(gk, vk) :$$

$$m \notin Q \text{ and } \mathrm{Ver}(gk, ak, vk, cert, m, \sigma) = 1\Big] \approx 0,$$

where $\mathrm{MessageSign}(\cdot)$ is an oracle that on input a_i runs $(m_i, h_i) \leftarrow M(gk, a_i)$; $\sigma_i \leftarrow \mathrm{Sign}_{sk}(m_i)$; $Q := Q \cup \{m_i\}$ and returns (m_i, h_i, σ_i).

Adaptive chosen message attack corresponds to letting M be an algorithm that on input m_i outputs (m_i, ε). On the other hand, letting M be an algorithm that ignores $\mathcal{A}$'s inputs corresponds to a weak chosen message attack, where messages to be signed by the oracle are chosen without knowledge of vk. In a weak chosen message attack, the h_i's may contain a history of how the messages were selected. In this paper, we only need security against weak chosen message attack.

4   A Certisignature Scheme

We will construct a certisignature scheme from bilinear groups that is existentially unforgeable under weak chosen message attack. There are two parts of the scheme: certification and signing. For signing, we will use the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme that is secure under weak chosen message attack. In their scheme the public key is $v := g^x$ and the secret signing key is x. A signature on message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{x\}$ is $\sigma = g^{\frac{1}{x+m}}$. It can be verified by checking $e(\sigma, vg^m) = e(g, g)$. Boneh and Boyen [BB04] proved that this signature scheme is secure against weak chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption. The existential unforgeability of our certisignature scheme under weak chosen message attack will follow directly from the security of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme under weak chosen message attack.

What remains is to certify the verification key v. Here we will use a variation of the signature scheme of Zhou and Lin [ZL06].[1] To set up the certification scheme, the certification authority picks random group elements $f, h, z \in G$. The authority key is (f, h, T) and the secret certification key is z so $T = e(g, z)$. To certify a Boneh-Boyen key v the authority picks $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $(a, b) := (f^{-r}, (hv)^r z)$. The certificate is verified by checking $e(a, hv)e(f, b) = T$. We remark that this is not a good signature scheme, since given v, a, b it is easy to create a certificate for $v' := v^2 h$ as $(a', b') := (a^{\frac{1}{2}}, b)$. For certisignatures it works fine though since we cannot use the faked verification keys to actually sign any messages. The nice part about the certification scheme we have suggested here is that a certificate consists of only two group elements and is created through the use of generic group operations. These two properties of the certisignature scheme are what enable us to construct a practical group signature scheme on top of it.

Theorem 2 *The scheme in Figure 1 is a certisignature scheme with perfect correctness for messages in $\mathbb{Z}_p \setminus \{x\}$. It is unfakeable under the q-U assumption and is existentially unforgeable under weak chosen message attack under the q-SDH assumption.*

Proof. Perfect correctness follows by inspection. Unfakeability follows in a straightforward manner from the q-U assumption with $q(k)$ being an upper bound on the number of keys $\mathcal{A}$ gets certified, for instance with $q(k)$ being the running time of $\mathcal{A}$. The signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under weak chosen message attack if the q-SDH assumption holds [BB04], and therefore so is our certisignature scheme. $\square$

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[1]The signature scheme of Zhou and Lin [ZL06] can be used to sign exponents. As they observe, however, it is sufficient to know $v = g^x$ to sign x. In our notation, their scheme computes a signature on x by setting $v = g^x$ and computing the signature (a, b) as $a := f^r, b := (hv)^r z$, where $z = h^{\log_f g}$ so $T = e(g, h)$.

$$\begin{array}{l|l}
\textbf{Setup}(1^k) & \textbf{UserKey}(gk) \\
\text{Return } gk := (p, G, G_T, e, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) & x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \; ; \; v := g^x \\
& \text{Return } (vk, sk) := (v, (gk, x)) \\
\hline
\textbf{CertKey}(gk) & \\
f, h, z \leftarrow G & \textbf{Sign}_{sk}(m) \\
T := e(f, z) & \text{If } x = -m \text{ return } \perp \\
\text{Return } (ak, ck) := ((gk, f, h, T), (ak, z)) & \text{Else return } \sigma := g^{\frac{1}{x+m}} \\
\hline
\textbf{Cert}_{ck}(vk) & \textbf{Ver}(gk, ak, vk, cert, m, \sigma) \\
r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p & \text{Return 1 if} \\
a := f^{-r} & \quad e(a, vh)e(f, b) = T \\
b := (vh)^r z & \quad e(\sigma, vg^m) = e(g, g) \\
\text{Return } cert := (a, b) & \text{Else return 0}
\end{array}$$

Figure 1: The certisignature scheme.

5 Defining Group Signatures

In a group signature scheme there is a group manager that decides who can join the group. Once in the group, members can sign messages on behalf of the group. Members' signatures are anonymous, except to the group manager who can open a signature and see who signed the message. In some scenarios it is of interest to separate the group manager into two entities, an issuer who enrolls members and an opener who traces signers.

We imagine that enrolled member's when joining have some identifying information added to a registry reg. This registry may or may not be publicly accessible. The specifics of how the registry works are not important, we just require that $reg[i]$ only contains content both the issuer and user i agrees on. One option could be that the issuer maintains the registry, but the user has to sign the content of $reg[i]$ for it to be considered a valid entry. User i stores her corresponding secret key in $gsk[i]$. The number i we associate with the user is simply a way to distinguish the users. Without loss of generality, we will assume users are numbered $1, \ldots, n$ according to the time they joined or attempted to join.

Key generation: GKg generates (gpk, ik, ok). Here gpk is a group public key, while ik and ok are respectively the issuer's and the opener's secret key.

Join/Issue: This is an interactive protocol between a user and the issuer. If successful, the user and issuer register a public key vk_i in $reg[i]$ and the user stores some corresponding secret signing key information in $gsk[i]$.

[BSZ05] specify that communication between the user and the issuer in this protocol should be secret. The Join/Issue protocol in our scheme works when all messages are sent in clear though. In our scheme, we will assume the issuer joins users in a sequential manner, but depending on the setup assumptions one is willing to make, it is easy to substitute the Join/Issue protocol for a concurrent protocol.

Sign: Group member i can sign a message m as $\Sigma \leftarrow \text{Gsig}(gpk, gsk[i], m)$.

Verify: To verify a signature Σ on message m we run $\text{GVf}(gpk, m, \Sigma)$. The signature is valid if and only if the verification algorithm outputs 1.

Open: The opener has read-access to the registration table reg. We have $(i, \tau) \leftarrow \mathrm{Open}(gpk, ok, reg, m, \Sigma)$ gives an opening of a valid signature Σ on message m pointing to user i. In case the signature points to no member, the opener will assume the issuer forged the signature and set $i := 0$. The role of τ is to accompany $i \neq 0$ with a proof that user i did indeed sign the message.

Judge: This algorithm is used to verify that openings are correct. We say the opening is correct if $\mathrm{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \tau) = 1$.

[BSZ05] define four properties that the group signature must satisfy: correctness, anonymity, traceability and non-frameability. We refer to [BSZ05] for a discussion of how these security definition covers and strengthens other security issues that have appeared in the literature. Informally, non-frameability protects the user against being falsely accused of making a group signature, even if both the issuer and the opener are corrupt. When the issuer is honest and the opening algorithm is applied correctly, albeit the opener's key may be exposed, traceability guarantees that a group signature always can be traced back to a member who made it. An opener knows who made a particular group signature, but provided the opener is honest and the opener's key is kept secret, nobody else should be able to identify the member. Anonymity guarantees that even in an environment where all users' keys are exposed and the issuer is corrupt. In the definition, the adversary is also permitted to ask the opener to open group signatures, except the group signature where it is trying to guess who signed it. A weaker variant of anonymity called CPA-anonymity does not permit the adversary to see openings of other group signatures. The difference between full anonymity and CPA-anonymity is analogous to the difference between security under chosen ciphertext attack and chosen plaintext attack for public-key encryption.

PERFECT CORRECTNESS. On any adversarially chosen message, the verification should accept a group signature created with a correctly generated group signing key $gsk[i]$ for member i. Running the opening algorithm on this should identify i and make the Judge algorithm accept the opening. For all (unbounded) adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[F := 0 \; ; \; (gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \mathrm{GKg}(1^k) \; ; \; (i, m) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Join/Issue}}(gpk, ik, ok) \; ; \; \Sigma \leftarrow \mathrm{GSig}(gpk, gsk[i], m) \; ;$$

$$(j, \tau) \leftarrow \mathrm{Open}(gpk, ok, reg, m, \Sigma) : F = 0 \; \wedge \; i = j \; \wedge \; \mathrm{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \tau) = 1 \Big] = 1,$$

where $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $i \in \mathrm{Members}$ and the oracle works as follows:

Join/Issue: On the i'th query to Join/Issue add i to the list Members. Run the Join/Issue protocol for an honest user and issuer. If the user or issuer does not accept, set $F := 1$ and return 1. Else update and return $reg[i], gsk[i]$.

ANONYMITY. It should be infeasible for an adversary to identify the signer of a message if she does not know the opener's key ok. We require a strong version of anonymity, which holds even when the adversary controls the issuer and all the members' secret signing keys are exposed. We require for all non-uniform polynomial time $\mathcal{A}$ that:

$$\Pr\Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \mathrm{GKg}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Ch}_0, \mathrm{Open}, \mathrm{JoinCorrupt}, \mathrm{JoinExposedHonest}}(gpk, ik) = 1\Big]$$

$$\approx \Pr\Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \mathrm{GKg}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathrm{Ch}_1, \mathrm{Open}, \mathrm{JoinCorrupt}, \mathrm{JoinExposedHonest}}(gpk, ik) = 1\Big]$$

where the oracles work as follows:

JoinExposedHonest: On input (i, start) start up an honest user i that tries to join the group. This user acts honestly, however, the entire internal state is exposed to the adversary. On input (i, msg) send message msg to the user on behalf of the issuer and return the new internal state of the user. On successful

completion of the Join/Issue protocol update $reg[i]$ and add i to HonestUserKeys. Since the internal state is exposed, the adversary knows the corresponding secret key $gsk[i]$ and will be able to make group signatures on behalf of the user.

JoinCorrupt: On input (i, vk_i) set $reg[i] := vk_i$. This allows the adversary to enroll a corrupt member and register any public key of its own choosing.

Ch$_b$: On input (i_0, i_1, m) where $i_0, i_1 \in$ HonestUserKeys return $\Sigma \leftarrow \text{GSig}(gpk, gsk[i_b], m)$.

Open: On input a valid message and group signature pair (m, Σ) that has not been produced by Ch$_b$ return $\text{Open}(gpk, ok, reg, m, \Sigma)$.

Some papers have considered a weaker variant of anonymity, called CPA-anonymity. In CPA-anonymity, the adversary does not have access to the Open oracle.

TRACEABILITY. We want to avoid forged group signatures. The issuer can always make a dummy registration and create group signatures, so we cannot rule out the creation of group signatures. What we want to capture here is that if the issuer is honest, then it is infeasible to create a signature that does not belong to some member with a registered key in $reg[i]$. For all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) \; ; \; (m, \Sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Join}}(gpk, ok) \; ; \; (i, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Open}(gpk, ok, reg, m, \Sigma) :$$

$$\text{GVf}(gpk, m, \Sigma) = 1 \; \wedge \; (\text{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \tau) = 0 \; \vee \; i = 0)\Big] \approx 0,$$

where the oracle is:

Join: On input (i, start) accept only (i, msg) queries until this Join/Issue protocol finishes successfully or not. Run the issuer's protocol using gpk, ik with the adversary being able to submit (i, msg) as the possibly malicious user's messages to the issuer. If the join protocol is successful update the registry $reg[i]$ correspondingly.

NON-FRAMEABILITY. We want to avoid that an honest member is falsely attributed a signature that it did not sign, even if both the issuer and opener are controlled by the adversary. We require that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) \; ; \; (m, \Sigma, i, \tau) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{IssueToHonest,ReadGsk,GSig}}(gpk, ik, ok) :$$

$$\text{GVf}(gpk, m, \Sigma) = 1 \; \wedge \; \text{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \tau) = 1$$

$$\wedge \; i \in \text{HonestUsers} \; \wedge \; i \notin \text{ExposedKeys} \; \wedge \; (m, \Sigma) \notin \text{UserSignatures}\Big] \approx 0,$$

where the oracles are:

IssueToHonest: On input (i, start) start up a new honest user i joining the group using gpk as the group public key and add i to HonestUsers. On input (i, msg) send this message to the user on behalf of the corrupt issuer. If the protocol is successful update $reg[i]$ and $gsk[i]$ correspondingly.

ReadGsk: On input i return $gsk[i]$. Add i to ExposedKeys.

GSig: On input (i, m) check whether $gsk[i]$ is non-empty. In that case return $\Sigma \leftarrow \text{GSig}(gpk, gsk[i], m)$ and add (m, Σ) to UserSignatures.

The definition above addresses a partially dynamic setting where members can be enrolled along the way. It also separates the roles of granting membership from opening signatures. In [BMW03] a simpler situation is considered. Only a single group manager that acts as opener is considered. All members' keys are set up from the start, there is no enrollment. This relaxation permits the definitions of traceability and non-frameability to be combined into one requirement called full-traceability. In this paper we concentrate on the stronger and more flexible [BSZ05] model.

6 Tools

To construct our group signature scheme, we will use the certisignature scheme from Section 4. We will also use several other tools in our construction, namely key establishment protocols, collision-free hash functions, non-interactive proofs for bilinear groups, strong one-time signatures secure against weak chosen message attack and selective-tag weak CCA-secure cryptosystems.

6.1 Key Establishment Protocols

In the certisignature scheme, we require that the user generates her signing key honestly. We will use an interactive protocol between the user and the issuer that gives the user a uniformly random secret key $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, while the issuer learns $v := g^x$. In case either party does not follow the protocol or halts prematurely, the other party will output $\perp$. We will now give a more precise definition of the properties the protocol should have. For notational convenience, define $g^\perp = \perp$.

Write $(x, v) \leftarrow \langle \mathrm{User}(gk), \mathrm{Issuer}(gk) \rangle$ for running the key establishment protocol between two probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines $\mathrm{User}, \mathrm{Issuer}$ on common input gk giving User output x and Issuer output v. We require that the protocol is correct in the following sense:

$$\Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; (x, v) \leftarrow \langle \mathrm{User}(gk), \mathrm{Issuer}(gk) \rangle : v = g^x \right] = 1.$$

We require that the view of the issuer, even if malicious, can be simulated. More precisely, for any $\delta > 0$ and polynomial time Issuer^* there exists a polynomial time (in k and the size of the input to Issuer^*) black-box simulator S_I, such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk) \; ; \; x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \; ; \; v := g^x \; ; \; (g^u, i) \leftarrow S_I^{\mathrm{Issuer}^*(y)}(gk, v) : \mathcal{A}(u, i) = 1 \right]$$
$$- \; \Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk) \; ; \; (x, i) \leftarrow \langle \mathrm{User}(gk), \mathrm{Issuer}^*(y) \rangle : \mathcal{A}(u, i) = 1 \right] < k^{-\delta},$$

where S_I outputs g^u so $u \in \{\perp, x\}$.

We also require that the view of the user, even if malicious, can be simulated. For any $\delta > 0$ and any polynomial time User^* there exists a polynomial time (in k and the size of the input to User^*) black-box simulator S_U, such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk) \; ; \; x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \; ; \; v := g^x \; ; \; (u, i) \leftarrow S_U^{\mathrm{User}^*(y)}(gk, x) : \mathcal{A}(u, i) = 1 \right]$$
$$- \; \Pr\left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk) \; ; \; (u, i) \leftarrow \langle \mathrm{User}^*(y), \mathrm{Issuer}(gk) \rangle : \mathcal{A}(u, i) = 1 \right] < k^{-\delta},$$

where S_U outputs $i \in \{\perp, v\}$.

We will offer an example of a 5-move key establishment protocol where the parties have gk as common input. The protocol lets the user pick g^a. The user and issuer use a coin-flipping protocol to generate a random modifier $b + c$ and output $v := g^{a+b+c}$. At the same time $b + c$ is used as a challenge to the user in a proof of knowledge of a.

User $\rightarrow$ Issuer : Pick $a, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, \eta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and send $A := g^a, R := g^r, h := g^\eta$ to issuer.

User $\leftarrow$ Issuer : Pick $b, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and send $B := g^b h^s$ to user.

User $\rightarrow$ Issuer : Send $c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ to issuer.

User $\leftarrow$ Issuer : Send b, s to user.

User → Issuer : Check $B = g^b h^s$. If check passes, send $z := (b+c)a + r \bmod p$ and η to issuer and output
$\quad x := a + b + c \bmod p$.

Issuer : Check $\eta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $h = g^\eta$ and $A^{b+c}R = g^z$ and output $v := Ag^{b+c}$ if checks pass.

Theorem 3 *The Join/Issue protocol has perfect correctness and assuming the discrete logarithm problem is hard it is possible to black-box simulate both the user and the issuer.*

Proof. Perfect correctness follows by direct verification.

We will now prove that for any $\delta > 0$ there exists a black-box simulator for a malicious issuer. We start by describing the simulator. $S_I^{\mathrm{Issuer}^*(y)}(gk, v)$ picks $e, z, \eta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $A := vg^{-e}$ and $R := g^z A^{-e}$ and $h := g^\eta$. It runs the Issuer$^*(y)$ on input A, R, h to get a commitment B. It then runs the malicious issuer up to $k^{\delta+1}$ times on randomly chosen $c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ until Issuer* opens B to b, s. There are now two possibilities: either Issuer* provides a satisfactory opening of B or it never opens the commitment. In case no such opening is given, the simulator runs Issuer* once again with random c. If Issuer* does not open B in this run, the simulator outputs $(\perp, i)$, where i is the output of Issuer*. If Issuer* opens B, we abort the simulation. The other possibility is that we did extract an opening b, s of B. In this case, we send $d := e - b \bmod p$ to Issuer*. If Issuer* stops the protocol, we output $(\perp, i)$, where i is Issuer*'s output. If Issuer* opens the commitment to $b' \neq b$ we abort the simulation. Finally, if Issuer* opens the commitment to b, we send η, z to Issuer* and output (v, i), where i is Issuer*'s output.

We will now prove that the simulator satisfies the definition. It is clear that S_I runs in polynomial time, since Issuer* is a polynomial time algorithm with polynomial size outputs and we only run it $k^{\delta+1}$ times. Let us modify the real protocol between an honest user and an adversarial issuer. After the user's first message A, R, h and the adversary's first message B we store the state of Issuer*. We run Issuer* up to $k^{\delta+1}$ times with randomly chosen c to get an opening b, s of B. After this, we make a real run of Issuer* and produce the output of the protocol, with two exceptions. If we extracted an opening b, s of B but in the real run Issuer* opens the commitment to $b' \neq b$ we abort. This only gives a negligible change in probability, since otherwise we could break the binding property of the commitment scheme and thus break the discrete logarithm assumption. The other change is that if Issuer* did not open B in the $k^{\delta+1}$ runs, but does so in the real run, we abort. Observe the following, if at the stored state Issuer* has at least $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ probability of opening B after seeing randomly chosen c, then there is $(1 - \frac{1}{2k^\delta})^{k^{\delta+1}} < e^{-\frac{k}{2}}$ probability that no opening of B will be extracted in the $k^{\delta+1}$ runs. On the other hand, adding up all cases with probability less than $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ of Issuer* finishing the protocol on random c add up to less than $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ probability of aborting.

What remains is to see that the simulation and the modified version of the real protocol described above yield the same probabilities. In both the simulation and the modified real protocol, we have uniform random A, R, h and get a response B from Issuer*. For Issuer* having probability less than $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ of opening B on random c, the two experiments are the same. For Issuer* having at least $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ chance of opening B on random c observe first that the experiment is perfectly indistinguishable from one, where we pick x, e at random and set $A := g^{x-e}$ in the beginning of the protocol and use $c := e - b$, since in both cases everything is still chosen uniformly at random. Now we have a proof of knowledge with a fixed challenge e and we can simulate it by picking z first and setting $R := g^z A^{-e}$, which again does not change the distribution at all.

We will now show that for any $\delta > 0$ there is a black-box simulator for an adversarial user. We first describe the simulator. The simulator gets (gk, x) as input and runs User$^*(y)$ on gk to get A, R, h. It now makes up to $k^{\delta+1}$ runs of User* with randomly chosen b, s to get two successful transcripts c, η, z and c', η, z'. If it is unsuccessful in getting two transcripts it makes yet another run with randomly chosen b, s and if User* produces satisfactory c, η, z, then it aborts the simulation. If it is successful, it aborts if $b + c = b' + c'$. Otherwise, we have $g^z = A^{b+c}R$ and $g^{z'} = A^{a'+b'}R$ giving $A = g^{(z-z')/(a+b-a'-b')}$ so we can set $a := (z-z')/(a+b-a'-b') \bmod p$. We also have $\eta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ so $h = g^\eta$. We now make a real run, with $B := g^t$, where t is chosen at random. If getting an incorrect or lacking response in either step of the real run, we output $(u, \perp)$,

where u is the output of User*. Else, we receive c and open the commitment as $B = g^{x-a-c}h^{(t-x+a+c)/\eta}$ and send $b := x - a - c, s := (t - x + a + c)/\eta \bmod p$ to User*. On a successful response from User*, we output (u, g^x).

We will now argue that this is a good simulation. It is clear that the simulator runs in polynomial time. Consider modifying a real protocol between the adversary and an honest issuer. We modify the behavior of the issuer such that it rewinds the protocol $k^{\delta+1}$ times after the initial message and makes a complete run with randomly chosen b, s to get two successful answers c, η, z and c', η, z'. If it does not succeed, it makes yet another run with random b, s and aborts if User* produces a satisfactory answer c, η, z. If User* has probability $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ of succeeding on random b, s, then there is overwhelming probability that we do extract two answers c, η, z and c', η, z'. So the only case where we would get an abort for the reason mentioned above is when User* has less than $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ chance of succeeding. So this abort only changes the success probability with less than $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$. The commitment is perfectly hiding, so there is negligible probability of $b + c = b' + c'$ in the simulation, so we can from now on ignore that possibility. Suppose User* has probability at least $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ of completing the protocol successfully after sending A, R, h, then we will successfully extract a so $A = g^a$ with overwhelming probability and we also learn η so $h = g^\eta$. Modifying the protocol further to pick x at random and opening B to $x - a - c$ therefore does not change the probability distribution further. This latter modification brings us to an experiment that is equivalent to the simulation running on a randomly chosen x. $\square$

6.2 Collision-Free Hash-Functions

$\mathcal{H}$ is a generator of collision free hash-functions $\text{Hash} : \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}^{\ell(k)}$ if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\left[\text{Hash} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(1^k) \; ; \; x, y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{Hash}) : \text{Hash}(x) = \text{Hash}(y)\right] \approx 0.$$

We will use a collision-free hash-function to compress messages before signing them. For this purpose we will require that we can hash down to $\mathbb{Z}_p$, so we want to have $2^{\ell(k)} < p$. We remark that collision-free hash-functions can be constructed assuming the discrete logarithm problem is hard, so the existence of collision-free hash-functions follows from our assumptions on the bilinear group.

6.3 Strong One-Time Signatures

We will use a one-time signature scheme that is secure against an adversary that has access to a single weak chosen message attack. We say the one-time signature scheme is strong, if the adversary can neither forge a signature on a different message nor create a different signature on the chosen message she already got signed. An obvious candidate for such a scheme is the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [BB04], since this signature scheme is deterministic and hence automatically has the strongness property.

6.4 Non-interactive Proofs for Bilinear Groups

Groth and Sahai [GS07] suggest non-interactive proofs that capture relations for bilinear groups. They look at sets of equations in our bilinear group (p, G, G_T, e, g) over variables in G and $\mathbb{Z}_p$ such as pairing product equations, e.g. $e(x_1, x_2)e(x_3, x_4) = 1$, or multi-exponentiation equations, e.g. $x_1^{\delta_1} x_2^{\delta_2} = 1$. They suggest non-interactive proofs for demonstrating that a set of equations of the form described above has a solution $x_1, \ldots, x_I \in G, \delta_1, \ldots, \delta_J \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ so all equations are simultaneously satisfied. Their proofs are in the common reference string model. There are two types of common reference strings that yield respectively perfect soundness and perfect witness indistinguishability/perfect zero-knowledge. The two types of common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable and they both give perfect completeness. We now give some further details.

[GS07] show that there exists four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (K, P, V, X), which we call respectively the key generator, the prover, the verifier and the extractor. The key generator takes (p, G, G_T, e, g) as input and outputs a common reference string $crs = (F, H, U, V, W, U', V', W') \in G^8$ as well as an extraction key xk. Given a set of equations, the prover takes crs and a witness $x_1, \ldots, x_I, \delta_1, \ldots, \delta_J$ as input and outputs a proof π. The verifier given crs, a set of equations and π outputs 1 if the proof is valid and else it outputs 0. Finally, the extractor on a valid proof π will extract $x_1, \ldots, x_I \in G$, in other words it will extract part of the witness.

The proofs of [GS07] have perfect completeness: on a correctly generated CRS and a correct witness, the prover always outputs a valid proof. They have perfect soundness: on a correctly generated CRS it is impossible to create a valid proof unless the equations are simultaneously satisfiable. Further, they have perfect partial knowledge: given xk the algorithm X can extract $x_1, \ldots, x_I$ from the proof, such that there exists a solution for the equations that use these $x_1, \ldots, x_I$.

There exists a simulator S_1 that outputs a simulated common reference string crs and a simulation trapdoor key tk. These simulated common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable from the common reference strings produced by K assuming the DLIN problem is hard. On a simulated common reference string, the proofs created by the prover are perfectly witness-indistinguishable: if there are many possible witnesses for the equations being satisfiable, the proof π does not reveal anything about which witness was used by the prover when creating the proof. Further, let us call a set of equations tractable, if it is possible to find a solution, where $x_1, \ldots, x_I$ are the same in all equations, but $\delta_1, \ldots, \delta_J$ are allowed to vary from equation to equation. Tractable equations have perfect zero-knowledge proofs on simulated reference strings: there exists a simulator S_2 that on a simulated reference string crs and a simulation trapdoor key tk produces a simulated proof π for the tractable equations being satisfiable. If the equations are satisfiable, then simulated proofs are perfectly indistinguishable from the proofs a real prover with a witness would form on a simulated reference string.

It will be useful later in the paper to know some technical details of the construction. The values F, H, U, V, W will be used to commit to the variables x as $(c_1, c_2, c_3) := (F^r U^t, H^s V^t, g^{r+s} W^t x)$ for randomly chosen $r, s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. On a real common reference string, they are set up so $U = F^R, V = H^S, W = g^{R+S}$ so the commitment can be rewritten as $(F^{r+Rt}, H^{s+St}, g^{r+s+(R+S)t}x)$. The extraction key is $xk := (\phi, \eta)$ so $F = g^\phi, H = g^\eta$. This permits decryption of the commitment as $x = c_3 c_1^{-\phi} c_2^{-\eta}$. On the other hand, on a simulation reference string, we use $U = F^R, V = H^S, W = g^T$ with $T \neq R + S$, which makes the commitment perfectly hiding.

To commit to a variable $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ using randomness r, s we use the commitment $(d_1, d_2, d_3) := (F^r (U')^\delta, H^s (V')^\delta, g^{r+s} (W')^\delta)$. On a normal common reference string, we pick $U' = F^R, V' = H^S, W' = g^T$ for $T \neq R + S$. This makes the commitment perfectly binding. On a simulated common reference string, on the other hand, we pick $U' = F^R, V' = H^S, W' = g^{R+S}$. The simulation trapdoor key is $tk := (R, S)$, which permits us to trapdoor open a commitment to 0 to any value δ since $(F^r, H^s, g^{r+s}) = (F^{r-R\delta}(U')^\delta, H^{s-S\delta}(V')^\delta, g^{r+s-(R+S)\delta}(W')^\delta)$.

6.5 Selective-tag Weakly CCA-secure Encryption

We will use a tag-based cryptosystem [MRY04] due to Kiltz [Kil06]. The public key consists of random non-trivial elements $pk = (F, H, K, L) \in G^4$ and the secret key is $sk = (\phi, \eta)$ so $F = g^\phi, H = g^\eta$. We encrypt $m \in \mathbb{G}$ using tag $t \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and randomness $r, s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ as $(y_1, \ldots, y_5) := (F^r, H^s, g^{r+s}m, (g^t K)^r, (g^t L)^s)$. The validity of the ciphertext is publicly verifiable, since valid ciphertexts have $e(F, y_4) = e(y_1, g^t K)$ and $e(H, y_5) = e(y_2, g^t L)$. Decryption can be done by computing $m = y_3 y_1^{-\phi} y_2^{-\eta}$. In the group signature scheme, we will set up the cryptosystem with the same F, H as in the common reference string of the non-interactive proofs.

[Kil06] shows that under the DLIN assumption this cryptosystem is selective-tag weakly CCA-secure. By

this we mean that it is indistinguishable which message we encrypted under a tag t, even when we have access to a decryption oracle that decrypts ciphertexts under any other tag. Formally, for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr \Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) ; \ t \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk) ; \ (pk, sk) \leftarrow K(gk) ; \ (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{D_{sk}(\cdot, \cdot)}(pk) ; \ y \leftarrow E_{pk}(t, m_0) :$$

$$\mathcal{A}^{D_{sk}(\cdot, \cdot)}(y) = 1 \Big]$$

$$\approx \ \Pr \Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) ; \ t \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk) ; \ (pk, sk) \leftarrow K(gk) ; \ (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{D_{sk}(\cdot, \cdot)}(pk) ; \ y \leftarrow E_{pk}(t, m_1) :$$

$$\mathcal{A}^{D_{sk}(\cdot, \cdot)}(y) = 1 \Big],$$

where the oracle returns $D_{sk}(t_i, y_i)$ if $t_i \neq t$.

7 The Group Signature Scheme

The core of our group signature scheme is the certisignature scheme from Section 4. The issuer acts as a certification authority and whenever a new member i wants to enroll, she needs to create a verification key v_i for the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme and get a certificate from the issuer. In the group signature scheme, the verification key and the corresponding secret key is generated with an interactive key establishment protocol as defined in Section 6.1. This way both user and issuer know that v_i is selected with the correct distribution and that the user holds the corresponding secret key x_i.

When making a group signature, the member will generate a key pair $(vk_{\mathrm{sots}}, sk_{\mathrm{sots}})$ for a strong one-time signature that is secure under weak chosen message attck. She will sign the message using sk_{sots} and use x_i to sign vk_{sots}. The combination of certisignatures and strong one-time signatures is what makes it hard to forge group signatures.

Group signatures have to be anonymous and therefore we cannot reveal the certisignature. Instead, a group signature will include a non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proof of knowledge of a certisignature on vk_{sots}. Witness-indistinguishability implies that a group signature does not reveal which group member has signed the message. The opener will hold the extraction key for the NIWI proof of knowledge and will be able to extract the certisignature. Whenever an opening is called for, she extracts the signature on vk_{sots}, which points to the member who signed the message. In case no member has certisigned vk_{sots}, the opener points to the issuer since the certisignature has a valid certificate.

The ideas above suffice to construct a CPA-anonymous group signature scheme. To get anonymity even when the adversary has access to the Open oracle, we will encrypt the signature on vk_{sots} with Kiltz' cryptosystem using vk_{sots} as a tag. We will also give an NIZK proof that the encrypted signature is the same as the one used in the NIWI proof of knowledge.

We present the full group signature scheme in Figure 2. Let us explain the non-interactive proofs further. The NIWI proof of knowledge, will demonstrate that there exists a certisignature (a, b, v, σ) on vk_{sots} so

$$e(a, hv)e(f, b) = T \ \wedge \ e(\sigma, vg^{\mathrm{Hash}(vk_{\mathrm{sots}})}) = e(g, g).$$

In the terminology of [GS07], these are two pairing product equations over three variables b, v, σ. The last element a will be public, since we can rerandomize the certificate such that a does not identify the member. [GS07] gives us an NIWI proof of knowledge for these two equations being simultaneously satisfiable that consists of 27 group elements. This proof consists of three commitments to respectively b, v, σ, which consist of 3 group elements each, and two proofs for the committed values satisfying the two equations consisting of 9 group elements each.

In the NIZK proof we have a ciphertext y under tag $\mathrm{Hash}(vk_{\mathrm{sots}})$ and a commitment c to σ from the NIWI proof of knowledge. We wish to prove that the plaintext of y and the committed value in c are the same. The

ciphertext is of the form $(y_1, \ldots, y_5) = (F^{r_y}, H^{s_y}, g^{r_y+s_y}\sigma, (g^{\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})}K)^{r_y}, (g^{\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})}L)^{s_y})$ and the commitment is of the form $(c_1, c_2, c_3) = (F^{r_c}U^t, H^{s_c}V^t, g^{r_c+s_c}W^t\sigma)$. Setting $r := r_c - r_y, s := s_c - s_y$ we have $(c_1y_1^{-1}, c_2y_2^{-1}, c_3y_3^{-1}) = (F^rU^t, H^sV^t, g^{r+s}W^t)$. On the other hand, if the plaintext and the committed value are different, then no such r, s, t exist. Proving that the plaintext and the committed value are the same, therefore corresponds to proving the simultaneous satisfiability of the following equations over $\phi, r, s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_p$:

$$\phi = 1 \ \wedge \ (c_1^{-1}y_1)^\phi F^rU^t = 1 \ \wedge \ (c_2^{-1}y_2)^\phi H^sV^t = 1 \ \wedge \ (c_3^{-1}y_3)^\phi g^{r+s}W^t.$$

This set is tractable, i.e., if we allow ϕ to take different values in the equations, then there is a trivial solution $\phi = 1$ in the first equation and $\phi = r = s = t = 0$ in the other three equations. Since the set of equations is tractable, there is an NIZK proof for the 4 equations being simultaneously satisfiable. The proof consists of commitments to ϕ, r, s, t, but since the first equation is straightforward we can simply use (U', V', W') as the commitment to ϕ, which makes it easy to verify that the first equation holds. The three commitments to r, s, t each consist of 3 group elements. The three last equations are multi-exponentiations of constants and using the proof of [GS07] each equation costs 2 group elements to prove. The NIZK proof therefore costs a total of 15 group elements.

GKg(1^k)
$gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \ ; \ \text{Hash} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(1^k)$
$((f, h, T), z) \leftarrow \text{CertKey}(gk)$
$(crs, xk) \leftarrow K_{\text{NI}}(gk) \ ; \ K, L \leftarrow G$
$(F, H, \text{the rest}) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(crs) \ ; \ pk := (F, H, K, L)$
$(gpk, ik, ok) := ((gk, \text{Hash}, f, h, T, crs, pk), z, xk)$

Join/Issue(User $i : gpk$, Issuer : gpk, ik)
User and Issuer: $(x_i, v_i) \leftarrow \langle \text{User}(gk), \text{Issuer}(gk) \rangle$
Issuer: $r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \ ; \ a_i := f^{-r_i} \ ; \ b_i := (hv_i)^{r_i}z$
Issuer sends to user: a_i, b_i
User: If $e(a_i, hv_i)e(f, b_i) = T$ set
$\quad reg[i] := v_i \ ; \ gsk[i] := (x_i, a_i, b_i)$

GSig$(gpk, gsk[i], m)$
$(vk_{\text{sots}}, sk_{\text{sots}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{sots}}(1^k)$
$\quad (\text{Repeat until Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}}) \neq -x_i)$
$\rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n \ ; \ a := a_if^{-\rho} \ ; \ b := b_i(hv_i)^\rho$
$\sigma := g^{\frac{1}{x_i+\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})}}$
$\pi \leftarrow P_{\text{NIWI}}(crs, (gpk, a, \text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})), (b, v_i, \sigma))$
$y \leftarrow E_{pk}(\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}}), v_i)$
$\psi \leftarrow P_{\text{NIZK}}(crs, (gpk, y, \pi), (r, s, t))$
$\sigma_{\text{sots}} \leftarrow \text{Sign}_{sk_{\text{sots}}}(vk_{\text{sots}}, m, a, \pi, y, \psi)$
Return $\Sigma := (vk_{\text{sots}}, a, \pi, y, \psi, \sigma_{\text{sots}})$

GVf(gpk, m, Σ)
Return 1 if the following holds:
$1 = \text{Ver}_{vk_{\text{sots}}}((vk_{\text{sots}}, m, a, \pi, y, \psi), \sigma_{\text{sots}})$
$1 = V_{\text{NIWI}}(crs, (gpk, a, \text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})), \pi)$
$1 = V_{\text{NIZK}}(crs, (gpk, \pi, y), \psi)$
$1 = \text{ValidCiphertext}(pk, \text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}}), y)$
Else return 0

Open(gpk, ok, m, Σ)
$(b, v, \sigma) \leftarrow X_{xk}(crs, (gpk, a, \text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})), \pi)$
Return (i, σ) if there is i so $v = v_i$
Else return $(0, \sigma)$

Judge$(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \sigma)$
Return 1 if
$i \neq 0 \ \wedge \ e(\sigma, v_ig^{\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})}) = e(g, g)$
Else return 0

Figure 2: The group signature scheme.

Theorem 4 *The scheme in Figure 2 is a group signature scheme with perfect correctness. Under the DLIN, q-SDH and q-U assumption and assuming the strong one-time signature scheme is secure against weak chosen message attack and the hash-function is collision resistant, the group signature has anonymity, traceability and non-frameability.*

Proof. Perfect correctness follows from the perfect correctness of the join/issue secure function evaluation, the certisignature, the NIWI proof of knowledge, the tag-based cryptosystem, the NIZK proof and the strong one-time signature. Anonymity, traceability and non-frameability follows from Lemmas 5, 7 and 6. □

Lemma 5 *The group signature scheme is anonymous.*

Proof. Consider the probability

$$\Pr\left[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) : \mathcal{A}^{\text{Ch}_b, \text{Open}, \text{JoinCorrupt}, \text{JoinExposedHonest}}(gpk, ik) = 1\right]$$

from the definition of anonymity. We want to prove that the two probabilities for respectively $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ only have negligible difference.

First, let us modify the underlying game by aborting if the strong one-time signature in the challenge group signature is ever forged in an opening query. The existential unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme under weak chosen message attack implies that there is negligible probability that we will abort for this reason. From now on we can therefore assume vk_{sots} is not used in valid group signature queries to Open.

We also abort, if any group signature queried to Open collides with $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ from the challenge group signature. Collision-freeness of the hash-function implies that there is negligible probability that this will ever happen, so from now on we can assume that no such collision will happen.

Let us now modify the way we generate the public key for the tag-based cryptosystem. We set $K := g^\kappa, L = g^\lambda$ and store κ, λ. Whenever Open receives a valid group signature, we use κ, λ to decrypt the tag-based cryptosystem. By the validity check of the tag-based ciphertext and the perfect soundness of the NIZK proof ψ this gives the same signature σ as we get when running the extractor on the NIWI proof of knowledge. We now go through reg checking whether there exists i so $e(\sigma, v_i g^{\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})}) = e(g, g)$. In that case, we return (i, σ). The equation defines v_i uniquely so this points to the same v_i as when extracting the NIWI proof of knowledge. If no such v_i can be found, we return $(0, \sigma)$. The perfect soundness of the NIWI proof of knowledge and the NIZK proof implies that this does not change the probabilities with $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ at all.

What we have accomplished in the last step is to modify the Open oracle such that it does not use the extraction key xk for the NIWI proof. We can therefore now switch to using a simulated common reference string crs that gives us perfect witness-indistinguishability and perfect zero-knowledge. Since real common reference strings and simulated common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable, this change only negligibly alters the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ outputting 1. Perfect witness indistinguishability implies that the proof π does not reveal any information about $gsk[i_0]$ or $gsk[i_1]$ having been used to create the challenge group signature.

The only information that is left in the challenge about the signer is inside the ciphertext y. We will now use the selective-tag weak CCA-security of the cryptosystem to show that the two modified probabilities for respectively $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ only differ negligibly. Let us therefore use the group signature adversary to construct a selective-tag adversary that attacks the cryptosystem. The cryptosystem has a public key F, H, K, L. It is possible to build a common reference string using the same F, H, g that has perfect witness-indistinguishability and perfect zero-knowledge, since the zero-knowledge trapdoor consists of the discrete logarithms of U', V', W' with respect to F, H, g. We can therefore on top of a public key F, H, K, L generate a correctly formed public key gpk for the group signature scheme and emulate the oracles JoinCorrupt and JoinHonestExposed. Whenever we have a valid group signature query to Open it contains a ciphertext y. This ciphertext never uses the tag $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ from the challenge ciphertext, so we can use the decryption oracle in the selective-tag weak CCA-security game defining the security of the cryptosystem to decrypt the ciphertext and get out σ.

We will now describe how to generate the challenge group signature on top of a challenge tag-based ciphertext. We start by picking a key for the strong one-time signature scheme $(vk_{\text{sots}}, sk_{\text{sots}})$. We will use $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ as the target tag, which we observe is chosen independently of the public key for the cryptosystem. We now get the public key F, H, K, L and run the group signature game on top of it as described

above. At some point the adversary produces i_0, i_1, m on which it wants a challenge group signature. We construct signatures $\sigma_{i_0}, \sigma_{i_1}$ on $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ for respectively user i_0 and i_1. We then get an encryption y using $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ as the tag of either σ_{i_0} or σ_{i_1} and our goal is to distinguish which one is the plaintext of y. We build a group signature on top of this ciphertext, which can be done since we have perfect NIWI proofs of knowledge and perfect NIZK proofs on simulated common reference strings. If the group signature anonymity probabilities for $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ are different, we can distinguish whether y encrypts σ_{i_0} or σ_{i_1}. The selective-tag weak CCA-security of the cryptosystem therefore gives us that the modified probabilities with $b = 0$ and $b = 1$ are indistinguishable. $\qquad\square$

Lemma 6 *The group signature scheme has non-frameability.*

Proof. We want to prove that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) \; ; \; (m, \Sigma, i, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{IssueToHonest,ReadGsk,GSig}}(gpk, ik, ok) :$$
$$\text{GVf}(gpk, m, \Sigma) = 1 \; \wedge \; \text{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \sigma) = 1$$
$$\wedge \; i \in \text{HonestUsers} \; \wedge \; i \notin \text{ExposedKeys} \; \wedge \; (m, \Sigma) \notin \text{UserSignatures}\Big] \approx 0.$$

Assume for contradiction that there exists a $\delta > 0$ such that for an infinite number of $k \in \mathbb{N}$ the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has probability at least $\frac{1}{k^\delta}$ of winning the game. Let $n(k)$ be a polynomial upper bound of the number of IssueToHonest queries that $\mathcal{A}$ makes. We have at least $\frac{1}{n(k)}$ chance of guessing the user j that $\mathcal{A}$ will attempt to frame before running the game.

Let F be the event that $\mathcal{A}$ produces (m, Σ) so vk_{sots} from one of the group signatures made from the GSig oracle is reused or $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ collides with one of the vk'_{sots} used by the GSig oracle. By the strong existential unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme under weak chosen message attack and the collision-freeness of the hash-function, there is negligible probability that F occurs. Our assumptions so far then lead to the existence of $\delta > 0$ so for an infinite number of $k \in \mathbb{N}$ we have:

$$\Pr\Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) \; ; \; j \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n(k)\} \; ; \; (m, \Sigma, i, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{IssueToHonest,ReadGsk,GSig}}(gpk, ik, ok) :$$
$$\neg F \; \wedge \; i = j \; \wedge \; \text{GVf}(gpk, m, \Sigma) = 1 \; \wedge \; \text{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \sigma) = 1$$
$$\wedge \; i \in \text{HonestUsers} \; \wedge \; i \notin \text{ExposedKeys} \; \wedge \; (m, \Sigma) \notin \text{UserSignatures}\Big] > \frac{1}{2k^\delta n(k)}.$$

We will use the properties of the key establishment protocol to simulate the j'th key establishment protocol. Consider the following game running with non-uniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{B}$ and Issuer*. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ on input gk simulates the entire game above, including simulating the behavior of $\mathcal{A}$. On the j'th call to IssueToHonest it gives the entire state of the protocol to Issuer* including the state of the simulated $\mathcal{A}$. Issuer* acts as $\mathcal{A}$ would in the protocol sending messages to IssueToHonest. We run this adversary Issuer* with an honest user in the key establishment protocol. In case the protocol is successful, the user outputs x_j, else she outputs $\bot$. In either case, Issuer* outputs the internal state of the oracles and all keys as well as the internal state of $\mathcal{A}$. Now $\mathcal{B}$ takes over and continues the run of $\mathcal{A}$ on the state output by Issuer*. In case the output of the user was $x_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and the adversary gives the user a valid certificate a_j, b_j, the user sets $gsk[j] := (x_j, a_j, b_j)$. $\mathcal{B}$ now continues the protocol run to get (m, Σ, i, σ) from $\mathcal{A}$. If $i = j$ and all the other success criteria specified in the probability above are satisfied, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1. Running this game, corresponds exactly to the probability above, so we have:

$$\Pr\Big[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \; ; \; y \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(gk) \; ; \; (x_j, i) \leftarrow \langle \text{User}(gk), \text{Issuer}^*(y)\rangle : \mathcal{B}(x_j, i) = 1\Big] > \frac{1}{2k^\delta n(k)}.$$

Since the key establishment protocol has black-box simulation of the issuer, there exists a black-box simulator S_I such that:

$$\Pr \left[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k) \, ; \, y \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(gk) \, ; \, x_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \, ; \, v_j := g^{x_j} \, ; \, (g^u, i) \leftarrow S_I^{\text{Issuer}^*(y)}(gk, v_j) \, : \mathcal{B}(u, i) = 1 \right] > \frac{1}{4k^\delta n(k)},$$

where $u \in \{\bot, x_j\}$.

The only way x_j is used by $\mathcal{B}$ is in creating Boneh-Boyen signatures on randomly chosen strong one-time verification keys when the GSig oracle is queried. Further, $\mathcal{B}$ only outputs 1 if a successful forgery of such a signature is made. The latter probability is therefore negligible. This leads us to a contradiction, so we must instead conclude that the probability of non-frameability eventually is smaller than $\frac{1}{k^\delta}$ for all $\delta > 0$. $\qquad \square$

Lemma 7 *The group signature scheme is traceable.*

Proof. We have to prove that valid signatures lead to the provable identification of a signer. In other words,

$$\Pr \Big[(gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) \, ; \, (m, \Sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Join}}(gpk, ok) \, ; \, (i, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{Open}(gpk, ok, reg, m, \Sigma) :$$

$$\text{GVf}(gpk, m, \Sigma) = 1 \, \wedge \, (\text{Judge}(gpk, i, reg[i], m, \Sigma, \sigma) = 0 \, \vee \, i = 0) \Big] \approx 0.$$

Let $n(k)$ be an upper bound on the number of users $\mathcal{A}$ joins. Since the running time of $\mathcal{A}$ is polynomial in k we can assume $n(k)$ is polynomial. Further, assume for contradiction that there exists a $\delta > 0$ so for an infinite number of $k \in \mathbb{N}$ the probability is more than $k^{-\delta}$.

We will consider a sequence of games $G_0, \ldots, G_{n(k)}$. Define G_0 to be the game in the probability above, i.e,

$$G_0 = \{ (gpk, ik, ok) \leftarrow \text{GKg}(1^k) \, ; \, (m, \Sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Join}}(gpk, ok) \, ; \, (i, \sigma) \leftarrow \text{Open}(gpk, ok, reg, m, \Sigma) \}.$$

Game G_j will be game G_{j-1} except the call $n(k) - j$ to Join is simulated. We will now explain this further.

We will first give an alternative description of the first part of G_{j-1}. We have an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ and User*. $\mathcal{B}$ on input gk runs the game simulating the generation of all keys and the internal state of $\mathcal{A}$. When reaching the $n(k) - j$'th call to Join, it gives the entire state of the protocol, including the state of $\mathcal{A}$ to User*. User* continues running the protocol and $\mathcal{A}$ and forwards $\mathcal{A}$'s messages to the key establishment protocol. We run this key establishment protocol with an honest issuer that gets gk as input. At the end of the protocol User* outputs all parameters of the scheme as well as the state of $\mathcal{A}$. Using this internal state, we then continue the protocol as in G_{j-1}.

Now we will describe G_j. As in G_{j-1} we let $\mathcal{B}$ be an adversary that generates keys for the group signature scheme and simulates the actions of all parties including $\mathcal{A}$ and gives the entire internal state of protocol and adversary to User*. On the $n(k) - j$'th call to Join we run $x_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$; $v_j := g^{x_j}$; $(u, i) \leftarrow S_U^{\text{User}^*}(gk, x_j)$. After that we continue the protocol as in G_{j-1}. By the properties of the key-establishment protocol we can choose a simulator S_U such that the probability difference between G_{j-1} and G_j resulting in the conditions being satisfied is at most $\frac{1}{2k^\delta n(k)}$. Therefore, $G_{n(k)}$ has at least probability $\frac{1}{2k^\delta}$ of resulting in success.

In game $G_{n(k)}$ a valid signature Σ implies the existence of a valid certisignature on $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$. We can use the extraction key xk to extract this certisignature. In $G_{n(k)}$ we have only given certificates on correctly generated verification keys. By the unfakeability of the certisignature scheme, the certisignature therefore points to one of these certified v_i's. The perfect soundness of the NIWI proof of knowledge implies that the extracted σ is indeed a signature on $\text{Hash}(vk_{\text{sots}})$ under the verification key v_i in the NIWI proof of knowledge. Judge will therefore output 1. So the success probability when running game $G_{n(k)}$ is negligible, giving us the desired contradiction. $\qquad \square$

EFFICIENCY. If we instantiate the strong one-time signature with the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme a verification key is one group element and a one-time signature is also one group element. We make the element

a public. The NIWI proof of knowledge consists of 27 group elements. The ciphertext consists of 5 group elements. The NIZK proof consists of 15 group elements. The total size of a group signature is therefore 50 group elements in G. This is of course much better than the many thousand elements required for a group signature in [Gro06].

In case CPA-anonymity is sufficient, we can consider a lighter version of our group signature, where we omit the ciphertext y and the NIZK proof ψ. This CPA-anonymous group signature scheme would consist of 30 group elements. We observe that regular anonymity implies that the group signature is strong, i.e., even when seeing a message m and a group signature Σ on it, it is not possible to create a different group signature Σ' on m such that it still points to the same member. In CPA-anonymity, however, we do not give the adversary access to an opening oracle and thus mauling signatures is no longer a problem. If we do not care about the group signature being strong, we do not need the strong one-time signature key and we can simply sign $\mathrm{Hash}(m)$ instead of $\mathrm{Hash}(vk_{\mathrm{sots}})$. This reduces the size of the group signatures further to 28 group elements. In comparison, the CPA-anonymous group signature scheme of [BW07] consists of 6 group elements in a composite order group. Since composite order groups rely on the hardness of factoring, these groups are very large and our CPA-anonymous group signatures are therefore comparable in size for practical parameters, perhaps even a bit smaller. However, our CPA-anonymous group signature scheme still supports dynamic enrollment of members and has a group public key gpk consisting of a constant number of group elements.

KEY GENERATION. Since the [BSZ05]-model assumes a trusted key generator it is worth considering how the key generation should be carried out in practice. The trust in our scheme relies on the bilinear group (p, G, G_T, e, g) being generated so the cryptographic assumptions hold and it relies on the hash-function being collision-free. We remark that an advantage of our scheme is that we work over prime order bilinear groups, so it may be possible to use a uniform random string to set up (p, G, G_T, e, g). Also, since the trust is based on a very elementary setup, a bilinear group and a hash-function, it is possible that suitable public standards can be found. One could for instance use SHA-256 as the hash-function.

The non-frameability of the user relies only on the collision-freeness of the hash-function and the cryptographic assumptions in (p, G, G_T, e, g). The rest of the group public key gpk can be generated jointly by the issuer and the opener. The issuer generates the authority key for the certisignature scheme. The opener generates crs and pk, anonymity follows from the opener generating these keys correctly. Since the opener can break anonymity anyway, it is quite reasonable to trust the opener with protecting anonymity. The opener will have to make a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the corresponding extraction key to the issuer, since the security proof for traceability relies on the opener being able to actually extract a signature from the NIWI proof of knowledge.

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