RC4 State Information at Any Stage Reveals the Secret Key[*]

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Abstract

A theoretical analysis of the RC4 Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) is presented in this paper, where the nonlinear operation is swapping among the permutation bytes. Explicit formulae are provided for the probabilities with which the permutation bytes at any stage of the KSA are biased to the secret key. Theoretical proofs of these formulae have been left open since Roos's work (1995). While this result shows that only the initial bytes of the permutation after the KSA (denoted by S_N) are biased to the secret key, we additionally show that each byte of S_N actually reveals secret key information. Looking at all the elements of the final permutation S_N and its inverse S_N^{-1}, the value of the hidden index j in each round of the KSA can be estimated from a "pair of values" in $0, \ldots, N-1$ with a constant probability of success $\pi = \frac{N-2}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1} + \frac{2}{N}$ (we get $\pi \approx 0.37$, for $N = 256$), which is significantly higher than the random association. Using the values of two consecutive j's, we estimate the y-th key byte from at most a "quadruple of values" in $0, \ldots, N-1$ with a probability > 0.12. As a secret key of l bytes is repeated at least $\lfloor \frac{N}{l} \rfloor$ times in RC4, these many quadruples can be accumulated to get each byte of the secret key with very high probability (e.g., 0.8 to close to 1) from a small set of values. Based on our analysis, for the first time we show that the secret key of RC4 can be recovered from the state information in a time much less than the exhaustive search with good probability. Finally, a generalization of the RC4 KSA is analyzed corresponding to a class of update functions of the indices involved in the swaps. This reveals an inherent weakness of shuffle-exchange kind of key scheduling.

Keywords: Bias, Cryptanalysis, Key Scheduling, Permutation, RC4, Stream Cipher.

Contents

1 Introduction

Two decades have passed since the inception of RC4. Though a variety of other stream ciphers have been discovered after RC4, it is still the most popular and most frequently used stream cipher algorithm due to its simplicity, ease of implementation, speed and efficiency. RC4 is widely used in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and similar protocols to protect the internet traffic, and was integrated into Microsoft Windows, Lotus Notes, Apple AOCE, Oracle Secure SQL, etc. Though the algorithm can be stated in less than ten lines, even after many years of analysis its strengths and weaknesses are of great interest to the community. In this paper, we study the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 in detail and find out results that have implications towards the security of RC4. Before getting into the contribution in this paper, we first revisit the basics of RC4.

     The RC4 stream cipher has been designed by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security in 1987, and was a propriety algorithm until 1994. It uses an S-Box $S = (S[0], \ldots, S[N-1])$ of length N, each location being of 8 bits. Typically, $N = 256$. S is initialized as the identity

permutation, i.e., $S[y] = y$ for $0 \leq y \leq N - 1$. A secret key of size l bytes (typically, $5 \leq l \leq 16$) is used to scramble this permutation. An array $K = (K[0], \ldots, K[N - 1])$ is used to hold the secret key, where each location is of 8 bits. The key is repeated in the array K at key length boundaries. For example, if the key size is 40 bits, then $K[0], \ldots, K[4]$ are filled by the key and then this pattern is repeated to fill up the entire array K.

The RC4 cipher has two components, namely, the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) and the Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA). The KSA turns the random key K into a permutation S of $0, 1, \ldots, N - 1$ and PRGA uses this permutation to generate pseudo-random keystream bytes. The keystream output byte z is XOR-ed with the message byte to generate the ciphertext byte at the sender end. Again, z is XOR-ed with the ciphertext byte to get back the message byte at the receiver end.

Any addition used related to the RC4 description is in general addition modulo N unless specified otherwise.

Algorithm KSA	Algorithm PRGA
Initialization:	*Initialization*:
For $i = 0, \ldots, N - 1$	$i = j = 0$;
$S[i] = i$;	*Output Keystream Generation Loop*:
$j = 0$;	$i = i + 1$;
Scrambling:	$j = j + S[i]$;
For $i = 0, \ldots, N - 1$	Swap($S[i], S[j]$);
$j = (j + S[i] + K[i])$;	$t = S[i] + S[j]$;
Swap($S[i], S[j]$);	Output $z = S[t]$;

Note that defining the array K to be of size N enables us to write $K[y]$ instead of the typical $K[y \bmod l]$ in the description of the algorithm. This is done for the sake of simplification in the subsequent analysis of the algorithm.

1.1   Outline of the Contribution

In this paper, the update of the permutation S in different rounds of the KSA is analyzed and it is theoretically proved that at any stage of the KSA, the initial bytes of the permutation will be significantly biased towards some combination of the secret key bytes. Such biases were observed by Roos in [20] for the first time. It has been noted in [20] that after the completion of the KSA, the most likely value of the y-th element of the permutation (denoted by S_N) for the first few values of y is given by $S_N[y] = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$. However,

the probability $P(S_N[y] = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x])$ could not be theoretically arrived in [20] and experimental values have been provided as in Table 1 below.

Note that Roos's observation [20] was about the final permutation after the KSA. We here theoretically prove for the first time with what probabilities the permutation bytes at any stage of the KSA are correlated with the secret key bytes. Thus, our results include

y	$P(S_N[y] = \frac{y(y+1)}{2}+\sum\limits_{x=0}^{y}K[x])$
0-15	.370 .368 .362 .358 .349 .340 .330 .322 .309 .298 .285 .275 .260 .245 .229 .216
16-31	.203 .189 .173 .161 .147 .135 .124 .112 .101 .090 .082 .074 .064 .057 .051 .044
32-47	.039 .035 .030 .026 .023 .020 .017 .014 .013 .012 .010 .009 .008 .007 .006 .006

Table 1: The probabilities experimentally observed by Roos [20].

Roos's observation as a special case. Roos [20] commented that "Swapping is a nasty nonlinear process which is hard to analyze." That process is analyzed in a disciplined manner in this paper that unfolds the effect of swapping in the KSA of RC4 (see Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 in Section 2.1).

In Section 2.2, we exploit all entries of both the permutations S_N and S_N^{-1} to gather information about the index j (we narrow it down to only two values in the range of $0, \ldots, N-1$ instead of N options) in each round of the KSA with a very good and constant probability of success (> 0.37). The estimates of the two consecutive pairs of j's give four possible values of a key byte with good probability. These results (Theorems 2, 3) are the theoretical foundations of this section which were not known earlier to the best of our knowledge. Since each key is repeated at least $\lfloor \frac{N}{l} \rfloor$ times, using the above idea we can form a frequency table for each secret key byte (see Theorems 4, 5).

In Section 3.3, we use the biases of Section 2.1 to show that if the permutation at any stage of the KSA is available, then one can retrieve the key bytes in time much less than the exhaustive key search. For a secret key of size $8l$ bits ($40 \leq 8l \leq 128$), the key can be recovered in $O(2^{\frac{8l}{2}})$ effort with a constant probability of success. In a shuffle-exchange kind of stream cipher, for proper cryptographic security, one may expect that after the key scheduling algorithm one should not be able to get any information regarding the secret key bytes from the random permutation in time complexity less than the exhaustive key search. We show that the KSA of RC4 is weak in this aspect. Based on the theoretical results of Section 2.2, in Section 3.4 we present further ideas in this direction, which produce better complexities and success probabilities than those in Section 3.3.

Subsequent to our work in [17], other researchers also have shown interest in the problem of recovering the secret key from RC4 permutation. In this paper, we briefly discuss these works [2, 1] in relation to our contributions (see Sections 3.5.1, 3.6.1).

One may note that if the state information of RC4 during the PRGA is available, then one can deterministically get back to the permutation after the KSA. By state information we mean (a) the entire permutation S, (b) the number of keystream output bytes generated (which is related to the index i) and (c) the value of the index j. Once the final permutation after the KSA is retrieved, using the approach of Section 3 we can recover the secret key.

Finally, in Section 4, we consider the generalization of the RC4 KSA where the index j can be updated in different manners. In RC4 KSA, the update rule is $j = (j + S[i] + K[i])$. We show that for any arbitrary secret key and for a certain class of update functions which

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compute the new value of the index j in the current round as a function of "the permutation S and j in the previous round" and "the secret key K", it is always possible to construct explicit functions of the key bytes which the permutation at every stage of the KSA will be biased to. This shows that the RC4 KSA cannot be made more secure by replacing the update rule $j = j + S[i] + K[i]$ with any rule from a large class that we present. Such bias is intrinsic to shuffle-exchange kind of paradigm, where one index (i) is updated linearly and another index (j) is modified pseudo-randomly.

1.2 Background

There are two broad approaches in the study of cryptanalysis of RC4: attacks based on the weaknesses of the KSA and those based on the weaknesses of the PRGA. Distinguishing attacks are the main motivation for PRGA-based approach [3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19]. Important results in this approach include bias in the keystream output bytes. For example, a bias in the second output byte being zero has been proved in [10] and a bias in the equality of the first two output bytes has been shown in [19]. In [15], RC4 has been analyzed using the theory of random shuffles and it has been recommended that initial 512 bytes of the keystream output should be discarded in order to be safe.

Initial empirical works based on the weaknesses of the RC4 KSA were done in [20, 23] and several classes of weak keys had been identified. Recently, a more general theoretical study has been performed in [16] which includes the observations of [20]. The work [16] shows how the bias of the "third permutation byte" (after the KSA) towards the "first three secret key bytes" propagates to the first keystream output byte (in the PRGA). Thus, it renews the interest to study how the permutation after the KSA (which acts as a bridge between the KSA and the PRGA) is biased towards the secret key, which is theoretically solved in this paper.

Some weaknesses of the KSA have been addressed in great detail in [4] and practical attacks have been mounted on RC4 in the IV mode (e.g. WEP [7]). Further, the propagation of weak key patterns to the output keystream bytes has also been discussed in [4]. Subsequently, the work [8] improved [4]. In [13, Chapter 6], correlation between the permutations that are a few rounds apart have been discussed.

Reconstruction of the permutation looking at the keystream output bytes is another approach to attack RC4. In [6, Table 2], it has been estimated that this kind of attack would require around 2^{779} to 2^{797} complexity. Later in [22, Table 7], an improved idea has been presented that estimates a complexity of 2^{731}. A much improved result [14] in this area shows that the permutation can be recovered in around 2^{241} complexity. This shows that RC4 is not secure when the key length is more than 30 bytes. Fortunately, this result does not affect RC4 for the typical secret key size of 5 to 16 bytes. If the complexity of "recovering the secret key from the permutation" is less than that of "recovering RC4 permutation from the keystream output bytes in PRGA", then by cascading the techniques of the latter [6, 22, 14] with those of the former, "recovering the secret key from the keystream output bytes" is possible at the same complexity as the latter.

2　Theoretical Analysis of the Key Scheduling

Let j_{y+1} and S_{y+1} be respectively the value of the pseudo-random index j and the permutation after the y-th round of the KSA, $0 \leq y \leq N$. As we have already denoted, S_N is the final permutation after the KSA. We also denote the initial permutation by S_0 and the initial value 0 of the index j by j_0. In the original RC4, S_0 is the identity permutation.

2.1　Correlation between Secret Key and Initial Bytes of the Permutation

We now prove a general formula (Theorem 1) that estimates the probabilities with which the permutation bytes after each round of the RC4 KSA are related to certain combinations of the secret key bytes. The result we present has two-fold significance. It gives for the first time a theoretical proof explicitly showing how these probabilities change as functions of i. Further, it does not assume that the initial permutation is an identity permutation. The result holds for any arbitrary initial permutation. Note that though j is updated using a deterministic formula, it is a linear function of the pseudo-random secret key bytes, and is therefore itself pseudo-random. If the secret key generator produces the secret keys uniformly at random, which is a reasonable assumption, then the distribution of j will also be uniform.

The proof of Theorem 1 depends on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 which we prove below first.

Lemma 1 *Assume that during the KSA rounds, the index j takes its values from $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$ uniformly at random. Then, $P(j_{y+1} = \sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]) \approx (\frac{N-1}{N})^{1+\frac{y(y+1)}{2}} + \frac{1}{N}$, $0 \leq y \leq N-1$.*

Proof: One contribution towards the event $E : (j_{y+1} = \sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x])$ is approximately $(\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}}$. This part is due to the association based on the recursive updates of j and can be proved by induction on y.

- *Base Case*: Before the beginning of the KSA, $j_0 = 0$. Now, in the first round, we have $j_1 = j_0 + S_0[0] + K[0] = 0 + S_0[0] + K[0] = \sum_{x=0}^{0} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{0} K[x]$ with probability $1 = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{0(0+1)}{2}}$. Hence, the result holds for the base case.

- *Inductive Case*: Suppose, that the result holds for the first y rounds, when the deterministic index i takes its values from 0 to $y-1$, $y \geq 1$. Now, for the $(y+1)$-th round, when $i = y$, we would have $j_{y+1} = j_y + S_y[y] + K[y]$. Thus, j_{y+1} can equal $\sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$, if $j_y = \sum_{x=0}^{y-1} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y-1} K[x]$ and $S_y[y] = S_0[y]$.

By *inductive hypothesis*, we get $P(j_y = \sum_{x=0}^{y-1} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y-1} K[x]) \approx (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y-1)}{2}}$. Further, $S_y[y]$ remains the same as $S_0[y]$, if it has not been involved in any swap during the previous rounds, i.e., if any of the values $j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y$ has not hit the index y, the probability of which is $(\frac{N-1}{N})^y$. Thus, the probability that the event E occurs along the above recursive path is $\approx (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y-1)}{2}} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}}$.

A second contribution towards the event E is due to random association when the above recursive path is not followed. This probability is approximately $\left(1 - (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N}$. Adding these two contributions, we get the total probability $\approx (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}} + \left(1 - (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = (1 - \frac{1}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}} + \frac{1}{N} = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{1 + \frac{y(y+1)}{2}} + \frac{1}{N}$. ∎

Lemma 2 *Assume that during the KSA rounds, the index j takes its values from $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$ uniformly at random. Then, $P(S_r[y] = S_0[j_{y+1}]) \approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1}$, $0 \le y \le r-1$, $1 \le r \le N$.*

Proof: During the swap in round $y+1$, $S_{y+1}[y]$ is assigned the value of $S_y[j_{y+1}]$. Now, the index j_{y+1} is not involved in any swap during the previous y many rounds, if it is not touched by the indices $\{0, 1, \ldots, y-1\}$, the probability of which is $(\frac{N-y}{N})$, as well as if it is not touched by the indices $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y\}$, the probability of which is $(\frac{N-1}{N})^y$. Hence, $P(S_{y+1}[y] = S_0[j_{y+1}]) \approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y$. After round $y+1$, index y is not touched by any of the subsequent $r-1-y$ many j values with probability $(\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1-y}$. Hence, $P(S_r[y] = S_0[j_{y+1}]) \approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1-y} = (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1}$. ∎

Theorem 1 *Assume that during the KSA rounds, the index j takes its values from $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$ uniformly at random. Then, $P(S_r[y] = f_y) \approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2} + r]} + \frac{1}{N}$, where $f_y = S_0\Big[\sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]\Big]$, $0 \le y \le r-1$, $1 \le r \le N$.*

Proof: $S_r[y]$ can equal $S_0\Big[\sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]\Big]$ in two ways. One way is that $j_{y+1} = \sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$ following the recursive path as in the proof of Lemma 1, and $S_r[y] = S_0[j_{y+1}]$. Combining the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we get the contribution of this part $\approx (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}} \cdot (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1} = (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2} + (r-1)]}$. Another way is that neither of the above events happen and still $S_r[y]$ equals $S_0\Big[\sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]\Big]$ due to random association. The contribution of this second part is approximately $\Big(1 - $

$(\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2}+(r-1)]}) \cdot \frac{1}{N}$. Adding these two contributions, we get the total probability
$\approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2}+(r-1)]} + \left(1 - (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2}+(r-1)]}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = (1 - \frac{1}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2}+(r-1)]} + \frac{1}{N} = (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2}+r]} + \frac{1}{N}$. ∎

Corollary 1 *If the initial permutation is the identity permutation, then* $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x], \ 0 \le y \le N-1$.

Proof: Substitute $S_0[y] = y$ in the form $f_y = S_0\left[\sum_{x=0}^{y} S_0[x] + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]\right]$ for $0 \le y \le N-1$. ∎

Corollary 2 *The bias of the final permutation after the KSA towards the secret key is given by* $P(S_N[y] = f_y) \approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{[\frac{y(y+1)}{2}+N]} + \frac{1}{N}, \ 0 \le y \le N-1$.

Proof: Substitute $r = N$ in the statement of the theorem. ∎

In the following table we list the values of probabilities $P(S_N[y] = f_y)$ (when the initial permutation is identity, i.e., when $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$) to compare with the experimental values provided in [20] and summarized in our Table 1.

y	$P(S_N[y] = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x])$															
0-15	.371	.368	.364	.358	.351	.343	.334	.324	.313	.301	.288	.275	.262	.248	.234	.220
16-31	.206	.192	.179	.165	.153	.140	.129	.117	.107	.097	.087	.079	.071	.063	.056	.050
32-47	.045	.039	.035	.031	.027	.024	.021	.019	.016	.015	.013	.011	.010	.009	.008	.008

Table 2: The probabilities following Corollary 2.

After the index 48 and onwards, both the theoretical as well as the experimental values tend to $\frac{1}{N}$ (= 0.0039 for $N = 256$) as is expected when we consider the equality between two randomly chosen values from a set of N elements.

2.2 Getting Individual Key Bytes using All Bytes of S_N

First note that, every value y in the permutation is touched at least once during the KSA by the indices $i, j, \ 0 \le y \le N-1$. Initially, y is located at index y in the permutation. In round $y+1$, when i reaches index y, either y is still in index y, or it has been moved due to swaps in one of the previous y rounds. In the former case, i will touch it in round $y+1$. In the latter case, one of $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y\}$ has touched it already.

In the proofs of this section, whenever we replace the probability of a joint event by the product of the probabilities of the individual events, independence of the underlying events is implicitly assumed.

Theorem 2 $P(j_{y+1} = S_N^{-1}[y] \text{ or } j_{y+1} = S_N[y]) = \frac{N-2}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1} + \frac{2}{N}$, $0 \le y \le N-1$.

Proof: The event $(j_{y+1} = S_N^{-1}[y])$, or, equivalently, the event $(S_N[j_{y+1}] = y)$ occurs, if $E_1(y)$, which is a combination of the following two events, holds.

1. y is not touched by any of $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y\}$ in the first y rounds. This happens with probability $(\frac{N-1}{N})^y$.

2. In round $y+1$, when i becomes y, j_{y+1} moves y to one of the indices in $\{0, \ldots, y\}$ due to the swap and y remains there until the end of KSA. This happens with probability $P(j_{y+1} \in \{0, \ldots, y\}) \cdot P(j_t \ne j_{y+1}, y+2 \le t \le N) = \frac{y+1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-y-1}$.

Thus, $P(E_1(y)) = (\frac{N-1}{N})^y \cdot \frac{y+1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-y-1} = \frac{y+1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}$.

Again, the event $(j_{y+1} = S_N[y])$ occurs, if $E_2(y)$, which is a combination of the following two events, holds. (Note that the event $E_2(y)$ is taken from Lemma 2. We here outline the proof of the probability of $E_2(y)$ for easy reference.)

1. $S_y[j_{y+1}] = j_{y+1}$ and therefore after the swap in round $y+1$, $S_{y+1}[y] = j_{y+1}$. This happens if $j_{y+1} \in \{y, \ldots, N-1\}$ and had not been touched by any of $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y\}$ in the first y rounds. The probability of this is $\frac{N-y}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y$.

2. Once j_{y+1} sits in index y due to the above, it is not touched by any of the remaining $N-y-1$ many j values until the end of the KSA. The probability of this is $(\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-y-1}$.

Thus, $P(E_2(y)) = \frac{N-y}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-y-1} = \frac{N-y}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}$.

Now, both $E_1(y)$ and $E_2(y)$ hold if $j_{y+1} = S_N[y] = S_N^{-1}[y]$. This happens if y is not touched by any of $\{j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y\}$ in the first y rounds, and then $j_{y+1} = y$ so that y is not moved due to the swap, and subsequently y is not touched by any of the remaining $N-y-1$ many j values until the end of the KSA. Thus, $P(E_1(y) \cap E_2(y)) = (\frac{N-1}{N})^y \cdot \frac{1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-y-1} = \frac{1}{N}(\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}$.

Hence, $P(E_1(y) \cup E_2(y)) = P(E_1(y)) + P(E_2(y)) - P(E_1(y) \cap E_2(y)) = \frac{y+1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1} + \frac{N-y}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1} - \frac{1}{N}(\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1} = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}$.

One way the event $(j_{y+1} = S_N^{-1}[y] \text{ or } j_{y+1} = S_N[y])$ occurs is through $E_1(y) \cup E_2(y)$. Another way is that neither $E_1(y)$ nor $E_2(y)$ holds, yet $j_{y+1} \in \{S_N^{-1}[y], S_N[y]\}$ due to random association, whose probability contribution is $(1 - (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}) \cdot \frac{2}{N}$. Adding these two contributions, we get the result. ∎

For $N = 256$, the value turns out to be > 0.37, which conforms to experimental observation. The result of Theorem 2 identifies for the first time that the permutation S_N and its inverse S_N^{-1} reveal information about the secret index j in each byte. This theorem can be used to reveal the secret key in the following manner.

Let $G_0 = \{S_N[0], S_N^{-1}[0]\}$ and for $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$, let $G_y = \{u - v - y | u \in \{S_N[y]\} \cup \{S_N^{-1}[y]\}, v \in \{S_N[y-1]\} \cup \{S_N^{-1}[y-1]\}\}$. Once more we like to remind that in $(u - v - y)$, the operations are modulo N.

Remark 1 *It is highly likely that $S_N[y] \neq S_N^{-1}[y]$ and $S_N[y-1] \neq S_N^{-1}[y-1]$. So we consider $|G_0| = 2$ and $|G_y| = 4$, $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$.*

We write $G_0 = \{g_{01}, g_{02}\}$, where $g_{01} = S_N^{-1}[0]$, and $g_{02} = S_N[0]$; and for $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$, $G_y = \{g_{y1}, g_{y2}, g_{y3}, g_{y4}\}$, where $g_{y1} = S_N^{-1}[y] - S_N^{-1}[y-1] - y$, $g_{y2} = S_N[y] - S_N[y-1] - y$, $g_{y3} = S_N^{-1}[y] - S_N[y-1] - y$, and $g_{y4} = S_N[y] - S_N^{-1}[y-1] - y$. Further, let $p_{0x} = P(K[0] = g_{0x})$, $1 \leq x \leq 2$, and for $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$, let $p_{yx} = P(K[y] = g_{yx})$, $1 \leq x \leq 4$. We have the following result.

Theorem 3
(1) $p_{01} = \frac{1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^N + \frac{1}{N}$, and $p_{02} = (\frac{N-1}{N})^N + \frac{1}{N}$.
(2) *For $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$,*
$p_{y1} = \frac{y(y+1)}{N^2} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{2N-1} + \frac{1}{N}$, $p_{y2} = \frac{(N-y)(N-y+1)}{N^2} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{2N-1+y} + \frac{1}{N}$,
$p_{y3} = \frac{(y+1)(N-y+1)}{N^2} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{2N-1+y} + \frac{1}{N}$, and $p_{y4} = \frac{y(N-y)}{N^2} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{2N-1+y} + \frac{1}{N}$.

Proof: We would be referring to the events $E_1(y)$ and $E_2(y)$ in the proof of Theorem 2. From Theorem 2, we have $P(E_1(y)) = \frac{y+1}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}$ and $P(E_2(y)) = \frac{N-y}{N} \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{N-1}$.

For each probability p_{yx} in items (1) and (2), we would consider two components. The component which comes due to the contributions of the events $E_1(y), E_2(y)$ etc, would be called α_{yx}. The other component is due to random association and is given by $(1 - \alpha_{yx}) \cdot \frac{1}{N}$. So for each probability p_{yx}, deriving the part α_{yx} suffices, as the total probability can be computed as $\alpha_{yx} + (1 - \alpha_{yx}) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = \frac{N-1}{N} \cdot \alpha_{yx} + \frac{1}{N}$.

Consider the update rule in the KSA: $j_{y+1} = j_y + S_y[y] + K[y]$, $0 \leq y \leq N - 1$, where $j_0 = 0$.

First, we prove item (1). Since $S_0[0] = 0$, we can write $j_1 = K[0]$. Considering $j_1 = S_N^{-1}[0]$, we have $\alpha_{01} = P(E_1(0))$ and considering $j_1 = S_N[0]$, we have $\alpha_{02} = P(E_2(0))$. Substituting 0 for y in the expressions for $P(E_1(y))$ and $P(E_2(y))$, we get the results.

Now, we come to item (2). In the update rule, $S_y[y]$ can be replaced by y, assuming that it has not been touched by any one of $j_1, j_2, \ldots, j_y$ in the first y rounds of the KSA. This happens with a probability $(\frac{N-1}{N})^y$, $0 \leq y \leq N - 1$. Assuming $S_y[y] = y$, we can write $K[y] = j_{y+1} - j_y - y$. When considering the contribution of $E_1(y)$ to j_{y+1}, the factor $(\frac{N-1}{N})^y$ need not be taken into account, as the event $(S_y[y] = y)$ is already contained in $E_1(y)$. Thus, the components α_{yx}'s for the probabilities p_{y1}, p_{y2}, p_{y3} and p_{y4} are respectively given by
$\alpha_{y1} = P(E_1(y)) \cdot P(E_1(y-1))$, $\alpha_{y2} = P(E_2(y)) \cdot P(E_2(y-1)) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y$,
$\alpha_{y3} = P(E_1(y)) \cdot P(E_2(y-1))$, and $\alpha_{y4} = P(E_2(y)) \cdot P(E_1(y-1)) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^y$.
Substituting the probability expressions for $E_1(y), E_1(y-1), E_2(y)$ and $E_2(y-1)$, we get the results. ∎

Corollary 3

(1) $P(K[0] \in G_0) = 1 - (1 - p_{01})(1 - p_{02})$.

(2) For $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$, $P(K[y] \in G_y) = 1 - (1 - p_{y1})(1 - p_{y2})(1 - p_{y3})(1 - p_{y4})$.

Substituting values for y, we find that $P(K[0] \in G_0) \approx 0.37$ and For $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$, $P(K[y] \in G_y)$ varies between 0.12 and 0.15. Experimental results also confirm these theoretical estimates.

Theorems 2, 3 are the foundations of this paper. Next, we present additional theoretical results based on the above two theorems to build the framework of retrieving individual key bytes.

The RC4 key k of l bytes gets repeated to fill the N bytes of the key array K. The number of places in K where the same key byte $k[w]$ is repeated is given by

$$n_w = \begin{cases} \lfloor \frac{N}{l} \rfloor + 1 & \text{for } 0 \leq w < N \bmod l; \\ \lfloor \frac{N}{l} \rfloor & \text{for } N \bmod l \leq w < l. \end{cases}$$

Thus, when considering a key byte k_w, we are interested in the set

$$T_w = \cup_{y \in [0, N-1], y \bmod l = w} G_y,$$

which is a union of n_w many G_y's. Let us denote these G_y's by $G_{w_1}, G_{w_2}, \ldots, G_{w_{n_w}}$ and the corresponding p_{yx}'s by $p_{w_1 x}, p_{w_2 x}, \ldots, p_{w_{n_w} x}$. Also, for notational convenience in representing the formulas, we denote the size of G_y by M_y. According to Remark 1, $M_0 = 2$ and $M_y = 4$, $1 \leq y \leq N - 1$. In the results below, $E(X)$ denotes the expectation of a random variable X.

Theorem 4 For $0 \leq w \leq l - 1$, let $freq_w$ be the frequency (i.e., no. of occurrences) of $k[w]$ in the set T_w. Then for $0 \leq w \leq l - 1$, we have the following.

(1) $P(k[w] \in T_w) = 1 - \prod\limits_{t=1}^{n_w} \prod\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} (1 - p_{w_t x})$.

(2) $P(freq_w = c) =$

$$\sum_{\substack{\{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\} \\ \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\}}} \left(\prod_{r=1}^{c} \sum_{x=1}^{M_{w_{t_r}}} p_{w_{t_r} x} \prod_{x' \neq x} (1 - p_{w_{t_r} x'}) \right) \left(\prod_{\substack{r \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\} \setminus \\ \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\}}} \prod_{x=1}^{M_{w_r}} (1 - p_{w_r x}) \right).$$

(3) $E(freq_w) = \sum\limits_{t=1}^{n_w} \sum\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} p_{w_t x}$.

Proof: First, we prove item (1). We know that $k_w \notin T_w$ iff $k_w \notin G_{w_t}$ for all $t \in \{1, \ldots, n_w\}$. Again, $k_w \notin G_{w_t}$, iff for each $x \in \{1, \ldots, M_{w_t}\}$, $k_w \neq g_{w_t x}$, the probability of which is $(1 - p_{w_t x})$. Hence the result follows.

Next, we prove item (2). Item (2) is a generalization of item (1), since $P(k_w \in T_w) = 1 - P(freq_w = 0)$. For arbitrary c, $0 \leq c \leq n_w$, k_w occurs exactly c times in T_w, iff it occurs once in exactly c out of n_w many G_w's, say once in each of $G_{w_{t_1}}, G_{w_{t_2}}, \ldots, G_{w_{t_c}}$,

and it does not occur in any of the remaining $n_w - c$ many G_w's. We call such a division of the G_w's a *c-division*. Again, $k[w]$ occurs exactly once in G_{w_t} iff $k[w]$ equals exactly one of the M_{w_t} members of G_{w_t} and it does not equal any of the remaining $(M_{w_t} - 1)$ members of G_{w_t}. Thus, the probability that $k[w]$ occurs exactly once in G_{w_t} is given by

$\sum\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_{t_r}}} p_{w_{t_r}x} \prod\limits_{x' \neq x} (1 - p_{w_{t_r}x'})$. Also, for any $r \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\} \setminus \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\}$, $k[w]$ does not

occur in G_{w_r} with probability $\prod\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_r}} (1 - p_{w_r x})$. Adding the contributions of all $\binom{n_w}{c}$ many

c-division's, we get the result.

Finally, we come to item (3). For $1 \leq t \leq n_w$, $1 \leq x \leq M_{w_t}$ let $u_{t,x} = 1$, if $k[w] = g_{w_t x}$; otherwise, let $u_{t,x} = 0$. Thus, the number of occurrences of $k[w]$ in T_w is $freq_w = \sum\limits_{t=1}^{n_w} \sum\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} u_{t,x}$. Then $E(freq_w)$ is given by $\sum\limits_{t=1}^{n_w} \sum\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} E(u_{t,x})$, where $E(u_{t,x}) = P(u_{t,x} = 1) = p_{w_t x}$. ∎

Corollary 4 *For $0 \leq w \leq l - 1$, given a threshold TH, $P(freq_w > TH)$ can be estimated as $1 - \sum\limits_{c=0}^{TH} P(freq_w = c)$, where $P(freq_w = c)$'s are as given in Theorem 3, item 2.*

Theorem 5 *Let $q_{yx} = \frac{1 - p_{yx}}{N - 1}$, $0 \leq x \leq M_y$, $0 \leq y \leq N - 1$. Then for $0 \leq w \leq l - 1$, we have the following.*
(1) The expected number of distinct values $\in [0, N - 1]$ occurring in T_w is given by

$$E_{dist} = N - \prod\limits_{t=1}^{n_w} \prod\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} (1 - p_{w_t x}) - (N - 1) \prod\limits_{t=1}^{n_w} \prod\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} (1 - q_{w_t x}).$$

(2) The expected number of distinct values $\in [0, N - 1]$, each occurring exactly c times in T_w, is given by

$$E_c = \sum\limits_{\substack{\{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\} \\ \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\}}} \left(\prod\limits_{r=1}^{c} \sum\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_{t_r}}} p_{w_{t_r}x} \prod\limits_{x' \neq x} (1 - p_{w_{t_r}x'}) \right) \left(\prod\limits_{\substack{r \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\} \setminus \\ \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\}}} \prod\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_r}} (1 - p_{w_r x}) \right) +$$

$$(N - 1) \sum\limits_{\substack{\{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\} \\ \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\}}} \left(\prod\limits_{r=1}^{c} \sum\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_{t_r}}} q_{w_{t_r}x} \prod\limits_{x' \neq x} (1 - q_{w_{t_r}x'}) \right) \left(\prod\limits_{\substack{r \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n_w\} \setminus \\ \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_c\}}} \prod\limits_{x=1}^{M_{w_r}} (1 - q_{w_r x}) \right).$$

Proof: First, we prove item (1). For $0 \leq u \leq N - 1$, let $x_u = 1$, if u does not occur in T_w; otherwise, let $x_u = 0$. Hence, the number of values from $[0, N - 1]$ that do not occur at all in T_w is given by $X = \sum\limits_{u=0}^{N-1} x_u$. A value u does not occur in T_w iff it does not occur in

any G_{w_t}. For $u = k[w]$, according to item 1 of Theorem 4, $P(x_u = 1) = \prod_{t=1}^{n_w} \prod_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} (1 - p_{w_t x})$.

Assuming that each $g_{w_t x}$, $1 \leq x \leq M_{w_t}$, takes each value $u \in [0, N] \setminus \{k[w]\}$ with equal probabilities, we have $P(g_{w_t x} = u) = \frac{1 - p_{w_t x}}{N - 1} = q_{w_t x}$. So, for $u \in [0, N] \setminus \{k[w]\}$, $P(x_u = 1) = \prod_{t=1}^{n_w} \prod_{x=1}^{M_{w_t}} (1 - q_{w_t x})$. We compute $E(X) = \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} E(x_u) = E(x_{k[w]}) + \sum_{u \in [0,N] \setminus \{k[w]\}} E(x_u)$, where $E(x_u) = P(x_u = 1)$. The expected number of distinct values $\in [0, N-1]$ occurring in T_w is then given by $N - E(X)$.

Next, we come to item (2). Here, let $x'_u = 1$, if u occurs exactly c times in T_w; otherwise, let $x'_u = 0$. Hence, the number of values from $[0, N-1]$ that occurs exactly c times in T_w is given by $X' = \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} x'_u$. Now, u occurs exactly c times in T_w, iff it occurs once in exactly c out of n_w many G_w's and it does not occur in any of the remaining $n_w - c$ many G_w's. For $u = k[w]$, $P(x'_u = 1)$ is given by item (2) of Theorem 4. In the same expression, $p_{w_{t_r} x}$ would be replaced by $q_{w_{t_r} x}$, when $u \neq k[w]$. Since $E(x'_u) = P(x'_u = 1)$, and $E(X') = \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} E(x'_u)$, we get the result by adding the individual expectations. ∎

Corollary 5 *For $0 \leq w \leq l - 1$, given a threshold TH, the expected number of distinct values $\in [0, N-1]$, each occurring $> TH$ times in T_w, can be estimated as $N - \sum_{c=0}^{TH} E_c$, where E_c is the the expected number of distinct values $\in [0, N-1]$, each occurring exactly c times in T_w, as given in Theorem 5, item 3.*

We can use the above results to devise an algorithm *BuildKeyTable* for building a frequency table for each key byte and use the table to extract important information about the key.

BuildKeyTable(S_N)

Data Structures:

    Arrays $jarr1[N+1], jarr2[N+1], karr[l][N]$.

  1. $jarr1[0] = jarr2[0] = 0$;

  2. For $y = 0$ to $N - 1$ do

      $jarr1[y+1] = S[y]$ and $jarr2[y+1] = S_N^{-1}[y]$;

  3. For $w = 0$ to $l - 1$ and for $y = 0$ to $N - 1$ do

      $karr[w][y] = 0$;

  4 $karr\big[0\big]\big[jarr1[1]\big]$ += 1 and $karr\big[0\big]\big[jarr2[1]\big]$ += 1;

  5. For $y = 1$ to $N - 1$ do

      5.1 $karr\big[y \bmod l\big]\big[jarr1[y+1] - jarr1[y] - y\big]$ += 1;

      5.2 $karr\big[y \bmod l\big]\big[jarr1[y+1] - jarr2[y] - y\big]$ += 1;

      5.3 $karr\big[y \bmod l\big]\big[jarr2[y+1] - jarr1[y] - y\big]$ += 1;

      5.4 $karr\big[y \bmod l\big]\big[jarr2[y+1] - jarr2[y] - y\big]$ += 1;

The arrays $jarr1$ and $jarr2$ contain the values of j_y's as estimated from S_N and S_N^{-1} respectively. For each key byte $k[w]$, $0 \le w \le l-1$, the frequency of a value $y \in [0, N-1]$ is stored in $karr[w][y]$. The notation '$x += 1$' is used to denote that x is incremented by 1.

When guessing a specific key byte $k[w]$, one would generally consider all values $\in [0, N-1]$ that have occurred at least once. However, one may try other alternatives such as considering only those values $\in [0, N-1]$ that have frequency above a certain threshold c.

2.2.1 Experimental Evidences

To compare how close the theoretical estimates are to the experimental ones, we present some results here. All the experiments are carried out with 1 million randomly chosen keys and the results presented are average of each run.

First we present experimental results corresponding to Theorems 4, 5 in Table 3. For all key lengths, the estimates are given for $k[3]$ (i.e. for $w = 3$ and $c = 2$) only as a representative. However, we have verified the results for all key bytes $k[w]$, $0 \le w \le l-1$, for each key length $l = 5, 8, 10, 12$ and 16, and for different values of c.

	l	5	8	10	12	16
$P(k[w] \in T_w)$	Theory	0.9991	0.9881	0.9729	0.9532	0.8909
	Exp.	0.9994	0.9902	0.9764	0.9578	0.8970
$P(freq_w = c)$	Theory	0.0225	0.1210	0.1814	0.2243	0.2682
	Exp.	0.0186	0.1204	0.1873	0.2353	0.2872
$E(freq_w)$	Theory	6.8	4.3	3.5	3.0	2.1
	Exp.	6.8	4.3	3.5	2.9	2.1
E_{dist}	Theory	138.5	99.2	84.2	73.4	55.9
	Exp.	138.2	98.9	84.0	73.2	55.8
E_c	Theory	34.7	18.1	13.1	10.0	5.8
	Exp.	35.2	18.6	13.6	10.4	6.2

Table 3: Theoretical vs. empirical estimates with $w = 3$ and $c = 2$ for Theorems 4, 5.

In few cases, the theoretical and the empirical values are not close. These cases arise because the idealistic assumption of independence of events does not always hold in practice. However, we find that in general the theoretical formula fits the empirical data to a very good approximation.

Next we present some experiments related to the *BuildKeyTable* algorithm. We show that each individual key byte can be recovered with a very high probability. Table 4 shows data for the first two bytes of secret keys with key lengths 5, 8, 10, 12 and 16. The results are obtained by considering 1 million randomly chosen secret keys of different key lengths. In Table 4, 'Succ.' denotes the success probability and 'Search' denotes the number of

values $\in [0, N-1]$ that have frequency above the threshold c. Theoretical estimates of these values are given in Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 respectively.

l	Key byte	Threshold c = 0		Threshold c = 1		Threshold c = 2	
		Succ.	Search	Succ.	Search	Succ.	Search
5	k[0]	0.9997	138.9	0.9967	47.9	0.9836	12.4
	k[1]	0.9995	138.2	0.9950	47.4	0.9763	12.2
8	k[0]	0.9927	97.6	0.9526	22.2	0.8477	4.1
	k[1]	0.9902	98.9	0.9400	22.9	0.8190	4.2
10	k[0]	0.9827	82.5	0.9041	15.7	0.7364	2.6
	k[1]	0.9761	84.0	0.8797	16.3	0.6927	2.7
12	k[0]	0.9686	71.6	0.8482	11.8	0.6315	1.8
	k[1]	0.9577	73.2	0.8118	12.3	0.5763	1.8
16	k[0]	0.9241	54.1	0.7072	6.7	0.4232	0.9
	k[1]	0.8969	55.8	0.6451	7.1	0.3586	0.9

Table 4: Experimental results for first two key bytes using different thresholds.

As an example, each secret key byte for $l = 5$ can be guessed with a probability > 0.97 amongst only around 12 values each of which has frequency at least 3; whereas, for random guess, one need to consider at least 248 ($\approx 256 \times 0.97$) values to achieve the same probability.

For any key length, the success probability and search complexity of other bytes from $k[2]$ onwards are almost same as those of $k[1]$. So the data for $k[1]$ is a representative of the other key bytes. Observe that the success probability for $K[0]$ is always little more than that for the other key bytes. This happens because $K[0]$ is estimated as $j_1 - j_0 - 0$, where $j_0 = 0$ with probability 1. This is also consistent with item (1) of Theorem 3.

For the same threshold c, the probability as well as the search complexity for each key byte decreases as the key length l increases. This happens because the number of repetitions corresponding to each key byte decreases with the increase in l.

This is an independent novel work for separately retrieving the individual secret key bytes from S_N as opposed to the earlier works of solving simultaneous equations. This reveals a new kind of weakness in the key scheduling of RC4. How this result can be combined with the earlier techniques to improve upon them for complete key recovery is not our immediate goal. However, we present some simple strategies in the next section to demonstrate possible applications of our results towards the complete key recovery. In certain cases, our results are currently the best known. We believe that our results, plugged with the existing strategies [17, 2, 1], would provide much more sharper results in this direction.

3 Recovering the Secret Key from the Permutation

In this section, we discuss how to get back the secret key, if we know the permutation at any stage of the KSA. Moreover, if we know the RC4 state information at any round of PRGA, we can deterministically get back the permutation after the KSA and thereby recover the secret key. By state information, we mean (a) the entire permutation S, (b) the number of keystream output bytes generated (which is related to the index i) and (c) the value of the index j.

Consider that τ many keystream output bytes are generated in the PRGA and the current permutation is S_C. Further we take the current value of j as j_C. These values constitute the state information of RC4. Note that we only need to get the value of τ, and not the keystream output bytes themselves. From τ, we can get the current value of i which we denote as i_C. In the first round of PRGA, i starts from 1, and thereafter i is updated by $(i+1) \bmod N$ in every step. Hence $i_C = \tau \bmod N$. Assuming j_C to be known, Algorithm PRGAreverse stated below retrieves the permutation after the KSA from the permutation after τ many rounds of the PRGA. Note that all subtractions except $r = r-1$ in Algorithm PRGAreverse are modulo N operations.

Algorithm PRGA	**Algorithm PRGAreverse**
Initialization:	*Initialization*:
$\quad i = 0;$	$\quad i = i_C; j = j_C; S = S_C;$
$\quad j = 0;$	$\quad r = \tau;$
Output Keystream Generation Loop:	*Do*
$\quad i = i + 1;$	$\quad \text{Swap}(S[i], S[j]);$
$\quad j = j + S[i];$	$\quad j = j - S[i];$
$\quad \text{Swap}(S[i], S[j]);$	$\quad i = i - 1;$
$\quad t = S[i] + S[j];$	$\quad r = r - 1;$
$\quad \text{Output } z = S[t];$	*While* $r > 0;$

The technique for recovering secret key from the permutation after the KSA or at any stage during the KSA is the main theme of this section.

3.1 Overview

We have first introduced the idea of recovering the complete key from S_N in [17]. Subsequent to our work of [17], Biham and Carmeli [2] refined the idea of [17] and also pointed out some minor errors in the tables related to complexity calculations. In Section 3.3.1 of this paper, we revise the complexity analysis of *RecoverKey* algorithm and related experimental results of our earlier version presented in [17, Section 3]. In particular, refer to Table 5 in Section 3.3.1 of this paper for a corrected and revised version of [17, Table 3]. The idea of [2] is presented in Section 3.5 and where the work of [2] stands in relation to our Section 3.3.1 in this paper is discussed in Section 3.5.1. The work of [1] is briefly explained in Section 3.6 and its relation to our work is discussed in Section 3.6.1. Note that the works of Sections 2.2, 3.4 of this paper and the work of [1] are performed independently at the same time.

3.2   Issues Related to Time Complexity Estimates

Given the permutation S_r after the r-th round of the KSA, whatever may be the underlying algorithm for guessing the key, after each guess an additional complexity of around r is required to run the KSA for the first r rounds and compare the permutation obtained with S_r to verify correctness of the key. If we start with the permutation S_N after the KSA, then (with the typical $N = 256$) this would require an additional complexity of 2^8 for verifying each key. Thus, the search space for exhaustive search of an l byte secret key is 2^{8l}, but the actual complexity including the verification time is around 2^{8l+8}. In the complexity analysis we do not include the key verification time, but only consider the number of keys to be searched. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the additional complexity overhead of 2^8 per key verification is constant for any algorithm. So all the algorithms can be compared under a common model, if only the key search complexity is considered, excluding the key verification time. Secondly, when a wrong key is verified, in practice one may not need to run N complete rounds of the KSA. If the initial bytes of the permutation after a few (such as 32) rounds of the KSA do not match at any position with the corresponding permutation bytes in hand, then one may discard the current guess and try with the next one. Since almost all the keys in the search space is wrong, on average key verification can be assumed to take a constant amount of time.

Remark 2 *Some of the works [2, 1], with which we compare our strategy, use time estimates instead of exact complexity. We have checked that on a 2.8 GHz CPU, verifying 2^{20} many secret keys can be completed in a second by a simple C code. Thus, the values of our time complexities can be divided by 2^{20} to get the estimate in seconds.*

3.3   Complete Key Recovery by Solving Simultaneous Equations

We explain the scenario with an example first. In all the examples in this section, we consider, without loss of generality, only the final permutation after the KSA, i.e., we consider the case $r = N$ only.

Example 1 *Consider a 5 byte secret key with $K[0] = 106, K[1] = 59, K[2] = 220, K[3] = 65$, and $K[4] = 34$. We denote $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$. If one runs the KSA, then the first 16 bytes of the final permutation will be as follows.*

y	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
f_y	106	166	132	200	238	93	158	129	202	245	105	175	151	229	21	142
$S_{256}[i]$	230	166	87	48	238	93	68	239	202	83	105	147	151	229	35	142

The strategy of key recovery would be to consider all possible sets of 5 equations chosen from the 16 equations $S_N[y] = f_y$, $0 \leq y \leq 15$, and then try to solve them. Whether the solution is correct or not can be checked by running the KSA and comparing the permutation obtained with the permutation in hand. Some of the choices may not be solvable at all.

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The case of correct solution for this example correspond to the choices $y = 1, 4, 5, 8$ and 12, and the corresponding equations are:

$$K[0] + K[1] + (1 \cdot 2)/2 = 166 \tag{1}$$
$$K[0] + K[1] + K[2] + K[3] + K[4] + (4 \cdot 5)/2 = 238 \tag{2}$$
$$K[0] + \ldots + K[5] + (5 \cdot 6)/2 = 93 \tag{3}$$
$$K[0] + \ldots + K[8] + (8 \cdot 9)/2 = 202 \tag{4}$$
$$K[0] + \ldots + K[12] + (12 \cdot 13)/2 = 151 \tag{5}$$

In general, the correctness of the solution depends on the correctness of the selected equations. The probability that we will indeed get correct solutions is related to the joint probability of $S_r[y] = f_y$ for the set of chosen y-values. Note that we do not need the assumption that the majority of the equations are correct. Whether indeed the equations selected are correct or not can be cross-checked by running the KSA again. Moreover, empirical results show that in a significant proportion of the cases we get enough correct equations to solve for the key.

For a 5 byte key, if we go for an exhaustive search for the key, then the complexity would be 2^{40}. Whereas in our approach, we need to consider at the most $\binom{16}{5} = 4368 < 2^{13}$ sets of 5 equations. Since the equations are triangular in form, solving each set of 5 equations would take approximately $5^2 = 25$ (times a small constant) $< 2^5$ many additions/subtractions. Hence the improvement over exhaustive search is almost by a factor of $\frac{2^{40}}{2^{13} \cdot 2^5} = 2^{22}$.

From Corollary 1, we get how $S_r[y]$ is biased to different combinations of the keys, namely, with $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$. Let us denote $P(S_r[y] = f_y) = p_{r,y}$ for $0 \le y \le r - 1$, $1 \le r \le N$. We initiate the discussion for RC4 with secret key of size l bytes. Suppose we want to recover exactly m out of the l secret key bytes by solving equations and the other $l - m$ bytes by exhaustive key search. For this, we consider n ($m \le n \le r$) many equations $S_r[y] = f_y$, $y = 0, 1, \ldots, n - 1$, in l variables (the key bytes). Let EI_t denote the set of all independent systems of t equations, or, equivalently, the collection of the indices $\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\} \subseteq \{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\}$, corresponding to all sets of t independent equations (selected from the above system of n equations).

If we want to recover m key bytes by solving m equations out of the first n equations of the form $S_r[y] = f_y$, in general, we need to check whether each of the $\binom{n}{m}$ systems of m equations is independent or not. In the next Theorem, we present the criteria for checking the independence of such a set of equations and also the total number of such sets.

Theorem 6 *Let $l \ge 2$ be the RC4 key length in bytes. Suppose we want to select systems of m independent equations, $2 \le m \le l$, from the following n equations of the form $S_r[y] = f_y$ involving the permutation bytes after round r of the KSA, $m \le n \le r \le N$, where $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$, $0 \le y \le n - 1$.*

1. The system $S_r[y_q] = f_{y_q}$, $1 \leq q \leq m$, of m equations selected from $S_r[y] = f_y$, $0 \leq y \leq n-1$, corresponding to $y = y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m$, is independent if and only if any one of the following two conditions hold: either (i) $y_q \bmod l$, $1 \leq q \leq m$, yields m distinct values, or (ii) $y_q \bmod l \neq (l-1)$, $1 \leq q \leq m$, and there is exactly one pair $y_a, y_b \in \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m\}$ such that $y_a = y_b \pmod{l}$, and all other $y_q \bmod l, q \neq a, q \neq b$ yields $m-2$ distinct values different from $y_a, y_b \pmod{l}$.

2. The total number of independent systems of m (≥ 2) equations is given by

$$|EI_m| = \sum_{x=0}^{m} \binom{n \bmod l}{x} \binom{l-n \bmod l}{m-x} (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1)^x (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)^{m-x}$$

$$+ \binom{n \bmod l}{1} \binom{\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{m-2} \binom{n \bmod l - 1}{x} \binom{l-n \bmod l - 1}{m-2-x} (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1)^x (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)^{m-2-x}$$

$$+ \binom{l-n \bmod l - 1}{1} \binom{\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{m-2} \binom{n \bmod l}{x} \binom{l-n \bmod l - 2}{m-2-x} (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1)^x (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)^{m-2-x},$$

where the binomial coefficient $\binom{u}{v}$ has the value 0, if $u < v$.

Proof: (*Part 1*) First, we will show that any one of the conditions (i) and (ii) is sufficient. Suppose that the condition (i) holds, i.e., $y_q \bmod l$ ($1 \leq q \leq m$) yields m distinct values. Then each equation involves a different key byte as a variable, and hence the system is independent. Now, suppose that the condition (ii) holds. Then there exists exactly one pair $a, b \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$, $a \neq b$, where $y_a = y_b \bmod l$. Without loss of generality, suppose $y_a < y_b$. Then we can subtract $S_r[y_a] = f_{y_a}$ from $S_r[y_b] = f_{y_b}$ to get one equation involving some multiple of the sum $s = \sum_{x=0}^{l-1} K[x]$ of the key bytes. So we can replace exactly one equation involving either y_a or y_b by the new equation involving s, which will become a different equation with a new variable $K[l-1]$, since $l-1 \notin \{y_1 \bmod l, y_2 \bmod l, \ldots, y_m \bmod l\}$. Thus, the resulting system is independent.

Next, we are going to show that the conditions are necessary. Suppose that neither condition (i) nor condition (ii) holds. Then either we will have a triplet a, b, c such that $y_a = y_b = y_c = \bmod l$, or we will have a pair a, b with $y_a = y_b \bmod l$ and $l-1 \in \{y_1 \bmod l, y_2 \bmod l, \ldots, y_m \bmod l\}$. In the first case, subtracting two of the equations from the third one would result in two equations involving s and the same key bytes as variables. Thus the resulting system will not be independent. In the second case, subtracting one equation from the other will result in an equation which is dependent on the equation involving the key byte $K[l-1]$.

(*Part 2*) We know that $n = (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor) l + (n \bmod l)$. If we compute $y \bmod l$, for $y = 0, 1, \ldots n-1$, then we will have the following residue classes:

$$\begin{aligned}
[0] &= \{0, l, 2l, \ldots, (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)l\} \\
[1] &= \{1, l+1, 2l+1, \ldots, (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)l+1\} \\
\vdots \quad &\quad \vdots \quad \vdots \\
[n \bmod l - 1] &= \{n \bmod l - 1, l + (n \bmod l - 1), 2l + (n \bmod l - 1), \ldots, \\
&\quad (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)l + (n \bmod l - 1)\} \\
[n \bmod l] &= \{n \bmod l, l + (n \bmod l), 2l + (n \bmod l), \ldots, (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor - 1)l \\
&\quad + (n \bmod l)\} \\
\vdots \quad &\quad \vdots \quad \vdots \\
[l-1] &= \{l-1, l+(l-1), 2l+(l-1), \ldots, (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor - 1)l + (l-1)\}
\end{aligned}$$

The set of these l many residue classes can be classified into two mutually exclusive subsets, namely $A = \{[0], \ldots, [n \bmod l - 1]\}$ and $B = \{[n \bmod l], \ldots, [l-1]\}$, such that each residue class $\in A$ has $\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1$ members and each residue class $\in B$ has $\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor$ members. Note that $|A| = n \bmod l$ and $|B| = l - (n \bmod l)$.

Now, the independent systems of m equations can be selected in three mutually exclusive and exhaustive ways. Case I corresponds to the condition (i) and Cases II & III correspond to the condition (ii) stated in the theorem.

<u>Case I</u>: *Select m different residue classes from $A \cup B$ and choose one y-value (the equation number) from each of these m residue classes.* Now, x of the m residue classes can be selected from the set A in $\binom{n \bmod l}{x}$ ways and the remaining $m - x$ can be selected from the set B in $\binom{l - n \bmod l}{m-x}$ ways. Again, corresponding to each such choice, the first x residue classes would give $\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1$ choices for y (the equation number) and each of the remaining $m - x$ residue classes would give $\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor$ choices for y. Thus, the total number of independent equations in this case is given by $\sum_{x=0}^{m} \binom{n \bmod l}{x} \binom{l - n \bmod l}{m-x} (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1)^x (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)^{m-x}$.

<u>Case II</u>: *Select two y-values from any residue class in A. Then select $m - 2$ other residue classes except $[l-1]$ and select one y-value from each of those $m - 2$ residue classes.* We can pick one residue class $a \in A$ in $\binom{n \bmod l}{1}$ ways and subsequently two y-values from a in $\binom{\lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1}{2}$ ways. Of the remaining $m - 2$ residue classes, x can be selected from $A \setminus \{a\}$ in $\binom{n \bmod l - 1}{x}$ ways and the remaining $m - 2 - x$ can be selected from $B \setminus \{[l-1]\}$ in $\binom{l - n \bmod l - 1}{m-2-x}$ ways. Again, corresponding to each such choice, the first x residue classes would give $\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1$ choices for y (the equation number) and each of the remaining $m - 2 - x$ residue classes would give $\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor$ choices for y. Thus, the total number of independent equations in this case is given by $\binom{n \bmod l}{1} \binom{\lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{m-2} \binom{n \bmod l - 1}{x} \binom{l - n \bmod l - 1}{m-2-x} (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1)^x (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)^{m-2-x}$.

<u>Case III</u>: *Select two y-values from any residue class in $B \setminus \{[l-1]\}$. Then select $m - 2$ other residue classes and select one y-value from each of those $m - 2$ residue classes.* This case is similar to case II, and the total number of independent equations in this case is given by $\binom{l - n \bmod l - 1}{1} \binom{\lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{m-2} \binom{n \bmod l}{x} \binom{l - n \bmod l - 2}{m-2-x} (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor + 1)^x (\lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor)^{m-2-x}$.

Adding the counts for the above three cases, we get the result. ∎

Proposition 1 *Given n and m, it takes $O(m^2 \cdot \binom{n}{m})$ time to generate the set EI_m using Theorem 6.*

Proof: We need to check a total of $\binom{n}{m}$ many m tuples $\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m\}$, and using the independence criteria of Theorem 6, it takes $O(m^2)$ amount of time to determine if each tuple belongs to EI_m or not. ∎

Proposition 2 *Suppose we have an independent system of equations of the form $S_r[y_q] = f_{y_q}$ involving the l key bytes as variables corresponding to the tuple $\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m\}$, $0 \leq y_q \leq n - 1$, $1 \leq q \leq m$, where $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$. If there is one equation in the system involving $s = \sum_{x=0}^{l-1} K[x]$, then we would have at most $\lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor$ many solutions for the key.*

Proof: If the coefficient of s is a, then by Linear Congruence Theorem [21], we would have at most $gcd(a, N)$ many solutions for s, each of which would give a different solution for the key. To find the maximum possible number of solutions, we need to find an upper bound of $gcd(a, N)$.

Since the key is of length l, the coefficient a of s would be $\lfloor \frac{y_s}{l} \rfloor$, where y_s is the y-value $\in \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m\}$ corresponding to the equation involving s. Thus, $gcd(a, N) \leq a = \lfloor \frac{y_s}{l} \rfloor \leq \lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor$. ∎

Let us consider an example to demonstrate the case when we have two y-values (equation numbers) from the same residue class in the selected system of m equations, but still the system is independent and hence solvable.

Example 2 *Assume that the secret key is of length 5 bytes. Let us consider 16 equations of the form $S_N[y] = f_y$, $0 \leq y \leq 15$. We would consider all possible sets of 5 equations chosen from the above 16 equations and then try to solve them. One such set would correspond to $y = 0, 1, 2, 3$ and 13. Let the corresponding $S_N[y]$ values be 246, 250, 47, 204 and 185 respectively. Then we can form the following equations:*

$$K[0] = 246 \tag{6}$$
$$K[0] + K[1] + (1 \cdot 2)/2 = 250 \tag{7}$$
$$K[0] + K[1] + K[2] + (2 \cdot 3)/2 = 47 \tag{8}$$
$$K[0] + K[1] + K[2] + K[3] + (3 \cdot 4)/2 = 204 \tag{9}$$
$$K[0] + \ldots + K[13] + (13 \cdot 14)/2 = 185 \tag{10}$$

From the first four equations, we readily get $K[0] = 246, K[1] = 3, K[2] = 51$ and $K[3] = 154$. Since the key is 5 bytes long, $K[5] = K[0], \ldots, K[9] = K[4], K[10] = K[0], \ldots, K[13] = K[3]$. Denoting the sum of the key bytes $K[0] + \ldots + K[4]$ by s, we can rewrite equation (10) as:

$$2s + K[0] + K[1] + K[2] + K[3] + 91 = 185 \tag{11}$$

Subtracting (9) from (11), and solving for s, we get $s = 76$ or 204. Taking the value 76, we get

$$K[0] + K[1] + K[2] + K[3] + K[4] = 76 \qquad (12)$$

Subtracting (9) from (12), we get $K[4] = 134$. $s = 204$ does not give the correct key, as can be verified by running the KSA and observing the permutation obtained.

3.3.1 Algorithm and Complexity Analysis

We now present the general algorithm for recovering the secret key bytes from the permutation at any stage of the KSA.

Algorithm RecoverKey
Inputs:
1. Number of key bytes: l.
2. Number of key bytes to be solved from equations: m $(\leq l)$.
3. Number of equations to be tried: n $(\geq m)$.
4. The permutation bytes: $S_r[y]$, $0 \leq y \leq r - 1$ and the stage r, $n \leq r \leq N$.
Output:
The recovered key bytes $K[0], K[1], \ldots, K[l-1]$, if they are found. Otherwise, the algorithm halts after trying all the $|EI_m|$ systems of m independent equations.
Steps:
1. For each distinct tuple $\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m\}$, $0 \leq y_q \leq n - 1$, $1 \leq q \leq m$ do
1.1. If the tuple belongs to EI_m then do
1.1.1 Arbitrarily select any m variables present in the system;
1.1.2 Solve for the m variables in terms of the remaining $l - m$ variables;
1.1.3 For each possible assignment of the $l - m$ variables do
1.1.3.1 Find values of the other m key bytes;
1.1.3.2 If the correct key is found, return it.

If one does not use the independence criteria (Theorem 6), all $\binom{n}{m}$ sets of equations need to be checked. However, the number of independent systems is $|EI_m|$, which is much smaller than $\binom{n}{m}$. Table 5 shows that $|EI_m| < \frac{1}{2}\binom{n}{m}$ for most values of l, n, and m. Thus, the independence criteria in Step 1.1 reduces the number of iterations in Step 1.1.2 by a substantial factor.

The following Theorem quantifies the amount of time required to recover the key due to our algorithm.

Theorem 7 *The time complexity of the RecoverKey algorithm is given by*

$$O\left(m^2 \cdot \binom{n}{m} + |EI_m| \cdot \left(m^2 + \lfloor \tfrac{n}{l} \rfloor \cdot 2^{8(l-m)}\right)\right),$$

where $|EI_m|$ is given by Theorem 6.

Proof: According to Proposition 1, for a complete run of the algorithm, checking the condition at Step 1.1 consumes a total of $O(m^2 \cdot \binom{n}{m})$ amount of time.

Further, the Steps 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 are executed $|EI_m|$ times. Among them, finding the solution in Step 1.1.2 involves $O(m^2)$ many addition/subtraction operations (the equations being triangular in form). By Proposition 2, each system can yield at the most $O(\lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor)$ many solutions for the key. After the solution is found, Step 1.1.3 involves $2^{8(l-m)}$ many trials. Thus, the total time consumed by Steps 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 for a complete run would be $O\Big(|EI_m| \cdot \big(m^2 + \lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor \cdot 2^{8(l-m)}\big)\Big)$.

Hence, the time complexity is given by $O\Big(m^2 \cdot \binom{n}{m} + |EI_m| \cdot \big(m^2 + \lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor \cdot 2^{8(l-m)}\big)\Big)$. ∎

Next, we estimate what is the probability of getting a set of independent correct equations when we run the above algorithm.

Proposition 3 *Suppose that we are given the system of equations $S_r[y] = f_y$, $y = 0, 1, \ldots, n-1$, $m \leq n \leq r \leq N$. Let $c_{r,n}$ be the number of independent correct equations. Then*

$$P(c_{r,n} \geq m) = \sum_{t=m}^{n} \sum_{\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\} \in EI_t} p_r(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t),$$

where EI_t is the collection of the indices $\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\}$ corresponding to all sets of t independent equations, and $p_r(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t)$ is the joint probability that the t equations corresponding to the indices $\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\}$ are correct and the other $n - t$ equations corresponding to the indices $\{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} \setminus \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\}$ are incorrect.

Proof: We need to sum $|EI_t|$ number of terms of the form $p_r(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t)$ to get the probability that exactly t equations are correct, i.e.,

$$P(c_{r,n} = t) = \sum_{\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\} \in EI_t} p_r(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t).$$

Hence, $P(c_{r,n} \geq m) = \sum_{t=m}^{n} P(c_{r,n} = t) = \sum_{t=m}^{n} \sum_{\{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t\} \in EI_t} p_r(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t).$ ∎

Note that $P(c_{r,n} \geq m)$ gives the success probability with which one can recover the secret key from the permutation after the r-th round of the KSA.

In Theorem 1, we observed that as the number r of rounds increase, the probabilities $P(S_r[y] = f_y)$ decrease. Finally, after the KSA, when $r = N$, (see Corollary 2) the probabilities settle to the values as given in Table 2. However, as the events $(S_r[y] = f_y)$ are not independent for different y's, theoretically presenting the formulae for the joint probability $p_r(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_t)$ seems to be extremely tedious.

In Table 5, we provide experimental results on the probability of having at least m independent correct equations, when the first n equations $S_N[y] = f_y, 0 \leq y \leq n-1$, after the complete KSA (i.e., $r = N$), are considered for the *RecoverKey* algorithm for different values of n, m, and the key length l, satisfying $m \leq l \leq n$. Table 5 is a corrected and revised version of [17, Table 3].

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l	n	m	$\binom{n}{m}$	$|EI_m|$	$8l$	e	$P(c_{N,n} \geq m)$
5	48	5	40	1712304	238500	25.6	0.431
5	24	5	42504	7500	40	20.3	0.385
5	16	5	4368	810	40	17.0	0.250
8	22	6	74613	29646	64	31.9	0.414
8	16	6	8008	3472	64	28.8	0.273
8	20	7	77520	13068	64	23.4	0.158
10	16	7	11440	5840	80	36.5	0.166
10	24	8	735471	130248	80	34.0	0.162
12	24	8	735471	274560	96	51.1	0.241
12	24	9	1307504	281600	96	43.1	0.116
12	21	10	352716	49920	96	31.6	0.026
16	24	9	1307504	721800	128	75.5	0.185
16	32	10	64512240	19731712	128	73.2	0.160
16	32	11	129024480	24321024	128	65.5	0.086
16	40	12	5586853480	367105284	128	61.5	0.050
16	27	12	17383860	2478464	128	53.2	0.022
16	26	12	9657700	1422080	128	52.4	0.019
16	44	14	114955808528	847648395	128	46.9	0.006
16	24	14	1961256	69120	128	32.2	0.0006

Table 5: Running the *RecoverKey* algorithm using different parameters for the final permutation after the complete KSA (with $N = 256$ rounds).

For each probability calculation, the complete KSA (with $N = 256$ rounds) is repeated a million times, each time with a randomly chosen key. We also compare the values of the exhaustive search complexity and the reduction due to our algorithm. Let $e = \log_2\left(m^2 \cdot \binom{n}{m} + |EI_m| \cdot \left(m^2 + \lfloor \frac{n}{l} \rfloor \cdot 2^{8(l-m)}\right)\right)$. The time complexity of exhaustive search is $O(2^{8l})$ and that of the *RecoverKey* algorithm, according to Theorem 7, is given by $O(2^e)$. Thus, the reduction in search complexity due to our algorithm is by a factor $O(2^{8l-e})$. *One may note from Table 5 that by suitably choosing the parameters, one can achieve the search complexity $O(2^{\frac{8l}{2}}) = O(2^{4l})$, which is the square root of the exhaustive key search complexity.*

The results in Table 5 clearly show that the probabilities (i.e., the empirical values of $P(c_{N,n} \geq m)$) in most of the cases are greater than 10%. However, the algorithm does not use the probabilities to recover the key. For certain keys the algorithm will be able to recover the keys and for certain other keys the algorithm will not be able to recover the keys by solving the equations. The success probability can be interpreted as the proportion of keys for which the algorithm will be able to successfully recover the key. The keys, that can be recovered from the permutation after the KSA using the *RecoverKey* algorithm,

may be considered as weak keys in RC4.

3.4   Complete Key Recovery from Frequency Table

In this section, we discuss how the complete key can be recovered using our technique described in Section 2.2. We first like to refer to the *BuildKeyTable* algorithm from Section 2.2. Corresponding to this algorithm, we have already explained the probabilities of getting an individual key byte from a selected set of values. Now we estimate the probability and time complexity when all the key bytes are identified at the same time. By *Method* 1, we refer to this simple strategy of guessing the complete key using different thresholds on the basic table obtained from *BuildKeyTable* algorithm.

Towards improving *Method* 1, we present *Method* 1A below. *Method* 1A updates the basic frequency table obtained from the *BuildKeyTable* algorithm by considering the values obtained from the $S[S[y]]$ type of biases [9]. In [9, Section 2], it was shown that biases towards $f_y = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[y]$ exist at the permutation bytes $S_N[y]$, $S_N[S_N[y]]$, $S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]$, $S_N[S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]]$, and so on. So, given the values of $K[0], K[1], \ldots, K[y-1]$, the value of $K[y]$ may be computed from the equations $S_N^d[y] = f_y$, where d is the level of indirections considered. Here, for frequency updates of $k[0]$, the first four levels of indirections (i.e., $d = 1, 2, 3$ and 4) are used and for frequency updates of other four key bytes, only the first two levels of indirections are used. For frequency updates of $k[1]$, only the values of $k[0]$ with frequency > 2 are considered. Similarly, for $k[2]$, the threshold frequencies of $k[0]$ and $k[1]$ are taken as 3 and 4 respectively. For $k[3]$, the threshold frequencies of $k[0], k[1]$ and $k[2]$ are 4 and 5 and 6 respectively. And finally, for $k[4]$, the threshold frequencies of $k[0], k[1], k[2]$ and $k[3]$ are 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. While updating the table for the key byte $k[w]$, we increase the thresholds for $k[0], \ldots, k[w-1]$, as w increases. This is due to the reason that we want to selectively consider those cases which are highly probable. Low thresholds for $k[0], \ldots, k[w-1]$ substantially increase the number of choices for $k[w]$ without significantly increasing the probability for correct $k[w]$. The thresholds we have presented here are tuned empirically. In *Method* 1A, we apply the thresholds after updating the frequency table as discussed above.

3.4.1   Experimental Results for 5 Byte Keys

In Table 6, we present the complete data related to all the bytes for 5 bytes secret key using both *Method* 1 and *Method* 1A. 'Succ.' denotes the success probability and 'comp.' denotes the search complexity. The complexity of retrieving the entire key is computed by multiplying the average number of values that need to be searched for individual key bytes. We see that without using any heuristic, just applying our simple *Method* 1 on the basic table obtained from *BuildKeyTable* algorithm helps to achieve 89.46% success rate in a complexity $12.4 \times (12.2)^4 \approx 2^{18.1}$.

Next, we try enhancements of the basic technique for 5 byte key to achieve better results. For each key byte, we first try the value with the maximum frequency, then the

		Threshold c = 0		Threshold c = 1		Threshold c = 2	
Key byte	Method	Succ.	Comp.	Succ.	Comp.	Succ.	Comp.
$k[0]$	1	0.9997	138.9	0.9967	47.9	0.9836	12.4
	1A	0.9998	140.2	0.9980	49.2	0.9900	13.0
$k[1]$	1	0.9995	138.2	0.9950	47.4	0.9763	12.2
	1A	0.9997	149.2	0.9971	56.6	0.9857	16.1
$k[2]$	1	0.9995	138.2	0.9949	47.4	0.9764	12.2
	1A	0.9996	142.2	0.9965	50.7	0.9834	13.6
$k[3]$	1	0.9995	138.2	0.9950	47.4	0.9761	12.2
	1A	0.9996	138.7	0.9958	47.8	0.9796	12.4
$k[4]$	1	0.9995	138.2	0.9950	47.4	0.9766	12.2
	1A	0.9996	138.7	0.9958	47.8	0.9796	12.4
Entire Key	1	0.9976	$2^{35.6}$	0.9768	$2^{27.8}$	0.8946	$2^{18.1}$
	1A	0.9983	$2^{35.7}$	0.9830	$2^{28.3}$	0.9203	$2^{18.7}$

Table 6: Experimental results for all key bytes using different thresholds for $l = 5$.

second maximum and so on. The search is done in an *iterative deepening* manner so that if d_w is the depth (starting from the most frequent guess) of the correct value for $k[w]$, then the search never go beyond depth $d_{max} = max\{d_w, 0 \leq w \leq 4\}$ for any key byte. The complexity is calculated by finding the average of d_{max}^5 over 1 million trials, each with a different key. We also set a *depth limit* G, which denotes at most how many different values is to be tried for each key in descending order of their frequencies, starting from the most frequent value. We denote this strategy as *Method* 2. If we update the frequency table as in *Method* 1A before performing the search in descending order of frequencies, then we name it as *Method* 2A.

The experimental results for the above two enhancements are presented in Table 7. As before, 'succ.' denotes the success probability and 'comp.' denotes the time complexity.

Method	G	10	16	32	48	64	80	96	160
2	Succ.	0.8434	0.9008	0.9383	0.9719	0.9800	0.9841	0.9870	0.9980
	Comp.	$2^{14.3}$	$2^{17.0}$	$2^{21.3}$	$2^{23.5}$	$2^{24.8}$	$2^{26.0}$	$2^{27.1}$	$2^{29.0}$
2A	Succ.	0.8678	0.9196	0.9503	0.9772	0.9855	0.9876	0.9906	0.9985
	Comp.	$2^{14.0}$	$2^{16.7}$	$2^{20.9}$	$2^{23.1}$	$2^{24.5}$	$2^{25.7}$	$2^{26.6}$	$2^{28.7}$

Table 7: Experimental results for $l = 5$ using the most frequent guesses of the key bytes.

Note that for 5 byte key, [2] reports a success probability of 0.8640 in 0.02 seconds and [1] reports a success probability of 0.998 in 0.008 seconds. Whereas, we achieve a success probability of 0.9985 in complexity $2^{28.7}$. So far, this is the best known success probability for 5 byte key.

Our further results related to $l = 8, 10, 12, 16$ are discussed later in Table 8 while we

will compare our results with the other works related to this area.

3.4.2 Experimental Results for Other Key Lengths

For key lengths $l = 8, 10, 12$ and 16, we performed simple experiments using *Method* 1A where the technique of updating the frequency table is applied for the first 5 key bytes only (as we have already implemented this for our experiments on 5 byte secret keys). In Table 8, we compare our success probabilities with those presented in [2, Table 4] and with [1]. In [2, 1], time estimates are presented in seconds instead of time complexity estimates of searching the number of keys. If there are multiple results for the same key length, we report the entry corresponding to the best probability in each of [2, 1] for each key length in Table 8.

In Table 8, we present three sets of results, namely, selected entries from Table 5 and data generated from Exp. I and II which are explained below. In Exp. I, we report the exact time complexities for our experiments in which we just exceed the probabilities given in [2, Table 4]. In Exp. II, we report the success probabilities for each key length that is achievable in complexity around 2^{40}, which should take less than a day using a few state of the art machines (see Remark 2). In Exp. I, for $l = 8, 10$ and 12, we use a threshold of 2 for each of the first 4 bytes and for $l = 16$, we use a threshold of 2 for each of the first 2 bytes. A threshold of 1 is used for the remaining bytes for each key length. In Exp. II, for $l = 16$, the thresholds are same as those in Exp. I. For other key lengths, the thresholds are as follow. For $l = 8$, we use a threshold of 1 for each of the first 6 bytes and a threshold of 0 for each of the last two bytes. A threshold of 1 is used for each key byte for the case $l = 10$. For $l = 12$, a threshold of 2 is used for the first byte and a threshold of 1 is used for each of the rest.

		l	8	10	12	16
Work of [2]	Probability		0.4058	0.1290	0.0212	0.0005
	Time in Seconds		0.60	3.93	7.43	278
Our Results from Table 5	Probability		0.414	0.162	0.026	0.0006
	Complexity		$2^{31.9}$	$2^{34.0}$	$2^{31.6}$	$2^{32.2}$
Our Exp. I	Probability		0.4362	0.1421	0.0275	0.0007
	Complexity		$2^{26.8}$	$2^{29.9}$	$2^{32.0}$	$2^{40.0}$
Our Exp. II	Probability		0.7250	0.2921	0.0659	0.0007
	Complexity		$2^{40.6}$	$2^{40.1}$	$2^{40.1}$	$2^{40.0}$
Work of [1]	Probability		0.931	–	0.506	0.0745
	Time in Seconds		8.602	–	54.390	1572

Table 8: Comparing our results with the existing works for $l = 8, 10, 12, 16$.

Here we only study the difference between two consecutive j's to extract a single byte of the key. However, the difference between any two j's can be considered to get equations

involving sum of more than one key bytes (in the same line as the idea of [17] has been extended in [2]).

We would like to emphasize here that our immediate goal in this paper is not to study all possible choices of parameters and heuristics through empirical trial and error for faster recovery of the secret key. Our main aim is to build a theoretical framework for recovering the key based on formal analysis of the correlation between the permutation and the secret key. Our basic technique, when combined with the works of [2, 1] would certainly provide further improvements in success probability as well as time complexity.

3.5 Brief Review of [2] and Detailed Comparison with Our Work

After the publication of [17], our idea has been exploited in [2] to achieve faster recovery of the secret key at the same success probability. In [2], $K[a \ldots b]$ denotes $\sum_{x=a}^{b} K[x]$ and C_y denotes $S_N[y] - \frac{y(y+1)}{2}$. According to this notation, [17] has used a system of equations of the form $K[0 \ldots y_1] = C_{y_1}$, $K[0 \ldots y_2] = C_{y_2}$. Whereas, the approach in [2] subtracts the equations of the above form to generate more equations of the form $K[0 \ldots y_2] - K[0 \ldots y_1] = K[y_1 + 1 \ldots y_2] = C_{y_2} - C_{y_1}$. Among the sums $K[a \ldots b]$ for different a, b, the sum $s = K[0 \ldots l - 1]$ of all the key bytes is guessed first. Plugging in the value of s reduces all the remaining equations to sums of fewer than l key bytes, of the form $K[y_1 \ldots y_2]$, $0 \le y_1 < l$, $y_1 \le y_2 < y_1 + l - 1$. At each stage, the value for a new sum of key bytes is guessed. Equations that are linearly dependent on prior guesses are not considered. After l such guesses, the resulting set of equations reveals the key. Below we enumerate additional techniques used in [2] towards improvement.

1. Since several equations suggest different values of the same sum of the key bytes, each equation with a specific sum is associated with a set of N counters for storing the weight of each possible value in $[0, \ldots, N]$. A weight of 2 is assigned to values with probability > 0.05, a weight of 1 is assigned to values with probability between 0.008 and 0.05 and a weight of 0 to all other values.

2. For each equation, the value with the highest weight is considered first and if this fails to retrieve the correct key, backtracking is performed and the value with the second highest weight is considered, and so on. The number of attempts λ_t to be tried on the t-th guess, $0 \le t < l$, are parameters of the algorithm, that are tuned empirically.

3. Two sums are said to be in the same equivalence class if and only if the value of each of them can be computed from the value of the other and the values of the known sums. Counters of such sums are merged together and exactly one representative of each equivalence class is kept.

4. If the sum $K[y_1 + 1 \ldots y_2]$ is correct, then it is expected that all the following three events occurred with high probability.

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- $S_r[r] = r$, $r \in [y_1 + 1, y_2]$.
- $S[y_1] = j_{y_1+1}$.
- $S[y_2] = j_{y_2+1}$.

This information is utilized in two ways.

(a) When considering a value for a sum of of key bytes $K[y_1 + 1 \ldots y_2]$ which is still unknown, if the known sums indicate that the above three events are likely to have occurred for y_1, y_2, then the weight associated with the value for the sum $K[y_1 + 1 \ldots y_2]$ is increased.

(b) All suggestions passing over some r, $y_1 < r < y_2$, for which $S_r[r] \neq r$ must have the same error $\Delta = C_{y_2} - C_{y_1} - K[y_1 + 1 \ldots y_2]$. So, if several suggestions passing over some r have the same error Δ, then other suggestions passing over r are corrected by Δ.

5. If $S[y] = v < y$ for some y, then the equation derived from $S[y]$ is discarded, as it is expected that v has already been swapped when $i = v$ had occurred and so is not likely to be in location y after y iterations of the KSA.

If $S[y] = v > y$ for some y, then there are two ways in which the assignment $S[y] \leftarrow v$ might have occurred: (a) when $i = y$ and $j = S[j] = v$, or (b) when $i = S[i] = v$ and $j = y$. The first case yields equation of the typical form $K[0 \ldots v] = C_v$. In the second case, the event $(y = K[0 \ldots v] + \frac{v(v+1)}{2})$ occurs with high probability and so $\overline{C}_v = S^{-1}[v] - \frac{v(v+1)}{2}$ can be considered as an alternative suggestion (in addition to C_v) for $K[0 \ldots v]$.

6. If the already-made guesses are correct, then after merging counters it is expected that the weight of the highest counter is significantly higher than other counters. With an aim to eliminating wrong guesses, when considering candidates for the t-th guess, only the ones with a weight of at least μ_t are considered, $0 \leq t < l$. The optimal values of these thresholds are determined empirically.

3.5.1 Work of [2] in Relation to Section 3.3.1 of this Paper

The work [2] claimed to improve upon [17] by increasing the probability of the equations involved through taking differences of the original equations in [17]. For example, in [2, Section 4.1], it was mentioned that the probability that $P(K[0] + \cdots + K[50]) = C_{50}) = 0.0059$, and $P(K[0] + \cdots + K[52]) = C_{52}) = 0.0052$, but $P(K[51] + K[52] = C_{52} - C_{50}) = 0.0624$, which is more than 10 times the probabilities of the individual equations. However, this does not hold for the initial bytes of the permutation. For the initial bytes, the probability of the difference of two equations being true is little more than the product of the probabilities of the individual equations, but it is much less than each individual probabilities. For example, $P(K[0] + K[1] = C_1) = 0.3682$ and $P(K[0] + \cdots + K[3] = C_3) = 0.3583$, whereas $P(K[2] + K[3] = C_3 - C_1) = 0.1403$, which is much less than the

values 0.3682 and 0.3583, and only little above their product 0.1319. So this cannot give major improvement in the success probability.

To substantiate this further, we like to refer to the work of [17]. As it is correctly pointed out in [2], there were some erroneous data related to the complexity calculation (due to integer overflow) in [17, Table 3]. Also the complexity formula of [17] was over-estimated. We present the revised formula and the updated table in Section 3.3.1 of this paper.

In [2, Table 4], it is demonstrated that a 16 bytes key can be recovered in 278 seconds with success probability 0.0005, but no formal complexity analysis is provided. Further, the impact of the $2l$ many tunable parameters (λ_w and μ_w, $0 \le w \le l-1$, see Appendix A for their definitions) on the success probability and the search complexity is not discussed in [2]. The result that the technique of [2] requires 278 seconds for a success probability 0.0005 on a Pentium IV 3 GHz machine does not give clear idea about the complexity when the same strategy is used to achieve a higher success probability.

In Table 5, it is shown that a probability of success of 0.0006 (more than 0.0005 as in [2, Table 4]) can be achieved in $2^{32.2}$ time complexity which requires around 4705 seconds (see Remark 1). From the results reported in [2], it is not clear how much increase in search complexity is required for a certain increase in the success probability. However, the last 8 entries corresponding to 16 bytes key length in Table 5 give a flavour about the relationship between the complexity and success probability. For example, when the success probability increases from 0.0006 to 0.006 (i.e. increases by 10 times), the complexity increases by a factor of $2^{14.7}$.

Note that our work in Section 3.4 achieves better success probabilities than those of [2] for each key length.

3.6   Brief Review of [1] and Detailed Comparison with Our Works

The work [17] showed for the first time how one can retrieve the secret key from the permutation S_N after the KSA. Later, [2] proposed some improvements to achieve faster recovery of the key. Recently, [1] has revisited the key reconstruction from S_N with further improvements. They have accumulated the ideas in the earlier works [17, 2] along with some additional new results to devise a more efficient algorithm for key recovery. The key retrieval algorithm in [1] considers 6 types of events for guessing one j value:

1. $j_{y+1} = S_N[y]$.

2. $j_{y+1} = S_N^{-1}[y]$.

3. $j_{y+1} = S_N[S_N[[y]]$.

4. $j_{y+1} = S_N^{-1}[S_N^{-1}[y]]$.

5. $j_{y+1} = S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]$.

6. $j_{y+1} = S_N^{-1}[S_N^{-1}[S_N^{-1}[y]]]$.

From two successive j values j_y and j_{y+1}, $6 \times 6 = 36$ candidates for the key byte $K[y]$ are obtained. They are weighted according to their probabilities. In addition to these, the equations of [2] are also used and the sum s of the key bytes is guessed first. Then, for all m-byte combinations of l key bytes, m key bytes are assigned values with the highest weight. After that, the remaining $l - m$ key-bytes are solved as follows. For each group of four bytes, some of them are already guessed (being part of the selected m-combination). New candidates for the remaining (being part of the other $l - m$ key bytes) ones are found using the sum information (i.e., C_y values) in these 4 byte sequence. The values for these are then fixed by trying all possible candidates through a selected depth.

3.6.1   Work of [1] in Relation to Our Works

Some of the theoretical results used in [1] were already known. These are briefly mentioned here.

1. Theorem 4 in Section 5 of [1] was already proved in [17, Section 2, Lemma 2], which appears as Lemma 2 in this paper.

2. Definitions 3 and 5 in [1] about $S_N[S_N[[y]]]$ and $S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]$ were introduced for the first time in [9, Section 2 and Appendix A] with detailed theoretical results and experimental evidences.

A few other works in [1] have intersections with some of our works in Sections 2.2, 3.4, which are done independently and at the same time. We enlist them below.

1. Definition 2 in [1] about $S_N^{-1}[y]$ is introduced independently in our current work of Section 2.2. In relation to $S_N^{-1}[y]$, Theorem 5 in Section 5 of [1] is contained in the event $E_1(y)$ of Theorem 2 in this paper, for all the permutation indices y, $0 \leq y \leq N - 1$.

2. In Section 3.4 of this paper, in addition to $S_N[y]$, we have used the terms $S_N[S_N[[y]]]$, $S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]$ and $S_N[S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]]$ in *Method* 1A and *Method* 2A for complete key recovery. In [1], the terms $S_N[y]$, $S_N[S_N[[y]]]$, $S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]$ have been used independently.

Moreover, similar to the natural extension of $S_N[y]$ into $S_N[S_N[[y]]]$, $S_N[S_N[S_N[y]]]$ etc. as performed in [9], the work in [1] has also extended the concept of $S_N^{-1}[y]$ into $S_N^{-1}[S_N^{-1}[y]]$ and $S_N^{-1}[S_N^{-1}[S_N^{-1}[y]]]$ in their Definitions 4 and 6.

4   Intrinsic Weakness of Shuffle-exchange Type KSA

In the KSA of RC4, the index i is incremented by one and j is updated pseudo-randomly by the rule $j = j + S[i] + K[i]$. In the notations of Section 2, we may write, for $0 \leq y \leq N - 1$,

$$j_{y+1} = j_y + S_y[y] + K[y].$$

Here, the increment of j is a function of the permutation and the secret key. One may expect that the correlation between the secret key and the permutation can be removed by modifying the update rule for j. Here we show that for a certain class of rules of this type, where j across different rounds is uniformly randomly distributed, there will always exist significant bias of the permutation at any stage of the KSA towards some combination of the secret key bytes with significant probability. Though the proof technique is similar to that in Section 2, it may be noted that the analysis in the proofs here focus on the weakness of the particular "form" of RC4 KSA, and not on the exact quantity of the bias.

We can model the update of j in the KSA as an arbitrary function u of (a) the current values of i, j, (b) the i-th and j-th permutation bytes from the previous round, and (c) the i-th and j-th key bytes. Using the notations of Section 2, we may write

$$j_{y+1} = u(y, j_y, S_y[y], S_y[j_y], K[y], K[j_y]).$$

For subsequent reference, let us call the KSA with this generalized update rule as GKSA.

Lemma 3 *Assume that during the GKSA rounds, the index j takes its values from $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$ uniformly at random. Then, one can always construct functions $h_y(S_0, K)$, which depends only on y, the secret key bytes and the initial permutation, and probabilities π_y, which depends only on y and N, such that $P(j_{y+1} = h_y(S_0, K)) = (\frac{N-1}{N})\pi_y + \frac{1}{N}$, $0 \leq y \leq N-1$.*

Proof: By induction on y, we will show (i) how to construct the recursive functions $h_y(S_0, K)$ and probabilities π_y and (ii) that one contribution towards the event $(j_{y+1} = h_y(S_0, K))$ is π_y.

- *Base Case*: Initially, before the beginning of round 1, $j_0 = 0$. In round 1, $j_1 = u(0, 0, S_0[0], S_0[0], K[0], K[0]) = h_0(S_0, K)$ (say), with probability $\pi_0 = 1$.

- *Inductive Case*: Suppose, $P(j_y = h_{y-1}(S_0, K)) = \pi_{y-1}$, $y \geq 1$ (*inductive hypothesis*). We know that $j_{y+1} = u(y, j_y, S_y[y], S_y[j_y], K[y], K[j_y])$. In the right hand side of this equality, all occurrences of $S_y[y]$ can be replaced by $S_0[y]$ with probability $(\frac{N-1}{N})^y$, which is the probability of index y not being involved in any swap in the previous y many rounds. Also, due to the swap in round y, we have $S_y[j_y] = S_{y-1}[y-1]$, which again can be replaced by $S_0[y-1]$ with probability $(\frac{N-1}{N})^{y-1}$. Finally, all occurrences of j_y can be replaced by $h_{y-1}(S_0, K)$ with probability π_{y-1} (using the inductive hypothesis). Thus, j_{y+1} equals $u(y, h_{y-1}(S_0, K), S_0[y], S_0[y-1], K[y], K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)])$ with some probability π_y which can be computed as a function of y, N, and π_{y-1}, depending on the occurrence or non-occurrence of various terms in u. If we denote $h_y(S_0, K) = u(y, h_{y-1}(S_0, K), S_0[y], S_0[y-1], K[y], K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)])$, then (i) and (ii) follow by induction.

  When the recursive path does not occur, then the event

$$\left(j_{y+1} = u\big(y, h_{y-1}(S_0, K), S_0[y], S_0[y-1], K[y], K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)]\big)\right)$$

occurs due to random association with probability $(1 - \pi_y) \cdot \frac{1}{N}$. Adding the above two contributions, we get $P(j_{y+1} = h_y(S_0, K)) = \pi_y + (1 - \pi_y) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = (\frac{N-1}{N})\pi_y + \frac{1}{N}$. $\blacksquare$

Theorem 8 *Assume that during the GKSA rounds, the index j takes its values uniformly at random from $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$. Then, one can always construct functions $f_y(S_0, K)$, which depends only on y, the secret key bytes and the initial permutation, such that $P(S_r[y] = f_y(S_0, K)) \approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^r \cdot \pi_y + \frac{1}{N}$, $0 \le y \le r - 1$, $1 \le r \le N$.*

Proof: We will show that $f_y(S_0, K) = S_0[h_y(S_0, K)]$ where the function h_y's are given by Lemma 3.

Now, $S_r[y]$ can equal $S_0[h_y(S_0, K)]$ in two ways. One way is that $j_{y+1} = h_y(S_0, K))$ following the recursive path as in Lemma 3 and $S_r[y] = S_0[j_{y+1}]$. Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 2, we find the probability of this event to be approximately $(\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1} \cdot \pi_y$. Another way is that the above path is not followed and still $S_r[y] = S_0[h_y(S_0, K)]$ due to random association. The contribution of this part is approximately $\left(1 - (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1} \cdot \pi_y\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N}$. Adding the above two contributions, we get the total probability $\approx (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1} \cdot \pi_y + \left(1 - (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1} \cdot \pi_y\right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} = (1 - \frac{1}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^{r-1} \cdot \pi_y + \frac{1}{N} = (\frac{N-y}{N}) \cdot (\frac{N-1}{N})^r \cdot \pi_y + \frac{1}{N}$. $\blacksquare$

Next, we discuss some special cases of the update rule u as illustrative examples of how to construct the functions f_y's and the probabilities π_y's for small values of y using Lemma 3. In all the following cases, we assume S_0 to be an identity permutation and hence $f_y(S_0, K)$ is the same as $h_y(S_0, K)$.

Example 3 *Consider the KSA of RC4, where*

$$u(y, j_y, S_y[y], S_y[j_y], K[y], K[j_y]) = j_y + S_y[y] + K[y].$$

We have $h_0(S_0, K) = u(0, 0, S_0[0], S_0[0], K[0], K[0]) = 0 + 0 + K[0] = K[0]$. Moreover, $\pi_0 = P(j_1 = h_0(S_0, K)) = 1$. For $y \ge 1$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
h_y(S_0, K) &= u(y, h_{y-1}(S_0, K), S_0[y], S_0[y-1], K[y], K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)]) \\
&= h_{y-1}(S_0, K) + S_0[y] + K[y] \\
&= h_{y-1}(S_0, K) + y + K[y].
\end{aligned}
$$

Solving the recurrence, we get $h_y(S_0, K) = \frac{y(y+1)}{2} + \sum_{x=0}^{y} K[x]$. From the analysis in the proof of Lemma 3, we see that in the recurrence of h_y, $S_y[y]$ has been replaced by $S_0[y]$ and j_y has been replaced by $h_{y-1}(S_0, K)$. Hence, we would have $\pi_y = P(S_y[y] = S_0[y]) \cdot P(j_y = h_{y-1}(S_0, K)) = (\frac{N-1}{N})^y \cdot \pi_{y-1}$. Solving this recurrence, we get $\pi_y = \prod_{x=0}^{y} (\frac{N-1}{N})^x = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y+1)}{2}}$. These expressions coincide with those in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.

Example 4 *Consider the update rule*

$$u(y, j_y, S_y[y], S_y[j_y], K[y], K[j_y]) = j_y + S_y[j_y] + K[j_y].$$

Here, $h_0(S_0, K) = u(0, 0, S_0[0], S_0[0], K[0], K[0]) = 0 + 0 + K[0] = K[0]$ and $\pi_0 = P(j_1 = h_0(S_0, K)) = 1$. For $y \geq 1$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
h_y(S_0, K) &= u(y, h_{y-1}(S_0, K), S_0[y], S_0[y-1], K[y], K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)]) \\
&= h_{y-1}(S_0, K) + S_0[y-1] + K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)] \\
&= h_{y-1}(S_0, K) + (y-1) + K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)].
\end{aligned}
$$

From the analysis in the proof of Lemma 3, we see that in the recurrence of h_y, $S_{y-1}[y-1]$ and j_y are respectively replaced by $S_0[y-1]$ and $h_{y-1}(S_0, K)$. Thus, we would have $\pi_y = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{y-1} \cdot \pi_{y-1}$. Solving this recurrence, we get $\pi_y = \prod_{x=1}^{y}(\frac{N-1}{N})^{x-1} = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y-1)}{2}}$.

Example 5 *As another example, suppose*

$$
u(y, j_y, S_y[y], S_y[j_y], K[y], K[j_y]) = j_y + y \cdot S_y[j_y] + K[j_y].
$$

As before, $h_0(S_0, K) = u(0, 0, S_0[0], S_0[0], K[0], K[0]) = 0 + 0 \cdot S[0] + K[0] = 0 + 0 + K[0] = K[0]$ and $\pi_0 = P(j_1 = h_0(S_0, K)) = 1$. For $y \geq 1$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
h_y(S_0, K) &= u(y, h_{y-1}(S_0, K), S_0[y], S_0[y-1], K[y], K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)]) \\
&= h_{y-1}(S_0, K)]) + y \cdot S_0[y-1] + K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)] \\
&= h_{y-1}(S_0, K)]) + y \cdot (y-1) + K[h_{y-1}(S_0, K)].
\end{aligned}
$$

As in the previous example, here also the recurrence relation for the probabilities is $\pi_y = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{y-1} \cdot \pi_{y-1}$, whose solution is $\pi_y = \prod_{x=1}^{y}(\frac{N-1}{N})^{x-1} = (\frac{N-1}{N})^{\frac{y(y-1)}{2}}$.

Our results show that the design of RC4 KSA cannot achieve further security by changing the update rule by any rule from a large class that we present.

5 Conclusion

We theoretically prove how the permutation bytes at any stage of the KSA are biased to the secret key bytes. We also use this result to recover the secret key bytes from the RC4 state at any stage. Our algorithm has a constant probability of success in order of square root of the time required for the exhaustive key search. This is the first work in secret key recovery from RC4 permutation and subsequently this has generated interests in the community in inverting the RC4 KSA (i.e. getting back the secret key from the permutation).

We also show that significant amount of information about the hidden index j at every round can be obtained by exploiting all the bytes of S_N, S_N^{-1}. This can be used to retrieve each of the key bytes with very high probability. Moreover, in recovering the complete key, our simple experiments, which are straightforward applications of our theoretical results, sometimes outperform other works such as [2] in terms of success probabilities (see Table 8). This indicates that if both of our techniques (Sections 3.3, 3.4) and other works [2, 1] are combined together, then further improvements are possible in recovering the complete key.

Further, we analyze a generalization of the RC4 KSA corresponding to a class of functions to update the hidden index j and find that the correlation of the permutation with the secret key exist for each function in this class.

Since the state (which includes the permutation and the indices) is in general not observable, our work does not immediately pose an additional threat to the security of RC4. However, for an ideal stream cipher, no information about the secret key should be revealed even if the complete state of the system is known at any instant. Our work clearly points out intrinsic structural weaknesses of RC4 KSA and certain generalizations of it.

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