

Collisions and other Non-Random Properties for Step-Reduced SHA-256*

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Abstract. We study the security of step-reduced but otherwise unmodified SHA-256. We show the first collision attacks on SHA-256 reduced to 23 and 24 steps with complexities 2^{18} and $2^{28.5}$, respectively. We give example colliding message pairs for 23-step and 24-step SHA-256. The best previous, recently obtained result was a collision attack for up to 22 steps. Additionally, we show non-random behaviour of SHA-256 in the form of free-start near collisions for up to 31 steps, which is 6 more steps than the recently obtained non-random behaviour in the form of a semi-free start near-collision. Even though this represents a step forwards in terms of cryptanalytic techniques, the results do not threaten the security of applications using SHA-256.

Key words: SHA-256, hash functions, collisions, semi-free start collisions, free start collisions, pseudo-near-collisions.

1 Introduction

In the light of previous break-through results on hash functions like MD5 and SHA-1, the security of their successor, SHA-256 and sisters, against all kinds of cryptanalytic attacks deserves special attention. This is even more important as many products and services that used to rely on SHA-1 are now migrating to SHA-256.

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1.1 Previous work on members of the SHA-2 family

Below, we briefly discuss existing work. Results on older variants of the larger MD4 related hash function family including SHA-1 suggest that the concept of local collisions might also be important for the SHA-2 members. The first published analysis on members of the SHA-2 family, by Gilbert and Handschuh [2], goes in this direction. They show that there exists a 9-step local collision with probability 2^{-66} . Later on, the result was improved by Hawkes *et al.* [3]. By considering modular differences, they increased the probability to 2^{-39} . Using XOR differences, local collisions with probability as high as 2^{-38} were used by Hölbl *et al.* [4]. Local collisions with lower probability but with other properties were studied by Sanadhya and Sarkar in [12].

Now we turn our attention to the analysis of simplified variants of SHA-256. In [15], all modular additions are replaced by XOR. For this variant, a search for pseudo-collisions is described, which is faster than brute force search for up to 34 steps. In [7], a variant of SHA-256 is analysed where all Σ - and σ -functions are removed. The conclusion is that for this variant, collisions can be found much faster than by brute force search. The work shows that the approach used by Chabaud and Joux [1] in their analysis of SHA-0 is extensible to that particular variant of SHA-256. The message expansion as a building block on its own was studied in [7,11].

Finally, we discuss previous work that focuses on step-reduced but otherwise unmodified SHA-256. The first study was done by Mendel *et al.* [8]. The results obtained are a practical 18-step collision and a differential characteristic for 19-step SHA-224 collision. Also an example of a pseudo-near-collision for 22-step SHA-256 is given. Similar techniques have been studied by Matusiewicz [7] and recently also by Sanadhya and Sarkar [14]. By using a different technique, Nikolić and Biryukov [9] obtained collisions for up to 21 steps and non-random behaviour in the form of semi free-start near-collisions for up to 25 steps. Very recently, Sanadhya and Sarkar [13] showed a collision example for 22 steps of SHA-256, likely based on a similar technique.

1.2 Our Contribution

We extend the work of Nikolić and Biryukov [9] to collisions for 23- and 24-step SHA-256 with respective time complexities of 2^{18} and $2^{28.5}$ reduced SHA-256 compression function evaluations. We also give several

Table 1. Comparison of our results with the known results in the literature for each type. Effort is expressed in (equivalent) calls to the respective reduced compression functions.

function	steps	type	effort	source	example
SHA-256	18	collision	2^0	[8]	yes
SHA-256	20	collision	$2^{1.58}$	[9]	no
SHA-256	21	collision	2^{15}	[9]	yes
SHA-256	22	collision	2^9	[13]	yes
SHA-256	23	collision	2^{18}	this work	yes
SHA-256	24	collision	$2^{28.5}$	this work	yes
SHA-256	23	semi-free start collision	2^{17}	[9]	yes
SHA-224	25	free start collision	2^{17}	this work	no
SHA-256	22	free start near-collision	2^0	[8]	yes
SHA-256	25	semi-free start near-collision	2^{34}	[9]	yes
SHA-256	31	free start near-collision	2^{32} , Table 6	this work	no

weaker collision style attacks on a larger number of rounds. Our results are summarised in Table 1.

The structure of this paper is as follows. We give a short description of SHA-256 in Sect. 2. Section 3 gives an alternative description of the semi-free start collision attack by Nikolić and Biryukov [9], which will make the subsequent description of the new attacks easier to understand. We then discuss our collision attacks on 23- and 24-step SHA-256 in Sect. 4. Further extensions can be found in the appendix. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.

2 Description of SHA-256

This section gives a short description of the SHA-256 hash function, using the notations from Table 2. For a detailed specification, we refer to [10].

The compression function of SHA-256 consists of a message expansion, which transforms a 512-bit message block into 64 expanded message words W_i of 32 bits each, and a state update transformation. The latter updates eight 32-bit state variables A, \dots, H in 64 identical steps, each using one expanded message word. The message expansion can be defined recursively as follows.

$$W_i = \begin{cases} M_i & 0 \leq i < 16 \\ \sigma_1(W_{i-2}) + W_{i-7} + \sigma_0(W_{i-15}) + W_{i-16} & 16 \leq i < 64 \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Table 2. The notations used in this paper.

$X \ggg s$	X rotated over s bits to the right
$X \gg s$	X shifted over s bits to the right
\overline{X}	One's complement of X
$X \oplus Y$	Bitwise exclusive OR of X and Y
$X + Y$	Addition of X and Y modulo 2^{32}
$X - Y$	Subtraction of X and Y modulo 2^{32}
A_i, \dots, H_i	State variables at step i , for the first message
A'_i, \dots, H'_i	Idem, for the second message
W_i	i -th expanded message word of the first message
W'_i	i -th expanded message word of the second message
δX	Additive difference in X , <i>i.e.</i> , $X' - X$
$\delta\sigma_0(X)$	Additive difference in $\sigma_0(X)$, <i>i.e.</i> , $\sigma_0(X') - \sigma_0(X)$

The functions $\sigma_0(X)$ and $\sigma_1(X)$ are given by

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_0(X) &= (X \ggg 7) \oplus (X \ggg 18) \oplus (X \gg 3) , \\ \sigma_1(X) &= (X \ggg 17) \oplus (X \ggg 19) \oplus (X \gg 10) .\end{aligned}\quad (2)$$

The state update transformation updates two of the state variables in every step. It uses the bitwise Boolean functions f_{ch} and f_{maj} as well as the GF(2)-linear functions Σ_0 and Σ_1 .

$$\begin{aligned}f_{\text{ch}}(X, Y, Z) &= XY \oplus \overline{X}Z , \\ f_{\text{maj}}(X, Y, Z) &= XY \oplus YZ \oplus XZ , \\ \Sigma_0(X) &= (X \ggg 2) \oplus (X \ggg 13) \oplus (X \ggg 22) , \\ \Sigma_1(X) &= (X \ggg 6) \oplus (X \ggg 11) \oplus (X \ggg 25) .\end{aligned}\quad (3)$$

The following equations describe the state update transformation, where K_i is a step constant.

$$\begin{aligned}T_1 &= H_i + \Sigma_1(E_i) + f_{\text{ch}}(E_i, F_i, G_i) + K_i + W_i , \\ T_2 &= \Sigma_0(A_i) + f_{\text{maj}}(A_i, B_i, C_i) , \\ A_{i+1} &= T_1 + T_2 , \quad B_{i+1} = A_i , \quad C_{i+1} = B_i , \quad D_{i+1} = C_i , \\ E_{i+1} &= D_i + T_1 , \quad F_{i+1} = E_i , \quad G_{i+1} = F_i , \quad H_{i+1} = G_i .\end{aligned}\quad (4)$$

After 64 steps, the initial state variables are fed forward using word-wise addition modulo 2^{32} .

3 Review of the Nikolić-Biryukov Semi-Free Start Collision Attack

In this section, we review the 23 step semi-free start collision attack by Nikolić and Biryukov [9], because new results we present in this paper are extensions of this attack. The notations we use are given in Table 2.

Table 3. A 9 step differential, using additive differences (left) and conditions on the value (right). Zero differences resp. unconstrained values are denoted by blanks.

step	δA	δB	δC	δD	δE	δF	δG	δH	δW	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
8										α				γ			
9									1	α	α			$\gamma+1$	γ		
10	1				1				-1	-1	α	α		-1	$\gamma+1$	γ	
11		1			-1	1			δ_1	α	-1	α	α	ϵ	-1	$\gamma+1$	γ
12			1			-1	1		δ_2	α	α	-1	α	β	ϵ	-1	$\gamma+1$
13				1			-1	1		α	α	α	-1	β	β	ϵ	-1
14					1			-1			α	α	α	-1	β	β	ϵ
15						1						α	α	0	-1	β	β
16							1		1				α	-2	0	-1	β
17								1	-1						-2	0	-1
18																-2	0

3.1 A Nine Step Differential

The attack uses a nine step differential which is presented in Table 3. All additive differences are fixed, as well as some of the actual values. Fixing these values ensures that the differential is followed, as will be explained later. The constants α , β , γ and ϵ are determined by the attack algorithm. The first difference is inserted via the message word W_9 . In order to obtain a 23 step semi-free start collision, we require that there are no differences in expanded message words other than those indicated in Table 3. In other words, only W_9 , W_{10} , W_{11} , W_{12} , W_{16} and W_{17} can have a difference.

3.2 The Attack

The attack algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase finds suitable values for the constants α , β , γ and ϵ as well as two expanded message words, W_{16} and W_{17} . The entire complexity of the attack can be attributed to this phase. A detailed description of this phase of the attack will be given in Sect. 3.4, as it is more instructive to describe the second phase first.

3.3 The Second Phase of the Attack

The second phase of the attack finds, when given suitable values for α , β , γ , ϵ , W_{16} and W_{17} , a pair of messages and a set of initial values that

lead to a semi-free start collision for 23 steps of SHA-256. It works by carefully fixing the internal state at step 11 and then computing forward and backward. At each step, the expanded message word W_i is computed such that the differential from Table 3 is followed. In three steps, extra conditions appear, involving only the constants determined by the first phase of the attack. The first phase guarantees that the constants are such that these conditions are satisfied.

The second phase of the attack has a negligible complexity and is guaranteed to succeed. Since there is still a lot of freedom left, many 23 step semi-free start collisions can be found with only a negligible extra effort, by repeating this second phase several times.

1. Start at step 11 by fixing the state variables in this step, A_{11}, \dots, H_{11} as indicated in Table 3. The constants α, β, γ and ϵ are given by the first phase of the attack.
2. Calculate W_{11} such that $A_{12} = \alpha$ and W'_{11} such that $A'_{12} = \alpha$. This can be done by simple rearranging (4). Compute the value of E_{12} , which we will refer to as β . Note that the value of β only depends on α , since

$$A_{12} = \alpha = \Sigma_0(\alpha) + f_{\text{maj}}(\alpha, -1, \alpha) + \beta - \alpha \Rightarrow \beta = \alpha - \Sigma_0(\alpha) \quad . \quad (5)$$

3. In a similar way, calculate W_{12} such that $E_{13} = \beta$ and W'_{12} such that $E'_{13} = \beta$. This also guarantees that $A_{13} = A'_{13}$ because the majority function absorbs the difference in C_{12} .
4. Calculate W_{13} such that $E_{14} = -1$ and set $W'_{13} = W_{13}$. Now, see Table 3, the additive difference δE_{14} should be equal to 1. Computing this difference yields the condition

$$\delta E_{14} = f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \beta, \epsilon - 1) - f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \beta, \epsilon) + 2 = 1 \quad . \quad (6)$$

This condition only involves the constants β and ϵ , and can thus already be ensured by a proper choice of these constants in phase one of the attack. Note that this condition also ensures that $\delta A_{14} = 0$.

5. Calculate W_{14} such that $E_{15} = 0$ and set $W'_{14} = W_{14}$. Since the values of E_{14} and E'_{14} were chosen to be fixed points of the function Σ_1 in the previous step, $\delta \Sigma_1(E_{14}) = \delta E_{14} = 1$ cancels with $\delta H_{14} = -1$. Also, f_{ch} absorbs the difference in E_{14} , no new differences are introduced into the state.
6. Calculate W_{15} such that $E_{16} = -2$ and set $W'_{15} = W_{15}$. The difference in F_{15} is absorbed by f_{ch} .

7. The value for W_{16} is computed in phase one of the attack. The difference $\delta W_{16} = 1$ is cancelled by the output of f_{ch} . Indeed, since the binary representation of $E_{16} = -2$ is $111 \dots 10_b$, the f_{ch} function passes only the difference in the least significant bit.
8. Also the value for W_{17} is computed in phase one of the attack. The difference $\delta W_{17} = 1$ cancels with $\delta H_{17} = 1$, thereby eliminating the final difference in the state variables. Thus, a collision is reached after step 17.
9. Now, go back to step 11 and proceed in the backward direction. Make an arbitrary choice for W_{10} . The differential from Table 3 is followed because of the careful choice of the state variables in step 11.
10. Make an arbitrary choice for W_9 , and proceed one step backward. The difference $\delta W_9 = 1$ cancels with δA_{10} and with δE_{10} such that there is a zero difference in the state variables A_9 through H_9 . Now randomly choose W_8 down to W_2 and calculate backward. Because no new differences appear in these expanded message words, there is also a zero difference in the state variables A_2 through H_2 .
11. It is not possible to freely choose W_0 or W_1 as 16 expanded message words have already been chosen, *i.e.*, W_2 until W_{17} . Hence, these are computed using the message expansion in the backward direction. Although some of the message words used to compute W_0 and W_1 have differences, these differences always cancel out.
12. Continuing forward from step 18 again, note that the collision is preserved as long as no new differences are introduced via the expanded message words. From the message expansion, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}
\delta W_{18} &= \delta \sigma_1(W_{16}) + \delta W_{11} \\
&= \sigma_1(W_{16} + 1) - \sigma_1(W_{16}) - \Sigma_1(\epsilon - 1) + \Sigma_1(\epsilon) \\
&\quad - f_{\text{ch}}(\epsilon - 1, 0, \gamma + 1) + f_{\text{ch}}(\epsilon, -1, \gamma + 1) = 0 . \quad (7)
\end{aligned}$$

Phase one of the attack will have to ensure that W_{16} , γ and ϵ are chosen such that this condition is satisfied.

13. In step 19, it follows from the message expansion that the following condition needs to be satisfied:

$$\begin{aligned}
\delta W_{19} &= \delta \sigma_1(W_{17}) + \delta W_{12} \\
&= \sigma_1(W_{17} - 1) - \sigma_1(W_{17}) \\
&\quad - f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \epsilon - 1, 0) + f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \epsilon, -1) = 0 . \quad (8)
\end{aligned}$$

Again, this condition only depends on W_{17} and the constants β and ϵ , so phase one of the attack can ensure that this condition is satisfied.

14. In steps 20–22, the message expansion guarantees that no new differences are introduced. In step 23, however, a difference of 1 is impossible to avoid, hence the attack stops after 23 steps.

3.4 The First Phase of the Attack

The goal of the first phase of the attack is to determine suitable values for the constants α , β , γ and ϵ , as well as two expanded message words, W_{16} and W_{17} . Suitable values imply that the three conditions that are required to be satisfied in the second phase of the attack are indeed satisfied. This is achieved as follows.

1. Make a random choice for γ and ϵ , and search for a value of W_{16} such that condition (7) is satisfied. There exists a simple, generic method to solve equations of this form, which is described in Appendix B. We note however that for this particular case, a faster method exists. An exhaustive search over every possible value of W_{16} resulted in the observation that only 6 181 additive differences can ever be achieved. These can be stored in a lookup table, together with one or more solutions for each difference. Hence, solving an equation of the form $\sigma_1(x+1) - \sigma_1(x) = \delta$ can be done with a simple table lookup. If no solution exists, simply retry with different choices for γ and/or ϵ . If the right hand side difference is selected uniformly at random, the probability that the equation has a solution is about $2^{-19.5}$, so we expect to have to repeat this step about $2^{19.5}$ times.
2. Satisfying the other two conditions can be done independently of the first. Make a random choice for α , and compute β using (5), *i.e.*, $\beta = \alpha - \Sigma_0(\alpha)$. Now check condition (6), which states that

$$f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \beta, \epsilon - 1) - f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \beta, \epsilon) = -1 \quad . \quad (9)$$

As described in [9], this equation is satisfied if the bits of β are zero in the positions where the bits of $\epsilon - 1$ and ϵ differ. This occurs with a probability of approximately $1/3$, so this condition is fairly easy to satisfy.

3. The last condition, (8), is of the same form as the first condition, provided it is rewritten as

$$\sigma_1(W'_{17} + 1) - \sigma_1(W'_{17}) = f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \epsilon, -1) - f_{\text{ch}}(\beta, \epsilon - 1, 0) \quad . \quad (10)$$

Also, it becomes independent of ϵ if we assume that the previous condition is satisfied, because that implies that the bits of β are zero where ϵ and $\epsilon - 1$ differ. Hence, the right hand side is equal to $\bar{\beta}$.

Note that, because not all conditions depend on all of the constants that are determined in this phase of the attack, the first condition can be treated independently of the last two. Thus, the first and last step of this phase of the attack are executed about $2^{19.5}$ times and the second step about 2^{21} times. Note also that one of these steps requires much less work than an evaluation of the compression function of (reduced) SHA-256 — a bit less than one step. Hence, the overall time complexity of the attack, when expressed in SHA-256 compression function evaluations, is below 2^{17} . If we consider the first phase to be a precomputation, the time complexity is only one reduced SHA-256 evaluation.

4 Our Collision Attacks on SHA-256

In this section we describe a novel, practical collision attack on SHA-256, reduced to 23 steps. It has a time complexity of about 2^{18} evaluations of the reduced SHA-256 compression function. We also extend this to 24 steps of SHA-256, with an expected time complexity of $2^{28.5}$ compression function evaluations.

4.1 23 Step Collision

Our collision attack for SHA-256 reduced to 23 steps consists of two parts. First, we construct a semi-free start collision for 23 steps, based on the attack from Sect. 3. Then we transform this semi-free start collision into a real collision.

Finding “Good” Constants. Finding a 23 step semi-free start collision is done using the same attack as described in Sect. 3, with a slight change to the first phase. In Sect. 3.4 it was described how to find constants α , β , γ and ϵ such that there exist values for W_{16} and W_{17} ensuring that the conditions (7) and (8) are satisfied. There are still some degrees of freedom left in this process. Indeed, it is possible to determine the constants α , β , γ and ϵ such that there are *many* values for W_{16} and W_{17} satisfying (7) and (8).

We performed a partially exhaustive search for such good constants. Condition (7) depends only on ϵ and γ . An exhaustive search can be performed with approximately 2^{37} evaluations of (7), because for each value of ϵ , only some of the bits in γ can have an influence. We found several values for ϵ and γ for which more than 2^{29} choices for W_{16} ensure that (7) is satisfied, for example

$$\gamma = 0000017c_x \quad \text{and} \quad \epsilon = 7f5f7200_x . \quad (11)$$

Conditions (6) and (8) depend on β (which in turn depends on α) and ϵ . Recall from Sect. 3.4 that (8) becomes independent of ϵ if we assume (6) is satisfied. Hence again, an exhaustive search is feasible. With ϵ as in (11), the following values for α and β are one of many optimal choices:

$$\alpha = 00b321e3_x \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = fcffe000_x . \quad (12)$$

There are 2^{16} possible W_{17} 's which satisfy (8) with these constants. Thus, these values for α , β , γ and ϵ gives us an additional freedom of 2^{45} in the choice of W_{16} and W_{17} . This phase can be considered a precomputation, or alternatively, one can reduce the effort spent in this phase by only searching a smaller part of the available search space, which likely leads to less optimal results. It may however be a worthwhile trade-off in practice.

Transforming into a Collision. Note that only 7 expanded message words are actually fixed to a certain value when constructing a semi-free start collision. Indeed, only W_{11} until W_{17} are really fixed, if we ignore the freedom we still have left in W_{16} and W_{17} for now. The others are chosen arbitrarily or computed from the message expansion when necessary. Using this freedom, it is possible to construct many semi-free start collisions with only a negligible extra effort. But it is also possible to use this freedom in a controlled manner to transform the semi-free start collision into a real collision.

To this end, we first introduce an alternative description of SHA-256. In older variants of the same design strategy like MD5 or SHA-1, only a single state variable is updated in every step. This naturally leads to a description where only the first state variable is considered. Something similar can be done with the SHA-2 hash functions, even though in the standard description, two state variables are updated in every step.

From the state update equations (4), we derive a series of equations which express the inputs of the i -th state update transformation, A_i, \dots, H_i , as a function of only A_i through A_{i-7} .

$$\begin{aligned} A_i &= A_i , \\ B_i &= A_{i-1} , \\ C_i &= A_{i-2} , \\ D_i &= A_{i-3} , \\ E_i &= A_{i-4} + A_i - \Sigma_0(A_{i-1}) - f_{\text{maj}}(A_{i-1}, A_{i-2}, A_{i-3}) , \\ F_i &= A_{i-5} + A_{i-1} - \Sigma_0(A_{i-2}) - f_{\text{maj}}(A_{i-2}, A_{i-3}, A_{i-4}) , \\ G_i &= A_{i-6} + A_{i-2} - \Sigma_0(A_{i-3}) - f_{\text{maj}}(A_{i-3}, A_{i-4}, A_{i-5}) , \\ H_i &= A_{i-7} + A_{i-3} - \Sigma_0(A_{i-4}) - f_{\text{maj}}(A_{i-4}, A_{i-5}, A_{i-6}) . \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Substituting these into (4) yields an alternative description requiring only a single state variable. This description can be written as

$$A_{i+1} = F(A_i, A_{i-1}, A_{i-2}, A_{i-3}, A_{i-4}, A_{i-5}, A_{i-6}) + A_{i-7} + W_i . \quad (14)$$

The function $F(\cdot)$ encapsulates (4) and (13) except for the addition of the expanded message word W_i and the state variable A_{i-7} .

From (13) it is clear that one can easily transform the internal state in the standard description, $\langle A_i, \dots, H_i \rangle$, to the internal state in the alternative description, $\langle A_i, \dots, A_{i-7} \rangle$ and vice versa. Analogous to what is done for MD5 and SHA-1, the initial values can be defined as A_{-7}, \dots, A_0 . Since control over one expanded message word W_i gives full control over one state variable A_{i+1} , control over eight consecutive expanded message words gives full control over the entire internal state.

This alternative description of SHA-256 can be used to transform a 23 step semi-free start collision for SHA-256 into a real collision.

1. Set $\langle A_0, \dots, A_{-7} \rangle$ to the SHA-256 initial values, in the alternative description. Make arbitrary choices for W_0, W_1 and W_2 . Recompute the first three steps.
2. The eight message words W_3 until W_{10} are now modified such that A_4 until A_{11} remain unchanged. In the original description of SHA-256, this implies that the internal state at step 11, *i.e.*, $\langle A_{11}, \dots, H_{11} \rangle$ does not change, and thus we connect to the rest of the semi-free start collision. More specifically, for every i , $3 \leq i \leq 10$, the new value of the i -th message word is computed as

$$W_i = A_{i+1} - F(A_i, A_{i-1}, A_{i-2}, A_{i-3}, A_{i-4}, A_{i-5}, A_{i-6}) - A_{i-7} . \quad (15)$$

In the message words W_9 and W_{10} there is an additive difference of 1 and -1 , respectively. This does not pose a problem since the construction of the semi-free start condition guarantees that these will have the intended effect, regardless of the values of W_9 and W_{10} , see Sect. 3.3.

3. Now we need to verify again if conditions (7) and (8) are still satisfied, since they depend on W_{16} and W_{17} , which may have changed. If the conditions are not satisfied, simply restart and make different choices for W_0, W_1 and/or W_2 .

Recall however that we have spent extra effort in the first phase of the attack to choose the constants α, β, γ and ϵ such that there are many values for W_{16} and W_{17} that satisfy the conditions. For the constants given in (11) and (12), there are 2^{45} allowed values for these two

Table 4. Example Colliding Message Pair for 23-Step Reduced SHA-256.

M	29f1ebfb _x	4468041a _x	1e6565b6 _x	4cc17e75 _x
	4ea4f993 _x	33a77104 _x	864a828d _x	1dcec3d2 _x
	d33d7b02 _x	bcd4a2d7 _x	3b10201d _x	39953548 _x
	8e127f2b _x	0304fc01 _x	e7118577 _x	43b12ca7 _x
M'	29f1ebfb _x	4468041a _x	1e6565b6 _x	4cc17e75 _x
	4ea4f993 _x	33a77104 _x	864a828d _x	1dcec3d2 _x
	d33d7b02 _x	bcd4a2d8 _x	3b10201c _x	3995d548 _x
	91129f2a _x	0304fc01 _x	e7118577 _x	43b12ca7 _x
H	c77405ea _x	8bfe2016 _x	ff0531b6 _x	a89b81f6 _x
	e98cf052 _x	491a6c62 _x	fd009a40 _x	3969dc83 _x

expanded message words. This translates into a probability of 2^{-19} that the conditions (7) and (8) are indeed still satisfied. We hence expect to have to repeat this procedure about 2^{19} times. Every trial requires an effort equivalent to about 10 steps of SHA-256.

4. After a successful modification of the first message words, the expanded message words W_{18} until W_{22} need to be recomputed, and also the corresponding steps need to be redone. The construction of the semi-free start collision still guarantees that no differences will be introduced.

If we consider the first phase to be a precomputation, the overall attack complexity is about 2^{18} evaluations of the compression function of SHA-256 reduced to 23 steps. An example collision pair for 23-step reduced SHA-256 is given in Table 4.

4.2 24 Step Collision

The same approach can be extended to 24 steps of SHA-256. The entire attack is simply shifted down by one step. Because of this, one more message word, W_0 , needs to be computed from the message expansion in the reverse direction when constructing a 24-step semi-free start collision. From the message expansion in the reverse direction, it follows that the additive difference in this word is

$$\delta W_0 = \delta W_{16} - \delta \sigma_1(W_{14}) - \delta W_9 - \delta \sigma_0(W_1) . \quad (16)$$

None of these expanded message words has a difference, so also $\delta W_0 = 0$.

When turning the semi-free start collision into a collision, however, the value of the expanded message word W_{16} (which was W_{15} , a non-expanded message word, in the 23-step attack) should not change. In a

straightforward extension of the 23-step collision attack to 24 steps, this extra condition would only be satisfied with a probability of 2^{-32} . Using the available freedom in a better way, this can be improved tremendously.

1. Set $\langle A_0, \dots, A_{-7} \rangle$ to the SHA-256 initial values. Make an arbitrary choice for W_0 and recompute the first step. Now, it follows from (4) that $(A_2 - W_1)$ is a constant

$$c_1 = A_2 - W_1 . \quad (17)$$

2. The new value of W_9 is determined from (15), *i.e.*, it depends on A_2 through A_{10} . The state variables A_5 through A_{10} have already been fixed in the semi-free start collision. If we additionally fix A_4 and A_3 to arbitrary values, it is possible to compute the sum of W_9 and A_2 ,

$$c_2 = W_9 + A_2 = A_{10} - F(A_9, \dots, A_3) . \quad (18)$$

3. From (1) and (17)-(18), it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} W_{16} &= \sigma_1(W_{14}) + W_9 + \sigma_0(W_1) + W_0 , \\ &= \sigma_1(W_{14}) + c_2 - c_1 - W_1 + \sigma_0(W_1) + W_0 , \\ &= c_3 + \sigma_0(W_1) - W_1 . \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

It is easy to find a suitable value for W_1 that ensures that W_{16} has the proper value, if it exists. It suffices to guess the 15 least significant bits of W_1 to compute all 32 bits of W_1 , satisfying the above condition with probability 2^{-14} . A conservative estimate is that each trial requires an effort equivalent to one step update of SHA-256.

4. Now there is no more freedom left, as all the internal state variables have been fixed. The corresponding message words can be found from (15) and the message expansion. Just like in the 23-step collision attack, however, there are still some conditions left. As explained in Sect. 4.1, these are satisfied with a probability of 2^{-19} .

Hence, the overall expected time complexity is equivalent to about $2^{19} \cdot (2^{14} + 10)$ SHA-256 step computations, or about $2^{28.5}$ evaluations of the SHA-256 compression function reduced to 24 steps. An example collision pair for 24-step reduced SHA-256 is given in Table 5. An extension of this attack method beyond 24 steps fails, because then a difference in the first message word, W_0 , becomes unavoidable. In [13], another differential than the one shown in Table 3 is used to find 22-step collisions for SHA-256. We tried to use this differential in our extended attacks, but even for 23 steps, using this differential fails.

Table 5. Example Colliding Message Pair for 24-Step Reduced SHA-256.

M	0187e08e _x	865cedaf _x	5b69e21a _x	e0f7485e _x
	50b98993 _x	217e4650 _x	51e3cf65 _x	c2997c68 _x
	2c267e16 _x	82ffa4e9 _x	37b5af09 _x	5b28721d _x
	1be35597 _x	7ff22aa1 _x	e807a758 _x	c1519aaa _x
M'	0187e08e _x	865cedaf _x	5b69e21a _x	e0f7485e _x
	50b98993 _x	217e4650 _x	51e3cf65 _x	c2997c68 _x
	2c267e16 _x	82ffa4e9 _x	37b5af0a _x	5b28721c _x
	1be3f597 _x	82f24aa0 _x	e807a758 _x	c1519aaa _x
H	1584074c _x	8b810a94 _x	01ea31b1 _x	81bffd02 _x
	d29c817d _x	e4e04b51 _x	b9f5ac4f _x	6b34d1f8 _x

4.3 Extensions

Further extensions using weaker attack models are discussed in Appendix A. Section A.1 considers SHA-224 and shows free start collisions for one more step, *i.e.*, 25 steps of SHA-224. Finally, in Sect. A.2, free-start near collision attacks for up to 31 steps of SHA-256 are explored.

5 Conclusion

Our results push the limit to cryptanalysis for step reduced but otherwise unmodified SHA-256; we found practical collisions for up to 24 steps. For almost half of the steps (31 out of 64) non-random properties are detectable in practice. Even though we did not perform a detailed analysis, we expect very similar results for SHA-512.

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A Further Extensions

This appendix explores further extensions towards weaker collision-style attacks on a larger number of steps of SHA-256 and SHA-224.

A.1 Free Start Collisions for 25 Steps of SHA-224

SHA-224 differs from SHA-256 in two ways. First, it has different initial values, and second, the output is truncated to the leftmost 224 bits. We

can thus extend the 24-step semi-free start collision of SHA-256 from Sect. 4.2 to a 25-step free start collision of SHA-224 by simply shifting the same attack down one more step. Now a difference will inevitably appear in W_0 , which propagates to the initial value H_0 . The other initial values, A_0 through G_0 still have a zero difference. Because the word H is truncated away in SHA-224, this results in free start collisions for 25 steps of SHA-224.

A.2 Free-Start Near Collisions of SHA-256

Extending the attack to more steps is possible, provided that some differences are allowed both in the initial value and in the hash result, *i.e.*, when considering free-start near collisions. The starting point is again the 23-step semi-free start collision attack from Sect. 3. It is extended by adding a number of extra backward and forward steps. For a given number of steps, the attacker can choose how to split the required extra steps into backward and forward steps.

As explained in Sect. 4.2, no difference is introduced in the first backward step. Note also that the diffusion of differences is slower in the backward direction than in the forward direction. A difference introduced in an expanded message word W_i affects both A_{i+1} and E_{i+1} in the forward direction, as opposed to only H_i when going in the backward direction. Thus, in the forward direction, all state words can be affected by a single difference in an expanded message word after only four rounds. In the backward direction, this takes eight rounds.

We have done several experiments, each equivalent to an effort of 2^{32} reduced SHA-256 compression function evaluations, which are summarised in Table 6. The first three columns give the total number of steps, and the number of extra backward and extra forward steps, respectively. The fourth column gives k_{\min} , the smallest Hamming distance found. The last eight columns contain the 2-logarithm of the number of solutions with a Hamming distance k of at most 8, 16, \dots , 64 bits. For comparison, also the expected values for a generic birthday attack with an equal effort of 2^{32} is given.

For a generic (free-start) near collision attack on an ideal n -bit hash function, using the birthday paradox with an effort of 2^w compression function evaluations, the lowest expected Hamming distance is the lowest k for which

$$2^{2w} \cdot \left(\sum_{i=0}^k 2^{-n} \binom{n}{i} \right) \geq 1 . \quad (20)$$

Table 6. Experimental results of the free-start near collision attack on SHA-256. For each number of steps, only the combination of forward/backward steps that gave the best results is shown. For comparison, the expected numbers of solutions for a generic birthday attack with an equal effort are also given.

steps	bwd.	fwd.	k_{\min}	2-logarithm of the number of solutions with k							
				≤ 8	≤ 16	≤ 24	≤ 32	≤ 40	≤ 48	≤ 56	≤ 64
25	1	1	2	31.95	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00
26	2	1	8	24.17	31.55	31.99	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00	32.00
27	3	1	11	$-\infty$	15.41	26.20	30.65	31.89	32.00	32.00	32.00
28	4	1	18	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	8.77	20.41	27.24	30.63	31.80	31.99
29	5	1	32	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	1.58	14.31	22.86	28.19	30.93
30	6	1	43	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	10.73	19.58	25.68
31	6	2	53	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	$-\infty$	6.34	15.50
Birthday Attack			57	-143.41	-108.84	-80.49	-56.36	-35.51	-17.37	-1.57	12.14

For instance, with $w = 32$ and for SHA-256 (*i.e.*, $n = 256$), this gives $k = 57$ bits. Our attack performs significantly better for up to 30 steps of SHA-256. For 31 steps, we still found 208 free-start near collisions with a Hamming distance of at most 57 bits, whereas a birthday attack is only expected to find one with the same effort.

B Solving $\mathcal{L}(x + \delta) = \mathcal{L}(x) + \delta'$

This section describes a generic method to solve equations of the form $\mathcal{L}(x + \delta) = \mathcal{L}(x) + \delta'$ where δ and δ' are given n -bit additive differences, and \mathcal{L} is an n -bit to n -bit GF(2)-linear transformation. This is a similar problem to the ones studied by Lipmaa and Moriai [5] and Lipmaa *et al.* [6].

Consider the modular addition $x + \delta$ and let $\Delta = (x + \delta) \oplus x$. This addition is described by the following equations, where x_i is the i -th bit of x and the c_i 's are the carry bits:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (x + \delta)_i &= x_i \oplus \delta_i \oplus c_i & c_i &= \delta_i \oplus \Delta_i \\
 c_{i+1} &= f_{\text{maj}}(x_i, \delta_i, c_i) & \Leftrightarrow & c_{i+1} = f_{\text{maj}}(x_i, \delta_i, \delta_i \oplus \Delta_i) \quad . \quad (21) \\
 c_0 &= 0 & c_0 &= 0
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, once we fix both the additive difference δ and the XOR difference Δ , all the c_i 's are fixed. Some of the x_i 's are also fixed: when $\Delta_i = 1$ and $i + 1 < n$, it must hold that $x_i = c_{i+1} = \delta_{i+1} \oplus \Delta_{i+1}$. This means

that the allowed values for x lie in an affine space. Note that not all additive differences are consistent with all XOR differences, *i.e.*, the following conditions must be satisfied

$$\begin{cases} c_0 = \delta_0 \oplus \Delta_0 = 0 \\ \delta_i = \delta_{i+1} \oplus \Delta_{i+1} \quad \text{when } \Delta_i = 0 \text{ and } i + 1 < n \end{cases} \quad (22)$$

Solving an equation of the form $\mathcal{L}(x + \delta) = \mathcal{L}(x) + \delta'$ can be done as follows. Let $\Delta' = (\mathcal{L}(x) + \delta') \oplus \mathcal{L}(x)$, *i.e.*, the XOR-difference associated with the modular addition $\mathcal{L}(x) + \delta'$. Since $\mathcal{L}(x + \delta) = \mathcal{L}(x) + \delta'$ and \mathcal{L} is GF(2)-linear, it follows that $\Delta' = \mathcal{L}(\Delta)$. We can thus simply enumerate all the XOR-differences Δ consistent with δ , compute $\Delta' = \mathcal{L}(\Delta)$ and check if this is consistent with δ' . If it is, both additions restrict x to a (different) affine space. The intersection of these spaces, which can be computed by solving a system of linear equations over GF(2), gives the solutions x for the chosen Δ . Note that the intersection may be empty. If no solutions are found for any value of Δ , the equation $\mathcal{L}(x + \delta) = \mathcal{L}(x) + \delta'$ has no solutions.

The time complexity of this method is proportional to the minimum of the number of XOR differences consistent with δ or δ' . This follows from the fact that one can easily modify the method to choose Δ' instead of Δ .