

Dynamic SHA-2

Zijie Xu

E-mail: xuzijiewz@gmail.com

Abstract. In this paper I describe the construction of Dynamic SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash functions. They are built with design components from the SHA-2 family, but I use the bits in message as parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation in the new hash function. It enabled us to achieve a novel design principle: *When message is changed, the calculation will be different.* It makes the system can resistant against all extant attacks.

Key words: Cryptographic hash function, SHA, Dynamic SHA-2

1 Introduction

The SHA-2 family of hash functions was designed by NSA and adopted by NIST in 2000 as a standard that is intended to replace SHA-1 in 2010 [6]. Since MD5, SHA-0 and SHA-1 was brought out, people have not stopped attacking them, and they succeed. Such as: den Boer and Bosselaers [2,3] in 1991 and 1993, Vaudenay [8] in 1995, Dobbertin [5] in 1996 and 1998, Chabaud and Joux [4] in 1998, Biham and Chen [1] in 2004, and Wang et al. [9–12] in 2005. Most well known cryptographic hash functions such as: MD4, MD5, HAVAL, RIPEMD, SHA-0 and SHA-1, have succumbed to those attacks.

Since the developments in the field of cryptographic hash functions, NIST decided to run a 4 year hash competition for selection of a new cryptographic hash standard [7]. And the new cryptographic hash standard will provide message digests of 224, 256, 384 and 512-bits.

In those attacks, we can find that when different message inputted, the operation in the hash function is no change. If message space is divided many parts, in different part, the calculation is different, the attacker will not know the relationship between message and hash value. The hash function will be secure. To achieve the purpose, Dynamic SHA-2 use bits in message as parameter of function G, R and ROTR operation to realize the principle.

My Work: By introducing a novel design principle in the design of hash functions, and by using components from the SHA-2 family, I describe the design of a new family of cryptographic hash functions called Dynamic SHA-2. The principle is:

When message is changed, the calculation will be different.

The principle combined with the already robust design principles present in SHA-2 enabled us to build a compression function of Dynamic SHA-2 that has the following properties:

1. There is not message expansion part.
2. The iterative part includes three parts.
3. The first part includes one round. Mix message words 1 times.
4. The second part includes 9 rounds. Mix no message word.
5. The third part includes 7 rounds. Mix message words 7 times.

2 Preliminaries and notation

In this paper I will use the same notation as that of NIST: FIPS 180-2 description of SHA-2 [6].

The following operations are applied to 32-bit or 64-bit words in Dynamic SHA-2:

1. Bitwise logical word operations: ' \wedge '—AND, ' \vee '—OR, ' \oplus '—XOR and ' \neg '—Negation.
2. Addition '+' modulo 2^{32} or modulo 2^{64} .

3. The shift right operation, $SHR^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).
4. The shift left operation, $SHL^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).
5. The rotate right (circular right shift) operation, $ROTR^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).
6. The rotate left (circular left shift) operation, $ROTL^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).

Depending on the context I will sometimes refer to the hash function as Dynamic SHA-2, and sometimes as Dynamic SHA-224/256 or Dynamic SHA-384/512.

2.1 Functions

Dynamic SHA-2 includes three functions. The functions are used in compression function.

2.1.1 Function $G(x_1, x_2, x_3, t)$

Function G operates on three words x_1, x_2, x_3 and an integer t , produces a word y as output. And function G as follow:

$$y = G_t(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \begin{cases} x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 & t = 0 \\ (x_1 \wedge x_2) \oplus x_3 & t = 1 \\ (\neg(x_1 \vee x_3)) \vee (x_1 \wedge (x_2 \oplus x_3)) & t = 2 \\ (\neg(x_1 \vee (x_2 \oplus x_3))) \vee (x_1 \wedge \neg x_3) & t = 3 \end{cases}$$

Table 1.1. function G for Dynamic SHA-2

x_1	x_2	x_3	f_1	f_2	f_3	f_4
0	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	0	1	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	0	1
1	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	1	0	0	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	0	0	0

Table 1.2 Truth table for logical functions

2.1.2 Function $R(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, t)$

Function R operates on eight words $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8$ and an integer t . produces one word y as output. Function R as follow:

$$y = ROTR^t((((x_1 \oplus x_2) + x_3) \oplus x_4) + x_5) \oplus x_6) + x_7) \oplus x_8$$

2.1.3 Function $COMP(hv_1, hv_2, \dots, hv_8, w(1), w(2), \dots, w(8), t)$

Function $ME1$ operates on sixteen words $hv_1, hv_2, \dots, hv_8, w(1), w(2), \dots, w(8)$ and an integer t . Function $COMP$ is defined as table 2.

2.2 Dynamic SHA-2 Constants

Dynamic SHA-2 does not use any constants.

<p>Dynamic SHA-224/256</p>	$T = R(hv1, hv2, hv3, hv4, hv5, hv6, hv7, hv8, w(t) \wedge 31)$ $hv8 = hv7$ $hv7 = ROTR^{(SHR^5(w(t))) \wedge 31}(hv6)$ $hv6 = hv5 + w((t + 3) \wedge 7)$ $hv5 = ROTR^{(SHR^{10}(w(t))) \wedge 31}(hv4)$ $hv4 = G(hv1, hv2, hv3, SHR^{30}(w(t))) + w((t + 2) \wedge 7)$ $hv3 = hv2$ $hv2 = hv1$ $hv1 = T + w((t + 1) \wedge 7)$ $T = R(hv1, hv2, hv3, hv4, hv5, hv6, hv7, hv8, (SHR^{15}(w(t))) \wedge 31)$ $hv8 = hv7 + w((t + 7) \wedge 7)$ $hv7 = ROTR^{(SHR^{20}(w(t))) \wedge 31}(hv6)$ $hv6 = hv5 + w((t + 6) \wedge 7)$ $hv5 = ROTR^{(SHR^{25}(w(t))) \wedge 31}(hv4)$ $hv4 = G(hv1, hv2, hv3, t \wedge 3) + w((t + 5) \wedge 7)$ $hv3 = hv2 + w(t)$ $hv2 = hv1$ $hv1 = T + w((t + 4) \wedge 7)$
<p>Dynamic SHA-384/512</p>	$T = R(hv1, hv2, hv3, hv4, hv5, hv6, hv7, hv8, w(t) \wedge 63)$ $hv8 = hv7$ $hv7 = ROTR^{(SHR^6(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv6)$ $hv6 = ROTR^{(SHR^{12}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv5) + w((t + 3) \wedge 7)$ $hv5 = ROTR^{(SHR^{18}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv4)$ $hv4 = G(hv1, hv2, hv3, SHR^{62}(w(t))) + w((t + 2) \wedge 7)$ $hv3 = ROTR^{(SHR^{24}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv2)$ $hv2 = hv1$ $hv1 = T + w((t + 1) \wedge 7)$ $T = R(hv1, hv2, hv3, hv4, hv5, hv6, hv7, hv8, (SHR^{30}(w(t))) \wedge 63)$ $hv8 = hv7 + w((t + 7) \wedge 7)$ $hv7 = ROTR^{(SHR^{36}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv6)$ $hv6 = ROTR^{(SHR^{42}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv5) + w((t + 6) \wedge 7)$ $hv5 = ROTR^{(SHR^{48}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv4)$ $hv4 = G(hv1, hv2, hv3, (SHR^{60}(w(t))) \wedge 3) + w((t + 5) \wedge 7)$ $hv3 = hv2 + w(t)$ $hv2 = ROTR^{(SHR^{54}(w(t))) \wedge 63}(hv1)$ $hv1 = T + w((t + 4) \wedge 7)$

Table 2 function COMP for Dynamic SHA-2

2.3 Preprocessing

Preprocessing in Dynamic SHA-2 is exactly the same as that of SHA-2. That means that these three steps: padding the message M , parsing the padded message into message blocks, and setting the initial hash value, H^0 are the same as in SHA-2. Thus in the parsing step the message is parsed into N blocks of 512 bits (resp. 1024

bits), and the i -th block of 512 bits (resp. 1024 bits) is a concatenation of sixteen 32-bit (resp. 64-bit) words denoted as $M_0^{(i)}, M_1^{(i)}, \dots, M_{15}^{(i)}$.

Dynamic SHA-2 may be used to hash a message, M , having a length of l bits, where $0 \leq l < 2^{64}$.

2.3.1 Padding

Suppose that the length of the message M is L bits. Append the bit “1” to the end of the message, followed by k zero bits, where k is the smallest, non-negative solution to the equation $L+1+k \equiv 448 \pmod{512}$ (resp. $L+1+k \equiv 960 \pmod{1024}$). Then append the 64-bit block that is equal to the number L expressed using a binary representation.

2.4 Initial Hash Value H^0

The initial hash value, H^0 for Dynamic SHA is the same as that of SHA-2 (given in Table 3.1).

Dynamic SHA-224	Dynamic SHA-256	Dynamic SHA-384	Dynamic SHA-512
$H_0^{(0)} = c1059ed8,$	$H_0^{(0)} = 6a09e667,$	$H_0^{(0)} = cbbb9d5dc1059ed8,$	$H_0^{(0)} = 6a09e667f3bcc908,$
$H_1^{(0)} = 367cd507,$	$H_1^{(0)} = bb67ae85,$	$H_1^{(0)} = 629a292a367cd507,$	$H_1^{(0)} = bb67ae8584caa73b,$
$H_2^{(0)} = 3070dd17,$	$H_2^{(0)} = 3c6ef372,$	$H_2^{(0)} = 9159015a3070dd17,$	$H_2^{(0)} = 3c6ef372fe94f82b,$
$H_3^{(0)} = f70e5939,$	$H_3^{(0)} = a54ff53a,$	$H_3^{(0)} = 152fec8d8f70e5939,$	$H_3^{(0)} = a54ff53a5f1d36f1,$
$H_4^{(0)} = ffc00b31,$	$H_4^{(0)} = 510e527f,$	$H_4^{(0)} = 67332667ffc00b31,$	$H_4^{(0)} = 510e527fade682d1f,$
$H_5^{(0)} = 68581511,$	$H_5^{(0)} = 9b05688c,$	$H_5^{(0)} = 8eb44a8768581511,$	$H_5^{(0)} = 9b05688c2b3e6c1f,$
$H_6^{(0)} = 64f98fa7,$	$H_6^{(0)} = 1f83d9ab,$	$H_6^{(0)} = db0c2e0d64f98fa7,$	$H_6^{(0)} = 1f83d9abfb41bd6b,$
$H_7^{(0)} = befa4fa4,$	$H_7^{(0)} = 5be0cd19,$	$H_7^{(0)} = 47b5481dbefa4fa4,$	$H_7^{(0)} = 5be0cd19137e2179,$

Table 3.1 The initial hash value, H^0 for Dynamic SHA

2.5 Dynamic SHA-2 Hash Computation

The Dynamic SHA-2 hash computation uses functions and initial values defined in previous subsections. So, after the preprocessing is completed, each message block, $M^{(0)}, M^{(1)}, \dots, M^{(N)}$, is processed in order, using the steps described algorithmically in Table 3.2.

The algorithm uses 1) a message schedule of forty-eight 32-bit (resp. 64-bit) words, 2) eight working variables of 32 bits (resp. 64 bits), and 3) a hash value of eight 32-bit (resp. 64-bit) words. The final result of Dynamic SHA-256 is a 256-bit message digest and of Dynamic SHA-512 is a 512-bit message digest. The final result of Dynamic SHA-224 and Dynamic SHA-384 are also 256 and 512 bits, but the output is then truncated as in SHA-2 to 224 (resp. 384 bits). The words of the message schedule are labeled W_0, W_1, \dots, W_{47} . The eight working variables are labeled a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h and sometimes they are called “state register”. The words of the hash value are labeled $H_0^{(i)}, H_1^{(i)}, \dots, H_7^{(i)}$, which will hold the initial hash value, $H^{(0)}$, replaced by each successive intermediate hash value (after each message block is processed), $H^{(i)}$, and ending with the final hash value, $H^{(N)}$.

Dynamic SHA-2 also uses one temporary words T .

3 Security of Dynamic SHA-2

In this section I will make an initial analysis of how strongly collision resistant, preimage resistant and second preimage resistant Dynamic SHA-2 is. I will start by describing our design rationale, then I will analyze the properties of the message

expansion part and finally I will discuss the strength of the function against known attacks for finding different types of collisions.

<p>For $i = 1$ to N:</p> <p>{</p> <p>1. Initialize eight working variables a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h with the $(i-1)^{th}$ hash value:</p> $\begin{array}{cccc} a = H_0^{(i-1)} & b = H_1^{(i-1)} & c = H_2^{(i-1)} & d = H_3^{(i-1)} \\ e = H_4^{(i-1)} & f = H_5^{(i-1)} & g = H_6^{(i-1)} & h = H_7^{(i-1)} \end{array}$ <p>2. Iterative part</p> <p>2.1 The first iterative part</p> $COMP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5, w_6, w_7, t)$ $COMP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, w_8, w_9, w_{10}, w_{11}, w_{12}, w_{13}, w_{14}, w_{15}, t)$ <p>2.2 The second iterative part</p> <p>For $t=0$ to 8</p> <p>{</p> $T = ROTR^{((((a+b) \oplus c) + d) \oplus e) + f) \oplus g} (h)$ $h = g$ $g = f$ $f = e$ $e = d$ $d = c$ $c = b$ $b = a$ $a = T$ <p>}</p> <p>2.3 The third iterative part</p> <p>For $t=1$ to 7</p> <p>{</p> $COMP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5, w_6, w_7, t)$ $COMP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, w_8, w_9, w_{10}, w_{11}, w_{12}, w_{13}, w_{14}, w_{15}, t)$ <p>}</p> <p>3. Compute the i^{th} intermediate hash value $H^{(i)}$:</p> $\begin{array}{cccc} H_0^{(i)} = a + H_0^{(i-1)} & H_1^{(i)} = b + H_1^{(i-1)} & H_2^{(i)} = c + H_2^{(i-1)} & H_3^{(i)} = d + H_3^{(i-1)} \\ H_4^{(i)} = e + H_4^{(i-1)} & H_5^{(i)} = f + H_5^{(i-1)} & H_6^{(i)} = g + H_6^{(i-1)} & H_7^{(i)} = h + H_7^{(i-1)} \end{array}$ <p>}</p>
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Table 3.2 Algorithmic description of Dynamic SHA-2 hash function.

3.2 Properties of iterative part

The iterative part includes three parts.

3.2.1 Properties of iterative part one

In iterative part one, all message bits have been mixed. And function COMP is called twice. All bits in message words W_0, W_8 have been used as parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation.

3.2.2 Properties of iterative part two

It is relatively easy to prove the following Theorem:

Theorem 1: The iterative part two of Dynamic SHA-2 is a bijection $\mathcal{E}: \{0,1\}^{8 \times w} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{8 \times w}$. working variables are w -bit words.

Proof. Let $hv(1)=(a(1), b(1), c(1), d(1),e(1), f(1), g(1), h(1))$. where $a(1), b(1), c(1), d(1),e(1), f(1), g(1), h(1)$ are working variables before iterative part two. And $hv(1a)=(a(1a), b(1a), c(1a), d(1a),e(1a), f(1a), g(1a), h(1a))$ are working variables before iterative part two.

The working variables are b-bit words. Then we have the function $F(hv(1))=hv(1a)$ and $F : \{0,1\}^{8 \times w} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{8 \times w}$.

It is enough to known that, to a given $hv(1)'$, there is a $hv(1a)$ make $F(hv(1)')=hv(1a)$.

To a given $hv(1a)'$, it is easy to backward the iterative part two and compute the unique value for $hv(1)$. So to a given $hv(1a)'$, there is a $hv(1)$ make $F(hv(1))=hv(1a)'$.

So Dynamic SHA-2 is a bijection $\xi : \{0,1\}^{8 \times w} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{8 \times w}$ \square

After iterative part one, all bits in message have been mixed. And there is $T = ROTR^{((((a+b) \oplus c) + d) \oplus e) + f) \oplus g}(h)$ in iterative part two. It is enough to known that all bits in working variables a, b, c, d, e, f, g will affect all bits in temporary words T . After call $T = ROTR^{((((a+b) \oplus c) + d) \oplus e) + f) \oplus g}(h)$ 9 times, all bits in $hv(1)$ will affect all bits in $hv(1a)$. If there is iterative part two, some bits in message will not affect all bits in last hash value.

3.2.3 Properties of iterative part three

In iterative part three, all message bits have been mixed seven times. And function COMP is called fourteen times. All bits in message words $W_1, W_2, W_3, W_4, W_5, W_6, W_7, W_9, W_{10}, W_{11}, W_{12}, W_{13}, W_{14}, W_{15}$ have been used as parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation.

In iterative part one and three, all bits in message have been used as parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation. This will divide message space into 2^{512} (resp. 2^{1024}) parts.

3.3 Design rationale

The reasons for principle: *When message is changed, the calculation will be different.*

From the definition of function G, R and ROTR operations, it is easy to know all bits in message have been used as parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation. One bit different in message, different logical function or different ROTR operation will be done, and it will make the calculation different. Different message will lead to different calculation, these different calculations divide message space into 2^{512} (resp. 2^{1024}) parts. In a part there is $2^{512-512} = 1$ (resp. $2^{1024-1024} = 1$) message value.

Why Dynamic SHA-2 does not have constants?

The reasons why I decided not to use any constants is that Dynamic SHA-2 is secure enough.

Controlling the differentials is hard in Dynamic SHA-2:

In Dynamic SHA-2, it is known that when message is changed, the calculation will be different. To analyze Dynamic SHA-2, it need the unchangeable formulas that represent function describe function G, R and data-depend ROTR operation. There are three ways to analyze Dynamic SHA-2:

1. Guess the parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation. The parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation divide message space into 2^{512} (resp. 2^{1024}) parts. This way is select a part in the message value space. And there is only one message value in a part. It can not find collisions in the same part.
2. Someone can use Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) to represent Dynamic SHA-2, but the ANFs that represent function R has up to 2^{261} (resp. 2^{518}) monomials.
3. Someone can constitute Arithmetic functions to represent Dynamic SHA-2 as in Appendix 2. But the Arithmetic function that represents function R and G is complex exponential function with round-off instruction. After iterative parts, the Arithmetic function that represents function R and G will be very huge.

3.4 Finding Preimages of Dynamic SHA-2

To a hash function $f(\cdot)$, it need satisfy:

Given hash value $H=f(M)$, it is hard to find message M that meet $H=f(M)$.

There are two ways to find preimages of a hash function:

1, From the definition of Dynamic SHA-2 (similarly as with SHA-2) it follows that from a given hash digest it is possible to perform backward iterative steps by guessing values that represent some relations between working variables of the extension part.

To do this, it needs the parameter of the ROTR operation and function G, R in Dynamic SHA-2. But in Dynamic SHA-2, when message changed, the parameter of the ROTR operation and function G, R will change. So attacker had to guess the parameter that will be used in Dynamic SHA-2. From the definition of Dynamic SHA-2, it is know that all bits in message are used as the parameter of the ROTR operation and function G, R . When attacker completes guessing parameters, he has guessed all bits in message.

2, The probability of random guess of finding preimages is 2^{-224} (resp. 2^{-256} , 2^{-384} , 2^{-512}).

3.5 Finding Second Preimages of Dynamic SHA-2

To a hash function $f(\cdot)$, it need satisfy:

Given M , it is hard to find M' s.t. $f(M) = f(M')$.

There are four ways to find second preimages of a hash function:

1, Get hash value H of message M , and find different message M' that has hash value H . then the problem become find Preimages of the hash function.

2, Given M , and find out the relationship between the difference $\Delta M=(M1-M)$ and the difference $\Delta H=f(M1)-f(M)$. And find out $\Delta M \neq 0$ that make $\Delta H=0$. To do this, someone will set up some system of equations obtained from the definition of the hash function, then trace forward and backward some initial bit differences that will result in fine tuning and annulling of those differences and finally obtain second preimages. It need know the unchangeable formulas that represent hash function f . In Dynamic SHA-2, when message is changed, the calculation is different. To get unchangeable formulas that represent hash function f , it need get ANFs for Dynamic SHA-2. And the ANFs that represent function R has up to 2^{261} (resp. 2^{518}) monomials. Or it can constitute Arithmetic functions to represent Dynamic SHA-2. And the Arithmetic functions that represent function R and G are complex exponential function with round-off instruction like equation (1.1) and (1.2). There exists no mathematical theory that analyzes exponential function like equation (1.1) and (1.2).

3. Guess the parameters of function G, R and ROTR operation. This way is select a part in the message value space. And there is only one message value in a part. It can not find second preimages in the same part.

4. The probability of random guess of finding second preimages is 2^{-224} (resp. 2^{-256} , 2^{-384} , 2^{-512}).

3.6 Finding Collisions in Dynamic SHA-2

To a hash function $f(\cdot)$, it need satisfy:

It is hard to find different M and M' s.t. $f(M) = f(M')$.

There are four ways to find collisions of a hash function:

1, Fix message M , and find different message M' that has hash value $H=f(M)$. then the problem become find Second Preimages of the hash function.

2. Find out the relationship between the (M, M') and the difference $\Delta H=f(M)-f(M')$. And find out (M, M') that make $\Delta H=0$. To do this, someone will set up some system of equations obtained from the definition of the hash function, then trace

forward and backward some initial bit differences that will result in fine tuning and annulling of those differences and finally obtain collisions. It need know the unchangeable formulas that represent hash function f . In Dynamic SHA-2, when message is changed, the calculation is different. To get unchangeable formulas that represent hash function f , it need get ANFs for Dynamic SHA-2. And the ANFs that represent function R has up to 2^{261} (resp. 2^{518}) monomials. Or it can constitute Arithmetic functions to represent Dynamic SHA-2. And the Arithmetic functions that represent function R and G are complex exponential function with round-off instruction like equation (1.1) and (1.2). There exists no mathematical theory that analyzes exponential function like equation (1.1) and (1.2).

3. Guess the parameters of function G , R and ROTR operation. This way is select a part in the message value space. And there is only one message value in a part. It can not find collisions in the same part.
4. The attack base on the birthday paradox. the workload for birthday attack is of $O(2^{112})$ (resp. $O(2^{128})$ $O(2^{192})$ $O(2^{256})$).

3.7 Finding collisions in the reduced compression function of Dynamic SHA-2

If the message bits are mixed less two times. The system will be weak, someone can backward Dynamic SHA-2 as table 6 show.

If the message bits are mixed at least twice, and attacker backward Dynamic SHA-2, he will have a system of more than 32 equation with 16 unknown variables, The probability of there is solution for the system is less than 2^{-512} (resp. 2^{-1024}). And the message space is divided into more that 2^{128} (resp. 2^{256}) parts. In a part, the average number of message values is less than 2^{384} (resp. 2^{768}). The average number of collisions is less than 2^{160} (resp. 2^{128} , 2^{384} , 2^{256}). If an algorithm is developed to find collision for a calculation, then the probability of find the collision is less than 2^{-128} (resp. 2^{-128} , 2^{-256} , 2^{-256}).

4 Improvements

There are some improvements for Dynamic SHA-2:

1. There is no any constant in Dynamic SHA-2. Use constants will increase system security.
2. In HMAC, the initial hash value is random variable to attacker. If Dynamic SHA-2 is used in HMAC, by theorem 3, it is easy know that the probability of hash value is 2^{-224} (resp. 2^{-256} 2^{-384} 2^{-512}).

There are some ways that we can adopt to get random initial hash value, for example: $IV_i = IV_{i-1} + c$, IV_i is i -th initial hash value, c is constant and c is odd number. To do this, it need design new communication protocol.

3. If some algorithms that based on Arithmetic functions and differential analysis are developed. The message expansions that composed with data depend function will increase the degree Arithmetic function that represent Dynamic SHA-2. It will increase the ability that resists differential analysis.

The message expansion maybe makes some hash values have more probability than other hash value. With improvement 2, all hash value will have same probability.

5 Conclusions

In the paper [1-5] and [8-12]. People has successfully attack SHA-2 family, in these attacks, people had use the fact that they can analyze what will happen at some bits in hash value when some bits in message changed.

William Stallings[14] has mentioned that data-depend function will make cipher system has good nonlinear, and composite function of Boolean functions and

Arithmetic functions also make cipher system has good nonlinear. Dynamic SHA-2 carry out the two suggestions. It make Dynamic SHA-2 is more nonlinear than SHA-2.

Function G, R and ROTR operations divided the message space into many parts, in different part, the calculation is different. At the same time, the ANFs for function R have huge number monomials. and the Arithmetic functions represent function R, G is complex exponential function with round-off instruction. So there are three ways to analyses:

1. Constitute Boolean functions to represent Dynamic SHA-2. It needs deal with a big formula. The ANFs that represent function R has up to 2^{160} (resp. 2^{320}) monomials.
2. Constitute Arithmetic functions to represent Dynamic SHA-2. It needs deal with complex exponential function. There exists no mathematical theory that analyzes exponential function like equation (1.1) and (1.2).
3. Guess the parameters of function G, R and ROTR operations. It needs deal with divided message space. The message space is divided into 2^{512} (resp. 2^{1024}) parts. In a part, there is one message value. It can not find the collision in one part..

And based on components from the family SHA-2. I have introduced the principle in the design of Dynamic SHA-2: *When message is changed, the calculation will be different.* And I bring in data depend function G, R, and use bits in message as parameters of function G, R and ROTR operations. These steps realize the principle. The principle enabled us to build a compression function of Dynamic SHA-2 that has not new variable, the iterative part include three iterative parts, it is more robust and resistant against generic multi-block collision attacks, and it is resistant against generic length extension attacks.

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Appendix 1: Constitute Boolean functions to represent function.

We can use Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) to represent function. Gupta and Sarkar[13] have studied it.

Let $n \geq r \geq 1$ be integers and let $F : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^r$ be a vector valued Boolean function. The vector valued function F can be represented as an r -tuple of Boolean functions $F = (F^{(1)}, F^{(2)}, \dots, F^{(r)})$, where $F^{(s)} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ ($s = 1, 2, \dots, r$), and the value of $F^{(s)}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ equals the value of the s -th component of $F(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$. The Boolean functions $F^{(s)}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ can be expressed in the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) as polynomials with n variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n of kind $a_0 \oplus a_1 x_1 \oplus \dots \oplus a_n x_n \oplus a_{1,2} x_1 x_2 \oplus \dots \oplus a_{n-1,n} x_{n-1} x_n \oplus \dots \oplus a_{1,2,\dots,n} x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$, where $a_\lambda \in \{0,1\}$. Each ANF has up to 2^n monomials, depending of the values of the coefficients a_λ .

Function R

Function R operates on six words $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8$ and an integer t and produces a word y as output, where $0 \leq t < w$. So we have $R : \{0,1\}^{8 \times w + \log_2^w} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^w$. It is easy to know that one-bit different in words $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8$. Because the parameter of the rotate right operation is depend on message, with different message different rotate right operation will be done. So the bit in output maybe changed.

So the ANFs to represent function R have up to $2^{8 \times w} \times w$ monomials, where w is bit length of the word.

Function G

Function G operates on six words x_1, x_2, x_3 and an integer t and produces a word y as output, where $0 \leq t < 4$. So we have $R : \{0,1\}^{3 \times w + 2} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^w$. It is easy to know that one-bit different in integer t , different logical will be called, every bit in output maybe change. One-bit different in words x_1, x_2, x_3 , a bit in output maybe change.

So the ANFs to represent function R have up to $2^{3+2} = 2^5$ monomials.

Appendix 2: Constitute Arithmetic functions to represent function.

Gupta and Sarkar [13] had studied how to use Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) to represent function. In this way, all function will be represented as polynomials.

1. Constitute Arithmetic functions to represent Boolean function:

Let $abs(x)$ is absolute value of x . $|x|$ is round-off instruction on x . In Boolean function, 1 is True, 0 is False.

1. To one bit word. The Boolean function can represented with arithmetic functions as follow:

operand	function	arithmetic function
x,y	$z = x \oplus y$	$z = x + y - 2 \times x \times y$
x,y	$z = x \wedge y$	$z = x \times y$
x,y	$z = x \vee y$	$z = x + y - x \times y$
x	$z = \neg x$	$z = 1 - x$

Tables 4.1 represent Boolean function with arithmetic function To Boolean polynomial, it can replace every calculation base on table 4.1.

2. To n-bit word.

If there are three n-bit words x, y, z. if there exist $z = f(x, y)$ where f is Boolean function that in table 4.1.

x, y, z are n-bit words. Let

$$x = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_i \times 2^i$$

$$y = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} y_i \times 2^i$$

$$z = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} z_i \times 2^i$$

where x_i, y_i, z_i is i-th bit of word x, y, z. There exists $z_i = f(x_i, y_i)$, where $0 \leq i \leq n-1$.

To Boolean polynomial, it can replace every calculation base on table 4.1 for every bit in variables of polynomial.

3. If function F includes a series functions f_0, \dots, f_{t-1} as follow:

$$z(x, y, k) = \begin{cases} f_0(x, y) & k = 0 \\ \dots & \\ f_{t-1}(x, y) & k = t-1 \end{cases}$$

Then it can represent as follow:

$$z(x, y, k) = \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} (2^{abs(i-k)} - \left\lfloor \frac{2^{abs(k-i)}}{2} \right\rfloor \times 2) \times (f_i(x, y))$$

Base on above-mentioned three ways, it can represent Boolean function with arithmetic functions.

2. Constitute Arithmetic functions to represent SHR operation:

The shift right operation $SHR^k(x)$ can be represented as follow:

$$y = SHR^k(x) = \left\lfloor \frac{x}{2^k} \right\rfloor \quad (1.0)$$

3. Constitute Arithmetic functions to represent data-depend function R:

There are two ways to constitute Arithmetic functions to represent data-depend function R:

1. Constitute ANFs that represent function R. And replace the Boolean function base on table 4.1. In this way, it will constitute huge and complex Arithmetic function. The ANFs represents function has up to $2^{8 \times w} \times w$ monomials.

2. At first, there exist rotate right (circular right shift) operation $ROTR^k(x)$, where x is n-bit word, and $0 \leq k < n$. It can represent $y = ROTR^k(x)$ as follow:

$$\begin{aligned} y &= ROTR^k(x) \\ &= \left\lfloor \frac{x}{2^k} \right\rfloor + \left(x - \left\lfloor \frac{x}{2^k} \right\rfloor \times 2^k \right) \times 2^{n-k} \\ &= \left\lfloor \frac{x}{2^k} \right\rfloor + x \times 2^{n-k} \end{aligned} \quad (1.1)$$

If function $y = ROTR^k(x)$ is not data-depend function, the k in equation (1.1) is constant, and equation (1.1) is linear equation. The derivative function of linear equation is constant. This means the difference of function value depend the difference of input, and the difference of function value dose not depend the input. In SHA-2, the ROTR operation is not data-depend function, it can constitute linear equation to represent the ROTR operation in SHA2.

If function $y = ROTR^k(x)$ is data-depend function, the k in equation (1.1) is variable, and equation (1.1) is exponential function. And equation (1.1) will be exponential function with round-off instruction. It is hard to represent exponential function with linear equation. The derivative function of exponential function is exponential function. This means the difference of function value depend the difference of input and input. When the input changes, the different of function value maybe change. In Dynamic SHA-2, function R is data-depend function. And if use equation (1.1) represents function R, the equation (1.1) will be complex exponential function. After several rounds, equation (1.1) will be iteration function with equation (1.1), it will be very huge and complex, and there exists no mathematical theory that reduces the size of equation (1.1). It is hard to analyses Dynamic SHA-2 that includes function R.

4. Constitute Arithmetic functions to represent data-depend function G:

There are two ways to constitute Arithmetic functions to represent data-depend function G:

1. Constitute ANFs that represent function G. And replace the Boolean function base on table 4.1.

2. The function G can be represented as follow:

$$y(x_1, x_2, x_3, t) = \sum_{i=0}^3 \left(2^{abs(i-t)} - \left\lfloor \frac{2^{abs(t-i)}}{2} \right\rfloor \times 2 \right) \times (G_i(x_1, x_2, x_3)) \quad (1.2)$$

If function G is not data-depend function, the t in equation (1.2) is constant, and it can replace every calculation in function G_i base on table 4.1 for every bit. The equation (1.2) is equation of higher degree. The Arithmetic functions $F(x_1, x_2, x_3, t)$ will be polynomial that includes monomials like $a \times x_1^{n_1} \times x_2^{n_2} \times x_3^{n_3}$, where a is coefficient, n1, n2, n3 are degree of x_1, x_2, x_3 . The derivative function of equation of higher degree will be lower degree equation. There is a high order derivative function of equation of higher degree will be constant. It is easy to analyze equation (1.2) with differential analysis.

If function G is data-depend function, the t in equation (1.2) is variable, and equation (1.2) will include exponential function monomial. And equation (1.2) will be

exponential function with round-off instruction. The derivative function of exponential function is exponential function. There is not any high order derivative function of exponential function will be constant. It is hard to analyze equation (1.2) with differential analysis.

In Dynamic SHA-2, function G is data-depend function. And if use equation (1.2) represents function G, the equation (1.2) will be complex exponential function. After several rounds, equation (1.2) will be iteration function with equation (1.2), it will be very huge and complex, and there exists no mathematical theory that reduces the size of equation (1.2). It is hard to analyses Dynamic SHA-2 that includes function G.

Compare the Arithmetic function that represent SHA-2, The Arithmetic function that represent Dynamic SHA-2 include exponential function. This make it is harder to analyses Dynamic SHA-2.

Appendix 3: Function G and Function R

Let $p(x)$ is probability of x .

1, Function G:

Function $y=G(x_1, x_2, x_3, t)$ operates on tree words x_1, x_2, x_3 and an integer t , $0 \leq t \leq 3$. Function G use the integer t select a logical function from f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3 . And y, x_1, x_2, x_3 are w -bit word. So the bit-length of (x_1, x_2, x_3, t) is $3 \times w + 2$, the bit-length of y is w .

To a given value $y'=G(x_1, x_2, x_3, t)$, there is $2^{2 \times w + 2}$ 4-tuple (y', x_1, x_2, t) . To a given 4-tuple (y', x_1', x_2', t') . There is the relation:

$$x_4' = \begin{cases} x_1' \oplus x_2' \oplus y' & t=0 \\ (x_1' \wedge x_2') \oplus y' & t=1 \\ \neg(x_1' \vee y') \vee (x_1' \wedge (x_2' \oplus y')) & t=2 \\ (\neg(x_1' \vee (x_2' \oplus y'))) \vee (x_1' \wedge \neg y') & t=3 \end{cases}$$

To given 4-tuple (y', x_1', x_2', t') , it can compute the value for x_3' . So there are $2^{2 \times w + 2}$ 4-tuple (x_1, x_2, x_3, t) have the same value y' . x_1, x_2, x_3, t are random and uncorrelated variable, there is:

$$p(x_1) = p(x_2) = p(x_3) = 2^{-w} \quad \text{and} \quad p(t) = 2^{-2}$$

$$p(y) = \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_2=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_3=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_4=0}^3 p(y | (x_{1_{i_1}}, x_{2_{i_2}}, x_{3_{i_3}}, t_{i_4})) \times p(x_{1_{i_1}}) \times p(x_{2_{i_2}}) \times p(x_{3_{i_3}}) \times p(t_{i_4})$$

$$p(y) = p(x_{1_{i_1}}) \times p(x_{2_{i_2}}) \times p(x_{3_{i_3}}) \times p(t_{i_4}) \times \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_2=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_3=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_4=0}^3 p(y | (x_{1_{i_1}}, x_{2_{i_2}}, x_{3_{i_3}}, t_{i_4}))$$

$$p(y) = 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-2} \times 2^{2 \times w + 2} = 2^{-w}$$

If x_1, x_2, x_3, t are random and uncorrelated, function G will produce random word and

$$p(y) = 2^{-w}$$

2, Function R:

Function $y=R(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, t)$ operates on eight words $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8$ and an integer t . To a given value $y'=R(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, t)$, there is $2^{7 \times w} \times w$ 9-tuple $(y', x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5', x_6', x_7', t')$. To a given 9-tuple $(y', x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5', x_6', x_7', t')$. There is the relation:

$$x_8 = ROTR'((((x_1' \oplus x_2') + x_3') \oplus x_4') + x_5') \oplus x_6') + x_7') \oplus y'$$

To given 9-tuple $(y', x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5', x_6', x_7', t')$, it can compute the value for x_8 . So there are $2^{7 \times w} \times w$ 9-tuple $(y', x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5', x_6', x_7', t')$ have the same value y' . $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, t$ are random and uncorrelated variable, there is:

$$p(x_1) = p(x_2) = p(x_3) = p(x_4) = p(x_5) = p(x_6) = p(x_7) = p(x_8) = 2^{-w}$$

$$p(t) = w^{-1}$$

$$p(y) = \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_2=0}^{2^w-1} \dots \sum_{i_8=0}^{2^w-1} \sum_{i_9=0}^{w-1} p(y | (x_{1_{i_1}}, x_{2_{i_2}}, \dots, x_{8_{i_8}}, t_{i_9})) \times$$

$$\times p(x_1) \times p(x_2) \times p(x_3) \times p(x_4) \times p(x_5) \times p(x_6) \times p(x_7) \times p(x_8) \times p(t)$$

$$p(y) = 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times 2^{-w} \times w^{-1} \times 2^{7 \times w} \times w = 2^{-w}$$

If $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, t$ are random and uncorrelated, function R will produce random word and $p(y) = 2^{-w}$

Appendix 4: Some thing about Dynamic SHA-2

1. Function G and function R

As mentioned at appendix 2, if the variables are random word, function G and R will produced random word.

Function G operates on three words and an integer t, produces a word as output. What function G does is produce confusion word.

Function R operates on eight words and an integer t, produces a word as output. What function R do is confuse the place of bits.

2. Why Dynamic SHA-2 use function G and function R

As mentioned in Appendix 2, when the variable is random word, function G and function R will produce random word.

Function R is data-depend function, the ANFs that describe function R has up to $2^{8 \times w + \log_2^w}$ monomials.

Function R include $(((((x1 \oplus x2) + x3) \oplus x4) + x5) \oplus x6) + x7) \oplus x8$, it include logical operations \oplus and arithmetic operations $+$, this make it hard to describe function R with simple logical operations and arithmetic operations.

3. It is hard analysis Dynamic SHA-2 with linear function and differential analysis

To analyze the relationship between message and hash value, it need the unchangeable formulas that represent hash function. And when message is changed, the calculation will be different.

The ANFs that describe function R has up to $2^{8 \times w + \log_2^w}$ monomials, and it is hard to describe function R with simple logical operations and arithmetic operations. So it is hard analysis Dynamic SHA-2 with linear function and differential analysis.

4. There is 8 rounds in Dynamic SHA-2

From the definition of Dynamic SHA-2, it is easy to know that after 8 rounds, all bits in message had been used as parameter of function G, R and ROTR operations. And the message value space had been divided into 2^{512} (resp. 2^{1024}) parts, in a part, there is only one message value.

From the definition of function COMP, it is easy to backward function COMP. If the message is mixed only one time, the system will be weak. In 8 rounds, the message bits are mixed 8 times, if attacker backward Dynamic SHA-2 as table 6 show, he will have a system of 128 equations with 16 unknown variables. The probability of there exist solution for the system is $2^{-7 \times 512}$ (resp. $2^{-7 \times 1024}$). Or attacker can use random guessing. The probability of random guess of finding preimages is 2^{-224} (resp. 2^{-256} , 2^{-384} , 2^{-512}).

5. Avalanche of Dynamic SHA-2.

After the first iterative part, all bits in message have been mixed. The second iterative part includes $T = ROTR^{((((a+b) \oplus c) + d) \oplus e) + f) \oplus g}(h)$. It is easy to know that one bit different in working variables a, b, c, d, e, f, g will lead to different ROTR operation been done. And after the second iterative part, every bit in working variables that before the second iterative part will affect all bits in working variables that after the second iterative part.

6. It is hard to describe Dynamic SHA-2 with linear function

It is hard to describe data depend function $z = ROTR^x y$ with linear function. The ANF is a way, but the ANFs for function R has up to $2^{8 \times w + \log_2^w}$ monomials. The ANFs that describe data depend function has more monomials than the ANFs that describe other functions. It will be harder to analyze data depend function with linear function.

Appendix 5: Spreading of Dynamic SHA

To simplification, Let:

1. $MW1=(W(0),W(1),W(2),W(3),W(4),W(5),W(6),W(7))$,
 $MW2=(W(8),W(9),W(10),W(11),W(12),W(13),W(14),W(15))$
 $W(j)$ is the message word.
2. $h_v(i)=(a(i), b(i), c(i), d(i),e(i), f(i), g(i), h(i)))$. where $a(i), b(i), c(i), d(i),e(i), f(i), g(i), h(i)$ are working variables at i -th function COMP called.
3. $H_i(h_v(-1),MW1,MW2) = h_v(i) \quad 1 \leq i \leq 15$
4. Message word and working variables are b -bit words.

From the definition of Dynamic SHA-2, it is easy know that function COMP had been called sixteen times, when function COMP is called, MW1 or MW2 will be mixed. So it can describe Dynamic SHA-2 as follow:




Table 5 data processing of Dynamic SHA-2

At first there are two theorems:

Theorem 2:

To function $COMP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, t)$, there is:

1. $MW=(W0, W1, W2, W3, W4, W5, W6, W7)$, where $W0, \dots, W7$ are words that mixed.
 2. $hva=(a0, b0, c0, d0, e0, f0, g0, h0)$. Where $a0, b0, c0, d0, e0, f0, g0, h0$ are working variables that before call function COMP.
 3. $hvb=(a1, b1, c1, d1, e1, f1, g1, h1)$. Where $a1, b1, c1, d1, e1, f1, g1, h1$ are working variables that after call function COMP.
- working variables are b -bit word. hva, MW are random and uncorrelated.

Then there exist:

- (1), $p(hvb)=2^{-8 \times b}$
- (2), $p(hvb|MW)=2^{-8 \times b}$
- (3), $p(hvb|hva)=2^{-8 \times b}$

Proof.

The integer t in function COMP is decided by which round function COMP be. So the integer t can be look as constant. And we can use function $hvb = F(hva, MW)$ describe function COMP. And we have $F : \{0,1\}^{16 \times b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{8 \times b}$. hva, MW are random and uncorrelated. So there is $p(hva)=2^{-8 \times b}$ and $p(MW)=2^{-8 \times b}$

There are $2^{8 \times b}$ MW. To a given MW' , there exist:

To a given hva' , from the definition of F , there is only a hvb that make $hvb = F(hva', MW')$.

And to a given hvb' , it can backward function F , and there is only a hva that make $hvb' = F(hva, MW')$. So there exist:

$$p(hvb) = \sum_{i1=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i2=0}^{2^b-1} p(hvb | (hva(i1), MW(i2))) \times p(hva(i1)) \times p(MW(i2))$$

$$p(hvb) = p(hva) \times p(MW) \times \sum_{i1=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i2=0}^{2^b-1} p(hvb | (hva(i1), MW(i2)))$$

$$p(hvb) = 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{8 \times b} = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

$$p(hvb | MW) = \sum_{i1=0}^{2^b-1} p((hvb | MW) | hva(i1)) \times p(hva(i1))$$

$$p(hvb | MW) = p(hva) \times \sum_{i1=0}^{2^b-1} p((hvb | MW) | hva(i1))$$

$$p(hvb | MW) = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

Dynamic SHA-224/256	$w0 = c1 - a0$ $w5 = d1 - G(b1, a0, b0, t \wedge 3)$ $w6 = f1 - ROTR^{32-(SHR^{10}w0) \wedge 31}(d0)$ $w7 = h1 - ROTR^{32-(SHR^5w0) \wedge 31}(f0)$ $w3 = ROTR^{32-(SHR^{20}w0) \wedge 31}(g1) - e0$ $w2 = ROTR^{32-(SHR^{25}w0) \wedge 31}(e1) - G(a0, b0, c0, SHR^{30}w0)$ $w1 = b1 - R(a0, b0, c0, d0, e0, f0, g0, h0, w0 \wedge 31)$ $d' = ROTR^{32-(SHR^{25}w0) \wedge 31}(e1)$ $e' = f1 - w6$ $f' = e0 + w3$ $g' = ROTR^{32-(SHR^5w0) \wedge 31}(e)$ $w4 = a1 - R(b1, a0, b0, d', e', f', g', g0, (SHR^{15}(w0)) \wedge 31)$
Dynamic SHA-384/512	$w0 = c1 - a0$ $a' = ROTR^{64-((SHR^{54}w0) \wedge 63)}b1$ $c' = ROTR^{64-((SHR^{24}w0) \wedge 63)}b0$ $w5 = d1 - G(a', a0, c', t \wedge 3)$ $w6 = f1 - ROTR^{128-((SHR^{42}w0) \wedge 63)-((SHR^{18}w0) \wedge 63)}(d0)$ $w7 = h1 - ROTR^{64-(SHR^6w0) \wedge 63}(f0)$ $w3 = ROTR^{128-((SHR^{36}w0) \wedge 63)-((SHR^{12}w0) \wedge 63)}(g1) - e0$ $w2 = ROTR^{64-(SHR^{48}w0) \wedge 31}(e1) - G(a0, b0, c0, SHR^{62}w0)$ $w1 = ROTR^{64-(SHR^{54}w0) \wedge 31}(b1) - R(a0, b0, c0, d0, e0, f0, g0, h0, w0 \wedge 63)$ $d' = ROTR^{64-(SHR^{48}w0) \wedge 63}(e1)$ $e' = ROTR^{64-(SHR^{18}w0) \wedge 63}(d0)$ $f' = ROTR^{64-(SHR^{36}w0) \wedge 63}(g1)$ $g' = ROTR^{64-((SHR^6w0) \wedge 63)}(f0)$ $w4 = a1 - R(a', a0, c', d', e', f', g', g0, (SHR^{15}(w0)) \wedge 31)$

Table 6. Relationship of hva, hvb

(3)

To given hva', there exist:

To a given hvb', there is the relationship as table 6, It is easy to compute the value for MW that make $hvb' = F(hva', MW)$. So there exist:

$$p(hvb|hva) = \sum_{i=0}^{2^b-1} p((hvb|hva)|MW(i)) \times p(MW(i)) = 2^{-8 \times b} = 2^{-8 \times b} \quad \square$$

By theorem 1, to function COMP, it is easy to know that:

To a given hva', mix different message words MW, the hvb will be different.
Mix given message words MW', if the hva is different, the hvb will be different.

Theorem 3. In Dynamic SHA-2, there exist:

$$\begin{aligned} (1) p(hv(j)) &= 2^{-8 \times b} \\ (2), p(hv(j)|MW1) &= 2^{-8 \times b} \\ (3), p(hv(j)|MW2) &= 2^{-8 \times b} \\ j &= 1, \dots, 15 \end{aligned}$$

Proof.

hv(-1), MW1 and MW2 are random and uncorrelated, so there exist:

$$\begin{aligned} p(hv(-1)) &= 2^{-8 \times b} \\ p(MW1) &= 2^{-8 \times b} \\ p(MW2) &= 2^{-8 \times b} . \end{aligned}$$

To simplification, Let $F(hv(i-1), MW) = hv(i)$, MW is mixed words MW1 or MW2.

To a given hv(i)' $i = 1, \dots, 15$, there are $2^{16 \times b}$ 2-tuple(MW1, MW2).

To a given 2-tuple(hv(i)', MW1'), there are $2^{8 \times b}$ MW2. To a given 2-tuple (hv(i)', MW2'), there are $2^{8 \times b}$ MW1.

To a given 3-tuple(hv(i)', MW1', MW2'), It is easy to backward iterative steps, and it is easy to compute the value for hv(-1), and the hv(-1) make $H_i(hv(-1), MW1', MW2') = hv(i)'$.

So there exist:

$$p(hv(i)) = \sum_{i_0=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_2=0}^{2^b-1} p(hv(i) | (hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW1_{i_1}, MW2_{i_2})) \times p(hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW1_{i_1}, MW2_{i_2})$$

$$p(hv(i)) = p(hv(-1), MW1, MW2) \times \sum_{i_0=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_2=0}^{2^b-1} p(hv(i) | (hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW1_{i_1}, MW2_{i_2}))$$

$$p(hv(i)) = 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{8 \times b} \times 2^{8 \times b} = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

$$p(hv(i) | MW1) = \sum_{i_0=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^b-1} p((hv(i) | MW1) | (hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW2_{i_1})) \times p(hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW2_{i_1})$$

$$p(hv(i) | MW1) = p(hv(-1), MW2) \times \sum_{i_0=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^b-1} p((hv(i) | MW1) | (hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW2_{i_1}))$$

$$p(hv(i) | MW1) = 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{8 \times b} = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

$$p(hv(i) | MW2) = \sum_{i_0=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^b-1} p((hv(i) | MW2) | (hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW1_{i_1})) \times p(hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW1_{i_1})$$

$$p(hv(i) | MW2) = p(hv(-1), MW1) \times \sum_{i_0=0}^{2^b-1} \sum_{i_1=0}^{2^b-1} p((hv(i) | MW2) | (hv(-1)_{i_0}, MW1_{i_1}))$$

$$p(hv(i) | MW2) = 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{-8 \times b} \times 2^{8 \times b} = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

□

Theorem 4. In Dynamic SHA-2, to a given hv(-1), there exist:

$$p(hv(2) | (hv(-1), MW1)) = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

Proof. To simplification, Let $F(hv(i-1), MW) = hv(i)$, MW is mixed words MW1 or MW2.

Let $F1(hv(1)) = hv(1a)$.

To a given 3-tuple (hv(2)', hv(-1)', MW1'). By theorem 2, there exist a 2-tuple (hv(0), hv(1a)) that make $F(hv(-1)', MW1') = hv(0)$ and $F(hv(1a), MW1') = hv(2)'$.

To a given $hv(1a)'$, by theorem 1, there exist a $hv(1)$ that make $F1(hv(1))=hv(1a)'$.
 To a given 2-tuple $(hv(0)',hv(1)')$. By theorem 2, there exist a $MW2$ that make $F(hv(0)',MW2)=hv(1)'$.
 So there exist:

$$p(hv(2) | (hv(-1), MW1)) = \sum_{i=0}^{2^b-1} p((hv(1) | (hv(-1), MW1)) | MW 2_i) \times p(MW 2_i)$$

$$p(hv(2) | (hv(-1), MW1)) = p(MW 2) \times \sum_{i=0}^{2^b-1} p((hv(1) | (hv(-1), MW1)) | MW 2_i)$$

$$p(hv(2) | (hv(-1), MW1)) = 2^{-8 \times b} \times 1 = 2^{-8 \times b}$$

□

By theorem 3 and 4, it is to know that:

1. When $hv(-1)$ is random variable, the probability of hash value is $2^{-8 \times b}$,
2. To a given $hv(-1)$, the probability of different hash value maybe different.

After first round, the bits in message have been mixed, the mixed bits and working variables value are not uncorrelated, it is hard to analyze the probability of hash value.

To get better property of spreading, Dynamic SHA-2 adopt ways as follow:

1. When the variable of function COMP is random value. Function COMP will produce random value.
2. To reduce the times that message bits mixed, there is no message expansion part in Dynamic SHA-2.