Possibility and impossibility results for selective decommitments

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Abstract

The *selective decommitment problem* can be described as follows: assume an adversary receives a number of commitments and then may request openings of, say, half of them. Do the unopened commitments remain secure? Although this question arose more than twenty years ago, no satisfactory answer could be presented so far. We answer the question in several ways:

1. If simulation-based security is desired (i.e., if we demand that the adversary's output can be simulated by a machine that does not see the unopened commitments), then security is *not achievable* for noninteractive commitment schemes via blackbox reductions to standard cryptographic assumptions. *However,* we show how to achieve security in this sense in two ways: with a non-blackbox reduction to one-way permutations, and with an interactive scheme whose security follows from a blackbox reduction to one-way permutations.
2. If only indistinguishability of the unopened commitments from random commitments is desired, then security is *not achievable* for (interactive or noninteractive) perfectly binding commitment schemes, via blackbox reductions to standard cryptographic assumptions. *However,* any statistically hiding scheme *does* achieve security in this sense.

Our results give an almost complete picture when and how security under selective openings can be achieved. Applications of our results include:

- Essentially, an encryption scheme *must* be non-committing in order to achieve provable security against an adaptive adversary.
- The zero-knowledge interactive proof system for graph 3-coloring due to Goldreich et al. is composable in parallel.
- We show the witness indistinguishability and composability of "commit-choose-open" style interactive proofs in a simple and elegant way.

On the technical side, we develop a technique to show very general impossibility results for blackbox proofs.

Keywords: cryptography, commitments, zero-knowledge, blackbox separations.

1 Introduction

Consider an adversary A that observes ciphertexts sent among parties in a multi-party cryptographic protocol. At some point, A may decide, based on the information he already observed, to corrupt, say, half of the parties. By this, A learns the secret keys of these parties, which allows him to open some of the observed ciphertexts. The question is: do the unopened ciphertexts remain secure? Since most encryption schemes actually constitute *commitments* to the respective messages, we can rephrase the question as what is known as the *selective decommitment problem*: assume A receives a number of commitments and then may request openings of half of them. Do the unopened commitments remain secure? According to Dwork et al. [13], this question arose already more than twenty years ago in the context of Byzantine agreement, but it is still relatively poorly understood. In particular, standard cryptographic techniques (e.g., guessing which commitments are opened, or hybrid arguments) fail to show that "ordinary" commitment security against a static adversary

guarantees security under selective openings.[1] Even worse: no commitment scheme is known to be secure under selective openings.

Our work. We answer the selective decommitment problem in several ways. First, we consider what happens if "security of the unopened commitments" means that we require the existence of a simulator S, such that S essentially achieves what A does, only without seeing the unopened commitments in the first place. We call a commitment scheme which is secure in this sense *simulatable under selective openings.* We show that no noninteractive commitment scheme can be proven simulatable under selective openings using blackbox reductions to standard assumptions. However, we also show how to construct commitment schemes which *are* simulatable under selective openings, under the assumption that one-way permutations exist. One of our constructions uses non-blackbox techniques (i.e., zero-knowledge proofs), while the other uses only (constant-round) interaction as a means to achieve security. This solves an important open problem from Dwork et al. [13]: our schemes are the first commitment schemes provably secure under selective openings.

We proceed to consider what happens if "security" means that A cannot distinguish the messages inside the unopened commitments from independent[2] messages. We call a commitment scheme which is secure in this sense *indistinguishable under selective openings.* We show that no perfectly binding commitment scheme (interactive or not) can be proven indistinguishable under selective openings, via blackbox reductions from standard assumptions. However, we also show that *all* statistically hiding commitment schemes *are* indistinguishable under selective openings.

Technically, we derive blackbox impossibility results in the style of Impagliazzo and Rudich [19], but we can derive stronger claims, similar to Dodis et al. [12]. Concretely, we prove impossibility via $\forall\exists$semi-blackbox proofs from *any* computational assumption that can be formalized as an oracle $\mathcal{X}$ and a corresponding security property $\mathcal{P}$ which the oracle satisfies. For instance, to model one-way permutations, $\mathcal{X}$ could be a truly random permutation and $\mathcal{P}$ could be the one-way game in which a PPT adversary tries to invert a random image. We emphasize that, disturbingly, our impossibility claim holds even if $\mathcal{P}$ models security under selective openings. In that case, however, a reduction will necessarily be non-blackbox, see Appendix A for a discussion.

Applications. We apply our results to the adaptively secure encryption example mentioned in the beginning, and to a special class of interactive proof systems. First, we comment that an adaptively secure encryption scheme must be non-committing, or rely on nonstandard techniques. Namely, whenever a committing (i.e., ciphertexts commit to messages) encryption scheme is adaptively secure, then it also is, interpreted as a (noninteractive) commitment scheme, simulatable under selective openings. Our impossibility results show that hence, a committing encryption scheme cannot be proven adaptively secure via blackbox reductions from standard assumptions.

Second, we apply our results to interactive proof systems. Dwork et al. [13] prove that if we implement the graph 3-coloring protocol G3C from Goldreich et al. [17] with a commitment scheme that is simulatable under selective openings, then the resulting protocol G3C is (weakly) zero-knowledge, even under *parallel* composition. Unfortunately, [13] could not give an instantiation of such a commitment scheme. However, we can instantiate their theorem with one of our secure schemes, which not only shows that G3C is composable in parallel. It also yields a constant-round (weakly) zero-knowledge argument system for NP with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error. This is a very surprising result, given the negative results of Goldreich and Krawczyk [16] and Canetti

[1] For instance, the probability to correctly guess an $n/2$-sized subset of n commitments is too small, and a hybrid argument would require some independence among the commitments, which we cannot assume in general.

[2] "independent" can of course only mean "independent, conditioned on the already opened messages"

et al. [8] for the concurrent composability limitations of zero-knowledge proof systems. We stress that we do not need to use non-blackbox (in the zero-knowledge sense) techniques like Barak [1].

We also show that if the underlying commitment scheme of a "commit-choose-open" style interactive proof system is indistinguishable under selective openings, then the proof system is witness-indistinguishable (a relaxation of zero-knowledge), also under parallel composition. Since we show that statistically hiding commitment schemes are in fact indistinguishable under selective openings, this demonstrates the usefulness of our definition.

Related work. The selective decommitment problem arises in particular in the encryption situation described above, and hence was recognized and mentioned in a number of works before (e.g., [6, 3, 7, 11, 9]). However, these works solved the problem by using (and, in fact, inventing) non-committing encryption, which circumvents the underlying commitment problem.

Dwork et al. [13] is, to the best of our knowledge, the only work that explicitly studies the selective decommitment problem. They prove that a commitment scheme which is simulatable under selective openings would have interesting applications, as outlined above. They proceed to give positive results for substantially relaxed selective decommitment problems (essentially, they prove security when standard techniques can be applied, i.e., when the set of opened commitments can be guessed, or when the messages are independent). However, they leave open the question whether commitment schemes secure under (general) selective decommitments exist.

Organization. After fixing some notation in Section 2, we present in Section 3 our possibility and impossibility results for the simulation-based security definition of Dwork et al. [13]. We give an indistinguishability-based security definition, along with possibility and impossibility results in Section 4. In Section 5 and Section 6, we consider applications of our results to encryption and interactive proof systems. We discuss the role of the computational assumption in our impossibility results in Appendix A.

2 Preliminaries

Notation. Throughout the paper, $k \in \mathbb{N}$ denotes a security parameter. With growing k, attacks should be become harder, but we also allow schemes to be of complexity which is polynomial in k. A PPT algorithm/machine is a probabilistic algorithm/machine which runs in time polynomial in k. A function $f = f(k)$ is called negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. That is, f is negligible iff $\forall c\, \exists k_0\, \forall k > k_0 : |f(k)| < k^{-c}$. If f is not negligible, we call f non-negligible. We say that f is overwhelming iff $1 - f$ is negligible. We write $[n] := \{1, \ldots, n\}$. If $M = (M_i)_i$ is an indexed set, then we write $M_I := (M_i)_{i \in I}$. We denote the empty (bit-)string by ϵ.

Commitment schemes. In the spirit of Dwork et al. [13], we focus on noninteractive commitment schemes, but only to ease presentation. We stress that many of our results also hold for interactive schemes (in which committing and/or opening are interactive processes). We will comment at the appropriate places on this.

Definition 2.1 (Commitment scheme)**.** *A (noninteractive)* commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ *is a pair of PPT algorithms, such that the following holds:*

Syntax. *For any $M \in \{0,1\}^k$, algorithm $\mathsf{Com}(M)$ outputs a pair (com, dec), and $\mathsf{Ver}(com, dec)$ deterministically outputs either a message $M \in \{0,1\}^k$ or rejects with output $\perp$.*

Correctness. *For all $M \in \{0,1\}^k$ and $(com, dec) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M)$, we have $\mathsf{Ver}(com, dec) = M$.*

Binding. *For an algorithm A, let $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{binding}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathsf{Ver},A}$ be the probability that A outputs (com, dec_1, dec_2) with*

$$\mathsf{Ver}(com, dec_1) = M_1 \neq M_2 = \mathsf{Ver}(com, dec_2).$$

We demand that for any PPT A, $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{binding}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathsf{Ver},A}$ is negligible in the security parameter.

Hiding. *For a pair $A = (A_1, A_2)$ of algorithms, let*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com},A} := \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{hiding}\text{-}0}_{\mathsf{Com},A} = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{hiding}\text{-}1}_{\mathsf{Com},A} = 1\right].$$

Here, $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{hiding}\text{-}b}_{\mathsf{Com},A}$ proceeds as follows:

1. *run $(st, M_0, M_1) \leftarrow A_1(1^k)$ to obtain two messages $M_0, M_1 \in \{0,1\}^k$ and a state st,*
2. *compute $(com, dec) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M_b)$,*
3. *run $b' \leftarrow A_2(st, com)$ to obtain a guess bit b'*
4. *output b'.*

We demand that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com},A}$ is negligible for any PPT A.

Furthermore, if $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com},A}$ is negligible for all (not necessarily PPT) A, then $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is statistically hiding. *If $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{binding}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathsf{Ver},A} = 0$ for all A, then $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is* perfectly binding.

Note that perfectly binding implies that *any* commitment *com* can only be opened to at most one value M. Perfectly binding (noninteractive) commitment schemes can be achieved from any one-way permutation (e.g., Blum [5]). On the other hand, statistically hiding implies that for any $M_1, M_2 \in \{0,1\}^k$, the statistical distance between the respective commitments com_1 and com_2 is negligible. One-way functions suffice to implement statistically hiding (interactive) commitment schemes (Haitner and Reingold [18]).

Interactive argument systems. We recall some basic definitions concerning interactive argument systems, mostly following Goldreich [15].

Definition 2.2 (Interactive proof/argument system)**.** *An* interactive proof system *for a language $\mathcal{L}$ with witness relation $\mathcal{R}$ is a pair of PPT machines (P, V) such that the following holds:*

Completeness. *For every family $(x_k, w_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}}$ such that $|x_k| = k$ and $\mathcal{R}(x_k, w_k)$ for all k, we have that the probability for $\mathsf{V}(x_k)$ to output 1 after interacting with $\mathsf{P}(x_k, w_k)$ is at least $2/3$.*

Soundness. *For every machine P^* and every family $(x_k, z_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}}$ such that $|x_k| = k$ and $x_k \notin \mathcal{L}$ for all k, we have that the probability for $\mathsf{V}(x_k)$ to output 1 after interacting with $P^*(x_k, z_k)$ is at most $1/3$.*

If the soundness condition holds for all PPT machines P^* (and not necessarily for all unbounded P^*), then (P, V) is an interactive argument system. *We say that (P, V) enjoys* perfect completeness *if V always outputs 1 in the completeness condition. Furthermore, (P, V) has* negligible soundness error *if V outputs 1 only with negligible probability in the soundness condition.*

Most known interactive proof system achieve perfect completeness. Conversely, most systems do not enjoy a negligible soundness error "by nature"; their soundness has to be amplified via repetition, e.g., via sequential or concurrent composition. Thus, it is important to consider the concurrent composition of an interactive argument system:

Definition 2.3 (Concurrent zero-knowledge)**.** *Let (P, V) be an interactive proof or argument system for language $\mathcal{L}$ with witness relation $\mathcal{R}$. (P, V) is* zero-knowledge under concurrent composition *iff for every polynomial $n = n(k)$ and PPT machine V^*, there exists a PPT machine S^* such that for all sequences $(x, w) = (x_{i,k}, w_{i,k})_{k\in\mathbb{N}, i\in[n]}$ with $\mathcal{R}(x_{i,k}, w_{i,k})$ and $|x_{i,k}| = k$ for all i, k, for all PPT*

machines D, and all auxiliary inputs $z^{V^*} = (z_k^{V^*})_{k\in\mathbb{N}} \in (\{0,1\}^*)^{\mathbb{N}}$ and $z^D = (z_k^D)_{k\in\mathbb{N}} \in (\{0,1\}^*)^{\mathbb{N}}$, we have that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cZK}}_{V^*,S^*,(x,w),D,z^{V^*},z^D} := \mathsf{Pr}\left[D((x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}, z_k^D, \langle \mathsf{P}((x_{i,k},w_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}), V^*((x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}, z_k^{V^*})\rangle) = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[D((x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}, z_k^D, S^*((x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}, z_k^{V^*})) = 1\right]$$

is negligible in k. Here $\langle \mathsf{P}((x_{i,k},w_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}), V^*((x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}, z_k^{V^*})\rangle$ denotes the transcript of the interaction between n copies of the prover P (with the respective inputs $(x_{i,k},w_{i,k})$ for $i = 1,\ldots,n$) on the one hand, and V^* on the other hand.

We stress that the requirement $|x_{i,k}| = k$ is without loss of generality, since we can always polynomially scale the security parameter of (P,V). Note also that Definition 2.3 involves two auxiliary inputs, one input z^{V^*} for V^* and S^*, and one input z^D for D. This deviates from the standard definition of zero-knowledge (e.g., Goldreich [15, Definition 4.3.10]), in which V^*, S^*, and D all get the same auxiliary input z. However, our change is without loss of generality (see also [15, Discussion after Definition 4.3.10]). Namely, since in the standard definition, D and z are chosen *after* V^* and S^*, and, by definition of PPT, the running time of V^* and S^* is polynomial in k (but not in the length of z), we can pad z such that only D will be able to access a certain portion z^D of z.

There exist interactive proof systems (with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error) that achieve Definition 2.3 for arbitrary NP-languages if one-way permutations exist (e.g., Richardson and Kilian [25]; see also [20, 8, 1, 14, 2] for similar results in related settings).

We also recall the definition of witness indistinguishability from Goldreich [15] (we chose a slightly different but equivalent formulation):

Definition 2.4 (Witness indistinguishability)**.** *Let (P,V) be an interactive proof or argument system for language $\mathcal{L}$ with witness relation $\mathcal{R}$. (P,V) is* witness indistinguishable *iff for every PPT machines V^* and D, all sequences $x = (x_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}}$, $w^0 = (w_k^0)_{k\in\mathbb{N}}$, and $w^1 = (w_k^1)_{k\in\mathbb{N}}$ with $|x_k| = k$ and $\mathcal{R}(x_k,w_k^0)$ and $\mathcal{R}(x_k,w_k^1)$, and all auxiliary inputs $z = (z_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}} \in (\{0,1\}^*)^{\mathbb{N}}$, we have that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{WI}}_{x,w^0,w^1,V^*,D,z} := \mathsf{Pr}\left[D(x_k,z_k,\langle \mathsf{P}(x_k,w_k^0), V^*(x_k,z_k)\rangle) = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[D(x_k,z_k,\langle \mathsf{P}(x_k,w_k^1), V^*(x_k,z_k)\rangle) = 1\right]$$

is negligible in k. Here, $\langle \mathsf{P}(x,w), V^*(x)\rangle$ denotes a transcript of the interaction between P and V^*.

Blackbox reductions. Reingold et al. [24] give an excellent overview and classification of blackbox reductions. We recall some of their definitions which are important for our case. A *primitive* $\mathsf{P} = (F_\mathsf{P}, R_\mathsf{P})$ is a set F_P of functions $f : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ along with a relation R over pairs (f,A), where $f \in F_\mathsf{P}$, and A is a machine. We say that f is an *implementation* of P iff $f \in F_\mathsf{P}$. Furthermore, f is an *efficient implementation* of P iff $f \in F_\mathsf{P}$ and f can be computed by a PPT machine. A machine A P-*breaks* $f \in F_\mathsf{P}$ iff $R_\mathsf{P}(f,A)$. A primitive P *exists* if there is an efficient implementation $f \in F_\mathsf{P}$ such that no PPT machine P-breaks f. A primitive P *exists relative to an oracle $\mathcal{B}$* iff there exists an implementation $f \in F_\mathsf{P}$ which is computable by a PPT machine with access to $\mathcal{B}$, such that no PPT machine with access to $\mathcal{B}$ P-breaks f.

Definition 2.5 (Relativizing reduction)**.** *There exists a* relativizing reduction *from a primitive $\mathsf{P} = (F_\mathsf{P}, R_\mathsf{P})$ to a primitive $\mathsf{Q} = (F_\mathsf{Q}, R_\mathsf{Q})$ iff for every oracle $\mathcal{B}$, the following holds: if Q exists relative to $\mathcal{B}$, then so does P.*

Definition 2.6 (∀∃semi-blackbox reduction)**.** *There exists a* ∀∃semi-blackbox reduction *from a primitive* $\mathsf{P} = (F_{\mathsf{P}}, R_{\mathsf{P}})$ *to a primitive* $\mathsf{Q} = (F_{\mathsf{Q}}, R_{\mathsf{Q}})$ *iff for every implementation* $f \in F_{\mathsf{Q}}$*, there exists a PPT machine* G *such that* $G^f \in F_{\mathsf{P}}$*, and the following holds: if there exists a PPT machine* A *such that* A^f P*-breaks* G^f*, then there exists a PPT machine* S *such that* S^f Q*-breaks* f*.*

It can be seen that if a relativizing reduction exists, then so does a ∀∃semi-blackbox reduction. The converse is true when Q "allows embedding," which essentially means that additional oracles can be embedded into Q without destroying its functionality (see Reingold et al. [24, Definition 3.4 and Theorem 3.5] and Simon [27]). Below we will prove impossibility of relativizing reductions between certain primitives, which also proves impossibility of ∀∃semi-blackbox reductions, since the corresponding primitives Q allow embedding.

3 A simulation-based definition

Consider the following real security game: adversary A gets, say, n commitments, and then may ask for openings of some of them. The security notion of [13] requires that for any such A, there exists a simulator S that can approximate A's output. More concretely, for any relation R, we require that $R(M, out_A)$ holds about as often as $R(M, out_S)$, where $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]}$ are the messages in the commitments, out_A is A's output, and out_S is S's output. Formally, we get the following definition (where henceforth, $\mathcal{I}$ will denote the set of "allowed" opening sets):

Definition 3.1 (Simulatable under selective openings/SIM-SO-COM)**.** *Let* $n = n(k) > 0$ *be polynomially bounded, and let* $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{I}_n)_n$ *be a family of sets such that each* $\mathcal{I}_n$ *is a set of subsets of* $[n]$*. A commitment scheme* $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ *is* simulatable under selective openings *(short* SIM-SO-COM secure*) iff for every PPT* n*-message distribution* $\mathcal{M}$*, every PPT relation* R*, and every PPT adversary* $A = (A_1, A_2)$*, there is a PPT simulator* $S = (S_1, S_2)$*, such that* $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,S,R}$ *is negligible. Here*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,S,R} := \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,R} = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R} = 1\right],$$

where $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,R}$ *proceeds as follows:*

1. *sample messages* $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$*,*
2. *compute (de-)commitments* $(com_i, dec_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M_i)$ *for* $i \in [n]$*,*
3. *run* $(st, I) \leftarrow A_1(1^k, (com_i)_{i\in[n]})$ *to get state information* st *and a set* $I \in \mathcal{I}$*,*
4. *run* $out_A \leftarrow A_2(st, (dec_i)_{i\in I})$*,*
5. *output 1 iff* $R(M, out_A)$*.*

On the other hand, $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R}$ *proceeds as follows:*

1. *sample messages* $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$*,*
2. *run* $(st, I) \leftarrow S_1(1^k)$ *to get state information* st *and a set* $I \in \mathcal{I}$*,*
3. *run* $out_S \leftarrow S_2(st, (M_i)_{i\in I})$*,*
4. *output 1 iff* $R(M, out_S)$*.*

For interactive commitments, the $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathcal{M},A,R}$ experiment concurrently performs n commitment processes with A in step 3, and $|I|$ decommitment processes in step 4. Note that we opted not to give auxiliary input to the adversary (or to the relation R). Such an auxiliary input is a common tool in cryptographic definitions to ensure some form of composability. Not giving the adversary auxiliary input only makes our negative results stronger. We stress, however, that our positive results (Theorem 3.12, Theorem 3.10 and Theorem 4.7) hold also for adversaries and relations with auxiliary input.

3.1 Impossibility from blackbox reductions

Formalization of computational assumptions. Our first result states that SIM-SO-COM security cannot be achieved via blackbox reductions from standard assumptions. We want to consider such standard assumptions in a general way that allows to make statements even in the presence of "relativizing" oracles. Thus we make the following definition, which is a special case of the definition of a *primitive* from Reingold et al. [24] (cf. also Section 2).

Definition 3.2 (Property of an oracle)**.** *Let $\mathcal{X}$ be an oracle. Then a* property $\mathcal{P}$ *of $\mathcal{X}$ is a (not necessarily PPT) machine $\mathcal{P}$ that, after arbitrarily interacting with $\mathcal{X}$ and another machine A, finally outputs a bit b. For an adversary A (that may interact with $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{P}$), we define A's* advantage against $\mathcal{P}$ *as*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_A^{\mathcal{P}} := \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathcal{P} \text{ outputs } b = 1 \text{ after an interaction with } A\right] - 1/2.$$

Now $\mathcal{X}$ is said to satisfy *property $\mathcal{P}$ iff for all PPT adversaries A, we have that $\mathsf{Adv}_A^{\mathcal{P}}$ is negligible.*

In terms of Reingold et al. [24], the corresponding primitive is $\mathsf{P} = (F_{\mathsf{P}}, R_{\mathsf{P}})$, where $F_{\mathsf{P}} = \{\mathcal{X}\}$, and $R_{\mathsf{P}}(\mathcal{X}, A)$ iff $\mathsf{Adv}_A^{\mathcal{P}}$ is non-negligible. Our definition is also similar in spirit to "hard games" as used by Dodis et al. [12], but more general. We emphasize that $\mathcal{P}$ can *only* interact with $\mathcal{X}$ and A, but not with possible additional oracles. (See Appendix A for further discussion of properties of oracles, in particular their role in our proofs.) Intuitively, $\mathcal{P}$ acts as a challenger in the sense of a cryptographic security experiment. That is, $\mathcal{P}$ tests whether adversary A can "break" $\mathcal{X}$ in the intended way. We give an example, where "breaking" means "breaking $\mathcal{X}$'s one-way property".

Example. If $\mathcal{X}$ is a random permutation of $\{0,1\}^k$, then the following $\mathcal{P}$ models $\mathcal{X}$'s one-way property: $\mathcal{P}$ acts as a challenger that challenges A to invert a randomly chosen $\mathcal{X}$-image. Concretely, $\mathcal{P}$ initially chooses a random $Y \in \{0,1\}^k$ and sends Y to A. Upon receiving a guess $X \in \{0,1\}^k$ from A, $\mathcal{P}$ checks if $\mathcal{X}(X) = Y$. If yes, then $\mathcal{P}$ terminates with output $b = 1$. If $\mathcal{X}(X) \neq Y$, then $\mathcal{P}$ tosses an unbiased coin $b' \in \{0,1\}$ and terminates with output $b = b'$.

We stress that we only gain generality by demanding that $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{P} \text{ outputs } 1]$ is close to $1/2$ (and not, say, negligible). In fact, this way indistinguishability-based games (such as, e.g., the indistinguishability of ciphertexts of an ideal cipher $\mathcal{X}$) can be formalized very conveniently. On the other hand, cryptographic games like the one-way game above can be formulated in this framework as well, by letting the challenger output $b = 1$ with probability $1/2$ when A fails.

On the role of property $\mathcal{P}$. Our upcoming results state the impossibility of (blackbox) security reductions, from essentially *any* computational assumption (i.e., property) $\mathcal{P}$. The obvious question is: what if the assumption already *is* an idealized commitment scheme secure under selective openings? The short answer is: "then the security proof will not be blackbox." We give a detailed explanation of what is going on in Appendix A.

Stateless breaking oracles. In our impossibility results, we will describe a computational world with a number of oracles. For instance, there will be a "breaking oracle" $\mathcal{B}$, such that $\mathcal{B}$ aids in breaking the SIM-SO-COM security of any given commitment scheme, but *nothing more*. To this end, $\mathcal{B}$ takes the role of the adversary in the SIM-SO-COM experiment. Namely, $\mathcal{B}$ expects to receive a number of commitments, then chooses a subset of these commitments, and then expects openings of the commitments in this subset. This is an interactive process which would usually require $\mathcal{B}$ to hold a state across invocations. However, stateful oracles are not very useful for establishing

blackbox separations, so we will have to give a stateless formulation of $\mathcal{B}$. Concretely, suppose that the investigated commitment scheme is noninteractive. Then $\mathcal{B}$ answers deterministically upon queries and expects each query to be prefixed with the history of that query. For instance, $\mathcal{B}$ expects to receive openings $dec = (dec_i)_{i\in I}$ *along* with the corresponding commitments $com = (com_i)_{i\in[n]}$ and selected set I. If I is not the set that $\mathcal{B}$ would have selected when receiving com alone, then $\mathcal{B}$ ignores the query. This way, $\mathcal{B}$ is stateless (but randomized, similarly to a random oracle). Furthermore, for noninteractive commitment schemes, this makes sure that any machine interacting with $\mathcal{B}$ can open commitments to $\mathcal{B}$ only in one way. Hence this formalization preserves the binding property of a commitment scheme, something which we will need in our proofs.

We stress, however, that this method does not necessarily work for interactive commitment schemes. Namely, any machine interacting with $\mathcal{B}$ can essentially rewind $\mathcal{B}$ during an interactive commitment phase, since $\mathcal{B}$ essentially realizes a "next-message function." Now if the commitment scheme is still binding if the receiver of the commitment can be rewound (e.g., this holds trivially for noninteractive commitment schemes, and also for perfectly binding commitment schemes), then our formalization of $\mathcal{B}$ preserves binding, and our upcoming proof works. If, however, the commitment scheme loses its binding property if the receiver can be rewound, then the following theorem cannot be applied. (An example is our scheme RSCom from Section 3.3, which we show in fact simulatable under selective openings.)

We are now ready to state our result.

Theorem 3.3 (Blackbox impossibility of noninteractive SIM-SO-COM, most general formulation)**.** *Let $n = n(k)$ be arbitrary, and let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{I}_n)_n$ be arbitrary such that $\mathcal{I}_n$ is a set of subsets of $[n]$ and $|\mathcal{I}_n|$ is superpolynomial in k.*[3] *Let $\mathcal{X}$ be an oracle that satisfies property $\mathcal{P}$. Then there is a set of oracles relative to which $\mathcal{X}$ still satisfies property $\mathcal{P}$, but there exists no noninteractive commitment scheme which is simulatable under selective openings.*

Proof. First, let $\mathcal{RO}$ be a random oracle (i.e., a random function $\{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^k$). When writing $\mathcal{RO}(x_1, \ldots, x_\ell)$, we assume that $\mathcal{RO}$'s input $x_1, \ldots, x_\ell$ is encoded in a prefix-free way, such that all individual x_i can be efficiently reconstructed from $\mathcal{RO}$'s input. Furthermore, let $\mathcal{B}$ be the oracle that proceeds as follows (for simplicity, we describe a stateful oracle $\mathcal{B}$, which can be made stateless as described above):

1. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com)$, where $com = (com_i)_{i\in[n]}$, return a uniformly chosen $I \in \mathcal{I}$ and record $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$.[4]
2. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, dec_I)$ with $dec_I = (dec_i)_{i\in I}$ for a $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$ which was previously recorded, verify using Ver that each dec_i is a valid opening of the respective com_i. If not, reject with output $\perp$. If yes, let M_i denote the message that com_i was opened to, and return the set of all $s \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$ such that $M_i = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, i, s)$ for all $i \in I$.

Fix any noninteractive commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$ (that may use all the above oracles in its algorithms). Consider the n-message distribution $\mathcal{M}^* = \{(\mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, i, s^*))_{i\in[n]}\}_{s^*\in\{0,1\}^{k/3}}$ (i.e., $\mathcal{M}^*$ chooses $s^* \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$ uniformly and then sets $M_i^* = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, i, s^*)$ for all i).

Lemma 3.4. *There is an adversary A that outputs $out_A = M^*$ with overwhelming probability in the real SIM-SO-COM experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com}^*,\mathsf{Ver}^*,\mathcal{M},A,R}$. Here M^* denotes the full message vector sampled from $\mathcal{M}^*$ by the experiment.*

Proof. Let A be the SIM-SO-COM adversary on $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$ that relays between its interface to the SIM-SO-COM experiment and $\mathcal{B}$ as follows:

[3] e.g., one could think of $n = 2k$ and $\mathcal{I}_n = \{I \subseteq [n] \mid |I| = n/2\}$ here

[4] Com and Ver denote descriptions of circuits (with access to all oracles) for commitment and verification algorithms. This has the effect that these algorithms will be PPT whenever the entity that uses $\mathcal{B}$ is PPT.

1. Upon receiving $com^* = (com_i^*)_{i\in[n]}$ from the experiment, send $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, com^*)$ to $\mathcal{B}$.
2. Upon receiving $I^* \in \mathcal{I}$ from $\mathcal{B}$, send I^* to the SIM-SO-COM experiment.
3. Upon receiving $dec_{I^*}^* = (dec_i^*)_{i\in I^*}$ from the experiment, send $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^* com^*, dec_{I^*}^*)$ to $\mathcal{B}$.
4. Finally, upon receiving a singleton set $\{s^*\}$ from $\mathcal{B}$, return $out_A = (\mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, i, s^*))_{i\in[n]}$. If $\mathcal{B}$ returns a set of larger size, return $out_A = \perp$.

(This adversary is straightforwardly split into two PPT parts A_1 and A_2 as required for the SIM-SO-COM experiment.) By construction of $\mathcal{M}^*$ and $\mathcal{B}$, it is clear that $out_A = M^*$ unless $\mathcal{B}$ returns multiple s (which happens only with negligible probability by a counting argument). □

Lemma 3.5. *Any given PPT simulator S will output $out_S = M^*$ in the ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R}$ only with negligible probability.*

Proof. Fix a PPT S. We claim that in the ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment, S has a view that is almost statistically independent of s^*, and hence will output $out_S = M^*$ only with negligible probability. To show the claim, denote by I^* the subset that S submits to the SIM-SO-COM experiment, and by $M_{I^*}^*$ the messages that S receives back. Denote by $\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, I^j, M_{I^j}^j$ the corresponding values used in S's j-th query to $\mathcal{B}$. We first define and bound a number of "bad" events:

- bad_{coll} occurs iff S submits an opened M_i^j to $\mathcal{B}$ for which there are two distinct $s_1, s_2 \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$ with $\mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, i, s_1) = M_i^j = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, i, s_2)$.
- bad_{img} occurs iff S submits an opened M_i^j to $\mathcal{B}$ for which an s with $M_i^j = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, i, s)$ exists, but M_i^j has not been obtained through an explicit $\mathcal{RO}$-query (by either S or the SIM-SO-COM experiment).
- bad_{bind} occurs iff $(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, I^j, M_{I^j}^j) = (\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, I^*, M_{I^*}^*)$ for some j.
- $\mathsf{bad} := \mathsf{bad}_{coll} \vee \mathsf{bad}_{img} \vee \mathsf{bad}_{bind}$.

These events occur only with negligible probability: informally, bad_{coll} implies a collision among $2^{k/3}$ uniformly distributed k-bit values, which is ruled out by a birthday bound; bad_{img} means that S guessed an element of a very sparse set; bad_{bind} means that S broke $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$'s binding property. A detailed proof can be found in Lemma 3.6 below.

Now consider the following oracle $\mathcal{B}'$ which is almost identical to $\mathcal{B}$:

1. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com)$, where $com = (com_i)_{i\in[n]}$, return a uniformly chosen $I \in \mathcal{I}$ and record $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$.
2. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, dec_I)$ with $dec_I = (dec_i)_{i\in I}$ for a $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$ which was previously recorded, verify using Ver that each dec_i is a valid opening of the respective com_i. If not, reject with output $\perp$. If yes, let M_i denote the message that com_i was opened to. If every M_i is the result of an $\mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, i, s)$-query of S (for the same $s \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$), then output $\{s\}$. Otherwise, output $\emptyset$.

By construction, the output of $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{B}'$ can differ only if

- there are multiple s with $M_i = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, i, s)$ for some $i \in I$, or
- for some $i \in I$, M_i is not the result of an explicit $\mathcal{RO}$-query of S, but there exists an s with $M_i = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, i, s)$ for all $i \in I$.

Assume that event bad does not occur. Then $\neg\mathsf{bad}_{coll}$ ensures that no multiple s with $M_i = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, i, s)$ exist, and $\neg\mathsf{bad}_{img}$ ensures that all M_i have been explicitly queried as $M_i = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, i, s)$ by either S or the SIM-SO-COM experiment. Now since the SIM-SO-COM experiment makes only queries of the form $M_i^* = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, i, s^*)$, this means that $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{B}'$ can only differ if $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}) = (\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$, and if M_I contains some M_i from $M_{I^*}^*$. On the other hand, $\neg\mathsf{bad}_{bind}$ implies that then, M_I must also contain some $M_{i'}$ not contained in $M_{I^*}^*$. By

$\neg\mathsf{bad}_{img}$, then $M_{i'}$ must have been explicitly queried by S through $M_{i'} = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, i', s^*)$, for the *same* s^* as chosen by the SIM-SO-COM experiment to generate $M_i^* = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, i, s^*)$.

In other words, assuming $\neg\mathsf{bad}$, in order to detect a difference between $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{B}'$, S must already have guessed the hidden s^* used in the SIM-SO-COM experiment. In particular, since up to that point, oracles $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{B}'$ behave identically, and S can simulate $\mathcal{B}'$ internally, S can either extract the hidden s^* from the SIM-SO-COM experiment with oracles $\mathcal{RO}$ and $\mathcal{X}$ alone, or not at all. However, since we defined $\mathcal{RO}$ independently and after $\mathcal{X}$, these oracles are independent. Hence, using $\mathcal{RO}$ and $\mathcal{X}$ alone, the view of S is independent of s^* unless S explicitly makes a $\mathcal{RO}$-query involving s^*. Since $s^* \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$ is uniformly chosen from a suitably large domain, and bad occurs with negligible probability, we get that S's view is almost statistically independent of s^*. Consequently, S's view is almost statistically independent of all M_i^* with $i \notin I^*$. Hence, S can produce $out_S = M^*$ only with negligible probability. □

It remains to prove that bad occurs only negligibly often.

Lemma 3.6. *Event* bad *occurs only with negligible probability.*

Proof. We show that any of the events bad_{coll}, bad_{img}, bad_{bind} occurs only with negligible probability for any fixed i, j. The full claim then can be derived by a union bound over i, j, and the individual events. So first fix i, j, and note that the functions $\mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, i, \cdot)$ and $\mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}', \mathsf{Ver}', i', \cdot)$ are independent as soon as $\mathsf{Com}^j \neq \mathsf{Com}'$ or $\mathsf{Ver}^j \neq \mathsf{Ver}'$ or $i \neq i'$. Hence, for all of the events, we can ignore $\mathcal{RO}$- and $\mathcal{B}$-queries with different Com, Ver, or i, and assume that $\mathcal{RO}'(\cdot) := \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, i, \cdot)$ is a fresh random oracle.

bad_{coll}: Using a birthday bound, we get

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\exists s_1, s_2 \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}, s_1 \neq s_2 : \ \mathcal{RO}'(s_1) = \mathcal{RO}'(s_2)\right] \leq \frac{(2^{k/3})^2}{2^k} = 2^{-k/3},$$

which implies that with large probability, there simply exists no M_i^j which could raise bad_{coll}.

bad_{img}: We show that S's chance to output M with $M = \mathcal{RO}'(s)$ for some $s \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$, and such that s has not been queried to $\mathcal{RO}'$-query, is negligible. Now S's access to the $\mathcal{B}$-oracle can be emulated using an oracle $\mathcal{B}'$ that, upon input M, outputs the set of all $s \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$ with $\mathcal{RO}'(s) = M$. Without loss of generality, we may further assume that S never queries $\mathcal{B}'$ with an M which has been obtained through an explicit $\mathcal{RO}'(s)$-query. (Namely, unless bad_{coll} occurs, which happens only with negligible probability, $\mathcal{B}'$'s answer will then be $\{s\}$.) Hence, whenever S receives an answer $\neq \emptyset$ from $\mathcal{B}'$, it has already succeeded in producing an M with $\mathcal{RO}'(s) = M$ for some s, and without querying $\mathcal{RO}'(s)$. So without loss of generality, we can assume that S never queries $\mathcal{B}'$, and hence only produces such an M using access to $\mathcal{RO}$ and $\mathcal{RP}$ alone. Clearly, $\mathcal{RP}$ does not help S, since $\mathcal{RP}$ and $\mathcal{RO}$ are independent. But since the set of all M for which $\mathcal{RO}'(s) = M$ for some $s \in \{0,1\}^{k/3}$ is sparse in the set of all $M \in \{0,1\}^k$, and S can only make a polynomial number of $\mathcal{RO}$-queries, S's success in producing such an M is negligible.

bad_{bind}: Without loss of generality, assume that S sets I^* after $\mathcal{B}$ chooses I^j. (Otherwise, $I^j = I^*$ occurs only with probability $1/|\mathcal{I}|$, since I^j is chosen uniformly and then independent of I^*.) We can also assume that $(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j) = (\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$, since otherwise bad_{bind} cannot happen by definition. This means that S first commits to $\mathcal{B}$ via sending $(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j, com)$, then receives I^j, and then sends $I^* = I^j$ to its own experiment to receive $M_{I^j}^*$. Finally, to achieve bad_{bind}, S must open com_{I^j} to $M_{I^j}^j$. In particular, there is an i such that S opens com_i to a value M_i^* which S only sees after defining com_i. This directly breaks the binding property

of $(\mathsf{Com}^j, \mathsf{Ver}^j) = (\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$. We stress that we use here that $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is noninteractive. If $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ was interactive, then we would have to map an interaction between S and $\mathcal{B}$ (where S may rewind $\mathcal{B}$, cf. the discussion above) to an interaction between an honest verifier and a dishonest committer (which may *not* rewind the verifier).

□

Taking things together, this shows that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com}^*,\mathcal{M}^*,A,S,R}$ is overwhelming for the relation $R(x,y) :\Leftrightarrow x = y$, the described A, and any PPT S. Hence $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$ is not SIM-SO-COM secure. It remains to argue that in the described computational world, $\mathcal{X}$ still satisfies property $\mathcal{P}$.

Lemma 3.7. *$\mathcal{X}$ satisfies $\mathcal{P}$.*

Proof. Assume a PPT adversary A on $\mathcal{X}$'s property $\mathcal{P}$. Since $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ do not query $\mathcal{B}$ or $\mathcal{RO}$, these latter two oracles do not help A, in the following sense. Namely, A can break property $\mathcal{P}$ without oracles $\mathcal{RO}$ and $\mathcal{B}$, and use internal simulations of these oracles instead. This achieves the same view for A, $\mathcal{X}$, and $\mathcal{P}$. To see this, note that $\mathcal{RO}$ never queries $\mathcal{X}$. Furthermore, $\mathcal{B}$ queries $\mathcal{X}$ at most a polynomial number of times (for checking the validity of the decommitments dec_I according to Ver). Hence both of these simulations inside A are efficient in terms of $\mathcal{X}$-queries. In fact, using lazy sampling techniques for $\mathcal{RO}$, both simulations can be made PPT. (This includes $\mathcal{B}$'s inversion of $\mathcal{RO}$, since we simulate $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{RO}$ at the same time.)

So without loss of generality, we can assume that A only uses $\mathcal{X}$-queries when interacting with $\mathcal{P}$. Since we assumed that $\mathcal{P}$ holds in the standard model (i.e., without any auxiliary oracles), $\mathcal{P}$ will hence also hold in presence of $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{RO}$. □

This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.3. □

The following corollary provides an instantiation of Theorem 3.3 for a number of standard cryptographic primitives.

Corollary 3.8 (Blackbox impossibility of SIM-SO-COM)**.** *Let n and $\mathcal{I}$ as in Theorem 3.3. Then no noninteractive commitment scheme can be proven simulatable under selective openings via a $\forall\exists$semi-blackbox reduction to one or more of the following primitives: one-way functions, one-way permutations, trapdoor one-way permutations, IND-CCA secure public key encryption.*

The corollary is a special case of Theorem 3.3. For instance, to show Corollary 3.8 for one-way permutations, one can use the example $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ from above: $\mathcal{X}$ is a random permutation of $\{0,1\}^k$, and $\mathcal{P}$ models the one-way experiment with $\mathcal{X}$. Clearly, $\mathcal{X}$ satisfies $\mathcal{P}$, and so we can apply Corollary 3.8. This yields impossibility of relativizing proofs for SIM-SO-COM security from one-way permutations. We get impossibility for $\forall\exists$semi-blackbox reductions since one-way permutations allow embedding, cf. Simon [27], Reingold et al. [24]. The other cases are similar. Note that while it is generally not easy to even give a candidate for a cryptographic primitive in the standard model, it is easy to construct an idealized, say, encryption scheme in oracle form.

Generalizations. First, Corollary 3.8 constitutes merely an example instantiation of the much more general Theorem 3.3. The proof also holds for a relaxation of SIM-SO-COM security considered by Dwork et al. [13, Definition 7.3], where adversary and simulator approximate a function of the message vector. Finally, the proof of Theorem 3.3 generalizes to *perfectly binding* interactive commitment schemes. Such schemes are binding even if we can rewind the receiver during commitment; this is all we need to show that event bad_{bind} occurs only negligibly often (see also the discussion above the theorem).

3.2 Possibility using non-blackbox techniques

Theorem 3.3 shows that SIM-SO-COM security cannot be achieved unless one uses non-blackbox techniques or interaction. We will first investigate the power of non-blackbox techniques to achieve SIM-SO-COM security. As it turns out, for our purposes a concurrently composable zero-knowledge argument system is a suitable non-blackbox tool.[5]

The scheme. Concretely, we need an interactive argument system (P, V) with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error, such that (P, V) which is zero-knowledge under concurrent composition. We also need a perfectly binding noninteractive commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$. Both these ingredients can be constructed from one-way permutations. To ease presentation, we only describe a *bit* commitment scheme, which is easily extended (along with the proof) to the multi-bit case.

Scheme 3.9 (Non-blackbox commitment scheme ZKCom)**.** Let $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$ be a perfectly binding noninteractive commitment scheme. Let (P, V) be an interactive argument system for NP which enjoys perfect completeness, has negligible soundness error, and which is zero-knowledge under concurrent composition.

- Commitment to bit b:
  1. Committer computes $(com^0, dec^0) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(b)$ and $(com^1, dec^1) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(b)$, and then sends (com^0, com^1) to receiver.
  2. Committer uses (P, V) to prove to receiver that com^0 and com^1 commit to the same bit.[6]
- Opening:
  1. Committer uniformly chooses $j \in \{0,1\}$ and sends (j, dec^j) to receiver.

Security proof. We comment that since ZKCom has an interactive commitment phase, we need to consider interactive variants of Definition 2.1 and Definition 3.1. It is straightforward to prove that ZKCom is a hiding and binding[7] commitment scheme. More interestingly, we can also show that ZKCom is SIM-SO-COM secure:

Theorem 3.10 (Non-blackbox possibility of SIM-SO-COM)**.** *Fix any n and $\mathcal{I}$ as in Definition 3.1. Then ZKCom is simulatable under selective openings in the sense of Definition 3.1.*

Proof. Assume arbitrary n, $\mathcal{I}$, $\mathcal{M}$, R, and $A = (A_1, A_2)$ as in Definition 3.1. We proceed in games.

Game 0 is the real SIM-SO-COM experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R}$ for ZKCom. Define the random variable out_0 as the output of the experiment, so that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R} = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_0 = 1\right].$$

In **Game 1**, we interpret the first stage of the experiment as a verifier V^* in the sense of Definition 2.3. To this end, we constructively define random variables $x_{i,k}, w_{i,k}, z^D_k, z^{V^*}_k$ as follows:

1. sample $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \in \{0,1\}^n$ from $\mathcal{M}$,
2. uniformly and independently choose n bits $j_1, \ldots, j_n$,
3. for all $i \in [n]$ and $j \in \{0,1\}$, compute $(com^j_i, dec^j_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(M_i)$,

[5] We require concurrent composability since the SIM-SO-COM definition considers multiple, concurrent sessions of the commitment scheme.

[6] Formally, the corresponding language $\mathcal{L}$ for (P, V) considers statements $x = (com^0, com^1)$ and witnesses $w = (dec^0, dec^1)$ such that $\mathcal{R}(x, w)$ iff $\mathsf{Ver}(com^0, dec^0) = \mathsf{Ver}(com^1, dec^1) \in \{0,1\}$.

[7] We stress that $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$'s *perfect* binding property is needed to prove that ZKCom is binding; otherwise, the zero-knowledge argument may become meaningless.

4. define $x_{i,k} = (com_i^0, com_i^1)$, $w_{i,k} = (dec_i^0, dec_i^1)$, $z_k^{V^*} = \epsilon$ and $z_k^D = (M, (j_i, dec_i^{j_i})_{i\in[n]})$.

Using this notation, the commitment stage of $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R}$ can be expressed as an interaction of n concurrent instances of prover P with a suitable verifier V^* as in Definition 2.3.[8] Concretely, we define a verifier V^* that, on input $(x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]} = (com_i^0, com_i^1)_{i\in[n]}$, internally simulates $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R}$ up to the point where A_1 outputs (st, I). The interactive arguments which show that com_i^0 and com_i^1 commit to the same bit are performed interactively with (n instances of) a prover P that gets $w_{i,k} = (dec_i^0, dec_i^1)$ as input. Finally, V^* outputs $out_{V^*} = (st, I)$, so that (st, I) will be part of the transcript $T_{\mathsf{P},V^*} = \langle \mathsf{P}((x_{i,k}, w_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}), V^*((x_{i,k})_{i\in[n]}, z_k^{V^*})\rangle$.

We outsource the second stage of the attack into a suitable distinguisher D. Concretely, we define a machine D which, on input $z_k^D = (M, (j_i, dec_i^{j_i})_{i\in[n]})$ and a transcript T_{P,V^*} (which contains $out_{V^*} = (st, I)$), simulates $out_A \leftarrow A_2(st, (j_i, dec_i^{j_i})_{i\in I})$ and outputs $out_1 = R(M, out_A)$.

This setting is merely a reformulation of $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R}$ as a concurrent zero-knowledge argument, so we have that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[out_1 = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_0 = 1\right].$$

In **Game 2**, we use (P, V)'s concurrent zero-knowledge property. That is, Game 1 already specifies a PPT verifier V^* and a PPT distinguisher D, as well as random variables (x, w), z^{V^*}, and z^D, as in Definition 2.3. Hence our assumption on (P, V) guarantees that there exists a PPT simulator S^* such that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cZK}}_{V^*,S^*,(x,w),D,z^{V^*},z^D}$ is negligible. We substitute V^* (along with all instances of P) from Game 1 with that simulator S^* in Game 2. Note that now, the execution of Game 2 does not require $w_{i,k} = (dec_i^0, dec_i^1)$ anymore, but instead only *one* decommitment $dec_i^{j_i}$ for each argument session. If we let out_2 denote D's output (on input z_k^D and out_{S^*}) in this setting, we get that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[out_1 = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_2 = 1\right] = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cZK}}_{V^*,S^*,(x,w),D,z^{V^*},z^D}$$

is negligible.

In **Game 3**, we use $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$'s hiding property. Namely, we now change the generation of the $x_{i,k} = (com_i^0, com_i^1)$. While we still generate $com_i^{j_i}$ as a commitment to M_i, we now define $com_i^{1-j_i}$ as a commitment to $1 - M_i$, so that com_i^0 and com_i^1 are commitments to *different* bits. Since $dec_i^{1-j_i}$ is never used in Game 2, this does not result in a detectable change in D's output. Concretely, we have that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[out_3 = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_2 = 1\right] = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}},A'}$$

for a suitable adversary A' on $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$'s hiding property, so that $\mathsf{Pr}\left[out_3 = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_2 = 1\right]$ is negligible.

To construct **Game 4**, observe that in Game 3, distinguisher D only needs the decommitments $dec_i^{j_i}$ for $i \in I$ from its input $z_k^D = (M, (dec_i^{j_i})_{i\in[n]})$. We can exploit this fact as follows. We now generate the commitments $x_{i,k} = (com_i^0, com_i^1)$ and decommitments $dec_i^{j_i}$, as well as the $j_i \in \{0, 1\}$ slightly differently. Concretely, for each message bit M_i, we first choose a random bit b_i and compute $(com_i^0, dec_i^0) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(b_i)$ and $(com_i^1, dec_i^1) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(1 - b_i)$. This modification does not change S^*'s view. When D requires a decommitment $dec_i^{j_i}$ (for $i \in I$), we define $j_i = b_i \oplus M_i$, so that $dec_i^{j_i}$ opens the "right" message M_i. This does not change the view of S^* or D, so that we have

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[out_4 = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_3 = 1\right].$$

[8] Note that Definition 2.3 trivially implies security for all *distributions* on (x, w), z^{V^*} and z^D. Also recall that Definition 2.3 models two different auxiliary inputs z^{V^*} (for V^* and S^*) and z^D (for D). We emphasize again that this is without loss of generality, cf. the discussion after Definition 2.3.

The crucial conceptual difference to Game 3 is that now the execution of D requires only knowledge about the message parts $(M_i)_{i\in I}$ selected by S^* and not the full message vector M.

We can now reformulate Game 4 as an ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment. First, we define a simulator $S = (S_1, S_2)$ as follows: S_1 prepares bits b_i and commitments (com_0^i, com_1^i) as in Game 4 and then runs an internal simulation of S^* on these commitments. Upon obtaining (st, I) from S^*, S_1 outputs (st', I) for $st' = (st, (b_i, com_i^j, dec_i^j)_{i\in I, j\in\{0,1\}})$. Upon input st' and $(M_i)_{i\in I}$, S_2 runs an internal simulation of A_2 on input st and $(j_i, dec_i^{j_i})_{i\in I}$ for $j_i = b_i \oplus M_i$ as in Game 4. Finally, S_2 outputs $out_S = out_A$. By construction, the ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R}$ with this S is only a reformulation of Game 4, so that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R} = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_4 = 1\right].$$

Putting things together, we get that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{sim-so}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,S,R} = \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R} = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R} = 1\right]$$

is negligible, which proves the theorem. □

Where is the non-blackbox component? Interestingly, the used zero-knowledge argument system (P, V) itself can well be blackbox zero-knowledge (where blackbox zero-knowledge means that the simulator S^* from Definition 2.3 has only blackbox access to the next-message function of V^*). The essential fact that allows us to circumvent our negative result Theorem 3.3 is the way we employ (P, V). Namely, ZKCom uses (P, V) to prove a statement about two given commitments (com^0, com^1). This proof (or, rather, argument) uses an explicit and non-blackbox description of the employed commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$. It is this argument that cannot even be expressed when $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$ makes use of, say, a one-way function given in oracle form.

Generalizations. First, ZKCom can be straightforwardly extended to a multi-bit commitment scheme, e.g., by running several sessions of ZKCom in parallel. Second, ZKCom is SIM-SO-COM secure also against adversaries with auxiliary input z: our proof holds literally, where of course we also require security of $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$ against adversaries with auxiliary input.

3.3 Possibility using interaction

We now aim at achieving SIM-SO-COM security using a blackbox reduction to one-way permutations. Theorem 3.3 tells us that we will need interaction. In fact, we will be using the same ideas as in the scheme ZKCom from Section 3.2, only with interaction in place of a zero-knowledge proof. More concretely, we will construct a scheme which is equivocable if the receiver of the commitment can be rewound. We stress that our upcoming scheme is *constant-round*, since many of the complications of rewinding in concurrent settings (which would normally make a larger number of rounds necessary) do not appear in our case. See below for more discussion on this.

The scheme. Analogously to Richardson and Kilian [25], we require two (interactive or non-interactive) commitment schemes as building blocks: a perfectly binding commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$, and a statistically hiding commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$. The required commitment schemes can be constructed in a blackbox way from one-way permutations. We will also employ Shamir's secret sharing scheme [26] (which does not rely on a computational assumption).

Scheme 3.11 (Interactive commitment scheme RSCom)**.** Let $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$ be a perfectly binding commitment scheme, and let $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$ be a statistically hiding commitment scheme. Let $\mathcal{S}$ be Shamir's $(k/2+1)$-out-of-k secret sharing scheme over a field $\mathbb{F}$ of cardinality $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^k$, with share generation algorithm Gen and recovery algorithm Rec. We assume that Rec corrects up to $k/5$ errors, such that $\mathsf{Rec}(\mathsf{Gen}(x)+e) = x$ whenever $e \in \mathbb{F}^k$ contains at most $k/5$ nonzero components.[9]

- Commitment to $x \in \mathbb{F}$:
  1. Receiver uniformly chooses $L \subseteq [k]$ of size $|L| = k/2$, computes $(com^R, dec^R) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}(L)$ and sends com^R to committer.
  2. Committer generates shares $(s^\ell)_{\ell\in[k]} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(x)$ with $s^\ell = (s^{\ell,t})_{t\in[k]} \in \{0,1\}^k$, then computes $(com^{\ell,t,j}, dec^{\ell,t,j}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(s^{\ell,t})$ for all $\ell, t \in [k]$ and $j \in \{0,1\}$, and finally sends all commitments $com^{\ell,t,j}$ to receiver. That is, the committer shares x and commits twice to each bit of each share.
  3. Receiver reveals L by sending dec^R to committer.
  4. Committer sends $(dec^{\ell,t,j})_{\ell\in L, t\in[k], j\in\{0,1\}}$ to receiver. That is, the committer proves consistency by opening both commitments for half of the shares.
  5. Receiver checks that the opened commitments are consistent, i.e., that for any $\ell \in L$ and $t \in [k]$ it holds that $\mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}}(com^{\ell,t,0}, dec^{\ell,t,0}) = \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}}(com^{\ell,t,1}, dec^{\ell,t,1}) \in \{0,1\}$.
- Opening:
  1. For all $\ell \in [k] \setminus L$ and $t \in [k]$, committer uniformly chooses $j^{\ell,t} \in \{0,1\}$ and sends $(\ell, t, j^{\ell,t}, dec^{\ell,t,j^{\ell,t}})$ to receiver. That is, the committer randomly opens one of the two commitments for each remaining share bit.
  2. For all $\ell, t \in [k]$, receiver sets $s^{\ell,t} = \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}}(com^{\ell,t,j^{\ell,t}}, dec^{\ell,t,j^{\ell,t}})$ (where we arbitrarily set $j^{\ell,t} = 0$ for $\ell \notin L$) and $s^\ell = (s^{\ell,t})_{t\in[k]}$, and reconstructs the overall message as $x = \mathsf{Rec}((s^\ell)_{\ell\in[k]})$.

Basic properties of RSCom**.** Like ZKCom, RSCom has an interactive commitment phase, so we need to consider interactive variants of Definition 2.1 and Definition 3.1. Clearly, RSCom satisfies correctness, and its hiding property, although not directly obvious, is trivially implied by its SIM-SO-COM security (to be proven below). On the other hand, it is instructive to sketch why RSCom is binding. Informally, in the commitment phase, the committer splits up the message into shares and commits to all shares twice. Using a cut-and-choose approach, the committer then proves to the receiver that the commitments for each share are consistent. Now the committer could try to cheat and provide some inconsistent shares, but will be caught with overwhelming probability if more than $k/5$ of the commitment pairs are inconsistent. When justifying this claim formally, it comes in handy that com^R (i.e., the receiver's commitment to the opening set I) is statistically hiding. Namely, this implies that the prepared commitment pairs $(com^{\ell,t,0}, com^{\ell,t,1})$ are (almost) statistically independent of I, which in turn allows for a standard cut-and-choose argument (and in particular shows that no malleability attacks occur). During the opening phase, the committer opens one commitment of each still unopened commitment pair and so releases a full set of shares. Assuming that at most $k/5$ of the commitment pairs are inconsistent, the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code corresponding to the secret sharing scheme $\mathcal{S}$ implies that the committer can only open to at most one valid message $x \in \mathbb{F}$. Hence RSCom is binding.

The handle that com^R **provides.** Now imagine what would happen if the committer could *rewind* the receiver. In that case, the committer could first produce legal commitments $com^{\ell,t,j}$ and wait for the receiver to unveil I. Then, the committer could rewind the receiver back to the point

[9] The error correction property of Reed-Solomon codes implies that this is indeed efficiently possible.

just before the $com^{\ell,t,j}$ were sent, in order to then restart it with *different* $com^{\ell,t,j}$, such that the pairs $(com^{\ell,t,0}, com^{\ell,t,1})$ are consistent (i.e., commit to the same bit) only for $\ell \in I$. This allows to later open the overall commitment in any desired way by choosing the $j^{\ell,t}$ appropriately. In other words, a committer which can rewind the receiver can also produce equivocable commitments. This not only breaks the proof of Theorem 3.3 in case of interactive commitments (since a stateless oracle $\mathcal{B}$ as in the proof can essentially be rewound). Fortunately, this observation also provides the technical handle we need for achieving SIM-SO-COM security.

Why no disturbing back-propagation occurs. Cryptographic instinct hints that it might become problematic to apply rewindings in a concurrent setting (cf. Dwork et al. [14] for an illustration of the difficulties that occur). In particular, our use of rewindings described above for a single session of RSCom is quite similar to the use of rewindings by Richardson and Kilian [25], who have to employ a rather sophisticated rewinding strategy and an even more complex analysis in a concurrent setting. Contrary to cryptographic intuition, our situation is much easier. Concretely, in the zero-knowledge setting of [25, 14], the simulator has "lost" as soon as any zero-knowledge session proceeds to the actual zero-knowledge proof, but the simulator has so far not been able to extract a secret value (hidden in a commitment) from the prelude of that session. In other words, in the zero-knowledge setting, the simulator has to extract the adversary's commitments *at once* in all sessions. This requires a clever strategy for deciding when to attempt to extract which session. (And in fact, it can be shown that in the concurrent zero-knowledge setting, a certain level of complexity in protocol and analysis is necessary for security, cf. Canetti et al. [8].) On the other hand, in our setting we can substitute real RSCom sessions with "fake sessions" (where "fake" means that the whole commitment is equivocable) *one by one.* We can afford a hybrid argument, in which some of the sessions are real and others are fake, because our setting is split up into *separate* commitment and opening phases. During the commitment phase, when we apply rewindings, no openings will be performed; and once the opening phase is reached, all necessary rewindings will have taken place. Now real *commitment* sessions can be simulated efficiently, even without knowledge of the real underlying message (only the opening would then be non-authentic). Hence, during the rewindings, it will never be necessary to "backtrack" to rewind recursively.

Theorem 3.12 (Interactive possibility of SIM-SO-COM)**.** *Fix any n and $\mathcal{I}$ as in Definition 3.1. Then* RSCom *is simulatable under selective openings in the sense of Definition 3.1.*

Proof. Assume arbitrary $n, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{M}, R$, and $A = (A_1, A_2)$ as in Definition 3.1. Our goal is to construct a suitable simulator $S = (S_1, S_2)$ for which $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{RSCom},\mathcal{M},A,S,R}$ is negligible. We proceed in games.

Game 0 is the real SIM-SO-COM experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{RSCom},\mathcal{M},A,R}$ for ZKCom. Define the random variable out_0 as the output of the experiment, so that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{sim\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{RSCom},\mathcal{M},A,R} = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_0 = 1\right].$$

To describe **Game 1**, recall that A_1 acts as a receiver of n RSCom commitments in Game 0. Let com_i^R, L_i, etc. denote the variables referring to the i-th RSCom session (in terms of the numbering of RSCom sessions as in the experiment). Let $i_1 \in [n]$ be the index of the first RSCom session in which A_1 sends a commitment $com_{i_1}^R$. Now Game 1 proceeds exactly as Game 0, except for the i_1-th RSCom session. Namely, after A_1 opens the corresponding set L_{i_1}, we rewind *the whole experiment (including all* RSCom *sessions)* back to the point where the $com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,j}$ are sent. Then, we substitute all pairs $(com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,0}, com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,1})$ for $\ell \in [k] \setminus L_{i_1}$ and $t \in [k]$ with commitments to uniformly chosen pairs of *different* bits. That is, we make exactly those pairs of commitments inconsistent which will not be

opened in the commitment phase. The simulation is then continued as before, except that of course later, in the opening phase, the "right" commitment $j_{i_1}^{\ell,t}$ in each pair has to be opened. Formally, we initially compute $(com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,j}, dec_{i_1}^{\ell,t,j}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}(b_{i_1}^{\ell,t} \oplus j)$ and set $j_{i_1}^{\ell,t} = b_{i_1}^{\ell,t} \oplus s_{i_1}^{\ell,t}$ for $\ell \in [k] \setminus L_{i_1}$, $t \in [k]$, $j \in \{0,1\}$, and uniformly chosen $b_{i_1}^{\ell,t}$. This implies that later, $dec_{i_1}^{\ell,t,j_{i_1}^{\ell,t}}$ opens the "right" share bit $s_{i_1}^{\ell,t}$. Let out_1 denote the experiment output in Game 1.

Our assumption that $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$ is binding ensures that in Game 1, A_1 does not reveal different sets L_{i_1} before and after rewinding. Formally, we construct an adversary A' on $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$'s binding property, such that A' internally simulates the commitment phase of Game 1. However, A' relays the commitment $com_{i_1}^R$, along with the decommitments $dec_{i_1}^R$ *before and after* the rewinding to its own $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$ binding experiment. Hence, A' breaks the binding property of $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$ whenever A_1 opens $com_{i_1}^R$ to different (valid) messages. Since $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$ is binding, we may hence assume that A_1 does not reveal different sets L_{i_1} before and after rewinding. In other words, of each commitment pair $(com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,0}, com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,1})$ which is made inconsistent in Game 1, only one commitment is opened. (Namely, the "right" commitment $com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,j_{i_1}^{\ell,t}}$ which gives an opening phase exactly as in Game 0.) Hence, the only remaining difference between Game 0 and Game 1 are the $k^2/2$ commitments $com_{i_1}^{\ell,t,1-j_{i_1}^{\ell,t}}$ (for $\ell \in [k] \setminus L_{i_1}$ and $t \in [k]$). These commitments are never opened, not even by the security experiment itself. Hence, a suitable adversary A'' on $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$'s hiding property now shows that the experiment output out_1 in Game 1 is computationally close to the output out_0 of Game 0. We get that

$$|\mathsf{Pr}[out_1 = 1] - \mathsf{Pr}[out_0 = 1]| \leq \left|\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{binding}}_{\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}},\mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}},A'}\right| + \frac{k^2}{2} \cdot \left|\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}},A''}\right|$$

is negligible.

We now inductively define **Game** u **(for** $2 \leq u \leq n$**)**. Let $i_u \notin \{i_1, \ldots, i_{u-1}\}$ be the index of the first RSCom session in which A_1 sends an initial commitment $com_{i_u}^R$, *after* all $u-1$ rewindings in the previous sessions $i_1, \ldots, i_{u-1}$ have taken place. For instance, i_2 is the index of the first RSCom session (different from session i_1) that A_1 talks to after the rewinding described in Game 1 has taken place. We stress that after the rewinding of Game 1, L_{i_1} will already be extracted, and no further rewindings of session i_1 are necessary. There will be no recursive rewinding as in the concurrent zero-knowledge setting [25]. The price for this sequential rewinding is that, so far, we still need knowledge about the full message vector. However, in our specific setting, this can be taken care of easily later on.

Now back to our description of Game u. Game u proceeds like Game $u-1$, but, after the first $u-1$ rewindings have taken place, adds an u-th rewinding to extract L_{i_u} (in exactly the same way as described for Game 1). After that, Game u generates and uses inconsistent commitment pairs $(com_{i_u}^{\ell,t,0}, com_{i_u}^{\ell,t,1})$ as in Game 1. Let out_u denote the experiment output in Game u. Using a reduction to $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}})$'s binding and $(\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}}, \mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{b}})$'s hiding property as in Game 1, we could deduce now that $\mathsf{Pr}[out_u = 1]$ and $\mathsf{Pr}[out_{u-1} = 1]$ are computationally close. In fact, we can even do a bit better with a hybrid argument and find a uniform indistinguishability bound, so that

$$|\mathsf{Pr}[out_n = 1] - \mathsf{Pr}[out_0 = 1]| \leq n \cdot \left(\left|\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{binding}}_{\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{h}},\mathsf{Ver}^{\mathsf{h}},A'}\right| + \frac{k^2}{2} \cdot \left|\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com}^{\mathsf{b}},A''}\right|\right)$$

for suitable adversaries A' and A'' that initially guess $u \in [n]$ uniformly.

We take a closer look at the (concurrent) commitment phase of Game n. Formally, this phase requires knowledge about the full message vector $M = (M_i)_{i \in [n]}$ to build shares s_i^ℓ and commitments

$com_i^{\ell,t,j}$ to these shares. However, all unopened commitment pairs $(com_i^{\ell,t,0}, com_i^{\ell,t,1})$ are equivocable, in the sense that each such pair can be opened to an arbitrary share bit. (Formally, opening $com_i^{\ell,t,j}$ in the opening phase unveils a share bit[10] $b_i^{\ell,t} \oplus j$.) This means that in the opening phase, adjusting the variables $j_i^{\ell,t}$ (which determine which commitment of a pair is opened) allows opening *arbitrary* shares s_i^ℓ. Of course this holds only for shares s_i^ℓ with $\ell \in [k] \setminus L_i$ which have not been opened already in the commitment phase. However, only $|L_i| = k/2$ shares are opened during the commitment phase, and by the secrecy property of $\mathcal{S}$, these shares are statistically independent of the message M_i. Even better, given any set $(s_i^\ell)_{\ell \in L_i}$ of $k/2$ shares and a message M_i, it is (for our choice of $\mathcal{S}$) computationally easy to construct complementary shares $(s_i^\ell)_{\ell \in [k] \setminus L_i}$ such that $(s_i^\ell)_{\ell \in [k]}$ looks exactly like a sharing of M_i, so that in particular we have $\mathsf{Rec}((s_i^\ell)_{i \in [k]}) = M_i$.

This discussion motivates **Game** $n+1$, in which the commitment phase no longer needs *any* knowledge about the message vector M. Instead, all shares s_i^ℓ are computed as shares of zero, i.e., using $(s_i^\ell)_{\ell \in [k]} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(0)$. By the secrecy property of $\mathcal{S}$, this does not affect A_1's view and output (st, I). Later, in the opening phase of RSCom, the $j_i^{\ell,t}$ (for $i \in I$ and $\ell \in [k] \setminus L_i$) can be chosen as $j_i^{\ell,t} = b^{\ell,t} \oplus s_i^{\ell,t}$ for shares s_i^ℓ that have been freshly constructed from M_i. These changes are conceptual and do not change A's view, so that we get

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[out_{n+1} = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_n = 1\right].$$

However, note that the commitment phase of Game $n+1$ no longer uses any knowledge about the message vector M, and the opening phase only uses knowledge about the messages M_i for $i \in I$. This means that we have constructed a working simulator.

Concretely, define $S = (S_1, S_2)$ as follows. S_1 internally simulates the commitment phase of Game $n+1$ to obtain (st, I) from A_1. Then S_1 sets $st' = (st, (b_i^{\ell,t}, com^{\ell,t,j})_{i \in I, \ell, z \in [k], j \in \{0,1\}})$ and outputs (st', I). Note that st' includes all the information needed to open the equivocated RSCom commitments in any desired way. The corresponding S_2 receives st' and $(M_i)_{i \in I}$ as input, so that it can simulate the execution of A_2 in the second phase of Game $n+1$. Of course, S_2 cannot evaluate $R(M, out_A)$ since S_2 does not know the full vector M. However, by definition it is only necessary to produce an authentic out_A. This shows

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R} = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[out_{n+1} = 1\right].$$

Putting things together, we get that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{sim-so}}_{\mathsf{RSCom},\mathcal{M},A,S,R} = \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-real}}_{\mathsf{ZKCom},\mathcal{M},A,R} = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{sim-so-ideal}}_{\mathcal{M},S,R} = 1\right]$$

is negligible, which proves the theorem. □

Generalizations. Like ZKCom, RSCom is SIM-SO-COM secure also against adversaries with auxiliary input z: our proof holds literally.

4 An indistinguishability-based definition

Motivated by the impossibility result from the previous section, we relax Definition 3.1 as follows:

[10] recall that for $\ell \notin L_i$, the uniformly chosen bits $b_i^{\ell,t}$ determine the actual bits in the commitments $com_i^{\ell,t,j}$

Definition 4.1 (Indistinguishable under selective openings/IND-SO-COM)**.** *Let $n = n(k) > 0$ be polynomially bounded, and let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{I}_n)_n$ be a family of sets such that each $\mathcal{I}_n$ is a set of subsets of $[n]$. A commitment scheme* $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ *is* indistinguishable under selective openings *(short* IND-SO-COM secure*) iff for every PPT n-message distribution $\mathcal{M}(\cdot)$, and every PPT adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$, we have that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ is negligible. Here*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} := \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}ideal}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} = 1\right],$$

where $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ proceeds as follows:

1. *sample messages $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$,*
2. *compute (de-)commitments $(com_i, dec_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M_i)$ for $i \in [n]$,*
3. *run $(st, I) \leftarrow A_1(1^k, (com_i)_{i\in[n]})$ to get state information st and a set $I \in \mathcal{I}$,*
4. *run $b \leftarrow A_2(st, (dec_i)_{i\in I}, M)$ to obtain a guess bit b,*
5. *output b.*

On the other hand, $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}ideal}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ proceeds as follows:

1. *sample messages $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$,*
2. *compute (de-)commitments $(com_i, dec_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M_i)$ for $i \in [n]$,*
3. *run $(st, I) \leftarrow A_1(1^k, (com_i)_{i\in[n]})$ to get state information st and a set $I \in \mathcal{I}$,*
4. *sample $M' \leftarrow \mathcal{M} \mid M_I$, i.e., sample a fresh message M' from $\mathcal{M}$ with $M'_I = M_I$,*
5. *run $b \leftarrow A_2(st, (dec_i)_{i\in I}, M')$ to obtain a guess bit b,*
6. *output b.*

As obvious, for interactive commitments, both experiments perform commitment and decommitment processes with A.

On the conditioned distribution $\mathcal{M} \mid M_I$. We stress that, depending on $\mathcal{M}$, it may be computationally hard to sample $M' \leftarrow \mathcal{M} \mid M_I$, even if (the unconditioned) $\mathcal{M}$ is PPT. This might seem strange at first and inconvenient when *applying* the definition in some larger reduction proof. However, there simply seems to be no other way to capture indistinguishability, since the set of opened commitments depends on the commitments themselves. In particular, in general we cannot predict which commitments the adversary wants opened, and then, say, substitute the not-to-be-opened commitments with random commitments. What we chose to do instead is to give the adversary either the full message vector, or an independent message vector which "could be" the full message vector, given the opened commitments. We believe that this is the canonical way to capture secrecy of the unopened commitments under selective openings. We should also stress that it is this definition that turns out to be useful in the context of interactive argument systems, see Section 6.

A relaxation. Alternatively, we could let the adversary predict a predicate π of the whole message vector, and consider him successful if $\mathsf{Pr}[b = \pi(M)]$ and $\mathsf{Pr}[b = \pi(M')]$ for the alternative message vector $M' \leftarrow \mathcal{M} \mid M_I$ differ non-negligibly. We stress that our upcoming negative result (as well as the application in Section 6) also applies to this relaxed notion.

4.1 Impossibility from blackbox reductions

Theorem 4.2 (Blackbox impossibility of perfectly binding IND-SO-COM, most general formulation)**.** *Let $n = n(k) = 2k$, and let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{I}_n)_n$ with $\mathcal{I}_n = \{I \subseteq [n] : |I| = n/2\}$ be the family of all $n/2$-sized subsets of $[n]$. Let $\mathcal{X}$ be an oracle that satisfies property $\mathcal{P}$ even in presence of a PSPACE-oracle. We demand that $\mathcal{X}$ is computable in PSPACE, at least in polynomially bounded*

contexts.[11] *Then, there exists a set of oracles relative to which $\mathcal{X}$ still satisfies $\mathcal{P}$, but no perfectly binding commitment scheme is indistinguishable under selective openings.*

Proof. First, let $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ be a suitably small positive real number that does not depend on n. (We will determine ε later.) Let $\mathbb{F}$ be the finite field of size 2^k. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be the oracle that initially chooses a linear code C over $\mathbb{F}$ with length n, dimension $D \geq (1/2 + \varepsilon)$ and minimum distance $d \geq 5\varepsilon$. That is, $\mathcal{C}$ chooses a full-rank generator matrix $G \in \mathbb{F}^{D \times n}$ such that for any distinct $x, y \in \mathbb{F}^D$, the vectors xG and yG differ in at least d components. We denote with C the induced linear code, i.e., $C = \{xG \mid x \in \{0,1\}^D\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$. For suitably small (but positive) ε and suitably large values of n, such codes exist due to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (cf., e.g., MacWilliams and Sloane [21, Theorem 12 and Problem 45]). We assume such values of n and ε, and we also assume n large enough such that $\varepsilon n \geq 1$. Upon any input, $\mathcal{C}$ replies with C (i.e., with G).

Moreover, let $\mathcal{PSPACE}$ be a PSPACE-oracle, and let $\mathcal{R}$ be the oracle that, upon input $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \in (\mathbb{F} \cup \{\perp\})^n$ and $I \subseteq [n]$, proceeds as follows. If there exists $\tilde{M} = (\tilde{M}_i)_{i\in[n]} \in C$ and $J \supseteq I$ with $|J| \geq (1-2\varepsilon)n$ such that $\tilde{M}_J = M_J$, then return $\tilde{M}$. (Since C has minimum distance $d \geq (1-5\varepsilon)n$, there is at most one such $\tilde{M}$.) If no such $\tilde{M} \in C$ exists, return $\perp$. Intuitively, $\mathcal{R}$ tries to "error-correct" M and find a vector $\tilde{M} \in C$ which is "close" to M and satisfies $\tilde{M}_I = M_I$. Note that $\mathcal{R}$ can be perfectly emulated using $\mathcal{PSPACE}$ and a description of C alone; we only use an explicit $\mathcal{R}$ to ease presentation.

Finally, let $\mathcal{B}$ be the oracle that proceeds as described below. Again, we describe a stateful $\mathcal{B}$ for simplicity. $\mathcal{B}$ can be made stateless by prepending the history to each query (cf. the discussion before Theorem 3.3). We stress, however, that this formalization preserves $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$'s perfect binding property even when $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is interactive. Namely, while $\mathcal{B}$ essentially grants the committer the power to rewind the receiver of the commitment, this additional rewinding power does not help against *perfectly* binding commitment schemes.

1. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com)$, where $com = (com_i)_{i\in[n]}$, check that $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ describes a perfectly binding, but not necessarily hiding, commitment scheme.[12] If not, reject with output $\perp$. If yes, return a uniformly chosen $I \in \mathcal{I}$ and record $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$.
2. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, dec_I)$ with $dec_I = (dec_i)_{i\in I}$ for a $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$ which was previously recorded, verify using Ver that each dec_i is a valid opening of the respective com_i. If not, reject with output $\perp$. If yes, extract the whole message vector M from com (this is possible uniquely since $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is perfectly binding), and return $\mathcal{R}(M, I)$.

We should comment on $\mathcal{B}$'s check whether $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is perfectly binding. We want that, for all possible values of C and states of $\mathcal{X}$, and for all syntactically allowed commitments com_i, there is at most one message M_i to which com_i can be opened in the sense of Ver. Note that by assumption about $\mathcal{X}$, this condition can be checked using PSPACE-oracle $\mathcal{PSPACE}$. (For instance, if $\mathcal{X}$ is a random oracle, then we can let $\mathcal{PSPACE}$ iterate over all possible answers to actually made queries; since there can by only polynomially many such queries in our context, this can be done in PSPACE. More generally, we can iterate over suitable prefixes of $\mathcal{X}$'s random tape.) Note that we completely ignore whether or not $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is hiding.

Lemma 4.3. *Let $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$ be a perfectly binding commitment scheme (that may use all of the described oracles in its algorithms). Then $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*)$ is not indistinguishable under selective openings.*

[11] This is not a contradiction. An example of such an $\mathcal{X}$ is a random oracle or an ideal cipher, using lazy sampling. It will become clearer how we use the PSPACE requirement in the proof.

[12] see the discussion after the description of $\mathcal{B}$

Proof. Consider the n-message distribution $\mathcal{M}^*$ that samples random elements of C. (I.e., $\mathcal{M}^*$ outputs a uniformly sampled $M \in C \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$.) Consider the following adversary A that relays between the real or ideal IND-SO-COM experiment and oracle $\mathcal{B}$:

1. Upon receiving $com^* = (com_i^*)_{i\in[n]}$ from the experiment, send $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, com^*)$ to $\mathcal{B}$.
2. Upon receiving $I^* \in \mathcal{I}$ from $\mathcal{B}$, send I^* to the IND-SO-COM experiment.
3. Upon receiving openings $dec_{I^*}^* = (dec_i^*)_{i\in I^*}$ and a challenge message M from the experiment, send $(\mathsf{Com}^*, \mathsf{Ver}^*, com^*, dec_{I^*}^*)$ to $\mathcal{B}$.
4. Finally, upon receiving $\tilde{M} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ from $\mathcal{B}$, output $out_A = 1$ iff $M = \tilde{M}$.

(Again, A is straightforwardly split into parts A_1 and A_2.)

Now by construction of the IND-SO-COM experiment and $\mathcal{B}$, we have that the message $\tilde{M}$ that A receives from $\mathcal{B}$ will always be identical to the initially sampled message M^*, both in the real and the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment. Hence, A will always output 1 in the real IND-SO-COM experiment (since then $M = M^*$ by definition). In the ideal experiment, M will be a random codeword with $M_{I^*} = M_{I^*}^*$. However, since code C has dimension $D \geq (1/2 + \varepsilon) \geq |I^*| + 1$, there are at least $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^k$ possible such M, and so $M = M^*$ with probability at most 2^{-k}. Hence A will output 1 with negligible probability in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment. We get that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com}^*,\mathcal{M}^*,A}$ is overwhelming, which proves the lemma. □

Lemma 4.4. *$\mathcal{X}$ satisfies $\mathcal{P}$.*

Proof. For contradiction, suppose that there is a successful (computationally unbounded, but polynomially bounded in the number of oracle queries) adversary A on $\mathcal{X}$'s property $\mathcal{P}$. We first argue that A can do without $\mathcal{B}$. Formally, we build a refined A' from A such that A' never queries $\mathcal{B}$, but still achieves that $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{P} \text{ outputs } 1] - 1/2$ is non-negligible.

Now A' simulates A and answers A's $\mathcal{B}$-queries on its own, as follows:

1. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com)$ from A, where $com = (com_i)_{i\in[n]}$, check that $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ describes a perfectly binding, but not necessarily hiding, commitment scheme.[13] If not, reject with output $\perp$. If yes, return a uniformly chosen $I \in \mathcal{I}$ and record $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$.
2. Upon input $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, dec_I)$ with $dec_I = (dec_i)_{i\in I}$ for a $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com, I)$ which was previously recorded, verify using Ver that each dec_i is a valid opening of the respective com_i. If not, reject with output $\perp$. If yes, apply procedure `Rewind` described below. If `Rewind` fails, return $\perp$. If `Rewind` succeeds, it will return a set $R \subseteq [n]$ of size $|R| \geq (1-\varepsilon)n$ along with messages M'_R such that $M'_R = M_R$ for the unique messages M inside com that would be extracted by $\mathcal{B}$. In this case, return $\mathcal{R}(M', I)$, where we set $M'_i := \perp$ for $i \notin R$.

We denote this simulation of $\mathcal{B}$ by $\mathcal{B}'$. Before we analyze $\mathcal{B}'$ further, we sketch the `Rewind` procedure. `Rewind` rewinds A back to the state just before receiving $I \in \mathcal{I}$ from $\mathcal{B}'$, and replaces I with a freshly sampled $I' \in \mathcal{I}$, in the hope that A opens $M_{I'}$ later. We argue below that rewinding a sufficient (polynomial[14]) number of times will with high probability allow to extract $(M_i)_{i\in R}$ for $R \supseteq I$ with $|R| \geq (1-\varepsilon)n$. In particular, we will prove that the probability for `Rewind` to fail in *any* $\mathcal{B}'$-query is significantly smaller than A's success probability. For that reason, we will henceforth silently assume that `Rewind` did not fail. A detailed description and analysis of `Rewind` can be found in the next lemma.

First we remark that, given a fixed vector com (that also fixes M), there is at most one $M^{\mathcal{B}} \in C$ that $\mathcal{B}$ could possibly output, and this $M^{\mathcal{B}}$ does not depend on I. Indeed, whenever $\mathcal{B}$ outputs some $M^{\mathcal{B}} \in C$, then by definition of $\mathcal{R}$, there must be a $J \subset [n]$, $|J| \geq (1-2\varepsilon)n$, such that $M_J^{\mathcal{B}} = M_J$. For

[13] By assumption, this can be efficiently done by A' using $\mathcal{PSPACE}$.

[14] Although A' will not necessarily be polynomial-time, we need to keep the number of A''s oracle queries polynomial, hence the need to bound the number of rewindings.

any two possible $\mathcal{B}$-outputs $M^{\mathcal{B},1}, M^{\mathcal{B},2} \in C$ and corresponding subsets J_1, J_2, we have $M^{\mathcal{B},1}_{J_1 \cap J_2} = M_{J_1 \cap J_2} = M^{\mathcal{B},2}_{J_1 \cap J_2}$. Hence $M^{\mathcal{B},1}$ and $M^{\mathcal{B},2}$ match in at least $|J_1 \cap J_2| \geq (1-4\varepsilon)n \geq (1-5\varepsilon)n + 1$ components, which implies $M^{\mathcal{B},1} = M^{\mathcal{B},2}$ by definition of C. The same argument shows that, given *com*, also $\mathcal{B}'$ can only output either $\perp$ or $M^{\mathcal{B}'} = M^{\mathcal{B}}$.

We claim that $\mathcal{B}'$ will output what $\mathcal{B}$ would have output, except with negligible probability. Indeed, if $\mathcal{B}'$ outputs $M^{\mathcal{B}'} \in C$, then already M_R can be error-corrected (in the sense of $\mathcal{R}$) to a unique vector $\tilde{M} = M^{\mathcal{B}'} \in C$. Hence also M can be error-corrected to the same $\tilde{M} \in C$, and so $\mathcal{B}$ would have output $M^{\mathcal{B}} = M^{\mathcal{B}'}$.

Conversely, assume that $\mathcal{B}$ would have output $M^{\mathcal{B}} \in C$ (and not $\perp$). For contradiction, assume that $\mathcal{B}'$ outputs $\perp$. Since $\mathcal{B}$ would have output $M^{\mathcal{B}}$, there exists a subset $J \supseteq I$ of size $|J| \geq (1-2\varepsilon)n$ with $M_J = M^{\mathcal{B}}_J$. Denote by $R \supseteq I$ the indices for which `Rewind` extracts M_R. Call an index $i \in [n]$ *bad* iff $M_i \neq M^{\mathcal{B}}_i$. Because we assumed that $\mathcal{B}'$ outputs $\perp$, every $(1-2\varepsilon)n$-sized subset of M_R must contain at least one bad index. Since $|R| \geq (1-\varepsilon)n$, we get that R contains at least εn bad indices. Now n grows linearly in k, and so a uniformly chosen subset $I \subseteq [n]$ contains hence a bad index with overwhelming probability over I. For any such choice of I, $\mathcal{B}$ would have output $\perp$ and not $M^{\mathcal{B}}$ since $M^{\mathcal{B}}_I = M_I$ by definition of $\mathcal{R}$. So $\mathcal{B}$'s probability to output $M^{\mathcal{B}}$ must be negligible in the first place. This shows that the claim "whenever $\mathcal{B}$ would have output $M^{\mathcal{B}} \in C$, then $\mathcal{B}'$ outputs $M^{\mathcal{B}'} = M^{\mathcal{B}}$" holds with overwhelming probability.

We conclude that the internal simulation $\mathcal{B}'$ behaves like $\mathcal{B}$, except with sufficiently small probability. Hence A' breaks property $\mathcal{P}$, but without querying $\mathcal{B}$. Without loss of generality, we can also assume that A' never queries $\mathcal{R}$, since $\mathcal{R}$-queries can be efficiently emulated using $\mathcal{PSPACE}$ (that itself cannot access $\mathcal{X}$) and a description of code C alone. Hence A' breaks property $\mathcal{P}$ with only a polynomial number of queries to $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{PSPACE}$. This contradicts our assumption on $\mathcal{X}$ and creates the desired contradiction. □

It leaves to give a detailed description and analysis of procedure `Rewind`.

Lemma 4.5. *Procedure* `Rewind` *sketched above extracts a subvector M_R of the message vector M with $R \supseteq I$ and $|R| \geq (1-\varepsilon)n$ upon success. The probability that* `Rewind` *fails in at least one of A's $\mathcal{B}$-queries is at most half of the advantage of A against $\mathcal{P}$.*

Proof. First, we detail how `Rewind` works. Generally, since A makes only polynomially many oracle queries, and we assumed A to be successfully attacking $\mathcal{X}$'s property $\mathcal{P}$, we can assume that there is a polynomial p such that (a) for infinitely many values of the security parameter k, A's advantage against $\mathcal{P}$ is at least $1/p(k)$, and (b) A always makes at most $p(k)$ queries. Assume concretely that A previously submitted $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver}, com)$ to $\mathcal{B}'$, such that $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is perfectly binding. Assume further that A successfully opened com_I to M_I for a subset $I \in \mathcal{I}$ uniformly chosen by $\mathcal{B}'$. Let P denote A's probability (over a uniform choice of $I \in \mathcal{I}$) to correctly open com_I.

In this situation, procedure `Rewind` records M_I and then rewinds A's state to the point where A received $I \in \mathcal{I}$ from $\mathcal{B}'$ (without altering A's random tape). `Rewind` then substitutes I with a fresh I' uniformly sampled from $\mathcal{I}$. If A later successfully opens $M_{I'}$, then `Rewind` records $M_{I'}$. (Note that there can be no contradiction among the different M_I, since any com_i can only be opened to at most one message M_i.) This process is repeated until either

- at least $(1-\varepsilon)n$ individual messages M_i have been gathered, or
- it turns out that with overwhelming probability, $P \leq 1/2p(k)^2$.

In other words, we rewind until either enough messages have been extracted, or it becomes clear that the event that A opened the first M_I successfully (which triggered `Rewind`) was very unlikely in the first place (in which case we can safely abort). We have to show that this process only takes up a polynomial number of rewindings, to show that `Rewind` is efficient.

Now, a Chernoff bound shows that using a polynomial number of rewindings, we can approximate P sufficiently well. In particular, if, say, $P \leq 1/3p(k)^2$, then we will detect that $P \leq 1/2p(k)^2$ with overwhelming probability, and we can abort. Note that `Rewind` is only triggered when A opens the first M_I. Using a union bound, we can hence conclude that the probability that in any of A's $\mathcal{B}$-queries, A opens the first M_I but `Rewind` then aborts, is at most $1/2p(k)$, i.e., at most half of A's overall success probability. That means that aborting does not significantly alter A's success.

It remains to show that, once $P > 1/3p^2(k)$, we can, using a polynomial number of rewindings, indeed extract at least $(1-\varepsilon)n$ messages M_i from A. To this end, let $\mathcal{I}' \subseteq \mathcal{I}$ be the set of I for which A opens M_I. (Note that this definition is meaningful, since we fixed A's random tape.) First, for contradiction, suppose that there is a set $B \subseteq [n]$ with $|B| \geq \varepsilon n$ such that for all $i \in B$, we have $\mathsf{Pr}[I \in \mathcal{I}' \wedge i \in I\}] < P/2n$, where the probability is over $I \in \mathcal{I}$. Then

$$P - \mathsf{Pr}[I \cap B = \emptyset] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[I \in \mathcal{I}'\right] - \mathsf{Pr}[I \cap B = \emptyset]$$
$$\leq \mathsf{Pr}\left[I \in \mathcal{I}' \wedge I \cap B \neq \emptyset\right] \leq \sum_{i \in B} \mathsf{Pr}\left[I \in \mathcal{I}' \wedge i \in I\right] \leq n \cdot \frac{P}{2n} = \frac{P}{2},$$

so that $\mathsf{Pr}[I \cap B = \emptyset] \geq P/2 \geq 1/6p(k)^2$. So if $|B|$ was a constant of fraction of n as we assumed, then this probability would be negligible in $n = n(k) = 2k$. So we have a contradiction to our assumption on $|B|$, and hence there can be no such B. Thus there is an $(1-\varepsilon)n$-sized subset $R \subseteq [n]$ and all $i \in R$, we have $\mathsf{Pr}[I \in \mathcal{I}' \wedge i \in I] \geq P/2n \geq 1/12kp(k)^2$. Again using a Chernoff bound shows that a sufficient (polynomial) number of rewinding retrieves M_i for all $i \in R$, except with negligible probability. Since we started with collecting all M_I, we have $R \supseteq I$. □

Taking everything together proves Theorem 4.2. □

Similarly to Corollary 3.8, we get for concrete choices of $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{P}$:

Corollary 4.6 (Blackbox impossibility of perfectly binding IND-SO-COM)**.** *Let n and $\mathcal{I}$ as in Theorem 4.2. Then no perfectly binding commitment scheme can be proven simulatable under selective openings via a $\forall\exists$semi-blackbox reduction to one or more of the following primitives: one-way functions, one-way permutations, trapdoor one-way permutations, IND-CCA secure public key encryption.*

Generalizations. Again, Corollary 4.6 constitutes merely an example instantiation of the much more general Theorem 4.2. Also, we stress that Theorem 4.2 also holds for (perfectly binding) interactive commitment schemes. As with Theorem 3.3, the perfectly binding property of a commitment scheme is preserved by the stateless formalization of $\mathcal{B}$. Theorem 4.7 generalizes as well: here, it is only necessary to note that any statistically hiding commitment can be opened (also interactively) as a commitment to any other message. However, we stress that the proof for Theorem 4.2 does *not* apply to "almost-perfectly binding" commitment schemes such as the one by Naor [22]. (For instance, for such schemes, $\mathcal{B}$'s check that the supplied commitment scheme is binding might tell something about $\mathcal{X}$.)

4.2 Statistically hiding schemes are secure

Fortunately, things look different for statistically hiding commitment schemes:

Theorem 4.7 (Statistically hiding schemes are IND-SO-COM secure)**.** *Fix arbitrary n and $\mathcal{I}$ as in Definition 4.1, and let $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ be a statistically hiding commitment scheme. Then $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is indistinguishable under selective openings in the sense of Definition 4.1.*

Proof. Fix an n-message distribution $\mathcal{M}$ and a PPT adversary A on the SIM-SO-COM security of $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$. We start by considering the $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ experiment. We refine this experiment stepwise, in each step preserving A's output distribution.

Our first modification of $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ is experiment H_0, which proceeds as follows (*emphasized* steps are different from $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$):

1. sample messages $M = (M_i)_{i\in[n]} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$,
2. compute (de-)commitments $(com_i, dec_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M_i)$ for $i \in [n]$,
3. run $(st, I) \leftarrow A_1(1^k, (com_i)_{i\in[n]})$ to get state information st and a set $I \in \mathcal{I}$,
4. *for every $i \in I$, compute an alternative decommitment $dec'_i \leftarrow \mathtt{AltDec}(com_i, M_i)$ (procedure* `AltDec` *is described below),*
5. *run $b \leftarrow A_2(st, (dec'_i)_{i\in I}, M)$ to obtain a guess bit b,*
6. output b.

To describe the (in general inefficient) procedure `AltDec`, consider $\mathsf{Com}(M)$'s output distribution $C_M = (C_{M,1}, C_{M,2})$. Now $\mathtt{AltDec}(com_i, M_i)$ samples from C_{M_i}, conditioned on the event that $C_{M_i,1} = com_i$. `AltDec` returns the sampled $C_{M_i,2}$. In other words, `AltDec` looks, given M_i, com_i, for a corresponding decommitment dec_i, as could have been output by $\mathsf{Com}(M_i)$. If no such dec_i exists (i.e., if the probability that $\mathsf{Com}(M_i)$ returns com_i is 0), then `AltDec` returns $\perp$.

Note that the distributions of dec_i and dec'_i are identical (even given com_i, M_i), and hence

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} = 1\right] = \mathsf{Pr}\left[H_0 = 1\right].$$

We now define a generalization H_j: H_j runs like H_0, except that H_j runs this alternative step 2' instead of step 2:

2'. for every $i \le j$, compute $(com_i, dec_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(0^k)$; for $i > j$, compute $(com_i, dec_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(M_i)$.

Obviously, for $j = 0$ we get H_0. Note that H_j computes commitments com_i which, for $i \le j$, do no longer depend on M_i. From H_j, we can now construct an adversary A' on $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$'s statistical hiding property. A' first uniformly picks $j \in [n]$, then simulates H_{j-1}, but constructs com_j using its own experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{hiding-}b}_{\mathsf{Com},A'}$. Namely, A' asks for a commitment to either M_j or 0^k, and uses the obtained com_j for further simulation in H_{j-1}. In $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{hiding-0}}_{\mathsf{Com},A'}$, this means that com_j is constructed as a commitment to M_j, and we obtain experiment H_{j-1}. On the other hand, in $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{hiding-1}}_{\mathsf{Com},A'}$, com_j is a commitment to 0^k, and we obtain experiment H_j. This way, we get that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{hiding}}_{\mathsf{Com},A'} = \frac{1}{n}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathsf{Pr}\left[H_j = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[H_{j-1} = 1\right]\right) = \frac{1}{n}\left(\mathsf{Pr}\left[H_n = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[H_0 = 1\right]\right)$$

is negligible, and hence so must be $\mathsf{Pr}\left[H_n = 1\right] - \mathsf{Pr}\left[H_0 = 1\right]$. Note that in H_n, the view of the adversary now only depends on M_I; all commitments are produced as commitments to 0^k.

With the same reasoning, we can show that the output of experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ is negligibly close to that of the analogously modified experiment H'_n, where all commitments are generated as commitments to 0^k. Since $H'_n = H_n$, we hence obtain that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} = \mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} - \mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$$

must be negligible, which proves the theorem. □

We stress that the proof of Theorem 4.7 also holds (literally) in case A and/or $\mathcal{M}$ gets an additional auxiliary input z.

Now statistically hiding (and hence IND-SO-COM secure) commitment schemes can be constructed using a blackbox reduction from one-way functions (Haitner and Reingold [18]), but Corollary 3.8 implies that this is not possible for SIM-SO-COM security. This immediately implies that IND-SO-COM security does not imply SIM-SO-COM security via a blackbox reduction.

5 Application to adaptively secure encryption

Motivation and setting. Taking up the motivation of Damgård [10], we consider the setting of an adversary A that may corrupt, in an adaptive manner, a subset of a set of parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$. Assume that for all i, the public encryption key pk_i with which party P_i encrypts outgoing messages, is publicly known. Suppose further that A may corrupt parties based on all public keys and all so far received ciphertexts. When A corrupts P_i, A learns P_i's internal state and history, in particular A learns the randomness used for all of that party's encryptions, and its secret key sk_i. We assume the following:

1. The number of parties is $n = 2k$ for the security parameter k,
2. It is allowed for A to choose at some point a subset $I \subseteq [n]$ of size $n/2$ and to corrupt all these P_i $(i \in I)$.
3. We can interpret the used encryption scheme as a (noninteractive hiding and binding) commitment scheme $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ in the following sense: $\mathsf{Com}(M)$ generates a fresh public key pk and outputs a commitment $com = (pk, \mathsf{Enc}(pk, M; r))$ and a decommitment $dec = (M, r)$. Here Enc denotes the encryption algorithm of the encryption scheme, and r denotes the randomness used while encrypting M. Verification of $(com, dec) = (pk, C, M, r)$ checks that $\mathsf{Enc}(pk, M; r) = C$.

Note that the third assumption does not follow from the scheme's correctness. Indeed, correctness implies that honestly generated (pk, M) are committing. However, there are schemes for which it is easy to come up with fake public keys and ciphertexts (i.e., fake commitments) which are computationally indistinguishable from honestly generated commitments, but can be opened in arbitrary ways. Prominent examples of such schemes are non-committing encryption schemes [6, 3, 7, 11, 9], which however generally contain an interactive set-up phase and are comparatively inefficient.

Application of our impossibility results. Attacks in this setting cannot be easily simulated in the sense of, e.g., Canetti et al. [6]: such a simulator would in particular be able to simulate openings (in the sense of Ver, i.e., openings of ciphertexts). Hence, this would imply a simulator for $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ in the sense of SIM-SO-COM security (Definition 3.1). Now from Corollary 3.8 we know that the construction and security analysis of such a simulator requires either a very strong computational assumption, or fundamentally non-blackbox techniques. Even worse: if $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ is perfectly binding[15], then Corollary 4.6 shows that not even secrecy in the sense of Definition 4.1[16] can be proven in a blackbox way. On top of that, we cannot hope to use our SIM-SO-COM secure scheme ZKCom to construct an encryption scheme in a non-blackbox way, since ZKCom's commitment phase is inherently interactive.

We stress that these negative results only apply if encryption really constitutes a (binding) commitment scheme in the above sense. In fact, e.g., [6] construct a sophisticated *non-committing*

[15] in the presence of non-uniform adversaries, this is already implied by the fact that the scheme is noninteractive and computationally binding

[16] in the context of encryption, Definition 4.1 would translate to a variant of indistinguishability of ciphertexts

(i.e., non-binding) encryption scheme and prove simulatability for their scheme. Our results show that such a non-committing property is to a certain extent necessary.

6 Application to zero-knowledge proof systems

Graph 3-coloring is composable in parallel. Dwork et al. [13] have considered the applications of SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes to zero-knowledge protocols. In their Theorem 7.6, they show that the well-known graph 3-coloring proof system $\mathsf{G3C}$ of Goldreich et al. [17] becomes composable in parallel when implemented with SIM-SO-COM secure commitments. Using our scheme RSCom hence makes $\mathsf{G3C}$ a 6-move (weakly) zero-knowledge interactive argument system with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error. This result is very surprising in light of the negative composability results Goldreich and Krawczyk [16], Canetti et al. [8]. We stress that the technical handle which allows us to circumvent known impossibility results is *not* that we use non-blackbox techniques (e.g., like Barak [1]). Rather, the impossibilities in particular from [8] can be circumvented since [13, Theorem 7.6] considers *parallel* composition instead of concurrent composition of $\mathsf{G3C}$ sessions.

What our positive results do not imply. As a caveat, we stress that [13, Theorem 7.6] only proves a weaker notion of zero-knowledge called "$S(V,T,D)$ zero-knowledge." This is a variant of zero-knowledge in which the simulator S may depend on the verifier V, on the distinguisher T between real and simulated transcript, and on the considered message distribution D. We emphasize as well that our results do *not* imply that there are, in the terminology of [13] no "magic functions." In order to prove nonexistence of magic functions with [13, Theorem 5.1], one would have to find a *noninteractive* SIM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme. (And in fact, Theorem 3.3 tells us that this will not be possible with blackbox reductions to standard assumptions.)

Protocol ZKCom viewed from a different angle. Recall that also protocol ZKCom is necessarily interactive, due to the internally used zero-knowledge argument (P,V). Hence, when implementing $\mathsf{G3C}$ with ZKCom commitments, the round complexity of protocol $\mathsf{G3C}$ will also increase beyond three moves. However, note the interesting circularity: ZKCom itself assumes a concurrently composable zero-knowledge system (P,V) as a basis, and so the parallel composability of $\mathsf{G3C}$ is directly inherited from (P,V).

IND-SO-COM security as a fallback. A natural question is whether IND-SO-COM security, our relaxation of SIM-SO-COM security, provides a reasonable fallback for SIM-SO-COM security. Now first, our results show that even when using IND-SO-COM secure schemes, we cannot rely on perfectly binding commitment schemes because of Theorem 4.2. For many interesting interactive proofs (and in particular the graph 3-coloring protocol from [17]), this unfortunately means that the proof system degrades to an argument system. But, assuming we are willing to pay this price, what do we get from IND-SO-COM security?

The answer is "essentially witness indistinguishability," as we will argue in a minute. Intuitively, any commitment scheme which satisfies (a slight variation of) IND-SO-COM security can be used to implement "commit-choose-open" style interactive argument systems, such that

- the argument system is witness indistinguishable,
- the security reduction is tight (and in particular does not lose a factor of $|I|$, where $|I|$ is the number of possible choices in the second stage), and
- we get composability essentially "for free."

(More details follow.) Now witness indistinguishable argument systems already enjoy a composition theorem (see, e.g., Goldreich [15, Lemma 4.6.6]), so at least the last of these claims is not surprising. However, our point here is that the security notion of IND-SO-COM secure commitments itself is a "good" and useful notion.

Formal setting. Consider an interactive argument system (P, V) for an NP-language $\mathcal{L}$ with witness relation $\mathcal{R}$. We assume that (P, V) is of the following "commit-choose-open" form, where the prover P gets as input a statement $x \in \mathcal{L}$ along with a witness w such that $\mathcal{R}(x, w)$, and the verifier only gets x.

1. P generates n commitments $com = (com_i)_{i \in [n']}$ and sends them to V,
2. V chooses a subset $I \subseteq [n']$,
3. P opens the commitments com_i for $i \in I$ by sending $dec_I = (dec_i)_{i \in I}$ to V,
4. V accepts if the openings are valid and if the opened values satisfy some fixed relation specified by the protocol.

We suppose further that the value of the actually opened messages M_I is always statistically independent of the used witness w. These are strong assumptions, but at least one of the most important zero-knowledge protocols (namely, the mentioned graph 3-coloring protocol $\mathsf{G3C}$ from Goldreich et al. [17]) is of this form.

Connection to IND-SO-COM security. Since the standard definition of witness indistinguishability (see Definition 2.4) involves an auxiliary input z given to the verifier/adversary V^*, we also consider a variation of Definition 4.1 that involves auxiliary input. Namely,

Definition 6.1 (Auxiliary-input-IND-SO-COM)**.** *In the situation of Definition 4.1, we say that* $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Ver})$ *is* auxiliary-input-IND-SO-COM secure *iff* $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z}$ *is negligible for all PPT* $\mathcal{M}$ *and* A *and all auxiliary inputs* $z = (z_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \in (\{0,1\}^*)^{\mathbb{N}}$*, where both* $\mathcal{M}$ *and* A *are invoked with additional auxiliary input* z_k*.*

Now we are ready to prove the following connection between witness indistinguishability and auxiliary-input-IND-SO-COM:

Theorem 6.2 (Auxiliary-input-IND-SO-COM implies witness indistinguishability)**.** *Assume an interactive argument system* (P, V) *as above. Then, if the commitment scheme in* (P, V) *is auxiliary-input-IND-SO-COM for parameters* $n = n' + 1$ *and all subsets* $\mathcal{I}$ *of* $[n']$ *as possible in* (P, V)*, then* (P, V) *is witness indistinguishable. The security reduction loses only a factor of 2.*

Proof. For contradiction, assume x, w^0, w^1, V^*, D, z such that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{WI}}_{x,w^0,w^1,V^*,D,z}$ is non-negligible. We construct a message distribution $\mathcal{M}$, an adversary A, and a z' such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z} = \frac{1}{2}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{WI}}_{x,w^0,w^1,V^*,D,z}. \tag{1}$$

First, define $z'_k = (x_k, w^0_k, w^1_k, z_k)$, so that $\mathcal{M}$ and A are both invoked with *both* witnesses and z_k. Then, let $\mathcal{M}$ be the following PPT algorithm:

1. upon input $z'_k = (x_k, w^0_k, w^1_k, z_k)$, toss a coin $b \in \{0,1\}$,
2. sample messages $(M_i)_{i \in [n']}$ by running P on input (x_k, w^b_k),
3. define $M_{n'+1} := b$,
4. return the $(n'+1)$-message vector $(M_i)_{i \in [n'+1]}$.

Now adversary A proceeds as follows:

1. upon input $z'_k = (x_k, w_k^0, w_k^1, z_k)$ and commitments $com = (com_i)_{i\in[n'+1]}$, run V^* on input (x_k, z_k) and commitments $(com_i)_{i\in[n']}$,
2. when V^* chooses a set $I \subseteq [n']$, relay this set (interpreted as a subset of $[n] = [n'+1]$) to the IND-SO-COM experiment,
3. upon receiving openings $(dec_i)_{i\in I}$ and a message vector $M^* = (M_i^*)_{i\in[n]}$ from the experiment, run D on input $(x_k, z_k, (com, I, dec_I))$ to receive a guess b' from D,
4. output $b' \oplus M^*_{n'+1}$.

(As usual, A is straightforwardly split up into (A_1, A_2) as required by the IND-SO-COM experiment.)

Now in the real IND-SO-COM experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z}$, the following happens: if $\mathcal{M}$ chose $b = 0$, then an interaction of $\mathsf{P}(x_k, w_k^0)$ and $V^*(x_k, z_k)$ is perfectly simulated, so that A (and hence, since $M^*_{n'+1} = b = 0$, also $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z}$) outputs $D(x_k, z_k, \langle \mathsf{P}(x_k, w_k^0), V^*(x_k, z_k)\rangle)$. Conversely, if $b = 1$, then $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z}$ outputs $1 - D(x_k, z_k, \langle \mathsf{P}(x_k, w_k^1), V^*(x_k, z_k)\rangle)$ because $M^*_{n'+1} = b = 1$ then. We get that

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z} = 1\right] = \frac{1}{2}\Big(\mathsf{Pr}\left[D(x_k, z_k, \langle \mathsf{P}(x_k, w_k^0), V^*(x_k, z_k)\rangle) = 1\right] + 1 - \mathsf{Pr}\left[D(x_k, z_k, \langle \mathsf{P}(x_k, w_k^0), V^*(x_k, z_k)\rangle) = 1\right]\Big) = \frac{1}{2}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{WI}}_{x,w^0,w^1,V^*,D,z} + \frac{1}{2}.$$

On the other hand, in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment, the message $M^*_{n'+1}$ that A receives from the experiment results from a resampling of $\mathcal{M}$, conditioned on $M^*_I = M_I$. Since we assumed about (P, V) that M_I is independent of the used witness, M_I is also independent of b, and hence $M^*_{n'+1}$ will be a freshly tossed coin. We get

$$\mathsf{Pr}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind\text{-}so\text{-}ideal}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A,z} = 1\right] = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Putting things together proves Equation 1. □

Tightness in the reduction and composition. We stress that we only lose a factor of 2 in our security reduction, which contrasts the loss of a factor of about n'^2 in the proof of Goldreich et al. [17]. Admittedly, their proof works also for perfectly binding commitment schemes (thus achieving an interactive *proof* system), which we (almost) cannot hope to satisfy IND-SO-COM security, according to Theorem 4.2. However, since we can instantiate IND-SO-COM secure schemes for arbitrary parameters n and $\mathcal{I}$, we can hope to apply Theorem 6.2 even to protocols where $|\mathcal{I}_n|$ is superpolynomial.[17] In particular, our proof shows that we can even map several parallel executions of a protocol (P, V) to the IND-SO-COM security experiment. This derives a parallel composition theorem (for this particular class of protocols and witness indistinguishability) at virtually no extra cost.

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[17] Of course, it is possibly to directly prove, say, witness indistinguishability for the case of superpolynomial $|\mathcal{I}_n|$ from statistically hiding commitment schemes. However, our point here is to illustrate the usefulness of our definition.

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A On the role of property $\mathcal{P}$

The intuitive contradiction. The formulations of Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 4.2 seem intuitively much too general: essentially they claim impossibility of blackbox proofs from *any* computational assumption which is formulated as a property $\mathcal{P}$ of an oracle $\mathcal{X}$. Why can't we choose $\mathcal{X}$ to be an ideally secure commitment scheme, and $\mathcal{P}$ a property that models precisely what we want to achieve, e.g., Definition 4.1 (i.e., IND-SO-COM security)? After all, Definition 4.1 can be rephrased as a property $\mathcal{P}$ by letting A choose a message distribution $\mathcal{M}$ and send this distribution (as a description of a PPT algorithm $\mathcal{M}$) to $\mathcal{P}$. Then, $\mathcal{P}$ could perform the $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-real}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ or the $\mathsf{Exp}^{\text{ind-so-ideal}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A}$ experiment with A, depending on an internal coin toss (the output of $\mathcal{P}$ will then depend on A's output and on that coin toss). This $\mathcal{P}$ models Definition 4.1, in the sense that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-so}}_{\mathsf{Com},\mathcal{M},A} = 2\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathcal{P}}_{A}.$$

Also, using a truly random permutation as a basis, it is natural to assume that we can construct an *ideal* (i.e., as an oracle) perfectly binding commitment scheme $\mathcal{X}$ that satisfies $\mathcal{P}$. (Note that although $\mathcal{X}$ is perfectly binding, A's view may still be almost statistically independent of the unopened messages, since the scheme $\mathcal{X}$ is given in oracle form.)

Hence, if the assumption essentially *is* already IND-SO-COM security, we can certainly achieve IND-SO-COM security (using a trivial reduction), and this seems to contradict Theorem 4.2. So where is the problem?

Resolving the situation. The problem in the above argument is that $\mathcal{P}$-security (our assumption) implies IND-SO-COM security (our goal) in a fundamentally non-blackbox way. Namely, the proof converts an IND-SO-COM adversary A and a message distribution $\mathcal{M}$ into a $\mathcal{P}$-adversary A' that sends a description of $\mathcal{M}$ to $\mathcal{P}$. This very step makes use of an *explicit representation* of the message distribution $\mathcal{M}$, and this is what makes the whole proof non-blackbox. In other words, this way of achieving IND-SO-COM security cannot be blackbox, and there is no contradiction to our results.

Viewed from a different angle, the essence of our impossibility proofs is: build a very specific message distribution, based on oracles ($\mathcal{RO}$, resp. $\mathcal{C}$), such that another "breaking oracle" $\mathcal{B}$ "breaks" this message distribution if and only if the adversary can prove that he can open commitments. This step relies on the fact that we can specify message distributions which depend on oracles. Relative to such oracles, property $\mathcal{P}$ still holds (as we prove), but may not reflect IND-SO-COM security anymore. Namely, since $\mathcal{P}$ itself cannot access additional oracles[18], $\mathcal{P}$ is also not able to sample a message space that depends on additional (i.e., on top of $\mathcal{X}$) oracles. So in our reduction, although A itself can, both in the IND-SO-COM experiment and when interacting with $\mathcal{P}$, access all oracles, it will not be able to communicate a message distribution $\mathcal{M}$ that depends on additional oracles (on top of $\mathcal{X}$) to $\mathcal{P}$. On the other hand, any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{M}$, as formalized in Definition 4.1, *can* access all available oracles.

[18] by definition, $\mathcal{P}$ must be specified independently of additional oracles, cf. Definition 3.2; if we did allow $\mathcal{P}$ to access additional oracles, this would break our impossibility proofs

So for the above modeling of IND-SO-COM security as a property $\mathcal{P}$ in the sense of Definition 3.2, our impossibility results still hold, but become meaningless (since basically using property $\mathcal{P}$ makes the proof non-blackbox). In a certain sense, this comes from the fact that the modeling of IND-SO-COM as a property $\mathcal{P}$ is inherently non-blackbox.

What computational assumptions can be formalized as properties in a "blackbox" way? Fortunately, most standard computational assumptions can be modeled in a blackbox way as a property $\mathcal{P}$. Besides the mentioned one-way property (and its variants), in particular, e.g., the IND-CCA security game for encryption schemes can be modeled. Observe that in this game, we can let the IND-CCA adversary himself sample challenge messages M_0, M_1 for the IND-CCA experiment from his favorite distribution; no PPT algorithm has to be transported to the security game. In fact, the only properties which do not allow for blackbox proofs are those that involve an explicit transmission of code (i.e., a description of a circuit or a Turing machine). In that sense, the formulation of Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 4.2 is very general and useful.

(Non-)programmable random oracles. We stress that the blackbox requirement for random oracles (when used in the role of $\mathcal{X}$) corresponds to "non-programmable random oracles" (as used by, e.g., Bellare and Rogaway [4]) as opposed to "programmable random oracles" (as used by, e.g., Nielsen [23]). Roughly, a proof in the programmable random oracle model translates an attack on a cryptographic scheme into an attack on a *simulated* random oracle (that is, an oracle completely under control of simulator). Naturally, such a reduction is not blackbox. And indeed, with programmable random oracles, SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes can be built relatively painless. As an example, [23] proves a simple encryption scheme (which can be interpreted as a commitment scheme) secure under selective openings.