Lattice-based Blind Signatures

Abstract. Blind signatures (BS), introduced by Chaum to implement untraceable e-cash, have become a cornerstone in privacy-oriented cryptography. Using hard lattice problems, such as the shortest vector problem, as the basis of security has advantages over using the factoring or discrete logarithm problems. For instance, lattice operations are more efficient than modular exponentiation and lattice problems remain hard for quantum or subexponential-time adversaries.

Generally speaking, BS allow a signer to sign a message without seeing it, while retaining a certain amount of control over the process. In particular, the signer can control the number of issued signatures. For the receiver of the signature, this process provides perfect anonymity, e.g., his spendings remain anonymous when using BS for electronic money.

We provide a positive answer to the question of whether it is possible to implement BS based on lattice problems. More precisely, we show how to turn Lyubashevsky's identification scheme into a BS scheme, which has almost the same efficiency and security in the random oracle model. In particular, it offers quasi-linear complexity, it is statistically blind, and its unforgeability is based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems with an approximation factor of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^5)$. Moreover, it is the first blind signature scheme that supports leakage-resilience, tolerating leakage of a $(1 - o(1))$ fraction of the secret key.

Previously, BS have been constructed either based on the hardness of factoring and computing discrete logarithms, or using general assumptions, e.g., "trapdoor permutations exist". Given a quantum computer, factorizations and discrete logarithms can be computed in polynomial time. Although general assumptions potentially hold in the presence of quantum computers, the result is typically very inefficient with respect to time and space requirements.

Here, our work provides an alternative that is efficient and resists subexponential and quantum-computer attacks. In consequence, it improves the security of all applications that use BS as a primitive.

Keywords. Blind signatures, post-quantum, lattices, provable security, leakage resilience

1 Introduction

Since Chaum proposed his idea of blind signatures [Cha82], it has become an important primitive for anonymous Internet banking, e-voting applications (e.g., [RHOAGZ07, Kim04]), as well as for oblivious transfer [CNS07]. These applications will retain their importance in both, near and far future. As for the near future, we are convinced that current factoring and discrete logarithm based instantiations are efficient and secure. *But for how long?*

Today, when building provably secure cryptographic schemes, one has to keep emerging technologies and especially quantum computers as an example in mind. In the quantum-age, the cryptographic assumptions change with the leap in computing power that quantum computers will provide. There are only a few cryptographic assumptions that are conjectured to be *post-quantum*, i.e., they are considered to withstand quantum computer attacks. One of those assumptions is the hardness of finding short vectors in a lattice. Even for today, there are benefits when building cryptography upon hard lattice problems because, unlike factoring, they withstand subexponential attacks and the best known algorithms, e.g., [AKS01], have an exponential complexity in the lattice dimension. Furthermore, lattice problems typically allow a worst-case to average-case reduction that goes back to Ajtai [Ajt96]. It states that a randomly chosen instance of a certain lattice problem is at least as hard as the worst-case instance of a related lattice problem. Thus, choosing secure keys is easy. This reduction was later on adapted to work with ideal lattices by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [LM06] because ideal lattices offer a compact public-key representation and very efficient operations.

According to the security model, mainly influenced by Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [JLO97] as well as Pointcheval and Stern [PS00], blind signature schemes have to satisfy blindness and one-more unforgeability. Blindness states that the signer must not obtain any information on the signed messages and one-more unforgeability means that an adversary cannot obtain more signatures than there were interactions with the signer.

1

Scheme	Post-quantum	Security	Moves	Secret key	Public key	Signature	Sign	Verify
RSA-2048	No	Current	2	256 Byte	512 Byte	256 Byte	24 ms	4 ms
RSA-4096	No	Future	2	512 Byte	1 kB	512 Byte	72 ms	8 ms
RSA-8192	No	Future	2	1 kB	2 kB	1 kB	360 ms	12 ms
RSA-16384	No	Future	2	2 kB	4 kB	2 kB	2592 ms	16 ms
Section 3 ($n = 1024$)	Yes	Current	4	9 kB	9 kB	73 kB	20 ms	5 ms
Section 3 ($n = 2048$)	Yes	Future	4	21 kB	19 kB	245 kB	56 ms	16 ms

The table compares RSA for moduli of bitlengths 2048, 4096, 8192, and 16384 for "Current" and "Future" security levels with our construction in terms of storage requirements and speed. Choosing such large RSA moduli may be necessary if there a new attacks or quantum computers that can handle a moderate number of qubits. For our blind signature scheme we chose two parameter sets for "Current" and "Future" security based on today's knowledge about lattice basis reduction.

Table 1: Secure parameters for RSA-based and lattice-based blind signatures.

Our Contribution. We construct the first lattice-based blind signature scheme. It is unconditionally blind, selective-failure blind [CNS07], and one-more unforgeable in the random oracle model if standard lattice problems in ideal lattices are hard in the worst-case. With its four moves it is quite efficient. All operations have quasi-linear complexity and all keys and signatures require a quasi-linear amount of storage bits, with respect to the main parameter n. Moreover, it is leakage resilient according to a model inspired by Katz and Vaikuntanathan [KV09]. Let L be the bit-length of the secret key. Our scheme remains secure, even if the adversary obtains $L(1 - o(n))$ bits of the secret key via arbitrary side channels. This brings the security model closer to reality, where the adversary may obtain information about the secret key, e.g, via (remote) timing attacks or by having physical access to the signing device. When applied in e-voting or e-cash schemes, such a resilience also helps against insider attacks and may improve the trust that we are willing to grant these schemes.

Our scheme is also the first leakage resilient blind signature scheme and our results in this respect are applicable to Lyubashevsky's ID and signature schemes [Lyu08a, Lyu09]. It may be possible to use an analogue of Pointcheval and Stern's approach [PS00] to turn the leakage resilient variants [KV09, ADW09] of the Okamoto-Schnorr signature scheme [Sch91, Oka92] into blind signature schemes. However, it is unclear whether this will actually work and whether it will be efficient.

Table 1 compares RSA blind signatures with our construction in terms of space requirements and computational cost. For both schemes, we propose several parameter sets for current and future security levels. We believe that RSA is a good basis for comparison because it is easy to understand and very efficient as signing only involves two modular exponentiations and verification can be done by a single one. As observed in [BNPS03], the security of the RSA blind signature scheme is based on a specially tailored interactive assumption that is stronger than the original RSA assumption [BMV08]. Taking all this into account, the timings observed for RSA provide an optimistic lower bound for current practical and secure schemes. The timings were obtained on an AMD Opteron running at 2.4 GHz. For RSA, we used OpenSSL 0.9.8g, which is supposed to be very efficient. For our blind signature schemes, we did a naive implementation without exploiting all the SIMD capabilities of modern CPUs or GPUs. To make the schemes comparable, we assume a possible speed-up factor of 8 for an SIMD implementation over the non-SIMD version as observed in [ADL+08] for the underlying family of compression functions.

From Table 1, we clearly see that the strong security guarantees in our scheme come at the price of having larger keys and signatures. In terms of speed, however, our scheme benefits from its quasi-linear complexity, especially in higher levels of security. For verification, we have even used RSA with a small verification exponent. In addition, for our scheme, we can have various trade-off between signature size and speed. For more details, refer to Appendix C.

We believe that our work is an important contribution because the previous efficient constructions, such as [Cha82, PS97, PS00, Abe01, BNPS03, CKW04, Oka06], have one thing in common: they are built upon classic number theoretic assumptions, like the hardness of factoring large integers or computing discrete logarithms.

The more recent approaches, e.g., by Boldyreva [Bol03] or Okamoto [Oka06], tend to use pairings that yield very elegant constructions. They, however, are again based on the discrete logarithm problem in this specific setting. None of the above schemes remains secure in the presence of reasonably large quantum computers, where both factoring and computing discrete logarithms become easy due to the seminal work of Shor [Sho97].

Finally, we would like to mention that there are also (typically inefficient) instantiations from general assumptions, e.g., by Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [JLO97], Fischlin [Fis06], Hazay, Katz, Koo, and Lindell [HKKL07], or Abe and Ohkubo [AO09]. Whether they are post-quantum or leakage-resilient depends on the exact instantiation.

Main Obstacles. For every blind signature scheme, one has to overcome three basic obstacles. The scheme needs to be blind, one-more unforgeable, and at the same time complete. Blindness and unforgeability are already somewhat orthogonal because granting the user too much power to ensure blindness harms unforgeability and vice-versa. Since working with lattices, we do not have access to a cyclic group structure as in schemes that are based on the DDH or DL assumptions. There, blindness is typically easy to achieve by multiplying the message with a random group element. The result is again a random group element.

In lattices, we need to emulate this over an infinite structure via a filtering technique that is inspired by [Lyu08a]. However, this technique introduces a completeness defect that even affects the interaction of an honest user with an honest signer. Thus, the protocol may need to be restarted. When addressing this defect, we need additional means to ensure blindness over repetitions of the process. Our solution involves a statistically hiding commitment.

Similarly, the completeness defect has implications with respect to unforgeability as the user may claim that the protocol has failed, whereas it was indeed successful. Here, we extend the typical three-move structure to a four-move structure where the user needs to demonstrate he or she could not obtain a valid signature. Such a last move, from user to signer, is highly unusual for blind signature schemes. We solve this issue by designing a special proof of failure and by employing a computationally binding commitment scheme.

All these issues, and the additional leakage resilience, need to be addressed simultaneously as they are interconnected. This leads to an intricate process of correctly setting up the numerous parameters and sets for our scheme in in Table 2.

Organization. After a brief preliminaries section, we propose our blind signature scheme in Section 3. There, we also provide an informal description of the scheme and a detailed analysis, including completeness, blindness, one-more unforgeability, and leakage resilience. In Appendix C, we discuss how to choose practical parameters and Appendix D contains all supporting lemmas for the theorems in Section 3.

2   Preliminaries

With n, we always denote the security parameter. The joint execution of two algorithms $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ in an interactive protocol with private inputs x to $\mathcal{A}$ and y to $\mathcal{B}$ is written as $(a, b) \leftarrow \langle \mathcal{A}(x), \mathcal{B}(y) \rangle$. The private outputs are a for $\mathcal{A}$ and b for $\mathcal{B}$. Accordingly, $\langle \mathcal{A}(x), \mathcal{B}(y) \rangle^k$ means that the interaction can take place up to k times. The statement $x \leftarrow\!\!\$\,X$ means that x is chosen uniformly at random from the finite set X. Recall that the statistical distance of two random variables X, Y over a discrete domain D is defined as $\Delta(X, Y) = 1/2 \sum_{a \in D} |\operatorname{Prob}[X = a] - \operatorname{Prob}[Y = a]|$. A function is negligible if it vanishes faster than $1/p(n)$ for any polynomial p. All logarithms are base 2 and we identify $\{1, \ldots, k\}$ with $[k]$.

We recall the definitions of blind signatures and commitments. Afterwards, we briefly recall some facts from lattice theory. For the reader's convenience, the Forking Lemma from [BN06] is repeated in Appendix A.

2.1   Blind Signatures

A blind signature scheme BS consists of three algorithms $(\mathsf{Kg}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Vf})$, where Sign is an interactive protocol between a signer $\mathcal{S}$ and a user $\mathcal{U}$. The specification is as follows.

Key Generation. $\mathsf{Kg}(1^n)$ outputs a private signing key sk and a public verification key pk.

Signature Protocol. $\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}, M)$ describes the joint execution of $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{U}$. The private output of $\mathcal{S}$ is a view $\mathcal{V}$ and the private output of $\mathcal{U}$ is a signature $\mathbf{s}$ on the message $M \in \mathcal{M}$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$ under sk. Thus, we write $(\mathcal{V}, \mathbf{s}) \leftarrow \langle \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{sk}), \mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk}, M) \rangle$.

Experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{blind}}_{\mathcal{S}^*,\mathsf{BS}}(n)$
  $b \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \{0,1\}$
  $(\mathsf{pk},\mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathsf{BS.Kg}(1^n)$
  $(M_0, M_1, \mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{find}}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}^*(\mathsf{find},\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{pk})$
  $(d, \mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{issue}}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}^{*\langle\cdot,\mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk},M_b)\rangle^1, \langle\cdot,\mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk},M_{1-b})\rangle^1}(\mathsf{issue},\mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{find}})$
  Let $\mathbf{s}_b$ and $\mathbf{s}_{1-b}$ be the outputs of $\mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk},M_b)$
  and $\mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk},M_{1-b})$, respectively.
  If $\mathbf{s}_0 \neq \mathsf{fail}$ and $\mathbf{s}_1 \neq \mathsf{fail}$
    $d \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}^*(\mathsf{guess},\mathbf{s}_0,\mathbf{s}_1,\mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{issue}})$
  Else
    $d \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{S}^*(\mathsf{guess},\mathsf{fail},\mathsf{fail},\mathsf{state}_{\mathsf{issue}})$
  Return 1 iff $d = b$

Experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{omf}}_{\mathcal{U}^*,\mathsf{BS}}(n)$
  $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{H}(1^n)$
  $(\mathsf{pk},\mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathsf{BS.Kg}(1^n)$
  $\{(M_1,\mathbf{s}_1),\ldots,(M_{\jmath},\mathbf{s}_{\jmath})\} \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{U}^{*\mathsf{H}(\cdot),\langle\mathcal{S}(\mathsf{sk}),\cdot\rangle}(\mathsf{pk})$
  Let ℓ be the number of successful interaction
  between $\mathcal{U}^*$ and the signer.
  Return 1 iff
    1. $M_i \neq M_j$ for all $1 \leq i < j \leq \jmath$;
    2. $\mathsf{BS.Vf}(\mathsf{pk},\mathbf{s}_i,M_i) = 1$ for all $i = 1,\ldots,\jmath$;
    3. $\ell + 1 = \jmath$.

Figure 1: Security experiments for blindness and one-more unforgeability of blind signatures.

Signature Verification. The algorithm $\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk},\mathbf{s},M)$ outputs 1 if $\mathbf{s}$ is a valid signature on M under pk and otherwise 0.

Completeness is defined as with digital signature schemes, i.e., every honestly created signature for honestly created keys and for any messages $M \in \mathcal{M}$ has to be valid under this key. Views are interpreted as random variables, whose output is generated by subsequent executions of the respective protocol. Two views $\mathcal{V}_1$ and $\mathcal{V}_2$ are considered equal if they cannot be distinguished by any computationally unbounded algorithm with noticeable probability.

As for security, blind signatures have to satisfy two properties: blindness and one-more unforgeability [JLO97, PS00]. The notion of blindness is defined in the experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{blind}}_{\mathcal{S}^*,\mathsf{BS}}$ in Figure 1, where the adversarial signer $\mathcal{S}^*$ works in three modes. In mode *find*, it chooses two messages M_0, M_1 and interacts with two users in mode *issue*. Depending on a coin flip b, the first (second) user obtains a blind signature for M_b (M_{1-b}). After seeing the unblinded signatures in the original order, with respect to M_0, M_1, the signer has to guess the bit b in mode *guess*. If either of the user algorithms fails in outputting a valid signature, the signer is merely notified of the failure and does not get any signature. Below, we deal with aborts as an extension. Also note that we allow the adversary to keep a state that is fed back in subsequent calls.

A scheme BS is (t,δ)-blind, if there is no adversary $\mathcal{S}^*$, running in time at most t, that wins the above experiment with advantage at least δ, where the advantage is defined as $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{blind}}_{\mathcal{S}^*,\mathsf{BS}} = \left| \mathrm{Prob}\left[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{blind}}_{\mathcal{S}^*,\mathsf{BS}}(n) = 1 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$. A scheme is *statistically* blind if the it is (∞,δ)-blind for a negligible δ. The second security property, one-more unforgeability, ensures that each completed interaction between signer and user yields at most one signature. It is formalized in the experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{omf}}_{\mathcal{U}^*,\mathsf{BS}}$, where an adversarial user tries to output $\jmath$ valid signatures after $\ell < \jmath$ completed interactions with an honest signer. $\mathcal{H}$ is a family of random oracles.

A signature scheme BS is $(t, q_{\mathsf{Sign}}, q_{\mathsf{H}}, \delta)$-one-more unforgeable if there is no adversary $\mathcal{A}$, running in time at most t, making at most q_{Sign} signature queries and at most q_{H} hash oracle queries, that wins the above experiment with probability at least δ.

2.2 Extensions

We consider three extensions to the above security model for blind signatures: one deals with user aborts, the second with dishonestly chosen keys, and the third with leakage resilience.

Security Under Aborts. Blindness in the previous subsection does not cover the case where the protocol is aborted prematurely. There is the strengthened notion of selective failure blindness [CNS07], where the malicious signer may choose either M_0 or M_1 according to some secret distribution that makes the protocol fail. Preventing this generically is easy as was shown by Fischlin and Schröder in [FS09]. In the course of the discussion of our construction, we argue that it already is blind in this sense.

Adversely-chosen Keys. Consider the blindness experiment in [ANN06]. Instead of having the experiment select pk,sk, we can let the signer output pk. Thus, blindness may be harder to achieve in this setting. However, our construction remains blind, even in this stronger model as the proof of blindness does not exploit specifics about the key.

Leakage Resilience. Resilience to key leakage is a way to ensure security against side-channel attacks. In [KV09], Katz and Vaikuntanathan give a nice overview of past developments and the evolution of leakage resilience for authenticity [ADW09, KV09] and secrecy, e.g., [DP08, AGV09, NS09]. Obviously, we are interested in authenticity in the special case of blind signatures. We model key leakage in the unforgeability experiment by adding a leakage oracle $\mathsf{Leak}(\cdot)$ to $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{omf}}_{\mathcal{U}^*,\mathsf{BS}}$. The adversary can adaptively query Leak with a series of functions f_i, $i \in \{1,\ldots,\kappa\}$, and receives $f_i(\mathsf{sk})$. The only restriction is that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} |f_i(\mathsf{sk})| < \lambda(|\mathsf{sk}|)$, where the function λ determines the amount of leakage that we are willing to tolerate. Notice that the signer's key does not have to evolve over time and its secret state consists of the secret key only. Furthermore, observe that this extension is only sensible as long as $\lambda(|\mathsf{sk}|) < \min\{|\mathsf{sk}|, |\mathbf{s}|\}$, where $|\cdot|$ denotes bit-length and $\mathbf{s}$ is a signature. Otherwise, the adversary could easily obtain the entire secret key or a signature of its choice. See Appendix B for the experiment. To demonstrate leakage resilience, one has to show that the conditional min-entropy $H_\infty(\mathsf{sk}|\mathsf{Leak}(\mathsf{sk})) = \min_{\mathsf{sk}'}\{-\log(\mathrm{Prob}\left[\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{sk}'|\mathsf{Leak}(\mathsf{sk})\right])\}$ of the secret key is still sufficiently large to prove security.

2.3 Commitments

Commitments typically work in two phases. First, one party publishes a commitment $C = \mathsf{com}(M; r) \in \{0,1\}^n$, $r \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$, to a message $M \in \{0,1\}^*$ without revealing any information about it. This is the "hiding" property of the commitment scheme. In the second phase, the party can prove that C actually corresponds to M by revealing r. It is important that no algorithm can find a second message M' and randomness r' such that $C = \mathsf{com}(M'; r')$, i.e., break the "binding" property. As usual, these properties are defined for families of such commitment functions. A scheme is (t, δ)-hiding (-binding) if there is no algorithm running in time at most t that can break the hiding (binding) property with probability at least δ. Both properties can be satisfied computationally or unconditionally but there is no scheme that is unconditionally hiding *and* unconditionally binding [Gol04].

For our scheme, we assume a statistically $\delta^{(h)}_{\mathsf{com}}$-hiding and computationally $(t_{\mathsf{com}}, \delta^{(b)}_{\mathsf{com}})$-binding commitment scheme. As we are interested in fully lattice-based schemes, we would like to point out that such commitment schemes can be built upon hard lattice problems [KTX08] but in practice, one rather uses cryptographic hash functions as a message authentication code. For example, using a lattice based hash function [ADL+08].

2.4 Lattices

A lattice in $\mathbb{R}^n$ is a discrete set $\Lambda = \{\sum_{i=1}^{d} x_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid x_i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$, where $\mathbf{b}_1,\ldots,\mathbf{b}_d$ are linearly independent over $\mathbb{R}$. The matrix $\mathbf{B} = [\mathbf{b}_1,\ldots,\mathbf{b}_d]$ is a basis of the lattice Λ and we write $\Lambda = \Lambda(\mathbf{B})$. The dimension of the lattice is d. The main computational problem in lattices is the (approximate) shortest vector problem (SVP), where an algorithm is given a description, a basis, of a lattice Λ and is supposed to find the shortest vector $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ with respect to a certain ℓ_p norm (up to an approximation factor). More precisely, find a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, such that $\|\mathbf{v}\|_p \leq \gamma \|\mathbf{w}\|_p$ for all $\mathbf{w} \in \Lambda \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ for a fixed approximation factor $\gamma \geq 1$.

In this work, we are interested in a special family of lattices related to ideals in the ring $\mathbf{R} = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/\langle\mathbf{g}\rangle$, where q is prime and $\mathbb{Z}_q = \{-(q-1)/2,\ldots(q-1)/2\}$. We focus on $\mathbf{g} = X^n + 1$ and $n =$ "power of two" for efficiency reasons but it may be replaced by any irreducible polynomial over $\mathbb{Z}$. Then, our scheme and the analysis become only slightly more involved. We identify $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R}$ with its coefficient vector $\mathbf{f} = (f_0,\ldots,f_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Furthermore, we denote elements of the $\mathbf{R}$-module $\mathbf{R}^m$ with $\hat{\mathbf{a}} = (\mathbf{a_0},\ldots,\mathbf{a_{m-1}})$ or directly with $(a_0,\ldots,a_{mn-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn}$. Consequently, we define $\|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty = \|(f_0,\ldots,f_{n-1})\|_\infty$. A lattice corresponds to an ideal $I \subset \mathbf{R}$ if and only if every lattice vector is the coefficient vector of a polynomial in I. The SVP problem easily translates to ideal lattices, where we call it ideal-SVP (ISVP).

The average-case hardness assumption for our construction relies on the problem finding short vectors in the kernel of the family $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$ of module homomorphisms $h_{\hat{\mathbf{a}} \in \mathbf{R}^m} : \mathbf{R}^m \to \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{x} \mapsto \hat{\mathbf{a}}\mathbf{x}$, when restricting the domain to $D' \subset \mathbf{R}$, i.e., restricting the coefficients in the input vector to $[-2d, 2d] \cap \mathbb{Z}$. This problem can be stated as the following collision problem [LM06].

Definition 2.1 (Collision Problem) *Let $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$, the collision problem $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ asks to find a distinct pair $(\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{x}}') \in D^m \times D^m$ such that $h(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) = h(\hat{\mathbf{x}}')$.*

Obviously, the function is linear over $\mathbf{R}^m$, i.e., $h(\mathbf{a}(\hat{\mathbf{x}} + \hat{\mathbf{y}})) = \mathbf{a}(h(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) + h(\hat{\mathbf{y}}))$ for all $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{R}$, $\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathbf{R}^m$. In addition, solving $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ implies being able to solve ISVP^∞ in *every* lattice that corresponds to an ideal in $\mathbf{R}$ by the following theorem.

Theorem 2.2 (Worst-case to Average-case Reduction, Theorem 2 in [LM06]) *Let $D = \{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq d\}$, $m > \log(q)/\log(2d)$, and $q \geq 4dmn\sqrt{n}\log(n)$. An adversary $\mathcal{C}$ that solves the $Col(h, D)$ problem, i.e., finds distinct preimages $\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}} \in D^m$ such that $h(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) = h(\hat{\mathbf{y}})$, can be used to solve ISVP^∞ with approximation factors $\gamma \geq 16dmn\log^2(n)$ in the worst case.*

3   Blind Signatures from Ideal Lattices

We construct a lattice-based blind signature scheme. It is secure in the random oracle model under a worst-case assumption in ideal lattices and its time *and* space complexity is quasi-optimal, $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$.

The road map for this section is as follows: We describe the 4-round blind signature scheme BS, including an informal description of the protocol. Then, we prove completeness, blindness, and one-more unforgeability. Proving completeness is non-trivial as we need to address an inevitable completeness defect. In the course of the discussion we show that neither harms security nor efficiency. Afterwards, we prove that the scheme is statistically blind and that it is one-more unforgeable unless the collision problem $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ is easy. In consequence, one-more unforgeability can be based on the worst-case hardness of the ISVP. After the main analysis, we prove that our scheme also supports leakage resilience with a $(1 - o(1))$ fraction of the secret key.

Observe that the scheme requires lots of parameters that need to be carefully worked out. Their definition in Table 2 will be justified later in the analysis. The "usage" hint in the table points at the section, where they are most influential. As for selecting practical parameters, we refer the reader to Appendix C. There, we propose secure parameter sets based on today's knowledge about lattice basis reduction. The appendix also includes a discussion on possible trade-offs for efficiency.

3.1   Our Construction

Let $\mathsf{H}\leftarrow\!\$\!-\mathcal{H}(1^n)$ mapping $\{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow D_\epsilon \subset D$ be a random oracle and let $\mathcal{C}(1^n)$ be a commitment scheme, mapping $\{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. We construct our blind signature scheme BS as follows.

Key Generation. BS.Kg(1^n) selects a secret key $\hat{\mathbf{s}}\leftarrow\!\$\!-D_s^m$, a function $h\leftarrow\!\$\!-\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$, and a commitment function $\mathsf{com}\leftarrow\!\$\!-\mathcal{C}(1^n)$. The algorithm computes the public key $\mathbf{S} \leftarrow h(\hat{\mathbf{s}})$, according to the parameters in Table 2. The output is $(\hat{\mathbf{s}}, \mathbf{S})$. For simplicity, we treat h, com, and the parameters in Table 2 as globally known and implicit inputs to all algorithms. However, each signer may choose them individually.

Signature Protocol. The signature issue protocol for messages $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is depicted in Figure 2. Note that the signer implicitly verifies that the user's messages come from the correct domains. Upon a restart after Step 2, the user only selects a fresh $\alpha\leftarrow\!\$\!-D_\alpha$ and repeats the operations that involve α. Whenever the signer triggers a restart, the user chooses a fresh r in order to make the protocol execution independent of the previous ones. Therefore, we omit values from previous runs in the signer's view. During Step 5, the signer can detect a cheating user that tries to trigger a restart, despite having received a valid signature. In this case, the signer can stop the protocol and assume that the user has obtained a valid signature. A detailed description of the protocol follows.

Eventually, the user outputs a message M and a signature $(r, \hat{\mathbf{z}}, \epsilon)$.

Verification. BS.Vf$(\mathbf{S}, (r, \hat{\mathbf{z}}, \epsilon), M)$ outputs 1 iff $\hat{\mathbf{z}} \in G^m$ and $\mathsf{H}(h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon, \mathsf{com}(M; r)) = \epsilon$.

3.2   Informal Description

We give a more detailed description of the protocol Steps 1-5 in Figure 2. For each step, we need a set of carefully chosen parameters from Table 2 to achieve completeness and security. For each parameter, the table contains a hint at their main usage and justification in the analysis.

Basically, the protocol follows the structure of the identification scheme in [Lyu08a] in combination with the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [FS86], which provides a witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge. The signer proves knowledge of $\hat{\mathbf{s}} \in D_s^m$ such that $h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}) = \mathbf{S}$, where $\mathbf{S}$ is the public key.

We stick to this basic structure and let the signer transmit a commitment $\mathbf{Y} = h(\hat{\mathbf{y}})$ for a random value $\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in D_y^m$. The user computes a challenge ϵ^* as a function (involving H) of $\mathbf{Y}$ and the to-be-signed message

Parameter	Value	Asymptotics	Usage
n	power of 2	-	main security parameter
d_s	positive integer constant $< q/(4n)$	$\mathcal{O}(1)$	secret key size, unforgeability
D_s	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq d_s\}$		set of secret keys
c_m	$> 1/\log(2d_s)$	$\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1)$	witness indistinguishability, leakage resilience
m	$\lfloor c_m \log(q) \rfloor + 1$	$\Omega(\log(n))$	worst-case to average-case reduction
D_ϵ	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq 1 =: d_\epsilon\}$	$\mathcal{O}(1)$	hash output size
ϕ, ψ	positive integer constant ≥ 1	$\mathcal{O}(1)$	completeness, speed
D_α	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq \psi n d_\epsilon =: d_\alpha\}$	$\mathcal{O}(n)$	blindness
D_{ϵ^*}	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq d_\alpha - d_\epsilon =: d_{\epsilon^*}\}$	$\mathcal{O}(n)$	blindness
D_y	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq \phi m n^2 d_s d_{\epsilon^*} =: d_y\}$	$\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^3)$	witness indistinguishability
G_*	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq d_y - n d_s d_{\epsilon^*} =: d_{G_*}\}$	$\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^3)$	witness indistinguishability, completeness defect
D_β	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq \phi m n d_{G_*} =: d_\beta\}$	$\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^4)$	blindness
G	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq d_\beta - d_{G_*} =: d_G\}$	$\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^4)$	blindness, completeness defect
D	$\{\mathbf{f} \in \mathbf{R} : \|\mathbf{f}\|_\infty \leq d_{G_*} + d_\beta + n d_s d_\epsilon =: d_D\}$	$\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^4)$	collisions under h
q	$\geq 4mn\sqrt{n}\log(n)d_D$, prime	$\widetilde{\Theta}(n^5\sqrt{n})$	worst-case to average-case reduction

The table defines all parameters and sets for our scheme. The sets are defined via a norm bound, for which we also state the asymptotic growth with respect to the security parameter n. The last column states the main usage for the individual parameter or set. Some sets introduce a completeness error to the scheme that can be reduced by increasing ϕ. Reducing this defect also significantly improves performance. All sets are subsets of the ring $\mathbf{R} = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$.

Table 2: Parameters for the security parameter n.

M and sends it to the signer, which returns $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* = \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^* + \hat{\mathbf{y}}$. Via the linearity of h, the user can verify that $h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*) = \mathbf{S}\epsilon^* + \mathbf{Y}$ using only public knowledge. Afterwards, the user has to transform the "blinded" signature $(\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*, \epsilon^*)$ into the regular signature $(\hat{\mathbf{z}}, \epsilon)$ or M.

However, to obtain a blind signature scheme from this strategy, we need to overcome three main obstacles. First, the scheme needs to be unforgeable, i.e., neither $\mathbf{Y}$ nor $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*$ may leak too much information about the secret key. Second, ϵ^* and $\hat{\mathbf{z}}$ need to be independent of the message M to ensure blindness. Third, we need to ensure completeness of the resulting protocol, which will be non-trivial because of the following filtering technique.

The secret key is protected as in [Lyu08a, Lyu09] by choosing the coefficients of $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$ from a relatively large set, compared to $\|\hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^*\|_\infty$, and then filter the output. Roughtly speaking, we add two numbers $a \in [-A, A]$ and $b \leftarrow \$- [-3A, 3A]$ and filter the output, i.e., we only hand over $c = a + b$ if $c \in [-2A, 2A]$. Otherwise, we choose a fresh b. This ensures that c is distributed independently of a. However, the filtering technique in this example only works with probability $\approx 2/3$ and the protocol needs to be restarted otherwise. Whenever filtering fails in Step 3, the signer has to restart the entire protocol. After a small number of restarts, the signer can safely send $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*$, bearing no information about the secret key. Actually, the filtering technique is much more involved and we need to deal with sums of vectors. We will show the details and a refinement in the next section.

Interestingly, the filtering technique can be applied to achieve blindness as well. For the protocol message $\epsilon^* = \epsilon - \alpha$ after Step 2, we use $\alpha \leftarrow \$- D_\alpha^m$ to hide ϵ. This is necessary, as ϵ will be a part of the output signature. The completeness defect in this filtering step can be reduced to 0 because the user can repeat it locally. In Step 4, the user attempts to "unblind" the signature by computing $\hat{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}$, where $\hat{\beta}$ is prepared in Step 1 and randomly chosen from a relatively large set to hide $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*$. This is the third application of the filtering technique. If it fails, the protocol needs to be restarted again.

This last defect is the reason for having the last move and Step 5. Even if both parties are honest, the user might not be able to obtain a valid signature with non-negligible probability (Step 4). This is highly unusual for a blind signature scheme, in fact we are not aware of any other schemes with this kind of behavior. In such a case, the user needs to prove that no valid signature could be obtained (Step 5) and the protocol needs to

Signer $\mathcal{S}(\hat{s})$		**User** $\mathcal{U}(\mathbf{S}, M)$

$\boxed{1}$ $\hat{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow\!\!\$\!\!- D_y^m$
   $\mathbf{Y} \leftarrow h(\hat{\mathbf{y}})$
   $\xrightarrow{\quad \mathbf{Y} \quad}$
   $r \leftarrow\!\!\$\!\!- \{0,1\}^n$
   $C \leftarrow \mathsf{com}(M; r)$
   $\alpha \leftarrow\!\!\$\!\!- D_\alpha$
   $\hat{\beta} \leftarrow\!\!\$\!\!- D_\beta^m$

$\boxed{2}$
   $\epsilon \leftarrow \mathsf{H}(\mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{S}\alpha - h(\hat{\beta}), C)$
   $\epsilon^* \leftarrow \epsilon - \alpha$
   If $\epsilon^* \notin D_{\epsilon^*}$
      Start over with a fresh α

$\boxed{3}$ $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* \leftarrow \hat{s}\epsilon^* + \hat{\mathbf{y}}$
   If $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* \notin G_*^m$
   $\xleftarrow{\quad \epsilon^* \quad}$
      Trigger restart

$\boxed{4}$
   $\xrightarrow{\quad \hat{\mathbf{z}}^* \quad}$
   $\hat{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}$
   If $\hat{\mathbf{z}} \notin G^m$
      $result \leftarrow (C, \alpha, \hat{\beta}, \epsilon)$
   Else
      $result \leftarrow ok$

$\boxed{5}$ If $result \neq ok$
   $\xleftarrow{\quad result \quad}$
      Parse $result = (C, \alpha, \hat{\beta}, \epsilon)$
      If $(\epsilon^* + \alpha = \epsilon = \mathsf{H}(\mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{S}\alpha - h(\hat{\beta}), C)$
         and $\mathsf{H}(h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon, C) = \epsilon$
         and $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta} \notin G^m)$
            Trigger restart
   Output $\mathcal{V} \leftarrow (\hat{\mathbf{y}}, \mathbf{Y}, \epsilon^*, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^*)$ Output $(M, (r, \hat{\mathbf{z}}, \epsilon))$ or $\perp$ when $result \neq ok$

Figure 2: Issue protocol of the blind signature scheme BS.

be restarted. Therefore, the user submits $(C, \alpha, \hat{\beta}, \epsilon)$ to the signer, where C is a commitment to the message M. The signer can verify that the user was unable to obtain a valid signature relative to the commitment C. More formally, we prove that successfully cheating in Step 5 implies being able to solve $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$. In addition, for unforgeability, we require that the commitment is binding and for blindness it is crucial that it is hiding. The hiding property of the commitment also prevents the signer from learning information about M across the required restarts.

Since restarts do not harm security, we can repeat the protocol until it is complete. The expected number of repetitions is constant and it can be brought very close to 1 by choosing the parameters appropriately. We provide the details in the next section.

3.3 Analysis and Security

In this section, we analyze our blind signature scheme with regard to completeness, blindness, one-more unforgeability, and leakage resilience. For each aspect, we prove a main theorem. Supporting lemmas are stated before the theorems and proven in Appendix D.

3.3.1 Completeness

Completeness of BS is a non-trivial issue due to the eventual restarts and the many parameters involved. The next lemma ensures that the number of restarts is small, effectively constant.

Lemma 3.1 *Let* $k = \Omega(n)$, $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ *with* arbitrary $\mathbf{a} \in \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq A\}$ *and* random $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow\!\!\$\!\!- \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq B\}$. *Given* $B \geq \phi k A$ *for* $\phi \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$, *we have* $\underset{\mathbf{b}}{\mathrm{Prob}}\left[\,\|\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty \leq B - A\,\right] > \frac{1}{e^{1/\phi}} - o(1)$.

The multiplication of two polynomials modulo $X^n + 1$ plays a major role in the analysis. Therefore, we need the following lemma, which is a special case of [Lyu08b, Lemma 2.8].

8

Lemma 3.2 *For any two polynomials* $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in R$, *we have* $\|\mathbf{ab} \bmod (X^n + 1)\|_\infty \le n \|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty \|\mathbf{b}\|_\infty$.

While it is possible to show an upper bound of $\sqrt{n} \log(n) \|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty \|\mathbf{b}\|_\infty$ that holds with overwhelming probability $p(n) = 1 - 4ne^{-\log^2(n)/8}$, we need to use Lemma 3.2 as $p(n)$ does not converge fast enough.

Theorem 3.3 (Completeness) *The scheme* BS *is complete.*

Proof. Let us assume that the protocol does not have to be restarted after Steps 2, 3, and 4. Then, for all honestly generated key pairs $(\hat{\mathbf{s}}, \mathbf{S})$, all messages $M \in \{0,1\}^*$, and all signatures $(r, \hat{\mathbf{z}}, \epsilon)$ we have $\hat{\mathbf{z}} \in G^m$ and $h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon = h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon = h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}(\epsilon - \alpha) + \hat{\mathbf{y}} - \hat{\beta}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon = \mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{S}\alpha - h(\hat{\beta})$ and $\mathsf{com}(M; r) = C$. Therefore $\mathsf{H}(h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon, \mathsf{com}(M; r)) = \epsilon$ and $\mathsf{BS.Vf}(\mathbf{S}, (r, \hat{\mathbf{z}}, \epsilon), M) = 1$.

   Now, we analyze the probability of a restart. Observe that the restarts after Step 2 do not affect completeness, as the user does them locally. The number of trials here is at most $\omega(\log(n))$ due to Lemma 3.1 ($k = n, A = d_s, B = d_\alpha$) for $\epsilon - \alpha \in D_{\epsilon^*}$. However, the expected number of trials is constant ($e^{1/\psi}$). It is safe to set $\psi = 1$ here but one might want less trials, e.g., < 1.5 for $\psi \ge 3$ and $n > 1$.

   After Steps 3 and 4, aborts affect the protocol and trigger a full restart. In Step 3, we need to ensure that $\hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^* + \hat{\mathbf{y}} \in G_*^m$. By Lemma 3.2, we know that $\|\hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^* \bmod (X^n + 1)\|_\infty \le nd_s d_{\epsilon^*}$ and applying Lemma 3.1 ($k = mn, A = nd_s d_{\epsilon^*}, B = d_y$) yields the constant success probability $e^{-1/\phi}$ and a maximum number of trials of $\omega(\log(n))$. This can be optimized by increasing ϕ. After an expected number $e^{1/\phi}$, the protocol proceeds to Step 4.

   In Step 4, the user attempts to "unblind" the signature and requires that $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta} \in G^m$. Otherwise, the user convinces the signer that a restart is necessary. We apply Lemma 3.1 on ($k = mn, A = d_{G_*}, B = d_\beta$) and obtain the same behavior as in Step 3.

   In total, after at most $\omega(\log^2(n))$ or an expected number $e^{2/\phi}$ of trials, the protocol is complete. $\qquad\square$

In Appendix C, we will see that choosing $\phi = 4$ is good choice to make the protocol more efficient in practice. Observe that in any case, all operations (including eventual restarts) in BS have $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$ complexity and that private keys, public keys, and signatures have size $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$.

3.3.2   Blindness

We prove that BS is statistically blind based on the observation that the signer only sees values that are statistically independent of the message being signed. More precisely, the views generated by two different messages are indistinguishable. For this argument to work, we require a statistically hiding commitment scheme and carefully selected sets D_α, D_β, D_{ϵ^*}, and G. The following probabilistic lemma is crucial as it guarantees that the user's message after Step 2 and the final output are independent of the message. In the context of $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{blind}}_{\mathcal{S}^*, \mathsf{BS}}$, this established a form of witness indistinguishability w.r.t. the messages that are chosen by the malicious signer.

Lemma 3.4 *Let* $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}', \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ *with arbitrary* $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}' \in \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \le A\}$, *a random* $\mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \le B\}$, *and* $B > A$. *If* $\max\{\|\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty, \|\mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty\} \le B - A$, *then* $\Delta(\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{b}) = 0$.

The role of com is to ensure that the signer can only obtain negligible information from restarts. Notice that BS is perfectly blind (($\infty, 0$)-blind) if the commitment scheme is perfect (0-hiding).

Theorem 3.5 (Blindness) BS *is* $(\infty, \delta^{(h)}_{\mathsf{com}})$-*blind if* com *is* $\delta^{(h)}_{\mathsf{com}}$-*hiding.*

Proof. As per experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{blind}}_{\mathcal{S}^*, \mathsf{BS}}$, the adversarial signer outputs two messages M_0, M_1 and interacts with two users $\mathcal{U}(\mathbf{S}, M_b), \mathcal{U}(\mathbf{S}, M_{1-b})$ after a secret coin flip $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$. We show that these users do not leak any information about their respective message.

   Technically, we establish that all protocol messages and the output, when interpreted as random variables, are distributed independently of the message being signed. This involves an analysis of ϵ^*, $\hat{\mathbf{z}}$, and eventual restarts. As for ϵ and r we need not worry. They are chosen uniformly at random.

Distribution of ϵ^***.** Let $\epsilon^*_b, \epsilon^*_{1-b}$ be the first protocol messages of $\mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk}, M_b)$ resp. $\mathcal{U}(\mathsf{pk}, M_{1-b})$. They are in D_{ϵ^*} and they are both of the form $\epsilon - \alpha$ with $\epsilon \in D_\epsilon$ and $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} D_\alpha$. The statistical distance $\Delta(\epsilon^*_b, \epsilon^*_{1-b})$ is 0 by Lemma 3.4 ($k = n, A = d_s, B = d_\alpha$) because the coefficients in D_{ϵ^*} are bounded by $B - A = d_\alpha - d_s$.

Distribution of $\hat{\mathbf{z}}$. Let $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_0, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_1$ be part of the final output of $\mathcal{U}(\text{pk}, M_0)$ resp. $\mathcal{U}(\text{pk}, M_1)$. Both are of the form $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}$ for $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* \in G_*^m$ and $\hat{\beta} \leftarrow\!\!\$\, D_\beta^m$. Furthermore, $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_0$ and $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_1$ are forced to be in G^m, having coefficients bounded by $d_\beta - d_{G_*}$. Hence, the statistical distance $\Delta(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_0, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_1)$ is 0 because of Lemma 3.4 ($k = mn$, $A = d_{G_*}$, $B = d_\beta$).

Restarts. Observe that each protocol run is statistically independent of the previous runs by the statistical hiding property of the commitment com and because the user selects fresh $r, \alpha, \hat{\beta}$ after every restart. This is the reason why we inherit the statistical $\delta_{\text{com}}^{(h)}$-hiding property to obtain $(\infty, \delta_{\text{com}}^{(h)})$-blindness instead of perfect blindness. Finally, we need to argue about the restart after Step 4. The user sends $(C, \alpha, \hat{\beta}, \epsilon)$ to the signer. These information allow the verification of the signature with respect to C. The message is still statistically hidden by the hiding property of com because the user never reveals the decommitment r. This concludes the proof as the protocol perfectly hides the to-be-signed message from the signer and subsequent runs of the protocol for the same message are statistically independent. $\qquad\square$

Furthermore, our scheme already supports selective failure blindness as shown in [FS09] because we are signing commitments instead of the adversely chosen messages. Even the fourth move does not reveal any information about the message due to the hiding property of the commitment.

3.3.3 One-more Unforgeability

In this section, we show that BS is one-more unforgeable, provided that the collision problem $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ is hard and the commitment scheme is binding. The main tool in the reduction is the Forking Lemma [PS00, BN06]. To simulate the environment, especially blind signature queries, for the attacker $\mathcal{A}$ in the unforgeability experiment, we require that there are at least two possible secret keys for each public key $\mathbf{S}$ (Lemma 3.6). Moreover, we need the signature protocol to be witness indistinguishable to prevent the attacker from learning the secret key (Lemma 3.7). The binding property of com is necessary to prevent an attacker from obtaining one signatures that works for two messages by changing the message under the commitment. All other attackers output at least one signature that does not correspond to a completed interaction. Here, we apply the Forking Lemma to extract knowledge about the secret key that was used to compute the forgery. Using this knowledge the reduction can solve the collision problem. Finally, we need to deal with Step 5 in the protocol. The adversary proves that it was unable to obtain a valid signature. We show that this is sufficient if Col is hard.

Since the function family $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$ compresses the domain D_s^m, it is easy to show that all secret keys collide with at least one other secret key.

Lemma 3.6 *Let $h \in \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$. For every secret key $\hat{\mathbf{s}} \leftarrow\!\!\$\, D_s^m$, there is a second $\hat{\mathbf{s}}' \in D_s^m \setminus \{\hat{\mathbf{s}}\}$ with $h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}) = h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}')$ (with overwhelming probability).*

The next lemma establishes witness indistinguishability of the protocol. Witness indistinguishability ensures that the malicious verifier cannot distinguish whether the prover uses one of two possible secret keys $\hat{\mathbf{s}}, \hat{\mathbf{s}}' \in h^{-1}(\mathbf{S}) \cap D_s^m$. Basically, it can be interpreted as an application of Lemma 3.4 to $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* = (\hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^*) + \hat{\mathbf{y}} \in G_*^m$ with some further observations. The choice of $\hat{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow\!\!\$\, D_y$ and the restriction "$\in G_*^m$" hide the first summand.

Lemma 3.7 *Let $h \in \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$ and $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbf{R}$. For any message M and any two secret keys $\hat{\mathbf{s}}, \hat{\mathbf{s}}' \in D_s^m$ with $h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}) = \mathbf{s} = h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}')$, the resulting protocol views $(\mathbf{Y}, \epsilon^*, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^*)$ and $(\mathbf{Y}', \epsilon^{*\prime}, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^{*\prime})$ are indistinguishable.*

Using lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, we can exploit witness indistinguishability to simulate all blind signature oracle queries with a secret key $\hat{\mathbf{s}}$ and at the same time expect the adversary to output a forgery that corresponds to a different secret key $\hat{\mathbf{s}}'$ with non-negligible probability or break the binding property of the commitment scheme. We apply the Forking Lemma to extract a solution to the $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$.

Theorem 3.8 (One-more unforgeability) *Let Sig be the signature oracle. Let T_{Sig} and T_{H} be the cost functions for simulating the oracles Sig and H, and let $c < 1$ be the probability for a restart in the protocol. BS is $(t, q_{\text{Sign}}, q_{\text{H}}, \delta)$-one-more unforgeable if com is $(t', \delta/2)$-binding and $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ is $(t', \delta'/2)$-hard with $t' = t + q_{\text{Sign}}T_{\text{Sig}} + q_{\text{H}}T_{\text{H}}$ and non-negligible δ' if δ is non-negligible.*

The probability δ' depends on the number of issued signatures. It can be found at the end of the proof.

Proof. Towards contradiction, we assume that there exists a successful forger $\mathcal{A}$ against one-more unforgeability of BS with non-negligible probability δ. Using $\mathcal{A}$, we construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$, such that it either solves the collision problem or breaks the binding property of com.

Setup. $\mathcal{B}$ gets as input the description of h. $\mathcal{B}$ initializes a list $L_{\mathsf{H}} \leftarrow \emptyset$ of query-hash pairs $(\mathbf{R} \times \{0,1\}^*, D_\epsilon)$. It chooses $\hat{\mathbf{s}} \xleftarrow{\$} D_s^m$ and sets $\mathbf{S} \leftarrow h(\hat{\mathbf{s}})$. Furthermore, it randomly pre-selects random oracle answers $\mathbf{h}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_{q_{\mathsf{H}}} \xleftarrow{\$} D_\epsilon$ and a random tape ρ. It runs $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{S}; \rho)$ in a black-box simulation and flips a coin $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$.

Random oracle queries. On input $(\mathbf{u}, C)$, $\mathcal{B}$ looks up $(\mathbf{u}, C)$ in L_{H}. If it finds corresponding hash value ϵ then it returns ϵ. Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}$ chooses the first unused value ϵ from the list $\mathbf{h}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_{q_{\mathsf{H}}}$, stores $((\mathbf{u}, C), \epsilon)$ in L_{H}, and returns ϵ.

Blind signature queries. $\mathcal{B}$ acts according to the protocol in Figure 2.

Output. Eventually, $\mathcal{A}$ stops and outputs $(M_1, (r_1, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_1, \epsilon_1)), \ldots, (M_{\jmath}, (r_{\jmath}, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_{\jmath}, \epsilon_{\jmath}))$, $q_{\mathsf{Sign}} < \jmath$, for distinct messages. If $b = 0$, the reduction looks for two pairs $(M_1^*, (r_1^*, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^*, \epsilon^*))$ and $(M_2^* \neq M_1^*, (r_2^*, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^*, \epsilon^*))$ and outputs $(M_1^*, r_1^*), (M_2^*, r_2^*)$ to break the binding property of com. If there is no such collision, $\mathcal{B}$ aborts. If $b = 1$, simulator $\mathcal{B}$ guesses an index $k \xleftarrow{\$} [\jmath]$ such that $\mathbf{h}_{\imath} = \epsilon_k$ for some $\imath \in [q_{\mathsf{H}}]$. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ starts over, running $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{S}; \rho)$ with random oracle answers $\mathbf{h}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_{\imath-1}, \mathbf{h}'_{\imath}, \ldots, \mathbf{h}'_{q_{\mathsf{H}}}$ for a fresh set $\mathbf{h}'_{\imath}, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_{q_{\mathsf{H}}} \xleftarrow{\$} D_\epsilon$. Both $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are run with the same random tape as in the first run. Among other values, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $(M'_k, (r'_k, \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k, \epsilon'_k))$ and $\mathcal{B}$ returns $(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon_k, \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon'_k)$ in an attempt to solve $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$.

Analysis. Observe that $\mathcal{A}$'s environment is perfectly simulated. Especially, restarts happen with the same probability as in the original protocol. For $b = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ $(t', \delta/2)$-breaks the binding property of com if $\mathcal{A}$ breaks the binding property of com to break one-more unforgeability.

For $b = 1$, we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ breaks one-more unforgeability without attacking com. So, at least one of the output signatures is not obtained via an interaction. The probability that $\mathcal{B}$ guesses the index k of this signature correctly is at least $1/(q_{\mathsf{Sign}} + 1)$. Observe that ϵ_k is a random oracle answer but with probability $1/|D_\epsilon|$.

Applying the Forking Lemma, we know that with probability $\delta_{\mathsf{frk}} \geq (1-c)(\delta - 1/|D_\epsilon|)((\delta - 1/|D_\epsilon|)/q_{\mathsf{H}} - 1/|D_\epsilon|)$, $\mathcal{A}$ is again successful in the one-more unforgeability experiment and outputs (among others) $(M'_k, (r'_k, \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k, \epsilon'_k))$ using the *same random oracle query* as in the first run. The additional $(1 - c)$ factor takes a potential abort during the second run into account, which happen with probability at most c. Therefore, we know that $(h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \mathbf{S}\epsilon_k), \mathsf{com}(M_k; r_k)) = (h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \mathbf{S}\epsilon'_k), \mathsf{com}(M'_k; r'_k))$.

Now, we turn to solving the collision problem. We have to show that $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon_k \neq \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon'_k$ and $h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon_k) = h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon'_k)$. The second requirement follows directly from the previous paragraph. The first is more involved. Here, it is important that the protocol is witness-indistinguishable (Lemma 3.7), i.e., the adversary does not recognize whether we used one of at least two possible $\hat{\mathbf{s}}, \hat{\mathbf{s}}'$ (Lemma 3.6 with probability greater than $1/2$. Thus, with probability at least $1/2$ its output $\hat{\mathbf{z}}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{z}}'$ corresponds to $\hat{\mathbf{s}}'$. We show that either $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon_k \neq \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon'_k$ or $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}'\epsilon_k \neq \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}'\epsilon'_k$. Assuming both are equal, we subtract the equations and obtain $(\epsilon_k - \epsilon'_k)(\hat{\mathbf{s}}' - \hat{\mathbf{s}}) = \mathbf{0}$. We know that $\epsilon_k - \epsilon'_k \neq \mathbf{0}$. Now, $\|(\epsilon_k - \epsilon'_k)(\hat{\mathbf{s}}' - \hat{\mathbf{s}})\|_\infty \leq 2d_s n < q/2$ because $\|\epsilon_k - \epsilon'_k\|_\infty \leq 2$ and $\|\hat{\mathbf{s}}' - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\|_\infty \leq 2d_s$. Thus, $(\epsilon_k - \epsilon'_k)(\hat{\mathbf{s}}' - \hat{\mathbf{s}}) = \mathbf{0}$ over $\mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle X^n + 1\rangle$, which is an integral domain. So, we have the contradiction $\hat{\mathbf{s}}' = \hat{\mathbf{s}}$ and a collision as $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon_k, \hat{\mathbf{z}}'_k - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon'_k \in D$. The success probability is at least $\delta_{\mathsf{col}} \geq 1/2\,\delta_{\mathsf{frk}}/(q_{\mathsf{Sign}} + 1)$, which is non-negligible if δ is non-negligible.

Concerning restarts, we argue that the user cannot obtain a valid signature out of an aborted interaction without solving the collision problem. In order to trigger an abort after Step 4, it outputs $result = (C, \alpha, \hat{\beta}, \epsilon)$ which, together with $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*, \hat{\mathbf{y}}, \epsilon^*$, satisfies all abort criteria:

$$\epsilon^* + \alpha = \epsilon = \mathsf{H}(\mathbf{Y} - \mathbf{S}\alpha - h(\hat{\beta}), C) \tag{1}$$

$$\epsilon = \mathsf{H}(h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}) - \mathbf{S}\epsilon, C) \tag{2}$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta} \notin G^m \tag{3}$$

Assume that it also obtains a valid signature $(r', \hat{\mathbf{z}}', \epsilon')$ from this interaction. If $\epsilon = \epsilon'$, then $h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}^* - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon) = h(\hat{\mathbf{z}}' - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon)$ by (2). If the arguments under h are equal, we have $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta} \in G^m$ — a contradiction with (3). If the arguments are distinct, we have a collision in D because $\|\hat{\mathbf{z}}' - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon\|_\infty \leq d_G < d_D$ and $\left\|\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* - \hat{\beta}^* - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon\right\|_\infty \leq d_{G_*} + d_\beta + nd_sd_\epsilon = d_D$.

The adversary may also succeed by hiding $\epsilon' \neq \epsilon$ in ϵ^*. But then, we necessarily have $\epsilon^* = \epsilon - \alpha = \epsilon' - \alpha'$ by (1) for an $\alpha \neq \alpha'$ and we know that $\alpha = \epsilon - \epsilon' + \alpha'$. So, the adversary had to be able to predict the output of H to compute α.

To conclude, the probability that we can extract a collision from a cheating user during an abort is at least $\delta_{\mathsf{abort}} \geq \delta\,(1 - 1/|D_\epsilon|)$, which is non-negligible if δ is non-negligible. Thus, the overall success probability of the reduction is $\delta' \geq \min(\delta_{\mathsf{col}}, \delta_{\mathsf{abort}})$ if the guess $b = 1$ was correct. $\qquad\square$

By Theorem 2.2, we get the following strong worst-case security guarantees.

Corollary 3.9 BS *is one-more unforgeable if solving* ISVP^∞ *is hard in the worst case for approximation factors* $\gamma \geq 16 d_D mn \log^2(n) = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^5)$ *in lattices that correspond to ideals in* **R**.

3.3.4 Leakage Resilience

Using an additional restriction for one of the parameters in Table 2, we can safely leak a $(1 - o(1))$ fraction of the secret key in the unforgeability experiment according to the definition in Appendix B. Recall that $m = \lfloor c_m \log(q) \rfloor + 1$ for some $c_m = \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1)$. Thus, it is possible to choose c_m, say $\log(n)$, without loosing the scheme's quasi-optimal efficiency. The following theorem states that such a choice is sufficient to provide strong leakage resilience.

To prove the theorem, we use a technical lemma from [KV09] in its alternative interpretation.

Lemma 3.10 ([KV09, Lemma 1]) *Let* X *be a random variable with* $H := H_\infty(X)$, *and fix* $H' \in [0, H]$. *Let* f *be a function whose range has size* 2^λ, *and set* $Y := \{y \in \{0,1\}^\lambda | H_\infty(X|y = f(X)) \geq H'\}$. *Then* $\mathrm{Prob}[\,f(X) \in Y\,] \geq 1 - 2^{\lambda - H + H'}$.

In our context, it states that the conditional min-entropy of the secret key after λ bits of leakage is at least H' but with probability $2^{\lambda - H + H'}$. We will use the lemma with $H' = 1$ because one bit of uncertainty is sufficient to apply Lemma 3.7 (witness indistinguishability) in Theorem 3.8.

Theorem 3.11 (Leakage Resilience) *Let* $c_m = \omega(1)$ *and let* $L := \log(|D_s^m|) = mn \log(2d_s + 1)$ *be the length of the secret key. The conditional min-entropy* H_∞ *of* $\hat{s}$, *conditioned on* $\mathbf{S} = h(\hat{s})$ *and a total secret-key leakage* $f(\hat{s})$ *of* $\lambda = \delta L = (1 - o(1))L$ *bits, is positive with overwhelming probability.*

Proof. We prove a conservative lower bound on the amount of tolerated leakage because we treat the public key $\mathbf{S}$ as additional leakage. Therefore, we define a new total leakage function $f'(\hat{s}) = f(\hat{s})||h(\hat{s})$ with a total leakage of at most $\lambda' = \lambda + n \log(q)$ bits. Now, we apply Lemma 3.10 to f', λ', and H' with $\hat{s}$ being the random variable. Observe that $H = L = mn \log(2d_s + 1)$. It yields

$$\mathrm{Prob}\left[\,f'(\hat{s}) \in Y\,\right] \geq 1 - 2^{\lambda + n \log(q) - L + 1}, \tag{4}$$

which we want to be overwhelming $\geq 1 - 2^{-p(n)}$. We take any function $p(n), \omega(\log(n)) \leq p(n) \leq \mathcal{O}(n \log(n))$ and bound the relative leakage $\delta \leq 1 - \frac{p(n) + n \log(q) + 1}{L} = 1 - \frac{\Theta(n \log(n))}{c_m \Theta(n \log(n))} = 1 - \frac{1}{\omega(1)} = 1 - o(1)$.

In consequence, (4) becomes $\geq 1 - 2^{\left(1 - \frac{p(n) + n \log(q) + 1}{L}\right)L + n \log(q) - L + 1} = 1 - 2^{p(n)}$. Thus, $\delta L = (1 - o(1))L$ leakage bits yield a non-zero conditional min-entropy with probability $1 - 2^{-p(n)} \geq 1 - 2^{-\omega(\log(n))}$. $\qquad\square$

4 Conclusions

We have shown how to construct an efficient and provably secure blind signature scheme based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems. Our scheme has four moves, offers quasi-optimal performance, and it is leakage resilient in an almost optimal sense. Therefore, we expect our construction to withstand even subexponential-time and quantum computer attacks, as well as limited side-channel attacks against the secret key. While estimating the precise attack complexity in hours, days, or years is still an important open question in lattice-based cryptography, we have proposed very conservative parameter sets based on today's knowledge about lattice basis reduction. Further work includes an alternate parameter selection process for a different ring **R** that does not restrict n to powers of two. One approach in this direction involves a different embedding of polynomials into $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, i.e., using the canonical embedding [PR07] instead of the coefficient embedding. This potentially allows smaller n and therefore smaller key and signature sizes.

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A   Forking Lemma

The forking lemma of Bellare and Neven [BN06] is a tool for proving security in the random oracle model. It provides a lower bound for the probability that a randomized algorithm outputs two related values when run twice with the same random tape but with a different random oracle.

Lemma A.1 (Lemma 1 in [BN06]) *Fix an integer $q \geq 1$ and a set H of size $h \geq 2$. Let A be a randomized algorithm that on input $x, h_1, \ldots, h_q$ returns a pair, the first element of which is an integer in the range $0, \ldots, q$ and the second element of which we refer to as a side output. Let IG be a randomized algorithm that we call the input generator. The accepting probability of A, denoted acc, is defined as the probability that $J \geq 1$ in the experiment $x \xleftarrow{\$} IG; h_1, \ldots, h_q \xleftarrow{\$} H; (J, \sigma) \xleftarrow{\$} A(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q)$. The forking algorithm F_A associated to A is the randomized algorithm that takes input x proceeds as follows:*

Algorithm $F_A(x)$
    Pick coins ρ for A at random
    $h_1, \ldots, h_q \xleftarrow{\$} H$
    $(I, \sigma) \leftarrow A(x, h_1, \ldots, h_q; \rho)$

If $I = 0$ then return $(0, \epsilon, \epsilon)$
$h'_I, \ldots, h'_q \leftarrow\!\!\$\; H$
$(I', \sigma') \leftarrow \mathsf{A}(x, h_1, \ldots, h_{I-1}, h'_I, \ldots, h'_q; \rho)$
If $I = I'$ and $h_I \neq h'_{I'}$ then return $(1, \sigma, \sigma')$
Else return $(0, \epsilon, \epsilon)$.

Let $\mathsf{frk} = \mathrm{Prob}\big[b = 1 : x \leftarrow\!\!\$\; \mathsf{IG}; (b, \sigma, \sigma') \leftarrow \mathsf{F_A}(x)\big]$. *Then* $\mathsf{frk} \geq acc\left(\frac{acc}{q} - \frac{1}{h}\right)$.

B Leakage-resilience for Blind Signatures

The following experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{omf},\lambda\text{-Leak}}_{\mathcal{U}^*,\mathcal{BS}}$ models leakage-resilience for unforgeability of blind signatures. The scheme $\mathcal{BS}$ is leakage-resilient with λ if there is no efficient adversary $\mathcal{U}^*$ for which the experiment outputs 1. The parameter λ is a function of the length L of the secret key and it controls the amount of tolerated leakage.

Experiment $\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{omf},\lambda\text{-Leak}}_{\mathcal{U}^*,\mathcal{BS}}(n)$
   $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow\!\!\$\; \mathcal{H}(1^n)$
   $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\; \mathsf{BS.Kg}(1^n)$
   $\{(M_1, \mathbf{s}_1), \ldots, (M_J, \mathbf{s}_J)\} \leftarrow\!\!\$\; \mathcal{U}^{*\,\mathsf{H}(\cdot), \langle \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{sk}), \cdot \rangle, \mathsf{Leak}(\mathsf{sk}, \cdot)}(\mathsf{pk})$
   Let ℓ be the number of successful interaction between $\mathcal{U}^*$ and the signer.
   Let $f_1, \ldots, f_\kappa$ be the leakage queries of $\mathcal{U}^*$, each with output length λ_i.
   Return 1 iff
      1. $M_i \neq M_j$ for all $1 \leq i < j \leq J$;
      2. $\mathsf{BS.Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{s}_i, M_i) = 1$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, J$;
      3. $\ell + 1 = J$;
      4. $\sum_{i=1}^\kappa \lambda_i \leq \lambda(|\mathsf{sk}|)$.

C Practical Parameters

Although worst-case guarantees are a good argument for lattice-based cryptography in general, we need to analyze the underlying average-case problem, the collision problem, directly before proposing concrete parameters. In our analysis, we use the results of Gama and Nguyen [GN08]. As described in their work, lattice reduction finds vectors $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda$ with

$$\|\mathbf{v}\|_2 \;\; \leq \;\; \delta^{\dim(\Lambda)} \det(\Lambda)^{1/\dim(\Lambda)} \tag{5}$$

for a lattice constant $\det(\Lambda)$ in lattices of dimension $\dim(\Lambda)$. Gama and Nguyen found that currently known algorithms find vectors with $\delta > 1.01$ in dimensions up to 200 in random lattices according to Goldstein and Mayer [GM03] and they argue that $\delta > 1.01$ may also be reachable in higher dimensions. On the other hand, undercutting this bound only a little seems to be infeasible.

The collision problem $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$, however, involves a different distribution of lattices. Fix a compression function $h \in Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ and let $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ be its key. By multiplying the polynomials in $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ with powers of X modulo (X^n+1), we obtain mn coefficient vectors in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$. We can write them as a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times mn}$ that represents the map h as $\mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} \bmod q$. This matrix generates the q-ary lattice $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{v} \equiv \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}\}$ that has $\det(\Lambda) = q^n$. Observe that solving the collision problem in the domain D implies finding a short vector $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ with $\|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq 2d_D$. The latter problem is the short integer solution (SIS) problem with parameters $\mathbf{A}$, q, and norm bound $2d_D$ in the ℓ_∞ norm.

It is well-known that solving SIS in q-ary lattices is easier than solving an equivalent approximate SVP in general lattices. In [MR08, page 154], Micciancio and Regev describe an attack against a "sublattice" and successfully reduce the dimension in which we have to apply lattice basis reduction. Let Λ be a q-ary lattice of dimension $d = mn$. Instead of attacking dimension d, their attack works best in sublattices of dimension $\tilde{d} = \sqrt{n \log(q)/\log(\delta)}$ if the attacker's "capability" is δ in (5).

Micciancio and Regev state that this attack finds vectors of Euclidean length at least $\min\{q, 2^{2\sqrt{n \log(q) \log(\delta)}}\}$ and hence vectors of ℓ_∞-length at least $\min\{q, 2^{2\sqrt{n \log(q) \log(\delta)}}/\sqrt{\tilde{d}}\}$.

Figure 3: Average number of runs needed to complete in the signature protocol of BS for $\phi \in [1, 15] \cap \mathbb{Z}$

In order to solve the collision problem $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$, the attacker needs to find vectors of ℓ_∞ at most $2d_D$. In consequence, a set of parameters for BS is secure if

$$2d_D \quad < \quad \min\{q, 2^{2\sqrt{n \log(q) \log(\delta)}}/\sqrt{\tilde{d}}\}. \tag{6}$$

C.1 Optimization

Before we propose actual parameters using (6), we show how to optimize the choice of parameters based on the constraints in Table 2. We discuss the parameters q, ψ, ϕ, and d_s.

Choosing q. From Table 2 and Theorem 2.2, we know that the worst-case to average-case reduction relies on having $q \geq 4mn\sqrt{n} \log(n) d_D = \widetilde{\Theta}(n^5 \sqrt{n})$. To resolve a circular dependency and to account for the hidden terms in the $\mathcal{O}$-notation, we choose a prime $q \geq n^7$.

Choosing ψ. As noted before, we can safely set $\psi = 1$ and let the user handle an expected number of e restarts after Step 2 in the protocol. These restarts are performed locally and experiments show that they do not significantly affect the overall efficiency of the protocol.

Choosing ϕ. For ϕ, the situation is different because it controls the probability of a restart after Steps 3 and 4. Restarts at this point cannot be done locally and involve an increase in communication and computation costs. The influence becomes obvious when looking at Figure 3. It shows the number of required repetitions of the blind signature protocol for $n \in \{256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096\}$ and $\phi \in [1, 15] \cap \mathbb{Z}$, averaged over 1000 random instances. As a comparison, it also shows the estimated number of repetitions $e^{2/\phi}$ from Section 3. As expected, the behavior is almost independent of n. Our experiments show that one should at least choose $\phi \geq 4$ and by closely looking at the numbers it even makes sense to choose $\phi = 10$ in some cases. This observation is backed up by Figure 4, which shows the actual combined running time in milliseconds of signing and verification, averaged over 1000 random instances. Since our implementation is pretty straightforward without many optimizations, we assume that exploiting SIMD instructions of modern processors and a special

Figure 4: Average running time of signature protocol and the verification algorithm of BS for $\phi \in [1, 15] \cap \mathbb{Z}$ in milliseconds. The running times include eventual restarts.

polynomial multiplication for the ring $\mathbf{R}$ yields a speed-up factor of at least 8. This observation was made in [ADL$^+$08], where the family $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$ is used to construct an efficient collision-resistant hash function. In Figure 4, we already take this potential improvement into account.

When increasing ϕ, one has to keep in mind that a larger ϕ also increases d_D and requires a slightly stronger hardness assumption.

Choosing d_s. When looking at the constraint for m, basically $m > \log(q)/\log(2d_s)$, it is clear that a larger d_s allows us to choose a smaller m. This can dramatically decrease the required bandwidth and computational cost at the expense of a slightly larger secret key. We show the effect of a larger d_s in Figure 5 for $n = 512$ and $\phi = 4$. Notice that we take the logarithm of d_s and round m to the next integer. So, in order to decrease m by a factor k, we need to choose d_s around 2^k. When removing the outliers, this leads to a perfect stair-stepped graph. Also, this increase comes at the price of having a larger d_D and requires stronger hardness assumption.

C.2 Secure Parameters

Table 3 shows a few exemplary parameter sets that are secure against attackers with "capability" $\delta \in \{1.01, 1.005\}$. We assume that $\delta = 1.01$ is not reachable with today's methods, so we denote the corresponding parameter sets with "Current" security. Achieving $\delta = 1.005$ in high dimensions seems completely out of reach as observed in [GN08]. Thus, this yields super-conservative parameter sets for "Future" security.

For both security levels, we propose three parameter sets. The first has the smallest secret key and requires the mildest hardness assumption. The second is optimized for minimizing the number of repetitions and the third simultaneously optimized for computational cost and bandwidth including restarts. The optimization goal is denoted in bold face. Depending on the application scenario, other trade offs are possible.

Figure 5: Average running time of signature protocol and the verification algorithm of BS for $d_s \in [1, 1024] \cap \mathbb{Z}$ and $n = 1024$ and $\phi = 4$.

D Supporting Lemmas

D.1 Completeness

Proving Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 concludes the discussion of completeness in Theorem 3.3. Lemma 3.1 shows that the number of aborts/restarts in the protocol is small. Lemma 3.2 ensures that multiplying two polynomials in **R** only slightly increases the norm of the resulting coefficient vector.

Lemma 3.1 Let $k = \Omega(n)$, $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with *arbitrary* $\mathbf{a} \in \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq A\}$ and *random* $\mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq B\}$. Given $B \geq \phi k A$ for $\phi \in \mathbb{N}_{>0}$, we have $\underset{\mathbf{b}}{\mathrm{Prob}}[\,\|\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty \leq B - A] > \frac{1}{e^{1/\phi}} - o(1)$.

Proof (Lemma 3.1). Observe that $\mathrm{Prob}[\,\|\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty \leq B - A] = \mathrm{Prob}[\,|a_i - b_i| \leq B - A]^k$ and that the b_i need to be in the range $[-(B - A) + a_i, B - A + a_i] \subseteq [-B, B]$ for that. Therefore, the probability is

$$\left(\frac{2(B - A) + 1}{2B + 1}\right)^k > \left(1 - \frac{A}{B}\right)^k \geq \left(1 - \frac{1/\phi}{k}\right)^k.$$

By the series expansion at infinity, this is at least $\frac{1}{e^{1/\phi}} - o(1)$ for an $o(1)$ term that vanishes like $1/k$. □

Lemma 3.2 For any two polynomials $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{R}$, we have $\|\mathbf{ab} \bmod (X^n + 1)\|_\infty \leq n \|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty \|\mathbf{b}\|_\infty$.

Proof (Lemma 3.2). Note that $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{ab} \bmod (X^n + 1) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_0 \mathbf{b} X^i \bmod (X^n + 1)$. Hence, we have $\|\mathbf{c}\|_\infty = \left\|\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_0 \mathbf{b} X^i \bmod (X^n + 1)\right\|_\infty \leq n \|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty \max_{i=0,\dots,n-1}\{\mathbf{b} X^i \bmod (X^n + 1)\}$, where the last term is reminiscent of an operator norm. For our particular ring polynomial $X^n + 1$, this norm is easy to evaluate because $\mathbf{b}X = b_0 X + b_1 X^2 + \cdots + b_{n-2} X^{n-1} + b_{n-1} X^n \bmod (X^n + 1) = -b_{n-1} + b_0 X + b_1 X^2 + \cdots + b_{n-2} X^{n-1}$. Therefore, we have $\left\|\mathbf{b}X^i \bmod (X^n + 1)\right\|_\infty = \|\mathbf{b}\|_\infty$ and $\|\mathbf{c}\|_\infty \leq n \|\mathbf{a}\|_\infty \|\mathbf{b}\|_\infty$. □

19

Parameter	Current I	Current II	Current III	Future I	Future II	Future III
n	1024	1024	1024	2048	2048	2048
q	$\approx 2^{70}$	$\approx 2^{70}$	$\approx 2^{70}$	$\approx 2^{77}$	$\approx 2^{77}$	$\approx 2^{77}$
ϕ	1	9	4	1	5	4
d_s	1	1	110	1	1	18
Repetitions	3.15	**1.12**	1.36	3.3	**1.26**	1.26
Secret key	**9 kB**	**9 kB**	10 kB	**20 kB**	**20 kB**	21 kB
Public key	9 kB	9 kB	9 kB	19 kB	19 kB	19 kB
Signature	300 kB	336 kB	**73 kB**	704 kB	762 kB	**245 kB**
Communication	1298 kB	408 kB	**126 kB**	3208 kB	1081 kB	**367 kB**
Signing	181 ms	94 ms	**20 ms**	408 ms	218 ms	**56 ms**
Verification	19 ms	32 ms	**5 ms**	66 ms	66 ms	**16 ms**
ℓ_∞-norm to break	$\mathbf{2^{52.1}}$	$2^{58.4}$	$2^{58.4}$	$\mathbf{2^{56.3}}$	$2^{60.9}$	$2^{61.2}$
Reachable ℓ_∞-norm	$2^{58.6}$	$2^{58.6}$	$2^{58.6}$	$2^{61.3}$	$2^{61.3}$	$2^{61.3}$

Table 3: Exemplary parameters for the blind signature scheme in Section 3. Sizes in kilo bytes (kB) and times in milliseconds (ms) are rounded to the nearest integer.

D.2 Blindness

Lemma 3.4 establishes blindness in Theorem 3.5. It guarantees that the every output by the user is distributed independently of the signed message via a careful choice of parameters and sets.

Lemma 3.4 Let $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}', \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ with *arbitrary* $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}' \in \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq A\}$, a *random* $\mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^k : \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty \leq B\}$, and $B > A$. If $\max\{\|\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty, \|\mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{b}\|_\infty\} \leq B - A$, then $\Delta(\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{b}) = 0$.

Proof (Lemma 3.4). By definition, the statistical distance is

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{\mathbf{c}:\|\mathbf{c}\|_\infty \leq B-A} \left| \Prob_{\mathbf{b}}[\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{c}] - \Prob_{\mathbf{b}}[\mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{b} = \mathbf{c}] \right| = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\mathbf{c}} \left| \Prob_{\mathbf{b}}[\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{a} - \mathbf{c}] - \Prob_{\mathbf{b}}[\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{c}] \right|.$$

Observe that $\max\{\|\mathbf{a} - \mathbf{c}\|_\infty, \|\mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{c}\|_\infty\} \leq A + (B - A) = B$ and $\|\mathbf{b}\|_\infty \leq B$. Hence, the probability in either case is $1/(2B + 1)^k$ and the statistical distance is 0. $\qquad\square$

D.3 One-more Unforgeability

Lemma 3.6 ensures that all secret keys collide with at least one alternative secret key under h. In combination with Lemma 3.7, which proves witness indistinguishability of the signature issue protocol, this allows us to build a reduction algorithm in Theorem 3.8 that correctly simulates the signer and breaks $Col(\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m), D)$ with the help of a forger.

Lemma 3.6 Let $h \in \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$. For every secret key $\hat{\mathbf{s}} \xleftarrow{\$} D_s^m$, there is a second $\hat{\mathbf{s}}' \in D_s^m \setminus \{\hat{\mathbf{s}}\}$ with $h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}) = h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}')$ (with overwhelming probability).

Proof (Lemma 3.6). All functions in the family $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$ are compressing when applied to the domain D_s^m for our choice of parameters because $|D_s^m| = (2d_s + 1)^{mn} > 3^{mn} > (2d_s)^{n \log(q)/\log(2d_s)} > 2^{n \log(q)} = q^n = |\mathbf{R}|$. Therefore, all but at most q^n elements in D_s^m do not collide. The probability of selecting such an element is at most $(q/(2d_s + 1)^m)^n < 2^{-n \log(q) \log(2d_s+1)/\log(2d_s)} < 2^{-n \log(q)} = 2^{-\Omega(n \log(n))}$. $\qquad\square$

Lemma 3.7 Let $h \in \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{R}, m)$ and $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbf{R}$. For any message M and any two secret keys $\hat{\mathbf{s}}, \hat{\mathbf{s}}' \in D_s^m$ with $h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}) = \mathbf{s} = h(\hat{\mathbf{s}}')$, the resulting protocol views $(\mathbf{Y}, \epsilon^*, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^*)$ and $(\mathbf{Y}', \epsilon^{*\prime}, \hat{\mathbf{z}}^{*\prime})$ are indistinguishable.

Proof (Lemma 3.7). The argument is an adaptation of [Lyu08b, Theorem 5.5]. We interpret the components of the view as random variables. Firstly, observe that $\mathbf{Y}$ and $\mathbf{Y}'$ are chosen independently of the secret key.

Secondly, ϵ^* and $\epsilon^{*\prime}$ are independent of a particular $\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in h^{-1}(\mathbf{Y}) \cap D_y^m$ because $\mathbf{Y}$ statistically hides $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$. Finally, we need to argue about the indistinguishability of $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*$ and $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^{*\prime}$. Let ϵ^* be any challenge and let $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* = \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^* + \hat{\mathbf{y}} \in G_*^m$. Then, we can set $\hat{\mathbf{y}}' \leftarrow \hat{\mathbf{y}} + \hat{\mathbf{s}}\epsilon^* - \hat{\mathbf{s}}'\epsilon^*$ for which $\hat{\mathbf{z}}^* = \hat{\mathbf{s}}'\epsilon^* + \hat{\mathbf{y}}'$. We need to show that $\hat{\mathbf{y}}' \in h^{-1}(\mathbf{Y}) \cap D_y^m$. This implies that for every $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$ (for $\hat{\mathbf{s}}$), there is a $\hat{\mathbf{y}}'$ (for $\hat{\mathbf{s}}'$) that yields the same output. Thus, the probability of a restart would also be equal. Clearly, $\hat{\mathbf{y}}' \in h^{-1}(\mathbf{Y})$ because $h(\hat{\mathbf{y}}') = \mathbf{Y} + \mathbf{S}\epsilon^* - \mathbf{S}\epsilon^* = \mathbf{Y}$. Furthermore, $\|\hat{\mathbf{y}}'\|_\infty \le \|\hat{\mathbf{z}}^*\|_\infty + \|\hat{\mathbf{s}}'\epsilon^*\|_\infty \le d_y - n d_s d_{\epsilon^*} + n d_s d_{\epsilon^*} = d_y$ by Lemma 3.2 and we can conclude $\hat{\mathbf{y}}' \in D_y^m$. $\square$