

# Revisit of Group-based Unidirectional Proxy Re-encryption Scheme

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**Abstract.** Currently, researchers have focused their attention on proxy re-encryption scheme deployed between two entities. Lots of bidirectional schemes have been proposed and this kind of scheme is suitable for the scenario in which the two entities have already established a relationship of trust. How to construct a unidirectional scheme is an open problem and receiving increasing attention. In this paper, we present a unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme for group communication. In this scheme, a proxy is only allowed to convert ciphertext for Alice into ciphertext for Bob without revealing any information on plaintext or private key. It is suitable for the environment in which no mutual relationship exists and transitivity is not permitted. We prove the scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack in standard model.

**Keywords** Unidirectional, Group-based, Proxy, Re-encryption, Standard model

## 1 Introduction

Mambo and Okamoto introduced the technique for delegating decryption right in [1]. Later, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [3] first present the concept of proxy re-encryption scheme, which allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext under Alice's public key into a ciphertext of the same message under Bob's private key. However, the proxy can't obtain anything about the plaintext or the private key used to decrypt the ciphertext.

From a functional point of view, proxy re-encryption schemes are divided into two categories: bidirectional and unidirectional [2]. In a bidirectional scheme, the proxy secret key can be used to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob and vice versa. Obviously, a mutual trust relationship between Alice and Bob is needed, otherwise, some security problem will arise [4]. For example, one of the crucial issues in bidirectional scheme is how to deal with transitivity, i.e. proxy alone has ability to create delegation rights between two entities that have never agreed on this. In a unidirectional scheme, the proxy secret key is allowed to be used to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob, whereas from Bob to Alice is not permitted. Currently, how to construct an efficient unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme has been an open and interesting problem.

The proxy re-encryption scheme has many applications. For example, in traditional storage system [12][13], the Server who housing information sometimes just semi-trusted and some added means should be used to ensure its security. In 2005, Ateniese et al. [4] designed an efficient and secure distributed storage system in which the proxy re-encryption scheme is employed. There are some other applications, such as secure email forwarding, and so on [3][6].

To date, most of the researches of proxy re-encryption emphasize two entities communication. For example, a proxy transforms a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key into one that can be opened by Bob's secret key. However, few literatures present approach to deal with proxy re-encryption for group communication. Group communication is a useful primitive for sharing message in a specifically group and has been widely used in unbalanced networks, for example, clusters of mobile devices [17]. Ma et al. [5] designed an encryption scheme to ensure the privacy of the messages shared in the group. In the scheme, anyone can encrypt a message and distribute it to a designated group and any member in the designated group can decrypt the ciphertext. There exists proxy re-encrypted problem in two different groups. For example, due to the change of duty, some work managed by group A has been assigned to group B such that some encrypted documents sent to group A should be decrypted by group B. In such scenario, proxy re-encryption technique can be used to realize this transformation.

Literature [18] proposed a group-based proxy re-encryption scheme, however it is bidirectional, i.e. the proxy using one secret key can divert ciphertext from group A to group B and vice versa. In this paper, as a natural extension of [18] we present a group-based unidirectional scheme which secure against chosen ciphertext attack in standard model. It is suitable for the scenario in which no mutual relationship exists and transitivity is not permitted.

The rest of paper consists of following sections. In section 2, we introduce some related works. In section 3, we give the security model and complexity assumptions. The proposed scheme is presented in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the security

of the proposed scheme in standard model. Finally, we draw the conclusions in section 6.

## 2 Related Works

The notion of “atomic proxy cryptography” was presented by Blaze et al. [3] in 1998. It provides securer and more efficient way than usual to deal with the scenario in which a proxy decrypts a ciphertext using Alice’s private key and then encrypts the result using Bob’s public key. They depict two examples: one for encryption, and another for signature. However, the two examples presented in this paper were proved to have low security guarantees. Their approach is only useful when the trust relationship between Alice and Bob is mutual and the transitivity is not harmful to the system. In addition, it is not suitable for group communication since the proxy has to preserve  $n$  re-encryption key for  $n$  group members.

In 2003, Ivan and Dodis [2] designed proxy encryption for ElGamal, RSA, and an IBE scheme using secret sharing technique. In their ElGamal based scheme, Public Key Generator (PKG) generates encrypt key EK and decrypt key DK for each user, and then DK is divided into two parts  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ , which satisfy  $DK = x_1 + x_2$ . Moreover, they designed unidirectional and bidirectional proxy encryption scheme. These “secret-sharing” schemes don’t change ciphertexts for Alice into ciphertext for Bob in the purest sense, the delegate decryption by requiring Bob to store additional secret that maybe difficult for him to manage.

Following the work of Ivan and Dodis, Ateniese et al. [4] presented an improved proxy re-encryption scheme, and employed it in distributed storage system. In their re-encryption scheme, the proxy only preserves a discrete value to prevent the collude attack. The advantage of the method presented in [2] is that it is feasible to design a unidirectional proxy encryption. Whereas it is very difficult to extend the scheme to group communication since overload stems from the secret sharing technology. Thus why the scheme proposed in [4] is not very practical.

Canetti and Hohenberger [6] proposed a bidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme secure against chosen ciphertext attack in standard model. In their paper the bilinear pairing technology is used to design proxy re-encryption scheme. Although their approach is just suitable for two entities, some method can be used to design group communication.

Libert and Vergnaud [19] proposed a proxy re-encryption scheme which comes from Canetti-Halevi-Katz’s [20] scheme and can be seen as a natural extension of the Canetti-Hohenberger definition to the unidirectional case. Their scheme is unidirectional, i.e. only allows the proxy to divert ciphertexts from Alice to Bob. However, some messages on Alice such as public key have been preserved in the ciphertext generated in the phase of ReEnc. An attacker maybe uses these messages to recognize the original recipient of the ciphertext. Furthermore, the scheme may be menaced by malleability.

There are some other re-encryption schemes, such as Jakobsson’s quorum controlled asymmetric proxy re-encryption [7], and the identity-based scheme presented by Green and Ateniese [8]. There are some investigations on proxy signature schemes [9][10].

## 3 Background

### 3.1 Preliminaries

Let  $G_1$  be a cyclic multiplicative group generated by  $g$ , whose order is a prime  $q$  and  $G_2$  be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order  $q$ . Assume that the discrete logarithm in both  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map  $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  and satisfies the following properties:

1. Bilinear:  $e(g^a, p^b) = e(g, p)^{ab}$ . For all  $g, p \in G_1$  and  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , the equation holds.
2. Non-degenerate: There exists  $p \in G_1$ , if  $e(g, p) = 1$ , then  $g = O$ .
3. Computable: For  $g, p \in G_1$ , there is an efficient algorithm to compute  $e(g, p)$ .

Typically, the map  $e$  will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. Pairings and other parameters should be selected in proactive for efficiency and security [11].

### 3.2 Complexity Assumptions

#### — Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Given  $g^a$  and  $g^b$  for some  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , compute  $g^{ab} \in G_1$ . A  $(\tau, \varepsilon)$ -CDH attacker in  $G_1$  is a probabilistic machine  $\Omega$  running in time  $\tau$  such that

$$Succ_{G_1}^{cdh}(\Omega) = \Pr[\Omega(g, g^a, g^b) = g^{ab}] \geq \varepsilon$$

where the probability is taken over the random values  $a$  and  $b$ . The CDH problem is  $(\tau, \varepsilon)$ -intractable if there is no  $(\tau, \varepsilon)$ -attacker in  $G_1$ . The CDH assumption states that it is the case for all polynomial  $\tau$  and any non-negligible  $\varepsilon$ .

#### — Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption [14]

We say that an algorithm  $\pi$  that outputs  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  has advantage  $\varepsilon$  in solving the **Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)** problem in  $G_1$  if

$$|\Pr[\pi(g, g^a, g^b, g^c, e(g, g)^{abc}) = 0] - \Pr[\pi(g, g^a, g^b, g^c, T) = 0]| \geq \varepsilon$$

where the probability is over the random bit of  $\pi$ , the random choice of  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , and the random choice of  $T \in G_2$ . The **DBDH** problem is intractable if there is no attacker in  $G_1$  can solve the **DBDH** with non-negligible  $\varepsilon$ .

— **V-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption**

An algorithm  $\pi$  that outputs  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  has advantage  $\varepsilon$  in solving the **V-Decisional Diffie-Hellman (V-DDH)** problem in  $G_1$  if

$$|\Pr[\pi(g, g^a, g^{ab}, g^{ac}, g^{bc}) = 0] - \Pr[\pi(g, g^a, g^{ab}, g^{ac}, T) = 0]| \geq \varepsilon$$

where the probability is over the random bit of  $\pi$ , the random choice of  $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , and the random choice of  $T \in G_1$ . The **V-DDH** problem is intractable if there is no attacker in  $G_1$  can solve the **V-DDH** with non-negligible  $\varepsilon$ .

### 3.3 Security Notions

The proposed unidirectional re-encryption scheme consists of five algorithms, namely **KeyGen**, **ReKeyGen**, **Enc**, **ReEnc** and **Dec**.

- **KeyGen** ( $1^\lambda$ ). On input the security parameter, outputs the public key  $P_{pub}$  of each group and the corresponding private key  $s_{k_i}$  for each member.
- **ReKeyGen** ( $s_{k_1}, s_{k_2}$ ). On input two private key  $s_{k_1}$  and  $s_{k_2}$ , outputs a unidirectional re-encryption key  $r_{k(1 \rightarrow 2)}$ .
- **Enc** ( $P_{pub}, m$ ). On input message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$  and a public key  $P_{pub}$ , outputs a ciphertext  $C$ .
- **ReEnc** ( $r_{k(1 \rightarrow 2)}, C_1$ ). On input ciphertext  $C_1$  and the re-encryption key  $r_{k(1 \rightarrow 2)}$ , outputs a ciphertext  $C_2$  or an error symbol  $\perp$ .
- **Dec** ( $s_k, C$ ). On input ciphertext  $C$  and a private key  $s_k$ , outputs the corresponding message  $m$ .

The indistinguishable chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) [15] presented by Goldwasser and Micali has been widely used to analyze the security of an encryption scheme. In this model, several queries are available to the attacker to model his capability. Subsequently, Rackhoff and Simon [16] enhanced it and proposed adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). Since this notion is stronger, it is becoming a prevalent model in analyzing encryption scheme. Green and Ateniese [8] enhanced the model and used it to discuss the security of proxy re-encryption scheme, then followed by Canetti and Hohenberger [6].

In this part, we define adaptively chosen ciphertext security of the group-based unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme. Compared to the model mentioned in [6], we don't consider the case of group A or B's corruption due to the properties of our key generation. Security is defined using the following game between an Attacker and Challenger.

1. **Setup.** The Challenger initializes the system and gives the Attacker the resulting system parameters and the public key  $P_{pub}$ . It keeps private key to itself.
2. **Query phase 1.**
  - **Decrypt queries.** The Attacker issues a query  $(c_{i1}, c_{i2}, c_{i3})$ . The Challenger outputs **Decrypt**  $(c_{i1}, c_{i2}, c_{i3})$ , otherwise outputs error symbol  $\perp$ .
  - **Re-encrypt queries.** The Attacker issues a query  $(c_{i1}, c_{i2}, c_{i3})$  encrypted using the public key of group A. The Challenger outputs **Re-encrypt**  $(r_{k(A \rightarrow B)}, c_{i1}, c_{i2}, c_{i3})$ . Obviously, the output is a ciphertext encrypted using the public key of group B.

The Attacker is allowed to perform the **Query phase 1** several times.
3. **Challenge.** Once the Attacker decides that **Query phase 1** is over, the Attacker outputs two equal length messages  $\{M_0, M_1\}$  to the Challenger. Upon receiving the messages, the Challenger chooses a random bit  $e \in \{0, 1\}$ , invokes **Encrypt**  $(P_A, M_e)$  and outputs  $(c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$  as the answer.
4. **Query phase 2.** The Attacker continues to adaptively issue **Decrypt** queries and **Re-encrypt** queries. The Challenger responds as in the phase 1. These queries may be asked adaptively as in **Query phase 1**, but the query on  $(c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$  is not permitted.
5. **Guess.** Finally, the Attacker outputs a guess  $e' \in \{0, 1\}$  for  $e$  and wins the game if  $e' = e$ .

The encryption scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attack, if the Attacker has a negligible advantage  $\varepsilon = \left| \Pr(e = e') - \frac{1}{2} \right|$  to win the game.

## 4 The proposed unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme

We assume that there exist two groups in our scheme, namely A and B. The function of the Proxy is to transform ciphertext corresponding to the public key of group A into ciphertext for the public key of group B without revealing any information about

the secret decryption keys or the clear text. It means that our proxy re-encryption is a unidirectional scheme. The proposed scheme consists of following steps.

#### 4.1 Initialize

Let  $G_1$  be a cyclic multiplicative group generated by  $g$ , whose order is a prime  $q$  and  $G_2$  be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order  $q$ . A bilinear pairing is a map:  $e: G_2 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  that can be efficiently computed. PKG chooses  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and  $h \in G_1$  uniformly at random, and then computes  $g_1 = g^a$  and  $g_2 = g^b$ . The master private keys are  $a$  and  $b$ , and the master public keys are  $g_1, g_2$  and  $h$ .

#### 4.2 Key Generation

PKG chooses  $l, t \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  uniformly at random as the tag of the group B. Using  $P_B = g^l$  as group B's public key. The private key of the member  $p_i \in B$  can be generated as follows:

1. PKG chooses  $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  uniformly at random.
2. compute and output  $d_{i1} = h^{l \cdot r_i} g^{r_i}$ ,  $d_{i2} = h^{(r_i - a \cdot l) \cdot b^{-1}} g^{r_i b^{-1}}$ , and  $d_{i3} = g^{a \cdot l} h^{l \cdot r_i}$ .

The member  $p_i$ 's private key is  $d_i = \{d_{i1}, d_{i2}, d_{i3}\}$ . This set of keys is used to decrypt re-encrypted ciphertext. In case  $p_i$  is demanded to directly decrypt a ciphertext that sends to him without converted by the proxy, PKG should generate following set of private keys for him to complete this mission.

$$d'_{i1} = h^{l \cdot r_i} g^{r_i} \quad d'_{i2} = h^{(r_i - a \cdot l) \cdot b^{-1}} g^{r_i b^{-1}} \quad d'_{i3} = g^{a \cdot l} h^{l \cdot r_i}$$

We have  $d'_i = \{d'_{i1}, d'_{i2}, d'_{i3}\}$ . Similarly, PKG chooses  $k, z \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  uniformly at random as the tag of the group A. Using  $P_A = g^k$  as group A's public key. The member's private key can be generated as  $p_i \in B$ .

#### 4.3 Encrypt

In order to encrypt a message  $M \in \{0,1\}^l$  for the group A, the sender ( $S_{Enc}$ ) first chooses  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  uniformly at random, and computes the ciphertext

$$c_1 = e(g_1, P_A)^s \cdot M \quad c_2 = (hg)^s \quad c_3 = g_2^s.$$

The ciphertext for message M is  $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ . The sender  $S_{Enc}$  sends the ciphertext to all the members in the group A by broadcast over Internet.

#### 4.4 Re-encrypt

In order to transform the ciphertext to group B whose public key is  $P_B = g^l$ , PKG picks a random number  $n_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and computes  $n_2$ , such that  $n_1 + n_2 = t$ . Thereafter, PKG generates three Re-encrypt keys

$$rk_{A \rightarrow B}^1 = g^{(n_1 - k)ab^{-1}} \quad rk_{A \rightarrow B}^2 = g^{n_2 a} \quad rk_{A \rightarrow B}^3 = h^{b^{-1} a n_2}$$

and sends these keys to proxy in a secure way. Then using the Re-encrypt keys, the proxy performs the following computing

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{c}_1 &= \frac{e(g^a, g^k)^s \cdot M \cdot e(c_3, rk_{A \rightarrow B}^1) e(c_2, rk_{A \rightarrow B}^2)}{e(c_3, rk_{A \rightarrow B}^3)} \\ &= \frac{e(g, g)^{aks} \cdot M \cdot e(g^{bs}, g^{(n_1 - k)ab^{-1}}) \cdot e(h^s g^s, g^{a n_2})}{e(g^{bs}, h^{ab^{-1} n_2})} \\ &= \frac{e(g, g)^{ask} \cdot M \cdot e(g, g)^{a(n_1 - k)s} \cdot e(h^s, g^{a n_2}) e(g^s, g^{a n_2})}{e(g, h)^{a n_2}} \\ &= e(g, g)^{ask} \cdot M \cdot e(g, g)^{a(n_1 - k)s} \cdot e(g, g)^{a n_2} \\ &= e(g, g)^{ask} \cdot M \cdot e(g, g)^{a(t - k)s} \\ &= e(g, g)^{as} \cdot M \end{aligned}$$

$$\tilde{c}_2 = (h \cdot g)^s$$

$$\tilde{c}_3 = g_2^s = g^{bs}$$

The proxy sends the Re-encrypted ciphertext  $(\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \tilde{c}_3)$  to group B.

#### 4.5 Decrypt

After receiving the re-encrypted message  $c = (\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \tilde{c}_3)$ , the member  $p_i \in B$  decrypts the ciphertext as follows:

1. compute  $T = e(\tilde{c}_2, d_{i3}) e(\tilde{c}_3, d_{i2}) / e(\tilde{c}_2, d_{i1})$ .
2. compute  $M = \tilde{c}_1 / T$ .

In fact any member  $p_i \in B$  can compute  $T$  correctly, since

$$\begin{aligned}
T &= \frac{e(\tilde{c}_2, d_{i3})e(\tilde{c}_3, d_{i2})}{e(\tilde{c}_2, d_{i1})} \\
&= \frac{e(g^s h^s, h^{r_i} g^{at})e(g_2^s, h^{-ab^{-1}} h^{rb^{-1}} g^{rb^{-1}})}{e(g^s h^s, g^{r_i} h^{r_i})} \\
&= \frac{e(h^s, h^{r_i})e(h^s, g^{at})e(g^s, h^{r_i})e(g^s, g^{at})}{e(h^s, h^{r_i})e(h^s, g^{r_i})} \frac{e(g_2^s, h^{-ab^{-1}})e(g_2^s, h^{rb^{-1}})e(g_2^s, g^{rb^{-1}})}{e(g^s, h^{r_i})e(g^s, g^{r_i})} \\
&= e(g^s, g^{at}) = e(g, g)^{ats}
\end{aligned}$$

So the member  $p_i$  can obtain the plaintext  $M = \tilde{c}_1 / T$ .

In case  $p_i \in B$  is demanded to directly decrypt a ciphertext that sender send to him, he should use private keys  $\{d'_{i1}, d'_{i2}, d'_{i3}\}$  to decrypt it as we have mentioned in section 4.2. To the ciphertext generated for group B, for example  $c'_1 = e(g_1, P_B)^s \cdot M$ ,  $c'_2 = (hg)^s$  and  $c'_3 = g_2^s$ , the users  $p_i$  decrypts the ciphertext as follows.

$$T' = \frac{e(c'_2, d'_{i3})e(c'_3, d'_{i2})}{e(c'_2, d'_{i1})} = e(g, g)^{als}$$

Then we have  $M = c'_1 / T'$ .

## 5 Security

In this section, we will discuss the security of the proposed unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme in standard model. The measure used to prove our scheme comes from the paper [6].

**Lemma.** Suppose the CDH assumption holds. Then given  $g^a, g^{ab}, g^{ac} \in G_1$ , computing  $g^{bc}$  is intractable.

**Proof.** Assume that given  $g^a, g^{ab}, g^{ac} \in G_1$ , the attack Alice has ability to compute another  $g^{bc}$ . Then we can design an algorithm to solve CDH problem. In other words, given  $g^m, g^n \in G_1$ , the challenger Bob can compute  $g^{m \cdot n}$  by running Alice as a subroutine.

To the given  $g^m, g^n \in G_1$ , Bob chooses a random number  $t \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ , computes  $g^{mt}$  and  $g^{nt}$ , and then sends  $g^t, g^{mt}$  and  $g^{nt}$  to Alice. With the assumption, Alice can output  $g^{m \cdot n}$ , then Bob can solve CDH problem. □

**Theorem.** Suppose that the V-DDH is intractable. Then our proxy re-encryption scheme is secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attack.

**Proof.** Assume that if the attacker Alice has ability to break the proposed encryption scheme via chosen ciphertext attack with non-negligible probability  $\varepsilon$ , then we can prove that there exists challenger Bob that can solve V-DDH problems with the same probability. In other words, given  $g^a, g^{a \cdot s}, g^{a \cdot k} \in G_1$  and  $T \in G_1$ , Bob can decide if  $T$  is equal to  $g^{s \cdot k}$  with non-negligible probability by running Alice as a subroutine. The challenger Bob interacts with Alice by simulating **Decrypt**, **Re-encrypt** oracles.

Bob initializes the system, chooses random numbers  $w, v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . Let

$$g_1 = g^a \quad g_2 = g^{a \cdot k \cdot w} \quad P_A = g^{a \cdot k} \quad h = g^{a \cdot k \cdot v - 1}$$

Then Bob chooses a random number  $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  and publishes  $P_A = g^{a \cdot k}$  and  $P_B = g^{a \cdot k \cdot \alpha}$ .

### Query phase 1.

- **Decrypt queries.** To every new query  $(c_1, c_2, c_3)$ , Bob computes and outputs  $M = c_1 / e(g_1, c_3^{1/w})$  as the answer.
- **Re-encrypt queries.** To every new query  $(c_1, c_2, c_3)$ , Bob computes

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{c}_1 &= e(g_1, P_A)^s \cdot M \cdot e(c_3^{1/w}, g^{a \cdot \beta - a^*}) \\
&= e(g, g)^{(a^*)^2 k^s s + (a^*)^2 k^s (\beta - 1)} \cdot M \\
&= e(g, g)^{(a^*)^2 k^s s \beta} \cdot M
\end{aligned}$$

and sets  $\tilde{c}_2 = c_2$  and  $\tilde{c}_3 = c_3$ , and then outputs  $(\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \tilde{c}_3)$  as the answer.

Since  $w, \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$  are two random number, Alice can't distinguish the simulated answers from the actual results. Thereby, we say above simulation is perfect. Alice is allowed to perform **Decrypt** and **Re-encrypt** queries several times.

**Challenge phase.** When Alice decides Query phase 1 is over, she chooses two equal length messages  $M_1, M_0$ , and sends them to Bob. Bob chooses a random bit  $e \in \{0, 1\}$ , computes and outputs

$$\begin{aligned}
c_1^* &= e(g_1, T) \cdot M_e = e(g^a, g^{a \cdot k})^{s/a^*} \cdot M_e \\
c_2^* &= (T)^v = (g^{k \cdot s})^v = (g \cdot g^{a \cdot k \cdot v - 1})^{s/a^*} \\
c_3^* &= (T)^w = (g^{k \cdot s})^w = (g^{a \cdot k \cdot w})^{s/a^*}
\end{aligned}$$

as the answer. The **Challenge phase** can be performed only once.

**Query phase 2.** Alice continues to adaptively issue **Decrypt** and **Re-encrypt** queries. Bob responds as in the phase 1. However, the query on  $(c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$  is not permitted.

**Guess.** Finally, Alice outputs a guess  $e' \in \{0,1\}$  for  $e$ . If  $e' = e$ , then Bob decides  $T = g^{s^*k^*}$ , otherwise Bob decides  $T \neq g^{s^*k^*}$ .

Obviously, above simulation is perfect. We say that Alice can break the proxy re-encryption scheme with non-negligible probability  $\varepsilon$ . It means that Alice can output correct  $e$  with probability  $\varepsilon$ . Then Bob can solve the **V-DDH** with same probability  $\varepsilon$  by running Alice as a subroutine. □

## 6 Conclusions

Many proxy re-encryption schemes have been presented in recent few years. However, unidirectional scheme is still an open problem which is attracting much attention. In this paper, we present a unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme used for group communications. In our scheme, the proxy only has ability to divert the ciphertext for group A into ciphertext for group B. To the member in group A/B, he can independently decrypt the ciphertext for the group. Obviously, the performance of encryption in our proposed scheme is similarly to that of paper [6], and it is crucial to the group communication since lots of members are involved in. Decryption operation is independently completed by each group member.

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