

# New Parallelizable Schemes for Message Authentication Using Pseudorandom Functions

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**Abstract.** We consider the construction and analysis of pseudorandom functions (PRF) for message authentication. Earlier work due to Bernstein and Vaudenay show how to reduce the analysis of PRFs to some probability calculations. We revisit this result and use it to prove a general result on constructions which use a PRF with “small” domain to build a PRF with “large” domain. This result is used to analyse new parallelizable schemes for PRF construction.

Two new schemes are described. An earlier parallel construction called the protected counter sum (PCS) had been proposed by Bernstein. PCS uses a keyed compressing function rather than a block cipher. We describe a new construction which works with keyed compressing function and compared to PCS requires lesser number of invocations. The variant where the compression function is replaced by a block cipher leads to an improved version of the well known PMAC algorithm; the improvement consists of removing the requirement of a discrete log computation in the design stage of PMAC.

All our constructions are in the stateless setting, i.e., a setting where the sender and the receiver do not share any state (apart from the common secret key). One of the aspects of our work is the simple and direct approach to the analysis of PRFs. In particular, we avoid the extensive and heavy machinery of game-playing technique which is used in most papers on this topic.

**Keywords:** pseudorandom function, message authentication, protected counter sum, PMAC.

## 1 Introduction

Authentication is one of the two basic tasks of cryptography with encryption being the other. In the symmetric key setting, the sender and the receiver share a common secret key  $K$ . Given a message  $x$ , the sender uses  $K$  to generate a tag, called a message authentication code (MAC), and sends  $(x, \text{tag})$  to the receiver. The receiver uses  $K$  to verify that  $(x, \text{tag})$  is a properly generated message-tag pair. In most cases, verification is simply to regenerate the tag on  $x$  and compare to the received value. The **tag** authenticates the message, or, in other words, it provides an assurance to the receiver that the message  $x$  was indeed sent by the sender. A method for tag generation and verification is called a MAC scheme.

An attack on a MAC scheme amounts to forging a message-tag pair, i.e., to find a valid pair which was not generated by the tag generation algorithm. An attacker (also called an adversary) is said to be successful if he can indeed generate such a pair. It is usually assumed that the adversary can obtain some tags on messages of his choosing. In other words, the adversary is allowed to ask the sender to authenticate some messages (chosen by the adversary) and provide the corresponding tags to the adversary. This is modelled by considering the tag generation algorithm to be instantiated by a secret key (unknown to the adversary) and provided as an oracle to the adversary. The adversary

interacts with this oracle by providing messages and obtains the corresponding tags. At the end of the interaction, the adversary outputs a “new” pair  $(x, \mathbf{tag})$ , i.e., this  $(x, \mathbf{tag})$  does not equal any  $(x_i, \mathbf{tag}_i)$ , where  $\mathbf{tag}_i$  was returned by the oracle on query  $x_i$ . The adversary is successful if  $(x, \mathbf{tag})$  passes the verification of the MAC scheme.

The description of MAC scheme given above does not require the sender and receiver to maintain state. Some constructions, on the other hand, are stateful. This means that for each message, apart from the secret key, the sender and receiver must have the same value of a variable called a nonce. This value itself need not be secret. The requirement on a nonce is that of freshness, i.e., the scheme should ensure that for a fixed key the nonce value is not repeated. In this work, we will not consider stateful MAC schemes.

A block cipher is a basic cryptographic primitive. Formally, it is a map  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ , where  $\mathcal{K}$  is the set of keys and  $\mathcal{M}$  is the set of messages. For every  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ ,  $E_K : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$  is bijective and hence a permutation of  $\mathcal{M}$ . In practical applications,  $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$  for some fixed positive integer  $n$  and similarly,  $\mathcal{K}$  also consists of fixed length binary strings. Well known examples are DES, AES [8]. It is usually assumed that a block cipher provides both privacy and authentication. However, a block cipher by itself can authenticate only  $n$ -bit strings. Applications require the authentication of long and possibly variable length strings. Authentication of a long string requires several invocations of the block cipher. Proper methods of doing this are called modes of operations.

The security model of a block cipher is that of a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) [15]. Informally, this means that an adversary should not be able to distinguish the block cipher from a uniform random permutation of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . This is formalized in the following manner. The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is given an oracle, which takes as input an  $n$ -bit string and also returns an  $n$ -bit string as output.  $\mathcal{A}$  makes several queries to the oracle and finally outputs a bit  $b$ . Suppose a key  $K$  is chosen uniformly at random from  $\mathcal{K}$  and the oracle is instantiated by  $E_K()$  and let  $p_1$  be the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 1 in this case. Similarly, let  $p_0$  be the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 1 when the oracle is instantiated using a uniform random permutation. Then the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in attacking the PRP-property of the block cipher is given by  $|p_1 - p_0|$ . This advantage is parametrized by the number of queries that  $\mathcal{A}$  makes and the runtime of  $\mathcal{A}$ . A stronger notion is that of strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP), where  $\mathcal{A}$  is also provided the inverse oracle. In this work we will not require SPRP.

A related notion is that of a pseudorandom function (PRF). Let  $F$  be a random (but, not necessarily uniform random) function from a set  $S$  to a set  $T$ , where  $T$  is a finite non-empty set. Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary which has an oracle. The oracle takes as input an element of  $S$  and returns as output an element of  $T$ . As before, instantiate the oracle in two ways; either with  $F$  or with a uniform random function from  $S$  to  $T$  and let the corresponding probabilities of  $\mathcal{A}$  outputting 1 be  $p_1$  and  $p_0$ . Then the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in attacking the PRF-property of  $F$  is defined to be  $|p_1 - p_0|$ . As in the case of MAC, the PRF-advantage is also parametrized by the number of queries made and the runtime of the adversary.

PRFs have many applications in cryptography. In this work, we will be concerned with the use of a PRF as a MAC scheme. It is intuitively clear (and also not difficult to prove) that a PRF  $F$  whose domain consists of arbitrary length binary strings and whose range is a short fixed length binary string, can serve as a MAC scheme. Basically, given a message  $x$ , the tag is  $\mathbf{tag} = F(x)$ ; and verification is done by regenerating the tag. The PRF-property of  $F$  is a sufficient condition for it being used as a MAC scheme. There are very efficient known constructions of PRF including one

which has been standardized by NIST [9]. In this work, we will be concerned with constructions of PRFs which are useful for MAC applications.

Many practical modes of operations for MAC schemes using block ciphers are analysed as a PRF. This analysis is done in two steps.

1. First analyse the scheme by replacing the block cipher with a uniform random permutation. This provides a bound on the PRF-advantage of an adversary. The bound on the advantage is information theoretic, i.e., it does not depend on the runtime of the adversary. In other words, the adversary is considered computationally unbounded and is only limited by the number of queries it can make. This forms the difficult part of the entire analysis.
2. Now, consider a block cipher instead of the uniform random permutation. Then, it is easy to show that the advantage obtained in Step 1 degrades by an additive term which is the advantage of the block cipher as a PRP.

Suppose that instead of a block cipher, a keyed compressing function is used to construct the PRF [4]. A similar analysis can be used; analysis is done using a uniform random function instead of the keyed function. In the second step, the advantage is adjusted by an additive term to reflect the strength of the keyed function as a PRF.

In view of this, in our analyses, we will only consider the first step. In other words, we will be analysing modes of operations which uses a uniform random permutation instead of a block cipher. Similarly, constructions using a keyed compressing function will be analysed with a uniform random function instead of the keyed function.

## 1.1 Our Contributions

A useful result for upper bounding PRF-advantage was proved by Bernstein [4] and Vaudenay [24]. Let  $F : S \rightarrow T$  be a random function and  $U$  is a “large” subset of  $T^d$  for some positive integer  $d$ . For distinct  $x_1, \dots, x_d \in S$  and  $(y_1, \dots, y_d) \in U$ ,  $\Pr[F(x_1) = y_1, \dots, F(x_d) = y_d]$  is called a  $d$ -interpolation probability [4]. In [24], it has been proved that if  $F$  has large “interpolation probabilities” on a “large” subset of  $T^d$ , then the advantage of  $F$  as a PRF can be upper bounded for any adversary which makes at most  $d$  queries. The special case where the subset  $U$  equals  $T^d$  has been proved in [4]. We slightly modify this result so as to include a length function  $\lambda$  on  $S$ . In applications, for  $x \in S$ ,  $\lambda(x)$  would be the number of  $n$ -bit blocks into which  $x$  is formatted. This makes it easier to apply the result to concrete settings.

Suppose  $F = \pi \circ F_1^{(\pi)}$ , where  $\pi$  is a uniform random permutation;  $F_1^{(\pi)}$  invokes  $\pi$  a finite number of times and the entire randomness of  $F_1$  arises from the invocations of  $\pi$ . Such random functions  $F$  are typical of many well known constructions of MAC schemes. This class of functions covers the class of DAG based construction considered in [11, 18].

We consider this in the more general setting where  $F = \rho \circ F_1$ , with  $\rho$  being either a uniform random permutation or a uniform random function. Suppose  $x$  and  $x'$  are two inputs to  $F$ ;  $U_1, \dots, U_m$  and  $U'_1, \dots, U'_{m'}$  are the inputs to the invocations of  $\rho$  during the computations of  $Z = F_1(x)$  and  $Z' = F_1(x')$  respectively. We define three events: collision (Coll), i.e.,  $Z = Z'$ ; self-disjoint (Self-Disjoint), i.e.,  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (Z \neq U_i)$ ; and pairwise-disjoint (Pairwise-Disjoint), i.e.,  $(\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (Z' \neq U_i) \wedge (\bigwedge_{i=1}^{m'} (Z \neq U'_i)))$ . We show that if the probabilities of Coll, Self-Disjoint and Pairwise-Disjoint are all small, the PRF-advantage of  $F$  is also small. The result is useful, since it reduces the task of bounding PRF-advantage of  $F$  to that of bounding the probabilities of certain events for  $F_1$ . Previous analysis of individual constructions have used this approach, but, to the best of our knowledge, the result has not been proved in this generality earlier.

NEW CONSTRUCTIONS. Parallel MAC schemes start with protected counter sum (PCS) [4] and PMAC [6, 21]. PMAC [21] uses a tweakable block cipher (TBC) and the design of the TBC requires the solution of a discrete log problem over  $GF(2^n)$ . The designer in [21] provides solutions for  $n = 64$  and  $n = 128$ ; but, for  $n = 256$  this will be difficult. Generalization of the TBC and PMAC has been done [7]. This can avoid the discrete log computation but is then (slightly) slower since it requires more masking operations.

The PCS scheme [4] uses a function  $\rho$  which maps  $\ell$  bits to  $n$  bits, with  $\ell > n$ . It is of the type

$$\rho(\underline{0}, \rho(\underline{1}, P_1) + \rho(\underline{2}, P_2) + \dots + \rho(\underline{m}, P_m))$$

where  $\underline{i}$  is the  $(\ell - n)$ -bit binary representation of  $i$ . The inputs  $\underline{i}$  to  $\rho$  “wastes”  $(\ell - n)$  bits per invocation of  $\rho$ .

We describe VPMAC, which is a new parallel construction; also works with such  $\rho$  and provides an efficiency improvement. PCS requires  $(1 + \text{len}(x)/n)$  invocations of  $\rho$  whereas VPMAC requires  $(1 + \text{len}(x)/\ell)$  invocations of  $\rho$ . Consequently, VPMAC requires approximately a fraction  $n/\ell$  of invocations of  $\rho$  compared to PCS.

In the case where  $\ell = n$  and  $\rho$  is a uniform random permutation, we obtain a new variant of PMAC called iPMAC. This variant does not require discrete log computation but unlike [7] uses the same number of masking operations as in [21]. The PRF-bound that we obtain for iPMAC is similar to that obtained in [17, 19] for PMAC.

The constructions and the bounds that we obtain are given in Table 1. From the table, it is

**Table 1.** Features of constructions analysed in this work. For PMAC and iPMAC a uniform random permutation of  $\{0, 1\}^n$  is to be used, whereas for PCS and VPMAC a uniform random function from  $\{0, 1\}^\ell$  to  $\{0, 1\}^n$  is to be used. The column “bound”, provides the upper bound on the advantage of any adversary which makes at most  $d$  queries and provides at most  $\sigma \geq d$  blocks in all the queries; the column “# invoc” provides the number of invocations of the permutation/function required to process a message  $x$ .

scheme	perm?	bound	# invoc
PMAC [21]	yes	$\frac{5d\sigma - 3.5d^2}{2^n}$ [19]	$1 + \lceil \text{len}(x)/n \rceil$
PCS [4]	no	$\frac{d(d-1)}{2^{n+1}}$ [4]	$1 + \lceil \text{len}(x)/n \rceil$
iPMAC	yes	$\frac{d(d-1) + 4\sigma(1+3d)}{2^{n+1}}$	$1 + \lceil \text{len}(x)/n \rceil$
VPMAC	no	$\frac{d(d-1) + 4\sigma(1+3d)}{2^{n+1}}$	$1 + \lceil \text{len}(x)/\ell \rceil$

clear that VPMAC requires lesser number of invocations compared to PCS. The bound for PCS, on the other hand, is better. This is due to the fact that in PCS, concatenating the counter values ensures that certain collisions do not happen at all, whereas in VPMAC these collisions are only probabilistically ruled out. Having said this, we note that the bound for VPMAC is also good enough and comparable to the bound that have been obtained earlier for PMAC.

Comparing PMAC and iPMAC, we see that the number of invocations for are same and the bounds are similar. The improvement of iPMAC over PMAC is the removal of the design stage discrete log computation.

## 1.2 Previous and Related Works

Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway [1] showed that for CBC-MAC working on equal length strings the advantage of an adversary making  $d$  queries each having  $m$   $n$ -bit blocks is bounded above by  $2m^2d^2/2^n$ . Maurer [16] and Vaudenay [23] gave different proofs for essentially the same bound (upto a constant). Bernstein [5] also gave a different short proof. Petrank and Rackoff [20] proved the same bound (with a different constant) on CBC for messages with the prefix property, i.e., no message is a prefix of another.

The bound was improved by Bellare, Pietrzak and Rogaway [2] who proved a bound of  $\frac{md^2}{2^n}(12 + \frac{8m^3}{2^n})$  for messages with the prefix property, where  $m$  is the maximum number of  $n$ -bit blocks in any query. The dominating term in this expression is  $md^2/2^n$ , which improves upon the previous bound of  $m^2d^2/2^n$ . In fact, the importance of the work in [2] is that it was the first paper to prove a bound of the type  $md^2/2^n$  for some PRF construction.

As mentioned earlier, a parallel MAC scheme called protected counter sum was described by Bernstein [4]. This scheme uses a compressing function as its building block and cannot be replaced by a block cipher. Black and Rogaway [6] and later Rogaway [21] described block cipher based methods for parallel message authentication. The scheme in [6] was called PMAC and the one in [21] was called PMAC1; currently, the scheme in [21] itself is called PMAC. The construction in [21] is based on an efficient construction of tweakable block cipher (TBC) family; the notion of tweakable block ciphers was introduced in [14]. Chakraborty and Sarkar [7] generalised the TBC construction in [21] and hence obtained several variants of PMAC.

The bound on the advantage of PMAC forgery was shown to be  $c\sigma^2/2^n$ , for some constant  $c$ , where  $\sigma$  is the total number of  $n$ -bit blocks provided by the adversary in all its queries. Following the work in [2], this bound was improved by Minematsu and Matsushima [17] to a constant times  $md^2/2^n$ , where  $m$  is the maximum of the lengths of all the queried messages. Nandi and Mandal [19] showed a bound of  $(5d\sigma - 3.5d^2)/2^n$  for PMAC.

**Note.** In this paper, “random” does *not* necessarily mean “uniform random”. When required, we will explicitly mention the uniformity condition. In most papers,  $q$  is used to denote the number of queries made by an adversary. We use  $d$  to denote this quantity. This may be taken to denote the fact that we are counting only *distinct* queries.

## 2 Basic Definitions and Results

Let  $S$  be a finite non-empty set and define  $\chi_d(S)$  to be

$$\chi_d(S) = \{(x_1, \dots, x_d) \in S^d : x_i \neq x_j, 1 \leq i < j \leq d\}. \quad (1)$$

In other words,  $\chi_d(S)$  consists of all  $(x_1, \dots, x_d)$  such that  $x_1, \dots, x_d$  are distinct elements of  $S$ .

Let  $\rho$  be a function from  $S$  to  $T$  and  $d$  be a positive integer. The natural extension of  $\rho$  to a function from  $S^d$  to  $T^d$  obtained by applying  $\rho$  to each component will be denoted by  $\Gamma_{\rho,d}$ , i.e., for any  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_d) \in S^d$ ,

$$\Gamma_{\rho,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \Gamma_{\rho,d}(x_1, \dots, x_d) = (\rho(x_1), \dots, \rho(x_d)). \quad (2)$$

**Note.** The number of elements in a set  $S$  will be denoted by  $\#S$  and the absolute value of a real number  $a$  will be denoted by  $|a|$ . The length of a binary string  $x$  will be denoted by  $\text{len}(x)$ .

**Definition 1.** A set  $U$  is said to be a  $\delta$ -large subset of a set  $S$ , if  $U$  is a subset of  $S$  and  $\#U \geq \delta \times \#S$ .

Let  $S$  be a non-empty set and  $\lambda$  be a function from  $S$  to non-negative integers, i.e., we associate a non-negative integer with each element of  $S$ . In our applications, the set  $S$  will consist of binary strings and for  $x \in S$ ,  $\lambda(x)$  will denote the number of  $n$ -bit blocks (counting partial blocks) into which  $x$  can be divided, for some fixed positive integer  $n$ . For the moment, however, we will not be requiring this interpretation. We will simply call  $\lambda$  to be a length function on  $S$ . Given  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_d) \in S^d$ , we define  $\lambda(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^d \lambda(x_i)$ .

Let  $m \geq d \geq 1$ . The following two functions will be useful later.

$$\left. \begin{aligned} p(m, d) &= m(m-1)(m-2) \cdots (m-(d-1)) \\ r(m, d) &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right) \left(1 - \frac{2}{m}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{d-1}{m}\right). \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (3)$$

**Proposition 1.** Let  $m \geq d \geq 1$ . Then  $\frac{1}{p(m, d)} \geq \frac{1}{m^d}$  and  $\frac{p(m, d)}{m^d} = r(m, d) \geq 1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2m}$ .

**Proof:** The bound on  $p(m, d)$  is obvious and the bound on  $r(m, d)$  follows on noting that  $(1 - a/m)(1 - b/m) \geq (1 - (a+b)/m)$ .  $\square$

**Proposition 2.** For a finite nonempty set  $S$ ,  $\#\chi_d(S) = p(\#S, d) \geq \left(1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2\#S}\right) (\#S)^d$ . Consequently,  $\chi_d(S)$  is a  $\left(1 - \frac{d(d-1)}{2\#S}\right)$ -large subset of  $S$ .

We will be studying functions from a set  $S$  to a finite non-empty set  $T$ . The set itself could be (countably) infinite, but, we will be interested in a finite number of elements of  $S$ . Our main object of study are random functions from  $S$  to  $T$ . Let  $T^S$  denote the set of all functions from  $S$  to  $T$ . By a uniform random function  $\rho$  from  $S$  to  $T$  we will mean an element  $T^S$  chosen uniformly at random. A more convenient way to view  $\rho$  is the following. For any  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$ ,  $\Gamma_{\rho, d}(\mathbf{x})$  is uniformly distributed over  $T^d$ , i.e., in other words, the outputs of  $\rho$  on distinct inputs are independent and uniformly distributed. If  $S = T$ , then we can talk about a permutation  $\pi$  of  $T$ , which is a bijection  $\pi : T \rightarrow T$ . By a uniform random permutation, we will mean a permutation chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations of  $T$ . Again, this means that for any  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$ ,  $\Gamma_{\rho, d}(\mathbf{x})$  is uniformly distributed over  $\chi_d(T)$ . Other examples of random (but not uniform random) functions can be obtained: let  $T$  be a finite field and  $S = T^2$ ; choose a uniform random  $\alpha \in T$  and define  $\rho : S \rightarrow T$  as  $\rho(a_0, a_1) = a_1\alpha + a_0$ . Then  $\rho$  is also a random function but not a uniform random function.

## 2.1 A Useful Inequality

The following result will be useful later.

**Lemma 1.** Let  $m_1, \dots, m_d$  be non-negative integers and  $\sigma = \sum_{i=1}^d m_i$ . Then

$$1. \quad \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \min(m_i, m_j) \leq \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \max(m_i, m_j) \leq d\sigma.$$

$$2. \quad \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} (m_i + m_j) \leq 2d\sigma.$$

**Proof:** Without loss of generality suppose that  $m_1 \geq m_2 \geq \dots \geq m_d$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \max(m_i, m_j) &= \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{j=i+1}^d \max(m_i, m_j) \\ &= (d-1)m_1 + (d-2)m_2 + \dots + m_{d-1} \\ &\leq d \sum_{i=1}^d m_i \\ &= d\sigma. \end{aligned}$$

Point (2) follows on noting that  $m_i + m_j \leq 2 \max(m_i, m_j)$ . □

## 2.2 Interpolation and Collision Probabilities

Let  $S$  and  $T$  be sets and  $F$  be a random function from  $S$  to  $T$ . For  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  and  $\mathbf{y} \in T^d$ , the probability  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] = \Pr[F(x_1) = y_1, \dots, F(x_d) = y_d]$  has been called a  $d$ -interpolation probability in [4].

**Definition 2.** Let  $F : S \rightarrow T$  be a random function and  $\lambda$  be a length function on  $S$ . Let  $U$  be a subset of  $T^d$ . We will say that the function  $F$  is  $(d, \sigma, \delta)$ -interpolating on  $U$  with respect to  $\lambda$  if for all  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  with  $\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \leq \sigma$  and for all  $\mathbf{y} \in U$ ,

$$\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \geq \delta / \#U.$$

Here  $\delta$  could possibly depend on  $d$  and  $\sigma$ .

A collision for a function  $F$  consists of two distinct elements  $x$  and  $x'$  in the domain of  $F$  such that  $F(x) = F(x')$ .

**Definition 3.** Let  $F$  be a random function with domain  $S$ .

1. Let  $x \neq x'$  be elements of  $S$ . The event  $\text{Coll}_F(x, x')$  is defined to be the event  $F(x) = F(x')$ . When  $F$  is clear from the context, then we will omit the subscript  $F$ .
2. For  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$ , we define the collision bound  $\text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x})$  to be

$$\text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \Pr[F(x_i) = F(x_j)].$$

An immediate consequence of this definition is the following result.

**Lemma 2.** Let  $F : S \rightarrow T$  be a random function and  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$ . Then

$$\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) \in \chi_d(T)] \geq 1 - \text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x}). \tag{4}$$

**Proof:** Let  $\mathbf{Y} = (Y_1, \dots, Y_d) = \Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = (F(x_1), \dots, F(x_d))$ . Then

$$\Pr \left[ \bigvee_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} (Y_i = Y_j) \right] \leq \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \Pr [(Y_i = Y_j)] = \text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x})$$

and

$$\Pr[\mathbf{Y} \in \chi_d(T)] = \Pr\left[\bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} (Y_i \neq Y_j)\right] = 1 - \Pr\left[\bigvee_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} (Y_i = Y_j)\right] \geq 1 - \text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x}).$$

□

We define two kinds of collision resistance for  $F$ , depending on whether the collision probability depends on the length function or not.

**Definition 4.** Let  $F$  be a random function with domain  $S$  and  $\lambda$  be a length function on  $S$ .

1.  $F$  is said to be  $\varepsilon$ -CR, if for any two distinct  $x, x' \in S$ ,  $\Pr[\text{Coll}_F(x, x')] \leq \varepsilon$ , for some constant  $\varepsilon$ .
2.  $F$  is said to be  $\varepsilon$ -CR with respect to  $\lambda$ , if for any two distinct  $x, x' \in S$ ,  $\Pr[\text{Coll}_F(x, x')] \leq \varepsilon \times \max(\lambda(x_1), \lambda(x_2))$ , for some constant  $\varepsilon$ .

The following result shows the intuitively clear fact that if collisions are unlikely for a random function  $F$ , then it behaves like an injective function, i.e., with high probability distinct inputs are mapped to distinct outputs.

**Lemma 3.** Let  $d$  and  $\sigma \geq d$  be positive integers; and  $F : S \rightarrow T$  be a random function and  $\lambda$  be a length function on  $S$ . Let  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  and  $\sigma = \lambda(\mathbf{x})$ .

1. If  $F$  is  $\varepsilon$ -CR, then  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) \in \chi_d(T)] \geq \left(1 - \frac{d(d-1)\varepsilon}{2}\right)$ .
2. If  $F$  is  $\varepsilon$ -CR with respect to  $\lambda$ , then  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) \in \chi_d(T)] \geq (1 - \varepsilon d\sigma)$ .

**Proof:** We obtain bounds on  $\text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x})$  and then the results follow from Lemma 2. In the first case, it is easily seen that  $\text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x}) \leq (d(d-1)\varepsilon)/2$ . For the second case, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CB}_F(\mathbf{x}) &\leq \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \Pr[F(x_i) = F(x_j)] \\ &\leq \sum_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} \varepsilon \max(\lambda(x_i), \lambda(x_j)) \\ &\leq \varepsilon d\sigma. \end{aligned}$$

The last inequality follows from Lemma 1. □

It may be noted that having low collision probabilities does not imply high interpolation probabilities. For example, let  $T$  be a finite field and  $F_\alpha$  be a random function mapping  $T^2$  to  $T$  by  $(a_0, a_1) \mapsto a_0 + \alpha a_1$ , where  $\alpha$  is a uniform random element of  $T$ . Then it is easy to show that  $F_\alpha$  has low collision probabilities whereas the value of  $F_\alpha$  on two distinct inputs uniquely determines  $\alpha$  and hence interpolation probabilities for  $d > 2$  are low.

### 2.3 Linear Functions With Low Collision Probabilities

In some of the constructions to be described later, we will be making use of linear functions with certain properties. The purpose of this section is to define these properties and mention known functions which possess these properties.

**Definition 5.** Let  $T = GF(2^n)$  be the finite field having  $2^n$  elements. We say that a function  $\psi : T \rightarrow T$  is a proper masking function if it satisfies the following properties.



1. For any fixed  $\alpha \in T$ ; any non-negative integer  $k$  with  $0 \leq k \leq 2^n - 2$ ; and a uniform random  $\beta \in T$ ;  $\Pr[\psi^k(\beta) = \alpha] = 1/\#T$ .
2. For any fixed  $\alpha \in T$ ; distinct integers  $k_1, k_2$  with  $0 \leq k_1 < k_2 \leq 2^n - 2$ ; and a uniform random  $\beta \in T$ ;  $\Pr[\psi^{k_1}(\beta) \oplus \psi^{k_2}(\beta) = \alpha] = 1/\#T$ .
3. For any fixed  $\alpha \in T$ ; distinct integers  $k_1, k_2$  with  $0 \leq k_1 < k_2 \leq 2^n - 2$ ; and uniform random  $(\beta_1, \beta_2) \in \chi_2(T)$ ,  $\Pr[\psi^{k_1}(\beta_1) \oplus \psi^{k_2}(\beta_2) = \alpha] = 1/(\#T - 1)$ .

There is a very general class of linear functions satisfying Definition 5.

**Proposition 3.** *Let  $T = GF(2^n)$  and  $\psi : T \rightarrow T$  be a linear function whose minimal polynomial  $\tau(u)$  over  $GF(2)$  is of degree  $n$  and is primitive over  $GF(2)$ . Then  $\psi$  satisfies Definition 5.*

**Proof:** Since  $\tau(u)$  is primitive over  $GF(2)$  and is of degree  $n$ , it follows that  $\psi$  is invertible and so for every non-negative integer  $k$ ,  $\psi^k$  is also invertible. The first point follows from this observation.

Define  $\phi_{i,j} : T \rightarrow T$  as  $\phi_{i,j}(\gamma) = \psi^i(\gamma) \oplus \psi^j(\gamma)$ . The second point will follow if we can show that  $\phi_{i,j}$  is a bijection. For this, it is sufficient to show that  $\phi_{i,j}$  is an injection. So, suppose that  $\gamma$  and  $\gamma'$  are distinct elements of  $T$  and let, if possible,  $\phi_{i,j}(\gamma) = \phi_{i,j}(\gamma')$ . Set  $\delta = \gamma \oplus \gamma'$  and note that since  $\gamma \neq \gamma'$ , we have  $\delta$  to be non-zero. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &= \phi_{i,j}(\gamma) \oplus \phi_{i,j}(\gamma') \\
&= \psi^i(\gamma) \oplus \psi^j(\gamma) \oplus \psi^i(\gamma') \oplus \psi^j(\gamma') \\
&= (\psi^i \oplus \psi^j)(\delta).
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

For any non-zero element  $\nu$  of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ , define  $M_\nu(u)$  to be the minimal degree polynomial such that  $(M_\nu(\psi))(\nu) = 0$ . Since  $\tau(u)$  is the minimal polynomial of  $\psi$  it follows that  $\tau(\psi) = 0$ , i.e.,  $\tau(\psi)$  maps all elements of  $T$  to 0. As a result,  $(\tau(\psi))(\nu) = 0$ . By the minimality of  $M_\nu(u)$  it follows that  $M_\nu(u)$  divides  $\tau(u)$ . But,  $\tau(u)$  is irreducible and so  $M_\nu(u) = \tau(u)$ .

Consider the minimal polynomial  $M_\delta(u)$  of  $\delta$ . Since  $\delta$  is non-zero, by the above argument, we have  $M_\delta(u) = \tau(u)$ . Also, from (5), it follows that  $\tau(u) = M_\delta(u)$  divides  $u^i \oplus u^j = u^i(1 \oplus u^{j-i})$  (assuming without loss of generality that  $i < j$ ). Since  $\tau(u)$  is primitive, it does not divide  $u^i$  and so  $\tau(u)|(1 \oplus u^{j-i})$ . It is well known that if  $\tau(u)$  is a primitive polynomial of degree  $n$ , then it does not divide  $1 \oplus u^i$  for any  $i$  with  $0 < i < 2^n - 1$  (see for example [13]). Since  $0 \leq i < j < 2^n - 1$ , we have  $0 < j - i < 2^{n-1}$  and hence,  $\tau(u)|(1 \oplus u^{j-i})$  contradicts the primitivity property of  $\tau(u)$ . This shows that  $\phi_{i,j}$  is a injection.

Consider the map  $\zeta_{k_1, k_2} : T^2 \rightarrow T$  which takes  $(\beta_1, \beta_2)$  to  $\psi^{k_1}(\beta_1) \oplus \psi^{k_2}(\beta_2)$ . We count the number of pre-images of  $\alpha \in T$  for  $\zeta_{k_1, k_2}$ . For every value of  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2 = \psi^{-k_2}(\psi^{k_1}(\beta_1) \oplus \alpha)$  is unique. Hence, there are  $\#T$  pre-images for any  $\alpha$ . Since  $(\beta_1, \beta_2)$  is uniformly distributed over  $\chi_2(T)$ , the result follows.  $\square$

There are known examples of  $\psi$  which satisfy Proposition 3.

1. In this case,  $\psi : \beta \mapsto u\beta \bmod \tau(u)$  and  $\psi^k : \beta \mapsto u^k\beta \bmod \tau(u)$ .
2. Suitable word oriented linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) can also be used. Using word oriented LFSRs provides a faster masking strategy.

The first strategy has been used in various constructions [6, 21, 10, 9], though the required properties has not really being brought out as clearly as given in Definition 5. The second strategy has been suggested in [7, 22]. The security of the constructions to be described later do not depend on the actual implementation of  $\psi$ . We will simply use the properties given by Definition 5.

## 2.4 Adversarial Model

We will consider computationally unbounded adversaries and consequently, without loss of generality, we consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  to be a deterministic algorithm. (This approach has been used earlier [24, 4].) This algorithm interacts with an oracle and outputs a bit. The oracle takes as input an element of a set  $S$  and produces as output an element of a finite non-empty set  $T$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  makes  $d$  queries to the oracle and then produces its output. Without loss of generality, we will make the assumption that the adversary never repeats a query.

Since  $\mathcal{A}$  is deterministic, the behaviour of  $\mathcal{A}$  can be described by a sequence of functions  $\phi_1, \phi_2, \dots, \phi_d$  and another function  $\phi$ . The function  $\phi_1()$  does not take any input and produces  $x_1 \in S$  as output. This is the first input provided by  $\mathcal{A}$  to the oracle and gets back  $y_1$  in return;  $\mathcal{A}$  then computes  $x_2 = \phi_2(y_1)$  as its second input and gets back  $y_2$ ; in the general case,  $\mathcal{A}$  computes  $x_i = \phi_i(y_1, \dots, y_{i-1})$  as its  $i$ -th oracle input and gets back  $y_i$ . Since no query is repeated,  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_d) \in \chi_d(S)$ .

Finally, the function  $\phi$  takes as input  $(y_1, \dots, y_d)$  and produces as output a bit, which is taken to be the output of  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that the functions  $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_d$  and  $\phi$  do not depend on the oracle. We will use the notation  $\phi_1^{\mathcal{A}}, \phi_2^{\mathcal{A}}, \dots, \phi_d^{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $\phi^{\mathcal{A}}$  when we wish to emphasize the association of the functions to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . Denote by  $\Pr[\mathcal{A}^F \rightarrow 1]$  the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 1, when the oracle is  $F$ . The probability is over the randomness of  $F$  since  $\mathcal{A}$  itself is deterministic. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{A}^F \rightarrow 1] &= \sum_{(y_1, \dots, y_d) \in T^d} \Pr[(F(\phi_1^{\mathcal{A}}()) = x_1) \wedge (F(\phi_2^{\mathcal{A}}(y_1)) = x_2) \\ &\quad \wedge \dots \wedge (F(\phi_d^{\mathcal{A}}(y_1, \dots, y_{d-1})) = x_d) \wedge (\phi^{\mathcal{A}}(y_1, \dots, y_d) = 1)] \\ &= \sum_{(y_1, \dots, y_d) \in \text{Acc}(\mathcal{A})} \Pr[(F(\phi_1^{\mathcal{A}}()) = x_1) \wedge (F(\phi_2^{\mathcal{A}}(y_1)) = x_2) \\ &\quad \wedge \dots \wedge (F(\phi_d^{\mathcal{A}}(y_1, \dots, y_{d-1})) = x_d)] \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\text{Acc}(\mathcal{A}) = \{(y_1, \dots, y_d) : \phi^{\mathcal{A}}(y_1, \dots, y_d) = 1\}. \quad (6)$$

The set  $\text{Acc}(\mathcal{A})$  is the set of  $(y_1, \dots, y_d)$  which result in  $\mathcal{A}$  producing 1 as output. This set does not depend on  $F$  and is determined entirely by  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Suppose that the oracle is instantiated twice by two random functions  $F$  and  $G$  both mapping  $S$  to  $T$ . Then the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in distinguishing between  $F$  and  $G$  is defined to be

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},(F,G)} = \Pr[\mathcal{A}^F \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^G \rightarrow 1]. \quad (7)$$

If  $G$  is a uniform random function from  $S$  to  $T$ , then the advantage will be denoted by  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},F}$ .

Let the domain of  $F$  be a non-empty set  $S$  and  $\lambda$  be a length function on  $S$ . For positive integers  $d$  and  $\sigma$ , we define  $\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma)$  to be the maximum advantage of any adversary which makes at most  $d$  distinct queries  $x_1, \dots, x_d$  such that  $\sum_{i=1}^d \lambda(x_i) \leq \sigma$ . The quantity  $\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma)$  is the PRF-advantage of  $F$ . Alternatively, if  $\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \varepsilon$ , then we say that  $F$  is a  $(d, \sigma, \varepsilon)$ -PRF.

Vaudenay proved a useful result (Lemma 22 in [24]) which reduces the task of bounding the advantage of an adaptive adversary to that of a probability calculation. A special version of this result was given by Bernstein (Theorem 3.1 in [4]) with a different proof. Theorem 1 below is a restatement of Vaudenay's result in a form suitable for our requirement. The ideas given in the proof below are from [24, 4]; we provide more details.

**Theorem 1.** Let  $d$  and  $\sigma \geq d$  be positive integers;  $F$  be a random function from a set  $S$  to a set  $T$ ; and  $\lambda$  be a length function on  $S$ . Suppose that  $U$  is a  $(1 - \varepsilon_1)$ -large subset of  $T^d$  and  $F$  is  $(d, \sigma, 1 - \varepsilon_2)$ -interpolating on  $U$  with respect to  $\lambda$ . Then,

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2.$$

**Note.** Here  $\varepsilon_2$  could depend on  $d$  and  $\sigma$  and in our applications later, it indeed does.

**Proof:** For any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , let  $V = \overline{\text{Acc}(\mathcal{A})}$ , where  $\text{Acc}(\mathcal{A})$  is as defined in (6). Then  $V$  is the subset of  $T^d$  such that if  $\mathcal{A}$  receives any  $\mathbf{y} \in V$  as reply to the oracle queries, then  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 0, i.e.,  $V = \{\mathbf{y} \in T^d : \phi^{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{y}) = 0\}$ . As noted earlier,  $V$  is independent of the function  $F$  and depends only on the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . Then for any random function  $F$ ,

$$\sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V} \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] + \sum_{\mathbf{y} \notin V} \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] = 1. \quad (8)$$

Also,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}^F \rightarrow 1] = \sum_{\mathbf{y} \notin V} \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \text{ and similarly, } \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{F^*} \rightarrow 1] = \sum_{\mathbf{y} \notin V} \Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}]. \quad (9)$$

Here  $F^*$  is a uniform random function from  $S$  to  $T$ . So,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} &= \Pr[\mathcal{A}^F \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{F^*} \rightarrow 1] \\ &\stackrel{(9)}{=} \sum_{\mathbf{y} \notin V} \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \sum_{\mathbf{y} \notin V} \Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \\ &\stackrel{(8)}{=} \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V} (\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}]) \\ &= \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \in U} (\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}]) \\ &\quad + \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \notin U} (\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}]). \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

Since  $F$  is  $(d, \sigma, 1 - \varepsilon_2)$ -interpolating on  $U$  with respect to  $\lambda$ , we have that for all  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  with  $\lambda(\mathbf{x}) \leq \sigma$  and for all  $\mathbf{y} \in U$ ,

$$\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \geq (1 - \varepsilon_2)/(\#U) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_2)/(\#T)^d. \quad (11)$$

$F^*$  is a random function from  $S$  to  $T$ , and hence, for all  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  and for all  $\mathbf{y} \in T^d$ ,  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] = 1/(\#T)^d$ . Using this and (11) we have for all  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  and for all  $\mathbf{y} \in U$ ,

$$\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \leq \varepsilon_2 \Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}].$$

Consequently,

$$\sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \in U} (\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}]) \leq \varepsilon_2 \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \in U} \Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \leq \varepsilon_2. \quad (12)$$

By the fact that  $U$  is a  $(1 - \varepsilon_1)$ -large subset of  $T^d$ ,  $(\#T)^d - (\#U) \leq \varepsilon_1(\#T)^d$ , and so,

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \notin U} (\Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] - \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}]) &\leq \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \notin U} \Pr[\Gamma_{F^*,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \\
&= \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in V, \mathbf{y} \notin U} \frac{1}{(\#T)^d} \\
&\leq \frac{(\#T)^d - (\#U)}{(\#T)^d} \\
&\leq \varepsilon_1.
\end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

Substituting (12) and (13) in (10) gives the desired inequality.  $\square$

Informally, Theorem 1 states that if  $F$  has high interpolation probability on a large subset  $U$  of  $T^d$ , then  $F$  is a PRF.

### 3 Domain Extenders

Many constructions use only a block cipher and the output of  $F_1$  is obtained by invoking a block cipher several times. Such functions can be viewed as composition of the type  $F = F_1 \circ F_2$ , where  $F_2$  is a uniform random permutation and  $F_1$  is built using  $F_2$ . When considered as keyed functions,  $F$  will have a single key which is the key for  $F_2$ .

More generally, suppose that we are given a random function  $\rho$  which maps from a set  $U$  to  $T$ . Using  $\rho$ , we wish to construct another random function  $F$  which maps from a set  $S$  to  $T$ , where  $S$  is larger than  $U$ . In other words, we wish to extend the domain from  $U$  to  $S$ . To capture such constructions, we have the following definition.

**Definition 6.** Let  $\rho : U \rightarrow T$  be a random function. A function  $F : S \rightarrow T$  is said to be a domain extender for  $\rho$  if  $F = \rho \circ F_1^{(\rho)}$ , where  $F_1 : S \rightarrow U$  and  $F_1$  satisfies the following conditions.

1. On any input,  $F_1$  invokes  $\rho$  a finite number of times.
2. The only randomness involved in computing  $F_1$  comes from the invocations of  $\rho$ .

When  $\rho$  is clear from the context, we will write  $F_1$  instead of  $F_1^{(\rho)}$ . We associate a canonical length function  $\lambda$  to  $S$ . For every  $x$  in  $S$ ,  $\lambda(x)$  denotes the total number of times  $\rho$  is invoked to compute the final output of  $F$ .

We wish to compute  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = (\mathbf{y})]$ , where  $\mathbf{x} \in \chi_d(S)$  and  $\mathbf{y} \in T^d$ .  $F_1$  and  $\rho$  “interact” and hence we need to account for such possibilities. To this end, we make the following definition.

**Definition 7.** Let  $\rho : U \rightarrow T$  be a random function and  $F = \rho \circ F_1$  be a map from  $S$  to  $T$  satisfying Definition 6. For  $x, x' \in S$  with  $x \neq x'$ , let  $Z = F_1(x)$ ,  $Z' = F_1(x')$ ;  $\lambda(x) = m + 1$ ,  $\lambda(x') = m' + 1$ ; and let  $U_1, \dots, U_m$  and  $U'_1, \dots, U'_m$  be the inputs to the different invocations of  $\rho$  in the computation of  $F_1(x)$  and  $F_1(x')$  respectively.

1. Define  $\text{Self-Disjoint}(x)$  to be the event  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (Z \neq U_i)$ .
2. Define  $\text{Pairwise-Disjoint}(x, x')$  to be the event  $(\bigwedge_{i=1}^m (Z' \neq U_i) \wedge \bigwedge_{j=1}^{m'} (Z \neq U'_j))$ .

**Definition 8.** Continuing with Definition 7, we say that  $F_1$  is  $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2)$ -disjoint with respect to  $\lambda$ , if for all pairs of distinct  $x, x' \in S$ ,

$$\Pr[\overline{\text{Self-Disjoint}(x)}] \leq \varepsilon_1(\lambda(x)) \text{ and } \Pr[\overline{\text{Pairwise-Disjoint}(x, x')}] \leq \varepsilon_2(\lambda(x) + \lambda(x')).$$

Note that the notion of disjointness is defined for  $F_1$  rather than for  $F$ .

We now prove the main result on domain extenders. In the result below, we consider  $\rho$  to be either a uniform random function or a uniform random permutation. The more general case is when we have lower bound on the interpolation probabilities of  $\rho$ . A result of this type can be proved as in the result below; but, such a result is of less practical interest, since, in practice,  $\rho$  will mostly be a block cipher which is modelled as a uniform random permutation.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $\rho : U \rightarrow T$  be a random function and  $F = \rho \circ F_1$  be a map from  $S$  to  $T$  satisfying Definition 6. Suppose that  $F_1$  is  $\varepsilon$ -CR with respect to the length function  $\lambda$  and also  $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2)$ -disjoint with respect to  $\lambda$ . Then for positive integers  $d$  and  $\sigma \geq d$  the following holds.*

1. *If  $\rho$  is a uniform random function, then*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2).$$

2. *If  $U = T$  and  $\rho$  is a uniform random permutation, then*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2) + \frac{d(d-1)}{2\#T}.$$

**Proof:** Let  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_d) \in \chi_d(S)$  with  $m_i + 1 = \lambda(x_i)$ . Then  $\sigma = d + \sum_{i=1}^d m_i$ . Set  $Z_i = F_1(x_i)$  and let  $U_{i,1}, \dots, U_{i,m_i}$  be the inputs to  $\rho$  in the computation of  $Z_i$ . Let  $\text{Distinct}(\mathbf{x})$  and  $\text{Disjoint}(\mathbf{x})$  be the events

$$\text{Distinct}(\mathbf{x}) = \bigwedge_{1 \leq i < j \leq d} (Z_i \neq Z_j) \quad (14)$$

and

$$\text{Disjoint}(\mathbf{x}) = \bigwedge_{i=1}^d \bigwedge_{j=1}^d \bigwedge_{k=1}^{m_j} (Z_i \neq U_{j,k}). \quad (15)$$

The event  $\text{Distinct}(\mathbf{x})$  is the event  $\Gamma_{F_1, d}(\mathbf{x}) \in \chi_d(U)$ . Using the fact that  $F_1$  is  $\varepsilon$ -CR with respect to  $\lambda$  and Lemma 3, we have

$$\Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Distinct}(\mathbf{x})} \right] \leq d\sigma\varepsilon. \quad (16)$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Disjoint}(\mathbf{x})} \right] &= \Pr \left[ \bigvee_{i=1}^d \bigvee_{j=1}^d \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_j} (Z_i = U_{j,k}) \right] \\ &= \Pr \left[ \bigvee_{i=1}^d \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_i} (Z_i = U_{i,k}) \right] + \Pr \left[ \bigvee_{i=1}^d \bigvee_{\substack{j=1, k=1 \\ j \neq i}}^d \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_j} (Z_i = U_{j,k}) \right] \\ &\leq \sum_{i=1}^d \Pr \left[ \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_i} (Z_i = U_{i,k}) \right] + \Pr \left[ \bigvee_{i=1}^d \bigvee_{j=i+1}^d \left( \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_j} (Z_i = U_{j,k}) \vee \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_i} (Z_j = U_{i,k}) \right) \right] \\ &\leq \sum_{i=1}^d \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Self-Disjoint}(x_i)} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{j=i+1}^d \Pr \left[ \left( \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_j} (Z_i = U_{j,k}) \vee \bigvee_{k=1}^{m_i} (Z_j = U_{i,k}) \right) \right] \\ &\leq \sum_{i=1}^d \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Self-Disjoint}(x_i)} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{j=i+1}^d \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Pairwise-Disjoint}(x_i, x_j)} \right]. \quad (17) \end{aligned}$$

Since  $F_1$  is  $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2)$ -disjoint with respect to  $\lambda$ , we have

$$\Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Self-Disjoint}(x_i)} \right] \leq \varepsilon_1 \lambda(x_i) \text{ and } \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Pairwise-Disjoint}(x_i, x_j)} \right] \leq \varepsilon_2 (\lambda(x_i) + \lambda(x_j)).$$

Using (17), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Disjoint}(\mathbf{x})} \right] &\leq \sum_{i=1}^d \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Self-Disjoint}(x_i)} \right] + \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{j=i+1}^d \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Pairwise-Disjoint}(x_i, x_j)} \right] \\ &\leq \varepsilon_1 \sum_{i=1}^d \lambda(x_i) + \varepsilon_2 \sum_{i=1}^d \sum_{j=i+1}^d (\lambda(x_i) + \lambda(x_j)) \\ &\leq \varepsilon_1 \sigma + 2\varepsilon_2 d \sigma. \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

Lemma 1 is used in the last line. Combining (16) and (18) we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Distinct} \wedge \text{Disjoint}] &= 1 - \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Distinct} \vee \text{Disjoint}} \right] \\ &\geq 1 - \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Distinct}} \right] - \Pr \left[ \overline{\text{Disjoint}} \right] \\ &\geq 1 - \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2). \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

Let  $\mathbf{y} \in T^d$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] &\geq \Pr[(\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}) \wedge (\text{Distinct} \wedge \text{Disjoint})] \\ &= \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} | (\text{Distinct} \wedge \text{Disjoint})] \times \Pr[\text{Distinct} \wedge \text{Disjoint}] \\ &\geq (1 - \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2)) \times \Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} | (\text{Distinct} \wedge \text{Disjoint})]. \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

The event “Distinct  $\wedge$  Disjoint” means that the random variables  $Z_1, \dots, Z_d$  have distinct values and they are different from any previous inputs to  $\rho$  obtained during the computations of  $Z_i = F_1(x_i)$ . In other words, the event “Distinct  $\wedge$  Disjoint” ensures that the set  $\{Z_1, \dots, Z_d\}$  is a set of  $d$  “new” values in the domain of  $\rho$ . If  $\rho$  is a uniform random function, then  $\Gamma_{\rho,d}(Z_1, \dots, Z_d)$  is uniformly distributed over  $T^d$ , while, if  $\rho$  is a uniform random permutation, then  $\Gamma_{\rho,d}(Z_1, \dots, Z_d)$  is uniformly distributed over  $\chi_d(T)$ . We consider these two cases separately.

1. If  $\rho$  is a uniform random function, then for any  $\mathbf{y} \in T^d$ ,  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} | (\text{Disjoint} \wedge \text{Distinct})] = 1/(\#T)^d$  and so,

$$\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \geq \frac{1}{\#T^d} \times (1 - \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2)).$$

This lower bounds the interpolation probabilities of  $F$ . Now, applying Theorem 1, we have

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2).$$

2. If  $\rho$  is a uniform random permutation, then for any  $\mathbf{y} \in \chi_d(T)$ ,  $\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y} | (\text{Disjoint} \wedge \text{Distinct})] = 1/p(\#T, d) \geq 1/(\#T)^d$  and so,

$$\Pr[\Gamma_{F,d}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \geq \frac{1}{p(\#T, d)} \times (1 - \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2)).$$

So,  $F$  is  $(d, \sigma, (1 - \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2)))$ -interpolating on  $\chi_d(T)$ . Again, applying Theorem 1, we have

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \sigma(d\varepsilon + \varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2) + \frac{d(d-1)}{2\#T}.$$

This completes the proof of the result.  $\square$

A simpler variant of Theorem 2 is given by the following result. The difference to Theorem 2 is the condition on collision resistance. In this case, collision resistance does not depend on the length function  $\lambda$ .

**Theorem 3.** *Let  $\pi : T \rightarrow T$  be a uniform random permutation and  $F = \pi \circ F_1$  be a map from  $S$  to  $T$  satisfying Definition 6. Suppose that  $F_1$  is  $\varepsilon$ -CR and it is  $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2)$ -disjoint with respect to  $\lambda$ . Then for positive integers  $d$  and  $\sigma \geq d$*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F(d, \sigma) \leq \frac{d(d-1)\varepsilon}{2} + \sigma(\varepsilon_1 + 2d\varepsilon_2) + \frac{d(d-1)}{2\#T}.$$

The advantage of Theorems 2 and 3 is that they reduce the problem of upper bounding the PRF-advantage for  $F$  to computing certain probabilities. These can be done using purely combinatorial/probabilistic methods. Previous works have identified similar tasks for specific functions, e.g., CBC-MAC. To the best of our knowledge, the generality with which we have worked has not been done earlier.

## 4 New Parallelizable Constructions

The basic idea of parallelizing is to apply the permutation  $\pi$  separately on (masked) blocks and then XOR the outputs together and apply  $\pi$  on this XOR. Though simple in principle, this idea needs to be worked out carefully. PCS [4] and PMAC [6, 21] are based on this principle. PCS uses a compressing function, whereas PMAC uses a permutation. We describe two constructions: iPMAC and VPMAC using a permutation and a compressing function respectively. The construction iPMAC improves upon PMAC by removing a design stage discrete log computation requirement while VPMAC improves upon PCS by reducing the number of invocations of the compressing function. As mentioned earlier, a suitable compressing function which can be used in practical constructions is surf [3] and has been suggested in [4].

In Figure 1, we define a formatting function which takes as input a binary string  $x$  of length  $\text{len}(x) \geq 0$ ; a positive integer  $l$ ; and returns as output  $P_1, \dots, P_m$  for some  $m \geq 1$  and where each  $P_i$  is an  $l$ -bit string. Further, the function  $\text{Format}(x, l)$  also defines an integer  $r$  with  $1 \leq r \leq l$ . If  $r = l$ , then this denotes that  $l$  divides  $\text{len}(x)$ , and if  $1 \leq r < l$ , then this denotes that  $l$  does not divide  $\text{len}(x)$  and that the last block  $P_m$  has been padded to length  $l$ .

$\text{Format}(x, l)$ .

1. Write  $\text{len}(x) = (m-1)l + r$ , where  $1 \leq r \leq l$ .
2. If  $r < l$ , then set  $\text{pad}(x) = x \parallel 10^{l-r-1}$ .
3. Else set  $\text{pad}(x) = x$ .
4. Format  $\text{pad}(x)$  into  $m$  blocks  $P_1, \dots, P_m$  each of length  $l$ .

Return  $(P_1, \dots, P_m)$ .

**Fig. 1.** Padding and formatting of arbitrary length strings. This also defines the values of  $m$  and  $r$  from  $\text{len}(x)$  and  $l$ .

Fix positive integers  $\ell$  and  $n$  with  $\ell \geq n$  and let  $U = \{0, 1\}^\ell$  and  $T = \{0, 1\}^n$ . Let  $\rho : U \rightarrow T$  be a uniform random function. The natural additive operation on equal length binary strings is

$\oplus$ . If  $x$  and  $y$  are unequal length binary strings, we define  $x \oplus y$  to be the binary string obtained by XORing the shorter string into the least significant bits of the longer string. By  $\text{bot}(P)$  we will mean the  $n$  least significant bits of  $P$ ; by  $\text{top}(P)$  we will mean the  $(\ell - n)$  most significant bits of  $P$ .


Let  $\text{fStr}$  be a fixed element of  $U$ , i.e., a fixed  $\ell$ -bit string and  $R = \rho(\text{fStr}) \in T$ . Let  $\psi$  be a function satisfying Definition 5. Given any binary string  $x$ , let  $(P_1, \dots, P_m)$  be the output of  $\text{Format}(x, \ell)$  given in Figure 1 which also defines the values of  $m$  and  $r$ . Define VPMAC to be a function

$$\text{VPMAC} : x \mapsto C_m$$

where  $C_i = \rho(D_i)$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m$  and

$$D_i = \begin{cases} \psi^i(R) \oplus P_i & 1 \leq i \leq m-1; \\ (C_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C_{m-1}) \oplus P_m & i = m, r = n; \\ (C_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C_{m-1} \oplus \psi^m(R)) \oplus P_m & i = m, r < n. \end{cases} \quad (21)$$

Figure 2 shows how a 4-block message is processed using PCS and VPMAC. The message lengths, however, are different. PCS processes  $4n$  bits, while VPMAC processes  $4\ell$  bits. In general, PCS requires  $1 + \lceil \text{len}(x)/n \rceil$  invocations of  $\rho$  to process a message  $x$ , while VPMAC requires  $1 + \lceil \text{len}(x)/\ell \rceil$  invocations of  $\rho$ . Thus, VPMAC requires approximately a fraction  $n/\ell$  of the invocations of PCS.



**Fig. 2.** Tag generation using PCS and VPMAC. In PCS,  $\text{esum} = T_1 \oplus T_2 \oplus T_3 \oplus T_4$ . In VPMAC,  $\Delta_i = \psi^i(R)$ ;  $\Lambda = 0^n$  if the last block is full and  $\Lambda = \psi^4(R)$  if the last block has been padded; and  $\text{esum} = C_1 \oplus C_2 \oplus C_3$ .

Define VPHASH to be the function which maps  $x$  to  $D_m$ . Then  $\text{VPMAC} = \rho \circ \text{VPHASH}$  and VPMAC is a domain extender for  $\rho$  in the sense of Definition 6.

**Lemma 4.** *Let  $x$  and  $x'$  be distinct messages which are mapped to  $D_m$  and  $D'_m$ , under VPHASH. Then  $\Pr[D_m = D'_m] \leq (m + m')/\#T$ .*

**Proof:** Assume without loss of generality that  $m \geq m'$ . There are four cases depending on whether  $r$  and  $r'$  are less than  $\ell$  or equal to  $\ell$ .

**Case  $r = \ell, r' = \ell$ :** Since  $x \neq x'$ , let  $j$  be the first index such that either  $(1 \leq j \leq m'$  and  $P_j \neq P'_j)$  or  $(j = m' + 1$  and  $P_i = P'_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m')$ .



If  $j = m = m'$ , then  $P_i = P'_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m' - 1$  and so  $C_i = C'_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m - 1$ . Then  $D_m \oplus D'_{m'} = ((C_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C_m) \oplus P_m) \oplus ((C'_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C'_m) \oplus P'_m) = P_m \oplus P'_m$  and so  $\Pr[D_m = D'_{m'}] = 0$ .

If  $j = m = m' + 1$ , then  $P_i = P'_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m' - 1$  and so  $C_i = C'_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m - 1$ . So,

$$\begin{aligned} D_m \oplus D'_{m'} &= ((C_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C_{m-1}) \oplus P_m) \oplus ((C'_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C'_{m'-1}) \oplus P'_{m'}) \\ &= C_{m-1} \oplus (P_m \oplus P'_{m'}) \end{aligned}$$

$C_{m-1}$  is the output of the uniform random function  $\rho$  on  $D_{m-1} = \psi^{m-1}(R) \oplus P_{m-1}$ , where  $R = \rho(\text{fStr})$ . The probability that  $\psi^{m-1}(R) \oplus P_{m-1}$  equals  $\text{fStr}$  is  $1/\#T$ . Using this a simple calculation shows the probability that  $C_{m-1}$  equals  $\text{bot}(P_m \oplus P'_{m'})$  is at most  $2/\#T$ .

So, we can assume that either  $(m > m' + 1, j = m' + 1)$  or  $(1 \leq j \leq m'$  and  $m > m')$ . In both cases, we have  $D_j = \psi^j(R) \oplus P_j$ . We claim that with high probability  $D_j$  is different from  $D_1, \dots, D_{j-1}, D_{j+1}, \dots, D_{m-1}$  and  $D'_1, \dots, D'_{m'-1}$ . To see this first note that  $D_i = \psi^i(R) \oplus P_i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq m - 1$ ; and  $D'_k = \psi^k(R) \oplus P'_k$ ,  $1 \leq k \leq m' - 1$ . Let  $E$  be the event

$$E : \left( \bigwedge_{\substack{i=1, \\ i \neq j}}^{m-1} (D_j \neq D_i) \right) \wedge \left( \bigwedge_{i=1}^{m'-1} (D_j \neq D'_i) \right).$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[E] &= 1 - \Pr[\overline{E}] \\ &\geq 1 - \sum_{\substack{i=1, \\ i \neq j}}^{m-1} \Pr[D_j = D_i] - \sum_{i=1}^{m'-1} \Pr[D_j = D'_i]. \end{aligned}$$

If  $j < m'$ , then since  $P_j \neq P'_j$ ,  $D_j = \psi^j(R) \oplus P_j \neq \psi^j(R) \oplus P'_j = D'_j$ . In all other cases, the individual probabilities are  $1/\#T$  by properties of  $\psi$  given in Definition 5. So,

$$\Pr[E] \geq \left( 1 - \frac{m + m' - 3}{\#T} \right).$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[D_m \neq D'_{m'}] &\geq \Pr[(D_m \neq D'_{m'}) \wedge E] \\ &= \Pr[(D_m \neq D'_{m'}) | E] \Pr[E] \\ &\geq \Pr[(D_m \neq D'_{m'}) | E] \times \left( 1 - \frac{m + m' - 3}{\#T} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Consider the event  $((D_m \neq D'_{m'}) | E)$ . Since  $\rho$  is a uniform random function from  $U$  to  $T$ , and  $D_j$  is distinct from all other  $D_i$ s and  $D'_1, \dots, D'_{m'-1}$ , we have that  $C_j$  is independent of all other  $C_i$ s and  $C'_1, \dots, C'_{m'-1}$ . Let

$$Q = (C_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C_{j-1} \oplus C_{j+1} \oplus \dots \oplus C_{m-1}) \oplus (C'_1 \oplus \dots \oplus C'_{m'-1}).$$

Then  $C_j$  is independent of  $Q$ .

Since  $r = r' = n$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} D_m &= (C_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C_{m-1}) \oplus P_m \\ D'_{m'} &= (C'_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C'_{m'-1}) \oplus P'_{m'}. \end{aligned}$$

So,  $D_m \oplus D'_{m'} = 0$  implies that  $C_j \oplus Q = \text{bot}(P_m \oplus P'_{m'})$ . If  $D_j \neq \text{fStr}$ , then  $C_j$  is uniformly distributed over  $T$ . Using this, we have  $\Pr[D_m \neq D'_{m'} | E] \geq 1 - 2/\#T$ .

From this we have,  $\Pr[D_m \neq D'_{m'}] \geq (1 - (m + m' - 1)/\#T)$  and so  $\Pr[D_m = D'_{m'}] \leq (m + m')/\#T$ .

**Case  $r < n, r' < n$ :** In this case, we have

$$\begin{aligned} D_m &= (C_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C_{m-1} \oplus \psi^m(R)) \oplus P_m \\ D'_{m'} &= (C'_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C'_{m'-1} \oplus \psi^{m'}(R)) \oplus P'_{m'}. \end{aligned}$$

If  $m = m'$ , then the terms involving  $\psi$  cancel out and the analysis is exactly the same as that for the case  $r = r' = n$ . So suppose  $m > m'$ . Let  $E$  be the event that  $\text{fStr}$  is not equal to any of  $D_1, \dots, D_{m-1}$  or  $D'_1, \dots, D'_{m'-1}$ . The probability of  $E$  is at least  $1 - (m + m' - 2)/\#T$ . In a manner similar to the previous case, it can be shown  $\Pr[D_m \neq D'_{m'} | E] \geq 1 - 1/\#T$  so that we again have,  $\Pr[D_m \neq D'_{m'}] \leq (m + m')/\#T$ .

**Cases ( $r = n, r' < n$ ) and ( $r < n, r' = n$ ):** Both the cases are similar and we consider only  $r = n$  and  $r' < n$ . In this case, we have

$$\begin{aligned} D_m &= (C_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C_{m-1} \oplus \psi^m(R)) \oplus P_m \\ D'_{m'} &= (C'_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C'_{m'-1}) \oplus P'_{m'}. \end{aligned}$$

It is possible that  $m = m'$  and  $P_i = P'_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m$  even though  $x \neq x'$ . This happens when  $x = \text{pad}(x') \neq x'$ . Then,  $\text{bot}(D_m \oplus D'_{m'}) = \psi^m(R)$  which is equal to 0 with probability  $1/\#T$ . If  $m > m'$  or  $P_i \neq P'_i$  for some  $1 \leq i \leq m'$ , then an analysis similar to the previous case shows the desired result.  $\square$

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $x$  and  $x'$  be two distinct messages having  $m$  and  $m'$  blocks respectively. Then*

1.  $\Pr[D'_{m'} = D_i] \leq 2/\#T$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m - 1$ ;
2.  $\Pr[D_m = D_i] \leq 2/\#T$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m - 1$ .

Consequently,  $\Pr[\overline{\text{Pairwise-Disjoint}(x, x')}] \leq (m + m')/\#T$  and  $\Pr[\overline{\text{Self-Disjoint}(x)}] \leq 2m/\#T$ .

Combining Lemmas 4 and 5 with Theorem 2, we have the following result.

**Theorem 4.** *Let  $d$  and  $\sigma \geq d$  be positive integers. Then*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{VPMAC}}(d, \sigma) \leq \frac{d(d-1) + 4\sigma(1+3d)}{2\#T}.$$

## 4.1 iPMAC


Suppose that in the construction for VPMAC we have  $\ell = n$  and  $\rho = \pi$  is a uniform random permutation from  $T$  to  $T$ . Then the construction that we get works with block ciphers. In more details, we define iPMAC to be a function

$$\text{iPMAC} : x \mapsto C_m$$

where  $C_i = \pi(D_i)$  for  $1 \leq i \leq m$  and

$$D_i = \begin{cases} P_i \oplus \psi^i(R) & 1 \leq i \leq m-1; \\ C_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C_{m-1} \oplus P_m & i = m, r = n; \\ C_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus C_{m-1} \oplus P_m \oplus \psi^m(R) & i = m, r < n. \end{cases} \quad (22)$$

Processing of a 4-block message using iPMAC is shown in Figure 3. The same figure also describes the processing of a 4-block message using PMAC. The difference is in the interpretation of  $\Lambda$ .



**Fig. 3.** Tag generation using iPMAC Here  $\Delta_i = \psi^i(R)$ ;  $\Lambda = 0^n$  if the last block is full and  $\Lambda = \psi^4(R)$  if the last block has been padded; and  $\text{esum} = C_1 \oplus C_2 \oplus C_3$ .

iPMAC. If the last block is full, then  $\Lambda = 0^n$  and if the last block is partial (and padded), then  $\Lambda = \psi^m(R)$ . (See Section 2.3 for more details about this map.)

PMAC. If the last block is full, then  $\Lambda = u^m R \bmod \tau(u)$  and if the last block is partial (and padded), then  $\Lambda = (u \oplus 1)u^m R \bmod \tau(u)$ . For this scheme to be secure, the discrete log of  $(u \oplus 1)$  to the base  $u$  has to be “large”. The actual value depends on  $\tau(x)$  and for specific values of  $\tau(x)$  with  $n = 64$  and  $n = 128$ , the values are given in [21]. Changing  $\tau(x)$  will require a re-computation of the discrete log to ensure that it is “large”; also for  $n = 256$ , it will be difficult to compute the discrete log. In contrast, iPMAC entirely avoids this discrete log computation.

The security of iPMAC is obtained in a manner similar to that of VPMAC. In this case, we have to be careful that  $\pi$  is a permutation rather than a function. The analysis, however, shows that the bound given in Theorem 4 also holds for iPMAC.

## 5 Conclusion

We have analysed pseudorandom functions for use in symmetric key message authentication. Starting from a useful result by Vaudenay [24] and Bernstein [4], we prove a general result on bounding the advantage of a PRF built using a uniform random permutation or a uniform random function.

A new parallelizable construction VPMAC has been described and analysed using this general result. VPMAC uses a keyed compressing function and reduces the number of invocations of the compressing function compared to PCS [4]. The variant where the compressing function is replaced by a block cipher is called iPMAC. This improves upon PMAC [21] by removing the requirement of a design stage discrete log computation.

An important feature of our work is the avoidance of the heavy machinery of game playing technique. The entire analysis is reduced to simple probability calculations which are done using elementary techniques.

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