

Security Analysis of Aggregate signature and Batch verification signature schemes

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Abstract. An identity based signature scheme allows any pair of users to communicate securely and to verify each others signatures without exchanging public key certificates. An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature scheme which supports aggregation of signatures. Given n signatures on n distinct messages signed by n distinct users it is possible to aggregate all these signatures into a single signature. This signature will convince the verifier that the n users signed the corresponding n messages. Batch verification is a method to verify multiple signatures at once. Aggregate signature is useful in reducing both communication and computation cost. In this paper, we describe the breaks possible in some of the aggregate signature schemes and batch verification scheme.

Keywords: Identity based signature, aggregate signatures, batch verification, cryptanalysis.

1 Introduction

The concept of an identity based cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [9]. The distinguishing characteristic of identity-based cryptography is the ability to use identity of the user as the public key of the user. The corresponding private key can only be derived by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) which uses a master secret key to generate them. An identity-based cryptosystem removes the need for users to look up and verify the public key before verifying a signature on a message. It avoids the overhead of storage of certificates of public keys and also the public key of the user can easily be derived from the identity which uniquely defines the user. Identity based cryptography provides a more convenient alternative to conventional public key infrastructure.

Identity based signature scheme are designed in such a way that a user can authenticate a message by producing a unique digital signature on the message using his private key and any other user in the system can verify the authenticity of the signature by just knowing the identity of the user who signed

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the message. Various identity based signature construct have been proposed [2] [14] [7]. The major constraints in the field of cryptography are the communication and computation complexity. Reducing both the complexities as much as possible is done to gain maximum advantage. There are many variations of signature schemes such as proxy, group, ring etc. signature schemes. One such variation is aggregate signature.

An important factor to be considered for cryptographic schemes to be practically applicable is efficiency. Efficiency includes both communication and computation efficiency. The growth in bandwidth of communication networks, seems to have more constraints, which increases the importance of communication efficiency. In banking services or electronic commerce one server may have to verify many signatures simultaneously. In order to enhance the efficiency of verification and reduce the communication over-head we use aggregate signatures. Aggregate signatures was first introduced by Boneh et al. [1] and a practical realization was also proposed by them.

Aggregation can be used to reduce the certificate chains in PKI settings. A desirable property of aggregate signature scheme is that an adversary cannot remove a single signature from the collection of signatures without detection. Two kinds of aggregation schemes exist. In the first type the signatures can be aggregated in any order and aggregation can be done by any user (signer or a third party) in the system. The second type is called sequential aggregation, where each user aggregates his signature to the previous aggregated signature. Sequential aggregation is a weaker model compared to the former model. Sequential aggregation is comparatively a weaker model but has many real life applications in corporate scenarios.

Since the aggregate signature was presented by Boneh et al., several aggregate signature schemes have been proposed so far [5] [3] [6] [13] [12] [4]. Gentry and Ramzan in [5] presented the most efficient identity based aggregate scheme which requires only three pairing computations. In this scheme all the signers participating in aggregation have to agree upon a common randomness value which makes it unsuitable for most real life scenarios. Wen et al. in [11] proposed an aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing operation, but this signature scheme has a forgeability attack which we have pointed in this paper. Wang Zhu et al. in [10] proposed an practical aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing operation but was able to achieve only partial aggregation. A valid user of the system will be able to forge a signature on any message by any user by just seeing a single signature on some message by the corresponding user. We describe the possible attack in this paper.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the preliminaries and the computational assumptions which we take into considerations. In section 3 we discuss the generic model for aggregate signature. In section 4 we discuss the generic security model for aggregate signatures. In section 5 we review the Wang Zhu scheme [10] and propose an attack on unforgeability of the scheme in section 6. In section 7 we review the Wen et al. scheme [11] and show the attack possible in the scheme in section 8. In Section 9, we review Seung et al.'s [8] scheme and we show the forgeability attack on this scheme in section 10. In section 11 and 12 we discuss Shi Cui et al.'s [4] and we show how universal forgery is possible in their batch verification construct. Then in section 13 we post the conclusions and the current open problems in this area.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Bilinear Pairing

Let \mathbb{G} be an additive cyclic group generated by P , with prime order q , and \mathbb{G}_T be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q . Let \hat{e} be a pairing defined as $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. It satisfies the following properties.

- **Bilinearity** Let $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ then $\hat{e}(aP, bQ) = \hat{e}(P, Q)^{ab}$.
- **Non Denegrate** Let $P \in \mathbb{G}$ then $\hat{e}(P, P) \neq 1$.
- **Easily Computable** Let $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}$ then $\hat{e}(P, Q)$ must be easily and efficiently computable.

2.2 Computational Assumptions

In this section, we review the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps that are relevant to the protocol we discuss.

Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP)

Given $(P, aP, bP, cP) \in \mathbb{G}^4$ for unknown $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the *BDH* problem in \mathbb{G} is to compute $\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$.

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathbb{A} in solving the BDH problem in \mathbb{G} is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathbb{A}}^{BDH} = Pr[\mathbb{A}(P, aP, bP, cP) = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} | a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

The BDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathbb{A} , the advantage $Adv_{\mathbb{A}}^{BDH}$ is negligibly small.

Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDHP)

Given $(P, aP, bP, cP, \alpha) \in \mathbb{G}^4 \times \mathbb{G}_T$ for unknown $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the *DBDH* problem in \mathbb{G} is to decide $\alpha = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$.

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathbb{A} in solving the DBDH problem in \mathbb{G} is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathbb{A}}^{DBDH} = |Pr[\mathbb{A}(P, aP, bP, cP, \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}) = 1] - Pr[\mathbb{A}(P, aP, bP, cP, \alpha) = 1]|$$

The DBDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathbb{A} , the advantage $Adv_{\mathbb{A}}^{DBDH}$ is negligibly small.

Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)

Given $(P, aP, bP) \in \mathbb{G}^3$ for unknown $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the *CDHP* problem in \mathbb{G} is to compute abP .

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the CDH problem in \mathbb{G} is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathbb{A}}^{CDH} = Pr[\mathbb{A}(P, aP, bP) = abP | a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A , the advantage $Adv_{\mathbb{A}}^{CDH}$ is negligibly small.

3 Generic Model

An identity based aggregate signature scheme (IBAS) consists of five algorithms as follows.

- **Setup** : The private key generator (PKG) provides the security parameter λ as the input to this algorithm and generates the system parameters $params$ and the master private key Msk . PKG publishes the $params$ and keeps the Msk secret.
- **KeyGen** : The user U_i provides his identity ID_i to PKG. The PKG runs this algorithm with identity ID_i , $params$ and Msk as the input and PKG outputs the private key D_i to user U_i through a secure channel.
- **Signing** : For generating a signature on a message m_i , the user U_i provides his ID_i , his private key D_i , $params$ and message m_i as input to this algorithm. This algorithm generates a valid signature σ_i on message m_i by user U_i .
- **Verify** : This algorithm on input of a signature σ on message m by user with identity ID checks whether σ is a valid signature on message m by ID . If true it outputs “Valid”, else it outputs “Invalid”.
- **Aggregate** : On receiving various signatures $(\sigma_i)_{i=1 to n}$ from different users $(U_i)_{i=1 to n}$, any third party or one of the signers can run this algorithm and generate the aggregate signature σ_{agg} and the message, identity pairs $(m_i, ID_i)_{i=1 to n}$.
- **Aggregate Verification** : This algorithm on input of an aggregate signature σ_{agg} , the list of message, identity pairs $(m_i, ID_i)_{i=1 to n}$ and the $params$ checks whether σ_{agg} is a valid aggregate signature on all $\{m_i\}_{i=1 to n}$ by the corresponding user U_i with identity ID_i . If true it outputs “Valid”, else output “Invalid”.

4 Security Model

4.1 Unforgeability

An IBAS scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive-chosen-identity and adaptive-chosen-message attack if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathbb{A} has non-negligible advantage in the following game.

- **Setup phase** : The challenger \mathbb{C} runs the setup algorithm and generates the $params$ and Msk . Challenger \mathbb{C} gives the params to adversary \mathbb{A} .
- **Training phase** : Once the setup phase is done \mathbb{A} is allowed to ask various queries to \mathbb{C} and \mathbb{C} responds correspondingly.
 - **KeyGen oracle** : When \mathbb{A} makes a query with ID_i , \mathbb{C} outputs D_i , the private key of ID_i to \mathbb{A} provided \mathbb{C} knows the secret for the queried identity. Else \mathbb{C} aborts.
 - **Signing oracle** : When \mathbb{A} makes a signing query with ID_i , message m_i , \mathbb{C} outputs a valid signature σ_i on m_i by ID_i .
- **Forgery phase** : When the adversary \mathbb{A} finishes all the queries, \mathbb{A} outputs an aggregate signature $(\sigma)_{i=1 to n}$ from the users $(ID_i)_{i=1 to n}$ on messages $(m_i)_{i=1 to n}$ where there exists a $ID_T \in (ID_i)_{i=1 to n}$ who is one of the target identities. The adversary \mathbb{A} wins the game if σ_{agg} is a valid aggregate signature and \mathbb{A} hasn't queried for signing query for (ID_T, m_T) pair for which it had forged.

5 Review of Practical Identity-Based Aggregate Signature from Bilinear Maps

In this section we review new aggregate signature scheme by Wang Zhu et al.[10]. The paper claim the scheme to be computationally efficient with constant pairings in verification. The scheme is based on weak CDH problem which is defined as follows.

5.1 Definition of wCDH

The wCDH in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as follows : Given (P, aP, bP, b^2P) for unknown $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$, compute abP .

5.2 Construction

The scheme consists of six algorithms. The first four algorithms are similar to a ordinary signature and the last two algorithms provide the aggregating capability.

- **Setup** Given a security parameter $l \in \mathbb{Z}$, the private key generator (PKG) runs the setup algorithm which outputs two groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 of prime order p , a generator P of \mathbb{G}_1 , a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$, master secret key $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. PKG computes $P_{pub} = sP$ and $P_{pub^2} = s^2P$. PKG also chooses cryptographic hash functions. $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1, H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

The system's public parameters are

$$params = \langle p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \hat{e}, P, P_{pub}, P_{pub^2}, H_1, H_2 \rangle .$$

- **Extract** The PKG provides the user's identity ID_i and the master secret key Msk as input to this algorithm and receives his public key $D_{ID_i} = H_1(ID_i)$, private key $s_{ID_i} = sD_{ID_i}$. The PKG sends D_{ID_i} and s_{ID_i} securely to the user. The user makes D_{ID_i} public and keeps s_{ID_i} secret.
- **Standard signature** To sign the message m_i , the user sends his identity ID_i , message m_i as the input to this algorithm. The algorithm follows the steps below:
 - Randomly chooses $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and computes $T_i = x_i P_{pub}$.
 - Computes $h_i = H_2(ID_i, m_i, T_i)$
 - Computes the signature $\sigma_i = (S_i, T_i)$ where $S_i = x_i P + h_i s_{ID_i}$.
 - Returns $sigma_i$ to user U_i as the signature on message m_i .
- **Verify** Any user can run this algorithm. This algorithm takes as input, a signature $\sigma_i = (S_i, T_i)$ on message m_i by user with identity ID_i , and does the following,
 - Compute $h_i = H_2(ID_i, m_i, T_i)$
 - Check if $\hat{e}(S_i, P_{pub}) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P, T_i) \hat{e}(h_i D_{ID_i}, P_{pub^2})$.
 - If true output "Valid", else output "Invalid".
- **Aggregate Signature** For the aggregating subset of users U , assign to each user an index i , ranging from 1 to $k \in |U|$. This algorithm takes as input user U_i 's identity ID_i , a signature (S_i, T_i) on a message m_i . It computes $S = \sum_{i=1}^k S_i$ and outputs the aggregate signature is $\sigma = (S, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_k)$.
- **Aggregate Signature verify** This algorithm on receiving the inputs aggregate signature $(S, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_k)$ for an aggregating subset of users U , and the list of <identity, message> pairs $\{ID_i, m_i\}_{i=1 \text{ to } k}$ indexed as before. To verify the aggregate signature,
 - The algorithm computes $h_i = H_2(ID_i, m_i, T_i)$
 - Checks if the following holds.

$$\hat{e}(S, P_{pub}) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^k T_i) \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^k h_i D_{ID_i}, P_{pub^2}).$$
 - If true output "Valid", else it outputs "Invalid".

6 Attack on Wang Zhu et al.'s scheme

We will show that universal forgery is possible in the aggregate scheme of Wang Zhu et al. Consider the adversary \mathbb{A} queries for the private key of some identity $ID_{\mathbb{A}}$. Let the identity on whom the forgery is to be performed is ID_B . Assume the \mathbb{A} in the training phase queries for a signature of ID_B on message m . The signature is of the form

$$T = xP_{pub} \quad (1)$$

$$S = xP + hs_B \quad (2)$$

for a random unknown x .

The value of h can be calculated as $H_2(ID, m, T)$. The adversary does the following steps to sign a message m_1 on behalf of ID and aggregate with his own signature on some random message with his identity $ID_{\mathbb{A}}$.

- Choose a random x_1 and set $T_1 = x_1P_{pub}$.
- Set $h_1 = H_2(ID, m_1, T_1)$.
- Set $T^* = \frac{x}{h}h_1P_{pub}$. (Dividing 3 by h and multiplying by h_1)
- Set $S^* = \frac{x}{h}h_1P + h_1s_{ID}$. (Dividing 4 by h and multiplying by h_1 .)

- Set $S_1 = S^* + x_1P$
 $= \frac{x}{h}h_1P + h_1s_{ID} + x_1P$.

The signature on m_1 by ID is $\sigma_1 = (S_1, T_1)$.

- Then the adversary \mathbb{A} uses his private key $s_{\mathbb{A}}$ and signs a random message m_2 as follows.
- $T_2 = x_2P_{pub} + T^*$
 $= x_2P_{pub} + \frac{x}{h}h_1P_{pub}$.
- $h_2 = H_2(ID_{\mathbb{A}}, m_2, T_2)$.
- Set $S_2 = x_2P + h_2s_{\mathbb{A}}$
- Then aggregate the S_i components of both the signatures and the aggregate signature is of form $\sigma = (S, T_1, T_2)$ on messages m_1 and m_2 . We can verify that this is a valid aggregate signature by the verification algorithm.

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(S, P_{pub}) &= \hat{e}\left(\frac{x}{h}h_1P + h_1s_{ID} + x_1P + x_2P + h_2s_{\mathbb{A}}, P_{pub}\right) \\ &= \hat{e}(x_1P, P_{pub})\hat{e}\left(\frac{x}{h}h_1 + x_2P, P_{pub}\right)\hat{e}(h_1s_{ID} + h_2s_{\mathbb{A}}, P_{pub}). \\ &= \hat{e}(T_1, P)\hat{e}(T_2, P)\hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 h_i D_{ID_i}, P_{pub^2}). \\ &= \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 T_i, P_{pub})\hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 h_i D_{ID_i}, P_{pub^2}). \end{aligned}$$

Thus this aggregate signature passes the verification. The adversary can forge signature on any message by any user having just known a single signature of the user. This kind of break is possible since any one signer is able to cancel out the components of any other user in aggregation. The base signature scheme is secure but its not secure when aggregated. Thus we have proved a universal forgery on Wang Zhu et al.'s [10] aggregate signature scheme.

7 Review of the Wen et al.'s Aggregate Signature Scheme

In this section we discuss the aggregate signature scheme as proposed by Wen et al. [11] which claims to be efficient with constant pairing operations in signature verification. Wen et al.'s aggregate signature scheme [11] comprises five algorithms: KEYGEN, SIGN, VERIFY, AGGREGATE AND AGGREGATE VERIFY. It uses two hash function $\hat{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. There are two generators P and P' of group \mathbb{G} . The system public parameters are $\{\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, \hat{e}, P, P', \hat{H}, H\}$

- **Key Generation:** The PKG provides the identity of the user ID_i as input to this algorithm. The algorithm selects a random $s_{ID_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $D_{ID_i} = s_{ID_i}P$. The public key is $D_{ID_i} \in \mathbb{G}$. The private key is s_{ID_i} .
- **Signing:** The user U_i with identity ID_i who wishes to sign message m_i provides his private key $s_{ID_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and a message $m_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ as an input to this algorithm. The algorithm compute $\hat{h} = \hat{H}(m_i || s_{ID_i})$ and $h = H(m_i)$. $T_i = \hat{h}P, S_i = (\hat{h} + h s_{ID_i})P'$. The algorithm outputs the signature $\sigma_i = (S_i, T_i)$ on message m_i by user with identity ID_i .
- **Verification:** This algorithms takes as input the public key, D_{ID_i} , message, m_i , and a signature (S_i, T_i) and computes $h_i = H(m_i)$ and checks if $\hat{e}(S_i, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P', T_i + h_i D_{ID_i})$. If yes it outputs “Valid”, else it outputs “Invalid”.
- **Aggregation:** For aggregate signature for a set of users U assign to each user an index i , ranging from 1 to $k = |U|$. Any user can run this algorithm with signatures $(S_i, T_i)_{i=1 \text{ to } k}$ by different users $\{U_i\}_{i=1 \text{ to } k}$ on a message $\{m_i\}_{i=1 \text{ to } k}$ as the input. The aggregate algorithm computes $S = \sum_{i=1}^k S_i$ and $T = \sum_{i=1}^k T_i$ and outputs the aggregate signature is (S, T) and the set of message, identity pairs $\{m_i, ID_i\}_{i=1 \text{ to } k}$.
- **Aggregate Verification:** This algorithm takes as input an aggregate signature (S, T) for an aggregating subset of users $U = \{U_i\}_{i=1 \text{ to } k}$, indexed as before, and the original messages m_i and public keys D_{ID_i} for all users U_i . To verify, algorithm first computes $h_i = H(m_i)$ for all $i = 1 \text{ to } k$ and checks if $\hat{e}(S, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P', T + \sum_{i=1}^k h_i D_i)$ holds. If yes it outputs “Valid”, else it outputs “Invalid”.

8 Attack on the Wen et al.'s Aggregate Signature Scheme

The signature scheme as proposed by Wen et al.'s[11] can be forged by any party who may not even be a legal user of the system.

- **Forgery of the signature:** The forger chooses a random message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and computes the signature for some user U_i in the following manner,
 - Select a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
 - $h = H(m)$
 - $T = rP - hD_{ID_i}$, where D_{ID_i} is public identity of the user whose signature he is forging.
 - $S = rP'$.

The forged signature passes the verification $\hat{e}(S, P) = \hat{e}(P', T + hD_{ID_i})$ because,
 $\hat{e}(P, T + hD_{ID_i}) = \hat{e}(P', rP - hD_{ID_i} + hD_{ID_i}) = \hat{e}(P', rP) = \hat{e}(rP', P) = \hat{e}(S, P)$

- **Forgery of the Aggregate Signature:**The aggregate signature can also be forged by anyone in the similar manner. The forger can generate an aggregate signature for a set of users U . He can generate (T_i, S_i) on m_i of his choice for all user $u_i \in U$ as mentioned above. He then aggregates, $S = \Sigma_{i=1}^k S_i$ and $T = \Sigma_{i=1}^k T_i$.

The forged aggregate signature passes the verification $\hat{e}(S, P) = \hat{e}(P', T + \Sigma_{i=1}^k h_i D_{ID_i})$ because,

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(P', T + \Sigma_{i=1}^k h_i D_{ID_i}) &= \hat{e}(P', \Sigma_{i=1}^k T_i + \Sigma_{i=1}^k h_i D_{ID_i}) \\ &= \hat{e}(P', \Sigma_{i=1}^k r_i P - \Sigma_{i=1}^k h_i D_{ID_i} + \Sigma_{i=1}^k h_i D_{ID_i}) \\ &= \hat{e}(P', \Sigma_{i=1}^k r_i P) = \hat{e}(\Sigma_{i=1}^k r_i P', P) \\ &= \hat{e}(S, P) \end{aligned}$$

Wen et al. in their paper[11] have proved that their signature is unforgeable in the chosen key model as given in [1]. Their signature consists of $(T = \hat{h}P, S = (\hat{h} + hs)P')$ where $\hat{h} = H(m||s)$, $h = H(m)$, no user can verify whether the sender has send $T = \hat{h}P$ or $T = rP$ where r is a random element belonging to \mathbb{Z}_q^* because no user other than the sender himself can calculate \hat{h} . For every other user it just seems like a random value. Therefore, due to this weakness, their signature is forgeable by anyone.

9 Identity Based universal designated multi-verifiers signature schemes

Seung et al. [8] have proposed the first identity based universal designated multi-verifiers signature scheme which generalizes identity based universal designated verifier signature scheme. In order to achieve this they have proposed a new identity based signature scheme which provides batch verification of signatures. They have proved their signature scheme existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model. In this paper we show that their scheme is not secure when considered for batch verification. In the following sections we review the scheme in [8] and propose a universal forgery of the batch verification used in the scheme.

9.1 Review of Seung et al.'s Identity based signature scheme and its batch verification

In this section we present the identity based signature scheme and its batch verification as proposed by Seung et al. [8]. This scheme consists of four algorithms, Setup, Extract, IDSign, ID-PV (Identity-Public Verify).

ID-Based Signature Scheme:

- **Setup:** The PKG chooses a random generator P of \mathbb{G} . PKG chooses $s \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP$. Then PKG keeps s as the *master secret key* and publishes system parameters $param =$

$\{\hat{e}, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, P, P_{pub}, H_1, H_2\}$ where, $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ and $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ are cryptographic hash functions.

- **Extract:** Given an user identity ID , the PKG compute's its public key $D_{ID} = H_1(ID)$ and the private key $S_{ID} = sD_{ID}$, and returns (D_{ID}, S_{ID}) to the user in a secure way. The user makes D_{ID} public and keeps S_{ID} as secret.
- **ID-Sign:** Given a secret key S_{ID} and a message m , pick $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, compute $T = rP$, $h = H_2(m, T)$ and $S = rP_{pub} + hS_{ID}$. Output the signature $\sigma = (T, S)$.
- **ID-PV:** Given the public parameter $param$, a message m , a signature $\sigma = (T, S)$, check if

$$\hat{e}(S, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(T + hD_{ID}, P_{pub})$$

If the equality holds then output “Valid”, output “Invalid”.

Batch Verification:

The above mentioned identity based signature scheme allows batch verification of multiple signatures on different messages. That is, a verifier can check the validity of n signatures $(T_1, S_1), \dots, (T_n, S_n)$ on n messages m_1, \dots, m_n simultaneously by checking the following:

$$\hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^n S_i, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^n (T_i + h_i D_i), P_{pub})$$

10 Attack on the Seung et al.’s Scheme

We will show that universal forgery is possible in the batch verification of Seung et al. scheme [8]. Consider the adversary \mathbb{A} queries for the private key of some identity $ID_{\mathbb{A}}$. Let the identity on whom the forgery is to be performed is ID_B . Assume the \mathbb{A} in the training phase queries for a signature of ID_B on message m . The signature is of the form

$$T = xP \tag{3}$$

$$S = xP_{pub} + hS_B \tag{4}$$

for a random unknown x .

The value of h can be calculated as $H_2(m, T)$

. The adversary does the following steps to sign a message m_1 on behalf of ID_B and aggregate with his own signature on some random message.

- Choose a random x_1 and set $T_1 = x_1 P_{pub}$.
- Set $h_1 = H_2(m_1, T_1)$.
- Set $T^* = \frac{x}{h} h_1 P$. (Dividing 3 by h and multiplying by h_1)
- Set $S^* = \frac{x}{h} h_1 P_{pub} + h_1 S_{ID}$. (Dividing 4 by h and multiplying by h_1 .)

- Set $S_1 = S^* + x_1 P_{pub} = \frac{x}{h} h_1 P_{pub} + h_1 s_{ID} + x_1 P_{pub}$. The signature on m_1 by ID is $\sigma_1 = (S_1, T_1)$.
- Then the adversary \mathbb{A} uses his private key $s_{\mathbb{A}}$ and signs a random message m_2 as follows.
- $T_2 = x_2 P + T^*$
 $= x_2 P + \frac{x}{h} h_1 P$.
- $h_2 = H_2(m_2, T_2)$.
- Set $S_2 = x_2 P_{pub} + h_2 s_{\mathbb{A}}$
- Then aggregate the S_i components of both the signatures and the aggregate signature is of form $\sigma = (S, T_1, T_2)$ on messages m_1 and m_2 . We can verify that this is a valid aggregate signature by the verification algorithm.

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{e}(S, P) &= \hat{e}\left(\frac{x}{h} h_1 P_{pub} + h_1 s_{ID} + x_1 P_{pub} + x_2 P_{pub} + h_2 s_{\mathbb{A}}, P\right) \\
&= \hat{e}(x_1 P_{pub}, P) \hat{e}\left(\left(\frac{x}{h} h_1 + x_2\right) P_{pub}, P\right) \hat{e}(h_1 s_{ID} + h_2 s_{\mathbb{A}}, P). \\
&= \hat{e}(T_1, P_{pub}) \hat{e}(T_2, P_{pub}) \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 h_i D_{ID_i}, P_{pub}). \\
&= \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 T_i, P_{pub}) \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 h_i D_{ID_i}, P_{pub}). \\
&= \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^2 (T_i + h_i D_{ID_i}), P_{pub}).
\end{aligned}$$

This aggregate signature passes the verification and hence is valid. The adversary can forge signature on any message by any user by knowing just a single signature of the user. The base signature scheme is secure but its not secure when aggregated. Thus we have proved a universal forgery on Seung et al. signature scheme[8] which is claimed to support batch verification.

11 Review of Shi Cui et al.'s Scheme [4]

In this section we review the scheme proposed by Shi Cui et al. in [4] where it is claimed that their identity based signature construct can be used for efficient batch verification. They propose three types of batch verifications. The type-3 batch verification construct is similar to aggregate signature construct where n signers sign in n distinct messages and the signatures on all the messages can be verified in a single batch verification. The base signature scheme consists of 4 algorithms which are as follows.

- **Setup** : The trusted authority runs this algorithm with the security parameter $l \in \mathbb{Z}_l^*$ as the input. The algorithm chooses two groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and chooses randomly a P as generator of \mathbb{G}_1 and a $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP$ and also computes $\omega = \hat{e}(P, P)$. It chooses a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_2^* \longmapsto \mathbb{Z}_l^*$ and returns the public parameters $params$ as $\langle P, P_{pub}, \omega, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, H \rangle$ and the master secret key s .
- **Extract** : For a given identity $id_i \in \mathbb{Z}_l^*$ the trusted authority runs this algorithm with $params, msk$ s , and identity id_i as the input. The algorithm does the following.

$$S_{ID_i} = \frac{1}{s + id_i}$$

and returns the private key S_{ID_i} to the user id_i .

– **Sign** : A user with id_i who wishes to sign message m_i runs this algorithm with his private key S_{ID_i} , $params$ and message m_i as input. The signing algorithm does the following.

- Choose a random $x_i \in Z_l^*$
- Compute $T_i = \omega^{x_i}$
- Compute the hash $h_i = H(m_i, T_i)$
- Then compute $S_i = (x_i + h_i)S_{id_i}$

and return the signature $\langle S_i, T_i \rangle$ as the signature on message m_i by identity id_i .

– **Verify** : Any user can run this algorithm to verify the validity of the signature. This algorithm takes as input the signature $\langle S_i, T_i \rangle$, the message m_i , the identity id_i and the $params$ as input. The algorithm verifies whether

$$\omega^{h_i} \cdot T_i \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P_{pub} + id_i \cdot P, S_i) \quad (5)$$

If yes it outputs “Valid”, else it outputs “Invalid”.

– **Correctness** :

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(P_{pub}, id_i \cdot P, S_i) &= \hat{e}((s + id_i)P, S_{id_i})^{h_i + x_i} \\ &= \hat{e}((s + id_i)P, \frac{1}{(s + id_i)}P)^{h_i + x_i} \\ &= \hat{e}(P, P)^{h_i + x_i} \\ &= \omega^{h_i + x_i} \\ &= \omega^{h_i} \cdot T_i \end{aligned}$$

– **Batch verification for type 3** : Suppose there are n signatures from n users $\{id_i\}_{i=1 to n}$ on n messages $\{m_i\}_{i=1 to n}$ where the signatures is of the form $\langle S_1, T_1, id_1 \rangle \langle S_2, T_2, id_2 \rangle \dots \langle S_n, T_n, id_n \rangle$ and user can run this algorithm with these inputs. The algorithm checks whether

$$\omega^{\sum_{i=1}^n h_i} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n T_i \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P_{pub}, \sum_{i=1}^n S_i) \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^n id_i S_i) \quad (6)$$

If yes it outputs “Valid”, else it outputs “Invalid”.

12 Universal forgery of Shi Cui et al. Scheme with batch verification-type 3

In this section we propose an attack on type-3 batch verification of Shi Cui et al. scheme [4]. Consider an adversary \mathbb{A} who is going to produce a forgery on the target identity ID_B . The \mathbb{A} queries for the private key of some identity $ID_{\mathbb{A}}$ other than the target identity ID_B and the private key is $S_{id_{\mathbb{A}}}$. The \mathbb{A} then queries the signature of the target identity ID_B on some message m_1 . The signature is of the form

$$\begin{aligned} S_1 &= (h_1 + x_1)S_{id_1} \\ T_1 &= \omega^{x_1} \end{aligned}$$

for some random x_1 and where $h_1 = H(m_1, T_1)$. The adversary then does the following to create a forgery on message m_2 .

Chooses a random x_2 and set $T_2 = \omega^{x_2}$ and $h_2 = H(m_2, T_2)$.

Then sets $S_2 = (h_2 + \frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1})S_{id_1}$. (By dividing S_1 by h_1 and multiplying by h_2).

Then chooses another random x_3 , message m_3 and set $T_3 = \omega^{x_3} \omega^{-x_2} \cdot \omega^{\frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1}}$ and $h_3 = H(m_3, T_3)$.
Sets $S_3 = (h_3 + x_3)S_{id_A}$.

Therefore $\langle S_2, T_2 \rangle$ is a signature on m_2 by target identity id and $\langle S_3, T_3 \rangle$ is a signature on m_3 by identity id_A .

It passes the batch verification as follows.

$$\omega^{\sum_{i=2}^3 h_i} \cdot \prod_{i=2}^3 T_i \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P_{pub}, \sum_{i=2}^3 S_i) \hat{e}(P, idS_2 + id_A S_3) \quad (7)$$

Correctness of Forgery :

LHS is of the form

$$\omega^{h_2+h_3} \cdot T_2 \cdot T_3 = \omega^{h_2+h_3+x_2+x_3-x_2+\frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1}} = \omega^{h_2+h_3+x_3+\frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1}} \quad (8)$$

The RHS is of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(P_{pub}, \sum_{i=2}^3 S_i) \hat{e}(P, idS_2 + id_A S_3) &= \hat{e}(P_{pub}, S_2) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, S_3) \hat{e}(P, idS_2) \hat{e}(P, id_A S_3) \\ &= \hat{e}(sP + idP, S_2) \hat{e}(sP + id_A P, S_3) \\ &= \hat{e}((s + id)P, (h_2 + \frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1}) \frac{1}{s + id} P) \hat{e}((s + id_A)P, (h_3 + x_3) \frac{1}{s + id_A} P) \\ &= \hat{e}(P, P)^{h_2 + \frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1}} \cdot \hat{e}(P, P)^{h_3 + x_3} \\ &= \omega^{h_2 + \frac{x_1 \cdot h_2}{h_1} + h_3 + x_3} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

The equation 8 is equal to equation 9. Thus this is valid forgery where the adversary by knowing just a single users private key can forge the signature of any user in the system on any message having seen the signature of that user on some random message. Thus we have proved that batch verification of type-3 in the scheme in [4] is universally forgeable.

13 Conclusion

We have analysed two aggregate signature schemes which claimed to have efficient computation complexity. We have shown that universal forgery is possible in such constructs and similar constructs. Currently there is no scheme which achieves constant computation cost in pairings during verification without any interaction among the signers. The interaction among signers in certain situations is a major disadvantage since each signer has to broadcast his value to all other signers and that makes n broadcast operations thus increasing the communication complexity highly. An efficient aggregate signature with constant pairing computations in verification without any interaction among users remains as an interesting open problem in this field. Also developing an aggregate signature in the standard model is another open problem to look at.

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