Automorphic Signatures in Bilinear Groups

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Abstract. We call signature schemes in bilinear groups *automorphic* if they have the following properties: the verification keys lie in the message space, messages and signatures consist of group elements only, and verification is done by evaluating a set of pairing-product equations. These signatures make a perfect counterpart to the powerful proof system by Groth and Sahai (Eurocrypt 2008). We give practical instantiations under appropriate assumptions and an extension yielding blind signatures. To illustrate their usefulness in combination with Groth-Sahai proofs, we efficiently instantiate a series of recent primitives ensuring user anonymity.

1 Introduction

One of the main goals of modern cryptography is anonymity. Group signatures [Cv91] let members who were enrolled by a group manager sign on behalf of a group while not revealing their identity; using an anonymous credential [Cha85], a user can prove that she holds a credential, and at the same time remain anonymous; blind signatures [Cha83] were introduced for electronic cash to prevent linking of a coin to its spender; and there are numerous other primitives addressing users' privacy concerns.

Security of such primitives is typically analyzed by defining a security model, which is then proven to be satisfiable in theory under general assumptions. Let us consider the example of *dynamic group signatures* by Bellare et al. [BSZ05]. To show feasibility of their model, they give the following generic construction:

Assume the existence of a signature scheme, an encryption scheme and general zero-knowledge proofs. The group manager publishes a signature verification key and uses the corresponding signing key to issue certificates on the group members' personal verification keys. The latter produce a group signature on a message by first signing it with their personal signing key; the group signature is then an encryption of the user's certificate, her verification key, and the signature on the message, completed by a zero-knowledge proof that the signatures in the plaintext are valid. The fact that a signature is a ciphertext and a proof leaking no information guarantees user anonymity.

For a long time the silver bullet to efficiently implement such primitives was to rely on the random-oracle heuristic [BR93]. Due to a series of criticisms starting with [GK03], more and more practical schemes are proposed in the standard model. Groups with a bilinear map ("pairing") turned out to be a particularly attractive tool to achieve efficiency. Many instantiations use ad hoc constructions, since the generic ones—in particular zero-knowledge proofs—are by far too inefficient.

The Groth-Sahai proof system. Recently, Groth and Sahai [GS08] proposed *efficient* zero-knowledge proofs for a large class of statements over bilinear groups, which already found use in many implementations [Gro07,GL07,BCKL08,BCC+09]. They proceed by constructing witness indistinguishable (WI) proofs of satisfiability of various types of equations. Basically, given a witness one makes *commitments* to its values and then constructs proofs asserting that the committed values satisfy the equations. As already observed by [Gro06], the most interesting type, which also found most applications, is the following: pairing-product equations (PPE) whose variables are elements of

the bilinear group. An equation consists of products of pairings applied to the variables and constants from the group. Since the employed commitments to the witnesses are extractable, the resulting proofs actually even constitute *proofs of knowledge*.

To efficiently instantiate the BSZ-model, Groth [Gro07] instantiates encryption and the proofs of plaintext validity with this WI proof system (to achieve anonymity against adversaries with opening oracles, he actually has to add some extra encryption; cf. Sect. 6.1). Extractability of the commitments used in the proofs serves two purposes: first, it lets the opener extract the user's verification key and thus trace the signer; second, unforgeability of group signatures can be directly reduced to unforgeability of the underlying signatures.

For the Groth-Sahai methodology to be applicable, Groth gives certification and signing schemes such that certificates, signature verification keys and signatures (i.e., the components that need to be hidden) are group elements whose validity is verified by evaluating PPEs.

Signatures and the Groth-Sahai Proof System. The first instantiations to use Groth-Sahai-like proofs were the group signatures by Boyen and Waters [BW06,BW07] (although they developed their purpose-built proofs independently). They require a weakly secure[1] signature scheme whose components and messages can be encrypted (committed to) and proven to be valid. To sign messages from the group, they modify the weak Boneh-Boyen signatures [BB04], which consist of a group element, on a scalar message: instead of giving the scalar directly, they give it as an exponentiation of two different group generators. Security of their construction holds under the *hidden strong Diffie-Hellman assumption* (HSDH) a variant of the *strong Diffie-Hellman assumption* (SDH) [BB04].

Belenkiy et al. [BCKL08] apply the Boneh-Boyen [BB04] transformation "from weak to strong security" to the Boyen-Waters signature scheme. This way they obtain fully secure signatures, at the price of introducing a rather strong assumption termed "triple Diffie-Hellman" (TDH). Their signatures are group elements, yet the messages are scalars. To construct anonymous credentials, they make commitments to a message and a signature on it and prove that their content is valid using Groth-Sahai proofs. Since from these commitments only group elements can be extracted efficiently (and one would have to compute discrete logarithms to recover the message), they need to define f-extractability, meaning that only a function of the committed value can be extracted.

Let us reconsider Groth's group signatures in [Gro07]. The certification of user verification keys is based on different mechanisms than the signatures under these keys. Moreover, the certificate-verification key is an element of the *target* group. As opposed to plain group signatures, in hierarchical group signatures [TW05] or anonymous proxy signatures [FP08], verification keys are not only certified once, but must also serve to certify other keys—requiring thus keys to take the form of messages. If we want to apply the Groth-Sahai methodology to "anonymize" such schemes and prove unforgeability notions by reduction to security of the underlying signatures, everything has to be in the group.

We identify the all-purpose building block to efficiently instantiate more intricate primitives for which anonymity is requisite as the following: a practical signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks that can sign its own verification keys; and which at the same time respects the pairing-product paradigm; that is, keys, messages and signatures consist of group elements and the signature verification relations are PPEs. We call such a scheme an *automorphic signature*, since it is able to sign its *own* keys and verification preserves the *structure* of keys and messages, which makes it perfectly suitable to be combined with Groth-Sahai proofs. We note that a scheme in Groth [Gro06], based on the *decision linear* assumption [BBS04], satisfies all the above properties, but should rather be regarded as a proof of concept due to its inefficiency (a signature consists of hundreds of thousands of group elements).

We believe that working with group elements enables a modular approach of combining signatures with Groth-Sahai proofs, and automorphic signatures are the tailor-made building block to do so.

[1] We call a signature scheme *weakly secure* if an adversary getting signatures on *random* messages is unable to come up with a new signed message.

As demonstrated in Sect. 6, together they yield straightforward efficient implementations of generic constructions, by simply plugging in concrete schemes for generic ones.

Our Contribution

After formally defining automorphic signatures, we give two practical instantiations over bilinear groups (Sect. 4). Recently, Fuchsbauer et al. [FPV09] introduced a variant of HSDH, termed *double hidden SDH* (DHSDH). We observe that their assumption immediately yields weakly secure signatures on messages consisting of group elements.

We make their scheme secure against chosen-message attacks by adding some randomness analogously to the transformation of [BB04]. Security of the resulting scheme requires an additional assumption which can be considered quite mild though (cf. Assumption 3): it is a non-parametrized non-interactive falsifiable assumption in the flavor of CDH, whose validity in the generic group model [Sho97] is immediate. Our second instantiation improves on efficiency and is secure under yet another variant of HSDH, termed DAHSDH ("asymmetrically hidden", cf. Assumption 2), which we also prove secure in the generic group model. Its signatures consist of 5 group elements.

In Sect. 5, we give extensions of our scheme: we show how to sign vectors of messages and in particular we give *blind* automorphic signatures. In Sect. 6, we show exemplary applications of our scheme: we construct CCA-secure group signatures, revisit the construction of non-interactive credentials of [BCKL08], and then give our main application: The first efficient instantiation of *anonymous proxy signatures* (APS), a generalization of group signatures, in the full model of [FP08] without random oracles.

This primitive enables users ("original signers") to delegate others to sign in their name; the latter can either sign or re-delegate to other users. Anonymity ensures that from a proxy signature one cannot tell who signed and who re-delegated; however one can be sure that the proxy signer was delegated by the original signer. As for group signatures, an algorithm to revoke anonymity to deter from misuse is also provided. Due to consecutiveness of delegation, this primitive models at the same time hierarchical group signatures satisfying a security model generalizing the one of [BSZ05]. In Sect. 6.4, we define the following additional security notions for APS in order to allow for a convergence towards *delegatable anonymous credentials* [BCC$^+$09] (see below):

- When signing rights are re-delegated, the previous delegators remain anonymous even to the delegatee.
- We give a protocol for *blind delegation*: A user can be delegated without revealing her identity.
- Finally we show how to sign messages on behalf of several users simultaneously.

We then give an efficient instantiation of the extended model, which nicely illustrates the benefits of automorphic signatures: combined with the Groth-Sahai proof system, they enable straightforward practical realization of generic concepts. Note that it is precisely the lack of an efficient automorphic signature that accounts for the necessity of a strong assumption for the first instantiation of APS [FP09], as well as for its impracticality.

APS vs. DAC. Delegatable anonymous credentials (DAC) were recently defined by Belenkiy et al. [BCC$^+$09]. Although they are incomparable to our extended model of APS, there are substantial similarities between them: both provide mechanisms enabling users to prove possession of certain rights while remaining anonymous; and both consider re-delegation of the received rights.

The core of DAC is a protocol allowing a user to obtain a proof of knowledge of a signature on her *secret* key, without revealing the identity of neither the signer nor the user. This imposes interactivity of the delegation process, while (non-blind) delegations for APS are non-interactive, even when previous delegators remain anonymous. (We show how to achieve delegatee anonymity at the expense of non-interactivity). Further differences are that DAC merely deal with authentication rather than signatures, and they do not provide tracing mechanisms.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Primitives

We start with reviewing some standard concepts from the literature.

Commitments. A non-interactive commitment scheme is composed of an algorithm $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{Com}}$, outputting a *commitment key* ck, and an algorithm Com with arguments ck, a message M and randomness ρ. We require that (1) the scheme is *perfectly binding*, i.e., for a commitment $\mathbf{c}$ there exists only one M s.t.: $\mathbf{c} = \mathsf{Com}(M, \rho)$ for some ρ; (2) the scheme is *computationally hiding*, in particular, there exists $\mathsf{SmSetup}_{\mathrm{Com}}$ outputting keys that are computationally indistinguishable from those output by $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{Com}}$, and which generate perfectly hiding commitments.

Digital Signatures. A digital signature scheme consists of the following algorithms: $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{Sig}}$ outputs public parameters pp. $\mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathrm{Sig}}$ outputs a pair (vk, sk) of verification and signing key. $\mathsf{Sign}(sk, M)$ outputs a signature σ, which is verified by $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{Sig}}(vk, M, \sigma)$. Signatures are *existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attack* (EUF-CMA) [GMR88] if no adversary, given vk and a signing oracle for messages of its choice, can output a pair (M, σ) s.t. M was never queried and $\mathsf{Verify}(vk, M, \sigma) = 1$.

Blind Signatures. Blind signatures [Cha83,PS00] extend digital signatures by an interactive protocol $\mathsf{Issue} \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Obtain}$ between the signer and a user allowing the latter to obtain a signature on a message hidden from the signer. Okamoto [Oka06] defines the following security requisites: *Blindness:* An adversary impersonating the signer interacting with Obtain twice for messages of its choice cannot relate the resulting signatures to their issuings. *Unforgeability:* No adversary interacting $q-1$ times with Issue can output q different messages and valid signatures on them.

Bilinear Groups. A (symmetric) *bilinear group* is a tuple $\mathcal{BG} = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, G)$ where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are two cyclic groups[2] of prime order p, G is a generator of $\mathbb{G}$, and $e\colon \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ is a non-degenerate bilinear map, i.e., $\forall\, X, Y \in \mathbb{G}\ \forall\, a, b \in \mathbb{Z} : e(aX, bY) = e(X, Y)^{ab}$, and $e(G, G)$ generates $\mathbb{G}_T$.

The *Decision Linear (DLIN) Assumption*, introduced by Boneh et al. [BBS04], in a bilinear group $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, G)$ states that given $(\alpha G, \beta G, r\alpha G, s\beta G, tG)$ for random $\alpha, \beta, r, s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ it is hard to decide whether $t = r + s$ or t is random.

Throughout the paper, we will assume two fixed generators G, H of $\mathbb{G}$. We call a pair $(A, B) \in \mathbb{G}^2$ a *Diffie-Hellman pair* (w.r.t. (G, H)), if there exists $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $A = aG$ and $B = aH$. Using the bilinear map e, such pairs are efficiently decidable by checking $e(A, H) = e(G, B)$. We let $\mathcal{DH}$ denote the set of DH pairs and implicitly assume them to be w.r.t. G and H.

2.2 Groth-Sahai Proofs for Pairing-Product Equations

We will use Groth-Sahai witness-indistinguishable (WI) proofs of *satisfiability of pairing-product equations* [GS08]. A *pairing-product equation* (PPE) is an equation over variables $\mathcal{Y}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{Y}_n \in \mathbb{G}$ of the form

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(A_i, \mathcal{Y}_i) \prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{j=1}^{n} e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{Y}_j)^{\gamma_{i,j}} \;=\; t_T \;, \tag{E}$$

determined by $A_i \in \mathbb{G}$, $\gamma_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $t_T \in \mathbb{G}_T$, for $1 \le i, j \le n$.

We will use the DLIN-instantiation of the proof system, built as follows: $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{GS}}(\mathcal{BG})$ takes a bilinear group $\mathcal{BG} = (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, G)$ and outputs a perfectly-binding linear commitment key $ck \in \mathbb{G}^5$. Given an assignment $\mathcal{Y}_i \leftarrow X_i$, for $X_i \in \mathbb{G}$, satisfying E, one first *commits* to the values X_i by choosing randomness ρ_i and setting $\mathbf{c}_{X_i} := \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, X_i, \rho_i)$ for all i. Running $\mathsf{Prove}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E, (X_i, \rho_i)_{i=1}^n)$

[2] Following [GS08], we denote $\mathbb{G}$ additively and $\mathbb{G}_T$ multiplicatively. We denote the neutral element of $\mathbb{G}$ by 0.

generates a proof[3] $\phi \in \mathbb{G}^{3\times 3}$ asserting that the values committed in $\mathbf{c}_{X_i}$ satisfy E, which is verified by $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E, (\mathbf{c}_{X_i})_{i=1}^n, \phi)$. An honestly computed proof on commitments to a satisfying vector is always accepted by $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{GS}}$.

Security. *Soundness.* There exist algorithms $\mathsf{ExSetup}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ and $\mathsf{Extract}_{\mathrm{GS}}$. The first outputs (ck, ek) s.t. ck is indistinguishable from one output by $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{GS}}$. Given the extraction key ek and commitments $\vec{\mathbf{c}_X}$ s.t. $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E, \vec{\mathbf{c}_X}, \phi) = 1$ for some ϕ, algorithm $\mathsf{Extract}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ returns a vector $\vec{X}$ satisfying E.

Witness Indistinguishability (WI). There exists an algorithm $\mathsf{SmSetup}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ outputting ck^* that is computationally indistinguishable from one output by $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{GS}}$. A commitment $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck^*, X, \rho)$ is perfectly hiding, i.e., given $\mathbf{c}$ then for any X there exists randomness ρ s.t. $\mathbf{c} = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck^*, X, \rho)$. Moreover, given values $((X_1, \rho_1), \ldots, (X_n, \rho_n))$ and $((X'_1, \rho'_1), \ldots, (X'_n, \rho'_n))$ such that for all i we have $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, X_i, \rho_i) = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, X'_i, \rho'_i)$, and $(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$ and $(X'_1, \ldots, X'_n)$ both satisfy E, it holds that $\mathsf{Prove}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck^*, E, (X_i, \rho_i)_{i=1}^n)$ and $\mathsf{Prove}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck^*, E, (X'_i, \rho'_i)_{i=1}^n)$ generate the same distribution of proofs.

Examples. (1) *Proof of Two Commitments Containing the Same Value.* Let $E_{\mathrm{equal}}(X_1, X_2)$ denote the equation $e(X_1, G)\, e(X_2, G^{-1}) = 1$. Given two commitments $\mathbf{c}_M = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, M, \rho)$ and $\mathbf{c}_N = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, N, \sigma)$, $\mathsf{Prove}(ck, E_{\mathrm{equal}}, (M, \rho), (N, \sigma))$ proves that $\mathbf{c}_M$ and $\mathbf{c}_N$ commit to the same value.

(2) *Proof of Commitments to a $\mathcal{DH}$-Pair.* Define $E_{\mathcal{DH}}(X, Y)$ as $e(X, H)\, e(Y, G^{-1}) = 1$. A proof for Equation $E_{\mathcal{DH}}$ yields a 3-element proof showing that the values in two commitments are in $\mathcal{DH}$.

Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Groth and Sahai also define algorithms $\mathsf{ZKProve}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ and $\mathsf{ZKVerify}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ (and further ones to simulate) to construct non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs for equations E whose right-hand side t_T is of the form $e(T_1, T_2)$ for given $T_1, T_2 \in \mathbb{G}$ (which is the case for all our equations).

Randomizing Groth-Sahai Proofs. As observed by [FP09] and [BCC+09] and formalized by the latter, Groth-Sahai WI proofs can be *randomized*: There exists an algorithm $\mathsf{RdCom}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ that on input ck, a commitment $\mathbf{c}$ and fresh randomness ρ outputs a *randomization* of $\mathbf{c}$ under ρ. A proof ϕ for an equation E and commitments $(\mathbf{c}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_n)$ can be *adapted* to the randomizations $\mathbf{c}'_i = \mathsf{RdCom}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, \mathbf{c}_i, \rho_i)$ by running $\mathsf{RdProof}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E, (\mathbf{c}_i, \rho_i)_{i=1}^n)$ yielding ϕ' such that $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E, (\mathbf{c}'_i)_{i=1}^n, \phi') = 1$. (Basically, if $\mathbf{c}_i = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, X_i, \sigma_i)$ then $\mathbf{c}'_i = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, X_i, \sigma_i + \rho_i)$ and ϕ' is distributed as proofs output by $\mathsf{Prove}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E, (X_i, \sigma_i + \rho_i)_{i=1}^n)$; see [FPV09, Sect. 5] for a concise overview.)

3 Assumptions

We first restate the assumption from [FPV09] and then introduce two new ones.

Assumption 1 (q-DHSDH). *Given $(G, H, K, X = xG) \in \mathbb{G}^4$ and $q-1$ tuples*

$$\big(A_i = \tfrac{1}{x+c_i}(K + v_i G),\ C_i = c_i G,\ D_i = c_i H,\ V_i = v_i G,\ W_i = v_i H\big)_{i=1}^{q-1}\ , \quad \text{for } c_i, v_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p,$$

it is hard to output a new tuple $(A^*, C^*, D^*, V^*, W^*)$ that satisfies

$$e(A^*, X + C^*) = e(K + V^*, G) \qquad e(C^*, H) = e(G, D^*) \qquad e(V^*, H) = e(G, W^*)\ . \tag{1}$$

Argument. As pointed out by its inventors, under the *Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption* (KEA) [Dam92,BP04], hardness of q-DHSDH follows from hardness of the following problem:

q-SDH-III: Given $\big(G, K, X = xG, (A_i = \frac{1}{x+c_i}(K + v_i G), c_i, v_i)_{i=1}^{q-1}\big)$, produce a new tuple (A^*, c^*, v^*) satisfying $e(A^*, X + c^* G) = e(K + v^* G, G)$.

[3] For general PPEs, the proof is in $\mathbb{G}^{3\times 3}$. If E is a *linear equation* (i.e., $\gamma_{i,j} = 0$ for all i, j), then the proof reduces to 3 group elements. Note that in this context the word *proof* can either denominate "proof of satisfiability" (or language-membership)—which thus includes the commitments—or mean a proof *that the content of some given commitments satisfies a given equation*. We adopt the latter diction.

(KEA asserts that given (G, H), from an adversary returning (c^*G, c^*H) and (v^*G, v^*H) one can extract c^* and v^*.) They then show that hardness of q-SDH-III is implied by hardness of q-SDH, a well-established assumption by now.

We introduce a variant of DHSDH that enables a more efficient instantiation of automorphic signatures. The elements $C_i = c_iG$ are now doubled by $D_i = c_iF$, i.e., with respect to a different generator. This makes it possible to include an additional element $Y = xH$ in the instance (if it is given together with c_iH, we arrive at an easy problem; cf. Appendix A.1).

Assumption 2 (q-DAHSDH). *Given* $(G, F, H, K, X = xG, Y = xH) \in \mathbb{G}^6$ *and* $q-1$ *tuples*

$$\left(A_i = \tfrac{1}{x+c_i}(K + v_iG),\ C_i = c_iG,\ D_i = c_iF,\ V_i = v_iG,\ W_i = v_iH\right)_{i=1}^{q-1}, \quad \text{for } c_i, v_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p,$$

it is hard to output a new tuple $(A^*, C^*, D^*, V^*, W^*)$ *that satisfies*

$$e(A^*, X + C^*) = e(K + V^*, G) \qquad e(C^*, F) = e(G, D^*) \qquad e(V^*, H) = e(G, W^*)\ . \tag{2}$$

Due to the fact that we give $Y = xH$, the KEA-reduction to SDH does not apply here (given G, H, X we would have to solve CDH to compute Y for the reduction). Instead, we directly prove that the assumption holds in the generic group model [Sho97] in Appendix A.2.

Assumption 3 (HDL). *Let* G, H, T *be random generators of* $\mathbb{G}$*, let* r *be random in* $\mathbb{Z}_p$*. Given* $(G, H, T, rG, rH, rT) \in \mathbb{G}^6$*, it is hard to output* $(M^*, N^*, R^*, S^*) \in \mathbb{G}^4$ *with* $M^* \neq 0$ *and*

$$e(R^*, T) = e(M^* + rT, G) \qquad e(M^*, H) = e(G, N^*) \qquad e(R^*, H) = e(G, S^*) \tag{3}$$

Argument. We show that under KEA, Assumption 3 is equivalent to the discrete-logarithm (DL) assumption, thus a fortiori it holds in the generic group model. Let (G, T) be a DL-instance, i.e., we have to compute $t := \log_G T$. Let H be the group element for KEA. Choose $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and give the adversary (G, H, T, rG, rH, rT). From a successful output, by KEA, we can extract $m^* := \log_G M^* = \log_H N^*$ and $r^* := \log_G R^* = \log_H S^*$. From (3), we have $r^*t = m^* + rt$ for $m^* \neq 0$, which means we can compute $t = \frac{m^*}{r^* - r}$.

When proving unforgeability of our signatures, our reduction will actually be to a variant of HDL, which we prove equivalent:

Claim 1. *For any* q*, hardness of HDL implies hardness of the following problem.*

q**-HDL:** *Given* $(G, H, T, (r_iG, r_iH, r_iT)_{i=1}^{q-1})$*, for random* $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$*, output a tuple* (M^*, N^*, R^*, S^*) *such that* $M^* \neq 0$ *and for some* i*,* (3) *holds with* r *replaced by* r_i*.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against q-HDL, and let (G, H, T, R, S, U) be an HDL-instance. For $1 \leq i \leq q-1$, choose a random $r'_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and set $R_i := R + r'_iG$, $S_i := S + r'_iH$, $U_i := U + r'_iT$. Run $\mathcal{A}$ on $(G, H, T, (R_i, S_i, U_i)_{i=1}^{q-1})$ and suppose $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a q-HDL solution (M^*, N^*, R^*, S^*).

Let i be such that $e(R^*, T) = e(M^* + U_i, G)$. Then $e(R^* - r'_iG, T) = e(M^* + U_i, G)\, e(-r'_iG, T) = e(M^* + U + r'_iT, G)\, e(-r'_iT, G) = e(M^* + U, G)$. So $(M^*, N^*, R^* - r'_iG, S^* - r'_iH)$ is a solution for the given HDL instance. □

4 Automorphic Signatures

Definition 1. *An* automorphic signature *over a bilinear group* $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, G)$ *is an EUF-CMA secure signature whose verification keys are contained in the message space. Moreover, the messages and signatures consist of elements of* $\mathbb{G}$ *and are verified by evaluating pairing-product equations over the verification key, the message and the signature.*

DHSDH immediately yields a weakly secure signature scheme if we consider X as the public key, (V, W) as a message in $\mathcal{DH}$ and (A, C, D) as the signature.[4] We show how to transform this into a CMA-secure signature scheme by assuming HDL: We introduce some additional randomness that lets us map a query for a message chosen by the adversary to a given tuple $(A_i, C_i, D_i, V_i, W_i)$ from a DHSDH instance. HDL then basically asserts that the adversary cannot produce a signed new message $\big((A^*, C^*, D^*, R^*, S^*), (M^*, N^*)\big)$ that maps back to a tuple from the instance (see the proof of Theorem 2).

Definition 2 ($\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$). *Given a bilinear group, $\mathsf{ParGen}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$ chooses parameters $(G, H, K, T) \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^4$, which define the message space as $\mathcal{DH} := \{(aG, aH) \,|\, a \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}$, $\mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$ chooses a secret key $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets the verification key $X := xG$. A message $(M, N) \in \mathcal{DH}$ is signed by $\mathsf{Sign}_{\mathrm{FPV}}(x, (M, N))$ outputting $\big(A := \frac{1}{x+c}(K + rT + M),\, C := cG,\, D := cH,\, R := rG,\, S := rH\big)$ for random $c, r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$ accepts a signature on a message $(M, N) \in \mathcal{DH}$ if it satisfies*

$$e(A, X + C) = e(K + M, G)\, e(T, R) \qquad e(C, H) = e(G, D) \qquad e(R, H) = e(G, S)\ .$$

Theorem 1. *Under q-DHSDH and HDL, $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$ is existentially unforgeable against adversaries making up to $q - 1$ adaptive chosen-message queries.*

(We omit the proof as the one of Theorem 2 works almost identically.) The fact that the verification keys are not in the message space is the only reason the scheme is not automorphic. However, the following hybrid scheme $\mathbf{Sig}_{2\mathrm{FPV}}$ with parameters (G, H, L, K, T) satisfies it:

We define a two-level scheme, using two instances of $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$. The first signs pairs (mG, mH), whereas the messages for the second are of the form (mG, mL) (i.e., it uses a different parameter L instead of H.) The public keys of $\mathbf{Sig}_{2\mathrm{FPV}}$ are formed as (xG, xL) too and signing a message (mG, mL) is defined as follows: choose $v \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and first make a $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$-signature on the *one-time key* $(V := vG, W := vH)$. Now use v to produce a signature on (mG, mL) w.r.t. parameters (G, L, K, T). The actual *signature* is the concatenation of the first parameter-H signature, the pair (V, W) and the parameter-L signature on the message under key (V, W).

Security of the construction follows from a simple hybrid argument: forgeries using a new one-time key are reduced to forgeries for the 1st-level scheme, whereas forgeries recycling a key from a signing query are reduced to security of the 2nd-level scheme. A signature consists of 12 group elements satisfying 7 PPEs. If we assume DAHSDH instead of DHSDH, we get the following, more efficient construction, whose signatures consist of 5 group elements.

Definition 3 ($\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$). $\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{A}}$. *Given $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, G)$, choose additional generators $F, H, K, T \in \mathbb{G}$.*
$\mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathrm{A}}$. *Choose $sk = x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and set $vk = (xG, xH)$.*
$\mathsf{Sign}_{\mathrm{A}}$. *A signature on a DH-pair (M, N), valid under public key (xG, xH), is defined as*

$$\big(A := \tfrac{1}{x+c}(K + rT + M),\, C := cG,\, D := cF,\, R := rG,\, S := rH\big)\ , \quad \text{for random } c, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{A}}$. *$(A, C, D, R, S)$ is valid on a valid message (M, N) under a valid public key $\mathrm{vk} = (X, Y)$ iff*

$$e(A, X + C) = e(K + M, G)\, e(T, R) \qquad e(C, F) = e(G, D) \qquad e(R, H) = e(G, S) \tag{4}$$

(Key (X, Y) and message (M, N) are valid if $e(X, H) = e(G, Y)$ and $e(M, H) = e(G, N)$, resp.)

Theorem 2. *Assuming q-DAHSDH and HDL, $\mathbf{Sig}_A$ is existentially unforgeable against adversaries making up to $q - 1$ adaptive chosen-message queries.*

[4] Note that this is not the case for the q-HSDH assumption stating that given G, H, xG and $q-1$ triples $(\frac{1}{x+c_i}G, c_iG, c_iH)$ for random $c_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to produce a new triple $(\frac{1}{x+c^*}G, c^*G, c^*H)$ with $c^* \neq c_i$. We cannot regard (cG, cH) as the message, since the signer must know c in order to produce $\frac{1}{x+c}G$.

Proof. Consider an adversary that after receiving parameters (G, F, H, K, T) and public key (X, Y) is allowed to ask for $q-1$ signatures $(A_i, C_i, D_i, R_i, S_i)$ on messages $(M_i, N_i) \in \mathcal{DH}$ of its choice and outputs $(M, N) \in \mathcal{DH}$ that it did not query and a valid signature (A, C, D, R, S) on it.

We distinguish two kinds of forgers: An adversary is called of Type I if its output satisfies

$$\forall\, 1 \le i \le q-1 :\ e(R - R_i, T) \neq e(M_i - M, G)\ , \tag{5}$$

otherwise it is called of Type II. We will use the first type to break q-DAHSDH and the second type to break q-HDL, which is equivalent to HDL by Claim 1.

Type I Let $\big(G, F, H, K, X, Y, (A_i, C_i, D_i, V_i, W_i)_{i=1}^{q-1}\big)$ be a $q-$DAHSDH challenge. It satisfies thus

$$e(A_i, X + C_i) = e(K + V_i, G) \qquad e(C_i, F) = e(G, D_i) \qquad e(V_i, H) = e(G, W_i) \tag{6}$$

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a forger of Type I. Choose $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and give parameters $(G, F, H, K, T{:=}tG)$ and the public key (X, Y) to $\mathcal{A}$. The i-th query for $(M_i, N_i) \in \mathcal{DH}$ is answered as $\big(A_i, C_i, D_i, R_i := \frac{1}{t}(V_i - M_i)$, $S_i = \frac{1}{t}(W_i - N_i)\big)$. It satisfies (4) and is correctly distributed since v_i is random in the DAHSDH instance. If the adverseray produces a valid signature/message pair $((A, C, D, R, S), (M, N))$, then

$$(A, C, D, V := tR + M, W := tS + N)$$

is a solution for the DAHSDH instance, since it satisfies (1) and it is a *new* tuple: if for some i, we had $V = V_i$, then $tR + M = tR_i + M_i$, and thus $e(R, T)\, e(M, G) = e(R_i, T)\, e(M_i, G)$, which contradicts (5).

Type II Let $(G, H, T, (R_i = r_i G, S_i = r_i H, U_i = r_i T)_{i=1}^{q-1})$ be an instance of q-HDL. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a forger of Type II. Pick $F, K \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$ and $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, set $X := xG$, $Y := xH$ and give the adversary parameters (G, F, H, K, T) and public key (X, Y). Answer a signing query on (M_i, N_i) by checking $e(M_i, H) = e(G, N_i)$ and if so, pick $c_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and return $\big(\frac{1}{x+c_i}(K{+}U_i{+}M_i), c_i G, c_i F, R_i, S_i\big)$. Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ returns $((A, C, D, R, S), (M, N))$ satisfying (4) s.t. for some i: $e(R{-}R_i, T) = e(M_i{-}M, G)$. This can be written as $e(R, T)\, e(M - M_i, G) = e(R_i, T)$, thus $(M^* := M - M_i, N^* := N - N_i, R, S)$ is a solution to q-HDL, since $M^* \neq 0$ by $M \neq M_i$. □

5 Extensions

5.1 Signatures on Bit-Strings

$\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$ also serves to sign bit strings (as is the standard definition of signatures). Let $\mathsf{Hash}\colon \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_p$ be a collision-resistant hash function. Define $\mathbf{Sig}^*_{\mathrm{A}} := (\mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{A}}, \mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathrm{A}}, \mathsf{Sign}^*_{\mathrm{A}}, \mathsf{Verify}^*_{\mathrm{A}})$ with

- $\mathsf{Sign}^*_{\mathrm{A}}(sk, m) := \mathsf{Sign}_{\mathrm{A}}\big(sk, (\mathsf{Hash}(m)G, \mathsf{Hash}(m)H)\big)$
- $\mathsf{Verify}^*_{\mathrm{A}}(vk, (A, C, D, R, S), m) := \mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{A}}\big(vk, (A, C, D, R, S), (\mathsf{Hash}(m)G, \mathsf{Hash}(m)H)\big)$

Security against chosen-message attack follows by a straightforward reduction to security of $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$ and collision resistance of Hash.

5.2 Automorphic Signatures on Message Vectors

We give a general transform of a signature scheme whose message space contains its public-key space to one signing message vectors of arbitrary length that leaves the structure of verification invariant. The signer produces a one-time key pair (vk, sk), signs vk with her actual secret key and uses sk to sign every component of the vector. (Actually, for each component, she signs another transient key, which will sign the component and its *index* to prevent shuffling of messages. The vector's length is signed too, barring thus truncating.) Formally:

Let $ck \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}_{\mathrm{GS}}$ be the common reference string. The signer holds her secret key x corresponding to public key (xG, xH). The user holds a message $(M, N) \in \mathcal{DH}$ on which he gets a blind signature.

1. **Obtain** The user chooses $\sigma, \tau, \rho_1, \rho_2, \rho_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, defines $Z := \sigma T$ and sends the following:
   (a) $\mathbf{c}_M := \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, M, \rho_1)$, $\mathbf{c}_N := \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, N, \rho_2)$, $\phi := \mathsf{Prove}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E_{\mathcal{DH}}, (M, \rho_1), (N, \rho_2))$.
   (b) $J_1 := \sigma(K + M)$, $J_2 := \frac{\sigma}{\tau} T$, $\mathbf{c}_Z := \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, Z, \rho_3)$.
   (c) $\psi := \mathsf{Prove}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E_{\mathrm{consist}}, (M, \rho_1), (Z, \rho_2))$, with E_{consist} defined as $e(J_1, T) = e(K + M, Z)$.
   (d) Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of σ and τ s.t. $\mathbf{c}_Z$ commits to σT and τJ_2.
2. **Issue** If all proofs are valid, choose $c, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and send:
   $I_1 := \frac{1}{x+c}(J_1 + rJ_2)$, $I_2 := cG$, $I_3 := cF$, $I_4 := rG$, $I_5 := rH$.

   The user sets $A := \frac{1}{\sigma} I_1, C := I_2, D := I_3, R := \frac{1}{\tau} I_4, S := \frac{1}{\tau} I_5$, checks whether (A, C, D, R, S) is valid on (M, N) and outputs a Groth-Sahai proof of knowledge of (A, C, D, R, S) satisfying (4) for ck.

Fig. 1. Two-move blind-signature protocol.

Definition 4. *Assume an efficiently computable injection* Msg *from* $\{1, \ldots, n_{max}\}$ *to the message space, where* n_{max} *is the maximum length of a message vector. Let* $\mathbf{Sig} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Sign}, \mathsf{Verify})$ *be a signature scheme whose message space contains its public-key space. The* vector transform *of* $\mathbf{Sig}$ *is defined as* $\mathbf{Sig}' = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Sign}', \mathsf{Verify}')$ *with*

$\mathsf{Sign}'_{sk}(M_1, \ldots, M_n)$ *with* $n \le n_{max}$
- $(vk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}$; $(vk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}$; $\ldots$; $(vk_n, sk_n) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}$;
- $\sigma := \big(vk_0, \mathsf{Sign}_{sk}(vk_0), \mathsf{Sign}_{sk_0}(\mathsf{Msg}(n)), \big(vk_i, \mathsf{Sign}_{sk_0}(vk_i), \mathsf{Sign}_{sk_i}(\mathsf{Msg}(i)), \mathsf{Sign}_{sk_i}(M_i)\big)_{i=1}^{n}\big)$.

$$\mathsf{Verify}'_{vk}\big((M_1, \ldots, M_n), (vk_0, \sigma_0, \rho_0, (vk_i, \sigma_i, \rho_i, \tau_i)_{i=1}^{n})\big) := \mathsf{Verify}_{vk}(vk_0, \sigma_0) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}_{vk_0}(\mathsf{Msg}(n), \rho_0) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^{n} \big(\mathsf{Verify}_{vk_0}(vk_i, \sigma_i) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}_{vk_i}(\mathsf{Msg}(i), \rho_i) \wedge \mathsf{Verify}_{vk_i}(M_i, \tau_i)\big).$$

It is easily seen that if Verify is a disjunction of paring-product equations, then so is Verify'. The signatures of the transform of $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$ on a length-n vector are of size $12 + 17n$ group elements. This is however the most general transform. If message vectors have some predefined structure (e.g., they are *signatures* as defined in Sect. 5.4), so that mixing and truncating is unlikely to result in a valid message, then *one* temporary key per message that signs all components suffices. The signature size is then $7 + 5n$ $\mathbb{G}$-elements. The following is proven in Appendix B.1.

Theorem 3. *If* $\mathbf{Sig}$ *is secure against EUF-CMA, then so is* $\mathbf{Sig}'$.

5.3 Blind Automorphic Signatures

We construct *blind signatures* based on the scheme $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$ from Def. 3. Intuitively, a blind signature is a Groth-Sahai proof of knowledge of a signature (which is precisely what we will use to achieve anonymity in our applications in Sect. 6). By witness indistinguishability of the proof system, two proofs of knowledge of different signatures on the same message (and under the same public key) are indistinguishable. Thus, it remains to ensure that the signer does not learn the message from a user that runs Obtain. The latter thus *blinds* the message by multiplying it by some randomness and committing to it. The signer then produces a pre-signature from which, by removing the randomness, the user obtains a signature of which he publishes commitments $\vec{\mathbf{c}}$ to its components and a proof π of validity. The details of the protocol are given in Fig. 1 (cf. Remark 1). Blind signatures $(\vec{\mathbf{c}}, \pi)$ are verified by checking $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, E_{\mathsf{Ver}_{\mathrm{A}}}, \vec{\mathbf{c}}, \vec{\pi})$, with $E_{\mathsf{Ver}_{\mathrm{A}}}$ being Equation (4). Note that the scheme remains automorph, since commitments and proofs are group elements verified by checking PPEs.

Remark 1 (On the Proof of Knowledge.). The protocol in Fig. 1 requires a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of σ and τ such that $Z = \sigma T$ and $Z = \tau J_2$, where Z is only given as a commitment. The proof is simply a proof of knowledge of *logarithms satisfying linear equations*: Let $(\mathbf{u}_1, \mathbf{u}_2, \mathbf{u}_3)$ be the linear commitment key (cf. [GS08]), let $\mathbf{c}_Z = (\sum s_i u_{i,1}, \sum s_i u_{i,2}, Z + \sum s_i u_{i,3})$. Then we prove knowledge of $(s_1, s_2, s_3, \sigma, \tau)$ such that

$$\mathbf{c}_1 = \textstyle\sum s_i u_{i,1} \qquad \mathbf{c}_2 = \sum s_i u_{i,2} \qquad \mathbf{c}_3 = \sigma T + \sum s_i u_{i,3} \qquad \mathbf{c}_3 = \tau J_2 + \sum s_i u_{i,3}$$

We can thus use interactive Schnorr-like proofs [Sch90] as exhibited in Appendix C.

Remark 2 (Signing Committed Values). The core building block for P-signatures [BCKL08] is an interactive protocol allowing a user that published a commitment to obtain a signature on the committed value. If we define Step 1a of our blind-signature protocol to precede the protocol we get exactly this.

Theorem 4. *Under Assumptions 2 and 3 and DLIN, the scheme in Figure 1 is an unforgeable blind-signature scheme.*

See Appendix B.2 for a proof. If we use interactive concurrent-zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (cf. Appendix C), we get a 5-round protocol. The plain signature consists of 5 group elements (GE) satisfying 2 linear and 1 general equation. Committing to the signature yields $5{\cdot}3$ GE and the Groth-Sahai proofs consist of $2{\cdot}3 + 9$ GE. The size of a blind signature is thus 30 GE.

5.4 Signatures on Signatures

For applications requiring automorphic signatures on *signatures*,[5] we suggest the scheme $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$ (Def. 2) for the signatures to be signed, since its signatures fit the message space: a signature on a message/signature pair $(M, N, A, C, D, R, S) \in \mathbb{G}^7$ is a signature on the vector (cf. Sect. 5.2) of messages $\big((M, N), (C, D), (R, S)\big) \in \mathcal{DH}^3$. (Note that it is not necessary to sign A, as it is fully determined by these elements.)

6 Applications

We present various applications of automorphic signatures and their extensions. However, we merely sketch the application areas, as going into details would be beyond the scope of this paper.

6.1 Fully-Secure Group Signatures

In order to implement the model for group signatures by [BSZ05], Groth [Gro07] uses the following ingredients to achieve CCA-anonymity: the tag-based encryption scheme[6] $\mathbf{Enc}_{\mathrm{tb}}$ by Kiltz [Kil06] and a strong one-time signature scheme[7] $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{ot}}$.

A user produces a signature key pair (vk, sk) and is enrolled by the issuer who gives her a *certificate* $cert$ on vk. Now to make a group signature on a message M, the user holding $(cert, vk, sk)$ generates a key pair $(vk_{\mathrm{ot}}, sk_{\mathrm{ot}})$ for $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{ot}}$ and makes a signature sig on vk_{ot} under vk (we call $(cert, vk, sig)$ a *certified signature*). She produces a Groth-Sahai WI proof of knowledge π of $(cert, vk, sig)$ s.t. $cert$ is a

[5] A potential application is electronic cash, where a *coin* is basically a signature by the bank. In order to prosecute double-spending, one could have a user sign the coin when spending it.

[6] A tag-based encryption scheme [MRY04] is a public-key encryption scheme whose encryption and decryption algorithms take as additional argument a *tag*. A scheme is *selective-tag weakly CCA-secure* if an adversary outputting a tag t^* and two messages and getting an encryption of one of them under t^* cannot decide which one was encrypted—even when provided with an oracle decrypting any ciphertext for tags $t \neq t^*$.

[7] A signature scheme is *strongly one-time*, if no adversary granted a single weak chosen-message query can output a new signed message nor a new signature on the queried message. Groth uses the weak Boneh-Boyen signature from [BB04].

valid certificate on vk and sig is a signature on vk_{ot} valid under vk. She produces an $\mathbf{Enc}_{\text{tb}}$-ciphertext C encrypting sig under tag vk_{ot} and adds a Groth-Sahai NIZK proof ζ that the encrypted value sig is the same as in π. Using sk_{ot}, she finally makes a signature sig_{ot} on $(M, vk_{\text{ot}}, \pi, C, \zeta)$ and outputs the group signature $\sigma = (vk_{\text{ot}}, \pi, C, \zeta, sig_{\text{ot}})$.

[FPV09] suggest to replace the certified-signature scheme based on the "q-U Assumption" by one based on the more natural DHSDH. Their substitute however uses Waters signatures [Wat05] which entail a dramatic increase of the public-key size. This is avoided by instead using the two-level construction $\mathbf{Sig}_{\text{2FPV}}$ given before Def. 3 (based on DHSDH as well), which actually *is* a certified-signature scheme: certificates are signatures on user verification keys (xG, xH); messages are of the form (mG, mL) and signatures use parameters (G, L, K, T). The certificate-verification key is an element of $\mathbb{G}$ (whereas in the construction of [Gro07] it consists of two elements of $\mathbb{G}$ and one of $\mathbb{G}_T$).

6.2 P-Signatures and Anonymous Credentials

In order to realize *non-interactive anonymous credentials*, Belenkiy et al. [BCKL08] introduce a new primitive: A *P-signature* scheme extends a signature scheme and a commitment scheme by the following functionalities: a protocol $\mathsf{Issue} \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Obtain}$ between a signer and a user allows the latter to obtain a signature on a value the signer only knows a commitment to; the holder of a message and a signature on it can produce a commitment to the message and a proof of knowledge of the signature; finally, two commitments can be proven to be to the same value.

The commitments and proofs are instantiated by the Groth-Sahai methodology; the compatible signature scheme is the one discussed in Sect. 1. Our scheme $\mathbf{Sig}_{\text{A}}$, combined with the modified blind-signature protocol from Remark 2, lends itself to replace their scheme in order to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings: it avoids the "TDH"-assumption, actual message/signature pairs can be extracted from the proofs (rather than a function of them) and it provides an efficient $\mathsf{Issue} \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Obtain}$-protocol (the one in [BCKL08] resorts to generic secure multiparty computation).

6.3 Anonymous Delegation of Signing Rights

Anonymous Proxy Signatures. Anonymous proxy signatures (APS) generalize group signatures in that everyone can become a group manager by delegating his signing rights to other users who can then sign is his name while remaining anonymous. Moreover, received rights can be *re-delegated* consecutively. We give a brief overview of the model defined by Fuchsbauer and Pointcheval [FP08].

Algorithm Setup establishes the public parameters. *Users* generate key pairs using KeyGen and run a protocol Reg with the *issuer* and their *opener* when joining the system. (This is essential to achieve traceability; see below.) To delegate to Bob, Alice runs Delgt on Bob's public key, which produces a *warrant* that she gives to Bob. With this warrant, Bob can either sign, or *re-delegate* to Carol, in which case Carol can again re-delegate or produce an *anonymous proxy signature* with PSign on behalf of Alice, which is verifiable by Verify on Alice's verification key.

Anonymity ensures that from a proxy signature one cannot tell who actually signed (or re-delegated), thus Bob and Carol remain anonymous. To prevent misuse, Alice's *opener* can revoke the anonymity of the intermediate delegators and the proxy signer. *Traceability* asserts that every valid signature can be opened to registered users and *non-frameability* guarantees that no adversary, even when colluding with the issuer, openers and other users, can produce a signature that opens to an honest user for a delegation or a signing she did not perform.

A Generic Construction. The generic construction by [FP08] proving feasibility of the model is as follows. Assume an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme. The issuer and the users choose a key pair each. When enrolling, a user U_i obtains a signature $cert_i$ on her verification key vk_i from the issuer. A warrant $warr_{1\to 2}$ from user U_1 to user U_2 is a signature on (vk_1, vk_2) valid under vk_1. U_2 re-delegates

to U_3 by sending $warr_{1\to 2}$ and $warr_{2\to 3}$, a signature on (vk_1, vk_2, vk_3) under vk_2. Additionally, in each delegation step, the delegators' certificates are also passed on. Given a warrant $(warr_{1\to 2}, warr_{2\to 3})$, U_3 proxy-signs a message M on behalf of U_1 as follows: produce a signature sig on (vk_1, vk_2, vk_3, M) using sk_3. Define the *plain* proxy signature as $(warr_{1\to 2}, vk_2, cert_2, warr_{2\to 3}, vk_3, cert_3, sig)$. A general plain proxy signature $\Sigma = (warr_{1\to 2}, \ldots, vk_k, cert_k, sig)$ on message M is valid if:

- $\forall i$: $cert_i$ is valid under the issuer's verification key
- $\forall i$: $warr_{i\to i+1}$ is a signature on $(vk_1, \ldots, vk_{i+1})$ valid under vk_i (7)
- sig is a signature on $(vk_1, \ldots, vk_k, M)$ valid under vk_k

Now to transform this into an *anonymous* proxy signature, the signer encrypts Σ under the public key of U_1's opener and adds a zero-knowledge proof that the plaintext satisfies the above. Due to her decryption key, the opener can retrieve the plain signature and thus trace delegators and the signer.

Concrete Instantiations. Restricting the model to CPA-anonymity, the building blocks can be instantiated as follows: define encryption to be linear commitments (which can be "decrypted" due to extractability) and use Groth-Sahai proofs to show that the verification relations are satisfied by the committed values. For this however to work, the plain proxy signatures must fit the Groth-Sahai framework, meaning in particular that the signature-verification keys and signatures must be group elements satisfying paring-product equations.

Fuchsbauer and Pointcheval [FP09] follow this overall approach using basically Groth-Sahai proofs in the *subgroup-decision* [BGN05] instantiation, which confines their scheme to one general opener (once the bilinear group is fixed there is only one key pair for encryption). The compatible EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme they construct has several shortcomings: besides being based on an unusual new assumption (not proven to hold in generic groups), it is far from being practical, since a public key contains several commitments to each *bit* of the secret key. Moreover, it imposes a fixed maximum number of re-delegations within one signature.

Replacing their scheme by $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$ (Sect. 4), which meets the necessary conditions, and using the DLIN instantiation of Groth-Sahai, we circumvent all these shortcomings, getting an efficient scheme based on reasonable assumptions. Moreover, we satisfy the model of [FP08] since we can assume several openers each publishing her own commitment key (due to our DLIN-based proofs), we do not impose a limit on the number of re-delegations, and below we show how to achieve CCA-anonymity.

CCA-Anonymous Proxy Signatures. The reason why Groth's construction sketched in Sect. 6.1 yields CCA-anonymous group signatures (i.e., anonymity holds against adversaries provided with an opening oracle) is the following: in the proof of anonymity, one substitutes the opener's commitment key by a perfectly hiding one, which results in perfectly random commitments and non-leaking proofs; however—due to the encryption—one can still answer the adversary's opening queries.

In order to achieve CCA-anonymity, we transform our APS scheme analogously. A proxy signer holding $W := (vk_1, (warr_i, cert_i, vk_i)_{i=2}^{k}, sk_k)$ makes a signature as follows: first choose $(vk_{\mathrm{ot}}, sk_{\mathrm{ot}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathrm{ot}}$, sign vk_{ot} (instead of M) with sk_k yielding sig, make commitments $\vec{\mathbf{c}}$ to the elements of W and sig, and add a WI proof ϕ_j for each equation E_j in (7)—as in the original scheme.

In addition, for $2 \le i \le k$ compute an $\mathbf{Enc}_{\mathrm{tb}}$-encryption C_i of vk_i under tag vk_{ot} and make a NIZK proof ζ_i for the plaintext of C_i being the value committed in $\mathbf{c}_{vk_i}$. Finally compute $sig_{\mathrm{ot}} := \mathsf{Sign}_{\mathrm{ot}}(sk_{\mathrm{ot}}, (vk_{\mathrm{ot}}, M, \vec{\mathbf{c}}, \vec{\phi}, \vec{C}, \vec{\zeta}))$ and output the signature $(vk_{\mathrm{ot}}, \vec{\mathbf{c}}, \vec{\phi}, \vec{C}, \vec{\zeta}, sig_{\mathrm{ot}})$. A signature is *valid* if sig_{ot} is valid under vk_{ot}, the proofs ϕ_j are valid for all j, and the proofs ζ_i and the ciphertexts C_i are valid for all i.

6.4 Extending the Anonymous-Proxy-Signature Model

We give an instantiation of the extended model of APS discussed in Sect. 1, offering a different view on delegatable anonymous credentials.

Blind Delegation. Using the variant of our blind-signature protocol discussed in Remark 2, we can define *blind delegation*: Given a commitment of a verification key, a user can delegate her signing rights to the holder of that key without learning her identity.

Delegator Anonymity. Due to modularity of Groth-Sahai proofs (for each equation its proof only depends on the commitments to the variables appearing in it), the "anonymization" of a signature need not be delayed until the proxy signing, rather can warrants be anonymized by the delegators already. However, this necessitates a revision of the way warrants are constructed, since the present scheme requires knowledge of the identities of all previous delegators to make a warrant. We follow the general approach by [BCC+09], associating an identifier id to each original delegation. A warrant from the user at level i to the next one is then a signature on $(\mathsf{Hash}(id \| i), vk_{i+1})$ under vk_i. The hash value prevents combining of different warrants and reordering within the same warrant.

Consider the following situation (we simplify our exposition by omitting the certificates from the issuer): Oliver (the **o**riginal delegator), owning vk_O, delegates to Alice by giving her a signature $warr_{O\to A}$ on her key vk_A. Alice delegates to Bob sending him $(warr_{O\to A}, warr_{A\to B})$. Bob can now delegate to Carol *without revealing Alice's identity*: He makes commitments $\mathbf{c}_{O\to A}$, $\mathbf{c}_A$ and $\mathbf{c}_{A\to B}$ to $warr_{O\to A}$, vk_A and $warr_{A\to B}$, respectively. Moreover, he makes a *trivial* commitment $\mathbf{c}_B := \mathsf{Com}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, vk_B, 0)$ to his own key, and the following proofs: $\phi_{O\to A}$ for $\mathbf{c}_{O\to A}$ containing a valid warrant from vk_O to the content of $\mathbf{c}_A$, and $\phi_{A\to B}$ for $\mathbf{c}_{A\to B}$ containing a valid warrant from the content of $\mathbf{c}_A$ to that of $\mathbf{c}_B$. He sends Carol $\widetilde{warr} := (\mathbf{c}_A, \mathbf{c}_{O\to A}, \phi_{O\to A}, \mathbf{c}_B, \mathbf{c}_{A\to B}, \phi_{A\to B})$ and a warrant $warr_{B\to C}$.

Now, Carol produces a signature on behalf of Oliver on M as follows (re-delegation works analogously): make a signature sig on M under vk_C; *randomize* the commitments and adapt the proofs in $\widetilde{warr}$, in particular, set $\mathbf{c}'_B := \mathsf{RdCom}_{\mathrm{GS}}(ck, \mathbf{c}_B, \rho_B)$ for $\rho_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$; make commitments to $warr_{B\to C}$, vk_C and sig, and proofs of validity for $warr_{B\to C}$ and sig. Note that the first proof requires the randomness of the related commitments—in particular $\mathbf{c}'_B$. Since $\mathbf{c}_B$ was a trivial commitment, the randomness of $\mathbf{c}'_B$ is ρ_B, which was chosen by Carol.

Remark 3. (1) Note that delegator-anonymous delegation is compatible with blind delegation: instead of simply sending $warr_{B\to C}$, Bob runs the interactive blind-issuing protocol with Carol, upon which she obtains $warr_{B\to C}$ and continues as above.

(2) Bob could even hide *his own identity* to Carol as follows: he additionally sends (hiding) commitments to his own key and to $warr_{B\to C}$, a trivial commitment to Carol's key and a proof of validity of $warr_{B\to C}$. Carol randomizes what Bob sent her, commits to a signature on the message and proves validity. Unlike the above, unfortunately this is not compatible with blind delegation.

Multiple Original Delegators. If we allow delegation to take the form of a tree (whose leaves represent original delegators) rather than a list, we can define proxy signatures on behalf of several originators. For example, consider three original delegators O, P, Q, the first of which delegates to A who in turn re-delegates to B. B is also delegated by P and re-delegates the rights for both O and P to C. Moreover Q delegates to C. Now C can produce a signature on behalf of O, P and Q.

In general, we define a *multi-originator signature* recursively: A (plain) signature consists of a signature on the message, the signer's verification key and a list of objects "*del*" for the signer. A *del for a user* U is either a warrant from an originator for U or a warrant from a user U', the verification key of U' and a list of *del*'s for U'. A signature on behalf of a set of originators is valid if the signature on the message is valid, all warrants are valid and it contains a warrant from each of the originators. As for the single-originator case, a plain signature is anonymized by committing to its components and adding proofs of validity.

For the above example, a signature on behalf of O, P and Q by C then has the following form (let $\psi_{U_1\to U_2}$ denote $\mathbf{c}_{U_1\to U_2} \| \phi_{U_1\to U_2}$, and let ψ_M denote a commitment to sig and a proof of validity):

$$\Big\{\psi_M, \mathbf{c}_C, \big\{\big\{\psi_{B\to C}, \mathbf{c}_B, \{\{\psi_{A\to B}, \mathbf{c}_A, \psi_{O\to A}\}, \psi_{P\to B}\}\big\}, \psi_{Q\to C}\big\}\Big\} .$$

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A The *q*-DAHSDH Assumption

A.1 A Note on DAHSDH

To make $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{FPV}}$ (Def. 2) an automorphic scheme without the detour via a transient key, one could be tempted to simply expand the public key by $Y = (\log_G X)H$ and assume a variant of DHSDH where Y is given as part of the instance.

However, this assumption is wrong, as it succumbs to the following attack: Given an instance, set $A^* := -A_1$, $C^* := -2X - C_1$, $D^* := -2Y - D_1$, $V^* := V_1$, $W^* := W_1$. Then we have $e(A^*, X + C^*) = e(-A_1, -C_1) = e(K + V_1, G) = e(K + V^*, G)$. The attack comes from the fact that we can use X to build C^* since given Y, the "shadow" of X, we are able to construct the shadow of C^*.

This is what makes it indispensable to use a different basis for the shadow of C, leading to a generically secure assumption, as proven below.

A.2 Generic Security of the *q*-DAHSDH Assumption

We restate the assumption for convenience:

(q-DAHSDH) Given $(G, F, H, K, X = xG, Y = xH)$ and $q - 1$ tuples

$$\left(A_i = \tfrac{1}{x+c_i}(K + v_i G),\ C_i = c_i G,\ D_i = c_i F,\ V_i = v_i G,\ W_i = v_i H\right) ,$$

with $c_i, v_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ for $i = 1, \ldots, q-1$, it is hard to output a new tuple $(A^*, C^*, D^*, V^*, W^*)$ that satisfies

$$e(A^*, X + C^*) = e(K + V^*, G) \qquad e(C^*, F) = e(G, D^*) \qquad e(V^*, H) = e(G, W^*) \ . \quad (1)$$

Theorem 5. *The q-DAHSDH assumption holds in generic bilinear groups when q is a polynomial.*

Proof. We assume that the reader is familiar with the methodology of proofs in the generic group model and thus focus on our particular assumption. We work with the "discrete-log" representation of all group elements w.r.t. basis G. A q-DAHSDH instance is thus represented by the following rational fractions:

$$1,\ f,\ h,\ k,\ x,\ xh,\ \{a_i = \tfrac{k+v_i}{x+c_i},\ c_i,\ c_i f,\ v_i,\ v_i h\}_{i=1}^{q-1} \tag{2}$$

Considering the logarithms of the $\mathbb{G}_T$-elements in (1) w.r.t. the basis $e(G,G)$ yields

$$a^*(x+c^*) = k + v^* \qquad\qquad d^* = c^* f \qquad\qquad w^* = v^* h \tag{3}$$

In a generic group, all the adversary can do is apply the group operation to the elements of its input. We will show that the only linear combinations $(a^*, c^*, d^*, v^*, w^*)$ of elements in (2) satisfying (3) are $(a^* = a_i, c^* = c_i, d^* = c_i f, v^* = v_i, w^* = v_i h)$ for some i; which means all the adversary can do is return a quintuple from the instance. We make the following ansatz for a^*:

$$a^* = \alpha + \alpha_f f + \alpha_h h + \alpha_k k + \alpha_x x + \alpha_y xh + \textstyle\sum \alpha_{a_i} \frac{k+v_i}{x+c_i} + \sum \alpha_{c,i} c_i + \sum \alpha_{d,i} c_i f + \sum \alpha_{v,i} v_i + \sum \alpha_{w,i} v_i h$$

Since for any c^* the adversary forms, it has to produce $c^* f$ as well, we can limit the elements used for c^* to those of which their product with f is also given: 1 and c_i (for all i). The same argument holds for v^* and elements for which we have their products with h. We set thus

$$c^* = \gamma + \textstyle\sum \gamma_{c,i} c_i \qquad\qquad v^* = \mu + \mu_x x + \sum \mu_{v,i} v_i$$

which implicitly satisfies the last two equations of (3) since d^* and w^* can then be defined as

$$d^* = \gamma f + \textstyle\sum \gamma_{c,i} c_i f \qquad\qquad w^* = \mu h + \mu_x xh + \sum \mu_{v,i} v_i h$$

We substitute a^*, c^*, v^* by their ansätze in the first equation of (3), that is $a^*(x+c^*) - v^* = k$. After some rearranging we get

$$(\alpha\gamma - \mu)\ 1 \ +\ (\alpha_f\gamma)\ f \ +\ (\alpha_h\gamma)\ h \ +\ (\alpha + \alpha_x\gamma - \mu_x)\ x \ +\ (\alpha_h + \alpha_y\gamma)\ xh \ + \tag{4a}$$

$$\textstyle\sum (\alpha_{a,i}\gamma)\ \frac{k+v_i}{x+c_i} \ +\ \sum (\alpha_{c,i}\gamma + \alpha\gamma_{c,i})\ c_i \ +\ \sum (\alpha_{d,i}\gamma + \alpha_f\gamma_{c,i})\ c_i f \ +\ \sum (\alpha_{w,i}\gamma)\ v_i h \ + \tag{4b}$$

$$(\alpha_f)\ xf \ +\ (\alpha_k)\ xk \ +\ (\alpha_x)\ x^2 \ +\ (\alpha_y)\ x^2 h \ +\ \textstyle\sum (\alpha_{v,i})\ v_i x \ +\ \sum (\alpha_{w,i})\ v_i xh \ + \tag{4c}$$

$$\textstyle\sum (\alpha_{c,i} + \alpha_x\gamma_{c,i})\ c_i x \ +\ \sum (\alpha_{d,i})\, c_i xf \ +\ \sum (\alpha_h\gamma_{c,i})\, c_i h \ +\ \sum (\alpha_k\gamma_{c,i})\, c_i k \ +\ \sum (\alpha_y\gamma_{c,i})\, xc_i h \ + \tag{4d}$$

$$\textstyle\sum\sum (\alpha_{c,i}\gamma_{c,j})\, c_i c_j \ +\ \sum\sum (\alpha_{d,i}\gamma_{c,j})\, c_i c_j f \ +\ \sum\sum (\alpha_{v,i}\gamma_{c,j})\, v_i c_j \ +\ \sum\sum (\alpha_{w,i}\gamma_{c,j})\, v_i c_j h \ + \tag{4e}$$

$$\underbrace{(\alpha_k\gamma)}_{=:\lambda_k}\ k \ +\ \sum \underbrace{(\alpha_{v,i}\gamma - \mu_{v,i})}_{=:\lambda_{v,i}}\ v_i \ +\ \sum \underbrace{(\alpha_{a,i})}_{=:\lambda_{xa,i}}\ \tfrac{x(k+v_i)}{x+c_i} \ +\ \sum\sum \underbrace{(\alpha_{a,i}\gamma_{c,j})}_{=:\lambda_{ca,i,j}}\ \tfrac{c_j(k+v_i)}{x+c_i} \quad = \quad k \tag{4f}$$

Comparison of coefficients[8] of the two sides of the equation shows that all coefficients in lines (4a)–(4e) must be 0, whereas for the last line we have a different situation: Adding $\frac{x(k+v_i)}{x+c_i}$ and $\frac{c_i(k+v_i)}{x+c_i}$ reduces to $k + v_i$ (but this is the only combination that reduces). We have thus

$$\lambda_{xa,i} = \lambda_{ca,i,i} \quad \text{for all } i \qquad\qquad \lambda_{ca,i,j} = 0 \quad \text{for all } i \neq j \tag{5}$$

and moreover

$$\text{coefficient of } k\text{:} \quad \textstyle\sum \lambda_{xa,i} + \lambda_k = 1 \qquad\qquad \text{coefficient of } v_i\text{:} \quad \lambda_{xa,i} + \lambda_{v,i} = 0 \tag{6}$$

[8] To do straightforward comparison of coefficients, we actually would have to multiply the equation by $\prod_{i=1}^{q-1}(x+c_i)$ first. For the sake of presentation, we keep the fractions and instead introduce new equations for the cases where a linear combination leads to a fraction that cancels down.

We now solve the equations "all coefficients in Lines (4a) to (4e) equal 0", and Equations (5) and (6) for $\big(\alpha, \alpha_f, \alpha_h, \alpha_k, \alpha_x, \alpha_y, \gamma, \mu, \mu_x, \{\alpha_{a_i}, \alpha_{c,i}, \alpha_{d,i}, \alpha_{v,i}, \alpha_{w,i}, \gamma_{c,i}, \mu_{v,i}\}\big)$:

Line (4c) and the second term in Line (4d) immediately yield: $\alpha_f = \alpha_k = \alpha_x = \alpha_y = \alpha_{v,i} = \alpha_{w,i} = \alpha_{d,i} = 0$ for all i. Now $\alpha_y = 0$ implies $\alpha_h = 0$ by the last term in (4a), and $\alpha_x = 0$ implies $\alpha_{c,i} = 0$ for all i by the first term in in (4d). The first equations in (5) and (6) give

$$\alpha_{a,i}(1 - \gamma_{c,i}) = 0 \quad \text{for all } i \qquad\qquad \sum \alpha_{a,i} + \alpha_k \gamma \overset{(\alpha_k=0)}{=} \sum \alpha_{a,i} = 1 \tag{7}$$

which together imply that for some i: $\gamma_{c,i} \neq 0$. The second term in (4b) requires that for all i: $\alpha_{c,i}\gamma + \alpha\gamma_{c,i} \overset{(\alpha_{c,i}=0)}{=} \alpha\gamma_{c,i} = 0$, thus $\alpha = 0$ since some $\gamma_{c,i} \neq 0$. Combining this with $\alpha_x = 0$ and the the fourth term in (4a), we get $\mu_x = 0$. The first term in (4b) and the second equation in (7) implies $\gamma = 0$, which yields $\mu = 0$ by the first term in in (4a). The only variables not shown to be 0 so far are $\{\alpha_{a,i}, \gamma_{c,i}, \mu_{v,i}\}$.

We show that there exists exactly one index i^* such that $\alpha_{a,i^*} \neq 0$: if we had $i \neq j$ s.t. $\alpha_{a,i} \neq 0$ and $\alpha_{a,j} \neq 0$ then by the first equation in (7) we would have $\gamma_{c,i} = \gamma_{c,j} = 1$. This however contradicts the second equation in (5) which states $\alpha_{a,i}\gamma_{c,j} = 0$ for all $i \neq j$. The same equation ensures that $\gamma_j = 0$ for all $j \neq i^*$. We have $\gamma_{c,i^*} = 1$ by (7) and by the last equation of (6): $\alpha_{a,i} + \alpha_{v,i}\gamma - \mu_{v,i} \overset{(\gamma=0)}{=} \alpha_{a,i} - \mu_{v,i} = 0$, we have $\alpha_{a,i} = \mu_{v,i}$ for all i.

We proved thus that there exists a i^* such that $a^* = \frac{k+v_{i^*}}{x+c_{i^*}}$, $c^* = c_{i^*}$ and $v^* = v_{i^*}$, which means the only tuples $(A^*, C^*, D^*, V^*, W^*)$ satisfying (1) and being generically constructable from a DAHSDH instance are the tuples from that instance. □

B Security Proofs for Extensions of $\mathbf{Sig}_{\mathrm{A}}$

B.1 Proof of Theorem 3

Let q be the maximal number of the adversary's signing queries, let $n_{\max}$ the maximum length of all queried vectors and the output vector. Let $\vec{M}^{(i)} := (M_1^{(i)}, \ldots, M_{n_i}^{(i)})$ denote the adversary's i-th signing query, let $\sigma^{(i)}$ denote the response, and let

$$\big(\, \vec{M}^* := (M_1^*, \ldots, M_{n^*}^*),\ \sigma^* := (vk_0^*, \sigma_0^*, (\sigma_i^*, \rho_i^*, \tau_i^*)_{i=1}^{n^*}) \,\big)$$

be the adversary's final output. Let vk be a challenge for **Sig**. We distinguish four types of forgers and give the appropriate reduction:

1. $\forall i : vk_0^* \neq vk_0^{(i)}$. Set vk to be the challenge verification key given to the adversary and answer signing queries by choosing (vk_0, sk_0), querying vk_0 to the Sign-oracle and using sk_0 to sign the vector entries and indices. If σ^* is of Type 1, then (vk_0^*, σ_0^*) is a forgery under vk.
2. $\exists i : vk_0^* = vk_0^{(i)}$ and: $\exists j\ \forall k : vk_j^* \neq vk_k^{(i)}$ or $n^* \neq n_i$. Choose $i^* \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, q\}$. Produce $(vk', sk') \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(1^k)$ and give the adversary vk' as challenge. Answer all queries as in the protocol, except for the i^*-th query: Set $vk_0^{(i^*)} := vk$, choose keys $(vk_j^{(i^*)}, sk_j^{(i^*)})$ and query signatures on $vk_j^{(i^*)}$ to the Sign-oracle. Complete the signature. If σ^* is of Type 2 and we guessed correctly ($i^* = i$) then (vk_j^*, σ_j^*) or (n^*G, ρ_0^*) is a forgery under vk.
3. $\exists i : vk_0^* = vk_0^{(i)}$, $n^* = n_i$, and $\forall j\ \exists k_j : vk_j^* = vk_{k_j}^{(i)}$ and $\exists j : M_j^* \neq M_{k_j}^{(i)}$. We choose $i^* \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, q\}$ and $j^* \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n_{\max}\}$ and set $vk_{j^*}^{(i^*)} := vk$. On guessing correctly ($i^* = i$ and $j^* = j$), (M_j^*, τ_j^*) is a forgery.
4. $\exists i : vk_0^* = vk_0^{(i)}$, $n^* = n_i$, and $\forall j\ \exists k_j : vk_j^* = vk_{k_j}^{(i)}$ and $\forall j : M_j^* = M_{k_j}^{(i)}$. Since $\vec{M}^*$ is a new message of equal length, there must be a j s.t. $k_j \neq j$. We set vk as for Type 3. On guessing correctly, (jG, ρ_j^*) is a forgery under vk.

□

B.2 Proof of Theorem 4

The protocol is correct: The signer sends $I_1 = \frac{1}{x+c}(J_1 + rJ_2) = \frac{\sigma}{x+c}(K + M + \frac{r}{\tau}T)$, $I_4 = rG$, $I_5 = rH$, The user then sets $A = \frac{1}{\sigma}I_1 = \frac{1}{x+c}(K + \frac{r}{\tau}T + M)$, $R = \frac{r}{\tau}G$, $S = \frac{r}{\tau}H$, which together with C and D constitutes a valid signature.

Blindness requires the following: *If we are given two messages from the signer and run* Obtain *twice for these messages (in arbitrary order) with it, and then give the two produced signature/message pairs, then the signer cannot relate them to their issuings.*

Replacing ck by a perfectly hiding key is computationally indistinguishable. Consider the signer's view after Step 1: $(\mathbf{c}_M, \mathbf{c}_N, \phi, J_1, J_2, \mathbf{c}_Z, \psi, \zeta)$, where ζ denotes a transcript of the ZK proof in Step 1d. Let $(M, N) \in \mathcal{DH}$ be arbitrarily fixed. Then there exist σ, τ consistent with J_1, J_2 and M. Define $Z := \sigma T$. Now due to witness indistinguishability of Groth-Sahai commitments and proofs, $\mathbf{c}_M, \mathbf{c}_N, \mathbf{c}_Z$ are perfectly random and the proofs ϕ, ψ leak no information other than the equations being satisfied. Moreover, ζ is zero-knowledge, thus in the WI setting, (M, N) remains information-theoretically hidden. WI of the proof of knowledge of the signature the users publishes in the end ensures that the signers learns nothing either.

Unforgeability means: *After running the protocol $q-1$ times with an honest signer, no adversary can output q different messages and valid signatures on them.*

We reduce unforgeability to the security of the underlying signature scheme $\mathbf{Sig}_A$ (Theorem 2): We compute ck using ExSetup; thus from a successful adversary's output, we can extract a signature $(A^*, C^*, D^*, R^*, S^*)$ on a new message. To simulate the protocol, we do the following: in the first step, we extract (M, N) from the commitments, and σ and τ from the proof of knowledge. We then query our own oracle for a signature on (M, N). On receiving (A, C, D, R, S), we give the receiver $(\sigma A, C, D, \tau R, \tau S)$. □

C An Interactive Instantiation of the Proof of Knowledge

In Sect. 5.3, we require the following proof of knowledge:

Let $(u_{i,j})_{i,j=1,2,3} \in \mathbb{G}^9$, let $T, J \in \mathbb{G}$. Given an instance $(c_1, c_2, c_3) \in \mathbb{G}^3$, we prove knowledge of $(s_1, s_2, s_3, \sigma, \tau)$ such that

$$c_1 = \sum s_i u_{i,1} \qquad c_2 = \sum s_i u_{i,2} \qquad c_3 = \sigma T + \sum s_i u_{i,3} \qquad c_3 = \tau J + \sum s_i u_{i,3}$$

Let ck be a perfectly binding commitment key.

- The verifier sends a commitment to a random value $k \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ under ck.
- The prover chooses $r_1, r_2, r_3, \alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sends

$$R_1 := \sum r_i u_{i,1} \qquad R_2 := \sum r_i u_{i,2} \qquad R_3 := \alpha T + \sum r_i u_{i,3} \qquad R_4 := \beta J + \sum r_i u_{i,3}$$

- The verifier opens his commitment to k
- The prover answers

$$d_1 := r_1 - k s_1 \qquad d_2 := r_2 - k s_2 \qquad d_3 := r_3 - k s_3 \qquad \delta := \alpha - k\sigma \qquad \varepsilon := \beta - k\tau$$

- The verifier accepts the proof if

$$\sum d_i u_{i,1} = R_1 - k c_1 \qquad \delta T + \sum d_i u_{i,3} = R_3 - k c_3$$
$$\sum d_i u_{i,2} = R_2 - k c_2 \qquad \varepsilon T + \sum d_i u_{i,3} = R_4 - k c_3$$

The proof is zero-knowledge: Given an instance (c_1, c_2, c_3), we simulate the prover. Run the protocol by picking random values R_i, and let the verifier open its commitment to k. Now rewind it to the state after committing. Choose random values $(d_1, d_2, d_3, \delta, \varepsilon) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and send $R_1 := \sum d_i u_{i,1} + kc_1$, $R_2 := \sum d_i u_{i,2} + kc_2$, $R_3 := \delta T + \sum d_i u_{i,3} + kc_3$, $R_4 := \varepsilon T + \sum d_i u_{i,3} + kc_3$. Finish the protocol by sending $(d_1, d_2, d_3, \delta, \varepsilon)$.

The proof proves knowledge: To extract knowledge from the prover, we simulate the verifier. We set the commitment key *ck* to produce equivocable commitments and run the protocol with the prover. After finishing, we rewind the prover to its state after sending the R_i's and now open the commitment to a different value k' whereafter the prover sends values $(d'_1, d'_2, d'_3, \delta', \varepsilon')$. Now we have $s_i = \frac{d_i - d'_i}{k' - k}$ for $1 \leq i \leq 3$, $\sigma = \frac{\delta - \delta'}{k' - k}$, $\tau = \frac{\varepsilon - \varepsilon'}{k' - k}$.

Achieving concurrent zero-knowledge: If we use an *extractable* commitment (e.g., by using linear commitments to the bits of k—or sufficiently small blocks of bits) in the first phase of the protocol then we even get *concurrent* zero-knowledge: to simulate a proof we need not rewind the verifier, as we can directly extract the challenge *before* producing the R_i's.