

Data-Depend Hash Algorithm

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Abstract: We study some technologies that people had developed to analyse and attack hash algorithm. We find a way that use data-depend function to resist differential attack. Then we design a hash algorithm that called Data-Depend Hash Algorit(DDHA). And DDHA is simple and strong under differential attack.

Key Word: Hash algorithm, data-depend function

1. Introduction

Hash algorithm is the algorithm that computes a fixed size message digest from arbitrary size messages. After SHA-0 was published, some technologies that analyse and attack hash algorithm is developed. The major technologies is Differential attack. Papers[Wy05, Dau05] has explain the attack.

Differential attack is the best technique to attack hash function. To attack hash function, it need do the work as follow:

1. Constitute a feasible difference path that has good possibility.
2. Constitute the adequate conditions for the difference path.
3. Find some technique to raise the possibility of the difference path.

From mentioned above description of differential attack, it is easy to know that constituting a feasible difference path is the hinge. If it can make it hard to constitute a feasible difference path, it will be hard to attack the hash function. In appenix 1, we know that the data-depend circular shift has good defence feature. And we find a message expansion function that make any difference path will has at least eight data-depend circular shift difference [appenix 2]. This make it hard to constitute a feasible difference path.

At the same time, we study some technologies[1,2] that used to attack hash algorithm, DDHA use some ways to resist these attack ways.

The following operations are applied to 32-bit or 64-bit words in DDHA:

1. \leftarrow variable assignment

2. Bitwise logical word operations: ‘ \wedge ’ – AND , ‘ \vee ’ – OR, ‘ \oplus ’ – XOR and ‘ \neg ’ – Negation.
3. Addition ‘+’ modulo 2^{32} or modulo 2^{64} .
4. The shift right operation, $SHR^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).
5. The shift left operation, $SHL^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).
6. The rotate right (circular right shift) operation, $ROTR^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).
7. The rotate left (circular left shift) operation, $ROTL^n(x)$, where x is a 32-bit or 64-bit word and n is an integer with $0 \leq n < 32$ (resp. $0 \leq n < 64$).

2. Data-Depend Hash Algorithm (DDHA)

DDHA has two hash functions: DDHA-256(32-bitversion), DDHA-512 (64-bitversion). DDHA-256 is used for message no bigger than 2^{64} , DDHA-512 is used for message no bigger than 2^{64} , The properties as follow:

	word	Message size	Block size	Hash value size
DDHA-256	32	$< 2^{64}$	512	256
DDHA-512	64	$< 2^{64}$	1024	512

Properties of DDHA hash functions(size in bits)

In DDHA, the message will be preprocessed. After message is preprocessed, the message will prased in N message blocks, these blocks will be processed with a compression function in order.

2.1 Preprocessing

Preprocessing in DDHA include steps:

- a. padding the message M, parsing the padded message into message blocks,
- b. setting the initial hash value,

2.1.1 Padding and parsing

Suppose that the length of the message M is L bits. Append the bit “1”

to the end of the message, followed by k zero bits, where k is the smallest, non-negative solution to the equation $L+1+k \equiv 448 \pmod{512}$ (resp. $L+1+k \equiv 960 \pmod{1024}$). Then append the 64-bit block that is equal to the number L expressed using a binary representation.

After message is padded, the message will be parsed into N 512-bits(resp. 1024-bits) message blocks.

2.1.2 Initial Hash Value and constants

DDHA use the same initial hash value as that of SHA-2 (given as follow):

DDHA-256	DDHA-512
$H_0^0 = 0x6a09e667,$	$H_0^0 = 0x6a09e667f3bcc908,$
$H_1^0 = 0xbb67ae85,$	$H_1^0 = 0xbb67ae8584caa73b,$
$H_2^0 = 0x3c6ef372,$	$H_2^0 = 0x3c6ef372fe94f82b,$
$H_3^0 = 0xa54ff53a,$	$H_3^0 = 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1,$
$H_4^0 = 0x510e527f,$	$H_4^0 = 0x510e527fade682d1f,$
$H_5^0 = 0x9b05688c,$	$H_5^0 = 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f,$
$H_6^0 = 0x1f83d9ab,$	$H_6^0 = 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b,$
$H_7^0 = 0x5be0cd19,$	$H_7^0 = 0x5be0cd19137e2179,$

The initial hash value for DDHA

DDHA use 32 constant words, these words separate into two parts C1 and C2, C1 as follow:

DDHA-256	DDHA-512
$C1_0 = 0xd76aa478,$	$C1_0 = 0xd76aa478ffa3942,$
$C1_1 = 0xe8c7b756,$	$C1_1 = 0xe8c7b7568771f681,$
$C1_2 = 0x242070db,$	$C1_2 = 0x242070db699d6122,$
$C1_3 = 0xc1bdcee,$	$C1_3 = 0xc1bdceeefde5380c,$
$C1_4 = 0xf57c0faf,$	$C1_4 = 0xf57c0fafa4beea44,$
$C1_5 = 0x4787c62a,$	$C1_5 = 0x4787c62a4bdecfa9,$
$C1_6 = 0xa8304613,$	$C1_6 = 0xa8304613f6bb4b60,$
$C1_7 = 0xfd469501,$	$C1_7 = 0xfd469501bebfbc70,$
$C1_8 = 0x698098d8,$	$C1_8 = 0x698098d8289b7ec6,$
$C1_9 = 0x8b44f7af,$	$C1_9 = 0x8b44f7afaa127fa,$

$C1_{10} = 0xffff5bb1,$	$C1_{10} = 0xffff5bb1d4ef3085,$
$C1_{11} = 0x895cd7be,$	$C1_{11} = 0x895cd7be04881d05,$
$C1_{12} = 0x6b901122,$	$C1_{12} = 0x6b901122d9d4d039,$
$C1_{13} = 0xfd987193,$	$C1_{13} = 0xfd987193e6db99e5,$
$C1_{14} = 0xa679438e,$	$C1_{14} = 0xa679438e1fa27cf8,$
$C1_{15} = 0x49b40821,$	$C1_{15} = 0x49b40821c4ac5665,$

Constants C1 of DDHA

C2 as follow:

DDHA-256	DDHA-512
$C2_0 = 0xf61e2562,$	$C2_0 = 0xf61e2562f4292244,$
$C2_1 = 0xc040b340,$	$C2_1 = 0xc040b340432aff97,$
$C2_2 = 0x265e5a51,$	$C2_2 = 0x265e5a51ab9423a7,$
$C2_3 = 0xe9b6c7aa,$	$C2_3 = 0xe9b6c7aa9c93a039,$
$C2_4 = 0xd62f105d,$	$C2_4 = 0xd62f105d655b59c3,$
$C2_5 = 0x02441453,$	$C2_5 = 0x024414538f0ccc92,$
$C2_6 = 0xd8a1e681,$	$C2_6 = 0xd8a1e681ffeff47d,$
$C2_7 = 0xe7d3fbc8,$	$C2_7 = 0xe7d3fbc885845dd1,$
$C2_8 = 0x21e1cde6,$	$C2_8 = 0x21e1cde66fa87e4f,$
$C2_9 = 0xc33707d6,$	$C2_9 = 0xc33707d6fe2ce6e0,$
$C2_{10} = 0xf4d50d87,$	$C2_{10} = 0xf4d50d87a3014314,$
$C2_{11} = 0x455a14ed,$	$C2_{11} = 0x455a14ed4e0811a1,$
$C2_{12} = 0xa9e3e905,$	$C2_{12} = 0xa9e3e905f7537e82,$
$C2_{13} = 0xfcefa3f8,$	$C2_{13} = 0xfcefa3f8bd3af235,$
$C2_{14} = 0x676f02d9,$	$C2_{14} = 0x676f02d92ad7d2bb,$
$C2_{15} = 0x8d2a4c8a,$	$C2_{15} = 0x8d2a4c8aeb86d391,$

Constants C2 of DDHA

2.2 processing.

If there are N message blocks M_0, \dots, M_{N-1} .

The DDHA has a compression function. The input of compression function include chaining variable(8 words, H_0^i, \dots, H_7^i), message block(16 words, m_0^i, \dots, m_{15}^i), constants(32 words, $C1_0, \dots, C1_{15}, C2_0, \dots, C2_{15}$).

Then the processing as foollow:

```

for j = 0 to 15
    tmj ← 0
next j

```

```

for i = 1 to N - 1
  for j = 0 to 15
    j1 ← j + 1
     $tm_{j1-1} \leftarrow tm_{j1-1} + m_{j1-1}^{i-1}$ 
    if ( $tm_{j1-1} < m_{j1-1}^{i-1}$ ) then
      while j1 < 16
         $tm_{j1} \leftarrow tm_{j1} + 1$ 
        if  $tm_{j1} < 1$  then
          j1 ← j1 + 1
        else
          j1 ← 16
        end if
      end while
    end if
  next j
   $h^i \leftarrow \text{compression}(\text{repeat\_times}, m^{i-1}, h^{i-1}, c1, c2)$ 
next i
 $h^{N-1} \leftarrow \neg h^{N-1}$ 
 $c2 \leftarrow \neg c2$ 
 $c1 \leftarrow c1 \oplus tm$ 
 $h^N \leftarrow \text{compression}(\text{repeat\_times}, m^{N-1}, h^{N-1}, c1, c2)$ 
return  $h^N$ 

```

Processing of DDHA

2.3 compression fuction

The function $\text{compression}(\text{repeat_times}, m, h, ct1, ct2)$ takes as input five values:

- * an integer value repeat_times . User can set repeat_times to get higher intensity. The default value of repeat_times is 1.

- * a chain value $h = h_0, \dots, h_7$

- * a message block $m = m_0, \dots, m_{32}$

- * a Constant $ct1 = ct1_0, \dots, ct1_{15}$

- * a Constant $ct2 = ct2_0, \dots, ct2_{15}$

The compression function use two functions: $\text{sub_round}(m, h, ct1, ct2)$,

message_expansion(m). In DDHA, the word is carved up to sixteen parts, every part is used as parameter of data-depend circular shift once. And in function message_expansion(m), the circular shift operation is based on part not bit.

2.3.1 sub_round(m,h,ct1,ct2)

The function sub_round(m,h,ct1,ct2) takes as input four values:

- * a chain value $h = h_0, \dots, h_7$
- * a message block $m = m_0, \dots, m_{32}$
- * a Constant $ct1 = ct1_0, \dots, ct1_{15}$
- * a Constant $ct2 = ct2_0, \dots, ct2_{15}$

And sub_round(m,h,ct1,ct2) as follow:

```

for i=0 to 15
  im ← i >> 1 + (i mod 2) × 8
  h0 ← (h0 + mim)
  for j=1 to 7
    im1 ← (i >> 1 + j) mod 8 + (i mod 2) × 8
    hj ← ROTR(mim >> ((j-1) × rl))^rv (hj + mim1)
  next j
  for j=1 to 7
    hj ← ROTR(mim >> ((j+6) × rl))^rv (hj + hj-1)
  next j
  t ← ROTR(mim >> (14 × rl))^rv (((h4 + h5) ⊕ h6) + h7) + ct1i
  h3 ← ROTR(mim >> (15 × rl))^rv (((h0 + h1) ⊕ h2) + h3) + ct2i
  for j=1 to 7
    hj ← hj-1
  next j
  h0 ← t
next i

```

sub_round function of DDHA

In DDHA-256, the word length is 32, rl is 2, rv is 3. In DDHA- 512, the word length is 64, rl is 4, rv is 15.

2.3.2 message_expansion(m)

The function `message_expansion(m)` takes as input one value:

* a message block $m = m_0, \dots, m_{15}$

And `message_expansion1(m)` as follow:

```

t =  $\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} (m_i)$ 
for i = 0 to 15
    mi ← (t ⊕ mi)
next i
for i = 0 to 15
    mi ← ROTRi×rl(mi)
next i
t =  $\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} (m_i)$ 
for i = 0 to 15
    mi ← (mi ⊕ t)
next i
return m

```

function `message_expansion1` of DDHA

In DDHA-256, the word length is 32, rl is 2. In DDHA- 512, the word length is 64, rl is 4.

With function `sub_round(m,h,ct1,ct2)`, `message_expansion(m)`, the compression function as follows:

```

h ← hi
c3 ← ct 1
c4 ← ct 2
ma ← m
mb ← message_expansion(m)
for j = 1 to repeat_times
    sub_round(ma, h, c3, c4)
    sub_round(mb, h, c4, c3)
    if repeat_times > 1 then
        for j1 = 0 to 15
            c3j1 ← ROTR-1(c3j1)
            c4j1 ← ROTR-1(c4j1)
        next j1
    end if
next j
h ← h + hi
return h

```

compression function of DDHA

In DDHA-256, the word bit-length is 32. In DDHA- 512, the word bit-length is 64.

3 Security of DDHA

In this section, we discuss the resistance of DDHA to Differential attack, Length extension, Multicollisions.

3.1 Differential attack

From appendix 2, we will know that if there is any difference in the message, the difference path for DDHA will has at least eight data-depend circular shift difference that $\Delta r \neq 0$, r is the parameter of data-depend circular shift.

By theorem A.1, it is known that if a data-depend circular shift difference that $(r_1 - r_2) \neq 0$, the possibility of a data-depend circular shift difference is $2^{\gcd-n}$, \gcd is the **greatest common divisor of** $(r_1 - r_2)$ **and** n .

In DDHA, the bit-length of the parameter of data-depend circular shift less than 4(resp.16). then there has:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 0 \leq r_1, r_2 < 4 & 0 \leq r_1, r_2 < 16 \\
 -4 < (r_1 - r_2) < 4 & -16 < (r_1 - r_2) < 16 \\
 \gcd = GCD(r_1 - r_2, 32) \leq 2 & \gcd = GCD(r_1 - r_2, 64) \leq 8 \\
 \text{DDHA} - 256 & \text{DDHA} - 512
 \end{array}$$

So the possibility of a difference path for DDHA will be:

$$p = 2^{(\gcd-n) \times 8} \leq 2^{16-8 \times n} \text{ (resp. } 2^{64-8 \times n} \text{)}$$

At the same time, in a difference path for DDHA if a chain value that $\Delta r = 0$ has defences, some bits in the parameter r will be fixed, this depend on the defences that the chain value has. Here we suppose attacker can find the needed defences.

3.2 Length extension

Let Σ is the sum of several members, and the addition operator is modulo 2^{512} or modulo 2^{1024} .

Length extension is the attack against keyed hash of form $h = H_k(m)$ or $h = H(k || m)$. The attack as: given $h = H_k(m)$, the padding data is p , then find m' that make $h = H(k || m || p || m')$. The $(m || p || m')$ is the fabricated message.

In DDHA, if $(... || m^{N-2} || m^{N-1})$ is padded message data, and m^{N-1} is the

last message block, the final chain values is $h^N = \text{compression}(-h^{N-1}, m^{N-1}, c1 \oplus (\sum_{i=0}^{N-2} m^i), -c2)$. If a block m^N is extended, then the chain value between m^{N-1}, m^N will be $h^N = \text{compression}(h^{N-1}, m^{N-1}, c1, c2)$ from $h^N = \text{compression}(-h^{N-1}, m^{N-1}, c1 \oplus (\sum_{i=0}^{N-2} m^i), -c2)$. The knowledge of $DDHA(\dots \| m^{N-2} \| m^{N-1})$ can not be used to compute the hash of $(\dots \| m^{N-2} \| m^{N-1} \| m^N)$.


3.3 Multicollisions

Let \sum is the sum of several members, and the addition operator is modulo 2^{512} or modulo 2^{1024} .

Many technique is developed to find Multicollisions of hash function, Joux's technique[1] and Kelsey/Schneier's technique[2] is representative technique.

3.3.1 Joux's technique

Joux [1] has proposed a technique to find a 2^k -collision for hash functions with n-bit hash values in $k \times 2^{n/2}$ as follow:



In Joux's technique, we can find that replace $m1^i$ with $m2^i$ will not change the final chain value h^k . In DDHA, if a message $m := (\dots \| m1^i \| \dots)$, replace $m1^i$ with $m2^i$ will change the final chain value h^k from $h^k = \text{compression}(-h^{k-1}, m^k, c1 \oplus (\sum_{i=0}^{N-2} m^i), -c2)$ to $h^k = \text{compression}(-h^{k-1}, m^k, c1 \oplus ((\sum_{i=0}^{N-2} m^i) - m1^i + m2^i), -c2)$.

And it can alter Joux's technique to apply it on DDHA. To pair (h^i, h^{i+1}) , if find message blocks $(m3^0, \dots, m3^{i3-1}, m4^0, \dots, m4^{i4-1})$ that satisfy:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_{ii=0}^{i3-1} m3^{ii} = \sum_{ii=0}^{i4-1} m4^{ii} \\ h3^1 = \text{compression}(h^i, m3^0, c1, c2) \\ h3^{ii+1} = \text{compression}(h3^{ii}, m3^{ii}, c1, c2) \quad ii = 1, \dots, (i3-2) \\ h^{i+1} = \text{compression}(h3^{i3-1}, m3^{i3-1}, c1, c2) \\ h4^1 = \text{compression}(h^i, m4^0, c1, c2) \\ h4^{ii+1} = \text{compression}(h4^{ii}, m4^{ii}, c1, c2) \quad ii = 1, \dots, (i4-2) \\ h^{i+1} = \text{compression}(h4^{i4-1}, m4^{i4-1}, c1, c2) \end{array} \right. \quad (3.1)$$

So to find Multicollisions of DDHA, to every pair chain value (h^i, h^{i+1}) , it need find message blocks that satisfy (3.1). Then to 2^k -collision for DDHA, the message blocks must satisfy k systems that like (3.1).

3.3.2 Kelsey/Schneier's technique

Kelsey/Schneier's technique bases on fixed-points of hash function. But in DDHA, when admit a fixed-points mfp for DDHA, the the final chain value will be $h^k = compression(-h^{k-1}, m^k, c1 \oplus ((\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} m^i) + mfp), -c2)$ from $h^k = compression(-h^{k-1}, m^k, c1 \oplus (\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} m^i), -c2)$.

4. Improvement

In compression function, there are 512 data-depend circular shift operations, this will increase the calculation. There exists a way to improve it. The function $sub_round(m, h, ct1, ct2)$ and $compression(repeat_times, m, h, ct1, ct2)$ will be changed to $sub_round1(m1, m2, h, ct1, ct2, b)$ and $compression1(repeat_times, m, h, ct1, ct2)$ as follow:

4.1 sub_round1(m1, m2, h, ct1, ct2, b)

The function $sub_round1(m1, m2, h, ct1, ct2, b)$ takes as input six values:

- * a chain value $h = h_0, \dots, h_7$
- * a message block $m1 = m1_0, \dots, m1_{32}$
- * a message block $m2 = m2_0, \dots, m2_{32}$
- * a Constant $ct1 = ct1_0, \dots, ct1_{15}$
- * a Constant $ct2 = ct2_0, \dots, ct2_{15}$
- * an integer b

And $sub_round1(m1, m2, h, ct1, ct2, b)$ as follow:

```

for i = b to 7 + b
    im ← i >> 1 + (i mod 2) × 8
    h0 ← (h0 + m2im)
    for j = 1 to 7
        im1 ← (i >> 1 + j) mod 8 + (i mod 2) × 8
        hj ← ROTR(m1im >> ((j-1) × rl)) ^ rv (hj + m2im1)
    next j
    for j = 1 to 7
        hj ← ROTR(m1im >> ((j+6) × rl)) ^ rv (hj + hj-1)
    next j

```

```

t ← ROTR(m1im>>(14×rl))^rv (((h4 + h5) ⊕ h6) + h7) + ct1i
h3 ← ROTR(m1im>>(15×rl))^rv (((h0 + h1) ⊕ h2) + h3) + ct2i
for j=1 to 7
    hj ← hj-1
next j
h0 ← t
next i

```

function sub_round1 of DDHA

In DDHA-256, the word length is 32, rl is 2, rv is 3. In DDHA- 512, the word length is 64, rl is 4, rv is 15.

compression(repeat_times,m,h,ct1,ct2) will be as follow:

4.2 compression1(repeat_times,m,h,ct1,ct2)

The function compression1(repeat_times,m,h,ct1,ct2) takes as input five values:

* an integer value *repeat_times*. User can set *repeat_times* to get higher intensity. The default value of *repeat_times* is 1.

* a chain value $h = h_0, \dots, h_7$

* a message block $m = m_0, \dots, m_{32}$

* a Constant $ct1 = ct1_0, \dots, ct1_{15}$

* a Constant $ct2 = ct2_0, \dots, ct2_{15}$

Function compression1(repeat_times,m,h,ct1,ct2) as follow:

```

h ← hi
c3 ← ct1
c4 ← ct2
ma ← m
mb ← message _ expansion (m)
for j = 1 to repeat _ times
    sub _ round 1(ma , ma , h , c3 , c4 ,0)
    sub _ round 1(ma , mb , h , c4 , c3 ,8)
    if repeat _ times > 1 then
        for j1 = 0 to 15
            c3j1 ← ROTR-1(c3j1)
            c4j1 ← ROTR-1(c4j1)
        next j1
    end if
next j
h ← h + hi

```

return h

function compression1 of DDHA

In DDHA-256, the word bit-length is 32. In DDHA- 512, the word bit-length is 64.

After $\text{sub_round}(m,h,ct1,ct2)$ and $\text{compression}(\text{repeat_times},m,h, ct1, ct2)$ is changed to $\text{sub_round1}(m1,m2,h,ct1,ct2,b)$ and $\text{compression1}(\text{repeat_times}, m,h,ct1,ct2)$. There are 256 data-depend circular shift perations, this will reduce calculation, And at the same time, function $\text{message_expension}(m)$ will make there are many defferences when there are few defferences in message. Here we will not discuss it detailedly.

5. Conclusions

After study the technologys[wY05, Dau05] and the defence feature of data-depend function, and we find a message expansion function that will make every defence path for DDHA will has at least eight data-depend circular shift defence, this make it hard to constitute a feasible difference path that has good possibility. Base on data-depende function and the message expansion function, we design the hash function DDHA.

At the same time, we study other attack technologys[1,2] and length extension, and we use some measures in view of these technologys, these measures wreck the condition that applying the technologys need, this make it harder to apply these technologys on DDHA.

DDHA uses a value that user can set the value to change rounds to change the strength.

So DDHA adopts various measures in view of the techniques that use to attack hash function, this will make DDHA resists these attacks.

References:

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Appendix 1: Difference of data-depend circular shift

Here we just discuss circular right shift. And we just discuss XOR differences[Dau05].

If $x \in F_2^n$, x has n -bits as:

$$x \mapsto (x_{n-1}, \dots, x_0)$$

If y, x is n -bits word, n is 32(resp. 64), $0 \leq r < 32$ (resp.64) is an integer that has 5(resp. 6) bits, then the circular right shift is:

$$y = ROTR^r(x) = ((x \ll (n-r)) \vee (x \gg r))$$

If there is $(x1, y1, r1)$ and $(x2, y2, r2)$ meet:

$$y1 = ROTR^{r1}(x1) \quad y2 = ROTR^{r2}(x2)$$

At first, there is: ($wbl = \log_2^n - 1$)

$$\begin{cases} r1 - r2 = \sum_{i=0}^{wbl} (\Delta^\pm(r1_i, r2_i) \times 2^i) \\ y1 := (x1_{r1-1}, \dots, x1_0, x1_{n-1}, \dots, x1_{r1}) \\ y2 := (x2_{r2-1}, \dots, x2_0, x2_{n-1}, \dots, x2_{r2}) \\ \Delta^\oplus(x1, x2) := (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{n-1}, x2_{n-1}), \dots, \Delta^\oplus(x1_0, x2_0)) \\ \Delta^\oplus(y1, y2) := (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{r1-1}, x2_{r2-1}), \dots, \Delta^\oplus(x1_{r1}, x2_{r2})) \end{cases}$$

Let the **greatest common divisor of $(r1-r2)$ and n** is $gcd = GCD(r1-r2, n)$. Then there exists:

1. if $r1=r2$, there has:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^\oplus(y1, y2) &= (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{r1-1}, x2_{r1-1}), \dots, \Delta^\oplus(x1_0, x2_0), \Delta^\oplus(x1_{n-1}, x2_{n-1}), \dots, \Delta^\oplus(x1_{r1}, x2_{r1})) \\ &= ROTR^{r1}(\Delta^\oplus(x1, x2)) \end{aligned}$$

So, if $r1=r2$, the difference of $y1$ and $y2$ will just depend on the difference of $x1$ and $x2$. of course it also depend on $r1$.

To given Δ^\oplus , there are 2^n $x1$. To given $(x1, \Delta^\oplus)$, there is a $x2$ that meet $x2 = x1 \oplus \Delta^\oplus(x1, x2)$. So there are 2^n pair $(x1, x2)$ has same Δ^\oplus .

2. if $r1 \neq r2$.

Divide $\Delta^\oplus(y1, y2)$ and $\Delta^\oplus(x1, x2)$ into gcd parts as follow:

$$\begin{cases} px_j := (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \\ | i = 0, \dots, (n/\text{gcd}-1)) \quad j = 0, \dots, \text{gcd}-1 \\ py_j := (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(n+r2-r1+j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \\ | i = 0, \dots, (n/\text{gcd}-1)) \quad j = 0, \dots, \text{gcd}-1 \end{cases} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

To given defence of patr px_j, py_j :

$$\begin{aligned} dx &:= (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \\ &| i = 0, \dots, (n/\text{gcd}-1)) \end{aligned}$$

There are $2^{n/\text{gcd}-1}$ diffence as follow:

$$\begin{aligned} dy1 &:= (\Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(n+r2-r1+j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \\ &| i = 0, \dots, (n/\text{gcd}-2)) \end{aligned}$$

To given pair $(dx, dy1)$, there exists:

$$\begin{aligned} &\bigoplus_{i=0}^{n/\text{gcd}-1} \Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \\ &\bigoplus \left(\bigoplus_{i=0}^{n/\text{gcd}-2} \Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(n+r2-r1+j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \right) \\ &= \Delta^\oplus(x1_{(j+n-\text{gcd}) \bmod n}, x2_{(2 \times n+r2-r1+j-\text{gcd}) \bmod n}) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Theorem A.1: if $r1 \neq r2$, the possibility of a difference pair $(\Delta^\oplus(y1, y2), \Delta^\oplus(x1, x2))$ is $2^{\text{gcd}-n}$.

Proof:

At first, Divide $\Delta^\oplus(y1, y2)$ and $\Delta^\oplus(x1, x2)$ into gcd parts as (A.1), and every part satisfy (A.2). To given pair $(dx, dy1)$, it will has the system:

$$\begin{cases} dx_{j,i} = x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n} \oplus x2_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n} \\ \quad \quad \quad i = 0, \dots, (n/\text{gcd}-1) \\ dy1_{j,i} = x1_{(j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n} \oplus x2_{(n+r2-r1+j+i \times \text{gcd}) \bmod n} \\ \quad \quad \quad i = 0, \dots, (n/\text{gcd}-2) \end{cases} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

The system has $2 \times (n/\text{gcd}-1)$ variables and $2 \times n/\text{gcd}-3$ equations. The

system has two roots on $GF(2)$.

The difference pair $(\Delta^\oplus(y_1, y_2), \Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2))$ include gcd parts that satisfy (A.2) (A.3). So there are 2^{gcd} pair (x_1, x_2) satisfy these systems.

So there are 2^{gcd} pair (x_1, x_2) have the given defference $(\Delta^\oplus(y_1, y_2), \Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2))$. Of course these pairs (x_1, x_2) satisfy $x_2 = \Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2) \oplus x_1$.

To given defference $(\Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2))$, there are 2^n x_1 , And to given pair $(\Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2), x_1)$, there is a x_2 that satisfy $x_2 = \Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2) \oplus x_1$, so there are 2^n pair (x_1, x_2) have the given defference $(\Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2))$.

So the possibility of a difference pair $(\Delta^\oplus(y_1, y_2), \Delta^\oplus(x_1, x_2))$ is $2^{\text{gcd}-n}$. \square

Appendix 2: Message_expansion(m)

In DDHA, the message m is expand from 16 words to 32 words. It can use a 512×1024 (resp. 1024×2048) generator matrix to describe it. It a little hard to find out the minimum deffences in expand message words with the big matrix. We will find out the minimum deffences in expand message words with other way.

At first, the follow facts is used to simplify the discussion:

1. Because the degree of the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) that describe function Message_expansion(m) is 1. Finding out the minimum deffences in expand message words is be equal finding out the minimum hamming weight of the expand message words if the Hamming weight of message bigger than 0.
2. The words in DDHA is carved up to sixteen parts. So it can describe a word as follow:

$$W := (w_{15}, \dots, w_0)$$

Where $w_i := (b_J, \dots, b_0)$ $0 \leq i < 16$, every part w_i has J bits. Then the message words m and expand message words em as follow:

$$\begin{cases} m := (m_{0,15}, m_{0,14}, \dots, m_{0,0}, \dots, m_{15,0}) \\ em := (em_{0,15}, em_{0,14}, \dots, em_{0,0}, \dots, em_{31,0}) \\ em_{i,j} = m_{i,j} \quad 0 \leq i, j \leq 15 \end{cases}$$

Then function Message_expansion(m) can be described with steps as follow, let $m1$ and $m2$ include 16 words.

$$\begin{cases} m1_i \leftarrow (\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} m_j) \oplus m_i \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \\ m2_i \leftarrow ROTR^i(m1_i) \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \\ em_{i+16} \leftarrow (\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} m2_j) \oplus m2_i \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \end{cases}$$

Then there exists:

$$m2_{i,j} = m1_{i, (16-i+j) \bmod 16}$$

Let $HW(w)$ is Hamming weight of w . Then there exists:

Theorem B.1: If

$$\begin{cases} x := (x_0, \dots, x_{15}) \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \\ y := (y_0, \dots, x_{15}) \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \\ y_i = x_i \oplus (\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j) \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \end{cases}$$

There exists:

1. If $\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j = 0$, then $HW(y) = HW(x)$.
2. If $\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j = 1$, then $HW(y) = 16 - HW(x)$.
3. If $HW(x) \geq 1$, then $HW(y) \geq 1$

proof:

There exists:

$$HW(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{15} x_j \leq 16 \quad (B.1.1)$$

When $x_j = 1 \quad 0 \leq j < 15$, the equality sign hold water.

1. If $\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j = 0$ Then

$$y_i = x_i \oplus (\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j) = x_i \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15$$

Then

$$HW(y) = HW(x)$$

2. If $\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j = 1$ Then

$$y_i = x_i \oplus (\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j) = x_i \oplus 1 = \neg x_i \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15$$

Then

$$HW(y) = \sum_{i=0}^{15} y_i = \sum_{i=0}^{15} (1 - x_i) = 16 - \sum_{i=0}^{15} x_i = 16 - HW(x)$$

3. If $HW(x) \geq 1$ and $\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j = 0$, then $HW(y) = HW(x) \geq 1$.

If $HW(x) \geq 1$ and $\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} x_j = 1$, then by (B.1.1), there exists:

$$16 > HW(x) > 0$$

$$HW(y) = 16 - HW(x) \geq 1. \quad \square$$

Theorem B.2: In message words of DDHA, if there exists $0 \leq j_1 \leq 15$ make $\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} m_{i,j_1} = 1$, Then there exist $HW(em) \geq 16$.

Proof:

There has:

$$em_i = m_i \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15$$

$$\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} em_{i,j_1} = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} m_{i,j_1} = 1$$

Suppose $I = \{i \mid m_{i,j_1} = 1\}$ and $HW((em_{0,j_1}, \dots, em_{15,j_1})) = H_0$

There has: $m1_i = em_i \oplus (\bigoplus_{j=0}^{15} em_{i,j})$

By theorem B.1, thus

$$HW((m1_{0,j_1}, \dots, m1_{15,j_1})) = 16 - H_0$$

$$m1_{i,j_1} = 1 \quad i \notin I$$

Let $J = \{(i + j1) \bmod 16 \mid i \notin I\}$, there are $16-H0$ members in J .

Because $m2_{i,j} = m1_{i,(16-i+j) \bmod 16}$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} m2_{i,j} &= m1_{i,(16-i+j) \bmod 16} \quad i \notin I \quad j \in J \\ &= m1_{i,(16-i+i+j1) \bmod 16} \\ &= m1_{i,j1} \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

So there exists: $16 \geq HW((m2_{0,j}, \dots, m2_{15,j})) \geq 1 \quad j \in J$

By theorem B.1, there exists:

$$\begin{aligned} HW((em_{16,j}, \dots, m2_{31,j})) &\geq 1 \quad j \in J \\ HW((em_{16}, \dots, m2_{31})) &= \left(\sum_{j \in J} \sum_{i=16}^{31} em_{i,j} \right) + \sum_{j \notin J} \sum_{i=16}^{31} em_{i,j} \\ &\geq \sum_{j \in J} \sum_{i=16}^{31} em_{i,j} \\ &\geq 16 - H0 \end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} HW(em) &= HW((em_0, \dots, em_{15})) + HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31})) \\ &\geq H0 + (16 - H0) \\ &= 16 \end{aligned}$$

□

Theorem B.3: In message words of DDHA, if $HW(m) \geq 0$ there exist $HW(em) \geq 8$.

Proof:

There exists:

$$\begin{aligned} em_i &= m_i \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \\ HW((em_0, \dots, em_{15})) &= HW((m_0, \dots, m_{15})) \end{aligned}$$

1. if there exists $j1$ make $\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} em_{i,j1} = 1$, by theorem B.2, there has exists:

$$HW(em) \geq 16 > 8 \quad (B.3.a).$$

2. if there exists

$$\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} em_{i,j} = 0 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15$$

Then there exists:

$$m1_{i,j} = em_{i,j} \oplus (\bigoplus_{i1=0}^{15} em_{i1,j}) = em_{i,j} \quad 0 \leq i, j \leq 15$$

$$m2_{i,j} = m1_{i,(i+j) \bmod 16}$$

Let $I0_j = \{i \mid em_{i,j} = 1 \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$, $I1_j = \{i \mid m1_{i,j} = 1 \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$
then:

$$I1_j = \{i \mid m1_{i,j} = 1 \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$$

$$= \{i \mid em_{i,j} = 1 \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$$

$$= I0_j$$

$$HW(m1) = HW((em_0, \dots, em_{15}))$$

Let $JB0 = \{jb_0, \dots\} = \{j \mid (\sum_{i=0}^{15} I1_{i,j}) > 0 \quad 15 \geq j \geq 0\}$, and because

$$\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} em_{i,j} = 0 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15$$

Then:

$$(\sum_{i \in I1_j} m1_{i,j}) = (\sum_{i \in I1_j} em_{i,j}) \geq 2 \quad j \in JB0 \quad (B.3.1)$$

Let $J2_j = \{i \mid m2_{i,j} = 1 \quad 0 \leq i \leq 15 \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$ then there has:

$$J2_j = \{i \mid i \in I1_{(j+i) \bmod 16} \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$$

$$I1_j = \{i \mid i \in J1_{(16-i+j) \bmod 16} \quad 0 \leq j \leq 15\}$$

This means that every bit of m2 is equal to a bit of m1, and every bit of m1 is equal to a bit of m2. So there exist:

$$HW((m2_0, \dots, m2_{15})) = HW((m1_0, \dots, m1_{15})) = HW((em_0, \dots, em_{15})) \quad (B.3.2)$$

2.1 If there exists $i1c$ make $(\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} m2_{i,i1c}) = 1$, by theroem B.1 and (B.3.2), there exists:

$$HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31})) \geq HW((em_{16,i1c}, \dots, em_{31,i1c}))$$

$$= 16 - HW((m2_{0,i1c}, \dots, m2_{15,i1c}))$$

$$HW((em_0, \dots, em_{31})) = HW((em_0, \dots, em_{15})) + HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31}))$$

$$\geq HW((m2_0, \dots, m2_{15})) + 16 - HW((m2_{0,i1c}, \dots, m2_{15,i1c}))$$

$$\geq HW((m2_{0,i1c}, \dots, m2_{15,i1c})) + 16 - HW((m2_{0,i1c}, \dots, m2_{15,i1c}))$$

$$= 16 > 8 \quad (B.3.b)$$

2.2 If $(\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} m2_i) = 0$. Then there exist:

$$em_{i,j} = m2_{i-16,j} \oplus (\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} m2_{i,j}) = m2_{i-16,j} \quad 16 \leq i \leq 31$$

$$HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31})) = HW(m2) \quad (B.3.3)$$

Because $HW(m) \geq 0$, there are at least one member in $JB0$. Let $jb0 = jb_0$ and there are at least two members in $I1_{jb0}$. Suppose $i1a \neq i1b \in I1_{jb0}$, then:

$$m1_{i1a,jb0} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad m1_{i1b,jb0} = 1$$

Then there has:

$$m1_{i1a,jb0} = m2_{i1a, (16+jb0-i1a) \bmod 16} = 1$$

$$m1_{i1b,jb0} = m2_{i1b, (16+jb0-i1b) \bmod 16} = 1$$

Because $(\bigoplus_{i=0}^{15} m2_i) = 0$, there are at least two members in $\{m2_{i, (16+jb0-i1a) \bmod 16} \mid 15 \geq i \geq 0\}$ and $\{m2_{i, (16+jb0-i1b) \bmod 16} \mid 15 \geq i \geq 0\}$ is 1. Then:

$$(\sum_{i=0}^{15} m2_{i, (16+jb0-i1a) \bmod 16}) \geq 2$$

$$(\sum_{i=0}^{15} m2_{i, (16+jb0-i1b) \bmod 16}) \geq 2$$

$$HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31})) = HW(m2)$$

$$\geq HW((m2_{0, (16+jb0-i1a) \bmod 16}, \dots, m2_{15, (16+jb0-i1a) \bmod 16})) +$$

$$HW((m2_{0, (16+jb0-i1b) \bmod 16}, \dots, m2_{15, (16+jb0-i1b) \bmod 16}))$$

$$\geq 4$$

$$(B.3.4)$$

By (B.3.2) (B.3.3) (B.3.4), there exist:

$$HW((em_0, \dots, em_{31})) = HW((em_0, \dots, em_{15})) + HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31}))$$

$$= 2 \times HW((em_{16}, \dots, em_{31}))$$

$$\geq 2 \times 4 = 8 \quad | \quad (B.3.c)$$

So by (B.3.a) (B.3.b) (B.3.c), if $HW(m) \geq 0$ there exist $HW(em) \geq 8$. \square

Because every part is as parameter of data-depend circular shift once. Theroem B.3 means in any difference path for DDHA, there will be at least eight data-depend circular shift defference.