

# Applications Of Surjection On Narrow-pipe Hash Functions

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**Abstract.** Recently several reports of Cryptology ePrint Archive give some analysis and conclusions,that for a narrow-pipe hash function the entropy and codomain will reduce greatly. And even generic collision attacks on narrow-pipe hash functions are faster than birthday paradox.However,the conclusions don't apply to surjective compression functions.In practice,it is hard to design an ideal compression function and prove whether it is or not a surjection.In this paper,we give an effective way that we can design a composition of compression function  $C$ , such that:  $C = g^* \circ C^*$ .Where  $g^*$  is a simple epimorphic function,  $C^*$  is a normal ideal compression just as those narrow-pipe compression functions, then,we can thwart the conclusions on narrow-pipe hash functions.

**keywords:**hash,surjection,codomain,entropy,narrow-pipe

## 1 Introduction:

The Merkle-Damgaard construction[1] is the most widely used to transform a secure compression function  $C : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  into a cryptographic hash function  $h_c(\cdot)$ . (where,  $n$  denotes the size of the chaining value, and  $m$  denotes the block size for the compression function.)

The iterating hash functions of M-D construction try to maintain the following three properties of the cryptographic secure compression functions :

**1.pre-image resistance:**

**2.second pre-image resistance:**

**3.collision resistance:**

A number of attacks on hash functions have shown weaknesses of M-D construction, and recently hash designs are two types which called "wide-pipe" and "narrow-pipe" hash functions. A wide-pipe iterated hash can produce large-size


internal chaining value, the size of internal chaining value is more larger than the final hash value . A narrow-pipe hash can use a big domain to produce internal chaining value ,the size of internal chaining value is equal to the hash value.

There are some reports giving analysis and conclusions:that for a narrow-pipe hash function the entropy and codomain will reduce greatly.

However,the conclusions didn't consider any surjection.In this text,we will firstly give a simple epimorphic function from MD5,then build a simple mode of a compression function  $C$ , such that:  $C = g^* \circ C^*$ ,Where  $g^*$  is a simple epimorphic function,  $C^*$  is a normal ideal compression just as those narrow-pipe compression functions, at last,we will try to avoid the conclusions on narrow-pipe hash functions.

## 2 Surjections

A function is said to be surjective or onto if its image is equal to its codomain. A function  $f : X \rightarrow Y$  is surjective if and only if for every  $y$  in the codomain  $Y$  there is at least one  $x$  in the domain  $X$  such that  $f(x) = y$ . A surjective function is called a surjection.If  $f : X \rightarrow Y$  is surjective and  $B$  is a subset of  $Y$ , then  $f(f^{-1}(B)) = B$ . Thus,  $B$  can be recovered from its preimage  $f^{-1}(B)$ .



a. A surjective function.      b.A bijective function.      c.A non-surjective function.

## 3 The Probability of Empty Set

The conclusions on narrow-pipe hash functions are based on the basic mathematical facts bellow [2]:

**Proposition 1.** For finite narrow domain: Ideal random functions  $C$  mapping the domain of n-bit strings  $X = \{0, 1\}^n$  to itself i.e. to the domain  $Y = \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

Let  $\mathcal{F}_C$  be the family of all functions  $C : X \rightarrow Y$  and let for every  $y \in Y$ ,  $C^{-1}(y) \subseteq X$  be the set of preimages of  $y$  i.e.  $C^{-1}(y) = \{x \in X | C(x) = y\}$ . For a function  $C \in \mathcal{F}_C$  chosen uniformly at random and for every  $y \in Y$  the probability that the set  $C^{-1}(y)$  is empty is approximately  $e^{-1}$  i.e.

$$P_r\{C^{-1}(y) = \emptyset\} \approx e^{-1}.$$

**Proposition 2.** For finite wide domain: Ideal random functions  $W$  mapping the domain of  $(n+m)$ -bit strings  $X = \{0, 1\}^{n+m}$  to the domain  $Y = \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

Let  $\mathcal{F}_W$  be the family of all functions  $W : X \rightarrow Y$  where  $X = \{0, 1\}^{n+m}$  and  $Y = \{0, 1\}^n$ . Let for every  $y \in Y$ ,  $W^{-1}(y) \subseteq X$  be the set of preimages of  $y$  i.e.  $W^{-1}(y) = \{x \in X | W(x) = y\}$ . For a function  $W \in \mathcal{F}_W$ , chosen uniformly at random and for every  $y \in Y$ , the probability that the set  $W^{-1}(y)$  is empty is approximately  $e^{-2^m}$  i.e.

$$P_r\{C^{-1}(y) = \emptyset\} \approx e^{-2^m}.$$

**Proposition 3.**

Let  $C_1 : X \rightarrow Y$ ,  $C_2 : X \rightarrow Y$  are two particular functions, chosen uniformly at random (where  $X = Y = \{0, 1\}^n$ ). If we define a function  $C : X \rightarrow Y$  as a composition:

$$C = C_1 \circ C_2,$$

then for every  $y \in Y$  the probability  $P_2$  that the set  $C^{-1}(y)$  is empty is  $P_2 = e^{-1+e^{-1}}$

## 4 MD5 Structure And It's Surjective Round

The Merkle-Damgard construction is the most common way to transform a compression function  $C : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  (where  $N = n + m$ ) into a hash function  $H_C(\cdot)$ , the Message Digest is  $n$ -bit value.

$C$  denotes the compression function.  $M$  denotes the padded and Appended message, it is formatted as  $16L$  words  $:w_0, w_1, \dots, w_i, \dots, w_{16L-1}$  i.e., the message is made up of  $L$   $m$ -bit blocks and each the block contains 16 words, for hash code  $H_C$ :

$CV_i$  = Chaining variable,  $CV_0 = IV$  (given Initial Value),  $M_i$  = the  $i$ -th block

$$CV_i = C(CV_{i-1}, M_i)$$

$$H_C(M) = CV_L$$

MD5 Algorithm [3]

The chaining variables are initialized as:  $a_0 = 0x67452301$ ;  $d_0 = 0x10325476$ ;  $c_0 = 0x98badcfe$ ;  $b_0 = 0xefcdab89$ ;

and for the  $i$ th iteration, the chaining variables  $a_0, b_0, c_0, d_0$  are updated by  $CV_{i-1}$ , i.e.,  $a_{i-1}, b_{i-1}, c_{i-1}, d_{i-1}$ . Copy the  $i$ -th block  $M_i$  of 16 32-bit words into Buffer:

$$m[16] \leftarrow w_{16i+j} \quad (0 \leq j \leq 15)$$

The 1st Round

Step1:  $\Sigma_1 = a_0 + F(b_0, c_0, d_0) + m_0 + 0xd76aa478$ ,  $a_1 = b_0 + \Sigma_1 \lll 7$ ;

Step2:  $\Sigma_2 = d_0 + F(a_1, b_0, c_0) + m_1 + 0xe8c7b756$ ,  $d_1 = a_1 + \Sigma_2 \lll 12$ ;

Step3:  $\Sigma_3 = c_0 + F(d_1, a_1, b_0) + m_2 + 0x242070db$ ,  $c_1 = d_1 + \Sigma_3 \lll 17$ ;

Step4:  $\Sigma_4 = b_0 + F(c_1, d_1, a_1) + m_3 + 0x1bdcee$ ,  $b_1 = c_1 + \Sigma_4 \lll 22$ ;

.....

Step13: $\Sigma_{13} = a_3 + F(b_3, c_3, d_3) + m_{12} + 0x6b901122$  ,  $a_4 = b_3 + \Sigma_{13} \lll 7$ ;  
 Step14: $\Sigma_{14} = d_3 + F(a_4, b_3, c_3) + m_{13} + 0xfd987193$  ,  $d_4 = a_4 + \Sigma_{14} \lll 12$ ;  
 Step15: $\Sigma_{15} = c_3 + F(d_4, a_4, b_3) + m_{14} + 0xa679438e$  ,  $c_4 = d_4 + \Sigma_{15} \lll 17$ ;  
 Step16: $\Sigma_{15} = b_3 + F(c_4, d_4, a_4) + m_{15} + 0x49b40821$  ,  $b_4 = c_4 + \Sigma_{16} \lll 22$ ;

For the First Round of the  $i$ th iteration, no matter how the input values of chaining variables (updated  $a_0, b_0, c_0, d_0$ ) are prescribed arbitrarily, the output of the chaining variables  $a_4, b_4, c_4, d_4$  can achieve any values prescribed arbitrarily by selecting the input values of  $m_{12}, m_{13}, m_{14}$  and  $m_{15}$ . If we mark the first round as a function  $g$ , then  $g$  is a surjection,  $g : X \rightarrow Y$ , i.e.,  $g : (0, 1)^n \times (0, 1)^N \rightarrow (0, 1)^n$ . where  $X = (0, 1)^N, Y = (0, 1)^n, N = m + n = 512, n = 128$ .

Namely for any given input of chaining variable  $CV_{i-1}$ , the codomain is recovered completely, the mapping from the first round is a surjection, this doesn't depend on the previous chaining variable  $CV_{i-1}$ .

For  $g : X \rightarrow Y$ , and let for every  $y \in Y$ ,  $g^{-1}(y) \subseteq X$  be the set of preimages of  $y$  i.e.  $g^{-1}(y) = \{x \in X | g(x) = y\}$ . For a function  $g$  chosen uniformly at random and for every  $y \in Y$  the probability that the set  $g^{-1}(y)$  is empty doesn't exist. i.e.

$$P_r\{g^{-1}(y) = \emptyset\} \approx e^{-2^m} \text{ doesn't exist.}$$

The rest 3 rounds of MD5 can be regarded as a function  $C^* : (0, 1)^n \times (0, 1)^m \rightarrow (0, 1)^n$ , then the compression function  $C$  of MD5 is:  $C = g \circ C^*$ .

Since the codomain can be recovered completely in each iteration firstly, the case that the **continuous and cumulative reducing** of entropy doesn't exist.

There may be the probability that the set  $C^{-1}(y)$  is empty is approximately  $e^{-2^m}$  in each iteration of the compression function  $C$  of MD5, i.e.

$$P_r\{C^{-1}(y) = \emptyset\} \approx e^{-2^m},$$

but this is discrete and independent, it's not cumulate, and the positions of empty set in each iteration are different.

It is necessary to make the difference between the input of Function  $C^*$  and of Function  $g$ , this can avoid the specificity of the mapping, we can see the sequences of the input ( $m_0, m_1, \dots, m_{15}$ ) in 4 rounds of MD5 are different.

## 5 Ideal Compression Function

Quote from Vlastimil Klima and Danilo Gligoroski [4]:

- hlen - the length of the chaining variable.
- mlen - the length of the message block.
- hashlen - the length of the hash function output.

If the compression function has the property, that for every value  $m$  the function  $C(h, m) \equiv Ch(h)$  is an ideal random function of the variable  $h$ , we denote it as  $IRF(h)$ .

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The hash function is defined by a narrow-pipe compression function (NPCF), iff  $hashlen = hlen = \frac{mlen}{2}$  and the compression function is  $IRF(h)$  and  $IRF(m)$ .

The hash function is defined by a wide-pipe compression function (WPCF), iff  $hashlen = \frac{hlen}{2} = \frac{mlen}{2}$  and the compression function is  $IRF(h)$  and  $IRF(m)$ .

Then, We can regard MD5 is a narrow-pipe approximate  $IRF(m)$  of surjection but not a  $IRF(h)$  of surjection.

If message input  $M$  chosen is fixed and invariant, there can't get surjection  $g$  so that the codomain can be recovered. There are continuous sets such  $C^{-1}(y)$  is empty in each iteration, the entropy and the codomain will reduce greatly. We'd amend the function  $g$  again.

For a narrow-pipe  $IRF(m)$ , variable  $h$  is  $hashlen = hlen = \frac{mlen}{2}$ . We amend the input  $M_i$  as:  $M_i = g^*(h_{i-1}, M_i)$ , then, the codomain is recovered by  $g^*(h, M_i)$  firstly, the compression function  $C$  is amended to be a approximate  $IRF(m)$  and  $IRF(h)$  of surjection, such that:  $C = g^* \circ C^*$ , i.e., we can mix  $CV_{i-1}$  into each message input  $M_i$  of a iteration, the codomain can be recovered completely in each iteration firstly, then the case that the **continuous and cumulative reducing** of entropy won't exist.

And we can define the last block  $M_L^*$  to avoid the specificity of it.

## 6 One Mode Of Narrow Pipe Hash

E.g., for  $hashlen = hlen = 512 = \frac{mlen}{2}$ ,  $mlen = 1024$ , amend a 512-bit  $r$ -round compression  $f$  of MD construction into ideal compression  $F$  of LAB Form C, and to get a secure hash function construction. The compression  $F$ . [5]:

$$CV_i = F(CV_{i-1}, \sum M_i, M_i);$$

where  $\sum M_i$  is the sum (modulo addition) of the  $i$  blocks, it can also be the xor operation of the  $i$  blocks.

And for each unit  $\Sigma w_{i,j}$  of Block, define:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum M_i (\Sigma m_{i,0}, \Sigma m_{i,1}, \dots, \Sigma m_{i,15}) \quad (1 \leq i \leq L, 0 \leq j \leq 15); \\ \sum M_i = M_i + \sum M_{i-1} \quad \text{i.e.:} \\ \Sigma m_{i,j} = m_{i,j} + \Sigma m_{i-1,j} \end{aligned}$$

We provide a detailed form of LAB Form C below.

1. Append padding bits and append length just as M-D Structure:

The message is padded with single 1-bit followed by the necessary number of 0-bits, so that its length  $l$  congruent to 896 modulo 1024 [ $l \equiv 896 \pmod{1024}$ ], append a block of 128 bits as an unsigned 128-bit integer (most significant byte first) and contains the length of the original message.  $M$  denotes the message after padding bits and appending length. message.  $M$  is split to be  $L$  blocks:  $M_1 M_2 \dots M_L$ , i.e.,  $M$

is made up of  $w_0, w_1, \dots, w_{16L-1}$ .

2. Define an additive block  $M_0$ , encode the size of hash value  $n$  into  $M_0$ , just like HAIFA.[6] Amend the last block as  $M_L^* = M_{L-1}$ .

3. Define an initial value  $IV$ , Set Array  $A[16]$  and Array  $B[16]$ , for a  $r$ -round compression function  $F$ , for  $i$  from 1 to  $L$ , do the following operations of each iteration, and get the hash value  $h_F(M)$ :

$$CV_0 = IV, \sum M_0 = M_0$$

$$CV_i = F(h_{i-1}, \sum M_i, M_i)$$

$$CV_L = F(h_{L-1}, \sum M_L, M_L^*), \text{The hash value is } CV_L.$$

4. Truncate the final chaining value if needed.

We provide details (e.g.):

Define:  $\sum M_i = M_i + \sum M_{i-1}$  ( $1 \leq i \leq L, 0 \leq j \leq 15$ ) i.e.:

$$\sum m_{i,j} = m_{i,j} + \sum m_{i-1,j}$$

Define:  $\sum M_0 = M_0$  and  $A[16] = \sum M_0$ .

For the  $i$ -th iteration, Update  $A[16]$  and  $B[16]$ :

For  $1 \leq i \leq L$ , copy the  $i$ -th block  $M_i$  of 16 64-bit words into Buffer:

$$1. B[16] \leftarrow w_{16i+j} \ (0 \leq j \leq 15), \text{ i.e., } B[16] \leftarrow M_i, \text{ and then,}$$

$$2. A[16] \leftarrow (B[16] + A[16]). \text{ i.e., } A[16] \leftarrow \sum M_i.$$

Split chaining variable  $CV_{i-1}$  into 8 words:  $h_{i-1,0}, h_{i-1,1}, \dots, h_{i-1,7}$ .

Define: For each unit  $m_{i,j}$  of  $M_i(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1}, \dots, m_{i,15})$ ,

$$m_{i,0} = m_{i,0} + h_{i-1,0}; m_{i,1} = m_{i,1} + h_{i-1,1}; \dots, m_{i,7} = m_{i,7} + h_{i-1,7};$$

$$m_{i,8} = m_{i,8} + h_{i-1,0}; m_{i,9} = m_{i,9} + h_{i-1,1}, \dots, m_{i,15} = m_{i,15} + h_{i-1,7}.$$

i.e.,  $m_{i,j} = m_{i,j} + h_{i-1,j \bmod 8}$ , on this wise, the entropy and the values of  $CV$  are mixed into the units of input message.

Amend all the nonlinearity step functions  $s_{t,j}(m_j)$  ( $1 \leq t \leq r, 0 \leq j \leq 15$ ).

1. For the step functions  $s_{t,j}(m_j)$  of the first round, amend them, such that:

$$S_{t,j} = s_{t,j}(\sum m_{i,j}) + m_{i,j} \ (t = 1). \text{ (The first round is **Surjection } g^* \text{.)}**$$

2. For the rest round,

$$S_{t,j} = s_{t,j}(m_{i,j}) + \sum m_{i,j} \ (2 \leq t \leq r).$$

The input mode of the rest rounds is different from which of the first round.

The computing of the last iteration is:

$$CV_L = F(CV_{L-1}, \sum M_L, M_L^*),$$

where,  $M_L^* = M_{L-1}, \sum M_L = M_L + \sum M_{L-1}$ , this avoid the simpleness and specificity of the last block.

## 7 About Wide-Pipe Hashes

By the way, if a compression function can't recover the codomain in each iteration, the conclusions that the entropy and codomain will reduce greatly will apply.[4]:

The only reason for wide-pipe hashes is that the entropy reduction after applying the compression function  $C(H_i, M_i)$  to different message blocks starts from the value  $hlen$  which is two times bigger than  $hashlen$  i.e.,  $hlen = 2hashlen$ .

For a wide-pipe hash, since  $hlen = mlen$ , it maybe necessary to build a surjection  $g^*$  to recover the codomain in each iteration (the surjection  $g^*$  can be found if and only if the mapping is a bijective function, namely a one-to-one mapping.), for if the entropy and codomain reduced greatly, how about the distribution of the empty set and what about the matching between  $hlen$  ( $hlen = 2hashlen$ ) and  $hashlen$  ?

However, it is meaningful for hash design that the observation of the reducing of entropy and codomain.

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