On the Indifferentiable Hash Functions in the Multi-Stage Security Games

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Abstract. It had been widely believed that the indifferentiability framework ensures composition in any security game. However, Ristenpart, Shacham, and Shrimpton (EUROCRYPT 2011) demonstrated that for some multi-stage security, there exists a cryptosystem which is secure in the random oracle (RO) model but is broken when some indifferentiable hash function is used. However, this does not imply that any cryptosystem is broken when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function. They showed that the important multi-stage security: the chosen-distribution attack (CDA) security is preserved for some public key encryption (PKE) schemes when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function proposed by Dodis, Ristenpart, and Shrimpton (EUROCRYPT 2009). An open problem from their result is the multi-stage security when a RO is replaced with other indifferentiable hash functions. We show the following for the important indifferentiable hash functions, Prefix-free Merkle-Damgård and Sponge.

  – For *any* PKE scheme, the PRIV security, which is a multi-stage security, is preserved when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash functions.
  – All existing hedged PKE schemes, which is CDA-secure in the RO model, are CDA-secure when using the indifferentiable hash functions.

1 Introduction

The indifferentiable composition theorem of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [22] is that if a functionality F (e.g., a hash function from an ideal primitive) is indifferentiable from a second functionality F' (e.g., a random oracle (RO)), the security of any cryptosystem is preserved when F' is replaced with F. The important application of this framework is the RO model security, because many practical cryptosystems e.g., RSA-OAEP [8] and RSA-PSS [9] are design by the RO methodology. Usually, ROs are instantiated by hash functions such as SHA-1 and SHA-256 [25]. However, the Merkle-Damgård hash functions [17,23] such as SHA-1 and SHA-256, are not indifferentiable from ROs [16]. So many indifferentiable (from a RO) hash functions have been proposed, e.g., the finalists of the SHA-3 competition [3, 11, 19, 20, 27, 1, 2, 10, 12, 16, 15, 18]. The indifferentiable security is thus an important security of hash functions.

Recently, Ristenpart, Shacham, and Shrimpton [26] showed that in some multi-stage security game a RO secure scheme is broken when the indifferentiable hash functions are used. They considered the multi-stage security game called CRP and showed that the hash-based challenge response protocol is CRP-secure in the RO model but broken when the indifferentiable hash functions are used. The CRP security game for the n-bit (output length) hash function H is the two stage security game. In the first stage, for a random message M of $4n$ bits, the first stage adversary A_1 derives the some state st of $2n$ bits. In the second stage, the second stage adversary A_2 receives st, and for a random $2n$-bit challenge value C outputs an n-bit value z. Then, the adversary wins if $z = H(M||C)$. Consider the chop MD hash function $H^h(M_1||M_2) = chop_n(h(h(IV, M_1), M_2))$ which is indifferentiable from a RO [16], where $h : \{0,1\}^{4n} \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$ is a RO, $|M_1| = |M_2| = 2n$, and $chop_n : \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^n$ outputs the right n-bits of the input. Clearly, the following adversary can win with probability 1 when H is the chop MD hash function. First, A_1 receives M, calculates $st = h(h(IV, M_1), M_2)$ where $M = M_1||M_2$, and outputs st. Second, A_2 receives st, and for a random challenge C, outputs $z = chop_n(h(st, C))$. On the other hand, when H is a RO, since A_2 cannot receive several value of M, the probability that the adversary wins is negligible. This result implies that the indifferentiable composition theorem does not ensure any multi-stage security when a RO is replaced with indifferentiable hash functions.

The chosen-distribution attack (CDA) security game is an important multi-stage security game, which is the security goal for deterministic [4, 6, 13], hedged [5], and efficiently searchable [4] public key encryption

(PKE), wherein there are several PKE schemes which are proven in the RO model [4, 5]. For the CDA secure PKE schemes EwH [4] and REwH1 [5] (in the RO model), Ristenpart *et al.* salvaged the important indifferentiable hash function, the NMAC-type hash function [18], which was proposed by Dodis, Ristenpart, and Shrimpton, and which is employed in the SHA-3 finalist Skein [19]. They showed that these PKE schemes are non-adaptive CDA secure in the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) case when the NMAC-type hash function is used.

The open problem from the paper of Ristenpart *et al.* is thus the CDA security when a RO replaced with other indifferentiable hash functions. Especially, it is important to consider the security when a RO is replaced with the SHA-3 finalists, because one of the SHA-3 finalists will be published as a standard hash function (FIPS) [24]. So we consider the important hash functions, Prefix-free Merkle-Damgård (PFMD) [16] and Sponge [10]. The PFMD hash function is employed in the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE [3]. The Sponge hash function is employed in the SHA-3 finalist Keccak [11]. We show the following.

- The adaptive PRIV security and the non-adaptive PRIV security of any PKE scheme in both chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) and CPA cases are preserved when a RO is replaced with these hash functions.
- All existing hedged PKE schemes [5], REwH, RtD, and PtD, which are CDA secure in the RO model, is CDA secure when using these hash functions.

The PRIV security [4] is the special case of the CDA security which is the security goal for the deterministic [4, 6, 13] and efficiently searchable [4] PKE schemes. Note that our results cover all PKE schemes which are CDA secure in the RO model. The advantages of our result to the result of Ristenpart *et al.* are that (1) our result ensures the *stronger* security (adaptive and CCA), and (2) our result ensures the CDA security of *all* existing PKE schemes which are CDA secure in the RO model. Since several PKE schemes in [5, 4] support the CCA case or the adaptive case, the analysis for the stronger security cases is important.

(Reset) Indifferentiability [26]. To prove the CDA security, we use the reset indifferentiability framework of Ristenpart *et al.* The reset indifferentiability ensures composition in any security game: if a hash function H^P which uses an ideal primitive P is reset indifferentiable from another ideal primitive P', any security of any cryptosystem is preserved when P' is replaced with H^P.

Recall the original [22] and reset [26] indifferentiability (from a RO) framework. The original indifferentiable security game from a RO for H^P is that a distinguisher A converses either with (H^P, P) or (RO, S^{RO}). S is a simulator which simulates P with the relation among H^P and P. If the probability that the distinguisher A hits the conversing world is small, then H^P is indifferentiable from a RO. In the reset indifferentiable security game, the distinguisher can reset the simulator to its initial state at arbitrary times.

To prove the original indifferentiable security, the simulator needs to record the query-response history. For a repeated query $P(x)$ where z was returned, the value z is returned. So, for a repeated query to the simulator where z was returned, the simulator should return z. When the internal state is reseted, the simulator forgets the value and cannot return. Thus one cannot use the reset indifferentiability from a RO to prove the CDA security when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash functions.

Our Approach. We thus use the reset indifferentiability from a variant of a RO. We propose a variant which covers many indifferentiable hash functions. We call the variant "Versatile Oracle" ($\mathcal{VO}$). $\mathcal{VO}$ consists of a RO and auxiliary oracles. The auxiliary oracles are used to record the query-response history of a simulator. $\mathcal{VO}$ thus enables to construct a simulator which does not update the internal state and which is unaffected by the reset function. We show that the PFMD hash function and the Sponge hash function are reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$s. Recently, Andreeva *et al.* [1] and Chang *et al.* [15] consider the indifferentiable security of the BLAKE hash function with the more concrete structure than PFMD. In the appendix C, we prove that the BLAKE hash function with the concrete structure is reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$. This ensures that $\mathcal{VO}$ can be replaced with these indifferentiable hash functions. Then, we show the following in both CPA and CCA cases and both adaptive and non-adaptive cases.

- For any PKE scheme, the PRIV security is preserved when a RO is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$.
- The CDA security of the existing hedged PKE schemes is preserved when a RO is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$.

The reset indifferentiability composition theorem ensures that the PRIV security and the CDA security are preserved when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function. Our results cover all existing CDA or PRIV secure PKE schemes. Note that this is the first time positive result for the reset indifferentiability (from $\mathcal{VO}$).

$\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$	$\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)$	$E_t(k,x)$
1 if $\mathsf{F}[M] =\perp$, $\mathsf{F}[M] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$;	1 if $\mathsf{F}_i^*[M] \neq\perp$ then $\mathsf{F}_i^*[M] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{w_i}$;	1 if $\mathsf{E}_t[k,x] =\perp$, $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{m_t}\backslash T_t^+[k]$;
2 **return** $\mathsf{F}[M]$;	2 **return** $\mathsf{F}_i^*[M]$;	2 $Update_t(k,x,y)$;
		3 **return** $\mathsf{E}_t[k,x]$;
$\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j(M)$	$\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(y)$	$D_t(y)$
1 If $\mathsf{F}_j[M] \neq\perp$, $\mathsf{F}_j[M] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{n_j}$;	1 if $\exists_1 M$ s.t. $\mathsf{F}_i^*[M] = y$ then **return** M;	1 if $\mathsf{D}_t[k,y] =\perp$, $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{m_t}\backslash T_t^-[k]$;
2 **return** $\mathsf{F}_j[M]$;	3 **return** $\perp$;	2 $Update_t(k,x,y)$;
		3 **return** $\mathsf{D}_t[k,y]$;

Fig. 1. Versatile Oracle $\mathcal{VO}$

2 Preliminaries

Notation. For two values x,y, $x||y$ is the concatenated value of x and y. For some value y, $x \leftarrow y$ means assigning y to x. When X is a non-empty finite set, we write $x \xleftarrow{\$} X$ to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from X and assign to x. $\oplus$ is bitwise exclusive or. $|x|$ is the bit length of x. For $l \times r$-bit value M, $div(r, M)$ divides M into r-bit values $(M_1, \dots, M_l)$ and outputs them where $M_1||\cdots||M_l = M$. For a formula F, if there exists an only one value M such that $F(M)$ is true, we denote $\exists_1 M$ s.t. $F(M)$.

(Reset) Indifferentiability [22, 26]. In the reset indifferentiability [26], for a functionality F, a private interface $F.priv$ and a public interface $F.pub$ are considered, where adversaries have oracle access to $F.pub$ and other parties (honest parties) have oracle access to $F.priv$. For example, for a cryptosystem in the F model, an output of the cryptosystem is calculated by accessing $F.priv$ and an adversary has oracle access to $F.pub$. In the RO model the RO $\mathcal{RO}_n : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ has both interfaces. Let $H^P : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a hash function that utilizes an ideal primitive P. The interfaces of H^P are defined by $H^P.priv = H^P$ and $H^P.pub = P$.

For two functionalities F_1 (e.g., hash function) and F_2 (e.g. a variant of a RO), the definition of the reset indifferentiability for F_1 from F_2 is as follows.

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{F_1,F_2,S}^{\mathsf{r\text{-}indiff}}(A) = |\Pr[A^{\bar{F}_1.priv,\bar{F}_1.pub} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^{F_2.priv,\hat{S}^{F_2.pub}} \Rightarrow 1]|$$

where $\hat{S} = (S, S.Rst)$, $\bar{F}_1.priv = F_1.priv$ and $\bar{F}_1.pub = (F_1.pub, nop)$. $S.Rst$ takes no input and when run reinitializes all of S. nop takes no input and does nothing. We say F_1 is reset indifferentiable from F_2 if there exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher A the advantage of the reset indifferentiability is negligible. This framework ensures that if F_1 is reset indifferentiable from F_2 then the any stage security of any cryptosystem is preserved when F_2 is replaced with F_1. Please see Theorem 6.1 in the full version of [26].

When $S.Rst$ and nop are removed from the reset indifferentiable security game, it is equal to the original indifferentiable security game [22]. In the original indifferentiable security game, the distinguisher interacts with $(F_1.priv, F_1.pub)$ and $(F_2.priv, S^{F_2.pub})$. We denote the advantage of the indifferentiable security by $\mathsf{Adv}_{F_1,F_2,S}^{\mathsf{indif}}(A)$ for a distinguisher A. We say F_1 is indifferentiable from F_2 if there exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher A the advantage is negligible.

3 Versatile Oracle

In this section, we propose a versatile oracle $\mathcal{VO}$. $\mathcal{VO}$ consists of a random oracle $\mathcal{RO}_n$, random oracles $\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$ $(j = 1, \dots, v)$, traceable random oracles $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \dots, u)$, and ideal ciphers $\mathsf{IC}_{k_t,m_t}^{(t)}$ $(t = 1, \dots, s)$. The private interface is defined by $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and the public interface is defined by $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$ $(j = 1, \dots, v), \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \dots, u), \mathsf{IC}_{k_t,m_t}^{(t)}$ $(t = 1, \dots, s))$. $\mathcal{VO}$ can be implemented as Fig. 1.

$\mathcal{RO}_n$ is shown in Fig. 1 (Left) where the input length is arbitrary and the output length is n bits. F is a (initially everywhere $\perp$) table.

$\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$ is shown in Fig. 1 (Left) where the input length is arbitrary and the output length is n_j bits, and F_j is a (initially everywhere $\perp$) table. Note that the n_j is defined in our proofs.

$\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ is shown in Fig. 1 (Center) which consists of a random oracle $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ and a trace oracle $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$. The output length of $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ and the input length of $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ are w_i bits, and F_i^* is a (initially everywhere $\perp$) table. Note that the length w_i is defined in our proofs.

$\mathsf{IC}_{k_t,m_t}^{(t)}$ can be implemented as Fig. 1 (Right) which consists of an encryption oracle E_t and a decryption oracle D_t where the first input of E_t is the key of k_t bits and the second input is the plain text of m_t bits, and the first input of D_t is the key of k_t bits and the second input is the cipher text of m_t bits. E_t and D_t are (initially everywhere $\perp$) tables where for the query $E_t(k,x)$ (resp. $D_t(k,y)$) the output is recored in $\mathsf{E}_t[k,x]$ (resp. $\mathsf{D}_t[k,y]$). $T_t^+[k]$ and $T_t^-[k]$ are (initially empty) tables which stores all values of $\mathsf{E}_t[k,\cdot]$ and $\mathsf{D}_t[k,\cdot]$, respectively. $Update_t(k,x,y)$ is the procedure wherein the tables $\mathsf{E}_t, \mathsf{D}_t, T_t^+[k]$ and $T_t^-[k]$ are updated, $\mathsf{E}_t[k,x] \leftarrow y, \mathsf{D}_t[k,y] \leftarrow x, T_t^+[k] \leftarrow y$ and $T_t^-[k] \leftarrow x$.

4 Reset Indifferentiability for Hash Functions

In this section, we consider the reset indifferentiable security of the important hash functions, prefix-free Merkle-Damgård (PFMD) [16] and Sponge [10]. We show that these hash functions are reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$s.

4.1 Reset Indifferentiable Proof Strategy

We prove the reset indifferentiable security by using the following strategy which enables to modularly incorporate the previous original indifferentiable security result into our proof.

Let P be some ideal primitive. Let $H^P : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a hash function using P. In the reset indifferentiable game, in the H^P world the distinguisher interacts with $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \hat{S})$ ($\mathcal{VO}$ scenario) and (H^P, P) (H^P scenario) where $\hat{S} = (S, S.Rst)$ and the simulator S simulates P. The simulator S has oracle access to $\mathcal{VO}.pub$. Let S^* be the simulator of the original indifferentiable security from $\mathcal{RO}_n$ for H^P where the simulator S^* has oracle access to $\mathcal{RO}_n$.

To evaluate the reset indifferentiable advantage, we employ the following strategy. In our proofs, we consider the following five games.

- Game 0. This is the $\mathcal{VO}$ scenario where $\mathcal{A}$ has oracle access to $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \hat{S})$.
- Game 1. This game is equal to Game 0 but $S.Rst$ is removed where $\mathcal{A}$ has oracle access to $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$.
- Game 2. This game is the random oracle scenario of the original indifferentiable security game of H^P where $\mathcal{A}$ has oracle access to $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$.
- Game 3. This game is the H^P scenario of the original indifferentiable security game where $\mathcal{A}$ has oracle access to (H^P, P).
- Game 4. This game is the H^P scenario of the reset indifferentiable security game where $\mathcal{A}$ has oracle access to (H^P, P, nop).

Let Gi be an event that $\mathcal{A}$ outputs 1 in Game i. Then,

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{H^P,\mathcal{VO},S}^{\mathsf{r\text{-}indiff}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G4]$$
$$\leq (\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]) + (\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]) + (\Pr[G2] - \Pr[G3]) + (\Pr[G3] - \Pr[G4])$$

The difference $(\Pr[G2] - \Pr[G3])$ is equal to the original indifferentiable security advantage of H^P from a RO, We denote the bound of the advantage by p^*. Since nop takes no input and does not nothing, $\Pr[G3] = \Pr[G4]$. Thus for any distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds.

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{H^P,\mathcal{VO},S}^{\mathsf{r\text{-}indiff}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]) + (\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]) + p^*.$$

So the remaining work is to define the simulator S such that the simulator does not update the internal state and the difference $(\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2])$ is small. If the simulator does not update the internal state, $S.Rst$ gives no advantage to $\mathcal{A}$, that is, $\Pr[G0] = \Pr[G1]$. We thus define such simulator.

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PFMD^h(M)
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1 (M_1, ..., M_i) ← div(m, pfpad(M))
2 x ← IV;
3 For j = 1, ..., i, x ← h(x||M_j);
4 Ret x;


S(x, y)
─────────────────────────────────
1 M* ← TO^(1)(x);
2 if x = IV then
3    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = y then z ← RO_n(M);
4    else z ← RO_n^(1)(y);
5 else if M* ≠ ⊥ then
6    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = M*||y then z ← RO_n(M);
7    else z ← RO_n^(1)(M*||y);
8 else z ← RO_n^1(x||y);
9 return z;
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S*(x, y)
─────────────────────────────────
01 if T_{S*}[x, y] ≠ ⊥ then return T_{S*}[x, y];
02 if x = IV then
03    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = y then z ← RO_n(M);
04    else
05       z ← {0, 1}^n;
06       if Path[z] = ⊥ then Path[z] ← y;
07 else if Path[x] = M* ≠ ⊥ then
08    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = M*||y then z ← RO_n(M);
09    else
10       z ← {0, 1}^n;
11       if Path[z] = ⊥ then Path[z] ← M*||y;
12 else z ←$ {0, 1}^n;
13 T_{S*}[x, y] ← z;
14 return T_{S*}[x, y];
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Fig. 2. PFMD Hash Function (left), Simulator S (left), and Simulator S^* (right)

4.2 Reset Indifferentiability for the PFMD Hash Function

The PFMD hash function is employed in the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE hash function [3]. In the document of [3], the indifferentiable security is proven when the compression function is a RO.

The PFMD hash function is illustrated in Fig. 2 (Left) where IV is the initial value of n bits, $h : \{0, 1\}^d \to \{0, 1\}^n$ is a compression function, $d = n + m$, and $\mathsf{pfpad} : \{0, 1\}^* \to (\{0, 1\}^m)^*$ is an injective prefix-free padding where for any different values M, M', $\mathsf{pfpad}(M)$ is not a prefix of $\mathsf{pfpad}(M')$ and the inverse function of pfpad is efficiently computable.

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security from $\mathcal{VO}$ for the PFMD hash function where h is a RO. We define the parameter of $\mathcal{VO}$ as $v = 1$, $u = 1$ $n_1 = n$, and $w_1 = n$. Note that in the reset indifferentiable proof ideal ciphers are not used. Thus in this case, $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_n^1, \mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)})$. The following theorem shows that PFMD^h is reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$.

Theorem 1. *There exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{r\text{-}indiff}}_{\mathrm{PFMD}^h, \mathcal{VO}, S}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{(lq_H + q_h)^2}{2^n}\right)$$

where $\mathcal{A}$ can make queries to $\mathrm{PFMD}^h/\mathcal{RO}_n$ and h/S at most q_H, q_h times, respectively, and l is a maximum number of blocks of a query to $\mathrm{PFMD}^h/\mathcal{RO}_n$. S makes at most $2q_h$ queries and runs in time $\mathcal{O}(q_h)$. ♦

In the proof of the theorem, we use the result of the indifferentiable security from a RO by Chang *et al.* [14] They defined a simulator S^* which is shown in Fig. 2. T_{S^*} is a (initially everywhere $\bot$) table which records query-response values of S^*. For the query $S^*(x, y)$, the response is recorded in $T_{S^*}[x, y]$. $Path$ is a (initially everywhere $\bot$) table which records all paths with the Merkle-Damgård style. If triples $(z_0, y_1, z_1), (z_1, y_2, z_2), (z_2, y_3, z_3)$ are recoded in T_{S^*} where $T_{S^*}[z_{j-1}, y_j] = z_j$ and $z_0 = IV$, $y_1||y_2||y_3$ is recoded in $Path[z_3]$ [1]. The task of the simulator S^* is to simulate h so that the relation among (PFMD^h, h) yields among $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$. So the response of $S^*(x, y)$ is defined by the output of $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ if there exists M^* such that $Path[x] = M^*$ and there exists M such that $\mathsf{pfpad}(M) = M^*||y$.

The Simulator S. We define the simulator S in Fig. 2. $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}$ offers the same functionality as the table $Path$. If the queries $S(z_0, y_1), S(z_1, y_2), S(z_2, y_3)$ were made where $z_1 = S(z_0, y_1), z_2 = S(z_1, y_2), z_3 = S(z_2, y_3)$, the structure of S^* ensures that the Merkle-Damgård style path $(y_1||y_2||y_3, z_3)$ is recoded in the table F_1^*. The response of $S(x, y)$ is defined by the output of $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ if the response $M^* = \mathcal{TO}^*(x)$ is not

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[1] Note that in [14], the paths are recorded by using another formula, which is a relation $\mathcal{R}$, but the table $Path$ realizes the same role as the relation.

Algorithm $Sponge^P(M)$

1 $M' \leftarrow \mathsf{pad}_S(M);$
2 $(M_1,\ldots,M_i) \leftarrow div(n,M);$
3 $s = IV;$
4 for $i = 1,\ldots,i$ do $s = P(s \oplus (M_i\|0^c));$
5 **return** the left most n-bits of $s;$

$\underline{S^*_+(x,y)}$
01 if $T_{S^*_+}[x,y] \neq \bot$ then **return** $T_{S^*_+}[x,y];$
02 if $y = IV_2$ then
03   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(IV_1 \oplus x) = M \neq \bot$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);$
04   else $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$
05 else if $Path[y] \neq \bot$ then
06   let $Path[y] = (M^*, z^*);$
07   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^*\|(z^* \oplus x)) = M \neq \bot$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);$
08   else $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$
09 else $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$
10 $w \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^c\backslash T_F[z];$
11 $Update_{S^*}(x,y,z,w);$
12 **return** $z\|w;$

$\underline{S^*_-(z,w)}$
1 if $T_{S^*}[z,w] \neq \bot$ then $T_{S^*}[z,w];$
2 $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$ $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^c\backslash T_I[x];$
3 $Update_{S^*}(x,y,z,w);$
4 **return** $x\|y;$

$\underline{S_+(x,y)}$
01 $M^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y);$
02 if $y = IV_2$ then
03   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(IV_1 \oplus x) = M \neq \bot$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);$
04   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x);$
05     $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1);$
06 else if $M^* \neq \bot$ then
07     $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M^*);$
08   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^*\|m) = M \neq \bot$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);$
09   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*\|m);$
10     $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*\|m);$
11 else $z\|w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x\|y);$
12 **return** $z\|w;$

$\underline{S_-(z,w)}$
01 $M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w);$
02 if $M \neq \bot$ and $|M| = n$ then
03     $x \leftarrow IV_1 \oplus M;$ $y \leftarrow IV_2;$
04 if $M \neq \bot$ and $|M| > n$ then
05   let $M = M^*\|m$ $(|m| = n);$
06   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^*) = M_1 \neq \bot$ then $x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M_1);$
07   else $x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*);$
08     $y \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*);$
09 else $x\|y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}^{-1}(z\|w);$
10 **return** $x\|y;$

Fig. 3. Sponge Hash Function (left), Simulator S^* (left) and Simulator S (right)

$\bot$ and there exists M such that $\mathsf{pfpad}(M) = M^*\|y$. The simulator S thus realizes the similar procedure to S^* and the difference $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$ is bounded by $q_h^2/2^n$. The formal evaluation of the difference is given in Appendix A. Since the simulator S does not update the internal state, $\Pr[G0] = \Pr[G1]$. From [14], the indifferentiable security bound is $\mathcal{O}((lq_H + q_h)^2/2^n)$. There results yield the bound of Theorem 1.

Remark 1. The EMD hash function [7] and the MDP hash function [21] are designed from the same design spirit as the PFMD hash function, which are designed so that the length extension attack is resisted. Thus, by the similar proof, one can prove that the EMD hash function and the MDP hash function are reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$s where the compression function is a RO.

4.3 Reset Indifferentiability for Sponge

The Sponge hash function is a permutation-based hash function which employed in the SHA-3 candidate Keccak [11].

Fig. 3 (left) illustrates the Sponge hash function where IV is the initial value of b bits, $\mathsf{pad}_S : \{0,1\}^* \to (\{0,1\}^n)^*$ is an injective padding function such that the final block message $M_i \neq 0$, $P : \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^b$ is a permutation and $b = n + c$. The inverse function of pad_S is denoted by $\mathsf{unpad}_S : (\{0,1\}^n)^* \to \{0,1\}^* \cup \{\bot\}$ efficiently computable. $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^*)$ outputs M if there exists M such that $\mathsf{pad}_S(M) = M^*$, and outputs $\bot$ otherwise. Note that the Sponge hash function of Fig. 3 is the special case of the general Sponge hash function where the output length is variable. The output lengths of SHA-3 are $224, 256, 384$ and 512 bits and in this case the Keccak hash function has the structure of Fig. 3 [2]. We conjecture that the reset indifferentiable

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[2] In the Keccak case, $b = 1600$ and $c = 576$. So, the output length of Keccak is shorter than n. Notice that the security analysis of this case is the same as the case that the output length n-bit, because the advantage of adversaries in the shorter output length case is decreased from that of adversaries in the case that the output length is n-bit. In

security of the general Sponge hash function can be proven by extending the following analysis of the Sponge hash function. We denote the left most n-bit value and the right most c bit value of IV by IV_1 and IV_2, respectively. Namely, $IV = IV_1||IV_2$.

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security of the Sponge hash function, where the permutation P is a forward oracle of a random permutation and P^{-1} is its inverse oracle [3]. We define the parameter of $\mathcal{VO}$ as $u = 1$, $s = 1$, $w_1 = c$, and $m_1 = b$, and the random oracles $\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$ are not used. We don't care the key length k_1, since in this proof we fix the key by some constant value, that is the fixed key ideal cipher is used. Since the fixed key ideal cipher is a random permutation of b bits, we use the random permutation $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$ of b bits instead of the ideal cipher $\mathsf{IC}_{k_1,b}^{(1)}$ where $\mathcal{P}$ is a forward oracle and $\mathcal{P}^{-1}$ is an inverse oracle. Thus, in this case, $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_c^{(1)}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$. The following theorem is that the sponge hash function $Sponge^P$ is reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$.

Theorem 2 (Sponge is reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$). *There exists a simulator $S = (S^+, S^-)$ such that for any distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds.*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{Sponge^P,\mathcal{VO},S}^{\mathsf{r\text{-}indiff}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{(1-2^{-n})q^2 + (1+2^{-n})q}{2^{c+1}} + \frac{q^2}{2^b} + \frac{q(3q+1)}{2^{c-1}}$$

where $\mathcal{A}$ can make at most q queries. S makes at most $3q$ queries and runs in time $\mathcal{O}(q)$. ♦

In the proof of the theorem, we use the result of the indifferentiable security from a RO by Bertoni *et al.* [10]. They define a simulator $S^* = (S_+^*, S_-^*)$ which is shown in Fig. 3. S_+^* and S_-^* simulate the random permutation P and its inverse P^{-1}, respectively. $T_{S_+^*}$ and $T_{S_-^*}$ are (initially everywhere $\perp$) tables which records query-response values of S_+^* and S_-^*. For the query $S_+^*(x,y)$, the response $z||w$ is recorded in $T_{S_+^*}[x,y]$ and $x||y$ is recoded in $T_{S_-^*}[z,w]$. Similarly, the response $z||w$ of the query $S_-^*(x,y)$ and $x||y$ are recoded in these tables. $Path$ is a (initially everywhere $\perp$) table which records all paths with the Sponge style. If triples $(x_1, w_0, z_1, w_1), (x_2, w_1, z_2, w_2), (x_3, w_2, z_3, w_3)$ are the query-response values where $T_{S_+^*}[x_j, w_{j-1}] = z_j||w_j$ ($j = 1, 2, 3$) and $w_0 = IV_2$, then $(x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1)||(x_3 \oplus z_2)$ and z_3 is recoded in $Path[w_3]$. T_F and T_I are (initially everywhere $\perp$) tables. $T_F[z]$ includes values which are all y' such that $T_{S_+^*}[\cdot, y'] \neq \perp$, IV_2, all y'' such that $Path[y''] \neq \perp$, and all w' such that $T_{S_-^*}[z||w'] \neq \perp$. $T_I[x]$ includes values which are IV_2, all y' such that $Path[y'] \neq \perp$, and all y'' such that $T_{S_+^*}[x, y'']$. $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$ is a procedure that the tables $T_{S_+^*}, T_{S_-^*}$, and $Path$ are updated by using (x, y, z, w), namely, $T_{S_+^*}[x, y] \leftarrow z||w$, $T_{S_-^*}[z, w] \leftarrow x||y$, and if $Path[y] = (M, z^*) \neq \perp$ and $Path[w] = \perp$ then $Path[w] \leftarrow (M||(x \oplus z^*), z)$ [4].

The simulator's task is to simulate the random permutation (P, P^{-1}) so that the simulator ensures the sponge consistency, that is, the relation among $(Sponge^P, P, P^{-1})$ yields among $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S_+^*, S_-^*)$. Thus, to ensure the Sponge consistency, for the query $S_+^*(x, y)$ the left n-bit value z of the response is defined by $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ if there is a path to (x, y), namely, $Path[y] = (M^*, z^*) \neq \perp$ such that there exists M such that $\mathsf{pad}_S(M^*||(x \oplus z^*)) = M$.

The Simulator S. We define the simulator S in Fig. 2. $\mathcal{TRO}_c^{(1)}$ realizes the same functionality as the table $Path$. When the queries $S_+(x_1, w_0), S(x_2, w_1)$ were made where $z_1||w_1 = S_+(x_1, w_0), z_2||w_2 = S(x_2, w_1)$ where $w_0 = IV_2$, the structure of S ensures that the Sponge style path $((x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1), w_2)$ is recoded in the table F_1^* where $\mathsf{F}_1^*[(x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1)] = w_2$. Then, when the query $S_+(x_3, w_2)$ is made such that $\mathsf{unpad}_S((x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1)||(x_3 \oplus z_2)) = M \neq \perp$, the simulator can obtain $(x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1)$ by the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w_2)$. Thus the simulator can ensure the Sponge consistency by defining the output $z_3||w_3$ so that $z_3 = \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ and $w_3 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}((x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1)||(x_3 \oplus z_2))$ where $z_2 = \mathcal{RO}_n^1((x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1))$. The simulator S thus realizes the similar procedure as S^*. The formal proof is given in Appendix B. The difference $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$ is bounded by $q^2/2^b + q(3q + 1)/2^{c-1}$. Since the simulator S does not update the internal state, $\Pr[G0] = \Pr[G1]$. The indifferentiable bound from $\mathcal{RO}_n$ in [10] is $((1 - 2^{-n})q^2 + (1 + 2^{-n})q)/2^{c+1}$. These results yield the bound of Theorem 2.

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the shorter output length case (assume that the output length is n'-bit), $\mathcal{VO}.priv$ is $chop_{n-n'} \circ \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{VO}$ is $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_c^1, \mathcal{TO}^1, \mathcal{RO}_r^2, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$ where $chop_{n-n'}$ is the chop function where the right most $n - n'$-bits of the input are chopped.

[3] The security of the Sponge hash function was evaluated in the random permutation model [10].

[4] Note that in [10], the paths and the query-response values are recorded by using a graph representation, but the table $Path$ and the tables $T_{S_+^*}, T_{S_-^*}$ realizes the same role as the graph.

$$\begin{array}{|ll|}
\hline
\underline{\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{A_1,A_2}} & \underline{\mathrm{CDA}j_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{A_1,A_2}\ (j=1,2)} \\
b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\} & b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\} \\
(pk,sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} & (pk,sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K} \\
(\mathbf{m}_0,\mathbf{m}_1,\mathbf{r}) \leftarrow A_1^{F.pub} & ((\mathbf{m}_0,\mathbf{m}_1,\mathbf{r}),i) \leftarrow A_1^{F.pub} \\
\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{F.priv}(pk,\mathbf{m}_b,\mathbf{r}) & \mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{F.priv}(pk,\mathbf{m}_b,\mathbf{r}) \\
b' \leftarrow A_2^{F.pub}(pk,\mathbf{c}) & b' \leftarrow A_2^{F.pub}(pk,\mathbf{c}) \\
\textbf{return}\ (b=b') & \textbf{return}\ (bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b,\mathbf{r})=b') \\
\hline
\end{array}$$

Fig. 4. CDA Security Game (left) and CDA1 Security Game (right)

5 Multi-Stage Security When a RO is Replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$

We show the following. Note that the following security ensure both adaptive and non-adaptive cases and both CCA and CPA cases.

- For any PKE scheme, the PRIV security [4] is preserved when a RO is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$.
- For all hedged PKE schemes [5], REwH, RtD, and PtD, the CDA security is preserved when a RO is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$.

In this section, we use the following notations. Vectors are written in blodface, e.g., $\mathbf{x}$. If $\mathbf{x}$ is a vector then $|\mathbf{x}|$ denotes its length and $\mathbf{x}[i]$ denotes its i-th component for $1 \leq i \leq |\mathbf{x}|$. $bit_j(\mathbf{x})$ is the left j-th bit of $\mathbf{x}[1]||\dots||\mathbf{x}[|\mathbf{x}|]$.

Public Key Encryption (PKE). Recall that a public key encryption scheme $\mathcal{AE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ consists of three algorithms. Key generation $\mathcal{K}$ outputs a public key, secret key pair. Encryption $\mathcal{E}$ takes a public key pk, a message m, and randomness r and outputs a cipher text. Decryption $\mathcal{D}$ takes a secret key, a cipher text, and outputs a plaintext or a distinguished symbol $\perp$. For vectors $\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{r}$ with $|\mathbf{m}| = |\mathbf{r}| = v$ we denote by $\mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}; \mathbf{r})$ the vector $(\mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}[1]; \mathbf{r}[1]), \dots, \mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}[v]; \mathbf{r}[v]))$. We say that $\mathcal{AE}$ is deterministic if $\mathcal{E}$ is deterministic. (That is, the length of the randomness is 0)

CDA Security. We explain the CDA security (we quote the explanation of the CDA security in [26]). Fig. 4 illustrates the non-adaptive CDA game in the CPA case for a PKE scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ using a functionality F. We explain the adaptive case and the CCA case, later. This notion captures the security of a PKE scheme when the randomness r used may not be a string of uniform bits. For the remainder of this section, fix a randomness length $\rho \geq 0$ and a message length $\omega > 0$. An (μ, ν)-mmr-source $\mathcal{M}$ is a randomized algorithm that outputs a triple of vector $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$ such that $|\mathbf{m}_0| = |\mathbf{m}_1| = |\mathbf{r}| = \nu$ which is the size of vectors, all components of $\mathbf{m}_0$ and $\mathbf{m}_1$ are bit strings of length ω, all components of $\mathbf{r}$ are bit strings of length ρ, and $(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}[i]) \neq (\mathbf{m}_b[j], \mathbf{r}[j])$ for all $1 \leq i < j \leq \nu$ and all $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Moreover, the source has mini-entropy μ, meaning $\Pr[(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}[i]) = (m', r')|(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}] \leq 2^{-\mu}$ for all $b \in \{0, 1\}$, all $1 \leq i \leq \nu$, and all (m', r'). A CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ is a pair of procedures, the first of which is a (μ, ν)-mmr-source. The CDA advantage for a CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ against scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ using a functionality F is defined by

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathrm{cda}}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - 1.$$

In the adaptive case, the adversary $\mathcal{A}_1$ can select multiple triples $(\mathbf{m}_{0,0}, \mathbf{m}_{0,1}, \mathbf{r}_0), \dots, (\mathbf{m}_{j,0}, \mathbf{m}_{j,1}, \mathbf{r}_j)$ adaptively, where before selecting $(\mathbf{m}_{i,0}, \mathbf{m}_{i,1}, \mathbf{r}_i)$, $\mathcal{A}_1$ can know cipher texts $\mathbf{c}_0, \dots, \mathbf{c}_{i-1}$ of $(\mathbf{m}_{0,b}, \mathbf{r}_0), \dots, (\mathbf{m}_{i-1,b}, \mathbf{r}_{i-1})$ where $b \in \{0, 1\}$. The adversary A_2 can receive its cipher texts $\mathbf{c}_0, \dots, \mathbf{c}_{j-1}$, while in the non-adaptive case, $\mathcal{A}_1$ outputs only one pair and $\mathcal{A}_2$ receives its cipher text. In the CCA case, the adversary $\mathcal{A}_2$ has oracle access to the decryption oracle where the queries don't appear as a component of the cipher text(s).

PRIV Security. The PRIV security is the special case of the CDA security when the PKE scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ being considered has randomness length $\rho = 0$. Thus the PRIV security game for a PKE scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ using a functionality F against adversary A_1, A_2 is equal to the CDA game when $\rho = 0$, namely $\mathrm{PRIV}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2} = \mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2}$ and the PRIV advantage $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathrm{priv}}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathrm{cda}}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$.

CDA1 Security. In the following proofs, we use a new security called CDA1. The CDA1 security game is shown in Fig. 4 which is equal to CDA security but in this game the first stage adversary outputs i and

the second adversary outputs b' where $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. Fig. 4 is a non-adaptive and CPA case. In the adaptive case, A_1 outputs $(\mathbf{m}_{0,0}, \mathbf{m}_{0,1}, \mathbf{r}_0), \ldots, (\mathbf{m}_{j-1,0}, \mathbf{m}_{j-1,1}, \mathbf{r}_{j-1})$ and A_2 obtains its cipher texts $\mathbf{c}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_{j-1}$. In the adaptive case, the CDA1 game returns $(bit_i(\mathbf{m}_{0,b}, \cdots, \mathbf{m}_{j-1,b}, \mathbf{r}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{r}_{j-1}) = b')$. In the CCA case, the adversary $\mathcal{A}_2$ has oracle access to the decryption oracle where the queries don't appear as a component of the cipher text(s). The CDA1 advantage for a CDA1 adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ against scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ using a functionality F is defined by

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda1}}_{\mathcal{AE}, F}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\mathrm{CDA1}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, F} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - 1.$$

CDA2 Security. The CDA2 security game is the special case of the CDA1 security game. In the CDA2 security game, A_1 outputs $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$ such that $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ is a random bit, namely, for the output of $\mathcal{A}_1$, $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$, $\Pr[bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r}) = 1] = 1/2$. The CDA2 advantage for a CDA2 adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ against scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ using a functionality F is defined by

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda2}}_{\mathcal{AE}, F}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\mathrm{CDA2}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, F} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - 1.$$

Clearly the following lemma holds.

Lemma 1. *For any CDA2 adversary A_1, A_2 of a PKE scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ using a functionality F, there exists a CDA1 adversary B_1, B_2 such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda2}}_{\mathcal{AE}, F}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda1}}_{\mathcal{AE}, F}(B_1, B_2)$$

where the running time of B_1, B_2 is at most that of A_1, A_2. ♦

5.1 Tools of Our Security Proofs

Removing Random Oracle. Let $\mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{RO}^*$ be random oracles (in this case we don't care the lengths of domain and range spaces of $\mathcal{RO}^*$). Let $\mathcal{O}_1$ be some oracle where $\mathcal{O}_1.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{O}_1.pub$ includes $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}^*$ and other independent oracles. Let $\mathcal{O}_2$ be an oracle which is equal to $\mathcal{O}_1$ but excludes $\mathcal{RO}^*$. The following lemma ensures that the CDA security in the $\mathcal{O}_2$ model ensures that in the $\mathcal{O}_1$ model. Notice that the following lemma ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the cases of the non-adaptive adversary and the adaptive adversary.

Lemma 2. *For any CDA adversary A_1, A_2, making queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}, q$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}^*$ and other oracles, there exists a CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ such that*

$$\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{A_1, A_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_1} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}].$$

where the running time of the CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ is at most that of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2 and makes queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$, and other oracles. ♦

Proof. We consider the following three games.

- Game 0 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_1$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_1.pub$.
- Game 1 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_1$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 but A_1, A_2 does not have oracle access to $\mathcal{RO}^*$.
- Game 2 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_2$ model where the adversary is $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_2.pub$.

Let Gj be an event that the CDA game in Game j output true. Thus

$$\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{A_1, A_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_1} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] + \Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2].$$

Consider the difference between Game 0 and Game 1 ($\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]$). Since $\mathcal{RO}^*$ does not leak one bit or more of $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$, $\mathcal{RO}^*$ gives no advantage to the CDA adversary. Thus $\Pr[G0] \leq \Pr[G1]$.

Consider the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 ($\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$). Clearly, $\Pr[G1] = \Pr[G2]$.

From above discussions, $\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{A_1, A_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_1} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq 0.$ □

Removing Ideal Cipher. Let $\mathcal{RO}_n$ be a random oracle. Let $\mathsf{IC} = (E, D)$ be an ideal cipher independently from $\mathcal{RO}_n$ where E is an encryption oracle and D is a decryption oracle (in this case we don't care the plain text space, the cipher text space and the key space). Let $\mathcal{O}_3$ be some oracle where $\mathcal{O}_3.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{O}_3.pub$ includes $\mathcal{RO}_n$, IC and other independent oracles. Let $\mathcal{O}_4$ be an oracle which is equal to $\mathcal{O}_3$ but does not include IC. The following lemma ensures that the CDA security in the $\mathcal{O}_4$ model ensures that in the $\mathcal{O}_3$ model. Notice that the following lemma ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the cases of the non-adaptive adversary and the adaptive adversary.

Lemma 3. *For any CDA adversary A_1, A_2 in the $\mathcal{O}_3$ model, making queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathsf{IC}$ and other oracles, respectively, there exists a CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ such that*

$$\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_3}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_4}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}].$$

$\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ can make queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$ and other oracles, respectively. The running time of the CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ is at most that of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2. ♦

Proof. We consider the following three games.

- Game 0 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_3$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_3.pub$.
- Game 1 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_3$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_3.pub$ excluding the ideal cipher (E, D).
- Game 2 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_4$ model where the adversary is $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_4.pub$.

Let Gj be an event that the CDA game in Game$j$ output true. Thus

$$\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_3}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_4}^{\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] + \Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2].$$

Game 0 $\Rightarrow$ Game 1. Consider the difference between Game 0 and Game 1 ($\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]$). If $\mathcal{A}_1$ can success to give some cipher text to $\mathcal{A}_2$ where the plain text includes one bit or more of $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$, $\mathcal{A}_2$ might obtain the information of $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$ by inverting the cipher text. However, since the length of the plain text is equal to that of the cipher text, the adversary $\mathcal{A}_1$ can also give the plain text to $\mathcal{A}_2$ without the ideal cipher. Thus, the ideal cipher gives no advantage to the adversary and $\Pr[G0] \leq \Pr[G1]$.

Game 1 $\Rightarrow$ Game 2. Since in Game 1 the adversary cannot make a query to the ideal cipher, Game 2 is equal to Game 1. So $\Pr[G1] = \Pr[G2]$. □

Removing Traceable Random Oracles. Let $\mathcal{RO}_n$ be a random oracle. Let $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)} = (\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}, \mathcal{TO}^{(i)})$ $(i = 1, \ldots, v)$ be traceable random oracles. Let $\mathcal{O}_5$ be some oracle where $\mathcal{O}_5.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$ includes $\mathcal{RO}_n$, $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ and other independent oracles. Let $\mathcal{O}_6$ be an oracle which is equal to $\mathcal{O}_5$ but does not include $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$. The following lemma shows that the CDA security in the $\mathcal{O}_6$ model and the CDA1 security in the $\mathcal{O}_5$ model ensures CDA security in the $\mathcal{O}_5$ model. Notice that the following lemma ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the cases of the non-adaptive adversary and the adaptive adversary.

Lemma 4. *For any CDA adversary A_1, A_2 in the $\mathcal{O}_5$ model, making queries to $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}, \mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ and other oracles at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}, q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}, q$, respectively, there exists a CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ in the $\mathcal{O}_6$ mode or a CDA1 adversary B_1, B_2 in the $\mathcal{O}_6$ model such that*

$$\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_5}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_6}^{\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] + \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_5}^{\mathrm{cda2}}(B_1, B_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-1}}.$$

where $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ can query to $\mathcal{RO}_n$ and other oracles at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q$, respectively. $w = \min\{w_1, \ldots, w_v\}$. The running time of the CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ is at most that of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2. ♦

Proof. We consider the following three games.

- Game 0 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_5$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$.

– Game 1 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_5$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$ excluding $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$.
– Game 2 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_5$ model where the adversary is A_1, A_2 which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$ excluding $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$.
– Game 3 is the CDA game in the $\mathcal{O}_6$ model where the adversary is $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ which has oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_6.pub$.

Let Gj be an event that the CDA game in Game$j$ output true. Thus

$$\Pr[\text{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_1}^{A_1, A_2} \Rightarrow \text{true}] - \Pr[\text{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_2}^{A_1, A_2} \Rightarrow \text{true}] \le \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] + \Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] + \Pr[G2] - \Pr[G3].$$

Game 0 $\Rightarrow$ Game 1. Consider the difference between Game 0 and Game 1 ($\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]$). We consider the following events.

– Event E1: A_1 makes a query $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)$ such that M includes one bit or more of $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$.
  • Event E11 = E1 $\wedge$ E1' where Event E1' is that A_2 makes the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ where $z = \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)$
    ∗ Event E111 = E11 $\wedge$ E11' where Event E11' is that $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ includes one bit or more of z.
      · Event E1111 = E111 $\wedge$ E111' where Event E111' is that when A_2 makes the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$, A_2 knows one bit or more of z in $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$.
      · Event E1112 = E111$\wedge\neg$E112' where Event $\neg$E112' is that when A_2 makes the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$, A_2 know no bit of z in $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$.
    ∗ Event E112 = E11 $\wedge$ $\neg$E11' where Event $\neg$E11' is that $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ includes no bit of z.
  • Event E12 = E1 $\wedge$ $\neg$E1' where Event $\neg$E1' is that A_2 does not make the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$.
– Event E2 = $\neg$E1 where Event $\neg$E1 is that A_1 does not make the query $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)$.

Thus in the following we consider the events E1111, E1112, E112, E12 and E2.
Let E[i] be the Event E in Game i. Then

$$\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] \le \Pr[G0|\text{E1111}[0]]\Pr[\text{E1111}[0]] + \Pr[G0|\text{E1112}[0]]\Pr[\text{E1112}[0]] + \Pr[G0|\text{E112}[0]]\Pr[\text{E112}[0]]$$
$$+ \Pr[G0|\text{E12}[0]]\Pr[\text{E12}[0]] + \Pr[G0|\text{E2}[0]]\Pr[\text{E2}[0]] - \Pr[G1]$$
$$\le \Pr[\text{E1111}[0]] + \Pr[\text{E1112}[0]] + \Pr[\text{E112}[0]]$$
$$+ \Pr[G0|\text{E12}[0]]\Pr[\text{E12}[0]] + \Pr[G0|\text{E2}[0]]\Pr[\text{E2}[0]] - \Pr[G1]$$

$\Pr[\text{E1111}[0]]$: Under Event E1111[0], A_2 knows one bit or more of z in $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ without using $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$. And $\mathcal{RO}_{n_i}^{(i)}$ leaks no bit of $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$. Thus A_2 knows the bit without using the traceable random oracles $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$. Since z is a random value, E1111[0] is equal to the event that in the $\mathcal{O}_6$ model A_1 makes $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$ such that for some i $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_{b^*}, \mathbf{r})$ is some bit of z and then A_2 hits the bit. Namely, if E1111[0] occurs then the CDA adversary succeeds in the CDA2 advantage begin 1. So if Event E1111[0] occurs then there exists the CDA2 adversary B_1, B_2 such that $\Pr[\text{E1111}[0]] \le \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_6}^{\text{cda2}}(B_1, B_2)$.

$\Pr[\text{E1112}[0]]$: Under Event E1111[0], when A_2 makes a query $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$, A_2 know no bit of $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$. Thus, Event E1111[0] is that A_2 needs to hit the random value z. Since A_1 can make such value z at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$ values, $\Pr[\text{E1112}[0]] \le q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^w$.

$\Pr[\text{E112}[0]]$: Since $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ does not include z, to query $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$, A_2 needs to hit the random value z. Since A_1 can make such value z at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ values, $\Pr[\text{E112}[0]] \le q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^w$.

$\Pr[G0|\text{E12}[0]]$: Since A_2 makes no $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ query to obtain $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$, $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ gives no advantage to A_2. Thus $\Pr[G0|\text{E12}[0]] = \Pr[G1]$.

$\Pr[G0|\text{E2}[0]]$: Since $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ gives no value of $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$ to A_2 under Event $E2[0]$, $\Pr[G0|\text{E22}[0]] = \Pr[G1]$.

Since $\Pr[\text{E12}[0]] + Pr[\text{E2}[0]] \le 1$, there exists the CDA2 adversary B_1, B_2 such that

$$\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] \le \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}_6}^{\text{cda2}}(B_1, B_2) + q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^{w-1}.$$

Note that the above discussion is in the case of the non-adaptive adversary, but clearly one can apply the discussion to the case of the adaptive adversary by changing the A_1's output and the cipher text from $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$ and $\mathbf{c}$ to $(\mathbf{m}_{0,0}, \mathbf{m}_{0,1}, \mathbf{r}_0), \ldots, (\mathbf{m}_{i-1,0}, \mathbf{m}_{i-1,1}, \mathbf{r}_{i-1})$ and $(\mathbf{c}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_j)$

Game 1 $\Rightarrow$ Game 2. In Game 2 $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ queries are removed. From Lemma 2, $\Pr[G1] \leq \Pr[G2]$.

Game 2 $\Rightarrow$ Game 3. Clearly Game 3 is equal to Game 2. Thus $\Pr[G2] = \Pr[G3]$.

Thus, the bound of the theorem is obtained. □

5.2 PRIV Security

Lemmas 2 and 3 ensure that for any PKE scheme the PRIV security is preserved when $\mathcal{O}_7$ is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$, where $\mathcal{O}_7.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{O}_7.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)})$ for $i = 1, \ldots, u$. To use Lemma 4, we evaluate the CDA1 advantage in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$ model. Since $\rho = 0$, the CDA1 advantage is that the second adversary in the PRIV game obtains one bit or more of $\mathbf{m}_b$. When A_1 generates $\mathbf{m}_b$ such that the obtained bit is b, A_2 can output b. Namely, the CDA1 advantage is bounded by the CDA advantage in the RO model. The formal evaluation of the bound of the CDA1 advantage is given in Appendix D. We thus obtain the following theorem. Notice that the theorem ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the non-adaptive cases and the adaptive case.

Theorem 3. *For any PRIV adversary A_1, A_2 in the $\mathcal{VO}$ model, making queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ and $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$, $\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$ $(j = 1, \ldots, v)$, $\mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$ $(t = 1, \ldots, s)$, $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ and $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$, respectively, there exists a PRIV adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}^*}^{\mathrm{priv}}(A_1, A_2) \leq 3 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{RO}_n}^{\mathrm{priv}}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

$\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ can make queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$. The running time of the PRIV adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ is at most that of the PRIV adversary A_1, A_2. ♦

5.3 The CDA Security of Hedged PKE Schemes

In the CDA security game with randomness, one cannot use Lemma 4 for some PKE scheme, since there exists a PKE scheme which is CDA secure in the RO model but the CDA2 advantage is not negligible. For example, such PKE scheme is that the encryption is defined as $\mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}; \mathbf{r}) || bit_1(\mathbf{r})$. We thus prove all hedged PKE schemes, REwH, RtD and PtD [5].

Lemmas 2 and 3 ensure that the CDA security of these PKE schemes is preserved when $\mathcal{O}_7$ is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$ where $\mathcal{O}_7.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{O}_7.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)})$ for $i = 1, \ldots, u$. We thus consider the CDA2 security of these PKE schemes in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$. Then Lemma 4 ensures that the CDA security of these PKE schemes is preserved when $\mathcal{RO}$ is replaced with $\mathcal{O}_7$

Let $\mathcal{AE}_r = (\mathcal{K}_r, \mathcal{E}_r, \mathcal{D}_r)$ be a (randomized) PKE scheme with randomness length $\rho_r > 0$. Let $\mathcal{AE}_d = (\mathcal{K}_d, \mathcal{E}_d, \mathcal{D}_d)$ be a (deterministic) PKE scheme with randomness length always 0.

The CDA Security of REwH. Let $\mathsf{REwH}[\mathcal{AE}_r] = (\mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{REwH}}, \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{REwH}}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{REwH}})$ be the PKE scheme. The encryption is defined as $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{REwH}}(pk, m; r) = \mathcal{E}_r(pk, m; \mathcal{RO}_n(pk||m||r))$. We evaluate the CDA2 advantage of REwH in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$. Since $\mathbf{r}$ is hidden by the $\mathcal{RO}_n$, to obtain the advantage of $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$, the second stage adversary needs to obtain some bits of $\mathbf{m}_b$ from $\mathbf{c}$, or hits some output of $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$. If the CDA2 adversary can cause the former case, he can break the CDA security by setting b in the obtained bit via the CDA1 adversary (Lemma 1). For the latter case, the probability that the second stage adversary hits a random value of at least w bits are less than $q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^w$. The formal evaluation is given in Appendix E. We thus have the following theorem.

Theorem 4. *For any CDA adversary A_1, A_2 in the $\mathcal{VO}$ model, making queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ and $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$, $\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$ $(j = 1, \ldots, v)$, $\mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$ $(t = 1, \ldots, s)$, $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ and $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ $(i = $*

$1, \ldots, u$), respectively, there exists a CDA adversary A_1, A_2 such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{O}^*}(A_1, A_2) \leq 3 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{RO}_n}(A_1, A_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

A_1, A_2 can make queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$. The running time of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2 is at most that of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2. ♦

The CDA Security of PtD. Let $\mathsf{PtD}[\mathcal{AE}_r] = (\mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{PtD}}, \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{PtD}}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{PtD}})$ be the PKE scheme. The encryption is defined as $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{PtD}}(pk_d, m; r) = \mathcal{E}_d(pk_d, r || m)$. We evaluate the CDA1 advantage of PtD. The deterministic encryption $\mathcal{E}_d$ ensures that the PRIV security of $\mathcal{E}_d$ ensure the CDA1 security of PtD. The formal evaluation is given in Appendix F. We have the following theorem.

Theorem 5. *For any CDA adversary A_1, A_2 in the $\mathcal{VO}$ model, making queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ and $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$, $\mathcal{RO}^j_{n_j}$ $(j = 1, \ldots, v)$, $\mathsf{IC}^{(t)}_{k_t, m_t}$ $(t = 1, \ldots, s)$, $\mathcal{RO}^{(i)}_{w_i}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ and $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$, respectively, there exists a CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ or a PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathcal{AE}_{\mathsf{PtD}}, \mathcal{O}^*}(A_1, A_2) \leq 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathcal{AE}_{\mathsf{PtD}}, \mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) + 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE}_d, \mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1, B_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

$\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ and B_1, B_2 can make queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$. The running times of the CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ and the PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 are at most that of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2. ♦

The CDA Security of RtD. Let $\mathsf{RtD}[\mathcal{AE}_r] = (\mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{RtD}}, \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{RtD}}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{RtD}})$ be the PKE scheme. The encryption is defined as $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{RtD}}((pk_r, pk_d), m; r) = \mathcal{E}_d(pk_d, \mathcal{E}_r(pk_r, m; r) || 10^l)$ where the randomized encryption $\mathcal{E}_r$ preserves the mini-entropy of its inputs. Thus, RtD is the special case of PtD. Namely, the CDA security of PtD ensures that of RtD. We thus have the following theorem.

Theorem 6. *For any CDA adversary A_1, A_2 in the $\mathcal{VO}$ model, making queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ and $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$, $\mathcal{RO}^j_{n_j}$ $(j = 1, \ldots, v)$, $\mathsf{IC}^{(t)}_{k_t, m_t}$ $(t = 1, \ldots, s)$, $\mathcal{RO}^{(i)}_{w_i}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ and $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$, respectively, there exists a CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ or a PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathcal{AE}_{\mathsf{RtD}}, \mathcal{O}^*}(A_1, A_2) \leq 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathcal{AE}_{\mathsf{RtD}}, \mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2) + 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE}_d, \mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1, B_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

$\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ and B_1, B_2 can make queries at most $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$ times to $\mathcal{RO}_n$. The running times of the CDA adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ and the PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 are at most that of the CDA adversary A_1, A_2. ♦

6 Conclusion and Future Works

We proved that for the following PKE schemes, the adaptive CDA security and the non-adaptive CDA security in both CPA and CCA cases are preserved when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash functions, PFMD and Sponge: Any PKE scheme being PRIV secure in the RO model and all hedged PKE schemes. First, we proposed the Versatile Oracle $\mathcal{VO}$, and showed that the PFMD hash function and the Sponge hash function are reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$s. Second, we proved that for the above PKE schemes the adaptive CDA security and the non-adaptive CDA security in both CPA and CCA cases are preserved when a RO is replaced with $\mathcal{VO}$. The reset indifferentiable composition theorem ensures the CDA security when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash functions. So far, there is no positive result for the reset indifferentiability. So, our result is the first time positive result.

For other indifferentiable hash functions, e.g., the SHA-3 finalists JH [27] and Grøstl [20], the CDA security is still open. We conjecture that our approach can be applied to the CDA security proof for these indifferentiable hash functions.

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```
𝒪(x, y)
─────────────────────
1 M* ← 𝒯𝒪^(1)(x);
2 if x = IV then
3    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
4    else z ← 𝓡𝒪_n^(1)(y);
5 else if M* ≠⊥ then
6    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = M*||y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
7    else z ← 𝓡𝒪_n^(1)(M*||y);
8 else z ← 𝓡𝒪_n^1(x||y);
9 return z;
```

```
𝒪(x, y)
─────────────────────
01 if x = IV then
02    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
03    else
04       if F_1^*[y] =⊥ then F_1^*[y] ←$ {0,1}^n;
05       z ← F_1^*[y];
06 else if ∃_1 M* s.t. F_1^*[M*] = x then
07    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = M*||y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
08    else
09       if F_1^*[M*||y] =⊥ then F_1^*[M*||y] ←$ {0,1}^n;
10       z ← F_1^*[M*||y];
11 else
12    if F_1[x||y] =⊥ then F_1[x||y] ←$ {0,1}^n;
13    z ← F_1[x||y];
14 T_{S*}[x, y] ← z;
15 return T_{S*}[x, y];
```

Fig. 5. Game PF1 (left), and Game PF2 (right)

```
𝒪(x, y)
─────────────────────
01 if T_{S*}[x, y] ≠⊥ then return T_{S*}[x, y];
02 if x = IV then
03    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
04    else
05       if F_1^*[y] =⊥ then F_1^*[y] ←$ {0,1}^n;
06       z ← F_1^*[y];
07 else if ∃_1 M* s.t. F_1^*[M*] = x then
08    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = M*||y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
09    else
10       if F_1^*[M*||y] =⊥ then F_1^*[M*||y] ←$ {0,1}^n;
11       z ← F_1^*[M*||y];
12 else
13    if F_1[x||y] =⊥ then F_1[x||y] ←$ {0,1}^n;
14    z ← F_1[x||y];
15 T_{S*}[x, y] ← z;
16 return T_{S*}[x, y];
```

```
𝒪(x, y)
─────────────────────
01 if T_{S*}[x, y] ≠⊥ then return T_{S*}[x, y];
02 if x = IV then
03    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
04    else
05       z ← {0,1}^n;
06       if Path[z] =⊥ then Path[z] ← y;
07 else if Path[x] = M* ≠⊥ then
08    if ∃M s.t. pfpad(M) = M*||y then z ← 𝓡𝒪_n(M);
09    else
10       z ← {0,1}^n;
11       if Path[z] =⊥ then Path[z] ← M*||y;
12 else z ←$ {0,1}^n;
13 T_{S*}[x, y] ← z;
14 return T_{S*}[x, y];
```

Fig. 6. Game PF3 (left), and Game PF4 (right)

A Proof of Theorem 1

We evaluate the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 where a distinguisher interacts with $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$ in Game 1 and $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$ in Game 2. Since the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is a simulator, we consider the distinguishing game between S and S^*. We evaluate the difference $\Pr[A_1^S \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A_1^{S^*} \Rightarrow 1]$ for any distinguisher A_1 which outputs a bit.

We consider the four games, Game PF1, Game PF2, Game PF3 and Game PF4. In each game, the distinguisher A_1 interacts with $\mathcal{O}$ which is shown in Fig. 5 and 6. Let $GPFj$ be an event that in Game PFj A_1 outputs 1. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GPF1] - \Pr[GPF4]$$
$$= \Pr[GPF1] - \Pr[GPF2] + \Pr[GPF2] - \Pr[GPF3] + \Pr[GPF3] - \Pr[GPF4]$$

First we evaluate the difference $\Pr[GPF1] - \Pr[GPF2]$. In Game PF2, the procedures of $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}$ and $\mathcal{RO}_n^1$ are hard-coded. Thus Game PF2 is equal to Game PF1 and $\Pr[GPF1] - \Pr[GPF2] = 0$.

We evaluate the difference $\Pr[GPF2] - \Pr[GPF3]$. In Game PF3, for a repeated query to $\mathcal{O}$, the value which was previously defined is returned due to the step 01. In Game PF2, for a repeated query, if no collision for the table F_1^* occurs, the value which was previously defined is returned, and otherwise the value might not be returned due to the condition of the step 06. The collision probability is at most $q_h^2/2^{n+1}$ from a birthday analysis. We thus have

$$\Pr[GPF2] - \Pr[GPF3] \leq \frac{q_h^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

Finally, we evaluate the difference $\Pr[GPF3] - \Pr[GPF4]$. In Game PF4, the tables F_1^* and F_1 are removed. Instead, the table $Path$ is used. From the condition of the step 07, if no collision for the table F_1^* occurs, for a repeated query, the value which was previously defined is returned due to the step 01. That is, if no collision for the table F_1^* occurs, this modification does not affects the A_1's view. The collision probability is at most $q_h^2/2^{n+1}$ from a birthday analysis. We thus have

$$\Pr[GPF3] - \Pr[GPF4] \leq \frac{q_h^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

$\square$

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{ll}
\underline{\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)} & \\
\text{01 } M^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y); & \underline{\mathcal{O}_-(z,w)} \\
\text{02 if } y = IV_2 \text{ then} & \text{01 } M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w); \\
\quad \text{03} \quad \text{if unpad}_S(IV_1 \oplus x) = M \neq\perp \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M); & \text{02 if } M \neq\perp \text{ and } |M| = n \text{ then} \\
\quad \text{04} \quad \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x); & \quad \text{03} \quad x \leftarrow IV_1 \oplus M; \; y \leftarrow IV_2; \\
\quad \text{05} \quad w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1); & \text{04 else if } M \neq\perp \text{ and } |M| > n \text{ then} \\
\text{06 else if } M^* \neq\perp \text{ then} & \quad \text{05} \quad \text{let } M = M^*||m \; (|m| = n); \\
\quad \text{07} \quad m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M^*); & \quad \text{06} \quad \text{if unpad}_S(M^*) = M_1 \neq\perp \text{ then } x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M_1); \\
\quad \text{08} \quad \text{if unpad}_S(M^*||m) = M \neq\perp \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M); & \quad \text{07} \quad \text{else } x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*); \\
\quad \text{09} \quad \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*||m); & \quad \text{08} \quad y \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*); \\
\quad \text{10} \quad w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*||m); & \text{09 else } x||y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}^{-1}(z||w); \\
\text{11 else } z||w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x||y); & \text{10 return } x||y; \\
\text{12 return } z||w; &
\end{array}}$$

Fig. 7. Game S1

B Proof of Theorem 2

We prove that Game 2 is equal to Game 1 where a distinguisher interacts with $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$ in Game 1 and $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$ in Game 2. Since the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is a simulator, we consider the distinguishing game between S and S^*. We evaluate the difference $\Pr[A_1^S \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A_1^{S^*} \Rightarrow 1]$ for any distinguisher A_1 which outputs a bit.

We consider the seven games Game S1, Game S2, Game S3, Game S4, Game S5, Game S6, and Game S7. In each game, the distinguisher interacts with $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$ shown in Figs. 7, 8, 9 10, 11, 12, and 13. Game S1 is equal to Game 1 and Game S7 is equal to Game 2. Let GSj be an event that A_1 output 1 in Game Sj. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GS1] - \Pr[GS7]$$
$$= \sum_{j=1}^{6} (\Pr[GSj] - \Pr[GS(j+1)]).$$

In the following, we evaluate each difference $\Pr[GSj] - \Pr[GS(j+1)]$.

Game S2. In this game, a random permutation $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$ is replaced with a new function $(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_1^{-1})$. F^+ and F^- are (initially everywhere $\perp$) tables. An output of $(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_1^{-1})$ is randomly chosen from $\{0,1\}^b$. Thus if in Game GS2 no collision occurs for the outputs of $(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_1^{-1})$, Game GS2 is equal to Game GS1. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GS1] - \Pr[GS2] = \frac{q^2}{2^{b+1}}.$$

Game S3. In this game, tables $T_{S^*_+}$ and $T_{S^*_-}$ are used to define the outputs of $\mathcal{O}_+$ and $\mathcal{O}_-$. Note that $Update_{S^*}$ updates tables $T_{S^*}^+$, $T_{S^*}^-$, and $Path$. In both Game S2 and Game S3, if no collision for the outputs of $\mathcal{O}_+$ and $\mathcal{O}_-$ occurs and no collision for the output of $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$ occurs, for a repeated query the value which was previously defined is returned. Thus in both games if no collision for the outputs of $\mathcal{O}_+$ and $\mathcal{O}_-$ occurs and no collision for the outputs of $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$ occurs, then Game S3 is equal to Game S2. From a birthday analysis, the collision probability for the outputs of $\mathcal{O}_+$ and $\mathcal{O}_-$ is at most $q^2/2^{b+1}$ and the collision probability for the outputs of $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$ is at most $q^2/2^{c+1}$. We thus have that

$$\Pr[GS2] - \Pr[GS3] = \frac{q^2}{2^{c+1}} + \frac{q^2}{2^{b+1}}.$$

Game S4. In this game, the steps 02 and 09 in $\mathcal{O}_+$ of Game S3 are removed. Since for the query $\mathcal{O}_-(z,w)$,

```
𝒪₊(x,y)
─────────
01 M* ← 𝒯𝒪^(1)(y);
02 if y = IV₂ then
03     if unpad_S(IV₁ ⊕ x) = M ≠⊥ then z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ(M);
04     else z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ¹(IV₁ ⊕ x);
05     w ← ℛ𝒪_c^(1)(x ⊕ IV₁);
06 else if M* ≠⊥ then
07     m ← x ⊕ ℛ𝒪ₙ(M*);
08     if unpad_S(M*||m) = M ≠⊥ then z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ(M);
09     else z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ¹(M*||m);
10     w ← ℛ𝒪_c^(1)(M*||m);
11 else z||w ← 𝒫₁(x||y);
12 return z||w;


𝒫₁(x)
──────
1 if F⁺[x] =⊥, ret F⁺[x];
2 y ←$ {0,1}ᵇ;
3 Update_P(x,y);
4 return F⁺[x]
```

```
𝒪₋(z,w)
─────────
01 M ← 𝒯𝒪^(1)(w);
02 if M ≠⊥ and |M| = n then
03     x ← IV₁ ⊕ M; y ← IV₂;
04 else if M ≠⊥ and |M| > n then
05     let M = M*||m (|m| = n);
06     if unpad_S(M*) = M₁ ≠⊥ then x ← m ⊕ ℛ𝒪ₙ(M₁);
07     else x ← m ⊕ ℛ𝒪ₙ¹(M*);
08     y ← ℛ𝒪_c^(1)(M*);
09 else x||y ← 𝒫₁⁻¹(z||w);
10 return x||y;


𝒫₁⁻¹(y)
────────
1 if F⁻[y] =⊥, ret F⁻[y];
2 x ←$ {0,1}ᵇ;
3 Update_P(x,y);
4 return F⁻[y];
```

Fig. 8. Game S2

```
𝒪₊(x,y)
─────────
01 if T_{S₊*}[x,y] ≠⊥ then return T_{S₊*}[x,y];
02 M* ← 𝒯𝒪^(1)(y);
03 if y = IV₂ then
04     if unpad_S(IV₁ ⊕ x) = M ≠⊥ then z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ(M);
05     else z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ¹(IV₁ ⊕ x);
06     w ← ℛ𝒪_c^(1)(x ⊕ IV₁);
07 else if M* ≠⊥ then
08     m ← x ⊕ ℛ𝒪ₙ(M*);
09     if unpad_S(M*||m) = M ≠⊥ then z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ(M);
10     else z ← ℛ𝒪ₙ¹(M*||m);
11     w ← ℛ𝒪_c^(1)(M*||m);
12 else z||w ← 𝒫₁(x||y);
13 Update_{S*}(x,y,z,w);
14 return z||w;
```

```
𝒪₋(z,w)
─────────
01 if T_{S₋*}[z,w] ≠⊥ then T_{S₋*}[z,w];
02 M ← 𝒯𝒪^(1)(w);
03 if M ≠⊥ and |M| = n then
04     x ← IV₁ ⊕ M; y ← IV₂;
05 else if M ≠⊥ and |M| > n then
06     let M = M*||m (|m| = n);
07     if unpad_S(M*) = M₁ ≠⊥ then x ← m ⊕ ℛ𝒪ₙ(M₁);
08     else x ← m ⊕ ℛ𝒪ₙ¹(M*);
09     y ← ℛ𝒪_c^(1)(M*);
10 else x||y ← 𝒫₁⁻¹(z||w);
11 Update_{S*}(x,y,z,w);
12 return x||y;
```

Fig. 9. Game S3

"$M\ (=\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w))\neq\perp$" implies that the query $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M)$ was made for the query $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$, the response $T_{S_-^*}[z,w]\ (=x||y)$ is already defined when the query $\mathcal{O}_-(z,w)$ is made. The steps corresponding with $M\ (=\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w))$ are the steps 02-09. Thus the modification does not affect the A_1's view. We thus have $\Pr[GS3]=\Pr[GS4]$.

Game S5. In this game, the table $Path$ is used instead of $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}$. In Game S5, if $M^*\neq\perp$ where $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y)$, then $Path[y]=M^*$. And if $Path[y]=M^*$ and no collision of $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$ occurs, then $M^*\neq\perp$ where $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y)$. Thus in both games if no collision for $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$ occurs, then Game S5 is equal to Game S4. We thus have via a birthday analysis

$$\Pr[GS4]-\Pr[GS5]=\frac{q^2}{2^{c+1}}.$$

Game S6. In this game, $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)},\mathcal{RO}_n^1,\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{P}^{-1}$ are removed. Since these outputs are random values, the modification does not affect the A_1's view. We thus have $\Pr[GS5]=\Pr[GS6]$.

```
O₊(x, y)
```

$\mathcal{O}_+(x, y)$
01 if $T_{S_+^*}[x, y] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$;
02 $M^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y)$;
03 if $y = IV_2$ then
04   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(IV_1 \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$;
05   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x)$;
06      $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1)$;
07 else if $M^* \neq \perp$ then
08      $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M^*)$;
09   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^* \| m) = M \neq \perp$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$;
10   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^* \| m)$;
11      $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^* \| m)$;
12 else $z \| w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1(x \| y)$;
13 $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$;
14 **return** $z \| w$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(z, w)$
1 if $T_{S^*}[z, w] \neq \perp$ then $T_{S^*}[z, w]$;
2 $x \| y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1^{-1}(z \| w)$;
3 $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$;
4 **return** $x \| y$;

Fig. 10. Game S4

$\mathcal{O}_+(x, y)$
01 if $T_{S_+^*}[x, y] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$;
02 if $y = IV_2$ then
03   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(IV_1 \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$;
04   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x)$;
05      $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1)$;
06 else if $Path[y] = M^* \neq \perp$ then
07      $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M^*)$;
08   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^* \| m) = M \neq \perp$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$;
09   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^* \| m)$;
10      $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^* \| m)$;
11 else $z \| w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1(x \| y)$;
12 $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$;
13 **return** $z \| w$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(z, w)$
1 if $T_{S^*}[z, w] \neq \perp$ then $T_{S^*}[z, w]$;
2 $x \| y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1^{-1}(z \| w)$;
3 $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$;
4 **return** $x \| y$;

Fig. 11. Game S5

$\mathcal{O}_+(x, y)$
01 if $T_{S_+^*}[x, y] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$;
02 if $y = IV_2$ then
03   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(IV_1 \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$;
04   else $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$;
05      $w \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^c$;
06 else if $Path[y] = M^* \neq \perp$ then
07      $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M^*)$;
08   if $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^* \| m) = M \neq \perp$ then $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$;
09   else $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$;
10      $w \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$;
11 else $z \| w \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^d$;
12 $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$;
13 **return** $z \| w$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(z, w)$
1 if $T_{S^*}[z, w] \neq \perp$ then $T_{S^*}[z, w]$;
2 $x \| y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^d$;
3 $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$;
4 **return** $x \| y$;

Fig. 12. Game S6

Game S7. In this game the table T_F (step 10 of $\mathcal{O}_+$) and the table T_I (step 2 of $\mathcal{O}_-$). Thus if in Game S6

```
𝒪₊(x, y)
─────────────────────────────────────
01 if T_{S*₊}[x, y] ≠ ⊥ then return T_{S*₊}[x, y];
02 if y = IV₂ then
03    if unpad_S(IV₁ ⊕ x) = M ≠ ⊥ then z ← 𝓡𝒪ₙ(M);
04    else z $← {0,1}ⁿ;                                              𝒪₋(z, w)
05 else if Path[y] ≠ ⊥ then                                          ─────────────────────────────────────
06    let Path[y] = (M*, z*);                                        1 if T_{S*}[z, w] ≠ ⊥ then T_{S*}[z, w];
07    if unpad_S(M*||(z* ⊕ x)) = M ≠ ⊥ then z ← 𝓡𝒪ₙ(M);             2 x $← {0,1}ⁿ; y $← {0,1}ᶜ\T_I[x];
08    else z $← {0,1}ⁿ;                                              3 Update_{S*}(x, y, z, w);
09 else z $← {0,1}ⁿ;                                                 4 return x||y;
10 w $← {0,1}ᶜ\T_F[z];
11 Update_{S*}(x, y, z, w);
12 return z||w;
```

<div align="center">

Fig. 13. Game 7

</div>

w does not collide with $T_F[z]$ in $\mathcal{O}_+$ and x does not collide with $T_I[x]$, then Game S7 is equal to Game S6. The number of elements in $T_F[z]$ is at most $3q+1$ and the number of elements in $T_I[x]$ is at most $2q+1$. Thus the collision probabilities for $T_F[z]$ and $T_I[x]$ are $q(3q+1)/2^c$ and $q(2q+1)/2^c$, respectively. We thus have

$$\Pr[GS6] - \Pr[GS7] = \frac{q(5q+2)}{2^c}.$$

$\underline{S^*_+(k,x)}$
01 if $T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T^+_{S^*}[k,x]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
03 $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
04 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
05     $P \leftarrow FindPath(h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
06   if $P \neq \emptyset$ then
07   let $P = (M,a)$;
08       $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M)$; $y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta^{-1}_{h,s}(z)$;
09       $AddPath(\beta_{h,s}(y),h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
10 $T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
11 **return** $T^+_{S^*}[k,x]$

$\underline{S^*_-(k,y)}$
01 if $T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T^-_{S^*}[k,y]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
03 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
04     $AddPath(\beta_{h,s}(y),h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
05 $T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
06 **return** $T^-_{S^*}[k,y]$;

$\underline{AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)}$
01 for all $(M,a) \in Path[h]$ do
02     $Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M||m,a||s||m||t)$;

$\underline{FindPath(h,s,m,t)}$
01 $P \leftarrow \emptyset$;
02 for all $(M,a) \in Path[h]$ do
03   if $\exists M_1$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M_1) = a||s||m||t$ then
04       $P \xleftarrow{\cup} (M_1,a||s||m||t)$;
05 if $P = \emptyset$ then **return** $\perp$;
06 else **return** $(M^*,a^*) \xleftarrow{\$} P$;

$\underline{S_+(k,x)}$
01 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
02 $y \leftarrow E_I(k,x)$;
03 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
04     $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(h)$;
05   if $a \neq \perp$ or $h = IV$ then
06   if $\exists M$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$ then
07         $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M)$;
08   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}^{(1)}_n(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
09       $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}^{(2)}_n(k,x)$; $y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus h \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z$; $y \leftarrow y_1||y_2$;
10 **return** y;

$\underline{S_-(k,y)}$
01 $k^*||x \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L)$;
02 if $k^*||x \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then **return** x;
03 $x \leftarrow D_I(k,y)$;
04 **return** x;

Fig. 14. S^* (left and top of right) and S (right)

C   Reset Indifferentiability for the BLAKE Hash Function

First define notations used in this subsection. $[x]_2 = x||x$ is the concatenation of two copies of x. If x is of even length, then x^L and x^R denote its left and right halves where $|x^L| = |x^R|$.

Let the output length of BLAKE be n bits. Then BLAKE takes as input a salt s of $n/2$ bits (chosen by the user), and a message M of arbitrary length. The evaluation of $\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{BC}_{2n,2n}}(s,M)$ is done as follows where a block cipher $\mathsf{BC}_{2n,2n} = (E,D)$ is used where E is the encryption function and D is the decryption function with the key size and the plain text size of $2n$ bits. Firstly, the message M is padded into message blocks $m_1, \ldots, m_k$ of $2n$ bits, where the padding function pad_B is defined as $\mathsf{pad}_B(M) = M||10^{-|M|-n/2-2 \mod 2n}1||\langle|M|\rangle_{n/2}$. Along with these message blocks, counter blocks $t_1, \ldots, t_k$ of length $n/4$ bits are generated. This counter keeps track of the number of message bits hashed so far and equals 0 if the i-th message block contains no message bits. Starting from an initial state value $h_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$, the message blocks m_i and counter blocks t_i are compressed iteratively into the state using a compression function $f : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{2n} \times \{0,1\}^{n/4} \to \{0,1\}^n$. Here, the second input to f denotes the salt s. The outcome of the BLAKE hash function is defined as its final state value $H(s,M) = h_k$. f is defined as Fig. 14. Here $C \in \{0,1\}^n$ is a constant.

$$\begin{aligned}
&\underline{f(h_{i-1},s,m_i,t_i)} \\
&v_i \leftarrow (h_{i-1}||s||[t_i^L]_2||[t_i^R]_2) \oplus (0^n||C); \\
&w_i \leftarrow E(m_i,v_i); \\
&h_i \leftarrow w_i^L \oplus w_i^R \oplus h_{i-1} \oplus [s]_2; \\
&\textbf{return } h_i;
\end{aligned}$$

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security from $\mathcal{VO}$ for the BLAKE hash function in the ideal cipher model. We define the parameter of $\mathcal{VO}$ as $v = 1$, $n_1 = n$, $u = 2$, $t = 1$ $w_1 = n$, $w_2 = n$, $k_1 = 2n$ and $m_1 = 2n$. Thus in this case, $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$ and $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}^{(1)}_n, \mathcal{TRO}^{(2)}_n, \mathsf{IC}^{(1)}_{2n,2n})$. The following theorem shows that the BLAKE hash function in the ideal cipher model is reset indifferentiable from $\mathcal{VO}$.

Theorem 7. *Let* $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n} = (E_I, D_I)$ *be an ideal cipher where the length of each elements is of* $2n$ *bits. There exists a simulator* S *such that for any distinguisher* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following holds,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{r\text{-}indiff}}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}}, \mathcal{VO}, S}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 3\frac{(lq_H + q_E)(lq_H + q_E + 1)}{2^n} + \frac{5q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}} + \frac{q_E^2}{2^{n-1}}.$$

where $\mathcal{A}$ *can make queries to* $\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}}/\mathcal{RO}_n$ *and* $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}/S_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}$ *at most* q_H, q_E *times, respectively, and* l *is a maximum number of blocks of a query to* $\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}}/\mathcal{RO}_n$*.* S_{BLAKE} *makes at most* $2q_h$ *queries and runs in time* $\mathcal{O}(q_h)$*.* ♦

First, we define a padding function $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}$ as $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = (s||m_1||t_1)|| \cdots ||(s||m_k||t_k)$. We also define $\beta_{h,s}$ and $\beta_{h,s}^{-1}$ as $\beta_{h,s}(w) = w^L \oplus w^R \oplus h \oplus [s]_2$ for $w \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$ and $\beta_{h,s}^{-1}(h') = \{w \in \{0,1\}^{2n} | w^L \oplus w^R \oplus h \oplus [s]_2 = h'\}$ for $h' \in \{0,1\}^n$. In the proof of the theorem, we use the result of the indifferentiable security from a RO by Andreeva *et al.* [1] They define a simulator S^* which can be implemented as Fig. 14. S^* simulates the ideal cipher $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}$ so that the relation among $(\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}}, \mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n})$ holds among $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$. S_+^* and S_-^* simulate the encryption oracle E_I and the decryption oracle D_I of $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}$, respectively. In this simulator, the function $FindPath$ and the procedure $AddPath$ are used.

$T_{S^*}^+$ and $T_{S^*}^-$ are (initially everywhere $\bot$) tables which record query-response values of S^*. If the query $S_+^*(k, x)$ is made, the output y is recorded in $T_{S^*}^+[k, x]$ and x is recoded in $T_{S^*}^-[k, y]$. Similarly, the query-response values for S_-^* are recoded in these tables. $Path$ is a (initially everywhere $\emptyset$) table which records all paths with the BLAKE style. Namely, if $(k_1, x_1, y_1), (k_2, x_2, y_2)$ are recoded in $T_{S^*}^+$ such that for $i = 1, 2$ $T_{S^*}^+[k_i, x_i] = y_i$, $x_i = h_{i-1}||s_i||t_i^L||t_i^L||t_i^R||t_i^R$, $h_i = \beta_{h_{i-1}, s_i}(y_i)$ and h_0 is the initial value, $(k_1||k_2, s_1||k_1||t_1||s_2||k_2||t_2)$ is recoded in $Path[h_2]$ [5]. Then, for the query $S_+^*(k_3, x_3)$, if the query and some query-response pairs of S^* have the BLAKE structure, the output is defined by $\mathcal{RO}_n$. Namely, if $x_3 = z_2||s_3||t_3^L||t_3^L||t_3^R||t_3^R$, $s_1 = s_2 = s_3$ and there exists M such that $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s_3, M) = (s_1||k_1||t_1)||(s_2||k_2||t_2)||(s_3||k_3||t_3)$, then the output y_3 is defined by $\beta_{z_2, s_3}(\mathcal{RO}_n(s_3, M))$ to ensure the BLAKE consistency.

The Simulator S**.** We define the simulator S in Fig. 14. $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}$ and $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(2)}$ realizes the functionality that a path is recoded and a new path is constructed. For the query $S_+(k_1, x_1)$ where $x_1 = IV||s_1||t^{(1)}||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(3)}$ and there does not exist M such that $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(M) = s_1||k_1||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(3)}$, the simulator makes the queries $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(s_1||k_1||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(3)})$ and $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k_1, x_1)$ where the outputs are z_1 and $y_{1,1}$, respectively, then $y_{1,2}$ is $y_{1,1} \oplus z \oplus [s_1]_2 \oplus IV$ and the output y_1 of the query $S_+(k_1, x_1)$ is defined by $y_{1,1}||y_{1,2}$. Then, for the query $S_{\mathsf{BLAKE},+}(k_2, x_2)$ where $x_2 = z_1||s_2||t_2^{(1)}||t_2^{(1)}||t_2^{(3)}||t_2^{(3)}$ and there exists M such that $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(M) = s_1||k_1||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(3)}||s_2||k_2||t_2^{(1)}||t_2^{(3)}$, the simulator can obtain $s_1||k_1||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(3)}$ by the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z_1)$ and thus can make the queries $\mathcal{RO}_n(s_2, M)$ and $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k_2, x_2)$ to ensure the BLAKE consistency where the outputs are z_2 and $y_{2,1}$, respectively, then $y_{2,2}$ is $y_{2,1} \oplus z \oplus [s_2]_2 \oplus z_1$ and the output y_2 of the query $S_+(k_2, x_2)$ is defined by $y_{2,1}||y_{2,2}$. Thus the simulator S_+ can make a response with the same procedure to S_+^*. For the inverse query $S_-(k_2, y_2)$, the simulator can obtain x_2 by the query $\mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y_2^R)$. Thus the simulator S_- can also make a response with the same procedure to S_-^*. The formal evaluation $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$ is given as follows where $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] \leq 5q_E^2/2^{2n+1} + q_E^2/2^{n-1}$. Since the simulator S does not update the internal state, $\Pr[G0] = \Pr[G1]$ (in Subsection 4.1). The indifferentiable bound from $\mathcal{RO}_n$ in [1] is $3(lq_H + q_E)(lq_H + q_E + 1)/2^n$. There results yield the bound of Theorem 1.

Proof. We consider ten games, Game B0, Game B1, Game B2, Game B3, Game B4, Game B5, Game B6, Game B7, Game B8, and Game B9, which are shown in Figs. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, respectively. In each game, the distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$ interacts with $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$. $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$ in Game B0 is equal to the simulator S in Game 1, and $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$ in Game B7 is equal to the simulator S^* in Game 2. Notice that in this proof $\mathcal{RO}_n$ queries are removed, since the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is just the simulator.

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[5] Note that in [1], the paths are recorded by using the graph representation, but the table $Path$ realizes the same role as the graph.

$\mathcal{O}_+(k, x)$

01 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
02 $y \leftarrow E_I(k, x)$;
03 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
04    $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(h)$;
05   if $a \neq \perp$ or $h = IV$ then
06   if $\exists M$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$ then
07          $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M)$;
08   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
09       $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k, x)$; $y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus h \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z$; $y \leftarrow y_1||y_2$;
10 return y;

$\mathcal{O}_-(k, y)$

01 $k^*||x \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L)$;
02 if $k^*||x \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then return x;
03 $x \leftarrow D_I(k, y)$;
04 return x;

Fig. 15. Game B0

$\mathcal{O}_-(k, y)$

01 $k^*||x \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L)$;
02 if $k^*||x \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then return x;
03 $x \leftarrow D^*(k, y)$;
04 return x;

$\mathcal{O}_+(k, x)$

01 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
02 $y \leftarrow E^*(k, x)$;
03 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
04    $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(h)$;
05   if $a \neq \perp$ or $h = IV$ then
06   if $\exists M$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$ then
07          $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M)$;
08   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
09       $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k, x)$; $y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus h \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z$; $y \leftarrow y_1||y_2$;
10 return y;

$E^*(k, x)$

01 if $\mathsf{E}^*[k, x] = \perp$ then $\mathsf{E}^*[k, x] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$;
02 $\mathsf{D}^*[k, \mathsf{E}^*[k, x]] \leftarrow x$;
03 return $\mathsf{E}^*[k, x]$;

$D^*(k, y)$

01 if $\mathsf{D}^*[k, y] = \perp$ then $\mathsf{D}^*[k, y] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$;
02 $\mathsf{E}^*[k, \mathsf{D}^*[k, y]] \leftarrow y$;
03 return $\mathsf{D}^*[k, y]$;

Fig. 16. Game B1

Let GBj be an event that the distinguisher $\mathcal{A}$ output 1 in Game Bj. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GB0] - \Pr[GB7]$$

$$= \sum_{j=0}^{8} (\Pr[GBj] - \Pr[GB(j+1)]).$$

In the following, we evaluate the each difference $\Pr[GBj] - \Pr[GB(j+1)]$.

Game B1. In Game B0 the ideal cipher (E_I, D_I) is used, while in Game B1 (E^*, D^*) is used where an output is randomly chosen from $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. E^* and D^* are (initially everywhere $\perp$) tables. We thus have via birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB0] - \Pr[GB1] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

Game B2. In this game, new tables $T_{S^*}^+$ and $T_{S^*}^-$ are used which are initially everywhere $\perp$. In both games, if no collision occurs for the output, for a repeated query, the same value is returned which was previously defined. That is, if no collision occurs for the output, Game B2 is equal to Game B1. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB1] - \Pr[GB2] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

$\mathcal{O}_+(k, x)$
$\overline{01}$ if $T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T^+_{S^*}[k, x]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
03 $y \leftarrow E^*(k, x)$;
04 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
05      $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(h)$;
06   if $a \neq \perp$ or $h = IV$ then
07   if $\exists M$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$ then
08              $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M)$;
09   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
10          $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k, x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus h \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1||y_2$;
11 $T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \leftarrow y; T^-_{S^*}[k, y] \leftarrow x$;
12 **return** $T^+_{S^*}[k, x]$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(k, y)$
$\overline{01}$ if $T^-_{S^*}[k, y] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T^-_{S^*}[k, y]$;
02 $k^*||x \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L)$;
03 if $k^*||x^* \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then $x \leftarrow x^*$;
04 else $x \leftarrow D^*(k, y)$;
05 $T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \leftarrow y; T^-_{S^*}[k, y] \leftarrow x$;
06 **return** $T^-_{S^*}[k, y]$;

$E^*(k, x)$
$\overline{01}$ if $E^*[k, x] = \perp$ then $E^*[k, x] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$;
02 $D^*[k, E^*[k, x]] \leftarrow x$;
03 **return** $E^*[k, x]$;

$D^*(k, y)$
$\overline{01}$ if $D^*[k, y] = \perp$ then $D^*[k, y] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$;
02 $E^*[k, D^*[k, y]] \leftarrow y$;
03 **return** $D^*[k, y]$;

Fig. 17. Game B2

$\mathcal{O}_+(k, x)$
$\overline{01}$ if $T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T^+_{S^*}[k, x]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
03 $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$;
04 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
05      $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(h)$;
06   if $a \neq \perp$ or $h = IV$ then
07   if $\exists M$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$ then
08              $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M)$;
09   else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
10          $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k, x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus h \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1||y_2$;
11 $T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \leftarrow y; T^-_{S^*}[k, y] \leftarrow x$;
12 **return** $T^+_{S^*}[k, x]$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(k, y)$
$\overline{01}$ if $T^-_{S^*}[k, y] \neq \perp$ then **return** $T^-_{S^*}[k, y]$;
02 $k^*||x \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L)$;
03 if $k^*||x^* \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then $x \leftarrow x^*$;
04 else $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$;
05 $T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \leftarrow y; T^-_{S^*}[k, y] \leftarrow x$;
06 **return** $T^-_{S^*}[k, y]$;

Fig. 18. Game B3

Game B3. In this game, (E^*, D^*) is removed. Outputs of E^* and D^* are randomly chosen from $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. In Game B2, if no collision occurs for $\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-$, for a repeated query, the value which was previously defined is returned. Thus in both games if no collision occurs for $\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-$, the modification does not affect A_1's view. We thus have via a birthday analysis

$$\Pr[GB2] - \Pr[GB3] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

Game B4. In this game, $\mathcal{TO}^{(2)}$ in $\mathcal{O}_-$ is removed. If no collision occurs for the output, for a repeated query its response value is defined in the Step 01 in both $\mathcal{O}_+$ and $\mathcal{O}_-$. That is, if no collision occurs for the output, $\mathcal{TO}^{(2)}$ is not used and thus Game B3 is equal to Game B2. We thus have via a birthday analysis

$$\Pr[GB3] - \Pr[GB4] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

Game B5. In this game, $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}$ is removed. In both Game B4 and Game B5, y is randomly chosen from $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$ with a relation that $\beta_{h,s}(y) = z$, and if no collision occurs for the output, for a repeated query its

```
𝒪₊(k, x)
─────────
01 if T⁺_{S*}[k, x] ≠⊥ then return T⁺_{S*}[k, x];
02 h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} ← x ⊕ (0ⁿ||C);
03 y ←$ {0, 1}^{2n};
04 if t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)} then                    𝒪₋(k, y)
05     a ← 𝒯𝒪^{(1)}(h);                                          ─────────
06     if a ≠⊥ or h = IV then                                    01 if T⁻_{S*}[k, y] ≠⊥ then return T⁻_{S*}[k, y];
07         if ∃M s.t. pad_{BLAKE}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} then   02 x ←$ {0, 1}^{2n};
08             z ← ℛ𝒪_n(s, M);                                   03 T⁺_{S*}[k, x] ← y; T⁻_{S*}[k, y] ← x;
09         else z ← ℛ𝒪_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});        04 return T⁻_{S*}[k, y];
10         y₁ ← ℛ𝒪_n^{(2)}(k, x); y₂ ← y₁ ⊕ h ⊕ [s]₂ ⊕ z; y ← y₁||y₂;
11 T⁺_{S*}[k, x] ← y; T⁻_{S*}[k, y] ← x;
12 return T⁺_{S*}[k, x];
```

Fig. 19. Game B4

```
𝒪₊(k, x)
─────────
01 if T⁺_{S*}[k, x] ≠⊥ then return T⁺_{S*}[k, x];
02 h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} ← x ⊕ (0ⁿ||C);
03 y ←$ {0, 1}^{2n};
04 if t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)} then                    𝒪₋(k, y)
05     a ← 𝒯𝒪^{(1)}(h);                                          ─────────
06     if a ≠⊥ or h = IV then                                    01 if T⁻_{S*}[k, y] ≠⊥ then return T⁻_{S*}[k, y];
07         if ∃M s.t. pad_{BLAKE}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} then   02 x ←$ {0, 1}^{2n};
08             z ← ℛ𝒪_n(s, M);                                   03 T⁺_{S*}[k, x] ← y; T⁻_{S*}[k, y] ← x;
09         else z ← ℛ𝒪_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});        04 return T⁻_{S*}[k, y];
10         y ←$ β_{h,s}^{-1}(z);
11 T⁺_{S*}[k, x] ← y; T⁻_{S*}[k, y] ← x;
12 return T⁺_{S*}[k, x];
```

Fig. 20. Game B5

response value is defined in the Step 01 in both $\mathcal{O}_+$ and $\mathcal{O}_-$. That is, if no collision occurs for the output, Game B5 is equal to Game B4. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB4] - \Pr[GB5] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

Game B6. In this game, $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{R}\mathcal{O}_n^{(1)}$ is removed. Instead, the functions $FindPath_1$ and $AddPath_1$ are used. $Path$ is a (initially everywhere $\bot$) table. If no collision occurs for the output of $AddPath_1$, then $AddPath_1$ and $FindPath_1$ behave as $\mathcal{R}\mathcal{O}_n^{(1)}$ and $\mathcal{T}\mathcal{O}^{(1)}$, respectively. That is, if no collision occurs for the output, Game B6 is equal to Game B5. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB5] - \Pr[GB6] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

Game B7. In this game, $AddPath$ and $FindPath$ are used instead of $AddPath_1$ and $FindPath_1$. For some value z, in $AddPath_1$, the number of paths in $Path_1[z]$ is at most 1, while in $AddPath$, the number of paths in $Path[z]$ not limited. Thus, if for any value z the number of paths in $Path[z]$ is at most 1, Game B7 is equal to Game B6. That is, if no collision for $\beta_{h,s}$ (step 07 in $\mathcal{O}_+$) occurs then Game B7 is equal to Game B6. Since y is randomly chosen from $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$, an output of $\beta_{h,s}$ is a random value of n bits. We thus via birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB6] - \Pr[GB7] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

$\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$
01 if $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \neq \perp$ then return $T_{S*}^+[k,x]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
03 $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
04 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
05    $a \leftarrow FindPath_1(h)$;
06   if $a \neq \perp$ or $h = IV$ then
07   if $\exists M$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$ then
08        $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M)$;
09   else $z \leftarrow AddPath_1(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
10      $y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta_{h,s}^{-1}(z)$;
11 $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
12 return $T_{S*}^+[k,x]$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(k,y)$
01 if $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \neq \perp$ then return $T_{S*}^-[k,y]$;
02 $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
03 $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
04 return $T_{S*}^-[k,y]$;

$AddPath_1(M)$
01 if $\exists z$ s.t. $Path_1[z] = M$ then return z;
02 $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$;
03 $Path_1[z] \leftarrow M$;
04 return z;

$FindPath_1(z)$
01 if $Path_1[z] \neq \perp$ then return $Path[z]$;
02 return $\perp$;

Fig. 21. Game B6

$\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$
01 if $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \neq \perp$ then return $T_{S*}^+[k,x]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
03 $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
04 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
05    $P \leftarrow FindPath(h,s,k,t)$;
06   if $P \neq \perp$ then let $P = (M,a)$; $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M)$;
07   else $AddPath(\beta_{h,s}(y),h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
08 $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
09 return $T_{S*}^+[k,x]$;

$AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)$
01 for all $(M,a) \in Path[h]$ do
02    $Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M||m,a||s||m||t)$;

$\mathcal{O}_-(k,y)$
01 if $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \neq \perp$ then return $T_{S*}^-[k,y]$;
02 $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
03 $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
04 return $T_{S*}^-[k,y]$;

$FindPath(h,s,m,t)$
01 $P \leftarrow \emptyset$;
02 for all $(M,a) \in Path[h]$ do
03   if $\exists M_1$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M_1) = a||s||m||t$ then
04      $P \xleftarrow{\cup} (M_1, a||s||m||t)$;
05 if $P = \emptyset$ then return $\perp$;
06 else return $(M^*,a^*) \xleftarrow{\$} P$;

Fig. 22. Game B7

$\mathcal{O}_B^+(k,x)$
01 if $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \neq \perp$ then return $T_{S*}^+[k,x]$;
02 $h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C)$;
03 $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
04 if $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$ then
05    $P \leftarrow FindPath(h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$;
06   if $P \neq \emptyset$ then
07   let $P = (M,a)$;
08      $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M)$; $y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta_{h,s}^{-1}(z)$;
09      $AddPath(\beta_{h,s}(y),h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$:
10 $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
11 return $T_{S*}^+[k,x]$;

$AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)$
01 for all $(M,a) \in Path[h]$ do
02    $Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M||m,a||s||m||t)$;

$\mathcal{O}_B^-(k,y)$
01 if $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \neq \perp$ then return $T_{S*}^-[k,y]$;
02 $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}$;
03 $T_{S*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y$; $T_{S*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x$;
04 return $T_{S*}^-[k,y]$;

$FindPath(h,s,m,t)$
01 $P \leftarrow \emptyset$;
02 for all $(M,a) \in Path[h]$ do
03   if $\exists M_1$ s.t. $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M_1) = a||s||m||t$ then
04      $P \xleftarrow{\cup} (M_1, a||s||m||t)$;
05 if $P = \emptyset$ then return $\perp$;
06 else return $(M^*,a^*) \xleftarrow{\$} P$;

Fig. 23. Game B8

$$\begin{array}{ll}
\underline{\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)} \\
\text{01 if } T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \neq\perp \text{ then } \textbf{return } T_{S^*}^+[k,x]; \\
\text{02 } h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C); \\
\text{03 } y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\
\text{04 if } t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)} \text{ then} \\
\text{05 } \quad P \leftarrow FindPath(h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}); \\
\text{06 } \quad \text{if } P \neq \emptyset \text{ then} \\
\text{07 } \qquad \text{let } P = (M,a); \\
\text{08 } \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M); \; y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta_{h,s}^{-1}(z); \\
\text{09 } \quad AddPath(\beta_{h,s}(y),h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}): \\
\text{10 } T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y; \; T_{S^*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\
\text{11 } \textbf{return } T_{S^*}^+[k,x];
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
\underline{AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)} \\
\text{01 for all } (M,a) \in Path[h] \text{ do} \\
\text{02 } \quad Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M||m,a||s||m||t);
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
\underline{\mathcal{O}_-(k,y)} \\
\text{01 if } T_{S^*}^-[k,y] \neq\perp \text{ then } \textbf{return } T_{S^*}^-[k,y]; \\
\text{02 } h||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\
\text{03 if } t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)} \text{ then} \\
\text{04 } \quad AddPath(\beta_{h,s}(y),h,s,k,t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}); \\
\text{05 } T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y; \; T_{S^*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\
\text{06 } \textbf{return } T_{S^*}^-[k,y];
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
\underline{FindPath(h,s,m,t)} \\
\text{01 } P \leftarrow \emptyset; \\
\text{02 for all } (M,a) \in Path[h] \text{ do} \\
\text{03 } \quad \text{if } \exists M_1 \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M_1) = a||s||m||t \text{ then} \\
\text{04 } \qquad P \xleftarrow{\cup} (M_1, a||s||m||t); \\
\text{05 if } P = \emptyset \text{ then } \textbf{return } \perp; \\
\text{06 else } \textbf{return } (M^*,a^*) \xleftarrow{\$} P;
\end{array}$$

Fig. 24. Game B9

Game B8. In Game B8, "else" for the step using $AddPath$ is removed. Since $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}$ is a prefix-free padding, the path constructed from the value defined the steps 06-08 is not used. Thus the modification does not affect the distinguisher's view. So we have that $\Pr[GB7] = \Pr[GB8]$.

Game B9. In this game, $AddPath$ is added in $\mathcal{O}_-$. Since x is randomly chosen from $\{0,1\}^{2n}$, the probability that in $\mathcal{O}_-$ a new path is added in the table $Path$ is at most $q_E^2/2^n$ where the number of paths stored in $Path$ is at most q_E. We thus have that

$$\Pr[GB8] - \Pr[GB9] \leq \frac{q_E^2}{2^n}.$$

$\square$

Adversary B_1	Adversary B_2
1 $((\mathbf{m}_0^*, \mathbf{m}_1^*), s) \leftarrow A_1^F$	1 obtains the cipher text $\mathbf{c}$
2 generates $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$ where the $bit_s(\mathbf{m}_{b^*}) = b^*$ for $b^* = 0, 1$.	2 $b' \leftarrow A_2^{\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathbf{c})$
3 outputs $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$ as the B_1's output.	3 **return** b'

Fig. 25. PRIV Adversary

D Proof of Theorem 3

We show the following lemma.

Lemma 5. *For any CDA2 adversary A_1, A_2, making $\mathcal{RO}_n$ queries at most q times, of a PKE scheme $\mathcal{AE}$ where the length of the randomness $\mathbf{r}$ is 0, there exists a PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 of the PKE scheme such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda2}}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{RO}_n}(A_1, A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE}, \mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1, B_2).$$

A_1, A_2 can make $\mathcal{RO}_n$ queries at most q times. The runing time of B_1, B_2 is at most that of A_1, A_2. ♦

Proof. We construct the PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 by using the CDA1 adversary A_1, A_2. The PRIV adversary is shown in Fig. 25. The adversary B_1 outputs two values, the B_1's output and the A_1's output. B_1 uses only s which one element of the output of A_1. B_1 defines messages of A_1 such that $\mathbf{m}_0$ and $\mathbf{m}_1$ are bit strings of length ω, all components of $\mathbf{r}$ are bit strings of length ρ, and $(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}[i]) \neq (\mathbf{m}_b[j], \mathbf{r}[j])$ for all $1 \leq i < j \leq \nu$ and all $b \in \{0, 1\}$ such that the source has mini-entropy μ, meaning $\Pr[(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}[i]) = (m', r')|(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}] \leq 2^{-\mu}$ for all $b \in \{0, 1\}$, all $1 \leq i \leq \nu$, and all (m', r'). A_1 and A_2 does not share the state and the second adversary A_2 obtains just the cipher text $\mathbf{c}$ whose the plain text has mini-entropy μ. Thus A_2 does not find that the plain text is defined by B_1. The adversary PRIV B_1, B_2 wins if the CDA2 adversary wins. □

E   Proof of Theorem 4

Lemma 6. *For any CDA1 adversary A_1, A_2 of REwH in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$ model, there exists a CDA adversary B_1, B_2 in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$ model such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda1}}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}(A_1, A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1, B_2).$$

where the running time of B_1, B_2 is at most that of A_1, A_2. ♦

Proof. We consider the following events.

– Event 1: A_1 outputs $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$ such that $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ is a bit of $\mathbf{r}$.
– Event 2: A_2 outputs $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$ such that $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ is a bit of $\mathbf{m}_b$.

Let $CDA1$ be the event that true is returned in the CDA1 security game. Thus we have the following.

$$
\begin{aligned}
Pr[\mathrm{CDA1}^{A_1,A_2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] &= \Pr[CDA1] \\
&\leq \Pr[GDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 1}]\Pr[\mathrm{Event\ 1}] + \Pr[GDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 2}]\Pr[\mathrm{Event\ 2}] \\
&= \Pr[GDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 1}] \times p + \Pr[GDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 2}] \times (1-p)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $p = \Pr[\mathrm{Event\ 1}]$.

We evaluate the probability $\Pr[CDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 1}]$. In the CDA2 security game, A_2 obtains the cipher text $\mathbf{c}$ where each component is $\mathcal{E}_r(pk, \mathbf{m}_b[t]; \mathcal{RO}_n(pk||\mathbf{m}_b[t]||\mathbf{r}[t]))$. Since $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ is a random bit and the bit is hidden by $\mathcal{RO}_n$, $\Pr[CDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 1}] = 1/2$.

We evaluate the probability $\Pr[CDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 2}]$. Let $CDA2$ be the event that for the CDA2 adversary A_1^*, A_2^*, $\mathrm{CDA}^{A_1^*,A_2^*}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}$. Let Event 2' be the event that in the CDA2 security game the $\mathcal{A}_2$ outputs $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$ such that $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ is a bit of $\mathbf{m}_b$. From Lemma 1, for any CDA1 adversary A_1, A_2 there exists a CDA2 adversary $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ such that

$$\Pr[CDA1|\mathrm{Event\ 2}] \leq \Pr[CDA2|\mathrm{Event\ 2'}]$$

Under Event 2', the CDA2 adversary can find some bit of $\mathbf{m}_b$ from the cipher text $\mathbf{c}$. Thus by setting b^* in the corresponding bit of $\mathbf{m}_{b^*}$ we can construct a CDA adversary. This case is equal to the proof in Appendix D. Thus, for any CDA2 adversary, there exists a CDA adversary B_1, B_2 such that

$$\Pr[CDA2|\mathrm{Event\ 2'}] \leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{B_1,B_2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}]$$

From above discussion, for any CDA1 adversary A_1, A_2 there exists CDA adversary B_1, B_2 such that

$$
\begin{aligned}
Pr[\mathrm{CDA1}^{A_1,A_2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] &\leq \frac{1}{2} \times p + \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{B_1,B_2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \times (1-p) \\
&\leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{B_1,B_2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}].
\end{aligned}
$$

□

Adversary B_1	Adversary B_2
1 $((\mathbf{m}_0^*, \mathbf{m}_1^*, \mathbf{r}), s) \leftarrow A_1^F$	1 obtains the cipher text $\mathbf{c}$
2 generates $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{r}_0), (\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}_1))$ such that $bit_s(\mathbf{m}_{b^*}, \mathbf{r}_b) = b^*$ for $b^* = 0, 1$.	2 $b' \leftarrow A_2^{\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathbf{c})$
3 outputs $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{r}_0), (\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}_1))$ as the B_1's output.	3 **return** b'

Fig. 26. PRIV Adversary

F   Proof of Theorem 5

Lemma 7. *For any CDA1 adversary A_1, A_2 of* PtD *in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$ model, there exists a CDA adversary B_1, B_2 in the $\mathcal{RO}_n$ model such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{PtD}, \mathcal{RO}_n}^{\mathrm{cda1}}(A_1, A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE}_d, \mathcal{RO}_n}^{\mathrm{priv}}(B_1, B_2).$$

where the running time of B_1, B_2 is at most that of A_1, A_2. ♦

Proof. We construct the PRIV adversary B_1, B_2 by using the CDA1 adversary A_1, A_2. The PRIV adversary is shown in Fig. 26. B_1 uses only s which one element of the output of A_1. B_1 defines messages of A_1 such that $\mathbf{m}_0$ and $\mathbf{m}_1$ are bit strings of length ω, all components of $\mathbf{r}_0, \mathbf{r}_1$ are bit strings of length ρ, and $(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}_b[i]) \neq (\mathbf{m}_b[j], \mathbf{r}_b[j])$ for all $1 \leq i < j \leq \nu$ and all $b \in \{0, 1\}$ such that the source has mini-entropy μ. A_1 and A_2 does not share the state and the second adversary A_2 obtains just the cipher text $\mathbf{c}$ whose the plain text has mini-entropy μ. Thus A_2 cannot find that the plain text is defined by B_1. If the CDA1 adversary wins then the adversary PRIV B_1, B_2 wins . □