# On the Indifferentiable Hash Functions in the Multi-Stage Security Games

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**Abstract.** It had been widely believed that the indifferentiability framework ensures composition in any security game. However, Ristenpart, Shacham, and Shrimpton (EUROCRYPT 2011) demonstrated that for some multi-stage security, there exists a cryptosystem which is secure in the random oracle (RO) model but is broken when some indifferentiable hash function is used. However, this does not imply that for any multi-stage security, any cryptosystem is broken when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function. They showed that the important multi-stage security: the chosen-distribution attack (CDA) security is preserved for some public key encryption (PKE) schemes when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function proposed by Dodis, Ristenpart, and Shrimpton (EUROCRYPT 2009). An open problem from their result is the multi-stage security when a RO is replaced with other indifferentiable hash functions. We show the following for the important indifferentiable hash functions, Prefix-free Merkle-Damgård, chop Merkle-Damgård, and Sponge.

- For any PKE scheme, the PRIV security, which is a multi-stage security, is preserved when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function.
- All existing hedged PKE schemes, which are CDA-secure in the RO model, are CDA-secure when using the indifferentiable hash function.

Keywords. Indifferentiable Hash Function, Reset Indifferentiable Security, Multi-Stage Security

### 1 Introduction

The indifferentiable composition theorem of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [25] ensures that if a functionality F (e.g., a hash function from an ideal primitive) is indifferentiable from a second functionality F'(e.g., a random oracle (RO)), the security of any cryptosystem is preserved when F' is replaced with F. The important application of this framework is the RO model security, because many practical cryptosystems e.g., RSA-OAEP [9] and RSA-PSS [10] are designed by the RO methodology. A RO is instantiated by a hash function such as SHA-1 and SHA-256 [29]. However, the Merkle-Damgård hash functions [19, 26] such as SHA-1 and SHA-256, are not indifferentiable from ROs [18]. So many indifferentiable (from a RO) hash functions have been proposed, e.g., the finalists of the SHA-3 competition [3, 12, 21, 23, 31, 1, 2, 11, 13, 18, 17, 20]. The indifferentiable security is thus an important security of hash functions.

Recently, Ristenpart, Shacham, and Shrimpton [30] showed that in some multi-stage security game some scheme secure in the RO model is broken when some indifferentiable hash function is used. They considered the multi-stage security game called CRP. The CRP security game for the *n*-bit (output length) hash function *H* is the two stage security game. In the first stage, for random messages  $M_1, M_2$  of 2n bits, the first stage adversary  $A_1$  derives the some state st of 2n bits. In the second stage, the second stage adversary  $A_2$  receives st, and for a random challenge value *C* of 2n bits outputs an *n*-bit value *z*. Then, the adversary wins if  $z = H(M_1||M_2||C)$ . Consider the chop MD hash function chopMD<sup>h</sup> $(M_1||M_2||C) =$  $chop_n(h(h(h(IV, M_1), M_2), C))$  which is indifferentiable from a RO [18], where  $h : \{0,1\}^{4n} \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$  is a RO, and  $chop_n : \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^n$  outputs the right *n* bits of the input. Clearly, the following adversary can win with probability 1 when *H* is the chop MD hash function. First,  $A_1$  receives  $M_1, M_2$ , calculates  $st = h(h(IV, M_1), M_2)$ , and outputs st. Second,  $A_2$  receives st, and for a random challenge *C*, outputs  $z = chop_n(h(st, C))$  which is equal to chopMD<sup>h</sup> $(M_1||M_2||C)$ . On the other hand, when *H* is a RO, since  $A_2$  cannot receive several value of  $M_1, M_2$ , the probability that the adversary wins is negligible. This result implies that the indifferentiable composition theorem does not ensure any multi-stage security when a RO is replaced with indifferentiable hash functions.

The chosen-distribution attack (CDA) security game is an important multi-stage security game, which is the security goal for deterministic, efficiently searchable [4, 6, 14, 22, 27], and hedged [5] public key encryption (PKE), wherein there are several PKE schemes which are proven in the RO model [4,5]. For the CDA secure PKE schemes EwH [4] and REwH1 [5] (in the RO model), Ristenpart *et al.* salvaged the important indifferentiable hash function, the NMAC-type hash function [20], which was proposed by Dodis, Ristenpart, and Shrimpton, and which is employed in the SHA-3 finalist Skein [21]. They showed that these PKE schemes are non-adaptive CDA secure in the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) case when the NMAC-type hash function is used.

The open problem from the paper of Ristenpart *et al.* is thus the CDA security when a RO replaced with other indifferentiable hash functions. Especially, it is important to consider the security when a RO is replaced with the SHA-3 finalists and the SHA-2 hash functions, because one of the SHA-3 finalists will be published as a standard hash function (FIPS) [28] and the SHA-2 hash functions were published as standard hash functions [29]. We consider the important hash functions, Prefix-free Merkle-Damgård (PFMD) [18], Sponge [11] and chop Merkle-Damgård (chop MD) [18]. The PFMD hash function is employed in the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE [3]. The Sponge hash function is employed in the SHA-3 finalist Keccak [12]. The chop Merkle-Damgård hash function is employed in SHA-224 and SHA384 [29]. We show the following.

- The PRIV security of any PKE scheme is preserved when a RO is replaced with the hash function.
- All existing hedged PKE schemes [5], REwH, RtD, and PtD, which are CDA secure in the RO model, is CDA secure when using the hash function.

The above result covers both the adaptive security and the non-adaptive security and both both chosenciphertext attack (CCA) and CPA cases. The PRIV security [4] is the special case of the CDA security which is the security goal for the deterministic and efficiently searchable PKE schemes. The advantages of our result to the result of Ristenpart *et al.* are that (1) our result ensures the *stronger* security (adaptive and CCA), and (2) our result ensures the PRIV security of *any* PKE scheme and the CDA security of *all* existing hedged PKE schemes. Since several PKE schemes in [5,4] support the CCA case or the adaptive case, the analysis for the stronger security cases is important.

(Reset) Indifferentiability [30]. To prove the CDA security, we use the reset indifferentiability framework of Ristenpart *et al.* The reset indifferentiability ensures composition in any security game: if a hash function  $H^P$  which uses an ideal primitive P is reset indifferentiable from another ideal primitive P', any security of any cryptosystem is preserved when P' is replaced with  $H^P$ .

Recall the original [25] and reset [30] indifferentiability (from a RO) frameworks. The original indifferentiable security game from a RO for  $H^P$  is that a distinguisher A converses either with  $(H^P, P)$  or  $(RO, S^{RO})$ . S is a simulator which simulates P such that S and P' are consistent. If the probability that the distinguisher A hits the conversing world is small, then  $H^P$  is indifferentiable from a RO. In the reset indifferentiable security game, the distinguisher can reset the initial state of the simulator at arbitrary times.

To prove the original indifferentiable security, the simulator needs to record the query-response history. When for a query P(x) z was returned, for a repeated query P(x), z is returned. So, when for a query S(x)z was returned, for a repeated query S(x), the simulator should return z. When the internal state is reseted, the simulator forgets the value and cannot return. Thus one cannot use the reset indifferentiability from a RO to prove the CDA security when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function.

**Our Approach.** We thus use the reset indifferentiability from a variant of a RO. We propose a variant which covers many indifferentiable hash functions. We call the variant "Versatile Oracle" ( $\mathcal{VO}$ ). The  $\mathcal{VO}$  consists of a RO and auxiliary oracles. The auxiliary oracles are used to record the query-response history of a simulator. The  $\mathcal{VO}$  thus enables to construct a simulator which does not update the internal state and which is unaffected by the reset function. We show that the PFMD hash function, the chop MD hash function <sup>1</sup>, and the Sponge hash function are reset indifferentiable from  $\mathcal{VO}$ s. Then, we show the following.

- For any PKE scheme, the PRIV security is preserved when a RO is replaced with a  $\mathcal{VO}$ .
- The CDA security of the existing hedged PKE schemes, REwH, RtD, and PtD, is preserved when a RO is replaced with a VO.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Recently, Andreeva *et al.* [1] and Chang *et al.* [17] consider the indifferentiable security of the BLAKE hash function with the more concrete structure than PFMD. Similarly, we can prove that the BLAKE hash function is reset indifferentiable from a  $\mathcal{VO}$ .

$ \frac{\mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)}{1 \text{ if } F[M]} = \perp,  F[M] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{n}; $ 2 return $F[M];$	$\frac{\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)}{1 \text{ if } F_i^*[M] \neq \perp \text{ then } F_i^*[M] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{w_i}; \\ 2 \text{ return } F_i^*[M]; \end{cases}$	$ \begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \frac{E_t(k,x)}{1 \text{ if } E_t[k,x] = \perp, y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{m_t} \setminus T_t^+[k]; \\ \displaystyle 2 \ Update_t(k,x,y); \\ \displaystyle 3 \ \mathbf{return} \ E_t[k,x]; \end{array} $
$ \frac{\mathcal{RO}_{n_{j}}^{j}(M)}{1 \text{ If } F_{j}[M]} \neq \perp, F_{j}[M] \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n_{j}}; \\ 2 \text{ return } F_{j}[M]; $	$\frac{\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(y)}{1 \text{ if } \exists_1 M \text{ s.t. }} F_i^*[M] = y \text{ then } \mathbf{return } M$ 3 return $\bot$ ;	$ \frac{D_t(y)}{1 \text{ if } D_t[k, y]} = \perp, x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{m_t} \backslash T_t^-[k]; $ $ 2 \ Update_t(k, x, y); $ $ 3 \text{ return } D_t[k, y]; $

**Fig. 1.** Versatile Oracle  $\mathcal{VO}$ 

The reset indifferentiability composition theorem ensures that the PRIV security and the CDA security are preserved when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function. Note that this is the first time positive result for the reset indifferentiability (from a  $\mathcal{VO}$ ).

## 2 Preliminaries

**Notation.** For two values x, y, x||y is the concatenated value of x and y. For some value  $y, x \leftarrow y$  means assigning y to x. When X is a non-empty finite set, we write  $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} X$  to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from X and assign to x.  $\oplus$  is bitwise exclusive or. |x| is the bit length of x. For sets A and  $C, C \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} A$  means assign  $A \cup C$  to C. For  $l \times r$ -bit value M, div(r, M) divides M into r-bit values  $(M_1, \ldots, M_l)$  and outputs them where  $M_1||\cdots||M_l = M$ . For a formula F, if there exists just a value M such that F(M) is true, we denote  $\exists_1 M$  s.t. F(M). Vectors are written in boldface, e.g.,  $\mathbf{x}$ . If  $\mathbf{x}$  is a vector then  $|\mathbf{x}|$  denotes its length and  $\mathbf{x}[i]$  denotes its *i*-th component for  $1 \leq i \leq |\mathbf{x}|$ .  $bit_j(\mathbf{x})$  is the left *j*-th bit of  $\mathbf{x}[1]||\ldots||\mathbf{x}||\mathbf{x}||$ .

(Reset) Indifferentiability [25, 30]. In the reset indifferentiability [30], for a functionality F, a private interface F.priv and a public interface F.pub are considered, where adversaries have oracle access to F.pub and other parties (honest parties) have oracle access to F.priv. For example, for a cryptosystem in the F model, an output of the cryptosystem is calculated by accessing F.priv and an adversary has oracle access to F.pub. In the RO model the RO has both interfaces. Let  $H^P$  be a hash function that utilizes an ideal primitive P. The interfaces of  $H^P$  are defined by  $H^P.priv = H^P$  and  $H^P.pub = P$ .

For two functionalities  $F_1$  (e.g., hash function) and  $F_2$  (e.g. a variant of a RO), the advantage of the reset indifferentiability for  $F_1$  from  $F_2$  is as follows.

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{F_1,F_2,S}^{\mathsf{r-indiff}}(A) = |\Pr[A^{\bar{F_1} \cdot priv, \bar{F_1} \cdot pub} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^{F_2 \cdot priv, \hat{S}^{F_2 \cdot pub}} \Rightarrow 1]|$$

where  $\hat{S} = (S, S.Rst)$ ,  $\bar{F}_1.priv = F_1.priv$  and  $\bar{F}_1.pub = (F_1.pub, nop)$ . S.Rst takes no input and when run reinitializes all of S. nop takes no input and does nothing. We say  $F_1$  is reset indifferentiable from  $F_2$  if there exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher A the advantage of the reset indifferentiability is negligible. This framework ensures that if  $F_1$  is reset indifferentiable from  $F_2$  then any stage security of any cryptosystem is preserved when  $F_2$  is replaced with  $F_1$ . Please see Theorem 6.1 in the full version of [30].

When *S.Rst* and *nop* are removed from the reset indifferentiable security game, it is equal to the original indifferentiable security game [25]. In the original indifferentiable security game, the distinguisher interacts with  $(F_1.priv, F_1.pub)$  and  $(F_2.priv, S^{F_2.pub})$ . We denote the advantage of the indifferentiable security by  $\mathsf{Adv}_{F_1,F_2,S}^{\mathsf{indif}}(A)$  for a distinguisher *A*. We say  $F_1$  is indifferentiable from  $F_2$  if there exists a simulator *S* such that for any distinguisher *A* the advantage is negligible.

## 3 Versatile Oracle

In this section, we propose a versatile oracle  $\mathcal{VO}$ .  $\mathcal{VO}$  consists of a RO  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ , ROs  $\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$   $(j = 1, \ldots, v)$ , traceable random oracles  $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ , and ideal ciphers  $\mathsf{IC}_{k_t,m_t}^{(t)}$   $(t = 1, \ldots, s)$ . The private in-

$ \frac{\text{PFMD}^{h}(M)}{1 (M_{1}, \dots, M_{i})} \leftarrow div(m, pfpad(M)) $ 2 $x \leftarrow IV$ ; 3 For $j = 1, \dots, i, x \leftarrow h(x  M_{j})$ ; 4 Ret $x$ ;	$ \begin{array}{l} \frac{S(x,y)}{1\ M^*} \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(x);\\ 2 \text{ if } x = IV \text{ then}\\ 3  \text{if } \exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{pfpad}(M) = y \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);\\ 4  \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(y);\\ 5 \text{ else if } M^* \neq \bot \text{ then}\\ 6  \text{if } \exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{pfpad}(M) = M^*    y \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);\\ 7  \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(M^*    y);\\ 8 \text{ else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{1}(x    y);\\ 9 \text{ return } z; \end{array} $
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**Fig. 2.** PFMD Hash Function (left) and Simulator S (right)

terface is defined by  $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and the public interface is defined by  $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j)$   $(j = 1, \ldots, v), \mathcal{TRO}_{n_j}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u), |\mathsf{C}_i^{(t)}|$   $(t = 1, \ldots, s)), \mathcal{VO}$  can be implemented as Fig. 1.

 $1, \ldots, v), \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u), \mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$   $(t = 1, \ldots, s)). \mathcal{VO}$  can be implemented as Fig. 1.  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  is shown in Fig. 1 (Left) where the input length is arbitrary and the output length is n bits. F is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table.

 $\mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$  is shown in Fig. 1 (Left) where the input length is arbitrary and the output length is  $n_j$  bits, and  $\mathsf{F}_j$  is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table. Note that  $n_j$  and v are defined in our proofs.

 $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  is shown in Fig. 1 (Center) which consists of a RO  $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  and a trace oracle  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ . The output length of  $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  and the input length of  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$  are  $w_i$  bits, and  $\mathsf{F}_i^*$  is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table. Note that  $w_i$  and u are defined in our proofs.

 $\mathsf{IC}_{k_t,m_t}^{(t)}$  can be implemented as Fig. 1 (Right) which consists of an encryption oracle  $E_t$  and a decryption oracle  $D_t$  where the first input of  $E_t$  is the key of  $k_t$  bits and the second input is the plain text of  $m_t$  bits, and the first input of  $D_t$  is the key of  $k_t$  bits and the second input is the cipher text of  $m_t$  bits.  $\mathsf{E}_t$  and  $\mathsf{D}_t$  are (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) tables where for the query  $E_t(k,x)$  (resp.  $D_t(k,y)$ ) the output is recorded in  $\mathsf{E}_t[k,x]$  (resp.  $\mathsf{D}_t[k,y]$ ).  $T_t^+[k]$  and  $T_t^-[k]$  are (initially empty) tables which stores all values of  $\mathsf{E}_t[k,\cdot]$  and  $\mathsf{D}_t[k,\cdot]$ , respectively.  $Update_t(k,x,y)$  is the procedure wherein the tables  $\mathsf{E}_t,\mathsf{D}_t,T_t^+[k]$  and  $T_t^-[k]$  are updated,  $\mathsf{E}_t[k,x] \leftarrow y,\mathsf{D}_t[k,y] \leftarrow x, T_t^+[k] \xleftarrow{\cup} \{y\}$  and  $T_t^-[k] \xleftarrow{\cup} \{x\}$ . Note that the length  $k_t$ ,  $m_t$  and s are defined in our proofs.

### 4 Reset Indifferentiability for Hash Functions

In this section, we consider the reset indifferentiable security of the important hash functions, prefix-free Merkle-Damgård (PFMD) [18], chop Merkle-Damgård (chop MD) [18], and Sponge [11]. We show that these hash functions are reset indifferentiable from  $\mathcal{VO}s$ .

### 4.1 Reset Indifferentiability for the PFMD Hash Function

The PFMD hash function is employed in the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE hash function [3]. In the document of [3], the indifferentiable security is proven when the compression function is a RO.

The PFMD hash function is illustrated in Fig. 2 (Left) where IV is the initial value of n bits,  $h : \{0, 1\}^d \to \{0, 1\}^n$  is a compression function, d = n + m, and  $pfpad : \{0, 1\}^* \to (\{0, 1\}^m)^*$  is an injective prefix-free padding where for any different values M, M', pfpad(M) is not a prefix of pfpad(M') and the inverse function of pfpad is efficiently computable.

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security from  $\mathcal{VO}$  for the PFMD hash function where h is a RO. We define the parameter of  $\mathcal{VO}$  as v = 1, u = 1  $n_1 = n$ , and  $w_1 = n$ . Note that in the reset indifferentiable proof ideal ciphers are not used. Thus in this case,  $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_n^1, \mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)})$ . The following theorem shows that PFMD<sup>h</sup> is reset indifferentiable from a  $\mathcal{VO}$ .

**Theorem 1.** There exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher A, the following holds,

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{r}\text{-indiff}}_{\mathrm{PFMD}^{h},\mathcal{VO},S}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{(lq_{H}+q_{h})^{2}}{2^{n}}\right)$$

	$\frac{S(x,m)}{01} \text{ where } x = x_1   x_2  ( x_1  = s,  x_2  = n)$ $\frac{1}{01} M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(x_1);$
$\operatorname{chopMD}^{h}(M)$	$\begin{array}{l} 01 \text{ if } x = IV \text{ then} \end{array}$
chopMD (M)	
$1 M' \leftarrow pad_c(M);$	$03 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);$
$2 (M_1, \ldots, M_i) \leftarrow div(d, M');$	$04 \qquad w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_s^{(1)}(m);$
$3 x \leftarrow IV;$	05 else if $M \neq \perp$ then
4 for $j = 1, \ldots, i$ do $x \leftarrow h(x, M_j)$ ;	$06 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M  m);$
5 <b>return</b> the right <i>n</i> -bits of $x$ ;	07 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_s^{(1)}(M  m);$
	08 else $w    z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n+s}^1(x,m);$
	09 return $w  z;$

**Fig. 3.** chop MD (left) and S (right)

where  $\mathcal{A}$  can make queries to  $\operatorname{PFMD}^h/\mathcal{RO}_n$  and h/S at most  $q_H, q_h$  times, respectively, and l is a maximum number of blocks of a query to  $\operatorname{PFMD}^h/\mathcal{RO}_n$ . S makes at most  $2q_h$  queries and runs in time  $\mathcal{O}(q_h)$ .

The Simulator S. We define the simulator S in Fig. 2 which does not update the internal state to remove the attack using S.Rst. The S's task is to simulate the compression function h such that  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and S are consistent, that is, for a value M PFMD<sup>S</sup>(M) =  $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ . We explain that the simulator S succeeds in the simulation of h. For the ordered queries  $S(IV, M_1), S(z_1, M_2)$  where  $z_1 = S(IV, M_1), z_2 = S(z_1, M_2)$ , if there does not exists M such that  $pfpad(M) = M_1 || M_2$ , then  $z_1$  and  $z_2$  are defined by the responses of  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(M_1)$ and  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(M_1 || M_2)$ , respectively, and the Merkle-Damgård style path  $(M_1 || M_2, z_2)$  is recoded in the table  $F_1^*$  of  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}$ . Then for the query  $S(z_2, M_3)$ , the response is defined by the output of  $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$  if there exists M such that  $pfpad(M) = M_1 || M_2 || M_3$ . Notice that  $M_1 || M_2$  can be obtained by the query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z_2)$ . Thus the simulator S succeeds in the simulation of h. The formal proof is given in Appendix B.

Remark 1. The EMD hash function [8] and the MDP hash function [24] are designed from the same design spirit as the PFMD hash function, which are designed to resist the length extension attack. Thus, by the similar proof, one can prove that EMD and MDP are reset indifferentiable from  $\mathcal{VO}_s$ .

#### 4.2 Reset Indifferentiability for the Chop MD Hash Function

The chop MD hash function is employed in SHA-2 family, SHA-224 and SHA-384 [29].

Fig. 3 illustrates the chop MD hash function chop  $MD^h : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ .  $h : \{0,1\}^{d+n+s} \to \{0,1\}^{n+s}$  is a compression function.  $\mathsf{pad}_c : \{0,1\}^* \to (\{0,1\}^d)^*$  is an injective padding function such that the inverse function is efficiently computable.

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security of the chop MD hash function where h is a RO. We define the parameter  $\mathcal{VO}$  as v = 1, u = 1,  $n_1 = s + n$  and  $w_1 = s$ . Note that the ideal ciphers are not used. Thus, in this case,  $\mathcal{VO} = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{s+n}^1, \mathcal{TRO}_s^{(1)})$ . The following theorem shows that chopMD<sup>h</sup> is reset indifferentiable from a  $\mathcal{VO}$ .

**Theorem 2.** There exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher A, the following holds,

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{r-indiff}}_{\mathsf{chopMD}^h,\mathcal{VO},S}(\mathcal{A}) \le \frac{(3n+1)q_h + nq_H}{2^s} + \frac{(q_H + q_h)}{2^{n-1}} + \frac{(lq_H + q_h)^2}{2^{s+n+1}} + \frac{q_h^2}{2^{s-1}} + \frac{(2q_h + 1)^2}{2^n} + \frac{($$

where  $\mathcal{A}$  can make queries to chopMD<sup>h</sup>/ $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and h/S at most  $q_H, q_h$  times, respectively, and l is a maximum number of blocks of a query to chopMD<sup>h</sup>/ $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . S makes at most  $3q_h$  queries and runs in time  $\mathcal{O}(q_h)$ .

**The Simulator** S. We define the simulator S in Fig. 3 which does not update the internal state to remove the attack using S.Rst. In the proof of Theorem 2, the padding function  $\mathsf{pad}_c$  is removed. Thus the queries to chopMD<sup>h</sup> and  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  are in  $(\{0,1\}^d)^*$ . Note that the chop Merkle-Damgård hash function with the padding function is the special case of that without the padding function. The S's task is to simulate the compression function h such that  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and S are consistent, that is, for a value M, chopMD<sup>S</sup>(M) =  $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ . For the ordered queries  $S(IV, M_1), S(w_1||z_1, M_2)$  where  $w_1||z_1 = S(IV, M_1), w_2||z_2 = S(w_1||z_1, M_2)$ , the structure of

$$\begin{array}{ll} \displaystyle \frac{\operatorname{Algorithm} Sponge^{P}(M)}{1 \ M' \leftarrow \operatorname{pad}_{S}(M);} \\ 2 \ (M_{1}, \ldots, M_{i}) \leftarrow \operatorname{div}(n, M); \\ 3 \ s = IV; \\ 4 \ \text{for } i = 1, \ldots, i \ \text{do } s = P(s \oplus (M_{i}||0^{c})); \\ 5 \ \text{return} \ \text{the left most } n \text{-bits of } s; \\ \hline \\ \displaystyle \frac{S_{-}(z,w)}{01 \ M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w); \\ 01 \ M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w); \\ 02 \ \text{if } y = IV_{2} \ \text{then} \\ 03 \ \text{ if unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \bot \ \text{then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M); \\ 04 \ \text{ else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(IV_{1} \oplus x); \\ 05 \ w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_{1}); \\ 06 \ \text{else if } M^{*} \neq \bot \ \text{then} \ m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M'); \\ 03 \ x \leftarrow IV_{1} \oplus M; \ y \leftarrow IV_{2}; \\ 04 \ \text{if } M \neq \bot \ \text{and } |M| = n \ \text{then} \\ 05 \ \text{if } unpad_{S}(M^{*}) = M' \neq \bot \ \text{then } x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M'); \\ 09 \ \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*}); \\ 09 \ \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*}); \\ 01 \ \text{mod}_{S}(M^{*}) = M' \neq \bot \ \text{then } x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M'); \\ 10 \ w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{(1)}(M^{*}||m); \\ 07 \ \text{else } x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*}); \\ 08 \ y \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{(1)}(M^{*}); \\ 08 \ y \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{(1)}(M^{*}); \\ 11 \ \text{else } z||w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x||y); \\ 08 \ y \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{(1)}(M^{*}); \\ 10 \ \text{return } x||y; \end{aligned}$$

Fig. 4. Sponge Hash Function (left) and Simulator S ( $S_+$  in right and  $S_-$  in left)

S ensures that  $z_1 = \mathcal{RO}_n(M_1)$ ,  $w_1 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M_1)$ ,  $z_2 = \mathcal{RO}_n(M_1||M_2)$ , and  $w_2 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M_1||M_2)$ . Thus, the path  $(M_1||M_2, w_2)$  is recoded in the table  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  where  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M_1||M_2] = w_2$ . Then, for the query  $S(w_2||z_2, M_3)$ , the response  $w_3||z_3$  is defined as  $z_3 = \mathcal{RO}_n(M_1||M_2||M_3)$  and  $w_3 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M_1||M_2||M_3)$ . Notice that  $M_1||M_2$  can be obtained by the queries  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w_2)$ . Thus the simulator S succeeds in the simulation of h. The formal proof is given in Appendix C.

### 4.3 Reset Indifferentiability for the Sponge Hash Function

The Sponge hash function is a permutation-based hash function which employed in the SHA-3 candidate Keccak [12].

Fig. 4 (left) illustrates the Sponge hash function where IV is the initial value of b bits,  $\mathsf{pad}_S : \{0,1\}^* \to (\{0,1\}^n)^*$  is an injective padding function such that the final block message  $M_i \neq 0$ ,  $P : \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^b \to \{0,1\}^b$  is a permutation and b = n + c. The inverse function of  $\mathsf{pad}_S$  is denoted by  $\mathsf{unpad}_S : (\{0,1\}^n)^* \to \{0,1\}^* \cup \{\bot\}$  efficiently computable.  $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^*)$  outputs M if there exists M such that  $\mathsf{pad}_S(M) = M^*$ , and outputs  $\bot$  otherwise. Note that the Sponge hash function of Fig. 4 is the special case of the general Sponge hash function where the output length is arbitrary. The output lengths of SHA-3 are 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits and in this case the Keccak hash function has the structure of Fig. 4.<sup>2</sup> We conjecture that the reset indifferentiable security of the general Sponge hash function can be proven by extending the following analysis of the Sponge hash function. We denote the left most n-bit value and the right most c bit value of IV by  $IV_1$  and  $IV_2$ , respectively. Namely,  $IV = IV_1 ||IV_2$ .

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security of the Sponge hash function in the random permutation model, where P is a forward oracle of the random permutation and  $P^{-1}$  is its inverse oracle.<sup>3</sup> We define the parameter of  $\mathcal{VO}$  as v = 1, u = 1, s = 1,  $n_1 = n$   $w_1 = c$ , and  $m_1 = b$ . We don't care the key length  $k_1$ , since in this proof we fix the key by some constant value, that is the fixed key ideal cipher is used, which is a random permutation of b bits. So we use the random permutation  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$  of b bits instead of the ideal cipher  $\mathsf{IC}_{k_1,b}^{(1)}$  where  $\mathcal{P}$  is a forward oracle and  $\mathcal{P}^{-1}$  is an inverse oracle. Thus, in this case,  $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_n^1, \mathcal{TRO}_c^{(1)}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$ . The following theorem is that the sponge hash function  $Sponge^P$ is reset indifferentiable from  $\mathcal{VO}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In the Keccak case, b = 1600 and c = 576. So, the output length of Keccak is shorter than n. Since a chopped RO is also a RO, the reset indifferentiable security of Sponge with the *n*-bits output length implies that of Sponge with the shorter output length.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The security of the Sponge hash function was evaluated in the random permutation model [11].

$ ext{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{A_1,A_2}$	$CDAj^{A_1,A_2}_{A\mathcal{E},F}$ $(j=1,2)$
$\frac{\overline{b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}}}{b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}}$	$\frac{b \overset{\text{(b)}}{\leftarrow} }{b \overset{\text{(b)}}{\leftarrow} } \{0, 1\}$
$(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$	$(pk,sk) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}$
$(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{F.pub}$	$((\mathbf{m}_0,\mathbf{m}_1,\mathbf{r}),i) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{F.pub}$
$\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{F.priv}(pk, \mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$	$\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{F.priv}(pk, \mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{F.pub}(pk, \mathbf{c})$	$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{F.pub}(pk, \mathbf{c})$
$\mathbf{return} \ (b = b')$	$\mathbf{return} \ (bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b,\mathbf{r})=b')$

**Fig. 5.** CDA Security Game (left) and CDA*j* Security Game (j = 1, 2) (right)

**Theorem 3 (Sponge is reset indifferentiable from a**  $\mathcal{VO}$ ). There exists a simulator  $S = (S_+, S_-)$  such that for any distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ , the following holds.

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{r-indiff}}_{Sponge^P,\mathcal{VO},S}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{(1-2^{-n})q^2 + (1+2^{-n})q}{2^{c+1}} + \frac{q^2}{2^{b-3}} + \frac{q(9q+4)}{2^{c+1}}$$

where A can make at most q queries. S makes at most 3q queries and runs in time  $\mathcal{O}(q)$ .

The Simulator S. We define the simulator S in Fig. 4 which does not update the internal state to remove the attack using S.Rst. The S's task is to simulate the random permutation  $(P, P^{-1})$  such that  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and S are consistent, that is, for a value M,  $Sponge^{S_+}(M) = \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ .  $S_+$  and  $S_-$  simulate P and  $P^{-1}$ , respectively. For the ordered queries  $S_+(x_1, IV_2), S_+(x_2, w_1)$  where  $z_1||w_1 = S_+(x_1, IV_2), z_2||w_2 = S_+(x_2, w_1)$ , the structure of S ensures that  $w_1 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M_1)$  and  $w_2 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M_1||M_2)$  where  $M_1 = IV_1 \oplus x_1$  and  $M_2 = z_1 \oplus x_2$ . Thus, the path  $(M_1||M_2, w_2)$  is recoded in the table  $F_1^*$  where  $F_1^*[M_1||M_2] = w_2$ . Then, for the query  $S_+(x_3, w_2)$ , the response  $w_3||z_3$  is defined as  $w_3 = \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$  and  $z_3 = \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M_1||M_2||M_3)$ , if  $unpad_S(M_1||M_2||M_3) = M \neq \bot$  where  $M_3 = z_2 \oplus x_3$ . Notice that  $M_1||M_2$  can be obtained by the queries  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w_2)$  and  $z_2$  can be obtained by the query  $\mathcal{RO}_n(unpad_S(M_1||M_2))$  or the query  $\mathcal{RO}_n^1(M_1||M_2)$ . Thus the simulator S succeeds in the simulation of the random permutation. The formal proof is given in Appendix D.

### 5 Multi-Stage Security in the $\mathcal{VO}$ Model

We show the following which ensures both the adaptive case and the non-adaptive case and both the CCA case and the CPA case.

- For any PKE scheme, the PRIV security [4] is preserved when a RO is replaced with a  $\mathcal{VO}$ .
- For all hedged PKE schemes [5], REwH, RtD, and PtD, the CDA security is preserved when a RO is replaced with a  $\mathcal{VO}$ .

**Public Key Encryption (PKE).** A public key encryption scheme  $\mathcal{AE} = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$  consists of three algorithms. Key generation  $\mathcal{K}$  outputs a public key, secret key pair. Encryption  $\mathcal{E}$  takes a public key pk, a message m, and randomness r and outputs a cipher text. Decryption  $\mathcal{D}$  takes a secret key, a cipher text, and outputs a plaintext or a distinguished symbol  $\perp$ . For vectors  $\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{r}$  with  $|\mathbf{m}| = |\mathbf{r}| = l$  which is the size of vectors, we denote by  $\mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}; \mathbf{r})$  the vector  $(\mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}[1]; \mathbf{r}[1]), \ldots, \mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}[l]; \mathbf{r}[l]))$ . We say that  $\mathcal{AE}$  is deterministic if  $\mathcal{E}$  is deterministic.

**CDA Security.** We explain the CDA security (we quote the explanation of the CDA security in [30]). Fig. 5 illustrates the non-adaptive CDA game in the CPA case for a PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  using a functionality F. We explain the adaptive case and the CCA case, later. This notion captures the security of a PKE scheme when the randomness  $\mathbf{r}$  used may not be a string of uniform bits. For the remainder of this section, fix a randomness length  $\rho \geq 0$  and a message length  $\omega > 0$ . An  $(\mu, \nu)$ -mmr-source  $\mathcal{M}$  is a randomized algorithm that outputs a triple of vector  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$  such that  $|\mathbf{m}_0| = |\mathbf{m}_1| = |\mathbf{r}| = \nu$ , all components of  $\mathbf{m}_0$  and  $\mathbf{m}_1$  are bit strings of length  $\omega$ , all components of  $\mathbf{r}$  are bit strings of length  $\rho$ , and  $(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}[i]) \neq (\mathbf{m}_b[j], \mathbf{r}[j])$  for all  $1 \leq i < j \leq \nu$  and all  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . Moreover, the source has mini-entropy  $\mu$ , meaning  $\Pr[(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}[i]) = (m', r')|(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}) \leftarrow \mathcal{M}| \leq 2^{-\mu}$  for all  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , all  $1 \leq i \leq \nu$ , and all (m', r'). A CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ 

is a pair of procedures, the first of which is a  $(\mu, \nu)$ -mmr-source. The CDA advantage for a CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  against scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  using a functionality F is defined by

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{cda}_{\mathcal{AE},F}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}^{\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE},F} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - 1.$$

In the adaptive case, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1$  can select multiple triples  $(\mathbf{m}_{0,0}, \mathbf{m}_{0,1}, \mathbf{r}_0), \ldots, (\mathbf{m}_{j,0}, \mathbf{m}_{j,1}, \mathbf{r}_j)$  adaptively, where before selecting  $(\mathbf{m}_{i,0}, \mathbf{m}_{i,1}, \mathbf{r}_i)$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_1$  can know cipher texts  $\mathbf{c}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_{i-1}$  of  $(\mathbf{m}_{0,b}, \mathbf{r}_0), \ldots, (\mathbf{m}_{i-1,b}, \mathbf{r}_{i-1})$  where  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_2$  can receive its cipher texts  $\mathbf{c}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_j$ . In the CCA case, the adversary has oracle access to the decryption oracle where the queries don't appear as a component of the cipher text(s). Note that the outputs of  $\mathcal{A}_1$  are independent of the coins used by *F.pub*.

**PRIV Security.** The PRIV security is the special case of the CDA security when the PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  being considered has randomness length  $\rho = 0$ . Thus the PRIV security game for a PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  using a functionality F against adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is equal to the CDA game when  $\rho = 0$ . The PRIV advantage for a PRIV adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is denoted by  $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\text{priv}}(\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$  which is equal to the CDA advantage with  $\rho = 0$ .

**CDA1 Security.** In the following proofs, we use a new security called CDA1. The CDA1 security game is shown in Fig. 5 where  $\mathcal{A}_1$  is a  $(\mu, \nu)$ -mmr-source and outputs *i* in addition to  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$  outputs a bit *b'*. Note that the outputs of  $\mathcal{A}_1$  are independent of the coins used by *F.pub*. Fig. 5 is a non-adaptive and CPA case. In the adaptive case,  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $((\mathbf{m}_{0,0}, \mathbf{m}_{0,1}, \mathbf{r}_0), \ldots, (\mathbf{m}_{j-1,0}, \mathbf{m}_{j-1,1}, \mathbf{r}_{j-1}), i)$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_2$  obtains its cipher texts  $\mathbf{c}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_{j-1}$  and the CDA1 security game returns  $(bit_i(\mathbf{m}_{0,b}, \cdots, \mathbf{m}_{j-1,b}, \mathbf{r}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{r}_{j-1}) = b')$ . In the CCA case, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}_2$  has oracle access to the decryption oracle where the queries don't appear as a component of the cipher text(s). The CDA1 advantage for an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  for a PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  using a functionality *F* is defined by

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\operatorname{cda1}}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\operatorname{CDA1}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - 1.$$

**CDA2 Security.** The CDA2 security game is the special case of the CDA1 security game. In the CDA2 security game,  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$  such that  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is a random bit, namely,  $\Pr[bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r}) = 1|((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1] = 1/2$ . The CDA2 advantage for an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  for a PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  using a functionality F is defined by

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\operatorname{cda2}}_{\mathcal{AE},F}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) = 2 \cdot \Pr[\operatorname{CDA2}^{\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2}_{\mathcal{AE},F} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - 1.$$

Clearly the following lemma holds.

**Lemma 1.** For any CDA2 adversary  $A_1, A_2$  of a PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  using a functionality F, there exists a CDA1 adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that

$$\operatorname{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\operatorname{cda2}}(A_1,A_2) \leq \operatorname{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},F}^{\operatorname{cda1}}(B_1,B_2)$$

where the running time of  $B_1, B_2$  is at most that of  $A_1, A_2$ .

#### 5.1 Tools of Our Security Proofs

The Impact of a Random Oracle. Let  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{RO}^*$  be ROs (in this case we don't care the lengths of domain and range spaces of  $\mathcal{RO}^*$ ). Let  $\mathcal{O}_1$  be some oracle where  $\mathcal{O}_1.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{O}_1.pub$  includes  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ ,  $\mathcal{RO}^*$  and other independent oracles. Let  $\mathcal{O}_2$  be an oracle which is equal to  $\mathcal{O}_1$  but excludes  $\mathcal{RO}^*$ . Clearly,  $\mathcal{RO}^*$  gives no advantage to the second stage adversary of the CDA security game. So the following lemma holds, which ensures that the CDA security in the  $\mathcal{O}_2$  model ensures that in the  $\mathcal{O}_1$  model. Notice that the following lemma ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the non-adaptive case and the adaptive case.

**Lemma 2.** For any CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$ , making queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}, q$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}^*$  and other oracles, there exists a CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  such that

$$\Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_1}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_2}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}].$$

where the running time of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is at most that of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  and makes queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ , and other oracles.  $\blacklozenge$ 

The Impact of an Ideal Cipher. Let  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  be a RO. Let  $\mathsf{IC} = (E, D)$  be an ideal cipher where E is an encryption oracle and D is a decryption oracle (in this case we don't care the length of the plain text, the length of the cipher text and the length of the key). Let  $\mathcal{O}_3$  be some oracle where  $\mathcal{O}_3.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{O}_3.pub$  includes  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ ,  $\mathsf{IC}$  and other oracles. Let  $\mathcal{O}_4$  be an oracle which is equal to  $\mathcal{O}_3$  but does not include  $\mathsf{IC}$ . The following lemma ensures that the CDA security in the  $\mathcal{O}_4$  model ensures that in the  $\mathcal{O}_3$  model. Notice that the following lemma ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the non-adaptive case and the adaptive case.

**Lemma 3.** For any CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$  in the  $\mathcal{O}_3$  model, making queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathsf{IC}$  and other oracles, respectively, there exists a CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  such that

$$\Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_3}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_4}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}]$$

 $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  can make queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and other oracles, respectively. The running time of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is at most that of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ .

*Proof.* We consider the following three games.

- Game 0 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_3$  model where the adversary is  $A_1, A_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_3.pub$ .
- Game 1 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_3$  model where the adversary is  $A_1, A_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_3.pub$  excluding the ideal cipher (E, D).
- Game 2 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_4$  model where the adversary is  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_4.pub$ .

Let Gj be an event that the CDA game in Game j outputs true. Thus

$$\Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_3}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - \Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_4}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \le \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] + \Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2].$$

**Game 0**  $\Rightarrow$  **Game 1.** Consider the difference between Game 0 and Game 1 ( $\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]$ ). If  $\mathcal{A}_1$  can success to give some cipher text of the ideal cipher to  $\mathcal{A}_2$  where the plain text includes one bit or more of  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$ , the adversary might be obtained the advantage of the ideal cipher. However, since the length of the plain text is equal to that of the cipher text, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1$  can also give the plain text to  $\mathcal{A}_2$  without the ideal cipher. Thus, the ideal cipher gives no advantage to the adversary and  $\Pr[G0] \leq \Pr[G1]$ .

**Game 1**  $\Rightarrow$  **Game 2.** Since in Game 1 the adversary cannot make a query to the ideal cipher, Game 2 is equal to Game 1. So  $\Pr[G1] = \Pr[G2]$ .

The Impact of Traceable Random Oracles. Let  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  be a RO. Let  $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)} = (\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}, \mathcal{TO}^{(i)})$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$  be traceable random oracles. Let  $\mathcal{O}_5$  be some oracle where  $\mathcal{O}_5.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$  includes  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  and other independent oracles. Let  $\mathcal{O}_6$  be an oracle which is equal to  $\mathcal{O}_5$  but does not include  $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ . The following lemma shows that the CDA security in the  $\mathcal{O}_6$  model and the CDA2 security in the  $\mathcal{O}_6$  model ensures CDA security in the  $\mathcal{O}_5$  model. Notice that the following lemma ensures both the CPA case and the Adaptive case.

**Lemma 4.** For any CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$  in the  $\mathcal{O}_5$  model, making queries to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}, \mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$  and other oracles at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}, q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}, q$ , respectively, there exists a CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  in the  $\mathcal{O}_6$  mode or a CDA1 adversary  $B_1, B_2$  in the  $\mathcal{O}_6$  model such that

$$\Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_{5}}^{A_{1},A_{2}} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \leq \Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_{6}}^{\mathcal{A}_{1},\mathcal{A}_{2}} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] + \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_{6}}^{\operatorname{cda2}}(B_{1},B_{2}) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^{*}}q_{\mathcal{TO}^{*}}}{2^{w-1}}.$$

where  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  can query to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and other oracles at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q$ , respectively.  $w = \min\{w_1, \ldots, w_u\}$ . The running time of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is at most that of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ .

*Proof.* We consider the following four games.

– Game 0 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_5$  model where the adversary is  $A_1, A_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$ .

- Game 1 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_5$  model where the adversary is  $A_1, A_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$  excluding  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$  (i = 1, ..., u).
- Game 2 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_5$  model where the adversary is  $A_1, A_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_5.pub$  excluding  $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ .
- Game 3 is the CDA game in the  $\mathcal{O}_6$  model where the adversary is  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  which has oracle access to  $\mathcal{O}_6.pub$ .

Let  $G_j$  be an event that the CDA game in Game j outputs true. Thus

$$\Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_1}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] - \Pr[\operatorname{CDA}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_2}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \le \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] + \Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] + \Pr[G2] - \Pr[G3].$$

**Game 0**  $\Rightarrow$  **Game 1.** We evaluate  $\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]$ . We consider the following events for Game 0.

- Event E1:  $A_1$  makes the query  $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)$  such that M includes one bit or more of  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$ .
  - Event E11 = E1  $\wedge$  E1' where Event E1' is that  $A_2$  makes the query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$  where  $z = \mathcal{RO}^{(i)}_{w}(M)$ 
    - \* Event E111 = E11  $\wedge$  E11' where Event E11' is that  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  includes one bit or more of z.
      - Event E1111 = E111  $\wedge$  E111' where Event E111' is that when  $A_2$  makes the query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ ,  $A_2$  already knows one bit or more of z in  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ .
      - Event E1112 = E111 $\wedge$ ¬E112' where Event ¬E112' is that when  $A_2$  makes the query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ ,  $A_2$  know no bit of z in ( $\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r}$ ).
    - \* Event E112 = E11  $\land \neg$  E11' where Event  $\neg$ E11' is that (**m**<sub>b</sub>, **r**) includes no bit of z.
  - Event E12 = E1  $\wedge \neg$  E1' where Event  $\neg$ E1' is that  $A_2$  does not make the query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ .
- Event E2 =  $\neg$ E1 where Event  $\neg$ E1 is that  $A_1$  does not make the query  $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}(M)$ .

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] &\leq \Pr[G0|\text{E1111}] \Pr[\text{E1111}] + \Pr[G0|\text{E1112}] \Pr[\text{E1112}] + \Pr[G0|\text{E112}] \Pr[\text{E112}] \\ &+ \Pr[G0|\text{E12}] \Pr[\text{E12}] + \Pr[G0|\text{E2}] \Pr[\text{E2}] - \Pr[G1] \\ &\leq \Pr[\text{E1111}] + \Pr[\text{E1112}] + \Pr[\text{E112}] + \Pr[G0|\text{E12}] \Pr[\text{E12}] + \Pr[G0|\text{E2}] \Pr[\text{E2}] - \Pr[G1] \end{aligned}$$

Pr[E1111]: Under Event E1111, since  $A_2$  knows one bit or more of z in  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  before the query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ ,  $A_2$  knows the bit without using  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$ . And  $\mathcal{RO}^{(i)}_{n_i}$  leaks no bit of  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ . Thus  $A_2$  knows the bit without using the traceable random oracles  $\mathcal{TRO}^{(i)}_{w_i}$ . Since z is a random value, E1111 is equal to the event that in the  $\mathcal{O}_6$  model  $A_1$  makes  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$  such that for some  $i \ bit_i(\mathbf{m}_{b^*}, \mathbf{r})$  is some bit of z and then  $A_2$  hits the bit. This is equal to the case that an adversary wins in the CDA2 security game (there exists an adversary such that the CDA2 advantage is 1). So there exists the CDA2 adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that  $\Pr[\text{E1111}] \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_6}^{cda2}(B_1, B_2)$ .

Pr[E1112]: Under Event E1111, when  $A_2$  makes a query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ ,  $A_2$  knows no bit of  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$ , that is  $A_2$  knows no bit of z. Thus, Event E1111 is that  $A_2$  needs to hit the random value z of at least w bits. Since  $A_1$  can make such value z at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$  values,  $\Pr[E1112] \leq q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^w$ .

Pr[E112]: Since  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  does not include z, to query  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}(z)$ ,  $A_2$  needs to hit the random value z of at least w bits. Since  $A_1$  can make such value z at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$  values, Pr[E112]  $\leq q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^w$ .

 $\Pr[G0|E12]$ : Since  $A_2$  makes no  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$  query to obtain  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), \mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$  gives no advantage to  $A_2$ . Thus  $\Pr[G0|E12] = \Pr[G1]$ .

 $\Pr[G0|E2]$ : Since  $\mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  gives no value of  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$  to  $A_2$  under Event E2,  $\Pr[G0|E22] = \Pr[G1]$ .

Since  $Pr[E12] + Pr[E2] \leq 1$ , there exists the CDA2 adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that

$$\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] \le \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cda2}}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{O}_6}(B_1, B_2) + q_{\mathcal{RO}^*} \times q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}/2^{w-1}.$$

Note that the above discussion is the non-adaptive case, but clearly one can apply the discussion to the adaptive case by changing the  $A_1$ 's output and the cipher text from  $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r})$  and  $\mathbf{c}$  to  $(\mathbf{m}_{0,0}, \mathbf{m}_{0,1}, \mathbf{r}_0)$ , ...,  $(\mathbf{m}_{i-1,0}, \mathbf{m}_{i-1,1}, \mathbf{r}_{i-1})$  and  $(\mathbf{c}_0, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_j)$ 

**Game 1**  $\Rightarrow$  **Game 2.** In Game 2  $\mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  queries are removed. From Lemma 2,  $\Pr[G1] \leq \Pr[G2]$ .

**Game 2**  $\Rightarrow$  **Game 3.** Game 3 is equal to Game 2. Thus  $\Pr[G2] = \Pr[G3]$ .

#### 5.2 PRIV Security

Lemmas 2 and 3 ensure that for any PKE scheme the PRIV security is preserved when  $\mathcal{O}_7$  is replaced with  $\mathcal{VO}$ , where  $\mathcal{O}_7.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{O}_7.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)})$  for  $i = 1, \ldots, u$ . Using Lemma 4, we show that the PRIV security is preserved when  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  is replaced with  $\mathcal{O}_7$ . So we evaluate the CDA1 advantage in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  model. Note that CDA2 advantage is bounded by the CDA1 advantage from Lemma 1. Wining the CDA1 game implies that the second stage adversary in the PRIV game obtains one bit or more of  $\mathbf{m}_b$ . Thus, in this case, the CDA1 advantage is bounded by the PRIV game by generating  $\mathbf{m}_b$  such that the obtained bit is b. Namely, the CDA1 advantage is bounded by the PRIV advantage in the RO model. The formal evaluation of the bound of the CDA1 advantage is given in Appendix F. We thus obtain the following theorem. Notice that the theorem ensures both the CPA case and the CCA case and both the non-adaptive case and the adaptive case.

**Theorem 4.** Let  $\mathcal{AE}$  be any PKE scheme. For any PRIV adversary  $A_1, A_2$  in the  $\mathcal{VO}$  model, making queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$  and  $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$   $(j = 1, \ldots, v), \mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$   $(t = 1, \ldots, s), \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$ and  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ , respectively, there exists a PRIV adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{VO}}(A_1,A_2) \leq 3 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

 $w = \min\{w_1, \ldots, w_u\}$ .  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  can make queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . The running time of the PRIV adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is at most that of the PRIV adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ .

### 5.3 The CDA Security of Hedged PKE Schemes

In the CDA security game with randomness, one cannot use Lemma 4 for some PKE scheme, since there exists a PKE scheme which is CDA secure in the RO model but the CDA2 security is broken. For example, such PKE scheme is that the encryption is defined as  $\mathcal{E}(pk, \mathbf{m}; \mathbf{r})||bit_1(\mathbf{r})$ . We thus consider the CDA security of all hedged PKE schemes, REwH, RtD and PtD [5] for both the non-adaptive cases and the adaptive case. Note that the CCA case of REwH, RtD and PtD have not been considered.

Lemmas 2 and 3 ensure that the CDA security of these PKE schemes is preserved when  $\mathcal{O}_7$  is replaced with  $\mathcal{VO}$  where  $\mathcal{O}_7.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{O}_7.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_{w_i}^{(i)})$  for  $i = 1, \ldots, u$ . We thus consider the CDA2 security of these PKE schemes in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . Then Lemma 4 ensures that the CDA security of these PKE schemes is preserved when  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  is replaced with  $\mathcal{O}_7$ .

Let  $\mathcal{AE}_r = (\mathcal{K}_r, \mathcal{E}_r, \mathcal{D}_r)$  be a (randomized) PKE scheme with randomness length  $\rho_r > 0$ . Let  $\mathcal{AE}_d = (\mathcal{K}_d, \mathcal{E}_d, \mathcal{D}_d)$  be a (deterministic) PKE scheme with randomness length always 0.

The CDA Security of REwH. Let  $\mathsf{REwH}[\mathcal{AE}_r] = (\mathcal{K}_{\mathsf{REwH}}, \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{REwH}}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{REwH}})$  be the PKE scheme. The encryption is defined as  $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{REwH}}(pk, m; r) = \mathcal{E}_r(pk, m; \mathcal{RO}_n(pk||m||r))$ . We evaluate the CDA2 advantage of REwH in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  model. One can divide this case into the two cases. The first case is that the first stage CDA2 adversary selects *i* such that  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is some bit of  $\mathbf{m}_b$ . The second case is that  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is some bit of  $\mathbf{r}$ . For the first case, if the second stage CDA2 adversary hits the bit, then the adversary can break the CDA security by setting *b* in the obtained bit via the CDA1 adversary (Lemma 1), that is the CDA2 advantage is bounded by the CDA advantage. For the second case, since  $\mathbf{r}$  is hidden by  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ , the probability that the second stage CDA2 advantage. The formal evaluation is given in Appendix G. We thus have the following theorem.

**Theorem 5.** For any CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$  in the  $\mathcal{VO}$  model, making queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathsf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}*}$ and  $q_{\mathcal{TO}*}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$   $(j = 1, \ldots, v), \mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$   $(t = 1, \ldots, s), \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$  and  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, v)$   $1, \ldots, u$ ), respectively, there exists a CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$  such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{cda}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{VO}}(A_1,A_2) \leq 3 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{cda}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

 $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  can make queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . The running time of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  is at most that of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$ .

The CDA Security of PtD. Let  $PtD[\mathcal{AE}_r] = (\mathcal{K}_{PtD}, \mathcal{E}_{PtD}, \mathcal{D}_{PtD})$  be the PKE scheme. The encryption is defined as  $\mathcal{E}_{PtD}(pk_d, m; r) = \mathcal{E}_d(pk_d, r||m)$ . For the CDA1 advantage of PtD, the PRIV security of  $\mathcal{E}_d$  ensure the CDA1 security of PtD. The CDA2 security is thus ensured from Lemma 1. The formal evaluation is given in Appendix H. We have the following theorem.

**Theorem 6.** For any CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$  in the  $\mathcal{VO}$  model, making queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathbf{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ and  $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$   $(j = 1, \ldots, v), \mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$   $(t = 1, \ldots, s), \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$  and  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$   $(i = 1, \ldots, u)$ , respectively, there exists a CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  or a PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{cda}_{\mathsf{PtD},\mathcal{VO}}(A_1,A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{cda}_{\mathsf{PtD},\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) + 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE}_d,\mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1,B_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

 $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  and  $B_1, B_2$  can make queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . The running times of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  and the PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  are at most that of the CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$ .

The CDA Security of RtD. Let  $\operatorname{RtD}[\mathcal{AE}_r] = (\mathcal{K}_{\operatorname{RtD}}, \mathcal{E}_{\operatorname{RtD}}, \mathcal{D}_{\operatorname{RtD}})$  be the PKE scheme. The encryption is defined as  $\mathcal{E}_{\operatorname{RtD}}((pk_r, pk_d), m; r) = \mathcal{E}_d(pk_d, \mathcal{E}_r(pk_r, m; r)||10^l)$  where the randomized encryption  $\mathcal{E}_r$  preserves the mini-entropy of its inputs. This means that RtD is the special case of PtD. So one can prove the CDA security of RtD by using the result of PtD. We thus have the following theorem.

**Theorem 7.** For any CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$  in the  $\mathcal{VO}$  model, making queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}'}, q_{\mathcal{IC}}, q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}$ and  $q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{RO}_{n_j}^j$   $(j = 1, ..., v), \mathsf{IC}_{k_t, m_t}^{(t)}$   $(t = 1, ..., s), \mathcal{RO}_{w_i}^{(i)}$  (i = 1, ..., u) and  $\mathcal{TO}^{(i)}$  (i = 1, ..., u), respectively, there exists a CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  or a PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathsf{RtD},\mathcal{VO}}(A_1,A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathsf{RtD},\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathcal{A}_1,\mathcal{A}_2) + 2 \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE}_d,\mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1,B_2) + \frac{q_{\mathcal{RO}^*}q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}q_{\mathcal{TO}^*}}{2^{w-2}}$$

 $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  and  $B_1, B_2$  can make queries at most  $q_{\mathcal{RO}}$  times to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . The running times of the CDA adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2$  and the PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  are at most that of the CDA adversary  $A_1, A_2$ .

### 6 Conclusion and Future Works

We proved that for any PKE scheme being PRIV secure in the RO model and all hedged PKE schemes REwH, RtD and PtD, the adaptive CDA security and the non-adaptive CDA security in both CPA and CCA cases are preserved when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash functions, PFMD, chop MD, and Sponge. First, we proposed the Versatile Oracle  $\mathcal{VO}$ , and showed that these hash functions are reset indifferentiable from  $\mathcal{VO}$ s. Second, we proved that for the PKE schemes the CDA security are preserved when a RO is replaced with a  $\mathcal{VO}$ . The reset indifferentiable composition theorem ensures the CDA security when a RO is replaced with the indifferentiable hash function. So far, there is no positive result for the reset indifferentiability. So, our result is the first time positive result.

For other indifferentiable hash functions, e.g., the SHA-3 finalists JH [31] and Grøstl [23], the CDA security is still open. We conjecture that our approach can be applied to the CDA security proof for these indifferentiable hash functions. For other cases, e.g., deterministic and hedged identity-based encryption schemes [7], we conjecture that the security can be proven by our approach.

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


Fig. 6. Games of Reset Indifferentiable Security Proof

# A The Strategy of Reset Indifferentiable Security Proofs

We prove the reset indifferentiable security by using the following strategy which enables to modularly incorporate the previous original indifferentiable security result into our proof.

Let P be some ideal primitive. Let  $H^P : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$  be a hash function using P. In the reset indifferentiable from a  $\mathcal{VO}$  security game for  $H^P$  the distinguisher interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \hat{S})$  ( $\mathcal{VO}$  scenario) and  $(H^P, P)$  ( $H^P$  scenario) where  $\hat{S} = (S, S.Rst)$  and the simulator S simulates P. The simulator S has oracle access to  $\mathcal{VO}.pub$ . Let  $S^*$  be the simulator of the original indifferentiable security from  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  for  $H^P$ where the simulator  $S^*$  has oracle access to  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ .

To evaluate the reset indifferentiable advantage, we employ the following strategy which consists of the five games which are shown in Fig. 6.

- Game 0. This is the  $\mathcal{VO}$  scenario. Thus  $\mathcal{A}$  has oracle access to  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \hat{S})$ .
- Game 1. This game is equal to Game 0 but S.Rst is removed. Thus  $\mathcal{A}$  has oracle access to  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$ .
- Game 2. This game is the RO scenario of the original indifferentiable security game of  $H^P$ . Thus  $\mathcal{A}$  has oracle access to  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$ .
- Game 3. This game is the  $H^P$  scenario of the original indifferentiable security game. Thus  $\mathcal{A}$  has oracle access to  $(H^P, P)$ .
- Game 4. This game is the  $H^P$  scenario of the reset indifferentiable security game. Thus  $\mathcal{A}$  has oracle access to  $(H^P, P, nop)$ .

Let Gi be an event that  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 1 in Game *i*. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Adv}_{H^P,\mathcal{VO},S}^{\mathsf{r-indiff}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \Pr[G0] - \Pr[G4] \\ &\leq (\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]) + (\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]) + (\Pr[G2] - \Pr[G3]) + (\Pr[G3] - \Pr[G4]) \end{aligned}$$

The difference  $(\Pr[G2] - \Pr[G3])$  is equal to the advantage of the original indifferentiable security of  $H^P$  from a RO, We denote the bound of the advantage by  $p^*$ . Since *nop* takes no input and does not nothing,  $\Pr[G3] = \Pr[G4]$ . Thus for any distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ , the following holds.

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{H^P,\mathcal{VO},S}^{\mathsf{r-indiff}}(\mathcal{A}) \le (\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1]) + (\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]) + p^*.$$

So the remaining work is to define the simulator S such that the simulator does not update the internal state and the difference  $(\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2])$  is small. If the simulator does not update the internal state, S.Rst gives no advantage to  $\mathcal{A}$ , that is,  $\Pr[G0] = \Pr[G1]$ .

 $S^*(x,y)$  $\overline{01} \text{ if } T_{S^*}[x, y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}[x, y];$ 02 if x = IV then if  $\exists M$  s.t. pfpad(M) = y then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ ; 0304else $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$ 05if  $Path[z] = \bot$  then  $Path[z] \leftarrow y$ ; 06 07 else if  $Path[x] = M^* \neq \perp$  then if  $\exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pfpad}(M) = M^* || y \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);$ 08 09 else  $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$ 10 if  $Path[z] = \bot$  then  $Path[z] \leftarrow M^* || y;$ 11 12 else  $z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$ ; 13  $T_{S^*}[x, y] \leftarrow z;$ 14 return  $T_{S^*}[x, y];$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \frac{\mathcal{O}(x,y)}{1\ M^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(x);} \\ 2 \text{ if } x = IV \text{ then} \\ 3 \quad \text{if } \exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{pfpad}(M) = y \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M); \\ 4 \quad \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(y); \\ 5 \text{ else if } M^* \neq \perp \text{ then} \\ 6 \quad \text{if } \exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{pfpad}(M) = M^* ||y \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M); \\ 7 \quad \text{else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(M^* ||y); \\ 8 \text{ else } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(x||y); \\ 9 \text{ return } z; \end{array}$ 

**Fig. 7.** Simulator  $S^*$  (Left) and Game PF1 (Right)

Fig. 8. Game PF2 (left), and Game PF3 (right)

# B Proof of Theorem 1

We prove Theorem 1 by using the strategy in Appendix A.

Since the simulator S does not update the internal state,  $\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] = 0$ .

We use the result of the indifferentiable security by Chang *et al.* [15] They defined a simulator  $S^*$  which is shown in Fig. 7.  $T_{S^*}$  is a (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) table which records query-response values of  $S^*$ . For the query  $S^*(x, y)$ , the response is recorded in  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$ . Path is a (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) table which records all paths with the Merkle-Damgård style. If triples  $(z_0, y_1, z_1), (z_1, y_2, z_2), (z_2, y_3, z_3)$  are recorded in  $T_{S^*}$  where  $T_{S^*}[z_{j-1}, y_j] = z_j$  and  $z_0 = IV, y_1||y_2||y_3$  is recorded in  $Path[z_3]$ .<sup>4</sup> The task of the simulator  $S^*$  is to simulate h so that  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $S^*$  are consistent. So the response of  $S^*(x, y)$  is defined by the output of  $\mathcal{RO}_n(M)$  if there exists  $M^*$  such that  $Path[x] = M^*$  and there exists M such that  $pfpad(M) = M^*||y$ . They show that the advantage  $p^*$  of the indifferentiable security is bounded by  $\mathcal{O}((lq_H + q_h)^2/2^n)$ .

We evaluate the difference  $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$  where the distinguisher  $A_1$  interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$  in Game 1 and  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$  in Game 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Note that in [15], the paths are recorded by using another formula, which is a relation  $\mathcal{R}$ , but the table *Path* realizes the same role as the relation.

 $\mathcal{O}(x,y)$  $\mathcal{O}(x,y)$ 01 if  $T_{S^*}[x, y] \neq \perp$  then **return**  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$ ;  $\overline{01} \text{ if } T_{S^*}[x, y] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T_{S^*}[x, y];$ 02 if x = IV then if  $\exists M$  s.t. pfpad(M) = y then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ ; 0302 if x = IV then if  $\exists M$  s.t. pfpad(M) = y then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ ; 04else0304 $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$ else 05 $z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$ : 0506  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[y] \leftarrow z;$ 07 else if  $\exists_1 M^*$  s.t.  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M^*] = x$  then if  $Path[z] = \bot$  then  $Path[z] \leftarrow y;$ 06 if  $\exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pfpad}(M) = M^* || y \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M);$ 07 else if  $Path[x] = M^* \neq \perp$  then 08 if  $\exists M$  s.t.  $pfpad(M) = M^* || y$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M)$ ; 09 08 else 09else  $z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n;$ 10 $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$ 11  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M^*||y] \leftarrow z;$ 10 if  $Path[z] = \bot$  then  $Path[z] \leftarrow M^* || y;$ 12 else11  $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n;$ 12 else  $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$ ; 13 $\mathsf{F}_1[x||y] \leftarrow z;$ 13  $T_{S^*}[x,y] \leftarrow z;$ 1414 return  $T_{S^*}[x, y];$ 15  $T_{S^*}[x,y] \leftarrow z;$ 16 return  $T_{S^*}[x, y];$ 

Fig. 9. Game PF4 (left), and Game PF5 (right)

We consider the five games, Game PF1, Game PF2, Game PF3, Game PF4, and Game PF5. In each game, the distinguisher  $A_1$  interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{O})$  where  $\mathcal{O}$  is shown in Figs. 7, 8, and 9.  $\mathcal{O}$  in Game PF1 is equal to S and  $\mathcal{O}$  in Game PF5 is equal to  $S^*$ . Let GPFj be an event that in Game PFj  $A_1$  outputs 1. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GPF1] - \Pr[GPF5]$$
$$= \sum_{j=1}^{4} \Pr[GPFj] - \Pr[GPF(j+1)]$$

First we evaluate the difference  $\Pr[GPF1] - \Pr[GPF2]$ . In Game PF2, the procedures of  $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}$  and  $\mathcal{RO}_n^1$  are hard-coded. Thus this modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior and  $\Pr[GPF1] = \Pr[GPF2]$ .

We evaluate the difference  $\Pr[GPF2] - \Pr[GPF3]$ . In Game PF3, for any (x, y), the table  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  is not redefined, while in Game PF2 there are cases that the table is redefined. For Game PF2 we consider the following cases which cover all cases that the table is redefined. So the modification from Game PF2 to Game PF3 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior if the following cases don't occur.

- Case 1: First  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  was defined by a value in the step 05 and then it is redefined due to another step (07, 10, or 13).
- Case 2: First  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  was defined by a value in the step 07 or 10 and then it is redefined due to another step (05 or 13).
- Case 3: First  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  was defined by a value in the step 13 and then it is redefined due to another step (05, 07, or 10).

Consider Case 1. In this case, x = IV. Since for any  $y T_{S^*}[IV, y]$  is defined by a value from the step 05, this case does not occurs.

Consider Case 2. In this case,  $x \neq IV$ . So the table is redefined due to the step 13. When  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  was defined by a value from the step 07 or 10, there was just a value M such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x$ . Thus, when  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  is redefined, there is another value M' such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M'] = x$ . So a collision for  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  occurs and the collision probability is bounded by  $q_h^2/2^{n+1}$  from a birthday analysis.

Consider Case 3. Since  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  is defined in the step 13,  $x \neq IV$ , that is,  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  is not redefined in the step 05 and is redefined in the step 07 or 10. When  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  was defined in the step 13, there was not a value  $M^*$  such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M^*] = x$ . When  $T_{S^*}[x, y]$  is redefined in the step 07 or 10, there is such value. Since  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M^*]$  is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , this case is that a random value of n bits hits x. Since

the number of the  $\mathcal{O}$  query is at most  $q_h$ , the probability of Case 2 is bounded by  $1 - (1 - q_h/2^n)^{q_h} \leq q_h^2/2^n$ . We thus have

$$\Pr[GPF2] - \Pr[GPF3] \le \frac{3q_h^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

We evaluate the difference  $\Pr[GPF3] - \Pr[GPF4]$ . In Game PF4, "if" in the steps 05, 10, and 13 is removed. So in Game PF4,  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  or  $\mathsf{F}_1$  might be redefined. However, the table  $T_{S^*}$  prevents the redefinition due to the step 01: For a pair (x, y),  $T_{S^*}^*[x, y] = \mathsf{F}_1^*[y]$  if x = IV,  $T_{S^*}^*[x, y] = \mathsf{F}_1^*[M^*||y]$  if  $x \neq IV$  and there exists a value  $M^*$  such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M^*] = x$ , and  $T_{S^*}^*[x, y] = \mathsf{F}_1[x||y]$  otherwise. Thus this modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior and  $\Pr[GPF3] = \Pr[GPF4]$ .

Finally, we evaluate the difference  $\Pr[GPF4] - \Pr[GPF5]$ . In Game PF4, the table  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  is replaced with the table *Path* and  $\mathsf{F}_1$  is removed. Note that  $\mathsf{F}_1$  is not used in Game PF4. For a pair (M, z), if  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = z$  and no collision for the table  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  occurs then Path[z] = M, and if Path[z] = M and no collision for the table  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  occurs then Path[z] = M, and if Path[z] = M and no collision for the table  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  occurs then  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = z$ . Thus if no collision for the table  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  occurs, this modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. The collision probability is at most  $q_h^2/2^{n+1}$  from a birthday analysis. We thus have

$$\Pr[GPF4] - \Pr[GPF5] \le \frac{q_h^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

$$\frac{S^{*}(x,m)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}}[x,m] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^{*}}[x,m]; \\
02 \text{ if } x = IV \text{ then} \\
03 \quad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(m); \\
04 \quad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{s} \setminus \{w':w' | | z \in C \cup \{x\}\}; \\
05 \quad Path[w||z] \leftarrow m; \\
06 \text{ else if } Path[x] = M \neq \perp \text{ then} \\
07 \quad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M||m); \\
08 \quad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{s} \setminus \{w':w' | | z \in C \cup \{x\}\}; \\
09 \quad Path[w||z] \leftarrow M||m; \\
10 \text{ else} \\
11 \quad z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\
12 \quad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{s} \setminus \{w':w' | | z \in C \cup \{x\}\}; \\
13 \ T_{S^{*}}[x,m] \leftarrow w||z; C \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \{x,z\}; \\
14 \text{ return } w||z; \\
\end{cases}$$

Fig. 10. Simulator  $S^*$ 

# C Proof of Theorem 2

We prove Theorem 2 by using the strategy shown in Appendix A.

Since the simulator S does not update the internal state,  $\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] = 0$ .

We use the result of the indifferentiable security by Chang and Nandi [16]. They define a simulator  $S^*$  which is shown in Fig. 10 which simulates a compression function h.  $T_{S^*}$  is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table which records query-response values of  $S^*$ . For the query  $S^*(x,m)$ , the response w||z| is recorded in  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$ . Path is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table which records all paths with the Merkle-Damgård style. If triples  $(IV, m_1, w_1||z_1), (w_1||z_1, m_2, w_2||z_2), (w_2||z_2, m_3, w_3||z_3)$  are the query-response values where  $T_{S^*}[w_{j-1}||z_{j-1}, m_j] = w_j||z_j| (j = 1, 2, 3)$  and  $w_0||z_0 = IV$ , then  $m_1||m_2||m_3$  is recorded in  $Path[w_3||z_3]$ . C is a (initially empty) set. They show that the advantage  $p^*$  of the indifferentiable security is bounded by  $((3n + 1)q_h + nq_H)/2^s + (q_H + q_h)/2^{n-1} + (lq_H + q_h)^2/2^{s+n+1}$ .

We evaluate the difference  $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$  where a distinguisher  $A_1$  interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$  in Game 1 and  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$  in Game 2. We consider the six games Game C0, Game C1, Game C2, Game C3, Game C4, and Game C5. In each game, the distinguisher interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{O})$  where  $\mathcal{O}$  in each game is shown in Figs. 11, 12, and 13. Game C0 is equal to Game 1 and Game C5 is equal to Game 2. Let GCj be an event that  $A_1$  output 1 in Game Cj. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GC0] - \Pr[GC5]$$
$$= \sum_{j=0}^{4} (\Pr[GCj] - \Pr[GC(j+1)]).$$

In the following, we evaluate each difference  $\Pr[GCj] - \Pr[GC(j+1)]$ .

**Game C1.** In this game, the procedures of  $\mathcal{RO}_s^{(1)}$ ,  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}$ , and  $\mathcal{RO}_{n+s}^1$  are hard-coded in  $\mathcal{O}$ . The modification from Game C0 to Game C1 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. Thus  $\Pr[GC0] = \Pr[GC1]$ . Note that  $T_{S^*}$  is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table and this table does not affect this game.

**Game C2.** In this game, due to the step 01, the table  $F_1^*$  is not redefined, while in Game C1, there are cases that the table is redefined. For Game C1, we consider the following cases which cover all cases that the table is redefined.

- Case 1: First  $T_{S^*}[x,m]$  was defined due to a value defined in the steps 01-04 and then the table is redefined due to the other steps.
- Case 2: First  $T_{S^*}[x,m]$  was defined due to a value defined in the steps 05-08 and then the table is redefined due to the other steps.

	$\mathcal{O}(x,m)$ where $x = x_1   x_2 ( x_1  = s,  x_2  = n)$
	$\overline{01 \text{ if } x} = IV \text{ then}$
$\mathcal{O}(x,m)$ where $x = x_1   x_2  ( x_1  = s,  x_2  = n)$	$02 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);$
$\overline{01} \ M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(x_1);$	03 if $F_1^*[m] = \bot$ then $F_1^*[m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^s$ ;
02 if $x = IV$ then	$04 \qquad w \leftarrow F_1^*[m];$
$03 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);$	05 else if $\exists_1 M$ s.t. $F_1^*[M] = x_1$ then
04 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_s^{(1)}(m);$	$06 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M  m);$
05 else if $M \neq \perp$ then	07 if $F_1^*[M  m] = \perp$ then $F_1^*[M  m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^s$ ;
$06 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M  m);$	08 $w \leftarrow F_1^*[M] m];$
07 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_s^{(1)}(M  m);$	09 else
08 else $w  z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}^1_{n+s}(x,m);$	10 if $F_1[x,m] = \bot$ then $F_1[x,m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{s+n}$ ;
$09 \mathbf{return} w    z;$	11 $w  z \leftarrow F_1[x,m];$
	$12 T_{S^*}[x,m] \leftarrow w   z;$
	13 return $w  z;$

Fig. 11. Game C0 (left) and Game C1 (right)

```
\mathcal{O}(x,m)
\mathcal{O}(x,m) where x = x_1 ||x_2| (|x_1| = s, |x_2| = n)
                                                                                                    01 if T_{S^*}[x,m] \neq \perp then return T_{S^*}[x,m];
01 if T_{S^*}[x,m] \neq \perp then return T_{S^*}[x,m];
                                                                                                    02 if x = IV then
02 if x = IV then
                                                                                                    03
                                                                                                               z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);
         z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);
03
                                                                                                              if \mathsf{F}_1^*[m] = \bot then \mathsf{F}_1^*[m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^s;
                                                                                                    04
          if \mathsf{F}_1^*[m] = \bot then \mathsf{F}_1^*[m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^s;
04
                                                                                                    05
                                                                                                               w \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1^*[m];
                                                                                                               Path[w||z] \leftarrow m;
05
          w \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1^*[m];
                                                                                                    06
06 else if \exists_1 M s.t. \mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x_1 then
                                                                                                    07 else if Path[x] = M \neq \perp then
                                                                                                               z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M||m);
          z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M||m);
07
                                                                                                    08
          if \mathsf{F}_1^*[M||m] = \bot then \mathsf{F}_1^*[M||m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^s;
                                                                                                              if \mathsf{F}_1^*[M||m] = \bot then \mathsf{F}_1^*[M||m] \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^s;
08
                                                                                                    09
          w \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1^*[M||m];
09
                                                                                                    10
                                                                                                               w \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1^*[M||m];
                                                                                                               Path[w||z] \leftarrow M||m;
10 \text{ else}
                                                                                                    11
          if \mathsf{F}_1[x,m] = \bot then \mathsf{F}_1[x,m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{s+n};
                                                                                                    12 \text{ else}
11
                                                                                                              if \mathsf{F}_1[x,m] = \bot then \mathsf{F}_1[x,m] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{s+n};
12
          w||z \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1[x,m];
                                                                                                    13
13 T_{S^*}[x,m] \leftarrow w || z;
                                                                                                    14
                                                                                                              w||z \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1[x,m];
14 return w||z;
                                                                                                    15 T_{S^*}[x,m] \leftarrow w || z;
                                                                                                    16 return w||z;
```

Fig. 12. Game C2 (left) and Game C3 (right)

- Case 3: First  $T_{S^*}[x,m]$  was defined due to a value defined in the steps 09-11 and then the table is redefined due to the other steps.

Consider Case 1. In this case, x = IV. Since for any  $m T_{S^*}[IV, m]$  is defined due to a value defined in the steps 01-04, this case does not occur.

Consider Case 2. In this case,  $x \neq IV$ . So the table is redefined due to the steps 09-11. When  $T_{S^*}[x,m]$  was defined, there was a value M such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x_1$ . When the table is redefined, there is another value M' such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M'] = x_1$ . Thus a collision for  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  occurs and the collision probability is bounded by  $q_h^2/2^{s+1}$  from a birthday analysis.

Consider Case 3. In this case  $x \neq IV$ . So  $T_{S^*}[x,m]$  is not redefined due to a value defined in the steps 01-04, and thus it is redefined due to a value defined in the steps 05-08. When  $T_{S^*}[x,m]$  was defined, there was not M such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x_1$  and when it is redefined, there is such M. Thus this case is that  $\mathsf{F}_1[x_1,m_1] = w_1||z_1$  was defined and then  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x_1$  which is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^s$  is defined. The probability for Case 3 is bounded by  $q_h^2/2^s$  since the number of queries to  $S^*$  is at most  $q_h$ .

Thus

$$\Pr[GC1] - \Pr[GC2] \le \frac{3q_h^2}{2^{s+1}}$$

	$\mathcal{O}(x,m)$
$\mathcal{O}(x,m)$	$\overline{01} \text{ if } T_{S^*}[x,m] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T_{S^*}[x,m];$
$\overline{01}$ if $T_{S^*}[x,m] \neq \perp$ then <b>return</b> $T_{S^*}[x,m];$	02 if $x = IV$ then
02 if $x = IV$ then	$03 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);$
$03 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(m);$	$04 \qquad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^s \setminus \{w': w'    z \in C \cup \{x\}\};$
$04 \qquad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^s;$	05 $Path[w  z] \leftarrow m;$
$\begin{array}{ccc} 0.1 & \dots & (s, r) \\ 0.5 & Path[w  z] \leftarrow m; \end{array}$	06 else if $Path[x] = M \neq \perp$ then
06 else if $Path[x] = M \neq \perp$ then	$07 \qquad z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M  m);$
07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(M  m);$	$08 \qquad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^s \setminus \{w': w'    z \in C \cup \{x\}\};$
$08 \qquad w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^s;$	$09  Path[w  z] \leftarrow M  m;$
$\begin{array}{ccc} 09 & Path[w  z] \leftarrow M  m; \end{array}$	10 else
10 else $w    z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{s+n};$	11 $z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n;$
$11 T_{S^*}[x,m] \leftarrow w    z;$	12 $w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^s \setminus \{w': w'     z \in C \cup \{x\}\};$
$12 \operatorname{return} w    z;$	$13 T_{S^*}[x,m] \leftarrow w   z; C \xleftarrow{\cup} \{x,z\};$
	$13 \ I_{S^*}[x, m] \leftarrow w  z, \ \cup \leftarrow \{x, z\}, \\ 14 \ \mathbf{return} \ w  z;$
	14 ICUIII $w_{\parallel}z$ ,

Fig. 13. Game C4 (left) and Game C5 (right)

**Game C3.** In this game, a new table *Path* is used which is initially everywhere  $\perp$  and recodes paths with Merkle-Damgård style. In the step 07, *Path* is used in this game, while  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  is used in Game C2. Note that if Path[x] = M and no collision occurs for  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  then  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x_1$  where  $x = x_1||x_2$  and  $|x_1| = s$ , and if  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = x_1$  and no collision occurs for  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  then Path[x] = M. Thus if no collision occurs for  $\mathsf{F}_1^*$  in Game C3 then this modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GC2] - \Pr[GC3] \le \frac{q_h^2}{2^{s+1}}.$$

**Game C4.** In this game, tables  $F_1$  and  $F_1^*$  are removed. In Game C3, for a pair (x, m), if x = IV then  $T_{S^*}[x,m] = F_1^*[m] || \mathcal{RO}_n(m)$ , and if there exists a value M such that  $F_1^*[M] = x_1$  then  $T_{S^*}[x,m] = F_1^*[M||m] || \mathcal{RO}_n(M||m)$ , and  $T_{S^*}[x,m] = F_1[x,m]$  otherwise. Thus due to the step 01, tables  $F_1$  and  $F_1^*$  are not used and this modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. So  $\Pr[GC3] = \Pr[GC4]$ .

**Game C5.** In this game, for a query  $\mathcal{O}(x,m)$ , w is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^n \setminus \{w' : w' \in C \cup \{x\}\}$ , while in Game C4 it is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^n$ . Thus if in Game C4 w does not collide with one of  $\{w' : w' \in C \cup \{x\}\}$  then this modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. The number of elements in  $\{w' : w' \in C \cup \{x\}\}$  is at most  $2q_h + 1$ . We thus have that

$$\Pr[GC4] - \Pr[GC5] \le \frac{(2q_h + 1)^2}{2^n}$$

 $S_{+}^{*}(x,y)$ 01 if  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y] \neq \perp$  then **return**  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y];$ 02 if  $y = IV_2$  then if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 03else  $z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$ ; 04 $S_{-}^{*}(z,w)$ 05 else if  $Path[y] \neq \perp$  then 1 if  $T_{S^*}[z,w] \neq \perp$  then  $T_{S^*}[z,w];$ let  $Path[y] = (M^*, z^*);$ 06 $2 x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n; y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^c \setminus T_I[x];$ if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||(z^{*}\oplus x)) = M \neq \perp \operatorname{then} z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M);$ 07 $3 \ Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w);$ else  $z \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$ ; 08 4 return  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w];$ 09 else  $z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n$ ; 10  $w \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^c \backslash T_F[z];$ 11  $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w);$ 12 return  $T_{S_{\perp}^{*}}[x, y];$ 

**Fig. 14.** Simulator  $S^*$ 

### D Proof of Theorem 3

We prove Theorem 3 by using the strategy in Appendix A.

Since the simulator S does not update the internal state,  $\Pr[G0] - \Pr[G1] = 0$ .

We use the result of the indifferentiable security by Bertoni *et al.* [11]. They define a simulator  $S^* = (S^*_+, S^*_-)$  which is shown in Fig. 14.  $S^*_+$  and  $S^*_-$  simulate the random permutation P and its inverse  $P^{-1}$ , respectively.  $T_{S^*_+}$  and  $T_{S^*_-}$  are (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) tables which records query-response values of  $S^*_+$  and  $S^*_-$ . For the query  $S^*_+(x, y)$ , the response z||w is recorded in  $T_{S^*_+}[x, y]$  and x||y is recoded in  $T_{S^*_-}[z, w]$ . Similarly, the response z||w of the query  $S^*_-(x, y)$  and x||y are recoded in these tables. *Path* is a (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) table which records all paths with the Sponge style. If triples  $(x_1, w_0, z_1, w_1), (x_2, w_1, z_2, w_2), (x_3, w_2, z_3, w_3)$  are the query-response values where  $T_{S^*_+}[x_j, w_{j-1}] = z_j||w_j$  (j = 1, 2, 3) and  $w_0 = IV_2$ , then  $(x_1 \oplus IV_1)||(x_2 \oplus z_1)||(x_3 \oplus z_2)$  and  $z_3$  is recoded in  $Path[w_3]$ .  $T_F$  and  $T_I$  are (initially everywhere empty) tables.  $T_F[z]$  includes values which are all y' such that  $T_{S^*_+}[z, w'] \neq \bot$ .  $T_I[x]$  includes values which are  $IV_2$ , all y'' such that  $Path[y''] \neq \bot$ , and all w' such that  $T_{S^*_+}[x, y''] \neq \bot$ .  $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w)$  is a procedure that the tables  $T_{S^*_+}, T_{S^*_-}$ , and Path are updated by using (x, y, z, w), namely,  $T_{S^*_+}[x, y] \leftarrow z||w, T_{S^*_-}[z, w] \leftarrow x||y$ , and if  $Path[y] = (M, z^*) \neq \bot$  then  $Path[w] \leftarrow (M||(x \oplus z^*), z)^{-5}$ . Notice that the tables  $T_F$  and  $T_I$  are used to avoid that a multipath is defined in Path. They show that the advantage  $p^*$  of the indifferentiable security is bounded by  $((1 - 2^{-n})q^2 + (1 + 2^{-n})q)/2^{c+1}$ .

We evaluate the difference  $\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2]$  where a distinguisher  $A_1$  interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S)$  in Game 1 and  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, S^*)$  in Game 2.

We consider the seven games Game S1, Game S2, Game S3, Game S4, Game S5, Game S6, and Game S7. In each game, the distinguisher interacts with  $(\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$  where  $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$  is shown in Figs. 15, 16, 17 18, 19, 20, and 21. Game S1 is equal to Game 1 and Game S7 is equal to Game 2. Let GSj be an event that  $A_1$  output 1 in Game Sj. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GS1] - \Pr[GS7]$$
$$= \sum_{j=1}^{6} (\Pr[GSj] - \Pr[GS(j+1)])$$


In the following, we evaluate each difference  $\Pr[GSj] - \Pr[GS(j+1)]$ .

**Game S2.** In this game, a random permutation  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}^{-1})$  is replaced with a new function  $(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_1^{-1})$ . F<sup>+</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Note that in [11], the paths and the query-response values are recorded by using a graph representation, but the table Path and the tables  $T_{S^*}$ ,  $T_{S^*}$  realizes the same role as the graph.

$$\frac{\mathcal{O}_{+}(x,y)}{01\ M^{*} \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y);}$$
02 if  $y = IV_{2}$  then  
03 if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \bot$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M);$   
04 else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(IV_{1} \oplus x);$   
05  $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_{1});$   
06 else if  $M^{*} \neq \bot$  then  
07 if  $\operatorname{unpad}(M^{*}) = M' \neq \bot$  then  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M');$   
08 else  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*});$   
09 if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||m) = M \neq \bot$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M);$   
10 else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*}||m);$   
11  $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(M^{*}||m);$   
12 else  $z||w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(x||y);$   
13 return  $z||w;$ 

$$\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)}{01\ M \leftarrow \mathcal{T}\mathcal{O}^{(1)}(w)};\\ 02\ \text{if}\ M \neq \bot \ \text{and}\ |M| = n \ \text{then}\\ 03\ x \leftarrow IV_1 \oplus M;\ y \leftarrow IV_2;\\ 04\ \text{if}\ M \neq \bot \ \text{and}\ |M| > n \ \text{then}\\ 05\ \ \text{let}\ M = M^* ||m\ (|m| = n);\\ 06\ \ \text{if}\ \text{unpad}_S(M^*) = M' \neq \bot \ \text{then}\ x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{R}\mathcal{O}_n(M');\\ 07\ \ \text{else}\ x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{R}\mathcal{O}_n^1(M^*);\\ 08\ \ y \leftarrow \mathcal{R}\mathcal{O}_c^{(1)}(M^*);\\ 09\ \text{else}\ x||y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}^{-1}(z||w);\\ 10\ \mathbf{return}\ x||y; \end{array}$$



$$\begin{array}{ll} \frac{\mathcal{O}_{+}(x,y)}{01\ M^{*}\leftarrow\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y);}\\ 02\ \text{if } y=IV_{2}\ \text{then}\\ 03\ \text{ if unpad}_{S}(IV_{1}\oplus x)=M\neq\perp \text{then } z\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{n}(M);\\ 04\ \text{ else } z\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{n}^{(1}(IV_{1}\oplus x);\\ 05\ w\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(x\oplus IV_{1});\\ 05\ w\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(x\oplus IV_{1});\\ 05\ w\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(x\oplus IV_{1});\\ 06\ \text{ else if } M^{*}\neq\perp \text{ then}\\ 07\ \text{ if unpad}(M^{*})=M'\neq\perp \text{ then } m\leftarrow x\oplus\mathcal{RO}_{n}(M');\\ 08\ \text{ else } m\leftarrow x\oplus\mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*});\\ 09\ \text{ if unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||m)=M\neq\perp \text{ then } z\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{n}(M);\\ 10\ \text{ else } z\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{n}^{1}(M^{*}||m);\\ 11\ w\leftarrow\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(M^{*}||m);\\ 12\ \text{ else } z||w\leftarrow\mathcal{P}_{1}(x||y);\\ 13\ Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w);\\ 14\ \text{ return } T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y];\\ \hline \frac{\mathcal{P}_{1}(x)}{1\ \text{ if } F^{+}[x]=\bot, \text{ ret } F^{+}[x];\\ 2\ y\stackrel{\&}{=}\{0,1\}^{b};\\ 3\ Update_{I}(x,y);\\ 4\ \text{ return } F^{+}[x]\end{array}$$

Fig. 16. Game S2


and  $\mathsf{F}^-$  are (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) tables.  $Update_P(x, y)$  updates the tables  $\mathsf{F}^+$  and  $\mathsf{F}^-$ :  $\mathsf{F}^+[x] \leftarrow y$  and  $\mathsf{F}^-[y] \leftarrow x$ . An output of  $(\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_1^{-1})$  is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0, 1\}^b$ . Thus if in Game GS2 no collision occurs for the outputs of  $\mathcal{P}_1$  and the outputs of  $\mathcal{P}_1^{-1}$ , the modification from Game GS1 to Game GS1 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. Since the number of the outputs of  $\mathcal{P}_1$  is at most q, the probability that a collision occurs for the outputs of  $\mathcal{P}_1^{-1}$  is at most  $q^2/2^b$ . Similarly, the probability that a collision occurs for the outputs of  $\mathcal{P}_1^{-1}$  is at most  $q^2/2^b$ . We thus have that

$$\Pr[GS1] - \Pr[GS2] \le \frac{q^2}{2^{b-1}}.$$

Note that the procedure  $Update_{S^*}$  updates tables  $T^+_{S^*}$ ,  $T^-_{S^*}$ , and Path.

**Game S3.** In Game S3, the step 01 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  and the step 01 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$  are new steps. The tables  $T_{S^*_+}$  and  $T_{S^*_-}$  are not redefined if no collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  or the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_-$  occurs. In Game S2, we show that if the following events don't occur then the tables  $T_{S^*_+}$  and  $T_{S^*_-}$  are not redefined.

 $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$ 01 if  $T_{S^*_{\pm}}[x, y] \neq \perp$  then **return**  $T_{S^*_{\pm}}[x, y];$  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)$ 02  $M^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y);$ 01 if  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w] \neq \perp$  then  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w];$ 03 if  $y = IV_2$  then 02  $M \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w);$ if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 0403 if  $M \neq \perp$  and |M| = n then else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x);$ 0504  $x \leftarrow IV_1 \oplus M; y \leftarrow IV_2;$  $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1);$ 06 05 else if  $M \neq \perp$  and |M| > n then 07 else if  $M^* \neq \perp$  then let  $M = M^* ||m|| = n$ ; 06if  $\operatorname{unpad}(M^*) = M' \neq \perp$  then  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M')$ ; 0807if  $\operatorname{unpad}_S(M^*) = M_1 \neq \perp$  then  $x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M_1)$ ; else  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*);$ 09else  $x \leftarrow m \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*);$ 08 if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||m) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 10 $y \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*);$ 09else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*||m);$ 1110 else  $x||y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1^{-1}(z||w);$  $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*||m);$ 1211  $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w);$ 13 else  $z || w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1(x || y);$ 12 return  $T_{S^*}[z,w];$  $14 \ Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w);$ 15 return  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y];$ 



- Event 1: A collision for  $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$  occurs.
- Event 2: A random value of c bits hits a value in at most q values.
- Event 3: A random value of c bits hits  $IV_2$ .

One of the following cases occurs when  $T_{S^*_{+}}$  or  $T_{S^*_{-}}$  are redefined.

- Case 1: First, for query  $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$ ,  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$  and  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w]$  were defined due to the steps 02-05 where  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y] = z ||w|$  and  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w] = x ||y|$ , and then  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$  or  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w]$  is redefined by a new value due to other steps.

In this case  $y = IV_2$ . So the redefined steps are not the steps 06-11 and 12 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ . And when  $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_-^*}[z, w]$  were defined,  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[y] = z$  where |y| = n. So the redefined steps are not the steps 02-03, and 04-08 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ . That is, the redefined step is just the step 09 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ .

- Case 2: First, for query  $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$ ,  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$  and  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w]$  were defined due to the steps 06-11 where  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y] = z ||w|$  and  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w] = x ||y|$ , and then  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$  or  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w]$  is redefined by a new value due to other steps.

In this case,  $y \neq IV_2$ . So the redefined steps are not the steps 02-05 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ . And after  $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$  defined, there is a value M such that  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M] = w$  and |M| > n. So the redefined steps are not the steps 02-03, and 04-08 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ . That is, the redefined steps are the step 12 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  or the step 09 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ .

- Case 3: First, for query  $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$ ,  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$  and  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w]$  were defined due to the step 12 where  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y] = z||w|$  and  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w] = x||y|$ , and then  $T_{S^*_+}[x,y]$  or  $T_{S^*_-}[z,w]$  is redefined by a new value due to other steps. In this case,  $y \neq IV_2$ . So the redefined steps are not the steps 02-05, that is the steps are the steps 06-11 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ , the steps 02-03, 04-08, or 09 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ .
- Case 4: First, for query  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)$ ,  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]$  and  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w]$  were defined due to the steps 02-03 where  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y] = z||w|$  and  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w] = x||y|$ , and then  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]$  or  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w]$  is redefined by a new value in other steps.

In this case, when the steps 02-03 were executed,  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M]$  (= w) had been already defined. The defined steps are the steps 02-05 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ . Thus  $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_-^*}[z, w]$  were already defined in the steps 02-05 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ . So this case does not occur.

- Case 5: First, for query  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)$ ,  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]$  and  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w]$  were defined due to the steps 04-08 where  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y] = z||w|$  and  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w] = x||y|$ , and then  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]$  or  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w]$  is redefined by a new value in other steps.

In this case, when the steps 04-08 were executed,  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M]$  (= w) had been defined where |M| > n. The steps where  $\mathsf{F}_1^*[M]$  defined are the steps 06-11. Thus  $T_{S_+^*}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_-^*}[z, w]$  were already defined in the steps 06-11 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ . So this case does not occur.

- Case 6: First, for query  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)$ ,  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]$  and  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w]$  were defined due to the step 09 where  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y] = z ||w|$  and  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w] = x ||y|$ , and then  $T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]$  or  $T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w]$  is redefined by a new value in other steps.

We show that in each case some of events occurs.

First, consider Case 1. When  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[z, w]$  were defined,  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[y] = z$  where |y| = n. However, when  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined,  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w) = \bot$ . Thus in this case, a collision for  $\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}$  occurs, that is Event 1 occurs.

Consider Case 2. When  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  were defined,  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M^{*}] (= y)$  had been defined and  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M] (= w)$  was defined where |M| > n. However, when  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined due to the step 12 of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ ,  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y) = \bot$ , and when  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined due to the step 09 of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$ ,  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w) = \bot$ . Thus in this case, a collision for  $\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}$  occurs, that is Event 1 occurs.

Consider Case 3. When  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  were defined, there did not exist  $M^{*}$  such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M^{*}] = y$ . (Case 3-1)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined in the steps 06-11 of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ . In this case, there is a value  $M^{*}$  such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M^{*}] = y$ . Thus in this case, first y was defined, and then a random value hits y. Since the number of such y is at most q, when Case 3-1 occurs then Event 2 occurs.

(Case 3-2)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined in the steps 02-03 of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$ . In this case, there is a value M such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M] = w$  and |M| = n.  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M]$  (= w) was defined in the steps 02-05 of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ . This implies that  $y = IV_{2}$ . This contradicts that  $y \neq IV_{2}$  and thus this case does not occur.

(Case 3-3)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined in the steps 04-08 of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$ . In this case, there is a value M such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M] = w$  and |M| > n.  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M] (= w)$  was defined in the steps 06-11 and thus  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  was redefined the steps 06-11. Thus this case does not occur.

(Case 3-4)  $T_{S^*_+}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S^*_+}[z, w]$  is redefined in the step 09 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ . Since an output of  $\mathcal{P}_1^{-1}$  is a random value of *b* bits, this case is that the random value hits x||y. Since the number of such *y* is at most *q*, when Case 3-4 occurs then Event 2 occurs.

Consider Case 6. When  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  and  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  were defined, there does not exist M such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M] = w$ . (Case 6-1)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined due to the steps 02-05 of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ . In this case,  $y = IV_{2}$ . Since an output of  $\mathcal{P}_{1}^{-1}$  is a random value of b bits, this case is that the left c bit value of the output hits  $IV_{2}$ , which is Event 3.

(Case 6-2)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined due to the steps 06-11 of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ . In this case, there is a value  $M^{*}$  such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M^{*}] = y$ . Note that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M^{*}] (= y)$  and  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w] (= x||y)$  are independent random values. Thus this case is that a random value of c bits hits one of q values, which is equal to Event 2.

(Case 6-3)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined due to the step 12 of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ . Since an output of  $\mathcal{P}_{1}$  is a random value of b bits, this case is that a random value of b bits hits z||w. So Event 2 occurs.

(Case 6-4)  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y]$  or  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z, w]$  is redefined due to the steps 02-03 or 04-08 of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$ . In this case, there is a value M such that  $\mathsf{F}_{1}^{*}[M] = w$ . Thus this case is that first w is defined and then a random value of c bits hits w. This is equal to Event 2.

Thus if the following events don't occur then the modification from Game S2 to Game S3 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. The first three events are due to Game S2 and the last two events are due to Game S3.

- Event 1: A collision for  $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$  occurs.
- Event 2: A random value of c bits hits a value in at most q values.
- Event 3: A random value of c bits hits  $IV_2$ .
- Event 4: A collision for the output of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  occurs.
- Event 5: A collision for the output of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$  occurs.

From a birthday analysis, the probability that Event 1 occurs is at most  $q^2/2^{c+1}$ . For Event 2, the number of a random value is at most q. So the probability that Event 2 occurs is at most  $q^2/2^c$ . For Event 3, the number of a random value is at most q. So the probability that Event 3 occurs is at most  $q/2^c$ . For Event 4, since the number of outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  is at most q, this event is that a random value of b bits collides with some of the q values. Since the number of the random values is at most q, the probability that Event 4 occurs is

 $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$ 01 if  $T_{S^*_{\pm}}[x, y] \neq \perp$  then **return**  $T_{S^*_{\pm}}[x, y];$ 02  $M^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y);$ 03 if  $y = IV_2$  then if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 04else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x);$ 05 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1);$ 06 07 else if  $M^* \neq \perp$  then if  $\operatorname{unpad}(M^*) = M' \neq \perp$  then  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M')$ ; 08else  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*);$ 09if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||m) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 10else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*||m);$ 11 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*||m);$ 1213 else  $z || w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1(x || y);$ 14  $Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w);$ 15 return  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}[x, y];$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} \underline{\mathcal{O}}_{-}(z,w) \\ \hline 1 \text{ if } T_{S_{*}^{*}}[z,w] \neq \perp \text{ then } T_{S_{*}^{*}}[z,w]; \\ 2 x||y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_{1}^{-1}(z||w); \\ 3 Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w); \\ 4 \text{ return } T_{S^{*}}[z,w]; \end{array}$ 

### Fig. 18. Game S4

 $\mathcal{O}_+(x,y)$  $\overline{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*_{\pm}}}[x,y] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T_{S^*_{\pm}}[x,y];$ 02 if  $y = IV_2$  then if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 03 else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(IV_1 \oplus x);$ 04 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(x \oplus IV_1);$ 0506 else if  $Path[y] = (M^*, z^*) \neq \perp$  then 07 if unpad $(M^*) = M' \neq \perp$  then  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n(M');$ 08 else  $m \leftarrow x \oplus \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*);$ if  $\operatorname{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||m) = M \neq \perp$  then  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M)$ ; 09else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^1(M^*||m);$ 10 $w \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}(M^*||m);$ 1112 else  $z || w \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_1(x || y);$  $13 \ Update_{S^*}(x, y, z, w);$ 14 return z || w;

 $\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)}{1 \text{ if } T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z,w] \neq \perp \text{ then } T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z,w];} \\ 2 x||y \leftarrow \mathcal{P}_{1}^{-1}(z||w); \\ 3 Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w); \\ 4 \text{ return } x||y; \end{array}$ 

Fig. 19. Game S5

at most  $q^2/2^b$ . The probability that Event 5 occurs is the same as that for Event 4. We thus have that

$$\Pr[GS2] - \Pr[GS3] \le \frac{3q^2 + 2q}{2^{c+1}} + \frac{q^2}{2^{b-1}}$$

**Game S4.** In this game, the steps 02-09 of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$  are removed. Since for the query  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)$ , " $M (= \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(w)) \neq \bot$ " implies that the query  $\mathcal{RO}_{c}^{(1)}(M)$  was made by the query  $\mathcal{O}_{+}(x,y)$  and thus when the query  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)$  is made, the response  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z,w] (= x||y)$  has been defined. So the steps 02-09 are not executed. Note that if no collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$  and the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$  occurs, then the table  $T_{S_{+}^{*}}$  and  $T_{S_{-}^{*}}$  are not redefined. Thus the modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior if no collision occurs. For the collision event for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_{+}$ , since the number of the outputs is at most q, the probability is at most  $q^2/2^b$ . Similarly, the probability that a collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$  occurs is at most  $q^2/2^b$ . We thus have that

$$\Pr[GS3] - \Pr[GS4] \le \frac{q^2}{2^{b-1}}.$$

**Game S5.** In this game, the table *Path* is used instead of  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}$ . In Game S5, if  $M^* (= \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y)) \neq \bot$ , then

 $\begin{array}{l} \underline{\mathcal{O}_{+}(x,y)} \\ \hline 01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y] \neq \bot \text{ then return } T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]; \\ \hline 02 \text{ if } y = IV_{2} \text{ then} \\ \hline 03 \quad \text{if } \text{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \bot \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M); \\ \hline 04 \quad \text{else } z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\ \hline 05 \text{ else if } Path[y] = (M^{*},z^{*}) \neq \bot \text{ then} \\ \hline 06 \quad \text{if } \text{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||(z^{*} \oplus x)) = M \neq \bot \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M); \\ \hline 07 \quad \text{else } z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\ \hline 08 \text{ else } z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\ \hline 09 w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{c}; \\ \hline 10 \ Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w); \\ \hline 11 \text{ return } z||w; \end{array}$ 

$$\frac{\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)}{1 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w] \neq \perp \text{ then } T_{S^{*}_{-}}[z,w];}$$

$$2 x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{c};$$

$$3 Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w);$$

$$4 \text{ return } x||y;$$

#### Fig. 20. Game S6

 $\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{\mathcal{O}_{+}(x,y)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^{*}_{+}}[x,y]; \\ 02 \text{ if } y = IV_{2} \text{ then} \\ 03 \quad \text{ if } \text{unpad}_{S}(IV_{1} \oplus x) = M \neq \perp \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M); \\ 04 \quad \text{else } z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\ 05 \text{ else if } Path[y] = (M^{*},z^{*}) \neq \perp \text{ then} \\ 06 \quad \text{ if } \text{unpad}_{S}(M^{*}||(z^{*} \oplus x)) = M \neq \perp \text{ then } z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(M); \\ 07 \quad \text{ else } z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\ 08 \text{ else } z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; \\ 09 w \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{c} \langle T_{F}[z]; \\ 10 \ Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w); \\ 11 \ \text{return } z||w; \end{array}$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} \frac{\mathcal{O}_{-}(z,w)}{1 \text{ if } T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z,w] \neq \perp \text{ then } T_{S_{-}^{*}}[z,w];} \\ 2 x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{n}; y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{c} \backslash T_{I}[x]; \\ 3 Update_{S^{*}}(x,y,z,w); \\ 4 \text{ return } x||y; \end{array}$ 

### Fig. 21. Game S7

 $Path[y] = (M^*, z^*)$ . And if  $Path[y] = (M^*, z^*) \neq \perp$  and no collision of  $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$  occurs, then  $M^* \neq \perp$  where  $M^* = \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(y)$ . Thus in both games if no collision for  $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}$  occurs, then the modification from Game S4 to Game S5 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. We thus have via a birthday analysis

$$\Pr[GS4] - \Pr[GS5] \le \frac{q^2}{2^{c+1}}.$$

**Game S6.** In this game,  $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}, \mathcal{RO}_n^1, \mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{P}^{-1}$  are removed and  $z^*$  is used in the step 06 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ . Notice that  $z^* = \mathcal{RO}_n(M')$  in the step 05 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  where  $\mathsf{unpad}_S(M^*) = M'$ . Thus the use of  $z^*$  does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. Since outputs of  $\mathcal{RO}_c^{(1)}, \mathcal{RO}_n^1, \mathcal{P}_1$ , and  $\mathcal{P}_1^{-1}$  are random values, the modification from Game S5 to Game S6 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior, if no collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  and the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_-$  occurs. Notice that if the table  $T_{S^*_+}$  and  $T_{S^*_-}$  are redefined then the collision occurs. We thus have that

$$\Pr[GS5] - \Pr[GS6] \le \frac{q^2}{2^{b-1}}.$$

**Game S7.** In this game the table  $T_F$  (step 10 of  $\mathcal{O}_+$ ) and the table  $T_I$  (step 2 of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ ). Thus if in Game S6 w does not collide with  $T_F[z]$  in  $\mathcal{O}_+$  and y does not collide with  $T_I[x]$ , then Game S7 is equal to Game S6. The number of elements in  $T_F[z]$  is at most 3q + 1 and the number of elements in  $T_I[x]$  is at most 2q + 1. Thus the collision probabilities for  $T_F[z]$  and  $T_I[x]$  are  $q(3q + 1)/2^c$  and  $q(2q + 1)/2^c$ , respectively. We thus

have that

$$\Pr[GS6] - \Pr[GS7] \le \frac{q(5q+2)}{2^c}.$$

$ \frac{S_{+}^{*}(k,x)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x]; \\ 02 \ z'  s  t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^{n}  C); \\ 03 \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 04 \ \text{if } t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)} \text{ then} \\ 05 \ P \leftarrow FindPath(z',s,k,t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}); $	$ \frac{FindPath(h, s, m, t)}{01 \ P \leftarrow \emptyset;} \\ 02 \ \text{for all } (M, a) \in Path[h] \ \text{do} \\ 03  \text{if } \exists M_1 \text{ s.t. } pad_{BLAKE}(s, M_1) = a  s  m  t \ \text{then} \\ 04 \qquad P \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} (M_1, a  s  m  t); \\ 05 \ \text{if } P = \emptyset \ \text{then } \mathbf{return} \ \bot; $
$\begin{array}{lll} 05 & P \leftarrow FindPath(z',s,k,t^{(1)}  t^{(3)});\\ 06 & \text{if } P \neq \emptyset \text{ then} \\ 07 & \text{let } P = (M,a);\\ 08 & z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s,M); \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \beta_{z',s}^{-1}(z);\\ 09 & AddPath(\beta_{z',s}(y),z',s,k,t^{(1)}  t^{(3)});\\ 10 \ T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x;\\ 11 \ \textbf{return } T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \end{array}$	06 else <b>return</b> $(M^*, a^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} P;$ $\frac{S_+(k, x)}{01 \ z'  s  t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n   C);$ $02 \ y \leftarrow E_I(k, x);$ $03 \ \text{if} \ t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)} \ \text{then}$ $04 \qquad a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$
$\begin{split} & \frac{S^*_{-}(k,y)}{01 \text{ if } T^{S^*}}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T^{S^*}[k,y]; \\ & 02 \ z  s  t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ & 03 \text{ if } t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)} \text{ then } \\ & 04 \ AddPath(\beta_{z,s}(y),z,s,k,t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}); \\ & 05 \ T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T^{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ & 06 \ \mathbf{return } T^{S^*}[k,y]; \end{split}$	05 if $a \neq \perp$ or $z' = IV$ then 06 if $\exists M$ s.t. $pad_{BLAKE}(s, M) = a  s  k  t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}$ then 07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ 08 else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a  s  k  t^{(1)}  t^{(3)});$ 09 $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k, x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus z' \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1  y_2;$ 10 return $y;$ $\underline{S}_{-}(k, y)$
$\begin{array}{l} \underline{AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)}\\ \hline 01 \text{ for all } (M,a) \in Path[h] \text{ do}\\ 02 \qquad Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M  m,a  s  m  t); \end{array}$	01 $k^*  x \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L);$ 02 if $k^*  x \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then <b>return</b> $x;$ 03 $x \leftarrow D_I(k, y);$ 04 <b>return</b> $x;$

**Fig. 22.**  $S^*$  (left and top of right) and S (right)

# E Reset Indifferentiability for the BLAKE Hash Function

First define notations used in this subsection.  $[x]_2 = x ||x|$  is the concatenation of two copies of x. If x is of even length, then  $x^L$  and  $x^R$  denote its left and right halves where  $|x^L| = |x^R|$ .

Let the output length of BLAKE be *n* bits. Then BLAKE takes as input a salt **s** of n/2 bits (chosen by the user), and a message *M* of arbitrary length. The evaluation of  $\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{BC}_{2n,2n}}(\mathbf{s}, M)$  is done as follows where a block cipher  $\mathsf{BC}_{2n,2n} = (E, D)$  is used where *E* is the encryption function and *D* is the decryption function with the key size and the plain text size of 2n bits. Firstly, the message *M* is padded into message blocks  $m_1, \ldots, m_k$  of 2n bits, where the padding function  $\mathsf{pad}_B$  is defined as  $\mathsf{pad}_B(M) = M ||10^{-|M|-n/2-2} \mod 2n1||\langle |M| \rangle_{n/2}$ . Along with these message blocks, counter blocks  $t_1, \ldots, t_k$ of length n/4 bits are generated. This counter keeps track of the number of message bits hashed so far and equals 0 if the *i*-th message block contains no message bits. Starting from an initial state value  $z_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$ , the message blocks  $m_i$  and counter blocks  $t_i$  are compressed iteratively into the state using a compression function  $f: \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{2n} \times \{0,1\}^{n/4} \to \{0,1\}^n$ . Here, the second input to *f* denotes the salt **s**. The outcome of the BLAKE hash function is defined as its final state value  $H(\mathbf{s}, M) = z_k$ . *f* is defined as Fig. 22. Here  $C \in \{0,1\}^n$  is a constant.

$$\frac{f(z_{i-1}, \mathbf{s}, m_i, t_i)}{v_i \leftarrow (z_{i-1}||\mathbf{s}||[t_i^L]_2||[t_i^R]_2]) \oplus (0^n ||C);}$$
  

$$w_i \leftarrow E(m_i, v_i);$$
  

$$z_i \leftarrow w_i^L \oplus w_i^R \oplus z_{i-1} \oplus [\mathbf{s}]_2;$$
  
return  $z_i$ :

We evaluate the reset indifferentiable security from  $\mathcal{VO}$  for the BLAKE hash function in the ideal cipher model. We define the parameter of  $\mathcal{VO}$  as v = 1,  $n_1 = n$ , u = 2, t = 1  $w_1 = n$ ,  $w_2 = n$ ,  $k_1 = 2n$  and  $m_1 = 2n$ . Thus in this case,  $\mathcal{VO}.priv = \mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathcal{VO}.pub = (\mathcal{RO}_n, \mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}, \mathcal{TRO}_n^{(2)}, \mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}^{(1)})$ . The following theorem shows that the BLAKE hash function in the ideal cipher model is reset indifferentiable from a  $\mathcal{VO}$ . **Theorem 8.** Let  $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n} = (E_I, D_I)$  be an ideal cipher where the length of each elements is of 2n bits. There exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ , the following holds,

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{r-indiff}}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{lC}_{2n,2n}},\mathcal{VO},S}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 3 \frac{(lq_H + q_E)(lq_H + q_E + 1)}{2^n} + \frac{5q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}} + \frac{q_E^2}{2^{n-1}}.$$

where  $\mathcal{A}$  can make queries to  $\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}}/\mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}/S_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}$  at most  $q_H, q_E$  times, respectively, and l is a maximum number of blocks of a query to  $\mathsf{BLAKE}^{\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}}/\mathcal{RO}_n$ .  $S_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}$  makes at most  $2q_h$  queries and runs in time  $\mathcal{O}(q_h)$ .

First, we define a padding function  $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}$  as  $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(\mathsf{s}, M) = (\mathsf{s}||m_1||t_1)||\cdots ||(\mathsf{s}||m_k||t_k)$ . We also define  $\beta_{z,\mathsf{s}}$  and  $\beta_{z,\mathsf{s}}^{-1}$  as  $\beta_{z,\mathsf{s}}(w) = w^L \oplus w^R \oplus z \oplus [\mathsf{s}]_2$  for  $w \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$  and  $\beta_{z,\mathsf{s}}^{-1}(z') = \{w \in \{0,1\}^{2n} | w^L \oplus w^R \oplus z \oplus [\mathsf{s}]_2 = z'\}$  for  $z' \in \{0,1\}^n$ . In the proof of the theorem, we use the result of the indifferentiable security from a RO by Andreeva *et al.* [1] They define a simulator  $S^*$  which can be implemented as Fig. 22.  $S^*$  simulates the ideal cipher  $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}$  so that  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  and  $S^*$  are consistent.  $S^*_+$  and  $S^*_-$  simulate the encryption oracle  $E_I$  and the decryption oracle  $D_I$  of  $\mathsf{IC}_{2n,2n}$ , respectively. In this simulator, the function *FindPath* and the procedure *AddPath* are used.

 $T_{S^*}^+$  and  $T_{S^*}^-$  are (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) tables which record query-response values of  $S^*$ . If the query  $S_+^*(k, x)$  is made, the output y is recorded in  $T_{S^*}^+[k, x]$  and x is recorded in  $T_{S^*}^-[k, y]$ . Similarly, the query-response values for  $S_-^*$  are recorded in these tables. Path is a (initially everywhere  $\emptyset$ ) table which records all paths with the BLAKE style. Namely, if  $(k_1, x_1, y_1)$  is recorded in  $T_{S^*}^+$  such that  $T_{S^*}^+[k_1, x_1] = y_1$ ,  $x_1 = z_0 ||\mathbf{s}_1||t_1^L||t_1^R||t_1^R$ , and  $z_1 = \beta_{z_0,\mathbf{s}_1}(y_1)$ ,  $(k_1,\mathbf{s}_1||k_1||t_1)$  is recorded in Path $[z_1]^6$ . Then, for the query  $S_+^*(k_2, x_2)$ , if the query and some query-response pairs of  $S^*$  have the BLAKE structure, the output is defined by  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ . Namely, if  $x_2 = z_1 ||\mathbf{s}_2||t_2^L||t_2^P||t_2^R$ ,  $\mathbf{s}_1 = \mathbf{s}_2$  and there exists M such that  $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(\mathbf{s}_2, M) = (\mathbf{s}_1||k_1||t_1)||(\mathbf{s}_2||k_2||t_2)$ , then the output  $y_2$  is uniformly chosen at random from  $\beta_{z_1,\mathbf{s}_2}^{-1}(\mathcal{RO}_n(\mathbf{s}_2, M))$  to ensure the BLAKE consistency.

The Simulator S. We define the simulator S in Fig. 22.  $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}$  and  $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(2)}$  realizes the functionality of recording a path and constructing a new path. For the query  $S_+(k_1, x_1)$  where  $x_1 = IV||\mathbf{s}_1||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(1)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{(3)}||t_1^{($ 

*Proof.* We consider ten games, Game B0, Game B1, Game B2, Game B3, Game B4, Game B5, Game B6, Game B7, Game B8, and Game B9, which are shown in Figs. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, respectively. In each game, the distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$  interacts with  $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$ .  $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$  in Game B0 is equal to the simulator S in Game 1, and  $(\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-)$  in Game B7 is equal to the simulator S<sup>\*</sup> in Game 2. Notice that in this proof  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  queries are removed, since the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is just the simulator.

 $<sup>^{6}</sup>$  Note that in [1], the paths are recorded by using the graph representation, but the table *Path* realizes the same role as the graph.

 $\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$  $\overline{01 \ z'||s||}t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n||C);$  $02 \ y \leftarrow E_I(k, x);$ 03 if  $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$  then  $\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)$  $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$  $\overline{01 \ k^* || x} \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L);$ 04if  $a \neq \perp$  or z' = IV then 0502 if  $k^* || x \neq \perp$  and  $k^* = k$  then **return** x; if  $\exists M$  s.t.  $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$  then 06 03  $x \leftarrow D_I(k, y);$ 07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ 04 return x;else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});$ 08 $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k,x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus z' \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1 ||y_2;$ 09 10 return y;



	$\frac{\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)}{01 \ k^*    x} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}\mathcal{O}^{(2)}(y^L);$
$\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$	02 if $k^*    x \neq \perp$ and $k^* = k$ then <b>return</b> $x$ ;
$\overline{01\ z'  s  }t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n  C);$	$03 \ x \leftarrow D^*(k, y);$
$02 \ y \leftarrow E^*(k,x);$	$04  ext{ return } x;$
03 if $t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)}$ then	
$04 \qquad a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$	$E^*(k,x)$
05 if $a \neq \perp$ or $z' = IV$ then	$\overline{01 \text{ if } E^*[k, x]} = \perp \text{ then } E^*[k, x] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n};$
06 if $\exists M \text{ s.t. } pad_{BLAKE}(s, M) = a   s  k  t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}$ then	02 $D^*[k,E^*[k,x]] \leftarrow x;$
07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(\overline{s, M});$	03 return $E^*[k, x];$
08 else $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a  s  k  t^{(1)}  t^{(3)});$	
09 $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k,x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus z' \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1   y_2;$	$D^{*}(k,y)$
10 return $y$ ;	01 if $D^*[k, y] = \perp$ then $D^*[k, y] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ ;
	$02 E^*[k,D^*[k,y]] \leftarrow y;$
	03 return $D^*[k, y];$



Let  $GB_j$  be an event that the distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$  output 1 in Game Bj. Thus

$$\Pr[G1] - \Pr[G2] = \Pr[GB0] - \Pr[GB9]$$
$$= \sum_{j=0}^{8} (\Pr[GBj] - \Pr[GB(j+1)])$$

In the following, we evaluate the each difference  $\Pr[GBj] - \Pr[GB(j+1)]$ .

**Game B1.** In Game B0 the ideal cipher  $(E_I, D_I)$  is used, while in Game B1  $(E^*, D^*)$  is used where an output is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$ .  $E^*$  and  $D^*$  are (initially everywhere  $\bot$ ) tables. We thus have via birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB0] - \Pr[GB1] \le \frac{2q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}$$

**Game B2.** In this game, new tables  $T_{S^*}^+$  and  $T_{S^*}^-$  are used which are initially everywhere  $\perp$ . In Game B2, if no collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  and the output of  $\mathcal{O}_-$  occurs, for a repeated query, the value which was previously returned is returned. In Game B1, the procedure of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  depends on the output of  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}$  and the procedure of  $\mathcal{O}_-$  depends on the output of  $\mathcal{TO}^{(2)}$ . Thus in Game B1 if no collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}$  and the output of  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}$  occurs then for a repeated query, the value which was previously returned is returned. Thus, in both game, if o collision for the outputs of  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}$ , the output of  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}$ , the outputs of

 $\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)$ 01 if  $T_{S^*}^-[k, y] \neq \perp$  then **return**  $T_{S^*}^-[k, y]$ ;  $02 k^* || x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L);$  $\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$ 03 if  $k^* || x^* \neq \perp$  and  $k^* = k$  then  $x \leftarrow x^*$ ;  $\overline{01} \text{ if } T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T^+_{S^*}[k, x];$ 02  $z'||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n ||C);$ 04 else  $x \leftarrow D^*(k, y);$  $\begin{array}{l} 05 \ T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 06 \ \mathbf{return} \ T^-_{S^*}[k,y]; \end{array}$  $03 \ y \leftarrow E^*(k, x);$ 04 if  $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$  then  $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$ 05 $E^*(k,x)$ if  $a \neq \perp$  or z' = IV then 06 if  $\exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a ||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$  then 0708  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$ : 09  $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k,x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus z' \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1 || y_2;$ 10  $\begin{array}{c} 11 \ T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 12 \ \mathbf{return} \ T^+_{S^*}[k,x]; \end{array}$  $D^*(k,y)$ 

01 if  $\mathsf{E}^*[k, x] = \bot$  then  $\mathsf{E}^*[k, x] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ ; 02  $\mathsf{D}^*[k, \mathsf{E}^*[k, x]] \leftarrow x;$ 03 return  $E^*[k, x];$ 

01 if  $\mathsf{D}^*[k, y] = \bot$  then  $\mathsf{D}^*[k, y] \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ ; 02  $\mathsf{E}^*[k, \mathsf{D}^*[k, y]] \leftarrow y;$ 03 return  $D^*[k, y]$ ;



 $\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$  $\overline{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^+}[k, x] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^+[k, x];$ 02  $z'||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n ||C);$  $03 \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n};$ 04 if  $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$  then  $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$ 05if  $a \neq \perp$  or z' = IV then 06 if  $\exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a ||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$  then 07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ 08 else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)})$ : 09  $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k,x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus z' \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1 || y_2;$ 10 11  $T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y; T_{S^*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x;$ 12 return  $T_{S^*}^+[k, x];$ 

 $\mathcal{O}_{-}(k, y)$  $\overline{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^-}[k, y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^-[k, y];$ 02  $k^* || x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(2)}(y^L);$ 03 if  $k^* || x^* \neq \perp$  and  $k^* = k$  then  $x \leftarrow x^*$ ; 04 else  $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n};$ 05  $T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y; T_{S^*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x;$ 06 return  $T_{S^*}^{-}[k, y];$ 



 $\mathcal{O}_+$  and the output of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ , the modification for Game B2 does not affect the distinguisher's behavior and so Game B2 is equal to Game B1. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB1] - \Pr[GB2] \le \frac{2q_E^2}{2^{n+1}} + \frac{2q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

**Game B3.** In this game,  $(E^*, D^*)$  is removed. Outputs of  $E^*$  and  $D^*$  are uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^{2n}$ . In Game B2, if no collision occurs for  $\mathcal{O}_+, \mathcal{O}_-$ , for a repeated query, the value which was previously returned is returned by the tables  $T_{S^*}^+$  and  $T_{S^*}^-$ . Thus in both games if no collision occurs for the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  and the outputs of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ , the modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB2] - \Pr[GB3] \le \frac{2q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}.$$

**Game B4.** In this game,  $\mathcal{TO}^{(2)}$  in  $\mathcal{O}_{-}$  is removed.  $k^*||x^*| = \mathcal{TO}(y^L) \neq \perp$  means that the value corresponding with the query (k, y) is recoded. If no collision occurs for the output of  $\mathcal{O}_+$  and the output of  $\mathcal{O}_-$ , for a repeated query, the value which was previously returned is returned. That is, if no collision occurs,  $TO^{(2)}$  is

 $\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$  $\overline{01} \text{ if } T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T^+_{S^*}[k, x];$ 02  $z'||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n ||C);$  $03 \ y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n};$ 04 if  $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$  then 05 $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$ if  $a \neq \perp$  or z' = IV then 06 if  $\exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a ||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$  then 0708 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});$ 09  $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}(k,x); y_2 \leftarrow y_1 \oplus z' \oplus [s]_2 \oplus z; y \leftarrow y_1 || y_2;$ 10 11  $T_{S^*}^+[k,x] \leftarrow y; T_{S^*}^-[k,y] \leftarrow x;$ 12 return  $T_{S^*}^+[k, x];$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \\ 02 \ x \stackrel{\leftarrow}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 03 \ T_{S^*}^{+}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 04 \ \text{return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \end{array}$ 



 $\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$ 01 if  $T_{S^*}^+[k, x] \neq \perp$  then **return**  $T_{S^*}^+[k, x]$ ; 02  $z'||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n ||C);$  $\begin{array}{l} 03 \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 04 \ \mathrm{if} \ t^{(1)} || t^{(3)} = t^{(2)} || t^{(4)} \ \mathrm{then} \end{array}$  $a \leftarrow \mathcal{TO}^{(1)}(z');$ 05if  $a \neq \perp$  or z' = IV then 06 if  $\exists M$  s.t.  $\mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$  then 07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ 08else  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});$ 09  $y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta_{z',s}^{-1}(z);$ 10 $\begin{array}{l} 11 \ T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow \widetilde{y}; T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 12 \ \mathbf{return} \ T^+_{S^*}[k,x]; \end{array}$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \frac{\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \\ 02 \ x \stackrel{\&}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 03 \ T_{S^*}^{+}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 04 \ \text{return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \end{array}$ 

Fig. 28. Game B5

not used and thus Game B3 is equal to Game B2. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB3] - \Pr[GB4] \le \frac{2q_E^2}{2^{2n+1}}$$

**Game B5.** In this game,  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(2)}$  is removed. In both Game B4 and Game B5, y is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^{2n}$  with a relation that  $\beta_{z',s}(y) = z$ . Thus Game B5 is equal to Game B4 and  $\Pr[GB4] = \Pr[GB5]$ .

**Game B6.** In this game,  $\mathcal{TRO}_n^{(1)}$  is removed. Instead, the functions  $FindPath_1$  and  $AddPath_1$  are used. *Path* is a (initially everywhere  $\perp$ ) table. If no collision occurs for the outputs of  $AddPath_1$ , then  $AddPath_1$ and  $FindPath_1$  behave as  $\mathcal{RO}_n^{(1)}$  and  $\mathcal{TO}^{(1)}$ , respectively. That is, if no collision occurs, Game B6 is equal to Game B5. We thus have via a birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB5] - \Pr[GB6] \le \frac{q_E^2}{2^{n+1}}$$

**Game B7.** In this game, AddPath and FindPath are used instead of  $AddPath_1$  and  $FindPath_1$ . For some value z, in  $AddPath_1$ , the number of paths in  $Path_1[z]$  is at most 1, while in AddPath, the number of paths in Path[z] not limited. Thus, if for any value z the number of paths in Path[z] is at most 1, Game B7 is equal to Game B6. That is, if no collision for  $\beta_{z',s}$  (step 07 in  $\mathcal{O}_+$ ) occurs then Game B7 is equal to Game B6. Since y is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^{2n}$ , an output of  $\beta_{z',s}$  is a random value of n bits. We

 $\mathcal{O}_+(k,x)$  $\overline{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^+}[k,x] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^+[k,x];$  $02 \ z'||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n ||C);$ 03  $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n};$ 04 if  $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$  then  $a \leftarrow FindPath_1(z');$ 05if  $a \neq \perp$  or z' = IV then 06if  $\exists M \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s, M) = a ||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}$  then 07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M);$ 08 else  $z \leftarrow AddPath_1(a||s||k||t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});$ 09  $y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta_{z',s}^{-1}(z);$ 1011  $T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y; T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x;$ 12 return  $T^+_{S^*}[k,x];$ 02 return  $\perp$ ;

 $\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y];} \\ 02 x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 03 T_{S^*}^{+}[k,x] \leftarrow y; T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 04 \text{ return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \\ \\ \underbrace{AddPath_1(M)}{01 \text{ if } \exists z \text{ s.t. } Path_1[z] = M \text{ then return } z; \\ 02 z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^n; \\ 03 Path_1[z] \leftarrow M; \\ 04 \text{ return } z; \\ \\ \underbrace{FindPath_1(z)}{01 \text{ if } Path_1[z]} \neq \perp \text{ then return } Path[z]; \end{array}$ 



$ \frac{\mathcal{O}_{+}(k,x)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x]; \\ 02 \ z'  s  t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^{n}  C); \\ 03 \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 04 \ \text{if } t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)} \text{ then} \\ 05 \ P \leftarrow FindPath(z',s,k,t); \\ $	$\begin{array}{l} \frac{\mathcal{O}_{-}(k,y)}{01 \text{ if } T^{-}_{S^{*}}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T^{-}_{S^{*}}[k,y]; \\ 02 \ x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 03 \ T^{+}_{S^{*}}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T^{-}_{S^{*}}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 04 \ \text{return } T^{-}_{S^{*}}[k,y]; \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{ll} 06 & \text{if } P \neq \perp \text{ then let } P = (M, a); \ z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M); \\ 07 & \text{else } AddPath(\beta_{z',s}(y), z', s, k, t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}); \\ 08 \ T^+_{S^*}[k, x] \leftarrow y; \ T^{S^*}[k, y] \leftarrow x; \\ 09 \ \text{return } T^+_{S^*}[k, x]; \end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \frac{FindPath(h,s,m,t)}{01\ P \leftarrow \emptyset;} \\ 02 \ \text{for all } (M,a) \in Path[h] \ \text{do} \\ 03  \text{ if } \exists M_1 \ \text{s.t. } pad_{BLAKE}(s,M_1) = a  s  m  t \ \text{then} \end{array} $
$\begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \frac{AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)}{01 \text{ for all } (M,a) \in Path[h] \text{ do}} \\ \displaystyle 02 \qquad Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M  m,a  s  m  t); \end{array}$	04 $P \xleftarrow{\cup} (M_1, a  s  m  t);$ 05 if $P = \emptyset$ then <b>return</b> $\bot;$ 06 else <b>return</b> $(M^*, a^*) \xleftarrow{\$} P;$

Fig. 30. Game B7

thus via birthday analysis that

$$\Pr[GB6] - \Pr[GB7] \le \frac{q_E^2}{2^{n+1}}.$$

**Game B8.** In Game B8, "else" for the step using AddPath is removed. Since  $pad_{BLAKE}$  is a prefix-free padding, the path constructed from the value defined the steps 06-08 is not used. Thus the modification does not affect the distinguisher's behavior. So we have that Pr[GB7] = Pr[GB8].

**Game B9.** In this game, AddPath is added in  $\mathcal{O}_-$ . Since x is uniformly chosen at random from  $\{0,1\}^{2n}$ , the probability that in  $\mathcal{O}_-$  a new path is added in the table Path is at most  $q_E^2/2^n$  where the number of paths stored in Path is at most  $q_E$ . We thus have that

$$\Pr[GB8] - \Pr[GB9] \le \frac{q_E^2}{2^n}$$

 $\mathcal{O}_B^+(k,x)$  $\overline{01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^+}[k, x] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^*}^+[k, x];$  $02 \ z'||s||t^{(1)}||t^{(2)}||t^{(3)}||t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^n ||C);$  $03 \ y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{2n};$ 04 if  $t^{(1)}||t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}||t^{(4)}$  then  $P \leftarrow FindPath(z', s, k, t^{(1)}||t^{(3)});$ 0506 if  $P \neq \emptyset$  then let P = (M, a);07 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_n(s, M); y \xleftarrow{\$} \beta_{z's}^{-1}(z);$ 08  $AddPath(\beta_{z',s}(y), z', s, k, t^{(1)}||t^{(3)}):$ 09 10  $T^+_{S^*}[k,x] \leftarrow y; T^-_{S^*}[k,y] \leftarrow x;$ 11 return  $T_{S^*}^+[k, x];$ AddPath(z, h, s, m, t)01 for all  $(M, a) \in Path[h]$  do  $Path[z] \xleftarrow{\cup} (M||m,a||s||m||t);$ 02

 $\begin{array}{l} \frac{\mathcal{O}_{B}^{-}(k,y)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}}^{-}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then return } T_{S^{*}}^{-}[k,y]; \\ 02 x \stackrel{\&}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 03 T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x] \leftarrow y; T_{S^{*}}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 04 \text{ return } T_{S^{*}}^{-}[k,y]; \\ \hline \frac{FindPath(h,s,m,t)}{01 P \leftarrow \emptyset;} \\ 02 \text{ for all } (M,a) \in Path[h] \text{ do} \\ 03 \quad \text{ if } \exists M_{1} \text{ s.t. } \text{pad}_{\mathsf{BLAKE}}(s,M_{1}) = a||s||m||t \text{ then} \\ 04 \qquad P \stackrel{\smile}{\leftarrow} (M_{1},a||s||m||t); \\ 05 \text{ if } P = \emptyset \text{ then return } \bot; \\ 06 \text{ else return } (M^{*},a^{*}) \stackrel{\&}{\leftarrow} P; \end{array}$ 



$\begin{array}{l} \frac{\mathcal{O}_{+}(k,x)}{01 \text{ if } T_{S^{*}}^{+}}[k,x] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x];\\ 02 \ z'  s  t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \oplus (0^{n}  C);\\ 03 \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n};\\ 04 \ \text{if } t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)} \ \text{then}\\ 05  P \leftarrow FindPath(z',s,k,t^{(1)}  t^{(3)});\\ 06  \text{if } P \neq \emptyset \ \text{then}\\ 07 \qquad \text{let } P = (M,a); \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \underline{\mathcal{O}}_{-}(k,y) \\ \hline 01 \text{ if } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \neq \perp \text{ then } \mathbf{return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \\ 02 \ z  s  t^{(1)}  t^{(2)}  t^{(3)}  t^{(4)} \leftarrow x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{2n}; \\ 03 \ \text{if } t^{(1)}  t^{(3)} = t^{(2)}  t^{(4)} \text{ then} \\ 04 \ AddPath(\beta_{z,s}(y),z,s,k,t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}); \\ 05 \ T_{S^*}^{+}[k,x] \leftarrow y; T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 06 \ \mathbf{return } T_{S^*}^{-}[k,y]; \end{array}$
$\begin{array}{ll} 08 & z \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}_{n}(s,M); \ y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \beta_{z',s}^{-1}(z); \\ 09 & AddPath(\beta_{z',s}(y), z', s, k, t^{(1)}  t^{(3)}): \\ 10 \ T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x] \leftarrow y; \ T_{S^{*}}^{-}[k,y] \leftarrow x; \\ 11 \ \mathbf{return} \ T_{S^{*}}^{+}[k,x]; \\ \\ \hline \frac{AddPath(z,h,s,m,t)}{01 \ \text{for all} \ (M,a) \in Path[h] \ \text{do}} \\ 02 & Path[z] \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} (M  m,a  s  m  t); \end{array}$	$ \frac{FindPath(h, s, m, t)}{01 \ P \leftarrow \emptyset;} \\ 02 \ \text{for all} \ (M, a) \in Path[h] \ \text{do} \\ 03  \text{if } \exists M_1 \text{ s.t. } pad_{BLAKE}(s, M_1) = a  s  m  t \ \text{then} \\ 04 \qquad P \stackrel{\smile}{\leftarrow} (M_1, a  s  m  t); \\ 05 \ \text{if } P = \emptyset \ \text{then return } \bot; \\ 06 \ \text{else return} \ (M^*, a^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} P; $

Fig. 32. Game B9

# F Proof of Theorem 4

We show the following lemma.

**Lemma 5.** For any CDA1 adversary  $A_1, A_2$ , making  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  queries at most q times, of a PKE scheme  $\mathcal{AE}$  where the length of the randomness  $\mathbf{r}$  is 0, there exists a PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  of the PKE scheme such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{cda1}}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{RO}_n}(A_1,A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE},\mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1,B_2).$$

 $A_1, A_2$  can make  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  queries at most q times. The runnig time of  $B_1, B_2$  is at most that of  $A_1, A_2$ .

*Proof.* We construct the PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  by using the CDA1 adversary  $A_1, A_2$ . The PRIV adversary is shown in Fig. 33. The adversary uses only s which one element of the output of  $A_1$ .  $B_1$  defines messages of  $A_1$  such that  $\mathbf{m}_0$  and  $\mathbf{m}_1$  are bit strings of length  $\omega$  and  $\mathbf{m}_b[i] \neq \mathbf{m}_b[j]$  for all  $1 \leq i < j \leq \nu$  and all  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  such that the source has mini-entropy  $\mu$ .  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  does not share the state and the second adversary  $A_2$  obtains just the cipher text  $\mathbf{c}$  whose the plain text has mini-entropy  $\mu$ . Thus  $A_2$  does not find that the plain text is defined by  $B_1$ . The adversary PRIV  $B_1, B_2$  wins if the CDA1 adversary wins.

Adversary $B_1$	Adversary $B_2$
$\overline{1\ ((\mathbf{m}_0^*, \mathbf{m}_1^*), s)} \leftarrow A_1^{\mathcal{RO}_n}$	$\overline{1 \text{ obtains the cipher text } \mathbf{c}}$
2 generates $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1)$ such that the $bit_s(\mathbf{m}_{b^*}) = b^*$ for $b^* = 0, 1$	$2 \ b' \leftarrow A_2^{\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathbf{c})$
$3  ext{ return } ( extbf{m}_0,  extbf{m}_1)$	3  return  b'

Fig. 33. PRIV Adversary

# G Proof of Theorem 5

**Lemma 6.** For any CDA2 adversary  $A_1, A_2$  of REwH in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  model, there exists a CDA adversary  $B_1, B_2$  in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  model such that

 $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda2}}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}(A_1,A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda}}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1,B_2).$ 

where the running time of  $B_1, B_2$  is at most that of  $A_1, A_2$ .

*Proof.* We consider the following events.

- Event 1:  $A_1$  outputs  $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$  such that  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is some bit of  $\mathbf{r}$ .
- Event 2:  $A_1$  outputs  $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$  such that  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is some bit of  $\mathbf{m}_b$ .

Let CDA2 be the event that true is returned in the CDA2 security game. Thus we have the following.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{CDA2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] &= \Pr[CDA2] \\ &\leq \Pr[GDA2|\text{Event 1}]\Pr[\text{Event 1}] + \Pr[GDA2|\text{Event 2}]\Pr[\text{Event 2}] \\ &= \Pr[GDA2|\text{Event 1}] \times p + \Pr[GDA2|\text{Event 2}] \times (1-p) \end{aligned}$$

where  $p = \Pr[\text{Event 1}]$ .

We evaluate the probability  $\Pr[CDA2|$ Event 1]. In the CDA2 security game,  $A_2$  obtains the cipher text **c** where each component is  $\mathcal{E}_r(pk, \mathbf{m}_b[t]; \mathcal{RO}_n(pk||\mathbf{m}_b[t]||\mathbf{r}[t]))$ . Since  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is a random bit and the bit is hidden by  $\mathcal{RO}_n$ ,  $\Pr[CDA2|$ Event 1] = 1/2.

We evaluate the probability  $\Pr[CDA2|$ Event 2]. Let CDA1 be the event that the CDA1 adversary  $A_1^*, A_2^*$ wins the CDA1 security game. Let Event 2' be the event that in the CDA1 security game  $A_2^*$  outputs  $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}), i)$  such that  $bit_i(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r})$  is a bit of  $\mathbf{m}_b$ . From Lemma 1, for any CDA2 adversary  $A_1, A_2$  there exists a CDA1 adversary  $A_1^*, A_2^*$  such that

$$\Pr[CDA2|\text{Event } 2] \leq \Pr[CDA1|\text{Event } 2']$$

Under Event 2', we can construct a CDA adversary from the CDA1 adversary by using the same proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix F. Thus, for any CDA1 adversary  $A_1^*, A_2^*$ , there exists a CDA adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that

$$\Pr[CDA1|\text{Event } 2'] \le \Pr[CDA^{B_1,B_2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}]$$

From above discussion, for any CDA2 adversary  $A_1, A_2$  there exists CDA adversary  $B_1, B_2$  such that

$$\begin{split} \Pr[\mathrm{CDA2}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}^{A_1,A_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] &\leq \frac{1}{2} \times p + \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}^{B_1,B_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}] \times (1-p) \\ &\leq \Pr[\mathrm{CDA}_{\mathsf{REwH},\mathcal{RO}_n}^{B_1,B_2} \Rightarrow \mathsf{true}]. \end{split}$$

Adversary $B_1$	Adversary $B_2$
$\overline{1\left((\mathbf{m}_{0}^{*},\mathbf{m}_{1}^{*},\mathbf{r}),s\right)} \leftarrow A_{1}^{\mathcal{RO}_{n}}$	$\overline{1 \text{ obtains the cipher text } \mathbf{c}}$
2 generates $((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{r}_0), (\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}_1))$ such that $bit_s(\mathbf{m}_{b^*}, \mathbf{r}_{b^*}) = b^*$ for $b^* = 0, 1$	$2 \ b' \leftarrow A_2^{\mathcal{RO}_n}(\mathbf{c})$
$3 \ \mathbf{return} \ ((\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{r}_0), (\mathbf{m}_1, \mathbf{r}_1))$	3  return  b'

Fig. 34. PRIV Adversary

## H Proof of Theorem 6

**Lemma 7.** For any CDA1 adversary  $A_1, A_2$  of PtD in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  model, there exists a CDA adversary  $B_1, B_2$  in the  $\mathcal{RO}_n$  model such that

 $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{cda1}}_{\mathsf{PtD},\mathcal{RO}_n}(A_1,A_2) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{priv}}_{\mathcal{AE}_d,\mathcal{RO}_n}(B_1,B_2).$ 

where the running time of  $B_1, B_2$  is at most that of  $A_1, A_2$ .

*Proof.* We construct the PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$  by using the CDA1 adversary  $A_1, A_2$ . The PRIV adversary is shown in Fig. 34.  $B_1$  uses only s which one element of the output of  $A_1$ .  $B_1$  defines messages of  $A_1$  such that all components of  $\mathbf{m}_0$  and  $\mathbf{m}_1$  are bit strings of length  $\omega$ , all components of  $\mathbf{r}_0$  and  $\mathbf{r}_1$  are bit strings of length  $\rho$ , and  $(\mathbf{m}_b[i], \mathbf{r}_b[i]) \neq (\mathbf{m}_b[j], \mathbf{r}_b[j])$  for all  $1 \leq i < j \leq \nu$  and all  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  such that the source has mini-entropy  $\mu$ .  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  does not share the state and the second adversary  $A_2$  obtains just the cipher text  $\mathbf{c}$  whose the plain text  $(\mathbf{m}_b, \mathbf{r}_b)$  has mini-entropy  $\mu$ . Thus  $A_2$  cannot find that the plain text is defined by  $B_1$ . If the CDA1 adversary wins then so is the PRIV adversary  $B_1, B_2$ .