Efficient UC-Secure Authenticated Key-Exchange for Algebraic Languages

Abstract. Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols enable two parties to establish a shared, cryptographically strong key over an insecure network using various authentication means, such as cryptographic keys, short (*i.e.*, low-entropy) secret keys or *credentials*. In this paper, we provide a general framework that encompasses several previous AKE primitives such as (*Verifier-based*) Password-Authenticated Key Exchange or Secret Handshakes. We call it LAKE for Language-Authenticated Key Exchange.

We first model this general primitive in the *Universal Composability* (UC) setting. Thereafter, we show that the Gennaro-Lindell approach can efficiently address this goal. But we need *smooth projective hash functions* on new languages, whose efficient implementations are of independent interest. We indeed provide such hash functions for languages defined by combinations of linear pairing product equations.

Combined with an efficient commitment scheme, derived from the highly-efficient UC-secure Lindell's commitment, we obtain a very practical realization of Secret Handshakes, but also *Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange protocols*. All the protocols are UC-secure, in the standard model with a common reference string, under the classical Decisional Linear assumption.

Keywords. Authenticated Key Exchange, Universal Composability, Secret Handshakes

1 Introduction

The main goal of an *Authenticated Key Exchange* (AKE) protocol is to enable two parties to establish a shared, cryptographically strong key over an insecure network under the complete control of an adversary. AKE is one of the most widely used and fundamental cryptographic primitives. In order for AKE to be possible, the parties must have authentication means, *e.g.* (public or secret) cryptographic keys, short (*i.e.*, low-entropy) secret keys or *credentials* that satisfy a (public or secret) policy.

Motivation. *Password-Authenticated Key Exchange* (PAKE) was formalized by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] and followed by many proposals based on different cryptographic assumptions (see [ACP09, CCGS10] and references therein). It allows users to generate a strong cryptographic key based on a shared "human-memorable" (*i.e.* low-entropy) password without requiring a public-key infrastructure. In this setting, an adversary controlling all communication in the network should not be able to mount an off-line dictionary attack.

The concept of *Secret Handshakes* has been introduced in 2003 by Balfanz, Durfee, Shankar, Smetters, Staddon and Wong [BDS⁺03] (see also [JL09, AKB07]). It allows two members of the same group to identify each other secretly, in the sense that each party reveals his affiliation to the other only if they are members of the same group. At the end of the protocol, the parties can set up an ephemeral session key for securing further communication between them and an outsider is unable to determine if the handshake succeeded. In case of failure, the players do not learn any information about the other party's affiliation.

More recently, *Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange* (CAKE) was presented by Camenisch, Casati, Groß and Shoup [CCGS10]. In this primitive, a common key is established if and only if a specific relation is satisfied between credentials hold by the two players. This primitive includes variants of PAKE and Secret Handshakes, and namely Verifier-based PAKE, where the client owns a password pw and the server knows a transformation v of the password only. It prevents massive password recovering in case of server corruption. The two players eventually agree on a common high entropy secret if and only if pw and v match together, and off-line dictionary attacks should be prevented for third-party players.

Our results. We propose a new primitive that encompasses most of the previous notions of authenticated key exchange. It is closely related to CAKE and we call it LAKE, for *Language-Authenticated Key-Exchange*, since parties establish a common key if and only if they hold credentials that belong to specific (and possibly independent) languages. The definition of the primitive is more practice-oriented than the definition of CAKE from [CCGS10] but the two notions are very similar¹. In particular, the new primitive enables privacy-preserving authenticate to each other without revealing this group beforehand.

¹ Actually we believe that any interesting AKE primitive can be formalized in either way.

In order to define the security of this primitive, we use the UC framework and an appropriate definition for languages that permits to dissociate the public part of the policy, the private common information the users want to check and the (possibly independent) secret values each user owns that assess the membership to the languages. We provide an ideal functionality for LAKE and give efficient realizations of the new primitive (for a large family of languages) secure under classical mild assumptions, in the standard model (with a common reference string – CRS), with static corruptions.

We significantly improve the efficiency of several CAKE protocols [CCGS10] for specific languages and we enlarge the set of languages for which we can construct practical schemes. Notably, we obtain a very practical realization of Secret Handshakes and a Verifier-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange that provide very strong security properties.

Our techniques. A general framework to design PAKE in the CRS model was proposed by Gennaro and Lindell [GL03] in 2003. This approach was applied to the UC framework by Canetti, Halevi, Katz, Lindell, and MacKenzie [CHK⁺05], and improved by Abdalla, Chevalier and Pointcheval [ACP09]. It makes use of the *smooth projective hash functions* (SPHF), introduced by Cramer and Shoup [CS02]. Such a hashing family is a family of hash functions that can be evaluated in two ways: using the (secret) hashing key, one can compute the function on every point in its domain, whereas using the (public) *projected* key one can only compute the function on a special subset of its domain. Our first contribution is the description of smooth projective hash functions for new interesting languages: Abdalla, Chevalier and Pointcheval [ACP09] explained how to make disjunctions and conjunctions of languages, we study here languages defined by linear pairing product equations on committed values.

In 2011, Lindell [Lin11] proposed an efficient commitment scheme, with a non-interactive opening algorithm, in the UC framework. We will not use it in black-box, but instead we will patch it to make the initial Gennaro and Lindell's approach to work, without zero-knowledge proofs [CHK⁺05], using the equivocability of the commitment.

Language definition. In [ACP09], Abdalla *et al.* already formalized languages to be considered for SPHF. But, in the following, we will use a more simple formalism, which is nevertheless more general: we consider any efficiently computable binary relation $\mathcal{R} : \{0,1\}^* \times \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, where the additional parameters $\mathsf{pub} \in \{0,1\}^*$ and $\mathsf{priv} \in \mathcal{P}$ define a language $L_{\mathcal{R}}(\mathsf{pub},\mathsf{priv}) \subseteq \mathcal{S}$ of the words W such that $\mathcal{R}(\mathsf{pub},\mathsf{priv}, W) = 1$:

- pub are public parameters;
- priv are private parameters the two players have in mind, and they should think to the same values: they will be committed to, but never revealed;
- W is the word the sender claims to know in the language: it will be committed to, but never revealed.

Our LAKE primitive, specific to two relations \mathcal{R}_a and \mathcal{R}_b , will allow two users, Alice and Bob, owning a word $W_a \in L_{\mathcal{R}_a}(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}_a)$ and $W_b \in L_{\mathcal{R}_b}(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}_b)$ respectively, to agree on a session key under some specific conditions: they first both agree on the public parameter pub, but Bob will think about priv'_a for his expected value of priv_a , Alice will do the same with priv'_b for priv_b ; eventually, if $\mathsf{priv}'_a = \mathsf{priv}_a$ and $\mathsf{priv}'_b = \mathsf{priv}_b$, and if they both know words in the languages, then the key agreement will succeed. In case of failure, no information should leak about the reason of failure, except the inputs did not satisfy the relations \mathcal{R}_a or \mathcal{R}_b , or the languages were not consistent.

We stress that each LAKE protocol will be specific to a pair of relations $(\mathcal{R}_a, \mathcal{R}_b)$ describing the way Alice and Bob will authenticate to each other. This pair of relations $(\mathcal{R}_a, \mathcal{R}_b)$ specifies the sets $\mathcal{P}_a, \mathcal{P}_b$ and $\mathcal{S}_a, \mathcal{S}_b$ (in which the private parameters and the words should be respectively). Therefore, the formats of priv_a, priv_b and W_a and W_b are known in advance, but not their values. When \mathcal{R}_a and \mathcal{R}_b are clearly defined from the context (e.g., PAKE), we omit them in the notations. For example, these relations can formalize:

- Password-based authentication: The language is defined by $\mathcal{R}(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}, W) = 1 \Leftrightarrow W = \mathsf{priv}$, and thus $\mathsf{pub} = \emptyset$. The classical setting of PAKE requires the players A and B to use the same password, and thus we should have $\mathsf{priv}_a = \mathsf{priv}_b = \mathsf{priv}_a = W_a = W_b$;
- Signature-based authentication: $\mathcal{R}(\mathsf{pub},\mathsf{priv},W) = 1 \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{Verif}(\mathsf{pub}_1,\mathsf{pub}_2,W) = 1$, where $\mathsf{pub} = (\mathsf{pub}_1 = \mathsf{vk},\mathsf{pub}_2 = M)$ and $\mathsf{priv} = \emptyset$. The word W is thus a signature of M valid under vk, both specified in pub;
- Credential-based authentication: we can consider any mix for vk and M in pub or priv, and even in W, for which the relation \mathcal{R} verifies the validity of the signature. When M and vk are in priv or W, we achieve *affiliation-hiding* property.

In the two last cases, the parameter pub can thus consist of a message on which the user is expected to know a signature valid under vk: either the user knows the signing key and can generate the signature on the fly to run the protocol, or the user has been given signatures on some messages (credentials). As a consequence, we just assume that, after having publicly agreed on a common pub, the two players have valid words in the appropriate languages. The way they have obtained these words does not matter.

Following our generic construction, private elements will be committed using Cramer-Shoup-like encryption schemes, and will thus have to be first encoded as *n*-tuples of elements in a group \mathbb{G} . In the case of PAKE, authentication will check that a player knows an appropriate password. The relation is a simple equality test, and accepts for one word only. A random commitment (and thus of a random group element) will succeed with negligible probability. For signature-based authentication, the verification key can be kept secret, but the signature should be unforgeable and thus a random word W should quite unlikely satisfy the relation. We will often make this assumption on useful relations \mathcal{R} : for any pub, {(priv, W) $\in \mathcal{P} \times S$, \mathcal{R} (pub, priv, W) = 1} is sparse (negligible) in $\mathcal{P} \times S$, and *a fortiori* in the set \mathbb{G}^n in which elements are first embedded.

2 Definitions

In this section, we first briefly recall the notations and the security notions of the basic primitives we will use in the rest of the paper, and namely public key encryption and signature. More formal definitions, together with the classical computational assumptions (CDH, DDH, and DLin) are provided in the Appendix A.1: A public-key encryption scheme is defined by four algorithms: param \leftarrow Setup (1^k) , (ek, dk) \leftarrow KeyGen(param), $c \leftarrow$ Encrypt(ek, m; r), and $m \leftarrow$ Decrypt(dk, c). We will need the classical notion of IND-CCA security. A signature scheme is defined by four algorithms: param \leftarrow Setup (1^k) , $(vk, sk) \leftarrow$ KeyGen(param), $\sigma \leftarrow$ Sign(sk, m; s), and Verif (vk, m, σ) . We will need the classical notion of EUF-CMA security. In both cases, the global parameters param will be ignored, included in the CRS. We will furthermore make use of collision-resistant hash function families.

2.1 Universal Composability

Our main goal will be to provide protocols with security in the universal composability framework. The interested reader is referred to [Can01, CHK⁺05] for details. More precisely, we will work in the UC framework with joint state proposed by Canetti and Rabin [CR03] (with the CRS as the joint state). Since players are not individually authenticated, but just afterward if the credentials are mutually consistent with the two players' languages, the adversary will be allowed to interact on behalf of any player from the beginning of the protocol, either with the credentials provided by the environment (static corruption) or without (impersonation attempt). As with the Split Functionality [BCL⁺05], according to whom sends the first flow for a player, either the player itself or the adversary, we know whether this is an honest player or a dishonest player (corrupted or impersonation attempt, but anyway controlled by the adversary). Then, our goal will be to prove that the best an adversary can do is to try to play against one of the other players, as an honest player would do, with a credential it guessed or obtained in any possible way. This is exactly the so-called one-line dictionary attack when one considers PAKE protocols. In the adaptive corruption setting, the adversary could get complete access to the private credentials and the internal memory of an honest player, and then get control of it, at any time. But we will restrict to the static corruption setting in this paper. It is enough to deal with most of the concrete requirements: related credentials, arbitrary compositions, and forward-secrecy. To achieve our goal, for a UC-secure LAKE, we will use some other primitives which are secure in the classical setting only.

2.2 Commitment

Commitments allow a user to commit to a value, without revealing it, but without the possibility to later change his mind. It is composed of three algorithms: $\mathsf{Setup}(1^k)$ generates the system parameters, according to a security parameter k; $\mathsf{Commit}(\ell, m; r)$ produces a commitment c on the input message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ using the random coins $r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}$, under the label ℓ ; while $\mathsf{Decommit}(\ell, c, m, d)$ opens the commitment c and reveals the message m, together with the opening information d that proves the correct opening under the label ℓ .

Such a commitment scheme should be both *hiding*, which says that the commit phase does not leak any information about m, and *binding*, which says that the decommit phase should not be able to open to two different messages. Additional features will be required in the following, such as non-malleability, extractability, and equivocability. We also included a label ℓ , which can be empty or an additional public information that has to be the same in both the

commit and the decommit phases. A labeled commitment that is both non-malleable and extractable can be instantiated by an IND-CCA labeled encryption scheme (see the Appendix A.1). We will use the Linear Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [Sha07, CKP07]. We will then patch it, using a technique inspired from [Lin11], to make it additionally equivocable (see Section 3). It will have an interactive commit phase, in two rounds: $Commit(\ell, m; r)$ and a challenge ε from the receiver, which will define an implicit full commitment to be open latter.

2.3 Smooth Projective Hash Functions

Smooth projective hash function (SPHF) systems have been defined by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] in order to build a chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme. They have thereafter been extended [GL03, ACP09, BPV12] and applied to several other primitives. Such a system is defined on a language *L*, with five algorithms:

- Setup (1^k) generates the system parameters, according to a security parameter k;
- HashKG(L) generates a hashing key hk for the language L;
- ProjKG(hk, L, W) derives the projection key hp, possibly depending on a word W;
- $\mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}, L, W)$ outputs the hash value from the hashing key;
- ProjHash(hp, L, W, w) outputs the hash value from the projection key and the witness w that $W \in L$.

The correctness of the scheme assures that if W is in L with w as a witness, then the two ways to compute the hash values give the same result: $\mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}, L, W) = \mathsf{ProjHash}(\mathsf{hp}, L, W, w)$. In our setting, these hash values will belong to a group \mathbb{G} . The security is defined through two different notions, the smoothness and the pseudo-randomness properties, where we use the distribution $\Delta(L, W) = \{(\mathsf{hk}, \mathsf{hp}), \mathsf{hk} \leftarrow \mathsf{Hash}\mathsf{KG}(L), \mathsf{hp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Proj}\mathsf{KG}(\mathsf{hk}, L, W)\}$:

- the *smoothness* property guarantees that if $W \notin L$, the hash value is *statistically* indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp:

 $\{(\mathsf{hp}, G), (\mathsf{hk}, \mathsf{hp}) \leftarrow \Delta(L, W), G \leftarrow \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}, L, W)\} \approx_s \{(\mathsf{hp}, G), (\mathsf{hk}, \mathsf{hp}) \leftarrow \Delta(L, W), G \xleftarrow{s} \mathbb{G}\}.$

We define by Adv^{smooth} the statistical distance between the two distributions.

- the *pseudo-randomness* property guarantees that even for a word $W \in L$, but without the knowledge of a witness w, the hash value is *computationally* indistinguishable from a random element, even knowing hp:

 $\{(\mathsf{hp}, G), (\mathsf{hk}, \mathsf{hp}) \leftarrow \Delta(L, W), G \leftarrow \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}, L, W)\} \approx_c \{(\mathsf{hp}, G), (\mathsf{hk}, \mathsf{hp}) \leftarrow \Delta(L, W), G \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}\}.$

We define by $Adv^{pr}(t)$ the computational distance between the two distributions for t-time distinguishers.

3 Double Linear Cramer-Shoup Encryption (DLCS)

As explained earlier, any IND-CCA labeled encryption scheme can be used as a non-malleable and extractable labeled commitment scheme: one could use the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme (see the Appendix A.4), but we will focus on the DLin-based primitives, and thus the Linear Cramer-Shoup scheme (see the Appendix A.3), we call LCS. In order to add the equivocability, one can use a technique inspired from [Lin11]. See the Appendix B for more details, but we briefly present the commitment scheme we will use in the rest of this paper in conjunction with SPHF.

Linear Cramer-Shoup commitment scheme (LCSCom). The parameters, in the CRS, are a group \mathbb{G} of prime order p, with three independent generators $(g_1, g_2, g_3) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^3$, a collision-resistant hash function \mathfrak{H}_K , and a reversible mapping \mathcal{G} from $\{0,1\}^n$ to \mathbb{G} . From 9 scalars $(x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^9$, one also sets, for $i = 1, 2, c_i = g_i^{x_i} g_3^{x_3}, d_i = g_i^{y_i} g_3^{y_3}$, and $h_i = g_i^{z_i} g_3^{z_3}$. The public parameters consist of the encryption key ek = $(\mathbb{G}, g_1, g_2, g_3, c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2, h_1, h_2, \mathfrak{H}_K)$, while the trapdoor for extraction is dk = $(x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3)$. One can define the encryption process: $\mathsf{LCS}(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M; r, s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{u} = (g_1^r, g_2^s, g_3^{r+s}), e = M \cdot h_1^r h_2^s, v = (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^r (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^s)$ where $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$. When ξ is specified from outside, one additionally denotes it $\mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M, \xi; r, s)$. The commitment to a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ encrypts $\mathcal{G}(m)$ under ek: $\mathsf{LCSCom}(\ell, m; r, s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathsf{LCS}(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, \mathcal{G}(m); r, s)$. The decommit process consists of m and (r, s) to check the correctness of the encryption. The variant with SPHF implicit verification does the same, except that there is not decommit information, but just an SPHF on the language of the ciphertexts of M where $M = \mathcal{G}(m)$ is privately shared by the two players. Since the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CCA, this commitment scheme is non-malleable and extactable.




Fig. 1. DLCSCom' Commitment Scheme for SPHF

Double Linear Cramer-Shoup commitment schemes (DLCSCom and DLCSCom'). To make it equivocable, we double the commitment process, in two steps. The CRS additionally contains a scalar $\aleph \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, one also sets, $\zeta = g_1^{\aleph}$. The trapdoor for equivocability is \aleph . The Double Linear Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, denoted DLCS and detailed in the Appendix B is

$$\mathsf{DLCS}(\ell,\mathsf{ek},M,N;r,s,a,b) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{=} (\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \mathsf{LCS}(\ell,\mathsf{ek},M;r,s), \mathcal{C}' \leftarrow \mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell,\mathsf{ek},N,\xi;a,b))$$

where $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$ is computed during the generation of \mathcal{C} and transferred for the generation of \mathcal{C}' .

The commit/decommit processes, for a single message, are described on Figure 5 in the Appendix B. This is the DLCSCom scheme, which differs from the DLCSCom' to be implicitly verified with an SPHF, as described on Figure 1. They essentially differ with $\chi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\mathcal{C}')$ instead of $\chi = \mathfrak{H}_K(m, \mathcal{C}')$. Because of this alteration, the DLCSCom' scheme is not a real commitment scheme (not formally extractable/binding), contrarily to the DLCSCom: in DLCSCom', the sender can indeed encrypt M in \mathcal{C} and $N \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ in \mathcal{C}' , and then, the global ciphertext $\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{C}'^{\varepsilon}$ contains $M' = MN^{\varepsilon} \neq M$, whereas one would have extracted M from \mathcal{C} . But M' is unknown before ε is sent, and thus, if one checks the membership of M' to a sparse language, it will unlikely be true.

One can extend these commitments LCSCom, DLCSCom and DLCSCom' to *n*-message vectors $\boldsymbol{m} = (m_i)_i$, using the multi-message version of the encryption scheme (see Appendix B), which encrypts each $M_i = \mathcal{G}(m_i)$ with independent random coins in $C_i = (\mathbf{u}_i, e_i, v_i)$ but the same $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, (\mathbf{u}_i)_i, (e_i)_i)$, together with independent companion ciphertexts C'_i of $1_{\mathbb{G}}$, still with the same ξ for the doubled version. In the latter case, *n* independent challenges $\varepsilon_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ are then sent to lead to the full commitment ($C_i \times C'_i^{\varepsilon}$) with random coins $z_{r_i} = r_i + \varepsilon_i a_i$ and $z_{s_i} = s_i + \varepsilon_i b_i$. Again, if one of the companion ciphertext C'_i does not encrypt $1_{\mathbb{G}}$, the full commitment encrypts a vector with at least one unpredictable component M'_i . Several non-unity components in the companion ciphertexts would lead to independent components in the full commitment. For appropriate sparse languages, this definitely turns out not to be in the language.

4 SPHF for Implicit Proofs of Membership

In [ACP09], Abdalla *et al.* presented a way to compute a conjunction or a disjunction of languages by some simple operations on their projection keys. Therefore all languages presented afterward can easily be combined together. However as the original set of manageable languages was not really developed, we are going to present several steps to extend it, and namely in order to cover some languages useful in various AKE instantiations.

We will show that almost all the vast family of languages covered by the Groth-Sahai methodology [GS08] can be addressed by our approach too. More precisely, we can handle all the linear pairing product equations, when witnesses are committed using our above (multi-message) DLCSCom' commitment scheme, or even the non-equivocable LCSCom version. This will be strong enough for our applications. For using them in black-box to build our LAKE protocol, one should note that the projected key is computed from the ciphertext C when using the simple LCSCom commitment, but also when using the DLCSCom' version. The full commitment $C \times C^{\ell_{\varepsilon}}$ is not required, but ξ only, which is known as soon as C is given (or the vector $(C_i)_i$ for the multi-message version). Of course, the hash value will then depend on the full commitment (either C for the LCSCom commitment, or $C \cdot C^{\ell_{\varepsilon}}$ for the DLCSCom' commitment).

This will be relevant to our AKE problem: equality of two passwords, in PAKE protocols; corresponding signing/verification keys associated with a valid signature on a pseudonym or a hidden identity, in secret handshakes; valid credentials, in CAKE protocols. All those tests are quite similar: one has to show that the ciphertexts are valid and that the plaintexts satisfy the expected relations in a group. We first illustrate that with commitments of Waters signatures of a public message under a committed verification key. We then explain the general method. The formal proofs are provided in the Appendix C.

4.1 Commitments of Signatures

Let us consider the Waters signature [Wat05] in a symmetric bilinear group, as reviewed in the Appendix A.3, and then we just need to recall that, in a pairing-friendly setting $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, with public parameters (\mathcal{F}, g, h) , and a verification key vk, a signature $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ is valid with respect to the message M under the key vk if it satisfies $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(h, \mathsf{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$.

A similar approach has already been followed in [BPV12], however not with a Linear Cramer-Shoup commitment scheme, nor with such general languages. We indeed first consider the language of the signatures $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2$ of a message $M \in \{0,1\}^k$ under the verification key vk $\in \mathbb{G}$, where M is public but vk is private: $L(\mathsf{pub},\mathsf{priv})$, where priv = vk and pub = M. One will thus commit vk $\in \mathbb{G}$ and $\sigma_1 \in \mathbb{G}$ with the label $\ell = (M, \sigma_2)$ using a 2-DLCSCom' commitment and then prove the commitment actually contains (vk, σ_1) such that $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(h, vk) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$. We insist on the fact that σ_1 only has to be encrypted, and not σ_2 , in order to hide the signature, since the latter σ_2 is a random group element. If one wants unlinkability between signature commitments, one simply needs to rerandomize (σ_1, σ_2) before encryption. Hence σ_2 can be sent in clear, but bounded to the commitment in the label, together with the pub part of the language. In order to prove the above property on the committed values, we will use conjunctions of SPHF: first, to show that each commitment is well-formed, using an approach similar to the one used for a DLin tuple; and then that the associated plaintexts verify the linear pairing equation, where the committed values are underlined: $e(\sigma_1, q) = e(h, \forall k) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$ (note that $\forall k$ is not used as a committed value for this verification of the membership of σ to the language since this is the verification key expected by the verifier, specified in the private part priv, which has to be independently checked with respect to the committed verification key. This is enough for the affiliation-hiding property.) We could consider the similar language where $M \in \{0, 1\}^k$ is in the word too: $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(h, \forall k) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$, and then one should commit M, bit-by-bit, and then use a $(k+2) - \mathsf{DLCSCom}'$ commitment.

4.2 Linear Pairing Product Equations

Instead of describing in details the SPHF for the above examples, let us show it for a more general framework: we considered $e(\underline{\sigma_1}, g) = e(h, \mathsf{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$ or $e(\underline{\sigma_1}, g) = e(h, \mathsf{vk}) \cdot e(\underline{\mathcal{F}(M)}, \sigma_2)$, where the unknowns are underlined. These are particular instantiations of t simultaneous equations

$$\left(\prod_{i\in A_k} e(\underline{\mathcal{Y}_i}, \mathcal{A}_{k,i})\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{i\in B_k} \underline{\mathcal{Z}_i}^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}}\right) = \mathcal{B}_k, \text{ for } k = 1, \dots, t,$$

where $\mathcal{A}_{k,i} \in \mathbb{G}$, $\mathcal{B}_k \in \mathbb{G}_T$, and $\mathfrak{z}_{k,i} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, as well as $A_k \subseteq \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and $B_k \subseteq \{m + 1, \ldots, n\}$ are public, but the $\mathcal{Y}_i \in \mathbb{G}$ and $\mathcal{Z}_i \in \mathbb{G}_T$ are simultaneously committed using the multi-message DLCSCom' or LCSCom commitments scheme, in \mathbb{G} or \mathbb{G}_T respectively. This is more general than the relations covered by [CCGS10], since one can also commit scalars bit-by-bit. In Appendix C.4 we detail how to build the corresponding SPHF, and prove the soundness of our approach. For the sake of clarity, we focus here to a single equation only, since multiple equations are just conjunctions, and to the simpler equation $\prod_{i=1}^{i=m} e(\underline{\mathcal{Y}_i}, \mathcal{A}_i) = \mathcal{B}$, since one can lift any ciphertext from \mathbb{G} to a ciphertext in \mathbb{G}_T , and then all the ciphertexts are in the same group. We thus have commitments, either \mathcal{C}_i or $\mathcal{C}_i \cdot \mathcal{C}_i^{\varepsilon}$, of \mathcal{Y}_i 's, but we use in both kinds of commitments the same notation \mathcal{C}_i , and want to check whether there exist \mathbf{z}_i 's and \mathcal{Y}_i 's such that $\mathcal{C}_i = \mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, \mathcal{Y}_i, \xi; \mathbf{z}_i)$ and $\prod_{i=1}^m e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_i) = \mathcal{B}$. The commitments have been generated simultaneously using the *m*-DLCSCom' version, with a common ξ , where the possible combination with the companion ciphertext to the power ε leads to

$$\mathcal{C}_{i} = (\boldsymbol{u}_{i} = (g_{1}^{z_{r_{i}}}, g_{2}^{z_{s_{i}}}, g_{3}^{z_{r_{i}} + z_{s_{i}}}), e_{i} = h_{1}^{z_{r_{i}}} h_{2}^{z_{s_{i}}} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_{i}, v_{i} = (c_{1}d_{1}^{\xi})^{z_{r_{i}}} \cdot (c_{2}d_{2}^{\xi})^{z_{s_{i}}}) \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, m$$

For the hashing keys, one picks scalars $(\lambda, (\eta_i, \theta_i, \kappa_i, \mu_i)_{i=1,...,m}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^{4n+1}$, and sets $\mathsf{hk}_i = (\eta_i, \theta_i, \kappa_i, \lambda, \mu_i)$. One then computes the projection keys as $\mathsf{hp}_i = (g_1^{\eta_i}g_3^{\kappa_i}h_1^{\lambda}(c_1d_1^{\xi})^{\mu_i}, g_2^{\theta_i}g_3^{\kappa_i}h_2^{\lambda}(c_2d_2^{\xi})^{\mu_i}) \in \mathbb{G}^2$. The hash value is

$$\left(\prod_{i} u_{i,1}^{\eta_i} \cdot u_{i,2}^{\theta_i} \cdot u_{i,3}^{\kappa_i} \cdot e_i^{\lambda} \cdot v_i^{\mu_i}\right) \times \mathcal{B}^{-\lambda} = \prod_{i} \mathsf{hp}_{i,1}^{z_{r_i}} \mathsf{hp}_{i,2}^{z_{s_i}}$$

which can be computed either from the commitments and the hashing keys, or from the projection keys and the witnesses. We stress again that the projected keys require the knowledge of ξ only: known from the LCSCom commitment or the first part C of the DLCSCom' commitment.

5 Language-Authenticated Key Exchange

5.1 The Ideal Functionality

We generalize the Password-Authenticated Key Exchange functionality \mathcal{F}_{PAKE} (first provided in [CHK⁺05]) to more complex languages: the players agree on a common secret key if and only if they own words that lie in the languages the partners have in mind. As before in this paper, the languages are formalized by an efficiently computable binary relation \mathcal{R} : $\{0,1\}^* \times \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ which defines the words $W \in \mathcal{S}$ that are in the language $L_{\mathcal{R}}(\text{pub, priv})$, according to the public part pub $\in \{0,1\}^*$ and the private part priv $\in \mathcal{P}$. More precisely, after an agreement on pub between P_i and P_j , player P_i uses a word W_i belonging to $L_i = L_{\mathcal{R}_i}(\text{pub, priv}_i)$ and it expects its partner P_j to use a word W_j belonging to the language $L'_j = L_{\mathcal{R}_j}(\text{pub, priv}'_j)$. We assume relations \mathcal{R}_i and \mathcal{R}_j to be specified by the kind of protocol we study (PAKE, Verifier-based PAKE, secret handshakes, ...) and so the languages are defined by the parameters pub, priv_i and priv_j: they both agree on the public part pub, to be possibly parsed in a different way by each player for each language according to the relations, player P_i owns $W_i \in L_i = L(\text{pub, priv}_i) \subseteq \mathcal{S}_i$, for priv_i $\in \mathcal{P}_i$, and expects player P_j to use the language $L'_j = L(\text{pub, priv}'_j) \subseteq \mathcal{S}_j$, for priv'_j $\in \mathcal{P}_j$. Symmetrically, player P_j owns $W_j \in L_j = L(\text{pub, priv}_j) \subseteq \mathcal{S}_j$ and expects player P_i to use the language $L'_i = L(\text{pub, priv}'_i) \subseteq \mathcal{S}_i$. The subsets $\mathcal{S}_i, \mathcal{S}_j$ and $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j$ are assumed public and determined by \mathcal{R}_i and \mathcal{R}_j , and thus by the kind of protocol.

Note however that the respective languages do not need to be the same or to use similar relations: authentication means could be totally different for the 2 players. The key exchange should succeed if and only if the two following pairs of equations hold: $(L'_i = L_i \text{ and } W_i \in L_i)$ and $(L'_j = L_j \text{ and } W_j \in L_j)$.

Description. In the initial \mathcal{F}_{PAKE} functionality [CHK⁺05], the adversary was given access to a TestPwd-query, which modeled the on-line dictionary attack. But it is known since [BCL⁺05] and [ACGP11] that it is equivalent to use the split functionality model [BCL⁺05], generate the NewSession-queries corresponding to the corrupted players and tell the adversary (on behalf of the corrupted player) whether the protocol should succeeds or not. Both methods enable the adversary to try a credential for a player (on-line dictionary attack). The second method (that we use here) implies allowing S to ask NewSession-queries on behalf of the corrupted player (hence the slight change in the NewSession-query on Figure 2), and letting him to be aware of the success or failure of the protocol: the adversary learns this information only when it plays on behalf of a player (static corruption or impersonation attempt). This is any way an information it would learn at the end of the protocol. We insist that third parties will not learn whether the protocol succeeded or not, as required for secret handshakes. To this aim, the NewKey-query informs the players whether the credentials are consistent with the languages or not. In addition, the split functionality model guarantees from the beginning which player is honest and which one is controlled by the adversary (see proof in Appendix D). This finally allows us to get rid of the TestPwd-query. The \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} functionality is presented on Figure 2.

The security goal is to show that the best attack for the adversary is a basic trial execution with a credential of its guess or choice: the proof will thus consist in emulating any real-life attack by either a trial execution by the adversary, playing as an honest player would do, but with a credential chosen by the adversary or obtained in any way; or a denial of service, where the adversary is clearly aware that its behavior will make the execution fail.

5.2 A Generic UC-Secure LAKE Construction

Intuition. Using smooth projective hash functions on commitments, one can generically define a LAKE protocol as done in [ACP09]. The basic idea is to make the player commit to their private information (for the expected languages and the owned words), and eventually the smooth projective hash functions will be used to make implicit validity checks of the global relation.

To this aim, we use the commitments and associated smooth projective hash function as described in Sections 3 and 4. More precisely, all examples of SPHF in Section 4 can be used on commitments divided into one or two parts (the non-equivocable LCSCom or the equivocable DLCSCom' commitments), the first part being denoted as C, and the second part (if needed) being denoted as C'. In the case of a two-part commitment, the first step of the commitment will consist in sending C along with a Pedersen commitment C'' on C' (with randomness t) and the second step of the

The functionality \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} is parametrized by a security parameter k. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P_1, \ldots, P_n via the following queries, where they already agree on the public parameter pub of the languages:

- New Session: Upon receiving a query (NewSession : sid, $P_i, P_j, W_i, L_i = L(pub, priv_i), L'_j = L(pub, priv'_j)$) from P_i or S (thus impersonating P_i (*)),
 - If this is the first NewSession-query with identifier sid, record the tuple $(P_i, P_j, W_i, L_i, L'_j, initiator)$. Send (NewSession; sid, P_i, P_j , pub, initiator) to S and P_j .
 - If this is the second NewSession-query with identifier sid and there is a record $(P_j, P_i, W_j, L_j, L'_i, initiator)$, record the tuple $(P_j, P_i, W_j, L_j, L'_i, initiator, W_i, L_i, L'_j, receiver)$. Send (NewSession; sid, P_i, P_j , pub, receiver) to S and P_j .
- Key Computation: Upon receiving a query (NewKey : sid) from S, if there is a record of the form $(P_i, P_j, W_i, L_i, L'_i)$, initiator, W_j, L_j, L'_i , receiver) and this is the first NewKey-query for session sid, then
 - If (L'_i = L_i and W_i ∈ L_i) and (L'_j = L_j and W_j ∈ L_j), then pick a random key sk of length k and store (sid, sk). Send (sid, success) to the two players P_i and P_j.
 - Else, store (sid, \perp), and (sid, fail) is sent to the two players P_i and P_j .
- Key Delivery: Upon receiving a query (SendKey : sid, P_i , sk) from S, then
 - if there is a record of the form (sid, sk'), then, if both players are uncorrupted, output (sid, sk') to P_i . Otherwise, output (sid, sk) to P_i .
 - if there is a record of the form (sid, \perp), then pick a random key sk' of length k and output (sid, sk') to P_i .

(*) This is possible when P_i is corrupted (controlled by the adversary), and then any message to P_i is sent to S

Fig. 2. Ideal Functionality \mathcal{F}_{LAKE}

commitment will consist in sending C' and the random t needed to check the Pedersen commitment. The relations on the committed values will not be explicitly checked, since the values will never be revealed, but will be implicitly checked using SPHF. It is interesting to note that in both cases (one-part or two-part commitment), the projected hash key will only depend on the first part C of the commitment.

As it is often the case in the UC setting, we need the initiator to use stronger primitives than the receiver. They both have to use non-malleable and extractable commitments, but the initiator will use a commitment that is additionally equivocable, the DLCSCom' in two parts ((C_i, C'_i) and $Com_i = C_i \cdot C'^{\varepsilon}$), while the receiver will only need the basic LCSCom commitment in one part ($Com_j = C_j$).

As already explained, SPHF will be used to implicitly check whether $(L'_i = L_i \text{ and } W_i \in L_i)$ and $(L'_j = L_j \text{ and } W_j \in L_j)$. But since in our instantiations private parameters priv and words W will have to be committed, the structure of these commitments will thus be publicly known in advance: commitments of \mathcal{P} -elements and \mathcal{S} -elements. Section 6 discusses on the languages captured by our definition, and illustrates with some AKE protocols. However, while these \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{S} sets are embedded in \mathbb{G}^n from some n, it might be important to prove that the committed values are actually in \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{S} (e.g., one can want to prove it commits bits, whereas they are first embedded as group elements in \mathbb{G} of large order p). This will be an additional language to check on the commitments, but it will be possible to check it on the \mathcal{C} part only, whatever the kind of commitment used, since equivocability will not be required for this sub-language.

Security Analysis. This leads to a very simple protocol described on Figure 3. Since we have to assume common pub, we make a first round (with flows in each direction) where the players send their contribution, to come up with pub. These flows will also be used to know which player is honest and which player is controlled by the adversary (as with the Split Functionality [BCL⁺05]). In case the languages have empty pub, these additional flows are not required, since the Split Functionality can be applied on the committed values, and thus the signing key for the receiver will not be required anymore. This LAKE protocol is secure against static corruptions. The proof is provided in Appendix D, and is in the same vein as the one in [ACP09]. However, it is a bit more intricate:

- in PAKE, when one is simulating a player, and knows the adversary used the correct password, one simply uses this password for the simulated player. In LAKE, when one knows the language expected by the adversary for the simulated player and has to simulate a successful execution (because of success announced by the NewKeyquery), one has to actually include a correct word in the commitment: smooth projective hash functions do not allow the simulator to cheat, equivocability of the commitment is the unique trapdoor, but with a valid word. The languages must allow the simulator to produce a valid word W in L(pub, priv), for any pub and $priv \in \mathcal{P}$ provided by the adversary or the environment. This will be the case in all the interesting applications of our protocol (see Section 6): if priv defines a Waters' verification key vk, with the master key s such that $h = g^s$, the signing key is sk = vk^s, and thus the simulator can sign any message; if such a master key does not exist, one can restrict \mathcal{P} , and implicitly check it with the SPHF (the additional language check, as said above). Execution between P_i and P_j , with session identifier sid.

- Preliminary Round: each user generates a pair of signing/verification keys (SK, VK) and sends VK together with its contribution to the public part of the language.

We denote by $\ell_i = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, \text{pub}, \text{VK}_i, \text{VK}_j)$ and by $\ell_j = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, \text{pub}, \text{VK}_j, \text{VK}_i)$, where pub is the combination of the contributions of the two players. The initiator now uses a word W_i in the language $L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_i)$, and the receiver uses a word W_j in the language $L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_i)$ (*). We assume commitments and associated smooth projective hash functions exist for these languages.

- First Round: user P_i (with random tape ω_i) generates a multi-DLCSCom' commitment on $(\text{priv}_i, \text{priv}'_j, W_i)$ in $(\mathcal{C}_i, \mathcal{C}'_i)$, under the label ℓ_i . It also computes a Pedersen commitment on \mathcal{C}'_i in \mathcal{C}''_i (with random exponent t). It then sends $(\mathcal{C}_i, \mathcal{C}''_i)$ to P_j ;
- Second Round: user P_j (with random tape ω_j) computes a multi-LCS commitment on (priv_j, priv'_i, W_j) in Com_j = C_j, with witness r, under the label ℓ_j. It then generates a challenge ε on C_i and hashing/projected keys (**) hk_i and hp_i associated to C_i (which will be associated to the future Com_i). It finally signs all the flows using SK_j in σ_j, and sends (C_j, ε, hp_i, σ_j) to P_i;
 Third Round: user P_i first checks the signature σ_j, computes Com_i = C_i × C_i^ε and witness z (from ε and ω_i), it generates
- Third Round: user P_i first checks the signature σ_j , computes $\mathsf{Com}_i = \mathcal{C}_i \times \mathcal{C}_i^{\prime \varepsilon}$ and witness \mathbf{z} (from ε and ω_i), it generates hashing/projected keys hk_j and hp_j associated to Com_j . It finally signs all the flows using SK_i in σ_i , and sends $(\mathcal{C}'_i, t, \mathsf{hp}_j, \sigma_i)$ to P_j ;
- Hashing: P_j first checks the signature σ_i and the correct opening of C''_i into C'_i , it computes $\text{Com}_i = C_i \times C'^{\epsilon}_i$. P_i computes K_i and P_j computes K_j as follows:

 $K_{i} = \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}_{j}, \{(\mathsf{priv}'_{j}, \mathsf{priv}_{i})\} \times L(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}'_{j}), \ell_{j}, \mathsf{Com}_{j}) \cdot \mathsf{ProjHash}(\mathsf{hp}_{i}, \{(\mathsf{priv}_{i}, \mathsf{priv}'_{j})\} \times L(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}_{i}), \ell_{i}, \mathsf{Com}_{i}; \mathbf{z})$ $K_{j} = \mathsf{ProjHash}(\mathsf{hp}_{i}, \{(\mathsf{priv}'_{j}, \mathsf{priv}'_{j})\} \times L(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}'_{j}), \ell_{j}, \mathsf{Com}_{j}; \mathbf{r}) \cdot \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}_{i}, \{(\mathsf{priv}'_{i}, \mathsf{priv}_{j})\} \times L(\mathsf{pub}, \mathsf{priv}'_{i}), \ell_{i}, \mathsf{Com}_{i})$

(*) As explained in Section 1, recall that the languages considered depend on two possibly different relations, namely $L_i = L_{\mathcal{R}_i}(\mathsf{pub},\mathsf{priv}_i)$ and $L_j = L_{\mathcal{R}_j}(\mathsf{pub},\mathsf{priv}_j)$, but we omit them for the sake of clarity. (**) Recall that the SPHF is constructed in such a way that this projected key does not depend on \mathcal{C}'_i and is indeed associated to the future whole Com_i .

Fig. 3. Language-based Authenticated Key Exchange from a Smooth Projective Hash Function on Commitments

- In addition, as already noted, our commitment DLCSCom' is not formally binding (contrarily to the much less efficient one used in [ACP09]). The adversary can indeed make the extraction give M from C_i , whereas Com_i will eventually contain M' if C'_i does not encrypt $(1_{\mathbb{G}})^n$. However, since the actual value M' depends on the random challenge ε , and the language is assumed sparse (otherwise authentication is easy), the protocol will fail: this can be seen as a denial of service from the adversary.

Theorem 1. Our LAKE scheme from Figure 3 realizes the \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} functionality in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model, in the presence of static adversaries, under the DLin assumption and the security of the One-Time Signature.

6 Concrete Instantiations and Comparisons

In this section, we first give some concrete instantiations of several AKE protocols, using our generic protocol of LAKE, and compare the efficiencies of those instantiations.

6.1 Useful Languages

This section details some relations and languages to be thereafter used in concrete instantiations. The same way as before, we will underline elements the prover wants to keep private, and that will be committed either with the LCSCom non-equivocable commitment or the DLCSCom' equivocable commitment. Equality tests and linear pairing product equations have been detailed earlier. We explain here how we can additionally restrict the space of the committed values.

Bit Commitment: $\underline{m} \in \{0, 1\}$. Player P_i owns a word W_i which is either 0 or 1, and wants to prove it. The apparent problem with disjunction of languages from [ACP09] comes from the fact the projection key relies on the final commitment. This makes no difference for the LCSCom but can be problematic in the case of the DLCSCom'. While in a regular context this does not create extra problems, this contradicts the creation of our projection key before the end of the equivocable commitment (in the third round of the protocol). But in our case, the verifier will build the projection key on the sole pre-commit C, and we make sure that in our simulation for the proof the simulator always pre-commits to $m_i = 0$: we do not need the equivocability on that property for the commitment. However, this bitlanguage will often be in combination with some other languages (like "a valid signature"): the computation of the

 P_i uses a password W_i and P_j uses a password W_j . We denote $\ell = (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j)$.

- First Round: P_i (with random tape ω_i) first generates a pair of signing/verification keys (SK_i, VK_i) and a DLCSCom' commitment on W_i in (C_i, C'_i) , under $\ell_i = (\ell, VK_i)$. It also computes a Pedersen commitment on C'_i in C''_i (with random exponent t). It then sends (VK_i, C_i, C''_i) to P_j ;
- Second Round: P_j (with random tape ω_j) computes a LCSCom commitment on W_j in $\text{Com}_j = C_j$, with witness r, under the label ℓ . It then generates a challenge ε on C_i and hashing/projected keys hk_i and the corresponding hp_i for the equality test on Com_i ("Com_i is a valid commitment of W_j ", this only requires the value ξ_i computable thanks to C_i). It then sends (C_j, ε, hp_i) to P_i ;
- Third Round: user P_i can compute $\mathsf{Com}_i = \mathcal{C}_i \times \mathcal{C}_i^{\varepsilon}$ and witness \mathbf{z} (from ε and ω_i), it generates hashing/projected keys hk_j and hp_j for the equality test on Com_j . It finally signs all the flows using SK_i in σ_i and send $(\mathcal{C}'_i, t, \mathsf{hp}_j, \sigma_i)$ to P_j ;
- Hashing: P_j first checks the signature and the validity of the Pedersen commitment (thanks to t), it computes $\text{Com}_i = C_i \times C_i^{\prime \varepsilon}$. P_i computes K_i and P_j computes K_j as follows:

 $K_{i} = \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}_{j}, L'_{j}, \ell, \mathsf{Com}_{j}) \cdot \mathsf{ProjHash}(\mathsf{hp}_{i}, L_{i}, \ell_{i}, \mathsf{Com}_{i}; \mathbf{z})$ $K_{j} = \mathsf{ProjHash}(\mathsf{hp}_{j}, L_{j}, \ell, \mathsf{Com}_{j}; \mathbf{r}) \cdot \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}_{i}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, \mathsf{Com}_{i})$

Fig. 4. Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange

hash values for the bit-language will be on the commitment C only, while the contribution for the other languages will be on the final commitment (and the hash values will be multiplied).

Finite Subset: $\underline{m} \in S = \{A, B, \ldots\}$. Player P_i owns a word W_i in a (polynomial-sized) set S. This follows the same idea as before, except that in this case, the simulator in the proof will always pre-commit to A, which does not require equivocability on the C part of the commitment since it is in this language. Equivocation can be required to make it in a more specific language, but then this will be checked with another SPHF on the full commitment.

6.2 Concrete Instantiations

Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. Using our generic construction, we can easily obtain a PAKE protocol, as described on Figure 4, where we optimize from the generic construction, since $pub = \emptyset$, removing the agreement on pub, but still keeping the signing key VK_i to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks since it has another later flow: P_i uses a password W_i and expects P_j to own the same word, and thus in the language $L'_j = L_i = \{W_i\}$; P_j uses a password W_j and expects P_i to own the same word, and thus in the language $L'_i = L_j = \{W_i\}$; The relation is the equality test between priv_i and priv_j, which both have no restriction in \mathbb{G} (hence $\mathcal{P} = \mathbb{G}$). As the word W_i , the language private parameters priv_i of a user and priv'_j of the expected language for the other user are the same, each user can commit in the protocol to only one value: its password.

It is quite efficient, as discussed in the next session, and relies on the DLin assumption. We can of course instantiate it with the Cramer-Shoup variant, under the DDH assumption, and it becomes even more efficient.

Verifier-based PAKE. The above scheme can be modified into an efficient PAKE protocol that is additionally secure against *server compromise*: the also so-called verifier-based PAKE, where the client owns a password pw, while the server knows a verifier only, such as g^{pw} , so that in case of break-in to the server, the adversary will not immediately get all the passwords.

To this aim, as usually done, one first does a PAKE with g^{pw} as common password, then asks the client to additionally prove it can compute the Diffie-Hellman value h^{pw} for a basis h chosen by the server. Ideally, we could implement this trick, where the client P_j just considers the equality test between the g^{pw} and the value committed by the server for the language $L'_i = L_j$, while the server P_i considers the equality test with (g^{pw}, h^{pw}) , where h is sent as its contribution to the public part of the language by the server $L_i = L'_j$. Since the server chooses h itself, it chooses it as $h = g^{\alpha}$, for an ephemeral random α , and can thus compute $h^{pw} = (g^{pw})^{\alpha}$. On its side, the client can compute this value since it knows pw. The client could thus commit to (g^{pw}, h^{pw}) , in order to prove its knowledge of pw, whereas the server could just commit to g^{pw} . Unfortunately, from the extractability of the server commitment, one would just get g^{pw} , which is not enough to simulate the client.

To make it in a provable way, the server chooses an ephemeral h as above, and they both run the previous PAKE protocol with (g^{pw}, h^{pw}) as common password, and mutually checked: h is seen as a the pub part, hence the preliminary flows are required.

Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange. In [CCGS10], the authors proposed instantiations of the CAKE primitive for conjunctions² of atomic policies that are defined algebraically by relations of the form $\prod_{j=1}^{k} g_j^{F_j} = 1$ where the g_j 's are elements of an abelian group and F_j 's are integer polynomials in the variables committed by the users. We can construct LAKE for languages with the same expressibility using the construction from Section 5.2. The resulting schemes are faster and more bandwidth-efficient than the proposals from [CCGS10]. Our schemes require two interleaved executions of the commitment scheme where the CAKE schemes need at least three.

In [CCGS10], the core of their constructions relies on their practical UC zero-knowledge proof. There is no precise instantiations of such proof, but it is very likely to be inefficient. Their proof technique indeed requires to transform the underlying Σ -protocols into corresponding Ω -protocols [GMY06] by verifiably encrypting the witness. An Ω -protocol is a Σ -protocol with the additional property that it admits a polynomial-time straight-line extractor. Since the witnesses are scalars in their algebraic relations, their approach requires either inefficient bit-per-bit encryption of these witnesses or Paillier encryption in which case the problem of using group with different orders in the representation and in the encryption requires additional overhead.

Even when used with Σ -protocols, their PAKE scheme without UC-security, requires at least two proofs of knowledge of representations that involve at least 30 group elements (if we assume the encryption to be linear Cramer Shoup), and some extra for the last proof of existence (*cf.* [CKS11]), where our PAKE requires at most 22 group elements (see next section). Anyway they say, their PAKE scheme is less efficient than [CHK⁺05], which needed 6 rounds and around 30 modular exponentiations per user, while our efficient PAKE requires overall 42 exponentiations in only 3 rounds. Our scheme is therefore more efficient than the scheme from [CHK⁺05] for the same security level (*i.e.* UC-security with static corruptions).

Secret-handshakes. We can also instantiate a (linkable) Secret Handshakes protocol, using our scheme with two different languages: P_i will commit to a valid signature σ_i on a message m_i (his identity for example), under a private verification key vk_i, and expects P_j to commit to a valid signature on a message m'_j under a private verification key vk'_j; but P_j will do analogously with a signature σ_j on m_j under vk_j, while expecting a signature on m'_i under vk'_i. The public parts of the signature (the second component) are sent in clear with the commitments.

In a regular Secret Handshakes both users should use the same languages. But here, we have a more general situation (called *dynamic matching* in [AKB07]): the two participants will have the same final value if and only if they both belong to the organization the other expects. If one lies, our protocol guarantees no information leakage. Furthermore, the semantic security of the session is even guaranteed with respect to the authorities, in a forward-secure way (this property is also achieved in [JL09] but in a weaker security model). Finally, our scheme supports revocation and can handle roles as in [AKB07].

Standard secret handshakes, like [AKB07], usually work with credentials delivered by a unique authority, this would remove our need for a hidden verification key, and private part of the language. Both users would only need to commit to signatures on their identity/credential, and show that they are valid. This would require 24 group elements with our approach. Their construction requires only 4 elements under BDH, however it relies on the asymmetric Waters IBE with only two elements, whereas the only security proof known for such IBE [Duc10] requires an extra term in \mathbb{G}_2 which would render their technique far less efficient, as several extra terms would be needed to expect a provably secure scheme. While sometimes less effective, our LAKE approach can manage Secret Handshakes, and provide additional functionalities, like more granular control on the credential as part of them can be expressly hidden by both the users. More precisely, we provide affiliation-hiding property and let third parties unaware of the success/failure of the protocol.

Unlinkable Secret-handshakes. Moving the users' identity from the public pub part to individual private priv part or even to the word W, and combining our technique with [BPV12], it is also possible to design an *unlinkable* Secret Handshakes protocol [JL09] with practical efficiency. It illustrates the case where committed values have to be proven in a strict subset of \mathbb{G} , as one has to commit to bits: the signed message M is now committed and not in clear, it thus has to be done bit-by-bit since the encoding \mathcal{G} does not allow algebraic operations with the content to apply the Waters function on the message. It is thus possible to prove the knowledge of a Waters signature on a private message (identity) valid under a private verification key. Additional relations can be required on the latter to make authentication even stronger.

² Camenisch *et al.* [CCGS10] claim that their CAKE protocol can also handle disjunctions of such languages but the technique relies on known techniques for circuit evaluation (based on homomorphic encryption) and are even less efficient.

DLin	G	\mathbb{Z}_p	Exp.	CSCom	\mathbb{G}	\mathbb{Z}_p	Exp.
LCSCom	5n	0	7n + 2	CSCom	4n	0	4n + 1
DLCSCom	10n+1	2	18n + 6	DCSCom	8n+1	2	12n + 5
Equality	2	0	14	Equality	1	0	10
LPPE	2n + 1	0	10n + 11	LPPE	n+1	0	7n + 9
OR	1	0	12	OR	1	0	9
Table 1. Computational and Communication Costs							3

6.3 Complexity

In the Table 1, we give the number of elements to be sent (group elements or scalars) and the number of exponentiations to compute for each operation (commitment and SPHF), where we consider the Equality Test, the Linear Pairing Product Equations and the OR languages. One has to commit all the private inputs, and then the cost for relations is just the additional overhead due to the projected keys and hashing computations once the elements are already committed: an LCSCom commitment is 5 group elements, and a DLCSCom' is twice more, plus the Pedersen commitment, the challenge ε and the opening t, and thus 13 elements. If the global language is a conjunction of several languages, one should simply add all the costs, and consider the product of all the sub-hashes as the final hash value from the SPHF.

PAKE. Two users want to prove to each other they possess the same password. In this case $W_i = \text{priv}_j = \text{priv}_i = \text{priv}_j = \text{priv}_i = W_j$. So P_i will commit to his password, and thus a unique DLCSCom commitment for W_i , priv_i and priv_i' . This is the same for P_j , but with an LCSCom. They then send projected keys for equality tests: 13 group elements and 2 scalars for Com_i and 7 group elements for Com_j, plus VK_i and sk_i. This leads to 20 group elements and two scalars our PAKE scheme. The DDH-based variant would use 15 group elements and 2 scalars only in total, which is far more efficient than existing solutions, and namely [ACP09] that uses a bit-per-bit commitment to provide equivocability.

Verifier-based PAKE. As explained earlier, we do a PAKE with the common password (g^{pw}, h^{pw}) , where *h* has been chosen by the server: the commitment Com_i needs 21 group elements plus 2 scalars, and 4 additional group elements to check it; the commitment Com_j needs 10 group elements, and 4 additional elements to check it. Because of the ephemeral *h*, one has to send in total 40 group elements and 2 scalars, plus the one-time signatures. The DDH-based variant would use 29 group elements and 2 scalars only in total.

Secret Handshake. The users want to check their partner possesses a valid signature on their public identity or pseudonym (in pub) under some valid but private verification key (affiliation-hiding). More precisely, P_i wants to prove he possesses a valid signature σ on the public message m (his identity or a pseudonym) under a private verification key vk: we thus have m in the pub part, $\text{priv}_i = \text{vk}$ and $W = \sigma$. This is the same for P_j . Using Waters signature, $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$, where σ_1 only has to be encrypted, because σ_2 does not contain any information, it can thus be sent in clear. To achieve unlinkability, one can rerandomize this signature σ to make the σ_2 values different and independent each time.

As a consequence, the committed values are: vk that can be any group element, since with the master secret key s such that $h = g^s$ for the global parameters of the Waters signature (see Appendix A.3) one can derive the signing key associated to any verification key, and thus generate a valid word in the language; and σ_1 . One additionally sends σ_2 in clear, and so 22 group elements plus 2 scalars for Com_i, and 11 group elements for Com_j. The languages to be verified are priv_i = priv'_i, on the committed priv_i = vk_i with the expected priv'_i = vk'_i, and the Linear Pairing Product Equation for the committed signature σ_i , but under the expected vk'_i: 5 group elements for the projected keys in both directions: 43 group elements plus 2 scalars are sent in total (plus the one-time signatures).

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A Preliminaries

A.1 Formal Definitions of the Primitives

We first recall the definitions of the basic tools, with the security notions with success/advantage that all depend on a security parameter (which is omitted here for simplicity of notation).

Hash Function Family. A hash function family \mathcal{H} is a family of functions \mathfrak{H}_K from $\{0,1\}^*$ to a fixed-length output, either $\{0,1\}^k$ or \mathbb{Z}_p . Such a family is said *collision-resistant* if for any adversary \mathcal{A} on a random function $\mathfrak{H}_K \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}$, it is hard to find a collision. More precisely, we denote

 $\mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathfrak{H}_K \stackrel{\hspace{0.1em}\mathsf{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}, (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathfrak{H}_K) : \mathfrak{H}_K(m_0) = \mathfrak{H}_K(m_1)], \qquad \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \{\mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(\mathcal{A})\}.$

Labeled encryption scheme. A labeled public-key encryption scheme is defined by four algorithms:

- Setup (1^k) , where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme;
- KeyGen(param) generates a pair of keys, the encryption key ek and the decryption key dk;
- Encrypt(ℓ , ek, m; r) produces a ciphertext c on the input message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ under the label ℓ and encryption key ek, using the random coins r;
- $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\ell, \mathsf{dk}, c)$ outputs the plaintext m encrypted in c under the label ℓ , or \perp .

An encryption scheme \mathcal{E} should satisfy the following properties

- Correctness: for all key pair (ek, dk), any label ℓ , all random coins r and all messages m,

 $\mathsf{Decrypt}(\ell, \mathsf{dk}, \mathsf{Encrypt}(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, m; r)) = m.$

- Indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where the adversary A keeps some internal state between the various calls FIND and GUESS, and makes use of the oracle ODecrypt:
 - ODecrypt(ℓ, c): This oracle outputs the decryption of c under the label ℓ and the challenge decryption key dk. The input queries (ℓ, c) are added to the list CT.

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{E},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{cca}-b}(k) \\ & 1.\mathsf{param} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^k) \\ & 2.(\mathsf{ek},\mathsf{dk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{param}) \\ & 3.(\ell^*,m_0,m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\texttt{FIND}:\mathsf{ek},\mathsf{ODecrypt}(\cdot,\cdot)) \\ & 4.c^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Encrypt}(\ell,\mathsf{ek},m_b) \\ & 5.b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\texttt{GUESS}:c^*,\mathsf{ODecrypt}(\cdot,\cdot)) \\ & 6.\mathsf{IF} \quad (\ell^*,c^*) \in \mathcal{CT} \; \texttt{RETURN} \quad 0 \\ & 7.\mathsf{ELSE} \; \; \texttt{RETURN} \quad b' \end{aligned}$$

The advantages are

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{cca}-1}_{\mathcal{E},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1] \quad \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \{\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{A})\}$$

Labeled commitment scheme. A labeled commitment scheme is defined by three algorithms:

- Setup (1^k) , where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme;
- Commit $(\ell, m; r)$ produces a commitment c and the opening information d on the input message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ under the label ℓ , using the random coins r;
- Decommit (ℓ, c, m, d) checks the validity of the opening information d on the commitment c for the message m under the label ℓ . It answers 1 for true, and 0 for false.

A commitment scheme C should satisfy the following properties

- Correctness: for any label ℓ , and all messages m, if $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\ell, m; r)$, then $\text{Decommit}(\ell, c, m, d) = 1$.
- *Hiding*: this security notion is similar to the indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks for encryption, which means that c does not help to distinguish between to candidates m_0 and m_1 as committed values.
- *Binding*: this security notion is more an unforgeability notion, which means that for any commitment c, it should be hard to open it in two different ways, which means to exhibit (m_0, d_0) and (m_1, d_1) , such that $m_0 \neq m_1$ and $\text{Decommit}(\ell, c, m_0, d_0) = \text{Decommit}(\ell, c, m_1, d_1) = 1$.

The commitment algorithm can be interactive between the sender and the received, but the hiding and the binding properties should still hold. Several additional properties are sometimes required:

- *Extractability*: an indistinguishable Setup procedure also outputs a trapdoor that allows a extractor to get the committed value m from any commitment c. More precisely, if c can be open in a valid way, the extractor can get this value from the commitment.
- *Equivocability*: an indistinguishable Setup procedure also outputs a trapdoor that allows a simulator to generate commitments that can thereafter be open in any way.
- *Non-Malleability*: it should be hard, from a commitment c to generate a new commitment $c' \neq c$ whose committed values are in relation.

It is well-known that any IND-CCA encryption scheme leads to a non-malleable and extractable commitment scheme [GL03].

Signature scheme. A signature scheme is defined by four algorithms:

- Setup (1^k) , where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme;
- KeyGen(param) generates a pair of keys, the verification key vk and the signing key sk;
- Sign(sk, m; s) produces a signature σ on the input message m, under the signing key sk, and using the random coins s;
- Verif(vk, m, σ) checks whether σ is a valid signature on m, w.r.t. the public key vk; it outputs 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.

A signature scheme S should satisfy the following properties

- *Correctness*: for all key pair (vk, sk), all random coins s and all messages m, Verif(vk, m, Sign(sk, m; s)) = 1.
- *Existential unforgeability under (adaptive) chosen-message attacks*: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where it makes use of the oracle OSign:
 - OSign(m): This oracle outputs a valid signature on m under the signing key sk. The input queries m are added to the list SM.

The success probabilities are

$$\mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf}-\mathsf{cma}}_{\mathcal{S}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{euf}}_{\mathcal{S},\mathcal{A}}(k) = 1] \quad \mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf}-\mathsf{cma}}_{\mathcal{S}}(k,t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \{\mathsf{Succ}^{\mathsf{euf}-\mathsf{cma}}_{\mathcal{S}}(\mathcal{A})\}$$

A.2 Computational Assumptions

The three classical assumptions we use along this paper are: the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH), the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the decisional Linear (DLin) assumptions. Our constructions essentially rely on the DLin assumption, that implies the CDH. It is the most general since it (presumably) holds in many groups, with or without pairing. Some more efficient instantiations will rely on the DDH assumption but in more specific groups.

Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)). The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption says that, in a group (p, \mathbb{G}, g) , when we are given (g^a, g^b) for unknown random $a, b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to compute g^{ab} . We define by $Succ_{p,\mathbb{G},q}^{cdh}(t)$ the best advantage an adversary can have in finding g^{ab} within time t.

Definition 3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)). The Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption says that, in a group (p, \mathbb{G}, g) , when we are given (g^a, g^b, g^c) for unknown random $a, b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to decide whether $c = ab \mod p$ (a DH tuple) or $c \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$ (a random tuple). We define by $\operatorname{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\operatorname{ddh}}(t)$ the best advantage an adversary can have in distinguishing a DH tuple from a random tuple within time t.

Definition 4 (Decisional Linear Problem (DLin)). The Decisional Linear Problem [BBS04] says that, in a group (p, \mathbb{G}, g) , when we are given $(g^x, g^y, g^{xa}, g^{yb}, g^c)$ for unknown random $x, y, a, b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to decide whether $c = a + b \mod p$ (a linear tuple) or $c \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$ (a random tuple). We define by $\operatorname{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\operatorname{din}}(t)$ the best advantage an adversary can have in distinguishing a linear tuple from a random tuple within time t.

A.3 Some Primitives in Symmetric Groups – Based on DLin

Linear Cramer-Shoup (LCS) encryption scheme. The Linear Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [Sha07] can be tuned to a labeled public-key encryption scheme:

- Setup (1^k) generates a group \mathbb{G} of order p, with three independent generators $(g_1, g_2, g_3) \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^3$;
- KeyGen(param) generates dk = $(x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^9$, and sets, for $i = 1, 2, c_i = g_i^{x_i} g_3^{x_3}$, $d_i = g_i^{y_i} g_3^{y_3}$, and $h_i = g_i^{z_i} g_3^{z_3}$. It also chooses a hash function \mathfrak{H}_K in a collision-resistant hash family \mathcal{H} (or simply a Universal One-Way Hash Function). The encryption key is ek = $(c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2, h_1, h_2, \mathfrak{H}_K)$.
- Encrypt $(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M; r, s)$, for a message $M \in \mathbb{G}$ and two random scalars $r, s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, the ciphertext is $\mathcal{C} = (\mathbf{u} = (g_1^r, g_2^s, g_3^{r+s}), e = M \cdot h_1^r h_2^s, v = (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^r (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^s)$, where v is computed afterwards with $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$.
- Decrypt $(\ell, \mathsf{dk}, \mathcal{C} = (\mathbf{u}, e, v))$: one first computes $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$ and checks whether $u_1^{x_1 + \xi y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2 + \xi y_2} \cdot u_3^{x_3 + \xi y_3} \stackrel{?}{=} v$. If the equality holds, one computes $M = e/(u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3})$ and outputs M. Otherwise, one outputs \perp .

This scheme is indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks, under the DLin assumption and if one uses a collision-resistant hash function \mathcal{H} .

 $\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{S},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{euf}-\mathsf{cma}}(k) \\ & 1.\mathsf{param} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^k) \\ & 2.(\mathsf{vk},\mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{param}) \\ & 3.(m^*,\sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{vk},\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot)) \\ & 4.b \leftarrow \mathsf{Verif}(\mathsf{vk},m^*,\sigma^*) \\ & 5.\mathsf{IF} \quad M \in \mathcal{SM} \text{ RETURN } 0 \\ & 6.\mathsf{ELSE} \quad \mathsf{RETURN} \quad b \end{aligned}$

Waters signature. The Waters signature [Wat05] is defined as follows:

- Setup(1^k): In a pairing-friendly setting $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, one chooses a random vector $\mathbf{f} = (f_0, \dots, f_k) \stackrel{*}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^{k+1}$ that defines the Waters hash function $\mathcal{F}(M) = f_0 \prod_{i=1}^k f_i^{M_i}$ for $M \in \{0, 1\}^k$, and an extra generator $h \stackrel{*}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$. The global parameters param consist of all these elements $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e, \mathbf{f}, h)$.
- KeyGen(param) chooses a random scalar $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which defines the public verification key as $vk = g^x$, and the secret signing key as $sk = h^x$.
- Sign(sk, M; s) outputs, for some random $s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p, \sigma = (\sigma_1 = \mathsf{sk} \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^s, \sigma_2 = g^s).$
- Verif(vk, M, σ) checks whether $e(\sigma_1, g) \stackrel{?}{=} e(h, vk) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$.

This scheme is existentially unforgeable against (adaptive) chosen-message attacks [GMR88] under the CDH assumption.

A.4 Some Primitives in Asymmetric Groups – Based on DDH

Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] can be tuned into a labeled public-key encryption scheme:

- Setup (1^k) generates a group \mathbb{G} of order p, with a generator g
- KeyGen(param) generates $(g_1, g_2) \stackrel{\text{\tiny \$}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^2$, dk = $(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z) \stackrel{\text{\tiny \$}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^5$, and sets, $c = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}$, $d = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}$, and $h = g_1^z$. It also chooses a collision-resistant hash function \mathfrak{H}_K in a hash family \mathcal{H} (or simply a Universal One-Way Hash Function). The encryption key is ek = $(g_1, g_2, c, d, h, \mathfrak{H}_K)$.
- Encrypt $(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M; r)$, for a message $M \in \mathbb{G}$ and a random scalar $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the ciphertext is $C = (\ell, \mathbf{u} = (g_1^r, g_2^r), e = M \cdot h^r, v = (cd^{\xi})^r)$, where v is computed afterwards with $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$.
- Decrypt (ℓ, dk, C) : one first computes $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$ and checks whether $u_1^{x_1+\xi y_1} \cdot u_2^{x_2+\xi y_2} \stackrel{?}{=} v$. If the equality holds, one computes $M = e/(u_1^z)$ and outputs M. Otherwise, one outputs \perp .

This scheme is indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks, under the DDH assumption and if one uses a collision-resistant hash function \mathcal{H} .

Waters signature (asymmetric). This variant of the Waters signature has been proposed and proved in [BFPV11]:

- Setup(1^k): In a bilinear group $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, one chooses a random vector $\mathbf{f} = (f_0, \dots, f_k) \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_1^{k+1}$, an extra generator $h_1 \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_1$. The global parameters param consist of $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, e, \mathbf{f}, h_1)$.
- KeyGen(param) chooses a random scalar $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which defines the public vk = \mathfrak{g}_1^x , and the secret sk = h_1^x .
- Sign(sk, M; s) outputs, for some random $s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\sigma = (\sigma_1 = \mathsf{sk} \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^s, \sigma_2 = (g_1^s, \mathfrak{g}_1^s))$.
- Verif(vk, M, σ) checks whether $e(\sigma_1, \mathfrak{g}_1) = e(h_1, \mathsf{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_{2,2})$, and $e(\sigma_{2,1}, \mathfrak{g}_1) = e(g_1, \sigma_{2,2})$.

This scheme is unforgeable under the following variant of the CDH assumption:

Definition 5 (The Advanced Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH⁺)). In a pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$. The CDH⁺ assumption states that given $(g_1, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_1^a, \mathfrak{g}_1^a, \mathfrak{g}_1^b)$, for random $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to compute g_1^{ab} .

B Multi Double Linear Cramer-Shoup Commitment

B.1 Multi Double Linear Cramer-Shoup (n - DLCS) Encryption

We can extend the encryption scheme implicitly presented in Section 3 to vectors $(M_i, N_i)_{i=1,...,n}$, partially IND-CCA protected, with a common ξ . It of course also includes the n - LCS scheme on vectors $(M_i)_i$, when ignoring the C' part, which is already anyway the case for the decryption oracle:

- Setup (1^k) generates a group \mathbb{G} of order p, with three independent generators $(g_1, g_2, g_3) \stackrel{\hspace{0.1em}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^3$;
- KeyGen(param) generates dk = $(x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3) \notin \mathbb{Z}_p^9$, and sets, for $i = 1, 2, c_i = g_i^{x_i} g_3^{x_3}$, $d_i = g_i^{y_i} g_3^{y_3}$, and $h_i = g_i^{z_i} g_3^{z_3}$. It also chooses a collision-resistant hash function \mathfrak{H}_K . The encryption key is $\mathsf{ek} = (c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2, h_1, h_2, \mathfrak{H}_K)$.

– Encrypt $(\ell,\mathsf{ek}, oldsymbol{M}; oldsymbol{r}, oldsymbol{s})$, for a vector $oldsymbol{M} \in \mathbb{G}^n$ and two vectors $oldsymbol{r}, oldsymbol{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, computes

$$\mathcal{C} = (\mathcal{C}_1, \dots, \mathcal{C}_n), \text{ where } \mathcal{C}_i = (\mathbf{u}_i = (g_1^{r_i}, g_2^{s_i}, g_3^{r_i + s_i}), e_i = M_i \cdot h_1^{r_i} h_2^{s_i}, v_i = (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^{r_i} (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^{s_i})$$

with the v_i computed afterwards with $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n, e_1, \dots, e_n)$.

- Encrypt' $(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, N, \xi; a, b)$, for a vector $N \in \mathbb{G}^n$ and two vectors $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, computes

$$\mathcal{C}' = (\mathcal{C}'_1, \dots, \mathcal{C}'_n), \text{ where } \mathcal{C}'_i = (\boldsymbol{\alpha}_i = (g_1^{a_i}, g_2^{b_i}, g_3^{a_i+b_i}), \beta_i = N_i \cdot h_1^{a_i} h_2^{b_i}, \gamma_i = (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^{a_i} (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^{b_i})$$

where the γ_i 's are computed with the above $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n, e_1, \dots, e_n)$, hence the additional input. One can use both simultaneously: on input $(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M, N; r, s, a, b)$, the global encryption algorithm first calls $\mathsf{Encrypt}(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M; r, s)$ and to get \mathcal{C} and ξ , and then calls $\mathsf{Encrypt}'(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, N, \xi; a, b)$ to get \mathcal{C}' .

- Decrypt(ℓ, dk, C, C'): one first parses C = (C₁,...,C_n) and C' = (C'₁,...,C'_n), where C_i = (u_i, e_i, v_i) and C'_i = (α_i, β_i, γ_i), for i = 1,...,n, computes ξ = 𝔅_K(ℓ, u₁,..., u_n, e₁,..., e_n) and checks whether, for i = 1,...,n, u^{x₁+ξy₁} · u^{x₂+ξy₂} · u^{x₃+ξy₃} ? v_i (but not for the γ_i's). If the equality holds, one computes M_i = e_i/(u^{z₁}_{i,1}u^{z₂}_{i,2}u^{z₃}_{i,3}) and N_i = β_i/(α^{z₁}_{i,1}α^{z₂}_{i,2}α^{z₃}_{i,3}), and outputs (M = (M₁,...,M_n), N = (N₁,...,N_n)). Otherwise, one outputs ⊥.
 PDecrypt(ℓ, dk, C): is a partial decryption algorithm that does as above but working on the C part only to get
- $\boldsymbol{M} = (M_1, \ldots, M_n)$ or \perp .

DLCS denotes the particular case where n = 1: DLCS $(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M, N; r, s, a, b) = (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C}')$, with

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C} &= (\mathbf{u} = (g_1^r, g_2^s, g_3^{r+s}), e = M \cdot h_1^r h_2^s, v = (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^r (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^s) = \mathsf{LCS}(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, M; r, s), \\ \mathcal{C}' &= (\alpha_i = (g_1^a, g_2^b, g_3^{a+b}), \beta = N \cdot h_1^a h_2^b, \gamma = (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^a (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^b) = \mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell, \mathsf{ek}, N, \xi; a, b) \end{aligned}$$

where $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$.

B.2 Security of the Multi Double Linear Cramer Shoup Encryption

Security model. This scheme is indistinguishable against *partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext* attacks, where a partial-decryption oracle only is available, but even when we allow the adversary to choose M and N in two different steps (see the security game below), under the DLin assumption and if one uses a collision-resistant hash function \mathcal{H} .

Indistinguishability against partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext attacks for vectors, in two steps: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where the adversary \mathcal{A} keeps some internal state between the various calls FIND_M, FIND_N and GUESS. In the first stage FIND_M, it receives the encryption key ek; in the second stage FIND_N, it receives the encryption of \mathcal{M}_b : $\mathcal{C}^* = \text{Encrypt}(\ell, \text{ek}, \mathcal{M}_b)$; in the last stage GUESS it receives the encryption of \mathcal{N}_b : $\mathcal{C}'^* = \text{Encrypt}'(\ell, \text{ek}, \xi^*, \mathcal{N}_b)$, where ξ^* is the value involved in \mathcal{C} . During all these stages, it can make use of the oracle ODecrypt (ℓ, \mathcal{C}) , that outputs the decryption of \mathcal{C} under the label ℓ and the challenge decryption key dk, using PDecrypt $(\ell, \text{dk}, \mathcal{C})$. The input queries (ℓ, \mathcal{C}) are added to the list \mathcal{CT} .

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Exp}_{\mathcal{E},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}-b}(k,n) \\ & 1.\mathsf{param} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^k); \, (\mathsf{ek},\mathsf{dk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{param}) \\ & 2.(\ell^*, \boldsymbol{M}_0, \boldsymbol{M}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\texttt{FIND}_M : \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{ODecrypt}(\cdot, \cdot)) \\ & 3.\mathcal{C}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Encrypt}(\ell^*, \mathsf{ek}, \boldsymbol{M}_b) \\ & 4.(\boldsymbol{N}_0, \boldsymbol{N}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\texttt{FIND}_N : \mathcal{C}^*, \mathsf{ODecrypt}(\cdot, \cdot)) \\ & 5.\mathcal{C}'^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Encrypt}'(\ell^*, \mathsf{ek}, \xi^*, \boldsymbol{N}_b) \\ & 6.b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{GUESS} : \mathcal{C}'^*, \mathsf{ODecrypt}(\cdot, \cdot)) \\ & 7.\mathsf{IF} \ (\ell^*, \mathcal{C}^*) \in \mathcal{CT} \text{ RETURN } 0 \\ & 8.\mathsf{ELSE} \ \mathsf{RETURN} \ b' \end{aligned}$$

The advantages are, where q_d is the number of decryption queries:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{A}) &= \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}-1}_{\mathcal{E},\mathcal{A}}(k,n) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}-0}_{\mathcal{E},\mathcal{A}}(k,n) = 1] \\ \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(n,q_d,t) &= \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{A}). \end{split}$$

Theorem 6. The Multiple n - DLCS encryption scheme is IND-PD-CCA if \mathcal{H} is a collision-resistant hash function family, under the DLin assumption in \mathbb{G} :

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{n-\mathsf{DLCS}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}(n,q_d,t) \le 4n \times \left(\mathsf{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\mathsf{dlin}}(t) + \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) + \frac{q_d}{p}\right).$$

Corollary 7. The Multiple n - LCS encryption scheme is IND-CCA if H is a collision-resistant hash function family, under the DLin assumption in \mathbb{G} .

Security proof. Let us be given a DLin challenge $(g_1, g_2, g_3, u_1 = g_1^r, u_2 = g_2^s, u_3 = g_3^t)$, for which we have to decide whether (u_1, u_2, u_3) is a linear tuple in basis (g_1, g_2, g_3) , and thus $t = r + s \mod p$, or a random one. From an IND-PD-CCA adversary \mathcal{A} against the encryption scheme, we built a DLin distinguisher \mathcal{B} . The latter first uses (g_1, g_2, g_3) as the global parameters. It also picks $x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^9$ and sets $c_i = g_i^{x_i} g_3^{x_3}, d_i = g_i^{y_i} g_3^{y_3}, h_i = g_i^{z_i} g_3^{z_3}$, for i = 1, 2. It chooses a collision-resistant hash function \mathfrak{H}_K and provides \mathcal{A} with the encryption key ek = $(c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2, h_1, h_2, \mathfrak{H}_K)$.

- In the initial game \mathcal{G}_0 ,
 - A's decryption queries are answered by \mathcal{B} , simply using the decryption key dk.
 - When A submits the first challenge vectors M₀ = (M_{0,1},..., M_{0,n}) and M₁ = (M_{1,1},..., M_{1,n}), with a label ℓ^{*}, B chooses a random bit b ^{*} {0,1} and encrypts M_b:
 - * it chooses two random vectors $\boldsymbol{r}^*, \boldsymbol{s}^* \stackrel{\hspace{0.1em} \mathsf{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^n$
 - * it defines $C_i^* = (\mathbf{u}_i^* = (g_1^{r_i^*}, g_2^{s_i^*}, g_3^{r_i^* + s_i^*}), e_i^* = M_{b,i} \cdot h_1^{r_i^*} h_2^{s_i^*}, v_i^* = (c_1 d_1^{\xi^*})^{r_i^*} (c_2 d_2^{\xi^*})^{s_i^*})$, for i = 1, ..., n, where the v_i^* 's are computed with $\xi^* = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell^*, \mathbf{u}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n^*, e_1^*, \dots, e_n^*)$, and $C^* = (C_1^*, \dots, C_n^*)$.
 - When \mathcal{A} submits the second challenge vectors $N_0 = (N_{0,1}, \ldots, N_{0,n})$ and $N_1 = (N_{1,1}, \ldots, N_{1,n})$,
 - * \mathcal{B} chooses two random vectors $oldsymbol{a}^*, oldsymbol{b}^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^n$
 - * it defines $C_{i}^{\prime *} = (\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{i}^{*} = (g_{1}^{a_{i}^{*}}, g_{2}^{b_{i}^{*}}, g_{3}^{a_{i}^{*}+b_{i}^{*}}), \beta_{i}^{*} = N_{b,i} \cdot h_{1}^{a_{i}^{*}}h_{2}^{b_{i}^{*}}, \gamma_{i}^{*} = (c_{1}d_{1}^{\xi^{*}})^{a_{i}^{*}}(c_{2}d_{2}^{\xi^{*}})^{b_{i}^{*}}), \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, n, \text{ where the } \gamma_{i}^{*}\text{'s are computed with the above } \xi^{*} = \mathfrak{H}_{K}(\ell^{*}, \mathbf{u}_{1}^{*}, \ldots, \mathbf{u}_{n}^{*}, e_{1}^{*}, \ldots, e_{n}^{*}), \text{ and } \mathcal{C}^{\prime *} = (\mathcal{C}_{1}^{\prime *}, \ldots, \mathcal{C}_{n}^{\prime *}).$
 - When \mathcal{A} returns b', \mathcal{B} outputs $b' \stackrel{?}{=} b$.

$$\Pr_0[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] = \Pr_0[b' = b] = (\mathsf{Adv}_{n-\mathsf{DLCS}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}(\mathcal{A}) - 1)/2$$

- In game \mathcal{G}_1 , where we assume $t = r + s \mod p$, to encrypt the challenge vectors M_b and N_b , \mathcal{B} does as above, excepted for \mathcal{C}_1^* : $\mathcal{C}_1^* = (\mathbf{u}_1^* = (u_1, u_2, u_3), e_i^* = M_{b,1} \cdot u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3}, v_1^* = u_1^{x_1 + \xi^* y_1} u_2^{x_2 + \xi^* y_2} u_3^{x_3 + \xi^* y_3})$, which actually defines $r_1^* = r$ and $s_1^* = s$.

$$\mathbf{u}_{1}^{*} = (g_{1}^{r_{1}^{*}}, g_{2}^{s_{1}^{*}}, g_{3}^{r_{1}^{*}+s_{1}^{*}}) \qquad e_{1}^{*} = M_{b,1} \cdot (g_{1}^{r_{1}^{*}})^{z_{1}} (g_{2}^{s_{1}^{*}})^{z_{2}} (g_{3}^{r_{1}^{*}+s_{1}^{*}})^{z_{3}} = M_{b,1} \cdot h_{1}^{r_{1}^{*}} h_{2}^{s_{1}^{*}} v_{1}^{*} = (g_{1}^{r_{1}^{*}})^{x_{1}+\xi^{*}y_{1}} (g_{2}^{s_{1}^{*}})^{x_{2}+\xi^{*}y_{2}} (g_{3}^{r_{1}^{*}+s_{1}^{*}})^{x_{3}+\xi^{*}y_{3}} = (c_{1}d_{1}^{\xi^{*}})^{r_{1}^{*}} (c_{2}d_{2}^{\xi^{*}})^{s_{1}^{*}}$$

The challenge ciphertexts are identical to the encryptions of M_b and N_b in \mathcal{G}_0 . Decryption queries are still answered the same way. Hence the gap between this game and the previous game is 0.

$$\Pr_{1}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] = \Pr_{0}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] = (\mathsf{Adv}_{n-\mathsf{DLCS}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}(\mathcal{A}) - 1)/2.$$

- In game \mathcal{G}_2 , we now assume that $t \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$ (a random tuple). First, we have to check that the *incorrect* computation of v_1^* does not impact the probability to reject invalid ciphertexts, then we prove that e_1^* is totally independent of $M_{b,1}$.
 - 1. About the validity checks, $u_{i,1}^{x_1+\xi y_1} \cdot u_{i,2}^{x_2+\xi y_2} \cdot u_{i,3}^{x_3+\xi y_3} \stackrel{?}{=} v_i$, where $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n, e_1, \dots, e_n)$, three cases can appear with respect to the challenge ciphertext $\mathcal{C}^* = ((\mathbf{u}_1^*, e_1^*, v_1^*), \dots, (\mathbf{u}_n^*, e_n^*, v_n^*))$:
 - (a) $(\ell, \mathbf{u}_1, e_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n, e_n) = (\ell^*, \mathbf{u}_1^*, e_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n^*, e_n^*)$, then necessarily, for some $i, v_i \neq v_i^*$, then the check on index i will fail since one value only is acceptable;
 - (b) $(\ell, \mathbf{u}_1, e_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n, e_n) \neq (\ell^*, \mathbf{u}_1^*, e_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n^*, e_n^*)$, but $\xi = \xi^*$, then the adversary has generated a collision for the hash function \mathfrak{H}_K .

(c) $(\ell, \mathbf{u}_1, e_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n, e_n) \neq (\ell^*, \mathbf{u}_1^*, e_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{u}_n^*, e_n^*)$, and $\xi \neq \xi^*$: the ciphertext should be accepted iff $v_i = u_{i,1}^{x_1+\xi y_1} \cdot u_{i,2}^{x_2+\xi y_2} \cdot u_{i,3}^{x_3+\xi y_3}$, for $i = 1, \dots, n$. To make it acceptable, if we denote $g_2 = g_1^{\beta_2}$ and $g_3 = g_1^{\beta_3}$, we indeed have

$$\log_{g_1} c_1 = x_1 + \beta_3 x_3 \log_{g_1} d_1 = y_1 + \beta_3 y_3 \log_{g_1} c_2 = \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_3 \log_{g_1} d_2 = \beta_3 y_2 + \beta_3 y_3$$

with in addition,

$$\begin{aligned} \log_{g_1} v_1^* &= rx_1 + s\beta_2 x_2 + t\beta_3 x_3 + r\xi^* y_1 + s\xi^* \beta_2 y_2 + t\xi^* \beta_3 y_3 \\ \log_{g_1} v_i^* &= r_i^* x_1 + s_i^* \beta_2 x_2 + (r_i^* + s_i^*) \beta_3 x_3 + r_i^* \xi^* y_1 + s_i^* \xi^* \beta_2 y_2 + (r_i^* + s_i^*) \xi^* \beta_3 y_3 \\ &= r_i^* \log_{g_1} c_1 + s_i^* \log_{g_1} c_2 + \xi^* r_i^* \log_{g_1} d_1 + \xi^* s_i^* \log_{g_1} c_2 \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n \\ \log_{g_1} \gamma_i^* &= a_i^* x_1 + b_i^* \beta_2 x_2 + (a_i^* + b_i^*) \beta_3 x_3 + a_i^* \xi^* y_1 + b_i^* \xi^* \beta_2 y_2 + (a_i^* + b_i^*) \xi^* \beta_3 y_3 \\ &= a_i^* \log_{g_1} c_1 + b_i^* \log_{g_1} c_2 + \xi^* a_i^* \log_{g_1} d_1 + \xi^* b_i^* \log_{g_1} c_2 \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n \end{aligned}$$

The 2n - 1 last relations are thus linearly dependent with the 4 above relations, hence remains the useful relations

$$\begin{aligned} \log_{g_1} c_1 &= x_1 & +\beta_3 x_3 & (1) \\ \log_{g_1} d_1 &= & y_1 & +\beta_3 y_3 & (2) \\ \log_{g_1} c_2 &= & \beta_2 x_2 & +\beta_3 x_3 & (3) \\ \log_{g_1} d_2 &= & & \beta_2 y_2 & +\beta_3 y_3 & (4) \\ \log_{g_1} v_1^* &= r x_1 + s \beta_2 x_2 + t \beta_3 x_3 + r \xi^* y_1 + s \xi^* \beta_2 y_2 + t \xi^* \beta_3 y_3 & (5) \end{aligned}$$

One can note that for v_1^* to be predictable, because of the x_1, x_2 and y_1, y_2 components, we need to have $(5) = r(1) + s(3) + r\xi^*(2) + s\xi^*(4)$, and then t = r + s, which is not the case, hence v_1^* looks random: in this game, v_1^* is perfectly uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G} .

Furthermore, for any v_i in the decryption query, if $\mathbf{u}_i = (g_1^{r'}, g_2^{s'}, g_3^{t'})$ is not a linear triple, then it should be such that

$$\log_{g_1} v_i = r'x_1 + s'\beta_2 x_2 + t'\beta_3 x_3 + r'\xi y_1 + s'\xi\beta_2 y_2 + t'\xi\beta_3 y_3$$

Since the matrix

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \beta_3 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \beta_3 \\ 0 & \beta_2 & \beta_3 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta_2 & \beta_3 \\ a & b\beta_2 & c\beta_3 & a\xi^* & b\xi^*\beta_2 & c\xi^*\beta_3 \\ r' & s'\beta_2 & t'\beta_3 & r'\xi & s'\xi\beta_2 & t'\xi\beta_3 \end{pmatrix}$$
 has determinant $\beta_2^2\beta_3^2(\xi^* - \xi)(t - r - s)(t' - r' - s') \neq 0$,

then the correct value for v_i is unpredictable: an invalid ciphertext will be accepted with probability 1/p.
Let us now consider the mask u₁^{z₁}u₂<sup>z₂</sub>u₃<sup>z₃^{z₁}: its discrete logarithm in basis g₁ is rz₁ + sβ₂z₂ + tβ₃z₃, whereas the informations about (z₁, z₂, z₃) are h₁ = g₁^{z₁}g₃<sup>z₃ and h₂ = g₂^{z₂}g₃<sup>z₃. The matrix
</sup></sup></sup></sup>

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \beta_3 \\ 0 & \beta_2 & \beta_3 \\ r & s\beta_2 & t\beta_3 \end{pmatrix} \text{ has determinant } \beta_2\beta_3(t-r-s)(t'-r'-s') \neq 0,$$

then the value of the mask is unpredictable: in this game, e_1^* is perfectly uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G} . Since the unique difference between the two games is the linear/random tuple, unless a collision is found for \mathfrak{H}_K (probability bounded by $\operatorname{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\operatorname{coll}}(t)$) and or an invalid ciphertext is accepted (probability bounded by q_d/p), then

$$\Pr_{2}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] \geq \Pr_{1}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] - \mathsf{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\mathsf{dlin}}(t) - \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) - \frac{q_{d}}{p}.$$

- In game \mathcal{G}_3 , to encrypt the challenge vectors M_b and N_b , \mathcal{B} does as above, excepted for \mathcal{C}_1^* : for a random $t_1^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\mathbf{u}_1^* = (g_1^{r_1^*}, g_2^{s_1^*}, g_3^{t_1^*}), e_1^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$, and $v_1^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$. As just explained, this is perfectly indistinguishable with the previous game:

$$\Pr_{3}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] = \Pr_{2}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] \ge (\mathsf{Adv}_{n-\mathsf{DLCS}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}(\mathcal{A}) - 1)/2 - \mathsf{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\mathsf{dlin}}(t) - \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) - \frac{q_{d}}{p}.$$

- In game \mathcal{G}_4 , to encrypt the challenge vectors M_b and N_b , \mathcal{B} does as above, excepted for \mathcal{C}^* : for a random vector $t^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, for $i = 2, \ldots, n$: $\mathbf{u}_i^* = (g_1^{r_i^*}, g_2^{s_i^*}, g_3^{t_i^*})$, $e_i^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$, and $v_i^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$. Thus replacing sequentially the \mathcal{C}_i^* 's by random ones, as we've just done, we obtain

$$\Pr_{4}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] \leq \Pr_{3}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] - (n-1) \left(\mathsf{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\mathsf{dlin}}(t) - \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) - \frac{q_{d}}{p} \right)$$

- In game \mathcal{G}_5 , to encrypt the challenge vectors M_b and N_b , \mathcal{B} does as above, excepted for \mathcal{C}'^* : for a random vector $c^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, for $i = 1, \ldots, n$: $\alpha_1^* = (g_1^{a_i^*}, g_2^{b_i^*}, g_3^{c_i^*})$, $\beta_i^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$, and $\gamma_i^* \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}$. Thus replacing sequentially the \mathcal{C}'_i 's by random ones, as we've just done, we obtain

$$\Pr_{5}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] \leq \Pr_{4}[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}] - n\left(\mathsf{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\mathsf{dlin}}(t) - \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) - \frac{q_{d}}{p}\right).$$

In this last game, it is clear that $Pr_5[1 \leftarrow B] = 1/2$, since (M_b, N_b) is not used anymore:

$$\frac{\mathsf{Adv}_{n-\mathsf{DLCS}}^{\mathsf{ind}-\mathsf{pd}-\mathsf{cca}}(\mathcal{A})-1}{2} - 2n \times \left(\mathsf{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\mathsf{dlin}}(t) - \mathsf{Succ}_{\mathcal{H}}^{\mathsf{coll}}(t) - \frac{q_d}{p}\right) \le \frac{1}{2},$$

which concludes the proof.

B.3 Double Linear Cramer-Shoup (DLCS) Commitment

Recently, Lindell [Lin11] proposed a highly efficient UC commitment. Our commitment strongly relies on it, but does not need to be UC secure. We will then show that the decommitment check can be done in an implicit way with an appropriate smooth projective hash function. Basically, the technique consists in encrypting M in $C = (\mathbf{u}, e, v) =$ $LCS(\ell, M; r, s)$, also getting $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(\ell, \mathbf{u}, e)$, and then encrypting $1_{\mathbb{G}}$ in $C' = LCS^*(\ell, 1_{\mathbb{G}}, \xi; a, b)$, with the same ξ . For a given challenge ε , we can see $C \times C'^{\varepsilon} = LCS^*(\ell, M, \xi; r + \varepsilon a, s + \varepsilon b)$, where the computations are done component-wise, as an encryption of M, still using the same above ξ . Note that Lindell [Lin11] used $C^{\varepsilon} \times C'$, but our choice seems more natural, since we essentially re-randomize the initial encryption C, but we have to take care of choosing $\varepsilon \neq 0$. It makes use of an equivocable commitment: the Pedersen commitment [Ped92].

- Setup (1^k) generates a group \mathbb{G} of order p, with two independent generators g and ζ ;
- Commit(m; r), for a message $m \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and random coins $r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, produces a commitment $c = g^m \zeta^r$;
- Decommit (c, m; r) outputs m and r, which opens c into m, with checking ability: $c \stackrel{?}{=} g^m \zeta^r$.

This commitment is computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption: two different openings (m, r) and (m', r') for a commitment c, leads to the discrete logarithm of ζ in basis g, that is equal to $(m'-m) \cdot (r-r')^{-1} \mod p$. Granted this logarithm as additional information from the setup, one can equivocate any dummy commitment.

Description. Our *n*-message vector commitment, which includes labels, is depicted on Figure 5, where the computation between vectors are component-wise. Note that for this commitment scheme, we can use $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon, ..., \varepsilon)$. For the version with SPHF implicit verification, according to the language, one can have to use independent components $\varepsilon \notin (\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^n$.

Analysis. Let us briefly show the properties of this commitment:

- Hiding property: m is committed in the Pedersen commitment C'', that does not leak any information, and in the n LCS encryption C, that is indistinguishable, even with access to the decryption oracle (extractability). This also implies non-malleability.
- Binding property: m is committed in the Pedersen commitment C'', that is computationally binding.

	dependent generators $(g_1, g_2, g_3, h_1, h_2, c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2, \zeta) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}^{10}$, sible mapping \mathcal{G} from $\{0, 1\}^k$ to \mathbb{G} . One can denote ek = , with $M = \mathcal{G}(m)$
$\begin{array}{l} (\mathcal{C},\mathcal{C}') \leftarrow n - DLCS(\ell,ek,\boldsymbol{M},(1_{\mathbb{G}})^{n};\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{a},\boldsymbol{b}) \\ \chi = \mathfrak{H}_{K}(\boldsymbol{m},\mathcal{C}'), \mathcal{C}'' = g_{1}^{t}\zeta^{\chi} \\ \prod_{i}\varepsilon_{i} \neq 0 \bmod p \\ \boldsymbol{z} = (\boldsymbol{r} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \times \boldsymbol{a} \bmod p, \boldsymbol{s} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \times \boldsymbol{b} \bmod p) \\ ERASE(\boldsymbol{r},\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{a},\boldsymbol{b}) \end{array}$	$\xrightarrow{\mathcal{C},\mathcal{C}''} \xrightarrow{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}} \varepsilon \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \leftarrow (\varepsilon,\ldots,\varepsilon)$
- Decommit $(\ell, C, C', \varepsilon)$:	$ \begin{array}{c} \overset{\mathcal{C}',t,\boldsymbol{m},\mathbf{z}}{\longrightarrow} \boldsymbol{M} = \mathcal{G}(\boldsymbol{m}), \text{compute } \boldsymbol{\xi} \text{ from } \mathcal{C} \\ \chi = \mathfrak{H}_{K}(\boldsymbol{m},\mathcal{C}'), \mathcal{C}'' \stackrel{?}{=} g_{1}^{t} \boldsymbol{\zeta}^{\chi} \\ \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{C}'^{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}} \stackrel{?}{=} n - LCS^{*}(\ell,\boldsymbol{M},\boldsymbol{\xi};\mathbf{z}_{r},\mathbf{z}_{s}) \end{array} $

Fig. 5. n - DLCS Commitment Scheme

- Extractability: using the decryption key of the LCS encryption scheme, one can extract *M* from *C*, and thus *m*. Latter, one has to open the ciphertext *CC'*^ε with *M'* = *G*(*m'*), which can be different from *M* in the case that *C'* contains *N* ≠ (1_G)ⁿ. But then *M'* = *M* × *N*^ε, that is unpredictable at the commit time of *C''*. With probability at most 1/*p*, one can open the commitment with a value *m'* different from *m*, if this value *m'* has been correctly anticipated in *C''*.
- Equivocability: if one wants to open with m', one computes $M' = \mathcal{G}(m')$, $N = (M'/M)^{1/\varepsilon}$, encrypts N in $\mathcal{C}' = n \mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell, N, \xi; a, b)$, and updates χ and t, using the Pedersen trapdoor for equivocability.

To allow an implicit verification with SPHF, one omits to send m and z, but make an implicit proof of their existence. Therefore, m cannot be committed/verified in \mathcal{C}'' , which has an impact on the binding property: \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{C}'' are not binded to a specific m, even in a computational way. However, as said above, if \mathcal{C}'' contains a ciphertext \mathcal{C}' of $N \neq (1_{\mathbb{G}})^n$, the actual committed value will depend on ε : $M' = MN^{\varepsilon}$ has its *i*-component, where $N_i \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$, uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G} when ε is uniformly distributed in \mathbb{Z}_p^* . In addition, if $\varepsilon \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^n$, all these *i*-component where $N_i \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ are randomly and independently distributed in \mathbb{G} . Then, if the committed value has to satisfy a specific relation, with very few solutions, m' such that $M' = \mathcal{G}(m')$ will unlikely satisfy it.

C Smooth Projective Hash Functions on More Complex Languages

C.1 Basic Relations

We first consider Diffie-Hellman pairs and linear tuples and show we can make proof of membership without using any pairing.

DDH pairs. Let us assume a user is given two elements g, h and then wants to send $G = g^a, H = h^a$ for a chosen a and prove that the pair (G, H) is well-formed with respect to (g, h). We thus consider the language of Diffie Hellman tuples $(g, h, G = g^a, H = h^a)$, with a as a witness.

As done in [CS98], we define a projection key hp = $g^{x_1}h^{x_2}$ by picking two random scalars $x_1, x_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which define the secret hashing key hk = (x_1, x_2) . One can then compute the hash value in two different ways: ProjHash(hp, $(g, h, G, H), a) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} hp^a = (g^{ax_1}h^{ax_2}) = G^{x_1}H^{x_2} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Hash}(hk, (g, h, G, H)).$

Such SPHF is smooth: this can be seen by proceeding like in the Cramer-Shoup proof. Given $hp = g^{\alpha}$, $h = g^{\beta}$, $G = g^{a}$ and $H = h^{a'}$, the hash value is g^{γ} that satisfies:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \gamma \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \beta \\ a & \beta a' \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

The determinant of this matrix is $\Delta = \beta(a'-a)$, that is zero if and only if we do have a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Otherwise, from hp, γ is perfectly hidden, from an information theoretical point of view, and so is Hash(hk, (g, h, G, H)) too.

DLin tuples. Let us consider three generators u, v, w, and a tuple $U = u^r, V = v^s, W = w^t$ one wants to prove be linear (*i.e.* t = r + s). We first define two projection keys $hp_1 = u^{x_1}w^{x_3}$, $hp_2 = v^{x_2}w^{x_3}$, for random scalars that define the secret hashing key hk = (x_1, x_2, x_3) . One can then compute the hash value in two different ways: $\operatorname{ProjHash}(hp_1, hp_2, (u, v, w, U, V, W), r, s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} hp_1^r hp_2^s = (u^{rx_1}v^{sx_2}w^{x_3(r+s)}) = U^{x_1}V^{x_2}W^{x_3} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (u^{rx_1}v^{sx_2}w^{x_3(r+s)}) = U^{x_1}V^{x_2}W^{x_3}$ $\mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}, (u, v, w, U, V, W)).$

Once again this SPHF can be shown to be smooth: given $hp_1 = u^{\alpha}$, $hp_2 = u^{\beta}$, $v = u^{\gamma}$, $w = u^{\delta}$, the hash value is u^{λ} that satisfies:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \alpha \\ \beta \\ \lambda \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \delta \\ 0 & \gamma & \delta \\ r & \gamma s & \delta t \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

The determinant of this matrix is $\Delta = \gamma \delta(t - s - r)$, that is zero if and only if we do have a valid linear tuple.

C.2 Smooth Projective Hashing on Commitments

We now show that our commitments LCS or DLCS' are well-suited for a use together with smooth projective hash functions: instead of publishing z at the decommit phase, in order to check whether $\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{C}^{\varepsilon} \stackrel{?}{=} \mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell, M, \xi; z_r, z_s)$ (with $\varepsilon = 0$ in the LCS non-equivocable case, or with $\varepsilon \neq 0$ in the DLCS' case), one uses a smooth projective hash function to "implicitly" prove the existence of a witness that the commitment actually contains the claimed (or assumed) value M. We will thereafter be able to use this primitive in Language-Authenticated Key Exchange, for complex languages.

Smooth projective hash functions. We thus have a commitment, either C or $C \cdot C'^{\varepsilon}$, but we use in both cases the notation C, and want to check whether there exists $\mathbf{z} = (z_r, z_s)$ such that

$$\mathcal{C} = \mathsf{LCS}^*(\ell, M, \xi; z_r, z_s) = (\mathbf{u} = (g_1^{z_r}, g_2^{z_s}, g_3^{z_r + z_s}), e = M \cdot h_1^{z_r} h_2^{z_s}, v = v_1^{z_r} v_2^{z_s}),$$

where we denote $v_1 = c_1 d_1^{\xi}$ and $v_2 = c_2 d_2^{\xi}$. We note here that all the bases g_1, g_2, g_3, h_1, h_2 but also v_1, v_2 are known as soon as ξ is known (the C part of the DLCS' commitment). One then generates hk = $(\eta, \theta, \kappa, \lambda, \mu) \stackrel{\text{s}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^5$, and derives the projection key that depends on ξ only: $hp = (hp_1 = g_1^{\eta}g_3^{\kappa}h_1^{\lambda}v_1^{\mu}, hp_2 = g_2^{\theta}g_3^{\kappa}h_2^{\lambda}v_2^{\mu})$. Then, one can compute the hash value:

$$H = \mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk}, M, \mathcal{C}) \stackrel{\text{\tiny def}}{=} u_1^{\eta} u_2^{\theta} u_3^{\kappa} (e/M)^{\lambda} v^{\mu} = \mathsf{hp}_1^{z_r} \mathsf{hp}_2^{z_s} \stackrel{\text{\tiny def}}{=} \mathsf{ProjHash}(\mathsf{hp}, M, \mathcal{C}; z_r, z_s) = H'$$

Security properties. Let us claim and prove the security properties:

Theorem 8. Under the DLin assumption, the above smooth projective hash function is both smooth and pseudorandom:

- Smoothness: $\operatorname{Adv}_{II}^{\operatorname{smooth}} = 0;$ Pseudo-Randomness: $\operatorname{Adv}_{II}^{\operatorname{pr}}(t) \leq \operatorname{Adv}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}^{\operatorname{dlin}}(t).$

Proof. For the correctness, one can easily check that if C contains M = M', then H = H':

$$\begin{split} H &= u_1^{\eta} u_2^{\theta} u_3^{\kappa} (e/M)^{\lambda} v^{\mu} = (g_1^{z_r})^{\eta} (g_2^{z_s})^{\theta} (g_3^{z_r+z_s})^{\kappa} (h_1^{z_r} h_2^{z_s} M'/M)^{\lambda} (v_1^{z_r} v_2^{z_s})^{\mu} \\ &= (g_1^{\eta} g_3^{\kappa} h_1^{\lambda} v_1^{\mu})^{z_r} \times (g_2^{\theta} g_3^{\kappa} h_2^{\lambda} v_2^{\mu})^{z_s} \times (M'/M)^{\lambda} = \mathsf{hp}_1^{z_r} \mathsf{hp}_2^{z_s} \times (M'/M)^{\lambda} = H' \times (M/M')^{\lambda} \end{split}$$

Smoothness: if C is not a correct encryption of M, then H is unpredictable: let us denote M' and z'_s such that $\mathcal{C} = (\boldsymbol{u} = (g_1^{z_r}, g_2^{z_s}, g_3^{z_t}), e = M' h_1^{z_r} h_2^{z_s}, v = v_1^{z_r} v_2^{z'_s}).$ Then, if we denote $g_2 = g_1^{\beta_2}$ and $g_3 = g_1^{\beta_3}$, and $h_1 = g_1^{\rho_1}$ and $h_2 = g_1^{\rho_2}$, but also $v_1 = g_1^{\delta_1}$ and $v_2 = g_1^{\delta_2}$, and $\Delta = \log_{g_1}(M'/M)$:

$$H = g_1^{\eta z_r} g_1^{\beta_2 \theta z_s} g_1^{\beta_3 \kappa z_t} (M'/M)^{\lambda} (g_1^{\rho_1 z_r + \rho_2 z_s})^{\lambda} (v_1^{z_r} v_2^{z'_s})^{\mu} \log_{g_1} H = \eta z_r + \beta_2 \theta z_s + \beta_3 \kappa z_t + \lambda (\rho_1 z_r + \rho_2 z_s) + \mu (\delta_1 z_+ \delta_2 z'_s) + \lambda \Delta$$

The information leaked by the projected key is $\log_{g_1} hp_1 = \eta + \beta_3 \kappa + \rho_1 \lambda + \delta_1 \mu$ and $\log_{g_1} hp_2 = \beta_2 \theta + \beta_3 \kappa + \rho_2 \lambda + \delta_2 \mu$, which leads to the matrix

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \beta_3 & \rho_1 & \delta_1 \\ 0 & \beta_2 & \beta_3 & \rho_2 & \delta_2 \\ z_r & \beta_2 z_s & \beta_3 z_t & \Delta + \rho_1 z_r + \rho_2 z_s & \delta_1 z_r + \delta_2 z'_s \end{pmatrix}$$

One remarks that if $z_t \neq z_r + z_s \mod p$, then the three rows are not linearly dependent even considering the 3 first components only, and then H is unpredictable. Hence, we can assume that $z_t = z_r + z_s \mod p$. The third row must thus be the first multiplied by z_r plus the second multiplied by z_s : $\rho_2 z_s = \Delta + \rho_2 z_s \mod p$ and $z_s = z'_s \mod p$, which implies $z'_s = s$ and $\Delta = 0$, otherwise, H remains unpredictable.

As a consequence, if C is not a correct encryption of W, H is perfectly unpredictable in \mathbb{G} :

$$\begin{split} &\{(\mathsf{hp},H),\mathsf{hk}=(\eta,\theta,\kappa,\lambda,\mu)\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow}\mathbb{Z}_p^5,\mathsf{hp}=(\mathsf{hp}_1=g_1^\eta g_3^\kappa h_1^\lambda v_1^\mu,\mathsf{hp}_2=g_2^\theta g_3^\kappa h_2^\lambda v_2^\mu),H\leftarrow\mathsf{Hash}(\mathsf{hk},M,\mathcal{C})\}\\ &\approx_s\{(\mathsf{hp},H),\mathsf{hk}=(\eta,\theta,\kappa,\lambda,\mu)\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow}\mathbb{Z}_p^5,\mathsf{hp}=(\mathsf{hp}_1=g_1^\eta g_3^\kappa h_1^\lambda v_1^\mu,\mathsf{hp}_2=g_2^\theta g_3^\kappa h_2^\lambda v_2^\mu),H\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow}\mathbb{G}\}. \end{split}$$

Pseudo-Randomness: we've just shown that if C is not a correct encryption of M, then H is statistically unpredictable. Let us be given a triple (g_1, g_2, g_3) together with another triple $\boldsymbol{u} = (u_1 = g_1^a, u_2 = g_2^b, u_3 = g_3^c)$. We choose random exponents $(x_1, x_2, x_3, y_1, y_2, y_3, z_1, z_2, z_3)$, and for i = 1, 2, we set $c_i = g_i^{x_i} g_3^{x_3}$, $d_i = g_i^{y_i} g_3^{y_3}$, and $h_i = g_i^{z_i} g_3^{z_3}$. We generate $C = (\boldsymbol{u}, e = M \times u_1^{z_1} u_2^{z_2} u_3^{z_3}, v = u_1^{x_1 + \xi y_1} u_2^{x_2 + \xi y_2} u_3^{x_3 + \xi y_3})$. If $c = a + b \mod p$ (i.e., \boldsymbol{u} is a linear tuple in basis \boldsymbol{g}), then C is a valid encryption of M, otherwise this is not, and we can apply the smoothness property:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pr}}_{\varPi}(t) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{smooth}}_{\varPi} + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{dlin}}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}(t) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{dlin}}_{p,\mathbb{G},g}(t).$$

C.3 Single Equation

Let us assume that we have \mathcal{Y}_i committed in \mathbb{G} , in c_i , for i = 1, ..., m and \mathcal{Z}_i committed in \mathbb{G}_T , in D_i , for i = m + 1, ..., n, and we want to show they simultaneously satisfy

$$\left(\prod_{i=1}^{m} e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_i)\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{i=m+1}^{n} \mathcal{Z}_i^{\mathfrak{z}_i}\right) = \mathcal{B}$$

where $A_i \in \mathbb{G}$, $B \in \mathbb{G}_T$, and $\mathfrak{z}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are public. As already said, the commitment can either be the LCS or the DLCS' version, but they both come up to a ciphertext C with the appropriate random coins \mathbf{z} :

 $\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_{i} &= (\mathbf{u}_{i} = (g_{1}^{z_{r_{i}}}, g_{2}^{z_{s_{i}}}, g_{3}^{z_{r_{i}}+z_{s_{i}}}), e_{i} = h_{1}^{z_{r_{i}}} h_{2}^{z_{s_{i}}} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_{i}, v_{i} = (c_{1}d_{1}^{\xi})^{z_{r_{i}}} \cdot (c_{2}d_{2}^{\xi})^{z_{s_{i}}}) & \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m \\ \text{which can be transposed into } \mathbb{G}_{T} : \\ \mathbf{C}_{i} &= (\mathbf{U}_{i} = (G_{i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}}, G_{i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}}, G_{i,3}^{z_{r_{i}}+z_{s_{i}}}), E_{i} = H_{i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}} H_{i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}} \cdot \mathcal{Z}_{i}, V_{i} = (C_{i,1}D_{i,1}^{\xi})^{z_{r_{i}}} \cdot (C_{i,2}D_{i,2}^{\xi})^{z_{s_{i}}}) & \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m \\ \text{where, for } j = 1, 2, 3, G_{i,j} = e(g_{j}, \mathcal{A}_{i}) \text{ and for } j = 1, 2, H_{i,j} = e(h_{j}, \mathcal{A}_{i}), C_{i,j} = e(c_{j}, \mathcal{A}_{i}), D_{i,j} = e(d_{j}, \mathcal{A}_{i}), \end{aligned}$

but also, $\mathcal{Z}_i = e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_i)$, and $\mathbf{D}_i = (\mathbf{U}_i = (G_{i,1}^{z_{r_i}}, G_{i,2}^{z_{s_i}}, G_{i,3}^{z_{r_i}+z_{s_i}}), E_i = H_{i,1}^{z_{r_i}} H_{i,2}^{z_{s_i}} \cdot \mathcal{Z}_i, V_i = (C_{i,1}D_{i,1}^{\xi})^{z_{r_i}} \cdot (C_{i,2}D_{i,2}^{\xi})^{z_{s_i}}) \text{ for } i = m+1, \dots, n$ where, for $j = 1, 2, 3, G_{i,j} = e(g_j, g)$ and for $j = 1, 2, H_{i,j} = e(h_j, g), C_{i,j} = e(c_j, g), D_{i,j} = e(d_j, g),$

where $\xi = \mathfrak{H}_K(u_1, \ldots, u_m, U_{m+1}, \ldots, U_n, e_1, \ldots, e_m, E_{m+1}, \ldots, E_n)$: \mathbb{G} -elements are encrypted under ek = $(g = (g_1, g_2, g_3), h = (h_1, h_2), c = (c_1, d_1), d = (c_2, d_2))$, and \mathbb{G}_T -element are encrypted under $\mathsf{EK}_i = (G_i = (G_{i,1}, G_{i,2}, G_{i,3}), H_i = (H_{i,1}, H_{i,2}), C_i = (C_{i,1}, C_{i,2}), D_i = (D_{i,1}, D_{i,2}))$. Note that an additional label ℓ can be included in the computation of ξ .

For the hashing keys, one picks scalars $(\lambda, (\eta_i, \theta_i, \kappa_i, \mu_i)_{i=1,...,n}) \stackrel{\text{\&}}{=} \mathbb{Z}_p^{4n+1}$, and sets $\mathsf{hk}_i = (\eta_i, \theta_i, \kappa_i, \lambda, \mu_i)$. One then computes the projection keys as $\mathsf{hp}_i = (g_1^{\eta_i} g_3^{\kappa_i} h_1^{\lambda} (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^{\mu_i}, g_2^{\theta_i} g_3^{\kappa_i} h_2^{\lambda} (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^{\mu_i}) \in \mathbb{G}^2$. The associated projection keys in \mathbb{G}_T are $\mathsf{HP}_i = (e(\mathsf{hp}_{i,1}, \mathcal{A}_i), e(\mathsf{hp}_{i,2}, \mathcal{A}_i))$, for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, where $\mathcal{A}_i = g^{\mathfrak{z}_i}$ for $i = m+1, \ldots, n$.

The hash value is

$$\begin{split} H &= \left(\prod_{i} U_{i,1}^{\eta_{i}} \cdot U_{i,2}^{\theta_{i}} \cdot U_{i,3}^{\kappa_{i}} \cdot E_{i}^{\lambda} \cdot V_{i}^{\mu_{i}}\right) \times \mathcal{B}^{-\lambda} \\ &= \prod_{i} \mathsf{HP}_{i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}} \mathsf{HP}_{i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}} = \left(\prod_{i=1}^{m} e(\mathsf{hp}_{i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}}, \mathcal{A}_{i}) \cdot e(\mathsf{hp}_{i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}}, \mathcal{A}_{i})\right) \times \left(e(\prod_{i=m+1}^{n} \mathsf{hp}_{i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}}, g^{\mathfrak{z}_{i}}) \cdot e(\prod_{i=m+1}^{n} \mathsf{hp}_{i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}}, g^{\mathfrak{z}_{i}})\right) \end{split}$$

which can be computed either from the commitments and the hashing keys, or from the projection keys and the witnesses. We prove below the smoothness, but first extend it even more to several equations.

C.4 Multiple Equations

Let us assume that we have \mathcal{Y}_i committed in \mathbb{G} , in c_i , for i = 1, ..., m and \mathcal{Z}_i committed in \mathbb{G}_T , in D_i , for i = m + 1, ..., n, and we want to show they simultaneously satisfy

$$\left(\prod_{i\in A_k} e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_{k,i})\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{i\in B_k} \mathcal{Z}_i^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}}\right) = \mathcal{B}_k, \text{ for } k = 1, \dots, t.$$

where $\mathcal{A}_{k,i} \in \mathbb{G}$, $\mathcal{B}_k \in \mathbb{G}_T$, and $\mathfrak{z}_{k,i} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, as well as $A_k \subseteq \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and $B_k \subseteq \{m + 1, \ldots, n\}$ are public. As above, from the commitments, one derives the global ξ , which can also involves the label ℓ , and one can also derive the commitments in \mathbb{G}_T , $C_{k,i}$ that correspond to the encryption of $\mathcal{Z}_{k,i} = e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_{k,i})$ under the keys $\mathsf{EK}_{k,i} = (G_{k,i} = (G_{k,i,1}, G_{k,i,2}, G_{k,i,3}), H_{k,i} = (H_{k,i,1}, H_{k,i,2}), C_{k,i} = (C_{k,i,1}, C_{k,i,2}), D_{k,i} = (D_{k,i,1}, D_{k,i,2}))$, where the capital letters $X_{k,i,j}$ correspond to the lower-case letters x_j paired with $\mathcal{A}_{k,i}$.

For the hashing keys, one picks scalars $(\lambda, \{\eta_i, \theta_i, \kappa_i, \mu_i\}_{i=1,...,n}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^{4n+1}, \{\varepsilon_k\}_{k=1,...,t} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^t$ and sets hk = $(\{\mathsf{hk}_i = (\eta_i, \theta_i, \kappa_i, \lambda, \mu_i)\}_{i=1,...,n}, \{\varepsilon_k\}_{k=1,...,t})$. We insist on the fact that the ε_k 's have to be sent after the commitments have been sent, or at least committed to (such as C and C'' which prevent from any modification). One then computes the projection keys as $\mathsf{hp}_i = (g_1^{\eta_i} g_3^{\kappa_i} h_1^{\lambda} (c_1 d_1^{\xi})^{\mu_i}, g_2^{\theta_i} g_3^{\kappa_i} h_2^{\lambda} (c_2 d_2^{\xi})^{\mu_i}) \in \mathbb{G}^2$, together with ε_k . The associated projection keys in \mathbb{G}_T are $\mathsf{HP}_{k,i} = (e(\mathsf{hp}_{i,1}, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}), e(\mathsf{hp}_{i,2}, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}))$, for $t = 1, \ldots, t$ and $i = 1, \ldots, n$, where $\mathcal{A}_{k,i} = g^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}}$ for $i = m + 1, \ldots, n$, together with ε_k . The hash function and the projective hash function are defined as:

$$\begin{split} H &= \prod_{k} \left(\left(\prod_{i \in A_{k} \cup B_{k}} U_{k,i,1}^{\eta_{i}} \cdot U_{k,i,2}^{\theta_{i}} \cdot U_{k,i,3}^{\kappa_{i}} \cdot E_{k,i}^{\lambda} \cdot V_{k,i}^{\mu_{i}} \right) \times \mathcal{B}_{k}^{-\lambda} \right)^{\varepsilon_{k}} \\ &= \prod_{k} \left(\prod_{i \in A_{k} \cup B_{k}} \mathsf{HP}_{k,i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}} \cdot \mathsf{HP}_{k,i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}} \right)^{\varepsilon_{k}} \times \prod_{k} \left(\prod_{i \in A_{k}} e(\mathcal{Y}_{i}, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}) \times \prod_{i \in B_{k}} \mathcal{Z}_{i}^{\mathfrak{d}_{k,i}} \times \mathcal{B}_{k}^{-1} \right)^{\lambda \varepsilon_{k}} \\ H' &= \prod_{k} \left(\prod_{i \in A_{k} \cup B_{k}} \mathsf{HP}_{k,i,1}^{z_{r_{i}}} \cdot \mathsf{HP}_{k,i,2}^{z_{s_{i}}} \right)^{\varepsilon_{k}} \end{split}$$

which can be computed either from the commitments and the hashing keys, or from the projection keys and the witnesses. They lead to the same values H' = H if

- for every k, $\prod_{i \in A_k} e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}) \times \prod_{i \in B_k} \mathcal{Z}_i^{\mathfrak{d}_{k,i}} = \mathcal{B}_k$, which means that all the equations are simultaneously satisfied;
- $\lambda = 0$, which is quite unlikely;
- $\prod_k \Delta_k^{\varepsilon_k} = 1$, where for every k, $\Delta_k = \prod_{i \in A_k} e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}) \times \prod_{i \in B_k} \mathcal{Z}_i^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}} / \mathcal{B}_k$, which is also quite unlikely since the Δ_k 's are fixed before the ε_k 's are known.

C.5 Security Analysis

Smoothness. In this section, first we prove the smoothness of the SPHF built right before. For k = 1, this proves the smoothness of the SPHF built to handle variables in one linear pairing equation. The list of commitments $C = (C_1, \ldots, C_n)$, which possibly results from the multiplication by the companion ciphertext when using the equivocable variant, should be considered in the language if and only if:

- the commitments are all valid Linear Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts (in either \mathbb{G} or \mathbb{G}_T), with the common and fixed ξ
- the plaintexts satisfy the linear pairing product equations

Let us assume that one of the commitments is not a valid ciphertext, this means that for some index $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$, the ciphertext (U_i, E_i, V_i) in \mathbb{G}_T satisfies $(U_i = (G_1^{r_i}, G_2^{s_i}, G_3^{t_i}), V_i)$ with either $t_i \neq r_i + s_i$ or $V_i \neq (C_1 D_1^{\xi})^{r_i} \cdot (C_2 D_2^{\xi})^{s_i}$. Then, the contribution of this ciphertext in the hash value is $(U_{i,1}^{\eta_i} \cdot U_{i,2}^{\theta_i} \cdot U_{i,3}^{\kappa_i} \cdot E_i^{\lambda} \cdot V_i^{\mu_i})^{\varepsilon'_i}$, where $\varepsilon'_i = \sum_{k,i \in A_k \cup B_k} \varepsilon_k$, knowing the projection keys that reveal, at most,

$$\log_{g_1}\mathsf{hp}_{i,1} = \eta_i + x_3 \times \kappa_i + x_4 \times \lambda + (y_1 + \xi y_3) \times \mu_i \quad \log_{g_1}\mathsf{hp}_{i,2} = x_2 \times \theta_i + x_3 \times \kappa_i + x_5 \times \lambda + (y_2 + \xi y_4) \times \mu_i,$$

where $g_2 = g_1^{x_2}$ $g_3 = g_1^{x_3}$ $h_1 = g_1^{x_4}$ $h_2 = g_1^{x_5}$ $c_1 = g_1^{y_1}$ $c_2 = g_1^{y_2}$ $d_1 = g_1^{y_3}$ $d_2 = g_1^{y_4}$. This contribution is thus $(G_1^{r_i\eta_i + x_2s_i\theta_i + x_3t_i\kappa_i + z_i\mu_i} \times E_i^{\lambda})^{\varepsilon'_i}$, where $V_i = G_1^{z_i}$. But even if all the discrete logarithms were known, and also λ , one has to guess $r_i\eta_i + x_2s_i\theta_i + x_3t_i\kappa_i + z_i\mu_i$, given $\eta_i + x_3 \times \kappa_i + (y_1 + \xi y_3) \times \mu_i$ and $x_2 \times \theta_i + x_3 \times \kappa_i + (y_2 + \xi y_4) \times \mu_i$:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & x_3 & (y_1 + \xi y_3) \\ 0 & x_2 & x_3 & (y_2 + \xi y_4) \\ r_i & x_2 s_i & x_3 t_i & z_i \end{pmatrix}$$

The first 3-column matrix has determinant is $x_2x_3(t_i - (r_i + s_i))$, that is non-zero as soon as $t_i \neq r_i + s_i$. In this case, there is no way to guess the correct value better than by chance: 1/p. If $t_i = (r_i + s_i)$, the third line is linearly dependent with the 2 first, if and only if $z_i = r_i(y_1 + \xi y_3) + s_i(y_2 + \xi y_4)$. Otherwise, one has no better way to guess the value than by chance either. Hence the smoothness of this hash function when one commitment is not valid.

About the equation validity, the E_i 's of the involved ciphertexts contain plaintexts \mathcal{Y}_i or \mathcal{Z}_i , and contribute to the hash value: from the projection keys, the k-th equation contributes to

$$H_{k} = \left(\prod_{i \in A_{k}} \mathsf{HP}_{k,i,1}^{r_{i}} \cdot \mathsf{HP}_{k,i,2}^{s_{i}} \times \prod_{i \in B_{k}} \left(\mathsf{HP}_{i,1}^{r_{i}} \cdot \mathsf{HP}_{i,2}^{s_{i}}\right)^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}}\right)^{\varepsilon_{k}} \times \left(\prod_{i \in A_{k}} e(\mathcal{Y}_{i}, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}) \times \prod_{i \in B_{k}} \mathcal{Z}_{i}^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}} \times \mathcal{B}_{k}^{-1}\right)^{\lambda \varepsilon_{k}}$$

Let us denote $\alpha_k = \prod_{i \in A_k} e(\mathcal{Y}_i, \mathcal{A}_{k,i}) \times \prod_{i \in B_k} \mathcal{Z}_i^{\mathfrak{z}_{k,i}} \times \mathcal{B}_k^{-1}$, then the uncertainty about H is $(\prod_k \alpha_k^{\varepsilon_k})^{\lambda}$. As soon as one of the equations is not satisfied, one of the α_k is different from 1. Since the ε_k 's are unknown at the commitment time, one cannot make the α_k to compensate themselves, but by chance: if one equation is not satisfied, the probability that $\prod_k \alpha_k^{\varepsilon_k} = 1$ is 1/p. Excepted this negligible case, $(\prod_k \alpha_k^{\varepsilon_k})^{\lambda}$ is totally unpredictable since λ is random.

Pseudo-randomness. The pseudo-randomness can be proven under the DLin assumption: with invalid ciphertexts, the smoothness guarantees unpredictability; without the witnesses, one cannot distinguish a valid ciphertext from an invalid ciphertext.

C.6 Asymmetric Setting

Our approach has been presented in the symmetric setting (at least when pairing are required). We can do the same in asymmetric bilinear groups, with $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$, and even more efficiently, using the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, and the analogous *n*-message commitment scheme, which security relies on the DDH assumption in either \mathbb{G}_1 or \mathbb{G}_2 . In this setting, our methodology can handle linear pairing product equations:

$$\left(\prod_{i=1}^{m} e(\mathcal{X}_i, \mathcal{B}_i)\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{j=1}^{n} e(\mathcal{A}_j, \mathcal{Y}_j)\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{k=1}^{o} \mathcal{Z}_k^{\mathfrak{z}_k}\right) = g_T,$$

where $\mathcal{A}_j, \mathcal{B}_i, g_T$ are public values, in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T respectively, and $\mathcal{X}_i, \mathcal{Y}_j, \mathcal{Z}_k$ are the unknown values, committed in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T respectively.

D Security of the LAKE Protocol: Proof of Theorem 1

For the sake of simplicity, we give in Figure 6 an explicit version of the protocol described in Figure 3. Recall that Com_i is the combination $\mathcal{C}_i \cdot \mathcal{C}_i^{\prime \varepsilon}$ of \mathcal{C}_i and \mathcal{C}_i^{\prime} when the challenge ε is known, while $\mathcal{C}_i^{\prime\prime}$ is the Pedersen commitment of \mathcal{C}_i^{\prime} with randomness t, and $\operatorname{Com}_j = \mathcal{C}_j$. We omit the additional verification that all the committed values are in the correct subsets \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{S} , since in the proof below we will always easily guarantee this membership. The proof heavily relies on the properties of the commitments and smooth projective hash functions given in Sections 3, 4 and Appendix B.

Initiator P_i

Receiver P_j

$$(10) (VK_{i}, SK_{i}) \leftarrow KeyGen()
\rightarrow pub
\ell_{i} = (\ell, pub, VK_{i}, VK_{j})
(11) L_{i} = L(pub, priv_{i}), L'_{j} = L(pub, priv'_{j})
W_{i} \in L(pub, priv_{i}), L'_{j} = L(pub, priv'_{j}, W_{i}); r_{i})
(C_{i}, C'_{i}, C'_{i}, c'_{i}, c) = Commit(\ell_{i}, (priv_{i}, priv'_{j}, W_{i}); r_{i})
(C_{i}, C'_{i}, C'_{i}, c''_{i}, c) = Commit(\ell_{i}, (priv_{i}, priv'_{j}, W_{i}); r_{i})
(I3) Abort if
not Verif(VK_{i}, (\ell_{j}, C_{j}, C_{i}, C'_{i}, \varepsilon, hp_{i}), \sigma_{j})
hk_{j} \overset{\delta}{\leftarrow}, hp_{j} = ProjKG(hk_{i}, Com_{j})
\sigma_{i} = Sign(SK_{i}, (\ell_{i}, C_{j}, C_{i}, C'_{i}, \varepsilon, hp_{i}, hp_{j}))
H'_{i} = Hash(hc_{i}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{j})
H'_{j} = ProjKS(hp_{i}, L_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i}; r_{i}, \varepsilon)
sk_{i} = H_{i} \times H'_{j}$$
Sets the session as accepted
and uses sk_{i} as a shared key
(R4) Abort if
not Verif(VK_{i}, (\ell_{i}, C_{j}, C_{i}, C'_{i}, \varepsilon, hp_{i}, hp_{j}), \sigma_{i})
H'_{i} = Hash(hc_{i}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i})
H'_{i} = ProjHash(hc_{j}, L_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i}; r_{i})
sk_{i} = H_{i} \times H'_{j}
Sets the session as accepted
and uses sk_{i} as a shared key
(R4) Abort if
not verif(VK_{i}, (\ell_{i}, C_{j}, C_{i}, C'_{i}, \varepsilon, hp_{i}, hp_{j}), \sigma_{i})
H'_{i} = ProjHash(hc_{j}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i})
H'_{i} = ProjHash(hc_{j}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i})
H'_{i} = Hash(hc_{j}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i})
H'_{i} = ProjHash(hc_{j}, L'_{i}, \ell_{i}, Com_{i})
H'_{i} = Hy \times H'_{i}
Sets the session as accepted
and uses sk_{i} as a shared key
(R4) Abort if
not correct opening t for C'_{i} in C''_{i}
Otherwise, does the following:
H'_{j} = Hy \times H'_{i}
Sets the session as accepted
and uses sk_{i} as a shared key
(R4) Abort if
(R5) H'_{i} = H'_{i} \times H'_{i}
Sets the session as accepted
and uses sk_{i} as a shared key
(R5) H'_{i} = H'_{i} \times H'_{i}
(R5) H'_{i} = H'_{i} = H'_{i} + H'_{i

Fig. 6. Description of the language authenticated key exchange protocol for players (P_i, ssid) , with index *i*, message $W_i \in L_i = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_i)$ and expected language for $P_j L'_j = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}'_j)$ and (P_j, ssid) , with index *j*, message $W_j \in L_j = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_j)$ and expected language for $P_i L'_i = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}'_j)$. The label is $\ell = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$. The random values used in the commitments (witnesses) are all included in r_i and r_j .

D.1 Notations

The proof follows that of [CHK⁺05] and [ACP09], but with a different approach since we want to prove that the best attack the adversary can perform is to play as an honest player would do with a chosen credential $(\text{priv}_i, \text{priv}'_j, W_i)$ —when trying to impersonate P_i — or $(\text{priv}_j, \text{priv}'_i, W_j)$ —when trying to impersonate P_j —. In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to construct, for any real-world adversary \mathcal{A} (controlling some dishonest parties), an ideal-world adversary \mathcal{S} (interacting with dummy parties and the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{\text{LAKE}}$) such that no environment \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between an execution with \mathcal{A} in the real world and \mathcal{S} in the ideal world with non-negligible probability.

We do not formally define the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$, but it is straightforward from the definition of the functionality \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} (see [BCL⁺05]). In particular, we assume that at the beginning of the protocol, S receives from it the contribution pub_i of P_i to the public language pub as answer to the lnit query sent by the environment on behalf of this player. After the preflows, it will receive the public language pub (as answer to the NewSession query transmitted by $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ to \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} , as seen on Figure 2) as determined during this preflow phase.

When initialized with security parameter k, the simulator first generates the CRS for the commitment (public parameters but also extraction and equivocation trapdoors), as well as the possibly required trapdoor to be able to generate, for any pub, a word in the language L(pub, priv) when priv is known. It then initializes the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} , giving it these values. The simulator then starts its interaction with the environment \mathcal{Z} , the functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ and its subroutine \mathcal{A} .

Since we are in the static-corruption model, the adversary can only corrupt players before the execution of the protocol. We assume players to be honest or not at the beginning, and they cannot be corrupted afterwards. However,

this does not prevent the adversary from modifying flows coming from the players. Indeed, since we are in a weak authenticated setting, when a player acts dishonestly (even without being aware of it), it is either corrupted, hence the adversary knows its private values and acts on its behalf; or the adversary tries to impersonate it with chosen/guessed inputs. In both cases, we say the player is A-controlled. Following [CHK⁺05], we say that a flow is *oracle-generated* if it was sent by an honest player and arrives without any alteration to the player it was meant to. We say it is *nonoracle-generated* otherwise, that is if it was sent by a A-controlled player (which means corrupted, or which flows have been modified by the adversary). The one-time signatures are aimed at avoiding changes of players during a session: if *pre-flow* is oracle-generated for P_i , then *flow-one* and *flow-three* cannot be non-oracle-generated without causing the protocol to fail because of the signature, for which the adversary does not know the signing key. Similarly, for P_j . On the other hand, if *pre-flow* is non-oracle-generated for P_i , then *flow-one* and *flow-three* cannot be oraclegenerated without causing the protocol to fail, since the honest player would sign wrong flows (the flows the player sent before the adversary alters them). In both cases, the verifications of the signatures will fail at Steps (*I*3) or (*R*4) and P_i or P_j will abort. One can note that if there is one flow only in the protocol for one player, its signature is not required, which is the case for P_j when there is no pub to agree on at the beginning. But this is just an optimization that can be occasionally applied, as for the PAKE protocol. We do not consider it here.

To deal with both cases of A-controlled players (either corrupted or impersonated by the adversary), we use the Split Functionality model (see Section 2). We thus add a pre-flow which will help us know which players are honest and which ones are A-controlled. If one player is honest and the other one corrupted, the adversary will send the pre-flow on behalf of the latter, and the simulator will have to send the pre-flow on behalf of the former. But in the case where both players are honest at the beginning of the protocol, both *pre-flow* will have to be sent by S on behalf of these players and the adversary can then decide to modify one of these flows. This models the fact that the adversary can decide to split a session between P_i and P_j by answering itself to P_i , and thus trying to impersonate P_j with respect to P_i , and doing the same with P_j . Then, the Split Functionality model ensures that two independent sessions are created (with sub-session identifiers). We can thus study these sessions independently, which means that we can assume, right after the pre-flow, that either a player is honest if its pre-flow is oracle-generated, or A-controlled if the pre-flow is non-oracle-generated. Since we want to show that the best possible attack for the adversary (by controlling a player) consists in playing honestly with a trial credential, we have to show that the view of the environment is unchanged if we simulate this dishonest player as an honest player. The simulator then has to transform its flows into queries to the Ideal Functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$, and namely the NewSession-query. Still, the \mathcal{A} -controlled player is not honest, and can have a bad behavior when sending the real-life flows, but then either it has no strong impact, and it is similar to an honest behavior, or it will make the protocol to fail: we cannot avoid the adversary to make denial of service attack, and the adversary will learn nothing.

As explained in [BCL⁺05] and [ACGP11], where the simulator actually had access to a TestPwd query to the functionality, it is equivalent to grant the adversary the right to test a password for P_i while trying to play on behalf of P_j (i.e., use a TestPwd query) or to use the split functionality model and generate the NewSession queries corresponding to the A-controlled players and see how the protocol terminates, since it corresponds to a trial of one credential by the adversary (one-line dictionary attack).

The proof will thus consist in generating ideal queries (and namely the NewSession) when receiving non-oraclegenerated flows from A-controlled players, and generating real messages for the honest players (whose NewSession queries will be received from the environment). This will be done in a indistinguishable way for the environment.

We assume from now on that we know in which case we are, and the pub part is fixed. We then describe the simulator for each of these cases, while it has generated the *pre-flow* for the honest players by generating (VK, SK) \leftarrow KeyGen(), and thus knows the signing keys. We denote by $L_i = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_i)$ the language used by P_i , and by $L'_j = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}'_j)$ the language that P_i expects P_j to use. We use the same notations in the reverse direction. As explained in Section 1, recall that the languages considered depend on two possibly different relations: $L_i = L_{\mathcal{R}_i}(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_i)$ and $L_j = L_{\mathcal{R}_j}(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_j)$, but we omit them for the sake of clarity. Note that the simulator will use the NewKey query to learn whether the protocol is a success or a failure. This will enable it to check whether the LAKE should fulfill, that is, whether the two users play with compatible words and languages, i.e., $\text{priv}'_i = \text{priv}_i$, $\text{priv}'_j = \text{priv}_j$, $W_i \in L_i$ and $W_j \in L_j$. For the most part, the interaction is implemented by the simulator S just following the protocol on behalf of all the honest players.

D.2 Description of the Simulators

Initialization and Simulation of *pre-flow***.** This is the beginning of the simulation of the protocol, where S has to send the message *pre-flow* on behalf of each non-corrupted player.

STEP (10). When receiving the (Init : ssid, P_i , P_j , pub_i, initiator) from $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ as answer to the Init query sent by the environment on behalf of P_i , S starts simulating the new session of the protocol for party P_i , peer P_j , session identifier ssid. S chooses a key pair (SK_i, VK_i) for a one-time signature scheme and generates a *pre-flow* message with the values (VK_i, pub_i). It gives this message to A on behalf of (P_i , ssid).

STEP (R0). When receiving the (Init : ssid, P_j , P_i , pub_j, receiver) from $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ as answer to the Init query sent by the environment on behalf of P_j , S starts simulating the new session of the protocol for party P_j , peer P_i , session identifier ssid. S chooses a key pair (SK_j, VK_j) for a one-time signature scheme and generates a *pre-flow* message with the values (VK_j, pub_j). It gives this message to A on behalf of (P_j , ssid).

Splitting the Players. As just said, thanks to the Split Functionality model, according to which flows were transmitted or altered by \mathcal{A} , we know from the *pre-flow* which player(s) is (are) honest and which player(s) is (are) \mathcal{A} -controlled, and the public part pub. We can consider each case independently after the initial split, during which \mathcal{S} generated the signing keys of the honest players. Thanks to the signature in the last flows for each player, if the adversary tries to take control on behalf of a honest user for some part of the execution (without learning the internal states, since we exclude adaptive corruptions), the verification will fail. Then we can assume that the sent flows are the received flows.

One can note that the prior agreement on pub allows to simulate P_i before any information from P_j and also whether it should be a success or not. Without such an agreement, the simulator would not know which value to use for pub whereas it cannot change its mind later, since it is sent in clear. Everything else is committed: either in an equivocable way on behalf of P_i so that we can change it later when we know the real status of the session; or in a non-equivocable way on behalf of P_j since we can check the status of the session before making this commitment. Of course, both commitments are extractable.

We come back again to the case of our equivocable commitment with SPHF that is not a really extractable/binding commitment since the player can open it in a different way one would extract it: if extraction leads to an inconsistent tuple, there is little chance that with the random ε it becomes consistent; if extraction leads to a consistent tuple, there is little chance that with the random ε it remains consistent, and then the real-life protocol will fail, whereas the ideal-one was successful at the NewKey-time. But then, because of the positive NewKey-answer, the SendKey-query takes the key-input into consideration, that is random on the initiator side because of the SPHF on an invalid word, and thus indistinguishable from the environment point of view from a failed session: this is a denial of service of which the adversary is aware.

Hence, the three simulations presented below exploit the properties of our commitments and SPHF to make the view of the environment indistinguishable from a real-life attack, just using the simulator S that is allowed to interact with the ideal functionality on behalf of players, but in an honest way only, since the functionality is perfect and does not know bad behavior.

Case 1: P_i is A-controlled and P_j is honest. In this case, S has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the honest player P_j , for which it has simulated the *pre-flow* and thus knows the signing key, and has to simulate the queries to the functionality as if the A-controlled player P_i was honest.

STEP (11). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its flow-one, from which S extracts $(\text{priv}_i, \text{priv}'_j, W_i)$. S then sends the query (NewSession : ssid', $P_i, P_j, W_i, L_i = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}_i), L'_j = L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}'_j)$) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LAKE}}$ on behalf of P_i .

STEP (R2). The NewSession query for this player (P_j , ssid') has been automatically transferred from the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ to \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} (transforming the session identifier from ssid to ssid'). S receives the answer (NewSession : ssid, P_j , P_i , pub, receiver) and makes a call NewKey to the functionality to check the success of the protocol. It indeed receives the answer in the name of P_i . In case of a success, S generates a word $W_j \in L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}'_j)$ and uses $\text{priv}_j = \text{priv}'_j$ and $\text{priv}'_i = \text{priv}_i$ for this receiver session (we have assumed the existence of a trapdoor in the CRS to generate such valid words) and produces a commitment C_j on the tuple (priv_j , priv'_i , W_j). Otherwise, S produces a commitment C_j on a tuple (priv_j , priv'_i , W_j), where (priv_j , W_j) is consistent with pub, and priv'_i is a dummy value in \mathcal{P}_i . It then generates a challenge value ε and the hash keys (hk_i, hp_i) on \mathcal{C}_i . It sends the flow-two message $(C_j, \varepsilon, hp_i, \sigma_j)$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_j , where σ_j is the signature on all the previous information.

STEP (I3). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its flow-three.

STEP (*R*4). Upon receiving $m = (\text{flow-three}, C'_i, t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$, S makes the verification checks, and possibly aborts. In case of correct checks, S already knows whether the protocol should succeed, thanks to the NewKey query. If the protocol is a success, then S computes receiver session key honestly, and makes a SendKey to P_j . Otherwise, S makes a SendKey to P_j with a random key that will anyway not be used.

Case 2: P_i is honest and P_j is A-controlled. In this case, S has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the honest player P_i , for which it has simulated the *pre-flow* and thus knows the signing key, and has to simulate the queries to the functionality as if the A-controlled player P_i was honest.

STEP (11). The NewSession query for this player (P_i , ssid') has been automatically transferred from the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ to \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} (transforming the session identifier from ssid to ssid'). S receives the answer (NewSession : ssid, P_i , P_j , pub, initiator) and generates a *flow-one* message by committing to the tuple (priv_i, priv'_j, W_i) where (priv_i, W_i) is a pair consistent with pub, and priv'_j is a dummy parameter in \mathcal{P}_j . It gives this commitment (C_i, C''_i) to \mathcal{A} on behalf of (P_i , ssid').

STEP (*R*2). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its *flow-two* = (*flow-two*, C_j , ε , hp_i, σ_i), from which S first checks the signature, and thereafter extracts the committed triple (priv_j, priv'_i, W_j). S then sends the query (NewSession : ssid', P_j , P_i , W_j , $L_j = L(pub, priv_j)$, $L'_i = L(pub, priv'_i)$) to \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} on behalf of P_j .

STEP (13). S makes a NewKey query to the functionality to know whether the protocol should succeed. It indeed receives the answer in the name of P_j . In case of a success, S generates a word $W_i \in L(\text{pub}, \text{priv}'_i)$ and uses $\text{priv}_i = \text{priv}'_i$ for this initiator session (we have assumed the existence of a trapdoor in the CRS to generate such valid words) and then uses the equivocability trapdoor to update C'_i and t in order to contain the new consistent tuple $(\text{priv}_i, \text{priv}'_j, W_i)$ with respect to the challenge ε . If the protocol should be a success, then S computes initiator session key honestly, and makes a SendKey to P_i . Otherwise, S makes a SendKey to P_i with a random key that will anyway not be used. S sends the flow-three message $(C'_i, t, \text{hp}_j, \sigma_i)$ to A on behalf of P_i , where σ_i is the signature on all the previous information.

STEP (R4). This step is taken care of by the adversary.

Case 3: P_i and P_j are honest. In this case, S has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the two honest players P_i and P_j , for which it has simulated the *pre-flow* and thus knows the signing keys. But since no player is controlled by A, the NewKey query will not provide any answer to the simulator. But thanks to the semantic security of the commitments, dummy values can be committed, no external adversary will make any difference.

STEP (*I*1). The NewSession query for this player (P_i , ssid') has been automatically transferred from the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ to \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} (transforming the session identifier from ssid to ssid'). S receives the answer (NewSession : ssid, P_i , P_j , pub, initiator) and generates a flow-one message by committing to a dummy tuple (priv_i, priv'_j, W_i). It gives this commitment (C_i, C''_i) to \mathcal{A} on behalf of (P_i , ssid').

STEP (R2). The NewSession query for this player (P_i , ssid') has been automatically transferred from the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{LAKE}$ to \mathcal{F}_{LAKE} (transforming the session identifier from ssid to ssid'). \mathcal{S} receives the answer (NewSession : ssid, P_j , P_i , pub, receiver) and generates a commitment C_j on a dummy tuple (priv_j, priv'_i, W_j). It then generates a challenge value ε and the hash keys (hk_i, hp_i) on C_i . It sends the flow-two message (C_j , ε , hp_i, σ_j) to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_j , where σ_j is the signature on all the previous information.

STEP (13). When the session $(P_i; \text{ssid}')$ receives the message $m = (\text{flow-two}, C_j, \varepsilon, hp_i, \sigma_j)$ from its peer session $(P_j; \text{ssid}')$, the signature is necessarily correct. Then, S makes a SendKey to P_i with a random key that will anyway not be used, since no player is corrupted. S sends the flow-three message $(C'_i, t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$ to A on behalf of P_i , where σ_i is the signature on all the previous information.

STEP (*R*4). When the session (P_j ; ssid') receives the message $m = (\text{flow-three}, C'_i, t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$ from its peer session (P_i ; ssid'), the signature is necessarily correct. S makes a SendKey to P_j with a random key that will anyway not be used, since no player is corrupted.