

Fair Exchange of Short Signatures without Trusted Third Party

Philippe Camacho
Dept. of Computer Science, University of Chile,
Blanco Encalada 2120, 3er piso, Santiago, Chile.
pcamacho@dcc.uchile.cl

May 30, 2012

Abstract

We propose a protocol to exchange Boneh-Boyen short signatures in a fair way, without relying on a trusted third party. Our protocol is quite practical and is the first of the sort to the best of our knowledge. Our construction uses a new non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) argument to prove that a commitment is the encryption of a bit vector. We also design a NIZK argument to prove that a commitment to a bit vector $v = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_\kappa)$ is such that $\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} b_i 2^{i-1} = \theta$ where θ is the discrete logarithm of some public value $D = g^\theta$. These arguments may be of independent interest.

Key words: Fair exchange, short signatures, gradual release of a secret.

1 Introduction

Nowadays it is more and more common to trade digital goods on the web: E-books, software licenses, avatar-games currencies like *Ultima Online*¹ to cite a few. Whether these goods are exchanged on *E-bay*, through *Paypal* or bought directly to their provider *Amazon* or *Microsoft*, the transaction to be secure, requires a trusted third party (TTP). Though it works quite well in practice, enabling totally distributed and at the same time secure transaction systems is of clear interest: It would avoid some security issues due to the presence of single points of failure, and also allow smoother electronic commercial transactions that would not rely on some intermediary. A lot of these transactions may be captured by the exchange of digital signatures. Suppose for example you want to buy a software license to some independent developer: Indeed exchanging the software license as well as the money transfer (digital check) can be modelled by signed messages. However we face a non-trivial problem. Given that the transaction is made online, a malicious participant may fool his counterpart by not sending his signature or sending some garbage information. A protocol that prevent such a behaviour from a corrupted party is called *fair*: This means that at the end of the execution of protocol either both parties obtain the signature they expected or none does.

¹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultima_Online

There are two main approaches to solve this problem. On the one hand one can assume that both players interact through a TTP. Though this solution does not fit our goal it is important to note that an important line of research has focused on designing protocols where the TTP is only required when “something goes wrong”. These protocols are said to be *optimistically fair*: See [1, 19] and [17] for some recent work.

If we assume that both participants have exactly the same computational resources, then it is impossible *in general* to achieve *complete fairness* [8]. In [2, 11] was proposed a way to relax the notion of fairness in order to overcome Cleve’s impossibility result. The idea is to assume that both players have roughly the same amount of time, so we can achieve *partial fairness*. Several secure multi-party computations and specific protocols, like [6, 9, 10, 5, 22, 13], were built on top of this security notion. The recurrent idea behind these constructions consists in enabling each player to release their secret bit by bit in alternation. Thus if a player aborts, the other participant will have “only one bit of disadvantage”. Formalizing this idea is not an easy task though, in particular because it is hard to reason on specific amount of time for the players. This issue was noticed in [14] where authors point that (1) assigning more time to the honest party in order to allow him recover his value is somehow artificial as it does not depend on the participant himself, (2) implementing such definitions seems to imply the use of strong assumptions related to the precise time required to solve some computationally problem, (3) in practice an adversary knowing the exact running time of the honest player may always be able to abort at the precise moment, thus breaking fairness or at least making the recovery of the value (signed message in our case) useless, because obtained too late.

In this work we propose a new security definition that still captures the intuition of partial fairness for the exchange of digital signatures, but without relying on the precise running time of the participants. With that definition in hand we can prove the security of our protocol without having to rely on the strong assumptions mentioned above. Our protocol is designed to exchange short signatures [4] without relying on a TTP. We use bilinear maps as the underlying signature scheme, and also the idea of releasing gradually each bit of some secret θ that will enable to recover the signature. The security of our construction relies on complexity assumptions for bilinear maps, namely the κ -Strong Diffie-Hellman [4], and the κ -Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions [3] and holds in the common reference string model. As we use non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZKPoK) in order to make the protocol simpler and more efficient, we require the use of random oracle [12] or some non-black box assumptions [15]. If we like we can use interactive ZKPoK at a minor expense of round efficiency.

OUR CONTRIBUTIONS.

1. We propose a practical protocol for exchanging short signatures [4] without relying on a TTP. To the best of our knowledge this is the first construction that meets such a goal. The number of rounds of our protocol is $\kappa + 1$. The communication complexity is $16\kappa^2 + 12\kappa$ bits. The protocol requires a linear number of group exponentiations, group multiplications, bilinear map applications, hash computations and also a constant number of group divisions. See figure 1 for more details.
2. We introduce a new non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) argument to prove that a commitment is the encryption of a bit vector. This protocol may be of independent interest.
3. We introduce another NIZK argument to prove that a commitment to a bit vector corresponds

Operation	# Exp	# Mult	# BM	# Div	# Hash
Step 2 EncSigGen	1				
Bit Vector commitment	κ	κ			
BV-NIZK	4κ	2κ			
BE-NIZK	2κ	$2\kappa - 3$		1	
ZKPoK	$2\kappa + 1$	κ			$\kappa + 1$
Check BV-NIZK		κ	4κ		
Check BE-NIZK	1	$\kappa - 1$	4	2	
Check ZKPoK	$3\kappa + 2$	$2\kappa + 1$			$\kappa + 1$
Step 7 EncSigCheck	2	2	2		
KeyBitCheck	κ	κ			
EncSigDecrypt	1				
Sum	$13\kappa + 8$	$11\kappa - 1$	$4\kappa + 6$	3	$2\kappa + 2$

Figure 1: **Time complexities of the fair exchange protocol.** This figure shows the number of cryptographic operations performed by each participant during the whole protocol. The first block corresponds to the algorithm EncSigGen, the second block to the algorithm EncSigCheck. BV-NIZK stands for the NIZK argument to prove a commitment is the encryption to a bit vector as depicted in figure 2. BE-NIZK stands for the NIZK argument to prove the equivalence between a commitment to a bit vector and the discrete logarithm of $D = g^\theta$, as depicted in figure 3. #Exp, #Mult, #BM, and #Div correspond respectively to the number of group exponentiations, group multiplications, bilinear map applications and group inversions. #Hash is the number of hash evaluations.

to the binary decomposition of some value θ which is hidden as the discrete logarithm of some group element. We think this argument may lead to other interesting applications.

- As stated earlier, we propose a new security definition for partial fairness in the context of the exchange of digital signatures. This definition is simple and avoids the issue of involving the specific running time of the participants.

We finally note that though we use our techniques to the specific scheme of [4], the proposed approach is flexible enough to be applied to other signature constructions or more generally to schemes that involve some value computed from a secret and which is publicly checkable using bilinear maps.

OUR APPROACH. Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ be the security parameter. Let $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \text{BMGen}(1^\kappa)$ be the public parameter where $p = |\mathbb{G}| = |\mathbb{G}_T|$ is prime, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T are cyclic groups, $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is the bilinear map and g is a random generator. Let s be a random element in \mathbb{Z}_p , we consider the following common reference string: $(g, g^s, g^{s^2}, \dots, g^{s^\kappa}) = (g_0, g_1, g_2, \dots, g_\kappa)$.

Our construction can be summarized as follows. The prover chooses a secret θ , then commits each bit of this secret into a pedersen [21] commitment, where the bit b_i in position i with randomness $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ will be committed with respect to the base (g, g_i) : That is $\text{Commit}(b_i, r_i, i) = g^{r_i} g_i^{b_i}$. Then we use a NIZK argument to prove this commitment really encrypts a bit. The next step is to publish $D = g^\theta$ and show, using another NIZK argument, that θ the discrete logarithm of D is “equivalent” to the bit vector committed in $\vec{C} = (\text{Commit}(b_i, r_i, i))_{i \in [\kappa]}$. More precisely the

argument proves that $\theta = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} b_i 2^{i-1}$. Now if we consider some signature σ , the prover will blind it using θ to obtain $\tilde{\sigma} = \sigma^\theta$. Using bilinear maps it is straightforward to verify that $\tilde{\sigma}$ contains a valid signature σ which is blinded in the exponent by θ , the discrete logarithm of D . The other verifications will consist simply in checking the NIZK arguments. Finally we need to provide zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for the representation of each bit commitment in order to be able to simulate the execution of the protocol even if the adversary aborts. By releasing each bit in turn, both players will reconstruct their own blinding factor θ and obtain the signature.

RELATED WORK. Among the abundant literature on the topic of gradual release and fair exchange for digital signatures, [10] is probably the work that is the most similar to ours: It describes a practical fair exchange protocol for digital signatures based on gradual release of a secret. The protocol described in [10] works for Rabin, RSA and El Gamal signatures. The number of rounds of the protocol described in [10] is roughly 2κ for RSA and Rabin signatures and κ for El Gamal signatures.

In [14] is proposed a definition for partial fairness that may exhibit some similarities with ours (both definitions involve a $\frac{1}{P(\kappa)}$ factor where P is a polynomial). However our definition and approach differs quite from [14]. First the setting in [14] is more general than our specific construction to exchange digital signatures. Secondly in their protocol the number of rounds is variable and defines the level of fairness, whereas in our construction fairness only depends on the computational power of participants.

Our NIZK argument to prove that a commitment encrypts a bit vector is inspired by [16, 15]. We remark that though [13] uses the idea of gradual release, the construction proposed is not practical as it requires to code the functionality (signing in our case) as an arithmetic circuit.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER. In section 2 we introduce notations and recall some definitions and standard techniques we use in this work. In section 3 we describe the bit vector commitment scheme. The argument for proving the equivalence between a bit vector commitment $(C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]}$ and the discrete logarithm θ of g^θ is introduced in section 4. The fair exchange protocol is shown in section 5. We conclude in section 6.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

For $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m < n$, $[m..n]$ means the set of integers $\{m, m+1, \dots, n-1, n\}$ and $[n]$ means the set of integers $\{1, \dots, n\}$. If $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ is the security parameter then 1^κ denotes the unary string with κ ones. We will use p to denote a prime number of κ bits. A function $\nu : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is said to be negligible in κ if for every polynomial $p(\cdot)$ there exists κ_0 such that $\forall \kappa > \kappa_0 : \nu(\kappa) < 1/p(\kappa)$. In the following, neg will denote *some* negligible function in κ . An algorithm is called PPT if it is probabilistic and runs in polynomial time in κ . We write $x \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} X$ to denote an element x chosen uniformly at random from a set X . $x \leftarrow v$ means that variable x is assigned value v .

A vector of n components and values v_i is denoted $\vec{v} = (v_i)_{i \in [n]}$. If the vector contains elements of \mathbb{Z}_p we may also write $B[\cdot] = (B[1], B[2], \dots, B[n])$. Let $\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we denote by $\theta[\cdot]$ the binary decomposition (vector) of θ . That is $\theta[\cdot] = (\theta[1], \dots, \theta[\kappa])$ and in particular $\theta = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} \theta[i] 2^{i-1}$. $P(\cdot)$ will stand for a formal polynomial with coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_p , and $P[\cdot]$ for the vector of its coefficients: Thus if $d = \text{deg}(P(\cdot))$ is the degree of polynomial $P(\cdot)$ then we have: $P(X) = \sum_{i \in [d+1]} P[i] X^{i-1}$.

2.2 Bilinear Maps

Let \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T , be cyclic groups of prime order p . We consider a map $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ which is

- *bilinear*: $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{G}, x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p : e(a^x, b^y) = e(a, b)^{xy}$.
- *non-degenerate*: let g be a generator of \mathbb{G} then $e(g, g)$ also generates \mathbb{G}_T .
- *efficiently computable*: there exists a polynomial time algorithm BMGen with parameter 1^κ that outputs $(p, \hat{\mathbb{G}}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}_T, \hat{e}, g)$ where $\hat{\mathbb{G}}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}_T$ refer to the representation of both groups of size p (p being a prime number of κ bits), g is a generator of \mathbb{G} and \hat{e} is an efficient algorithm to compute the map. For the sake of simplicity, in the following we will not distinguish between $\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e$ and $\hat{\mathbb{G}}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}_T, \hat{e}$.

For the following assumptions the common public parameter is $\text{PP} = \langle (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g), (g_0, g_1, g_2, \dots, g_\lambda) \rangle$ where s is chosen randomly in \mathbb{Z}_p and $g_i = g^{s^i}$ for $i \in [0.. \lambda]$.

Definition 1 λ - *Diffie-Hellman Inversion* ($\lambda - \text{DHI}$) *assumption*, [20]. *The λ - Diffie-Hellman Inversion ($\lambda - \text{DHI}$) problem consists in computing $g^{\frac{1}{s}}$ given PP . We say the $\lambda - \text{DHI}$ assumption holds if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have*

$$\text{Adv}^{\lambda\text{-DHI}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa, \lambda) = \Pr \left[g^{\frac{1}{s}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, \text{PP}) \right] = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

The bilinear variant of the previous assumption was introduced in [3].

Definition 2 λ - *Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion* ($\lambda - \text{BDHI}$) *assumption*. *The λ - Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion ($\lambda - \text{BDHI}$) problem consists in computing $e(g, g)^{\frac{1}{s}}$ given PP . We say the $\lambda - \text{BDHI}$ assumption holds if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have*

$$\text{Adv}^{\lambda\text{-BDHI}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa, \lambda) = \Pr \left[e(g, g)^{\frac{1}{s}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, \text{PP}) \right] = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

Definition 3 λ -*Strong Diffie-Hellman* ($\lambda - \text{SDH}$) *assumption*, [4]. *The λ -Strong Diffie-Hellman ($\lambda - \text{SDH}$) problem consists in computing $(c, g^{\frac{1}{s+c}})$ given PP . We say the $\lambda - \text{SDH}$ assumption holds if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have*

$$\text{Adv}^{\lambda\text{-SDH}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa, \lambda) = \Pr \left[(c, g^{\frac{1}{s+c}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, \text{PP}) \right] = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

As mentioned in [4], the $\lambda - \text{SDH}$ assumption is equivalent to the $\lambda - \text{DHI}$ assumption when c is fixed².

The following assumption which can be considered as a particular case of the *poly*-Diffie-Hellman assumption [18], or a generalization of the $\lambda + 1$ -Exponent assumption introduced in [23].

Definition 4 $\lambda + i$ *Diffie-Hellman Exponent* ($\lambda + i - \text{DHE}$) *assumption*. *The $\lambda + i$ -Diffie-Hellman Exponent problem consists in computing $g^{s^{\lambda+i}}$, for $1 \leq i \leq \lambda$ given PP . We say the $\lambda + i - \text{DHE}$ assumption holds if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have:*

$$\text{Adv}^{\lambda+i\text{-DHE}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa, \lambda) = \Pr \left[g^{s^{\lambda+i}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, \text{PP}) \right] = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

²In our case $c = 2$. See proof in section B.

In [23], the $\lambda - DHI$ was shown to be equivalent to the $\lambda + 1$ -Exponent assumption ($\lambda + 1 - DHE$). We prove here the following implication following the idea of [23].

Proposition 1 $\lambda - BDHI \Rightarrow \lambda + i - DHE$.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be a PPT adversary that breaks the $\lambda + i - DHE$ assumption. We build the following adversary \mathcal{B} . \mathcal{B} receives the challenge tuple $g, g^s, g^{s^2}, \dots, g^{s^\lambda}$. He sets $h = g^{s^\lambda}$. Then if we consider $t = \frac{1}{s}$ we have that: $(h, h^t, h^{t^2}, \dots, h^{t^\lambda}) = (g^{s^\lambda}, g^{s^{\lambda-1}}, g^{s^{\lambda-2}}, \dots, g)$. \mathcal{B} sends the tuple $(h, h^t, h^{t^2}, \dots, h^{t^\lambda})$ to \mathcal{A} who outputs $h' = h^{t^{\lambda+i}}$ where $1 \leq i \leq \lambda$. We have that $h' = h^{t^{\lambda+i}} = g^{s^{\lambda-\lambda-i}} = g^{\frac{1}{s^i}}$. Finally \mathcal{B} outputs $e(h', g^{s^{i-1}}) = e(g, g)^{s^{-i+i-1}} = e(g, g)^{\frac{1}{s}}$ ■

2.3 Boneh and Boyen signature scheme [4]

We recall here briefly the short signature scheme [4] introduced by Boneh and Boyen. The setup algorithm $\text{BGen}(1^\kappa)$ generates the public parameters of the scheme $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g)^3$. The key generation algorithm $\text{SKG}(1^\kappa)$ selects random integers $x, y \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $u = g^x$ and $v = g^y$. The secret key is $sk = (g, x, y)$ and the public key is $pk = (g, u, v)$. Given a message m and sk , the signing algorithm $\text{SSig}(sk, m)$ works as follows. It selects $r_\sigma \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $r_\sigma - (x + m)/y \neq 0 \pmod p$ and return the (randomized) signature $\sigma = (g^{\frac{1}{x+m+yr_\sigma}}, r_\sigma) = (\sigma', r_\sigma)$. Finally in order to verify a signature σ on message m , relative to the public key pk , the algorithm $\text{SVf}(pk, m, \sigma)$: consists in checking that $e(\sigma', ug^m v^{r_\sigma}) = e(g, g)$. The scheme is secure in the standard model under the $\lambda - SDH$ assumption.

2.4 Commitments

Let \mathcal{R} be the space of randomness, \mathcal{C} the set where commitments belong and \mathcal{M} the space for messages. A trapdoor commitment scheme is composed by the following algorithms: **Setup**, **Commit**, **Verify**, **TCommit**, **TOpen**. $\text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ is a randomized algorithm that generates the common reference string CRS and an associated trapdoor τ . $\text{Commit}(\text{CRS}, m, r)$ is a deterministic algorithm that computes a commitment C to value $m \in \mathcal{M}$ using $r \in \mathcal{R}$. $\text{Verify}(\text{CRS}, C, m, r)$ returns 1 if and only if $C = \text{Commit}(\text{CRS}, m, r)$, otherwise returns 0. We will sometime use the notation open to denote the opening of the commitment C , that is $\text{open} = (m, r)$. $\text{TCommit}(\tau)$ is a randomized algorithm that returns an equivocal commitment C along with an equivocation key ek given the trapdoor τ . $\text{TOpen}(ek, C, m)$ is a deterministic algorithm that returns the randomness $r \in \mathcal{R}$ of C with respect to message $m \in \mathcal{M}$. In order to simplify the notation, in the following the common reference string CRS will be an implicit argument of algorithms **Commit** and **Verify**.

We say the commitment scheme is *computationally binding* if for all non-uniform stateful PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa); (m_0, m_1, r_0, r_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}) : \\ m_0 \neq m_1 \wedge \text{Commit}(m_0, r_0) = \text{Commit}(m_1, r_1) \end{array} \right] = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

The scheme is said to be *perfectly hiding* if for all non-uniform stateful adversaries \mathcal{A} we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr [(\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa); (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); c \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m_0, r_0) : \mathcal{A}(c) = 1] \\ & = \Pr [(\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa); (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); c \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m_1, r_1) : \mathcal{A}(c) = 1] \end{aligned}$$

³We use symmetric bilinear map for the sake of exposition.

A commitment scheme is *perfectly trapdoor* for any stateful PPT adversary we have:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa); \\ m \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \\ r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{R}; \\ C \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m, r); \\ \mathcal{A}(m, r) = 1 \end{array} \right] = \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\kappa); \\ m \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \\ (C, ek) \leftarrow \text{TCommit}(\tau); \\ r \leftarrow \text{TOpen}(ek, C, m); \\ \mathcal{A}(m, r) = 1 \end{array} \right]$$

As a commitment is perfectly indistinguishable from an equivocal commitment we have that a perfect trapdoor commitment scheme is also perfectly hiding.

Our construction relies on a slight variation of the Pedersen commitment scheme [21] which we recall here. Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of prime order $p \in \mathbb{N}$. We consider the common reference string composed by $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and $h \in \mathbb{G}$ where g, h are chosen randomly and the discrete logarithm s of h in base g remains secret. To commit to a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ with randomness $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ we compute⁴ $\text{Commit}(m, r) = g^r h^m$. We denote by $\text{open} = (m, r)$ the opening of the commitment. As shown in [21], this scheme is perfectly hiding (in fact it is a trapdoor commitment where $\tau = s$) and computationally binding, under the assumption that computing the discrete logarithm in \mathbb{G} is hard.

2.5 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments

We are interested in statements that are efficiently verifiable⁵. Let R be a NP relation such that $(C, w) \in R$ means the statement is true and this can be verified with the witness w . We will consider R_λ , the subset of R where the statements are of size $\lambda = \kappa^{O(1)}$. For relation R we define a non-interactive argument in the following way. An algorithm $\mathcal{K}(1^\kappa, \lambda)$ generates the common reference string CRS . Then the prover \mathcal{P} given as input (CRS, C, w) , checks first that $(C, w) \in R_\lambda$. If this is not the case he outputs \perp . Otherwise he outputs an argument π . The verifier \mathcal{V} using CRS, C and π returns 1 in case it accepts the argument and 0 otherwise.

In our case, C will be a commitment and w its opening (the message and the randomness). We will consider non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) argument (proof) systems $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ for the relation R_λ with the following properties.

PERFECT COMPLETENESS. The argument is perfectly complete if a honest prover can convince a honest verifier with probability 1 in case the statement is true. For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CRS} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\kappa, \lambda); (C, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{CRS}, C, w); \\ \mathcal{V}(\text{CRS}, C, \pi) = 1 \wedge (C, w) \in R_\lambda \end{array} \right] = 1$$

COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS. The argument is said to be sound if no adversary can convince a verifier of a false statement. For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CRS} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\kappa, \lambda); (C, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \\ \mathcal{V}(\text{CRS}, C, \pi) = 1 \wedge \nexists w : (C, w) \in R_\lambda \end{array} \right] = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

⁴Note that we change a bit the convention as the message is “stored” as the exponent of h , instead of g .

⁵We follow the notations of [15].

PERFECT WITNESS INDISTINGUISHABILITY. The argument is said to be perfectly witness-indistinguishable if the verifier does not learn which witness was used by the prover in order to produce the proof. For all stateful interactive PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CRS} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\kappa, \lambda); (C, w_1, w_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{CRS}, C, w_1) : \\ ((C, w_1), (C, w_2)) \in R_\lambda^2 \wedge \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \end{array} \right] \\ = & \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CRS} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\kappa, \lambda); (C, w_1, w_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{CRS}, C, w_2) : \\ ((C, w_1), (C, w_2)) \in R_\lambda^2 \wedge \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \end{array} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Note that in case there is only one valid witness w for some statement C , then the argument becomes trivially perfectly witness-indistinguishable.

PERFECT ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. We say an argument is zero-knowledge if the verifier learns nothing but the truth of the statement. To formalize this idea we consider two simulators S_1, S_2 such that S_1 generates the CRS and a trapdoor τ . The simulator S_2 uses the common reference string CRS, the statement C and the trapdoor τ to output a simulated argument π . The argument is said to be perfect zero-knowledge if for any stateful interactive PPT adversary \mathcal{A} we have

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{CRS} \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\kappa, \lambda); \\ (C, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \\ \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{CRS}, C, w) : \\ (C, w) \in R_\lambda \wedge \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \end{array} \right] = \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^\kappa, \lambda); \\ (C, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}); \\ \pi \leftarrow S_2(\text{CRS}, C, \tau) : \\ (C, w) \in R_\lambda \wedge \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \end{array} \right]$$

2.6 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge

Our protocol uses zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge relative to bit commitments. In order to simplify the description of the fair exchange protocol we will use non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. As mentioned in the introduction, we note however that interactive ZKPoK would work as well, though adding 2 rounds to our protocol and loosing possibly security guarantees in case the protocol is run in parallel or involves more than 2 players. The most popular way to implement such protocols is by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [12], trading non-interaction for a security proof relying on the random oracle model. We mention that our scheme could also be adapted to fit Groth's short non-interactive argument proof system [15]. In this case the security of non-interactive proofs of knowledge would depend on a non-black box assumption and we would get shorter arguments⁶.

Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of prime order p where the discrete logarithm is hard. Let $\mathsf{H} : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ be a randomly chosen function from a collision-resistant hash function family. Let g, h be two random generators of \mathbb{G} such that the discrete logarithm of h in base g is unknown.

We will need a ZKPoK of the discrete logarithm θ of some public value $D = g^\theta$. Following the notation of [7] we have that $PK\{\theta : g^\theta\} = (c = \mathsf{H}(g^r), z = r - c\theta)$ where $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$. The verifier checks that $c = \mathsf{H}(D^c g^z)$. We will also use the following ZKPoK that convinces a verifier that the prover knows the representation of a commitment $C = g^\alpha h^\beta$ in base (g, h) where $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. $PK\{(\alpha, \beta) : C = g^\alpha h^\beta\} = (c = \mathsf{H}(g^{r_1} h^{r_2}), z_1 = r_1 - c\alpha, z_2 = r_2 - c\beta)$ where $r_1, r_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$. The verifier checks that $c = \mathsf{H}(C^c g^{z_1} h^{z_2})$.

⁶Note however that the common reference string would need to be of quadratic size in the size of the statements.

3 A new argument to prove a commitment encrypts a bit

In this section we describe a commitment scheme to encrypt a vector of values in \mathbb{Z}_p and then provide a NIZK proof that each component of this vector is a bit. Our technique borrows from [16] in the sense we use the idea that if the value b encrypted is a bit then $b(b-1)$ must be equal to 0, and also from [15] by implementing a basic form of the restriction argument.

Our commitment scheme requires to generate a common reference string $\text{CRS} = (g, g^s, g^{s^2}, \dots, g^{s^\lambda}) = (g_0, g_1, \dots, g_\lambda)$ where $s \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$ is the trapdoor. To commit a bit b_i in position i using randomness $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we compute the following slight variation of the Pedersen [21] commitment $\text{Commit}(b_i, r_i, i) = C_i = g^{r_i} g_i^{b_i}$. The commitment to the vector $\vec{B} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_\lambda)$ using the randomness $\vec{r} = (r_i)_{i \in [\lambda]}$ will simply be the vector formed by the commitments for each bit in position i : $\vec{C} = (C_i)_{i \in [\lambda]}$. Abusing a bit our notation we will write $\vec{C} = \text{Commit}(\vec{B}, \vec{r})$.

We still need a NIZK that each commitment C_i is the encryption of a bit. The prover proceeds as follows: He computes the “translation” of the commitment by $\lambda - i$ positions to the right, by providing the value $A_i = g_{\lambda-i}^{r_i} g_\lambda^{b_i}$. If we compute $e(A_i, C_i g^{-1})$ and try to express this quantity as $e(B_i, g)$ we realize by simple inspection (see correctness proof of theorem 2) that a factor $g_{\lambda+i}^{b_i(b_i-1)}$ will appear. Obviously the prover does not know $g_{\lambda+i}$ so in case $b \notin \{0, 1\}$ he will not be able to provide the second part of the proof, B_i . In case b is indeed a bit then the prover will compute the proof $\pi = (A_i, B_i)$ in order to convince the verifier that C_i is the encryption of a bit relative to position i .

Proposition 2 *The vector commitment scheme described above is perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the $\lambda - \text{BDHI}$ assumption.*

Proof.

Here we have that $\tau = s$. If we define $\text{TCommit}(\tau) = (C = g^r g_i^m, ek = (m, r))$ for $m, r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we have that $\text{TOpen}(C, ek, m')$ will return $r' = r + s^i(m - m')$. So the scheme is perfectly trapdoor.

Assume an adversary \mathcal{A} computes $B[\cdot], B'[\cdot] \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$ two vectors of messages and $\vec{r} = (r_1, \dots, r_\lambda), \vec{r}' = (r'_1, \dots, r'_\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\lambda$ two randomness vectors such that $\text{Commit}(\vec{B}, \vec{r}) = \text{Commit}(\vec{B}', \vec{r}')$ and $B[j] \neq B'[j]$ for (at least) one $j \in [\lambda]$: We obtain the equation $g^{r_j - r'_j} g^{(B[j] - B'[j])s^j} = 1_G$. If we set $X = s^j$, we can deduce that $(r_j - r'_j) + (B[j] - B'[j])X = 0$ and then $X = s^j = \frac{r'_j - r_j}{B[j] - B'[j]} \pmod p$. Once s^j is recovered we can compute $g_\lambda^X = g_{\lambda+j}$ and by proposition 1, the $\lambda - \text{BDHI}$ assumption is broken. ■

Theorem 1 *The protocol of figure 2 is a NIZK proof that the statement $C = (C_i)_{i \in [\lambda]}$ is such that for every $i \in [\lambda]$ there exists $(r_i, b_i) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p \times \{0, 1\})$ with $C_i = g^{r_i} g_i^{b_i}$. The NIZK proof has perfect completeness, perfect zero-knowledge and computational soundness under the $\lambda - \text{BDHI}$ assumption.*

See section A for the proof.

4 Base equivalence argument

Let $\theta \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Consider the commitment to the bit vector $\vec{C} = (C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]} = (g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta[i]})_{i \in [\kappa]}$ where $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ for each $i \in [\kappa]$ and also $D = g^\theta$. In this section we introduce a NIZK proof to show




Figure 2: NIZK proof of a commitment being the encryption of a binary vector.

that indeed each bit commitment in position i , C_i , encrypts the i -th bit of θ , which is hidden as the discrete logarithm of D . This argument will allow us to blind the signature with some factor θ (in the exponent) and then reveal each bit of this exponent gradually without leaking any additional information. The idea is the following. Given $\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $\vec{C} = (g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta[i]})_{i \in [\kappa]}$, the prover proceeds in two steps. First he computes $D' = \frac{\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta[i]}}{g^r}$ where $r = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i$. Here the prover computes some compressed representation of the bit vector commitment and removes the randomness. Observe however that as θ is uniformly random, thus so is D' . The prover will need to convince the verifier that r is indeed the accumulated randomness of the bit vector commitment. To do so he computes $U = D'^{\frac{1}{s}} = (\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} g_i^{\theta[i]})^{\frac{1}{s}} = \prod_{i \in [\kappa]} g_{i-1}^{\theta[i]}$ where by convention $g_0 = g$. Observe that this value can be computed without knowing s . In order to verify this proof, the verifier will check that $e(\frac{\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} C_i}{g^r}, g) = e(U, g_1)$. Intuitively, once the randomness of the bit vector is removed one can move the vector to the left by one position. If r would not be equal to $\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i$ this would not be possible without breaking some assumption. The second step consists in checking that the condensed bit vector commitment $U = \prod_{i \in [\kappa]} g_{i-1}^{\theta[i]}$ is “equivalent” to the simple commitment g^θ . This is done by noting that $U = \prod_{i \in [\kappa]} g_{i-1}^{\theta[i]} = g^{P(s)}$ where $P(\cdot)$ is the polynomial $P(X) = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} \theta[i] X^{i-1}$. This means in particular that $P(2) = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} \theta[i] 2^{i-1} = \theta$. Thus we need to prove that $P(s) - P(2) = P(s) - \theta$ is divisible by $s - 2$. The prover can compute the coefficients of the formal polynomial $W(\cdot)$ such that $P(X) - P(2) = W(X)(X - 2)$, then using the common reference string CRS the prover obtains $V = g^{W(s)}$. Verifying the “base equivalence” statement consists in checking that $e(\frac{U}{D}, g) = e(V, g_1 g^{-2}) = e(V, g^{s-2})$. This means that indeed




Figure 3: NIZK proof that a basic commitment is equivalent to a bit vector commitment.

$\theta = P(2)$ and thus the coefficients of $P(\cdot)$ correspond to the binary decomposition of θ . The full protocol is detailed in figure 3.

Theorem 2 *The protocol in figure 3 is a NIZK proof that the bits of the discrete logarithm of D corresponds to the bit vector committed in $(C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]}$. The NIZK proof has perfect completeness, perfect zero-knowledge and computational soundness under the $\kappa - \text{SDH}$ assumption.*

See section B for the proof.

5 Fair exchange of short signatures without TTP

Our fair exchange protocol for digital signatures works as follows. At the beginning a common reference string CRS is generated. Then each participant runs $\text{FEKeyGen}(1^\kappa)$ to obtain a pair of (public/private) keys pk, sk for the signing algorithm. At this point each participant executing $\text{EncSigGen}(\text{CRS}, sk, m)$ will compute an encrypted signature γ for the message m , using the signature σ_m blinded with some factor θ . This γ will contain also the proofs that relate the signature σ_m with some bit vector commitment to θ .

The rest is straightforward: each participant sends the encrypted signature. If all the verifications pass, the first participant \mathcal{P}_A will ask to \mathcal{P}_B to open the commitment of the first bit of θ . If the opening is successful \mathcal{P}_B will do the same for its own blinding factor. The process is repeated for each bit until all the bits of the blinding factors are recovered. Finally each player can compute the signature by “cancelling out” the blinding factor θ . The abstract syntax of the protocol is described in figure 4.

We describe now more in detail how the encrypted signature is constructed, which is the core of our construction. The encrypted signature contains:

1. A commitment \vec{C} to the bit string formed by the bits of θ as described in section 3.
2. $\tilde{\sigma}$, the signature of the message m blinded by θ .
3. Proofs to guarantee that the bit vector commitment encrypts the binary decomposition of the blinding factor θ .
4. A proof in order to convince the verifier that γ is the encryption of σ_m under some blinding factor θ which is hidden in the basic commitment g^θ .
5. A proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of D and a proof of knowledge of the representation of each bit commitment of the vector \vec{C} . These proofs of knowledge will allow us to keep simulating the adversary despite he aborts.

A detailed description of the concrete protocol is given in figure 5.

	$\mathcal{P}_A(\text{CRS}, m_A, m_B)$		$\mathcal{P}_B(\text{CRS}, m_A, m_B)$
1	$(sk_A, pk_A) \leftarrow \text{FEKeyGen}(1^\kappa)$		
2	pk_A	→	
3			$(sk_B, pk_B) \leftarrow \text{FEKeyGen}(1^\kappa)$
4		←	pk_B
5	$(\theta_A, \vec{r}_A, \gamma_A) \leftarrow \text{EncSigGen}(\text{CRS}, sk_A, m_A)$		
6	γ_A	→	
7			$(\theta_B, \vec{r}_B, \gamma_B) \leftarrow \text{EncSigGen}(\text{CRS}, sk_B, m_B)$
8		←	γ_B
10	$v \leftarrow \text{EncSigCheck}(\text{CRS}, pk_B, m_B, \gamma_B)$		
11	if $v = 0$ then ABORT		
12			$v \leftarrow \text{EncSigCheck}(\text{CRS}, pk_A, m_A, \gamma_A)$
13			if $v = 0$ then ABORT
14	for $i = 1$ to κ :		
15	$\text{open}_{A,i} \leftarrow \text{KeyBitProofGen}(\text{CRS}, \vec{r}_A, \theta_A, i)$	→	
16	$\text{open}_{A,i}$		$\text{open}_{B,i} \leftarrow \text{KeyBitProofGen}(\text{CRS}, \vec{r}_B, \theta_B, i)$
17		←	$\text{open}_{B,i}$
19	$v_i \leftarrow \text{KeyBitCheck}(\text{CRS}, \text{open}_{B,i}, i)$		
20	if $v_i = 0$ then ABORT		
21			$v_i \leftarrow \text{KeyBitCheck}(\text{CRS}, \text{open}_{A,i}, i)$
22			if $v_i = 0$ then ABORT
23	$\sigma_{m_B} \leftarrow \text{EncSigDecrypt}(\gamma_B, \theta_B)$		
24			$\sigma_{m_A} \leftarrow \text{EncSigDecrypt}(\gamma_A, \theta_A)$

Figure 4: Abstract fair exchange protocol.

We say that the protocol is *perfectly complete*⁷ if and only if both players \mathcal{P}_A and \mathcal{P}_B that follow the protocol obtain respectively $\sigma_A = \text{SSig}(sk_B, m_B)$, the signature of message m_B and $\sigma_B = \text{SSig}(sk_A, m_A)$, the signature of message m_A with probability 1.

We say that the protocol is (*partially*) *fair* if at the end of the execution of the protocol (be it normal or anticipated by the abortion of the adversary) the probability of both players to recover their corresponding signature differs at most by a polynomial factor in the security parameter κ . As mentioned in the introduction, the advantage of this approach is that it avoids trying to compare the running time of the participants and thus allows to capture in a simple, but precise manner the intuition of *partial fairness*.

Definition 5 (*Partial fairness*) We define the partial fairness of the protocol through the following experiment: The adversary \mathcal{A} plays the role of the corrupted player say w.l.o.g. \mathcal{P}_A . Thus \mathcal{P}_B is honest and follows the protocol. $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SSig}}(\cdot)$ is the signing oracle for the signature scheme SSig relative to the public key pk_B of \mathcal{P}_B .

1. \mathcal{A} asks for signature computations for arbitrary messages to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SSig}}(\cdot)$.
2. \mathcal{A} chooses the messages m_A and m_B on which the fair exchange protocol will be run, with the restriction that m_B must not have been requested before to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{SSig}}(\cdot)$.
 \mathcal{A} computes also its public key pk_A and sends it to \mathcal{P}_B .
3. \mathcal{A} then interacts in arbitrary way with \mathcal{P}_B .
4. If \mathcal{A} has aborted before ending the protocol, then let $\theta_A^*[1..i]$ ($0 \leq i \leq \kappa$) be the partial blinding obtained by \mathcal{P}_B . At this point we assume that \mathcal{P}_B will try to compute $\text{SSig}(sk_A, m_A)$ by choosing at random some element in the remaining space of size $2^{\kappa-i}$. We call this tentative signature σ_B .
5. \mathcal{A} keeps running his own algorithm and finally outputs a tentative signature σ_A on m_B relative to public key pk_B .

The protocol is said to be partially fair if and only if

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{FE}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) = \frac{\Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_B, m_B, \sigma_A) = \text{valid}]}{\Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_A, m_A, \sigma_B) = \text{valid}] \cdot 2^\kappa} = \text{neg}(\kappa)$$

where the probability is taken over the random choices of \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{P}_B .

Theorem 3 The protocol described in figure 5 is complete. Moreover if the $\kappa - \text{SDH}$ assumption and the $\kappa - \text{BDHI}$ assumption hold and the underlying signature scheme is secure, it is secure in the random oracle model according to definition 5.

The proof is given in section C.

As the scheme presented in [4] is secure under the $\kappa - \text{SDH}$ assumption, we have

Corollary 1 The protocol described in figure 5 is complete. Moreover if the $\kappa - \text{SDH}$ assumption and the $\kappa - \text{BDHI}$ assumption hold it is secure in the random oracle model according to definition 5.

⁷Here *complete* does not refer to fairness.

<p>FESetup(1^κ)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g) \leftarrow \text{BMGen}(1^\kappa)$ 2. $s \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$ 3. Return $\text{CRS} = \langle (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g), (g_0, g_1, g_2, \dots, g_\kappa) \rangle$ where for all $i \in [0..\kappa] : g_i = g^{s^i}$. <p>FEKeyGen(1^κ)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{SKG}(1^\kappa)$ where $sk = (g, x, y)$ and $pk = (g, u, v)$ like described in section 2.3. 2. Return (sk, pk). <p>EncSigGen(CRS, sk, m)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Compute $\theta \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$. 2. Compute $D = g^\theta$. 3. Compute $\vec{C} = (C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]} = (g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta[i]})_{i \in [\kappa]}$. 4. Compute π_1 that shows that \vec{C} is the encryption of a binary vector as described in figure 2. 5. Compute π_2 that shows that \vec{C} is the encryption of the bits of the binary decomposition of the blinding factor θ as described in figure 3. 6. Compute $PK_\theta = PK\{\theta : g^\theta\}$ as described in section 2.6. 7. Compute \vec{PK}, a vector where each component at position i is ZKPoK for the representation of C_i in base (g, g_i). $\vec{PK} = (PK\{(r_i, \theta[i]) : g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta[i]}\})_{i \in [\kappa]}$ as described in section 2.6. 8. Parse sk as (g, x, y). 9. Set $r_\sigma \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$. 10. Compute $\sigma = (\sigma', r_\sigma) \leftarrow \text{SSig}(sk, m)$ where $\sigma' = g^{\frac{1}{x+m+y r_\sigma}}$. 11. Set $\tilde{\sigma} \leftarrow (\sigma'^\theta = g^{\frac{\theta}{x+m+y r_\sigma}}, r_\sigma) = (\tilde{\sigma}', r_\sigma)$. 12. Set $\gamma \leftarrow (D, \vec{C}, \pi_1, \pi_2, PK_\theta, \vec{PK}, \tilde{\sigma})$. 13. Return $(\theta, \vec{r}, \gamma)$. <p>EncSigCheck($\text{CRS}, pk, m, \gamma$)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parse γ as $\gamma = (D, \vec{C}, \pi_1, \pi_2, PK_\theta, \vec{PK}, \tilde{\sigma})$. 2. Check π_1 as described in figure 2. 3. Check π_2 as described in figure 3. 4. Check PK_θ using D and PK_θ as described in section 2.6. 5. Check the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge using \vec{C} and \vec{PK} as described in section 2.6. 6. Parse pk as $pk = (g, u, v)$ 7. Check that $e(\tilde{\sigma}, u g^m v_\sigma^r) = e(D, g)$. 8. Return 1 if all tests pass, 0 otherwise. <p>KeyBitProofGen($\text{CRS}, \vec{r}, \theta, i$)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opens the i-th commitment of \vec{C}, that is $(\theta[i], r_i)$ such that $C_i = g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta[i]}$. 2. Return $\text{open} \leftarrow (\theta[i], r_i)$. <p>KeyBitCheck($\text{CRS}, \text{open}, i$)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parse open as $\text{open} = (b, r)$ 2. Check that $C_i = g^r g_i^b$. <p>EncSigDecrypt(γ, θ)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Parse γ as $\gamma = (D, \vec{C}, \pi, PK_\theta, \vec{PK}, \tilde{\sigma})$. 2. Parse $\tilde{\sigma}$ as $\tilde{\sigma} = (\tilde{\sigma}', r_\sigma)$. 3. Compute $\sigma' = \tilde{\sigma}'^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$. 4. Return $\sigma = (\sigma', r_\sigma)$.
--

Figure 5: Implementation of the fair exchange protocol.

6 Conclusion

In this work we introduced a practical protocol to exchange short signatures [4] fairly without relying on a TTP. It seems our approach can be applicable to other signature schemes or more generally to the exchange of values which are computed from a secret and are publicly verifiable using bilinear maps. Thus it seems interesting to use our techniques in order to obtain a general framework to build practical fair protocols involving bilinear maps.

References

- [1] N. Asokan, Matthias Schunter, and Michael Waidner. Optimistic protocols for fair exchange. In *CCS*, pages 7–17. ACM Press, April 1997.
- [2] Manuel Blum. How to exchange (secret) keys. *ACM Transactions on Computer Systems*, 1(2):175–193, May 1983.
- [3] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Efficient selective-ID secure identity-based encryption without random oracles. In *EUROCRYPT*, volume pages of *LNCS*, pages 223–238. Springer, Heidelberg, 2004.
- [4] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Short Signatures Without Random Oracles and the SDH Assumption in Bilinear Groups. *Journal of Cryptology*, 21(2):149–177, 2008.
- [5] Dan Boneh and Moni Naor. Timed Commitments. In Mihir Bellare, editor, *CRYPTO*, LNCS, pages 236–254. Springer-Verlag, August 2000.
- [6] Ernest Brickell, David Chaum, Jeroen van De Graaf, and Ivan Bjerre Damgård. Gradual and verifiable release of a secret. In Carl Pomerance, editor, *CRYPTO*, pages 156–166. Springer-Verlag, 1987.
- [7] Jan Camenisch and Markus Stadler. Proof Systems for General Statements about Discrete Logarithms. Technical report, 1997.
- [8] Richard Cleve. Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty. In *Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '86*, pages 364–369, New York, New York, USA, November 1986. ACM Press.
- [9] Richard Cleve and Gilles Brassard. Controlled Gradual Disclosure Schemes for Random Bits and Their Applications. In Gilles Brassard, editor, *Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 89 Proceedings*, volume 435 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 573–588. Springer New York, New York, NY, July 1990.
- [10] Ivan Damgård. Practical and provably secure release of a secret and exchange of signatures. *Journal of Cryptology*, 8(4):201–222, September 1995.
- [11] Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich, and Abraham Lempel. A randomized protocol for signing contracts. *Communications of the ACM*, 28(6):637–647, June 1985.
- [12] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In *CRYPTO*, January 1986.

- [13] Juan A. Garay, Philip MacKenzie, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Ke Yang. Resource Fairness and Composability of Cryptographic Protocols. In Ran Canetti, editor, *TCC*, volume 3876 of *LNCS*, pages 404–428. Springer, 2006.
- [14] S. Dov Gordon and Jonathan Katz. Partial Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation. In Henri Gilbert, editor, *EUROCRYPT*, volume 6110 of *LNCS*, pages 157–176. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
- [15] Jens Groth. Short Pairing-Based Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments. In Masayuki Abe, editor, *ASIACRYPT*, volume 6477 of *LNCS*, pages 321–340. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
- [16] Jens Groth, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Amit Sahai. Perfect Non-interactive Zero Knowledge for NP. In Serge Vaudenay, editor, *EUROCRYPT*, volume 4004 of *LNCS*, pages 339–358. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006.
- [17] Qiong Huang, Duncan S. Wong, and Willy Susilo. The Construction of Ambiguous Optimistic Fair Exchange from Designated Confirmer Signature without Random Oracles. In Marc Fischlin, J. Buchmann, and Mark Manulis, editors, *PKC*, volume 7293 of *LNCS*, pages 120–137. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
- [18] Aniket Kate, Gregory Zaverucha, and Ian Goldberg. Constant-Size Commitments to Polynomials and Their Applications. In Masayuki Abe, editor, *ASIACRYPT*, volume 6477 of *LNCS*, pages 177–194–194. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
- [19] Silvio Micali. Simple and fast optimistic protocols for fair electronic exchange. In *Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing - PODC '03*, pages 12–19, New York, New York, USA, July 2003. ACM Press.
- [20] S Mitsunari, R Sakai, and M Kasahara. A New Traitor Tracing. *EICE*, E85-A:481–484, 2002.
- [21] Torben Pedersen. Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing. In J. Feigenbaum, editor, *CRYPTO*, volume 576 of *LNCS*, pages 129–140. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991.
- [22] Benny Pinkas. Fair Secure Two-Party Computation. In Eli Biham, editor, *EUROCRYPT*, volume 2656 of *LNCS*, pages 87–105. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, May 2003.
- [23] Fangguo Zhang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Willy Susilo. An Efficient Signature Scheme from Bilinear Pairings and Its Applications. In Feng Bao, Robert Deng, and Jianying Zhou, editors, *PKC*, volume 2947 of *LNCS*, pages 277–290. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004.

A Proof of theorem 1

Proof.

Completeness. Let $i \in [\lambda]$. It's clear that the prover can compute $A_i = C_i^{s^{\lambda-i}}$. Then if $b_i := B[i] \in \{0, 1\}$ we have $b_i(b_i - 1) = 0$ and

$$\begin{aligned}
e(A_i, C_i g_i^{-1}) &= e(g^{(r_i + b_i s^i) s^{\lambda-i}}, g^{r_i} g^{(b_i - 1) s^i}) \\
&= e(g^{(r_i s^{\lambda-i} + b_i s^\lambda)(r_i + (b_i - 1) s^i)}, g) \\
&= e(g^{r_i^2 s^{\lambda-i} + r_i b_i s^\lambda + r_i (b_i - 1) s^\lambda + b_i (b_i - 1) s^{\lambda+i}}, g) \\
&= e(g^{r_i^2 s^{\lambda-i} + s^\lambda r_i (2b_i - 1)}, g) \\
&= e(B_i, g)
\end{aligned}$$

We can see that the prover can compute B_i as he knows r_i and b_i and the group elements $g_{\lambda-i}, g_\lambda$ are public.

Computational Soundness. Assume there exist some adversary \mathcal{A} that breaks the soundness of the scheme (that is \mathcal{A} is able to open the commitment to some vector that does not contain bits) for at least one i . We build the following adversary \mathcal{B} that breaks the $\lambda - BDHI$ assumption. \mathcal{B} receives the challenge tuple $(g_0, g_1, g_2, \dots, g_\lambda)$. \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{A} using the tuple as the CRS and obtains C_i, r_i, b_i such that $C_i = g^{r_i} g_i^{b_i}$ and $\pi_i = (A_i, B_i)$ where $e(C_i, g_{\lambda-i}) = e(A_i, g)$ (1) and $e(A_i, C_i g_i^{-1}) = e(B_i, g)$ (2).

From (1) we can deduce that $A_i = C_i^{s^{\lambda-i}}$. From (2) (as seen in the correctness proof) we have that $B_i = g^{r_i^2 s^{\lambda-i} + r_i (2b_i - 1) s^\lambda + b_i (b_i - 1) s^{\lambda+i}} = g_{\lambda-i}^{r_i^2} g_\lambda^{r_i (2b_i - 1)} g_{\lambda+i}^{b_i (b_i - 1)}$

\mathcal{B} can compute $X = g_{\lambda-i}^{r_i^2} g_\lambda^{r_i (2b_i - 1)}$, so it can obtain $g_{\lambda+i} = (B_i \cdot X^{-1})^{\frac{1}{b_i (b_i - 1)}}$ where $b_i (b_i - 1) \neq 0$ as $b_i \notin \{0, 1\}$, and thus the $\kappa + i - DHE$ assumption is broken. Using proposition 1 we have that the $\lambda - BDHI$ assumption is broken as well.

Perfect zero-knowledge. We observe first that the argument is perfectly witness-indistinguishable because for a given commitment $C_i = g^{r_i} g_i^{b_i}$ there is only one possible argument that satisfies equations $A_i = C_i^{s^{\lambda-i}}$ and $e(A_i, C_i g_i^{-1}) = e(B_i, g)$.

We describe now the zero-knowledge simulator. It generates the common reference string correctly, and also learns the trapdoor so it can create commitments that can be opened to any value. As the commitment can be opened and the trapdoor is known it is easy to compute an argument A_i, B_i .

Let us justify why the simulator simulates perfectly the real argument. Consider the *hybrid* stateful algorithm where the simulator generates the trapdoor and the common reference string but opens the commitment to real witness (r_i, b_i) . As the commitment is perfectly trapdoor the real argument is perfectly indistinguishable from the hybrid algorithm. Finally as the argument is perfect witness-indistinguishable the hybrid is perfectly indistinguishable from the simulated argument.

■

B Proof of theorem 2

Proof.

Perfect completeness. The reason why the prover can compute $U = \left(\frac{\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} C_i}{g^r}\right)^{\frac{1}{s}}$ without knowing s is because $U = \prod_{i \in \kappa} g_{i-1}^{\theta[i]}$. Indeed U corresponds to the vector $(0, \theta[1], \dots, \theta[\kappa])$ that is moved by one position to the left. Similarly V can be computed because the prover knows the

coefficients $W[i]$ of the polynomial $W(\cdot)$ of degree $\kappa - 2$, so we have $V = \prod_{i \in [\kappa-1]} g_{i-1}^{W[i]}$. The rest follows by simple inspection.

Computational Soundness. Let \mathcal{A} be the PPT adversary that breaks the soundness of the scheme. We build the following adversary \mathcal{B} . \mathcal{B} receives the challenge tuple $(g_0, g_1, g_2, \dots, g_\kappa)$. This challenge tuple stands for the CRS and is sent to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} returns the following values:

- $\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.
- $\theta^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $D = g^{\theta^*}$.
- $(r_i, \theta[i]) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p \times \{0, 1\})^\kappa$ for $i \in [\kappa]$ such that $\vec{C} = (C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]}$ where $C_i = g^{r_i} g^{\theta[i] s^i}$.
- $\pi = (r, U, V) \in \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G}$.

Assume first that $r \neq \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i \pmod p$ then we can deduce that $U = (g^{\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i - r} g^{\theta_i s^i})^{1/s}$. As $g^{\frac{\theta_i s^i}{s}} = g_{i-1}^{\theta_i}$ is easily computable due to the fact that $\theta[i]$ are known, \mathcal{B} can deduce $g^{\frac{\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i - r}{s}}$ and as $\delta = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i - r \neq 0 \pmod p$ is known, \mathcal{B} can compute $g^{\frac{1}{\delta}} = (\frac{U}{g_{i-1}^{\theta_i}})^{\frac{1}{\delta}}$ and thus the $\kappa - DHI$ assumption is broken. From now on we assume that $\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} r_i = r$. As the adversary \mathcal{A} wins, this means that there exists some $j \in [\kappa]$ such that $\theta[j] \neq \theta^*[j]$. Moreover as the verification involving V passes we have that $V = g^{\frac{\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} \theta[i] s^{i-1} - \theta^*[i] 2^{i-1}}{s-2}}$. As the decomposition in binary is unique we have that $\Delta = \sum_{i \in [\kappa]} 2^{i-1} (\theta[i] - \theta^*[i]) \neq 0 \pmod p$. We can rewrite V as $V = g^{\frac{\Delta}{s-2} + \frac{\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} \theta[i] s^{i-1} - \theta[i] 2^{i-1}}{s-2}}$ = $g^{\frac{\Delta}{s-2} + \frac{\sum_{i \in [\kappa]} \theta[i] (s^{i-1} - 2^{i-1})}{s-2}}$ = $g^{\frac{\Delta}{s-2} + Z(s)}$ where the coefficients of $Z(\cdot)$ are efficiently computable by \mathcal{B} because $\forall i \in [\kappa] : s - 2 | s^{i-1} - 2^{i-1}$. As $\Delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ is also known this means \mathcal{A} can compute $g^{\frac{1}{s-2}} = (\frac{V}{g^{Z(s)}})^{\frac{1}{\Delta}}$ and thus the $\kappa - SDH$ assumption is broken.

Perfect zero-knowledge. The simulator works as follows. He generates the common reference string CRS correctly and saves the trapdoor s . Given the statement $D, \vec{C} = (C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]}$ such that \vec{C} is formed by Pedersen commitments to bits in positions $1, \dots, \kappa$ and such that D and \vec{C} are equivalent with respect to bases $(2, s)$, the simulator choose a random $r' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and reveals it as the randomness of $\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} C_i$. Then the simulator sets $D' = \frac{\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} C_i}{g^{r'}}$, $U = (\frac{\prod_{i \in [\kappa]} C_i}{g^{r'}})^{\frac{1}{s}}$ and $V = (\frac{U}{D})^{\frac{1}{s-2}}$. r', U, V are indistinguishable from a real argument as they are all uniform.

■

C Proof of theorem 3

Proof.

As the underlying NIZK arguments are perfectly complete, we can see by inspection that so is the fair exchange protocol. Let \mathcal{A} be the adversary that breaks the fairness of our protocol. We build the following adversary \mathcal{B} .

We distinguish between two types of adversaries \mathcal{A} :

- *Type I:* the adversary \mathcal{A} does not lie: That is he does not forge values for the NIZK arguments and/or the commitments. Said differently, adversary \mathcal{A} follows the protocol, but may abort prematurely.

- *Type II*: the adversary \mathcal{A} lies.

Note that both adversaries may abort during the execution of the protocol. The simulator \mathcal{B} will choose with probability 1/2 to bet that \mathcal{A} is of type I and with probability 1/2 that \mathcal{A} is of type II.

What happens in case of an adversary of type I, is that the only way for \mathcal{A} to win his by breaking the signature scheme (without even caring about the values sent by \mathcal{P}_B). This means the simulator \mathcal{B} will try to build an adversary that breaks the security of the signature scheme. The case of adversary of type II is more straightforward: as \mathcal{A} lies, the simulator will be able to break the soundness of some of the arguments involved or the binding property of the commitment scheme.

For adversary \mathcal{A} of type I, \mathcal{B} does the following. \mathcal{B} generates himself the CRS, thus knowing the trapdoor s . When \mathcal{A} chooses the message m_B to be signed, \mathcal{B} will not compute the signature because he wants to break the signature scheme. More concretely \mathcal{B} will

1. Run $\text{BMGen}(1^\kappa)$ to obtain $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g)$.
2. Set $s \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$.
3. Compute $\text{CRS} \leftarrow \langle (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g), (g, g^s, g^{s^2}, \dots, g^{s^\kappa}) \rangle = \langle (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e, g), (g_0, g_1, \dots, g_\kappa) \rangle$.
4. Set $\theta_B \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$.
5. Set $r_\sigma \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$.
6. Set $D = (g^{m_B} uv^{r_\sigma})^{\theta_B}$.
7. Set $\tilde{\sigma} = (g^{\theta_B}, r_\sigma)$.
8. Set $(r_1, r_2, \dots, r_\kappa) \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p^\kappa$.
9. $\vec{C} = (C_i)_{i \in [\kappa]} = (g^{r_i} g_i^{\theta^{[i]}})_{i \in [\kappa]}$.

Note that all the proofs can be computed because \mathcal{B} knows s . Moreover \mathcal{A} is fooled because we have $e(\tilde{\sigma}, g^{m_B} uv^{r_\sigma}) = e((g^{m_B} uv^{r_\sigma})^{\theta_B}, g) = e(D, g)$ and all values computed by the simulator \mathcal{B} are perfectly indistinguishable from those of a real experiment. Some subtle issue arises though: Let us consider the case where \mathcal{A} detects that he is inside the simulator because he does a brute force attack on the remaining bits and realizes that \mathcal{B} does not know the signature. In this case \mathcal{A} will abort the simulation (not only the protocol) and in particular he will not output the signature and thus our reduction will fail. As the bit vector commitment scheme is perfectly hiding and the arguments are perfectly zero-knowledge, we can deduce that this may only happen in round j where there are $\kappa - j$ (few) remaining bits. Moreover \mathcal{A} runs in polynomial time, so we can deduce that $\kappa - j \leq \log(Q(\kappa))$ where $Q(\cdot)$ is a polynomial. Let σ_B be the signature that is output by \mathcal{B} . As \mathcal{A} does not lie we also have that $\Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_A, m_A, \sigma_B) = \text{valid}] \geq \frac{1}{2^{\log(Q(\kappa))+1}} (+1$ because \mathcal{A} has got one bit of advantage). We can deduce that the advantage of \mathcal{A} is such that $\text{Adv}^{\text{FE}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa, \lambda) \leq \frac{1}{2^{-(\log(Q(\kappa))+1)} 2^\kappa} = \frac{2^{\log(Q(\kappa))+1}}{2^\kappa} = \frac{2Q(\kappa)}{2^\kappa}$ which is still negligible, thus \mathcal{A} did not win, so our reduction is still valid. Consider now the case where \mathcal{A} does not abort in the simulation. That is he may abort the protocol but will finally output the signature σ_A , which is an attempt to be a valid signature for message m_B . We can deduce that $\text{Adv}^{\text{FE}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa, \lambda) \geq \epsilon \Rightarrow$

$$\frac{\Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_B, m_B, \sigma_A) = \text{valid}]}{\Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_A, m_A, \sigma_B) = \text{valid}] 2^\kappa} \geq \epsilon \Rightarrow \Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_B, m_B, \sigma_A) = \text{valid}] \geq \epsilon$$

because we trivially have that $\Pr[\text{SVf}(pk_A, m_A, \sigma_B)] \geq \frac{1}{2^\kappa}$. Thus \mathcal{B} has broken the signature scheme.

For adversary \mathcal{A} of type II, the simulator \mathcal{B} does the following: he asks \mathcal{A} to compute γ_A which is parsed as $(D_A, \vec{C}_A, \pi_{A,1}, \pi_{A,2}, PK_{\theta_A}, \vec{PK}_A, \tilde{\sigma}_A)$. For the proofs of knowledge \mathcal{A} will use $\mathbf{H}(\cdot)$ a random oracle which is controlled by \mathcal{B} . So \mathcal{B} will rewind \mathcal{A} and obtain $PK_{\theta'_A}$ from which he will obtain θ_A^* and \vec{PK}'_A from which he will extract $(r_{Ai}, \theta_A[i])$ for each $i \in [\kappa]$. As \mathcal{A} lied, \mathcal{B} will be able to break the soundness of one of the NIZK argument or the binding property of the commitment scheme.

■