

# Information-Theoretic Timed-Release Security: Key-Agreement, Encryption, and Authentication Codes \*

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## Abstract

In this paper, we study timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. As fundamental cryptographic primitives with information-theoretic security, we can consider key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes. Therefore, in this paper, we deal with information-theoretic timed-release security for all those primitives. Specifically, we propose models and formalizations of security for information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes, and we present constructions of those ones. In particular, information-theoretic timed-release encryption and authentication codes can be constructed from information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement in a generic and simple way. Also, we derive tight lower bounds on sizes of secret-keys and show optimal constructions for information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement and encryption. Furthermore, we investigate a relationship of mechanisms between information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement and information-theoretic key-insulated key-agreement. It turns out that there exists a simple algorithm which converts the former into the latter, and vice versa. In the sense, we conclude that these two mechanisms are essentially close.

## 1 Introduction

The security of most of present cryptographic systems is based on the assumption of difficulty of computationally hard problems such as the integer factoring problem or the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields or elliptic curves. However, taking into account recent rapid development of algorithms and computer technologies, such a system based on the assumption of difficulty of computationally hard problems might not maintain sufficient long-term security. In fact, it is known that quantum computers can easily solve the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. From these aspects, it is necessary and interesting to consider cryptographic techniques whose security does not depend on any computationally hard problems, especially for the long-term security.

Informally, the goal of timed-release cryptography is to securely send certain information into the future. For instance, in timed-release encryption, a sender transmits a ciphertext so that a receiver can decrypt it when the time which the sender specified has come, and the receiver cannot decrypt it before the time. The timed-release cryptography was first proposed by May [10] in 1993, and after that, Rivest et al. [12] developed it in a systematic and formal way. Since Rivest et al. gave a formal definition of timed-release encryption in [12], various researches on timed-release cryptography

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including timed-release signatures (e.g., [1, 8, 9]) and timed-release encryption have been done based on computational security. In particular, timed-release public key encryption (TR-PKE for short) has been recently researched intensively. Chan et al.[4] proposed the first TR-PKE scheme, but did not present a formal security definition. Cathalo et al.[2] and Chalkias et al.[3] proposed direct constructions of TR-PKE schemes based on number-theoretic assumptions in the random oracle model. Independently, Cheon et al. [6] proposed a generic construction of TR-PKE and it is efficient and provably secure in the standard model. And also, Fujioka et al.[7] proposed a generic construction of TR-PKE that guarantees strong security in the random oracle model. It also should be noted that Choen et al.[5] recently shows relationships between TR-PKE and key-insulated public-key encryption (KI-PKE for short) with computational security setting.

To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper which reports on the study of information-theoretic timed-release cryptography. If a sender wants to transmit a message far into the future, information-theoretic security will be helpful in constructing timed-release mechanism, since its security can provide the long-term security. In this paper, we study timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. As fundamental cryptographic primitives with information-theoretic security, we can consider information-theoretically secure key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes. Therefore, in this paper, we deal with information-theoretic timed-release security for all those primitives. Specifically, the contribution of this paper is as follows.

- We propose a model and formalization of security for timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA for short) in information-theoretic security setting. We also derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TR-KA. In addition, we propose an optimal direct construction of TR-KA based on multivariate polynomials over finite fields.
- We propose models and formalizations of security for timed-release encryption (TRE for short) and authentication codes (TRA-codes for short) in information-theoretic security setting. We also present simple generic constructions of TRE and TRA-codes: TRE can be constructed from TR-KA and the one-time pad; and TRA-codes can be constructed from TR-KA and traditional A-codes. In addition, we derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TRE.
- We investigate and show relationship between TR-KA and key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA for short) [13] in information-theoretic security setting. It turns out that there exists a simple algorithm which converts TR-KA into KI-KA, and vice versa. Therefore, we can conclude that the mechanisms of TR-KA and KI-KA are essentially close. Note that this relationship in information-theoretic security setting is analogous to that of TR-PKE and KI-PKE in computational security setting shown in [5].

## 2 TR-KA: Timed-Release Key-Agreement with Information-Theoretic Security

### 2.1 Model and Security Definition

In this section we show a model and a security definition of timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA for short) with information-theoretic security. This is done based on those of timed-release schemes with computational security and those of traditional key-agreement with information-theoretic security.

For simplicity, we assume that there is a trusted authority whose role is to generate and to distribute secret-keys of entities. We call this model the *trusted initializer model* as in [11]. In TR-KA, there are  $n + 2$  entities,  $n$  users  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n$ , a time-server  $T$  for broadcasting *time-signals* and a trusted initializer  $TI$ , where  $n$  is a positive integer. In this paper, we assume that the identity of each user  $U_i$  is

also denoted by  $U_i$ . In addition, when any two users communicate each other in a timed-release scheme (i.e., not only TR-KA but also TRE and TRA-codes in the following sections) under consideration in this paper, we call a user who specifies the time a *sender* and the other a *receiver* for convenience.

Informally, TR-KA is executed as follows. In the initial phase, TI generates secret-keys on behalf of  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and the time-server T. After distributing these keys via secure channels, TI deletes them in his memory. Any user  $U_{i_1}$  can specify future time when  $U_{i_1}$  wants to share a common-key with a user  $U_{i_2}$ , and he computes a common-key in advance by using  $U_{i_1}$ 's secret-key and the identity  $U_{i_2}$ . And  $U_{i_1}$  tells  $U_{i_2}$  the future time which  $U_{i_1}$  specified. The time-server T periodically broadcasts a time-signal at each time which is generated by using T's master-key. When the specified time has come,  $U_{i_2}$  can compute a common-key shared with  $U_{i_1}$  by using  $U_{i_2}$ 's secret-key, the identity  $U_{i_1}$  and a time-signal of the specified time. Note that each user has two kinds of secret-keys: one is used for generating a common-key when he is a sender; and the other is used for deriving a common-key when he is a receiver. In TR-KA, we consider a non-interactive model where any two users can share a common-key without interactive communications.

Formally, we give the definition of TR-KA as follows.<sup>1</sup>

**Definition 1 (TR-KA).** A *timed-release key-agreement* (TR-KA for short)  $\Pi$  involves  $n+2$  entities, TI,  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n$  and T, and consists of a four-tuple of algorithms ( $Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer$ ) with five spaces,  $\mathcal{TCK}, \mathcal{TUK}, \mathcal{TMK}, \mathcal{T}$ , and  $\mathcal{TI}$ , where all of the above algorithms except  $Setup$  are deterministic and all of the above spaces are finite. In addition,  $\Pi$  is executed with four phases as follows.

– **Notation:**

- *Entities:* TI is a trusted initializer,  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) is a user and T is a time-server which broadcasts time-signals. Let  $\mathcal{U} := \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n\}$  be the set of all users.
- *Spaces:*  $\mathcal{TCK}$  is a set of possible common-keys, and  $\mathcal{TMK}$  is a set of possible master-keys.  $\mathcal{T} := \{1, 2, \dots, \tau\}$  is a set of time.  $\mathcal{TI}^{(t)}$  is a set of time-signals at time  $t$ . Let  $\mathcal{TI} := \bigcup_{i=1}^{\tau} \mathcal{TI}^{(i)}$ . Also,  $\mathcal{TUK}_i^{(S)}$  is a set of possible  $U_i$ 's secret-keys for common-key generation. And also,  $\mathcal{TUK}_i^{(R)}$  is a set of possible  $U_i$ 's secret-keys for common-key derivation. Then,  $\mathcal{TUK}_i := \mathcal{TUK}_i^{(S)} \times \mathcal{TUK}_i^{(R)}$  is the set of possible secret-keys for  $U_i$  with an associated probability distribution  $P_{\mathcal{TUK}_i}$ . Let  $\mathcal{TUK}^{(S)} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{TUK}_i^{(S)}$ ,  $\mathcal{TUK}^{(R)} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{TUK}_i^{(R)}$ , and  $\mathcal{TUK} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{TUK}_i$ .
- *Algorithms:*  $Setup$  is a key generation algorithm which on input a security parameter  $1^k$ , outputs users' secret-keys and a time-server's master-key,  $Ext: \mathcal{TMK} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{TI}$  is a time-signal generation algorithm for T,  $KeyGen: \mathcal{TUK}^{(S)} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{TCK}$  is a common-key generation algorithm and  $KeyDer: \mathcal{TUK}^{(R)} \times \mathcal{TI} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{TCK}$  is a common-key derivation algorithm.

1. **Key Generation and Distribution.** In the initial phase, TI generates the following keys by using  $Setup$ : a master-key  $tmk^* \in \mathcal{TMK}$  for T; and a secret-key  $tuk_i = (tuk_i^{(S)}, tuk_i^{(R)}) \in \mathcal{TUK}_i$  for  $U_i$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ). These keys are distributed to corresponding entities via secure channels. After distributing these keys, TI deletes them from his memory. And, T and  $U_i$  keep their keys secret, respectively.

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<sup>1</sup>Note that our models of information-theoretically secure timed-release schemes (i.e., Definitions 1, 4 and 6) are almost the same as those of computationally secure timed-release schemes [2, 4, 5, 6, 7] except for considering the trusted initializer in our models.

2. **Time-signal Generation.** For broadcasting a time-signal at each time,  $T$  generates a time-signal  $tmk^{(t)} = Ext(tmk^*, t) \in \mathcal{TI}^{(t)}$  by using a master key  $tmk^*$  and time  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . Then,  $T$  broadcasts it to all users via a (authenticated) broadcast channel.
3. **Common-key Generation.** If  $U_{i_1}$  wants to share a common-key with  $U_{i_2}$  at future time  $t$ ,  $U_{i_1}$  computes a common-key to be shared with  $U_{i_2}$  in advance,  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = KeyGen(tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}, t, U_{i_2}) \in \mathcal{TCK}$ , by using his secret-key  $tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}$ , time  $t$ , and the receiver's identity  $U_{i_2}$ . And,  $U_{i_1}$  tells  $U_{i_2}$  the specified time  $t$  via an authenticated channel.
4. **Common-key Derivation.** On receiving the specified time  $t$  from  $U_{i_1}$ , and if the time  $t$  has come,  $U_{i_2}$  computes a common-key  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = KeyDer(tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}, tmk^{(t)}, U_{i_1})$  by using his secret-key  $tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}$ , a time-signal  $tmk^{(t)}$  at time  $t$ , and the sender's identity  $U_{i_1}$ .

In the model of TR-KA, we require the following equation holds: For all possible  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ ,  $i_1, i_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ ,  $tuk_{i_1}^{(S)} \in \mathcal{TUK}_{i_1}^{(S)}$ ,  $tuk_{i_2}^{(R)} \in \mathcal{TUK}_{i_2}^{(R)}$ ,  $tmk^{(t)} \in \mathcal{TI}^{(t)}$ , we have  $KeyGen(tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}, t, U_{i_2}) = KeyDer(tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}, tmk^{(t)}, U_{i_1})$ . The above requirement implies that any two users can share a common-key at the specified time without any error if they correctly follow the specification of TR-KA. In addition,  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  means a shared key between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  at time  $t$  when  $U_{i_1}$  is the sender and  $U_{i_2}$  is the receiver, and we note that  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \neq tck_{i_2, i_1}^{(t)}$  in general.

We now define several notation to formalize security of TR-KA as follows. For any finite set  $\mathcal{Z}$  and any non-negative integer  $z$ , let  $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{Z}, z) := \{Z \subset \mathcal{Z} \mid |Z| \leq z\}$  be the family of all subsets of  $\mathcal{Z}$  whose cardinality is less than or equal to  $z$ . Let  $\omega (< n)$  be the maximum number of possible colluders. For a set of colluders  $W = \{U_{l_1}, U_{l_2}, \dots, U_{l_j}\} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $\mathcal{TUK}_W^{(S)} := \mathcal{TUK}_{l_1}^{(S)} \times \mathcal{TUK}_{l_2}^{(S)} \times \dots \times \mathcal{TUK}_{l_j}^{(S)}$  denotes the set of possible  $W$ 's secret-keys for common-key generation, and  $\mathcal{TUK}_W^{(R)} := \mathcal{TUK}_{l_1}^{(R)} \times \mathcal{TUK}_{l_2}^{(R)} \times \dots \times \mathcal{TUK}_{l_j}^{(R)}$  denotes the set of possible  $W$ 's secret-keys for common-key derivation. And, let  $\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  be the set of possible common-keys shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  at the time  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . Furthermore, let  $TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ ,  $TMK$ ,  $TUK_W^{(S)}$ ,  $TUK_W^{(R)}$ , and  $TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}$  be random variables which take values on  $\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ ,  $TMK$ ,  $\mathcal{TUK}_W^{(S)}$ ,  $\mathcal{TUK}_W^{(R)}$ , and  $\mathcal{TI}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{TI}^{(\tau)}$ , respectively.

Next, we formalize a security definition of TR-KA based on the idea of timed-release security and traditional key-agreement with information-theoretic security. In TR-KA, we consider the following security goal and attacking model. First, the security goal which we consider is basically the same as that of the traditional key-agreement: an adversary (or a dishonest entity) cannot obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users. In addition to this, we want to require that even a legitimate receiver cannot obtain any information on a common-key to be shared before the specified time comes (i.e., before a time-signal at the specified time is received), since we consider timed-release security in this paper. Secondly, as an attacking model we consider the following three types of attacks: (1) an attack by a dishonest time-server; (2) an attack by colluders (i.e., dishonest users) not including a receiver; and (3) an attack by colluders including a receiver. By combining the security goal and attacks mentioned above, we formally define security of TR-KA as follows.

**Definition 2.** Let  $\Pi$  be TR-KA.  $\Pi$  is said to be  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure if the following conditions are satisfied:

- (1) For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  and  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \mid TMK) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}).$$

(2) For any  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$ , and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \mid TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}).$$

(3) For any  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1} \notin W$  and  $U_{i_2} \in W$ , for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \mid TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}, TI^{(t+1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}).$$

Intuitively, the meaning of formalizations (1)-(3) in Definition 2 is explained as follows: (1) a dishonest time-server cannot obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users. However, we assume that the time-server correctly broadcasts a time-signal at each time; (2) No information on a common-key shared between two honest users is obtained by any colluding group  $W$  not including a legitimate receiver, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time; (3) No information on a common-key between two users at the specified time is obtained by any colluding group  $W$  including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time.<sup>2</sup>

## 2.2 Lower Bounds

In this section, we derive lower bounds of entities' memory-sizes required for secure TR-KA as follows. The proof is given in Appendix A.

**Theorem 1.** *Let  $\Pi$  be  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure TR-KA, and we assume that all entropies on common-keys are equal, namely  $H(TCK) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$  for any  $i_1, i_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  and  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . Then, we have*

$$\begin{aligned} (i) \quad & H(TUK_i^{(R)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(TCK), \quad (ii) \quad H(TUK_i^{(S)}) \geq (\tau + \omega)H(TCK), \\ (iii) \quad & H(TI^{(t)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(TCK), \quad (iv) \quad H(TMK) \geq \tau(\omega + 1)H(TCK). \end{aligned}$$

As we will see in the next section, the above lower bounds are tight since our construction will meet all the above inequalities with equalities. Therefore, we define optimality of constructions of TR-KA as follows.

**Definition 3.** A construction of  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure TR-KA is said to be *optimal* if it meets equality in every inequality of (i)-(iv) in Theorem 1.

## 2.3 Construction

We present a construction, which is provably secure TR-KA in our model, by using multivariate polynomials over finite fields. In addition, it is shown that the construction is optimal. The detail of our construction of TR-KA  $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Ext}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{KeyDer})$  is given as follows.

1. **Setup.** For a security parameter  $1^k$ , *Setup* outputs matching secret-keys  $tuk_i$  and  $tmk^*$  for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $T$ , respectively, as follows. *Setup* picks a  $k$ -bit prime power  $q$ , where  $q > \max(n, \tau)$ , and constructs the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  with  $q$  elements. We assume that the identity of each user  $U_i$  is encoded as  $U_i \in \mathbb{F}_q \setminus \{0\}$ . Also, we assume  $\mathcal{T} = \{1, 2, \dots, \tau\} \subset \mathbb{F}_q \setminus \{0\}$  by using appropriate encoding. And, *Setup* chooses uniformly at random  $f(x, y) := \sum_{i=0}^{\omega} \sum_{j=0}^{\omega} a_{ij} x^i y^j$ ,  $tmk^*(x, z) := \sum_{i=0}^{\omega} \sum_{k=0}^{\tau-1} b_{ik} x^i z^k$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  with three variables  $x, y$  and  $z$  in which each degree of

<sup>2</sup>In this sense, we have formalized the security notion stronger than the security that a dishonest receiver cannot obtain any information on a common-key to be shared before the specified time comes.

$x$  and  $y$  is at most  $\omega$ , and the degree of  $z$  is at most  $\tau - 1$ . *Setup* also computes  $tuk_i^{(S)}(y, z) := f(U_i, y) + tmk^*(U_i, z)$  and  $tuk_i^{(R)}(x) := f(x, U_i)$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ). Then, *Setup* outputs secret-keys  $tuk_i := (tuk_i^{(S)}(y, z), tuk_i^{(R)}(x))$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $tmk^* := tmk^*(x, z)$  for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $\mathsf{T}$ , respectively.

2. **Ext.** For  $tmk^* = tmk^*(x, z)$  and time  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , *Ext* outputs a time-signal at time  $t$ ,  $tmk^{(t)}(x) := tmk^*(x, t)$ .
3. **KeyGen.** For a secret-key  $tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}$ , the specified time  $t$  and an identity  $U_{i_2}$ , *KeyGen* generates a common-key shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$ ,  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} := tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}(U_{i_2}, t)$ , and outputs it.
4. **KeyDer.** For a secret-key  $tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}$ , a time-signal  $tmk^{(t)}$  at the specified time  $t$  and an identity  $U_{i_1}$ , *KeyDer* outputs a common-key shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$ ,  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} := tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}(U_{i_1}) + tmk^{(t)}(U_{i_1})$ .

The security and optimality of the above construction is stated as follows.

**Theorem 2.** *The resulting TR-KA II by the above construction is  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure and optimal.*

*Proof Sketch.* First, we show the construction satisfies the condition (1) in Definition 2.  $\mathsf{T}$  cannot guess the information on a common-key  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  with probability larger than  $1/q$ , since he does not know at least one coefficient of  $f(x, y)$ . Thus, we have  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TMK) = \log_2 q$ . On the other hand, it is clear that  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}) = \log_2 q$ . Therefore, for any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  and  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ ,  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TMK) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$ .

Next, we show the construction satisfies the conditions (2) in Definition 2. Suppose a group of colluders  $W$  not including a targeted receiver gets all time-signals. Then,  $W$  can obtain  $tmk^*(x, z)$ . Also,  $W$  has  $f(U_l, y)$  and  $f(x, U_l)$  ( $U_l \in W$ ). However, since each degree of  $f(x, y)$  with respect to  $x$  and  $y$  is at most  $\omega$ ,  $W$  cannot guess at least one coefficient of  $f(x, y)$  with probability larger than  $1/q$ . Thus, we have  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) = \log_2 q$ . Therefore, for any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$ , and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ ,  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$ .

Moreover, we show the construction satisfies the condition (3) in Definition 2. Without loss of generality, we suppose that  $U_{i_1}$  is a targeted sender,  $U_{i_2}$  is a targeted receiver, and  $\tau$  is a specified time. Suppose a group of colluders  $W$  with  $U_{i_2} \in W$  will guess a common-key  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(\tau)}$ . Note that  $W$  can get  $f(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2})$  since  $U_{i_2} \in W$ . Thus,  $W$  tries to obtain  $tmk^*(x, z)$  to know  $f(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}) + tmk^*(U_{i_1}, \tau)$ . Although  $W$  can know  $tmk^*(U_l, z)$  ( $U_l \in W$ ) and  $tmk^*(x, t)$  ( $1 \leq t \leq \tau - 1$ ),  $W$  cannot guess at least one coefficient of  $tmk^*(x, z)$  with probability larger than  $1/q$  since the degrees of  $tmk^*(x, z)$  with respect to  $x$  and  $z$  are at most  $\omega$  and  $\tau - 1$ , respectively. Thus, we have  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(\tau)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, TI^{(2)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau-1)}) = \log_2 q$ . Therefore, in general, for any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1} \notin W$  and  $U_{i_2} \in W$ , and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ ,  $H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}, TI^{(t+1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$ .

Finally, it is straightforward to see that the construction satisfies all the equalities of lower bounds in Theorem 1.  $\square$

### 3 TRE: Timed-Release Encryption with Information-Theoretic Security

In this section, we show a model and a security formalization of timed-release encryption (TRE for short) with information-theoretic security. We also show that TRE can be constructed from TR-KA and the one-time pad in a generic and simple way. In addition, we derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TRE.

#### 3.1 Model and Security Definition

We propose a model and a security definition of TRE, based on that of timed-release encryption with computational security (e.g., [12]) and that of the traditional encryption with information-theoretic security (e.g., [14]). Formally, we give a definition of TRE in the TI-model as in the case of TR-KA.

**Definition 4 (TRE).** A *timed-release encryption* (TRE for short)  $\Sigma$  involves  $n + 2$  entities, TI,  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n$  and T, and consists of a four-tuple of algorithms ( $E\text{Gen}, E\text{Ext}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ ) with six spaces,  $\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}_E, \mathcal{USK}, \mathcal{EMK}, \mathcal{T}$ , and  $\mathcal{ETTI}$ , where all of the above algorithms except  $E\text{Gen}$  are deterministic and all of the above spaces are finite. In addition,  $\Sigma$  is executed with four phases as follows.

– **Notation:**

- Entities: TI,  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ), T, and  $\mathcal{U}$  are the same as those in Definition 1.
- Spaces:  $\mathcal{T}$  is the same as that in Definition 1.  $\mathcal{C}$  is a set of possible ciphertexts,  $\mathcal{M}_E$  is a set of possible plaintexts with a probability distribution  $P_M$ ,  $\mathcal{EMK}$  is a set of possible master-keys.  $\mathcal{ETTI}^{(t)}$  is a set of time-signals at time  $t$ . Let  $\mathcal{ETTI} := \bigcup_{i=1}^r \mathcal{ETTI}^{(i)}$ . Also,  $\mathcal{EK}_i$  is a set of possible encryption-keys for  $U_i$ ,  $\mathcal{DK}_i$  is a set of possible decryption-keys for  $U_i$ , and  $\mathcal{USK}_i := \mathcal{EK}_i \times \mathcal{DK}_i$  is a set of possible secret-keys for  $U_i$ . Let  $\mathcal{EK} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{EK}_i$ ,  $\mathcal{DK} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{DK}_i$  and  $\mathcal{USK} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{USK}_i$ .
- Algorithms:  $E\text{Gen}$  is a key generation algorithm which on input a security parameter  $1^k$ , outputs each user's secret-key and a server's master-key,  $E\text{Ext}: \mathcal{EMK} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{ETTI}$  is a time-signal generation algorithm for T,  $\text{Enc}: \mathcal{M}_E \times \mathcal{EK} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$  is an encryption algorithm, and  $\text{Dec}: \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{DK} \times \mathcal{ETTI} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_E$  is a decryption algorithm.

1. **Key Generation and Distribution.** In the initial phase, TI generates the following keys by using  $E\text{Gen}$ : a master-key  $emk^* \in \mathcal{EMK}$  for T; a secret-key  $usk_i = (ek_i, dk_i) \in \mathcal{USK}_i$  for  $U_i$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ). These keys are distributed to corresponding entities via secure channels. After distributing these keys, TI deletes them from his memory. And, T and  $U_i$  keep their keys secret, respectively.
2. **Time-signal Generation.** For broadcasting a time-signal at each time, T generates a time-signal  $emk^{(t)} = E\text{Ext}(emk^*, t) \in \mathcal{ETTI}^{(t)}$  by using a master-key  $emk^* \in \mathcal{EMK}$  and time  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . Then, T broadcasts it to all users via a (authenticated) broadcast channel.
3. **Encryption.**  $U_{i_1}$  specifies time  $t$  when  $U_{i_2}$  can decrypt a ciphertext, and then  $U_{i_1}$  computes a ciphertext,  $c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = \text{Enc}(m, ek_{i_1}, t, U_{i_2}) \in \mathcal{C}$ , by a plaintext  $m \in \mathcal{M}_E$ , an encryption-key  $ek_{i_1} \in \mathcal{EK}$ , the specified time  $t$  and the identity  $U_{i_2}$ . And,  $U_{i_1}$  sends a pair of the ciphertext and the specified time,  $(c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)$ , to  $U_{i_2}$  via an authenticated channel.

4. **Decryption.** Suppose that  $U_{i_2}$  has received  $(c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)$  from  $U_{i_1}$ . After receiving a time-signal  $emk^{(t)}$  at the specified time  $t$ ,  $U_{i_2}$  recovers  $m = Dec(c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, dk_{i_2}, emk^{(t)}, U_{i_1})$  by a ciphertext  $c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ , a decryption-key  $dk_{i_2}$ , a time-signal  $emk^{(t)}$ , and the identity  $U_{i_1}$ .

In the model of TRE, we require the following equation holds: For all possible  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ ,  $i_1, i_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ ,  $ek_{i_1} \in \mathcal{EK}_{i_1}$ ,  $dk_{i_2} \in \mathcal{DK}_{i_2}$ ,  $emk^{(t)} \in \mathcal{ETI}^{(t)}$ , we have

$$Dec(Enc(m, ek_{i_1}, t, U_{i_2}), dk_{i_2}, emk^{(t)}, U_{i_1}) = m.$$

The above requirement means correctness of TRE.

Next, we provide a security definition of TRE based on the idea of timed-release security and the traditional encryption with information-theoretic security. The choice of possible colluders  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$  is the same as that in TR-KA. For a set of colluders  $W = \{U_{l_1}, U_{l_2}, \dots, U_{l_j}\} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $\mathcal{EK}_W := \mathcal{EK}_{l_1} \times \mathcal{EK}_{l_2} \times \dots \times \mathcal{EK}_{l_j}$  is a set of  $W$ 's encryption-keys, and  $\mathcal{DK}_W := \mathcal{DK}_{l_1} \times \mathcal{DK}_{l_2} \times \dots \times \mathcal{DK}_{l_j}$  is a set of  $W$ 's decryption-keys. Also, let  $\mathcal{C}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  be a finite set of possible ciphertexts sent from  $U_{i_1}$  to  $U_{i_2}$  such that it can be decrypted at the time  $t$ . Furthermore, let  $M$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ ,  $EMK$ ,  $EK_W$ ,  $DK_W$ , and  $ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}$  be random variables which take values on  $\mathcal{M}_E$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ ,  $\mathcal{EMK}$ ,  $\mathcal{EK}_W$ ,  $\mathcal{DK}_W$ , and  $\mathcal{ETI}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{ETI}^{(\tau)}$ , respectively.

Similarly as in Definition 2 we consider the following three types of security notions for TRE: (1) A dishonest time-server cannot obtain any information on an underlying plaintext from a target ciphertext transmitted on the channel; (2) No information on an underlying plaintext from a target ciphertext is obtained by any colluding group  $W$  not including a legitimate receiver, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time; (3) No information on an underlying plaintext from a target ciphertext is obtained by any colluding group  $W$  including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time.

The formalizations of the above security notions for TRE are given as follows.

**Definition 5.** Let  $\Sigma$  be TRE.  $\Sigma$  is said to be  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure if the following conditions are satisfied:

- (1) For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  and any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(M | C_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, EMK) = H(M).$$

- (2) For any  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$ , and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(M | C_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) = H(M).$$

- (3) For any  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1} \notin W$  and  $U_{i_2} \in W$ , for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(M | C_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) = H(M).$$

### 3.2 Lower Bounds

We derive lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for secure TRE as follows.

**Theorem 3.** Let  $\Sigma$  be an  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure TRE. Then, we have

- (i)  $H(DK_i) \geq (\omega + 1)H(M)$ , (ii)  $H(EK_i) \geq (\tau + \omega)H(M)$ ,  
 (iii)  $H(ETI^{(t)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(M)$ , (iv)  $H(EMK) \geq \tau(\omega + 1)H(M)$ .



*Proof.* The proof is given in Appendix B. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, however, in the proof there are several technical points which are complicated than that of Theorem 1 (See Appendix B for details).  $\square$

As we will see in the next section, the above lower bounds are tight since an instantiation of our generic construction will meet all the above inequalities with equalities.

### 3.3 Construction of TRE from TR-KA and One-time Pad

We present a generic construction of TRE  $\Sigma=(EGen, EExt, Enc, Dec)$  starting from TR-KA  $\Pi=(Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer)$  and the one-time pad. In our construction,  $\Pi$  and  $\Sigma$  satisfy the following conditions:  $\mathcal{EMK} = \mathcal{TMK}$ ;  $\mathcal{ETI} = \mathcal{TI}$ ;  $\mathcal{EK} = \mathcal{TUK}^{(S)}$ ; and  $\mathcal{DK} = \mathcal{TUK}^{(R)}$ .

1. **EGen.** For a security parameter  $1^k$ ,  $EGen$  outputs matching secret-keys  $usk_i = (ek_i, dk_i)$  and  $emk^*$  for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $T$ , respectively, as follows.  $EGen$  calls  $Setup$  with input  $1^k$ . Suppose  $(tuk_1^{(S)}, tuk_1^{(R)}, tuk_2^{(S)}, tuk_2^{(R)}, \dots, tuk_n^{(S)}, tuk_n^{(R)}, tmk^*) \leftarrow Setup(1^k)$ . Then,  $EGen$  outputs secret-keys  $ek_i := tuk_i^{(S)}$ ,  $dk_i := tuk_i^{(R)}$ , and  $emk^* := tmk^*$  for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $T$ , respectively.
2. **EExt.** For a master-key  $emk^* = tmk^*$  and time  $t$ ,  $EExt$  calls  $Ext$ , and let  $tmk^{(t)} = Ext(tmk^*, t)$ . Then,  $EExt$  outputs a time-signal at the time  $t$ ,  $emk^{(t)} := tmk^{(t)}$ .
3. **Enc.** For a plaintext  $m$ , an encryption-key  $ek_{i_1} = tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}$ , the specified time  $t$  and an identity  $U_{i_2}$ ,  $Enc$  calls  $KeyGen$ , and suppose  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = KeyGen(tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}, t, U_{i_2})$ . Then,  $Enc$  outputs a ciphertext  $c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} := m \oplus tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ .
4. **Dec.** For a ciphertext  $c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ , a decryption-key  $dk_{i_2} = tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}$ , a time-signal  $emk^{(t)} = tmk^{(t)}$  at the specified time  $t$  and an identity  $U_{i_1}$ ,  $Dec$  calls  $KeyDer$ , and suppose  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = KeyDer(tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}, tmk^{(t)}, U_{i_1})$ . Then,  $Dec$  outputs a plaintext  $m := c_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \oplus tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ .

The security of the above construction is shown as follows.

**Theorem 4.** *Given  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure TR-KA  $\Pi$  in which common-keys are uniformly distributed over  $\mathcal{TCK}$  (i.e.,  $H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i,j}^{(t)}) = \log_2 |\mathcal{TCK}|$  for any  $i, j$ , and  $t$ ), then the TRE  $\Sigma$  formed by the above construction based on  $\Pi$  is  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure.*

*Proof Sketch.* The proof can be directly shown by the security of TR-KA and perfect secrecy of the one-time pad. First, we describe the outline of the proof for the condition (1) in Definition 5. From Definition 2,  $T$  cannot obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users even if  $T$  knows a master key. Therefore, by perfect secrecy of the one-time pad,  $H(M | C_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, EMK) = H(M)$ .

Next, we only describe the outline of the proof for the condition (2) in Definition 5, since the condition (3) can be shown by a similar idea. From Definition 2, any colluding group  $W$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$  cannot know a uniform common-key shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  in TR-KA. Therefore, by perfect secrecy of the one-time pad,  $H(M | C_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) = H(M)$ .  $\square$

**Remark 1.** Although in this paper we have presented the direct proof of Theorem 1 (i.e., the lower bounds in TR-KA), we can also prove Theorem 1 by using Theorem 3 (i.e., the lower bounds in TRE) and the above generic construction where uniformly distributed plaintexts are taken.

**Remark 2.** In the above generic construction, we suppose  $P_M$  to be uniform (i.e., uniformly distributed plaintexts) and apply the direct (and optimal) construction of TR-KA in Section 2.3. Then, the resulting direct construction of TRE meets equality in every inequality of (i)-(iv) in Theorem 3. Therefore, the resulting direct construction is optimal and the lower bounds in Theorem 3 are tight.

## 4 TRA-codes: Timed-Release Authentication Codes

In this section, we show a model and a security definition of timed-release authentication codes (TRA-codes for short). We also show that TRA-codes can be constructed from TR-KA and the traditional authentication codes (A-codes for short) in a generic and simple way.

### 4.1 Model and Security Definition

We newly propose a model and a security definition of TRA-codes, based on that of timed-release signatures with computational security (e.g., [8]) and that of the traditional authentication code with information-theoretic security (e.g., [15]).

Formally, we give a definition of TRA-codes in the TI-model as in the case of TR-KA.

**Definition 6 (TRA-codes).** A *timed-release authentication code* (TRA-code for short)  $\Lambda$  involves  $n + 2$  entities, TI,  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n$  and T, and consists of a four-tuple of algorithms ( $TAGen, AExt, TAuth, TVer$ ) with six spaces,  $\mathcal{M}_A, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{AMK}, \mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{ATT}$ , where all of the above algorithms except  $TAGen$  are deterministic and all of the above spaces are finite. In addition,  $\Lambda$  is executed with four phases as follows.

– **Notation:**

- Entities: TI,  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ), T, and  $\mathcal{U}$  are the same as those in Definition 1.
- Spaces:  $\mathcal{T}$  is the same as that in Definition 1.  $\mathcal{A}$  is a set of possible authenticators (or tags),  $\mathcal{M}_A$  is a set of possible messages,  $\mathcal{AMK}$  is a set of possible master-keys.  $\mathcal{ATT}^{(t)}$  is a set of time-signals at time  $t$ . Let  $\mathcal{ATT} := \bigcup_{t=1}^r \mathcal{ATT}^{(t)}$ . Also,  $\mathcal{E}_i^{(S)}$  is a set of possible  $U_i$ 's authentication-keys,  $\mathcal{E}_i^{(R)}$  is a set of possible  $U_i$ 's verification-keys, and  $\mathcal{E}_i := \mathcal{E}_i^{(S)} \times \mathcal{E}_i^{(R)}$  is a set of possible secret-keys for  $U_i$ . Let  $\mathcal{E}^{(S)} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{E}_i^{(S)}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}^{(R)} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{E}_i^{(R)}$ , and  $\mathcal{E} := \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{E}_i$ .
- Algorithms:  $TAGen$  is a key generation algorithm which on input a security parameter  $1^k$ , outputs each user's secret-key and a time-server's master-key,  $AExt: \mathcal{AMK} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{ATT}$  is a time-signal generation algorithm for T,  $TAuth: \mathcal{M}_A \times \mathcal{E}^{(S)} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$  is an authentication algorithm, and  $TVer: \mathcal{M}_A \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{E}^{(R)} \times \mathcal{ATT} \times \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \{true, false\}$  is a verification algorithm.

1. **Key Generation and Distribution.** In the initial phase, TI generates the following keys by using  $TAGen$ : a master-key  $amk^* \in \mathcal{AMK}$  for T; a secret-key  $e_i = (e_i^{(S)}, e_i^{(R)}) \in \mathcal{E}_i$  for  $U_i$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ). These keys are distributed to corresponding entities via secure channels. After distributing these keys, TI deletes them from his memory. And, T and  $U_i$  keep their keys secret, respectively.
2. **Time-signal Generation.** For broadcasting a time-signal at each time, T generates a time-signal  $amk^{(t)} = AExt(amk^*, t) \in \mathcal{ATT}^{(t)}$  by using a master-key  $amk^* \in \mathcal{AMK}$  and time  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . Then, T broadcasts it to all users via a (authenticated) broadcast channel.

3. **Authentication.**  $U_{i_1}$  specifies time  $t$  when  $U_{i_2}$  can verify validity of a message  $m$ , and then  $U_{i_1}$  computes an authenticator,  $\alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = TAuth(m, e_{i_1}^{(S)}, t, U_{i_2}) \in \mathcal{A}$ , by the message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_A$ , an authentication-key  $e_{i_1}^{(S)}$ , the specified time  $t$  and the identity  $U_{i_2}$ . And,  $U_{i_1}$  sends  $(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)$  to  $U_{i_2}$  via an insecure channel.
4. **Verification.** Suppose that  $U_{i_2}$  has received  $(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)$  from  $U_{i_1}$ . After receiving a time-signal  $amk^{(t)}$  at the specified time  $t$ ,  $U_{i_2}$  checks the validity of  $\alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  by a verification-key  $e_{i_2}^{(R)}$ , a time-signal  $amk^{(t)}$  and the identity  $U_{i_1}$ : If  $TVer(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, amk^{(t)}, U_{i_1}) = true$ , then  $U_{i_2}$  accepts  $(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)$  as valid, and rejects it otherwise.

In the model of TRA-codes, we require the following equation holds: For all possible  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ ,  $i_1, i_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ ,  $e_{i_1}^{(S)} \in \mathcal{E}_{i_1}^{(S)}$ ,  $e_{i_2}^{(R)} \in \mathcal{E}_{i_2}^{(R)}$ ,  $amk^{(t)} \in \mathcal{ATI}^{(t)}$ , we have  $TVer(m, TAuth(m, e_{i_1}^{(S)}, t, U_{i_2}), t, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, amk^{(t)}, U_{i_1}) = true$ . The above requirement means correctness of TRA-codes.

Next, we provide a security notion and its formalization for TRA-codes based on the idea of timed-release security and the traditional authentication code with information-theoretic security. The choice of possible colluders  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$  is the same as that in TR-KA. For a set of colluders  $W := \{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, \dots, U_{i_j}\} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $\mathcal{E}_W^{(S)} := \mathcal{E}_{i_1}^{(S)} \times \mathcal{E}_{i_2}^{(S)} \times \dots \times \mathcal{E}_{i_j}^{(S)}$  is a set of  $W$ 's authentication-keys, and  $\mathcal{E}_W^{(R)} := \mathcal{E}_{i_1}^{(R)} \times \mathcal{E}_{i_2}^{(R)} \times \dots \times \mathcal{E}_{i_j}^{(R)}$  is a set of  $W$ 's verification-keys. In TRA-codes, we consider *impersonation attacks* and *substitution attacks* as follows. (a) *Impersonation attacks*: an adversary (or a dishonest entity) tries to generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time  $t$ ,  $(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)$ , that has not been legally generated by a sender  $U_{i_1}$  but will be accepted by a receiver  $U_{i_2}$ . (b) *Substitution attacks*: an adversary (or a dishonest entity) tries to generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time  $t_2$ ,  $(m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2)$ , that has not been legally generated by a sender  $U_{i_1}$  but will be accepted by a receiver  $U_{i_2}$ , after observing a valid authenticated message at time  $t_1$ ,  $(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_1)}, t_1)$  with  $(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_1)}, t_1) \neq (m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2)$ . Similarly as in Definition 2 we consider the following three types of security notions for TRA-codes: (1) A dishonest time-server cannot succeed in each of the *impersonation attack* and *substitution attack*; (2) Any colluding group  $W$  not including a legitimate receiver cannot succeed in each of the *impersonation attack* and *substitution attack*, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time; (3) Any colluding group  $W$  including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver cannot check the validity of a target authenticated message without a time-signal at the specified time, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time. To formalize this security notion, we consider it to be a kind of security against impersonation attacks at the future specified time: Any colluding group  $W$  including a receiver cannot succeed in impersonation attacks at the future specified time, even if  $W$  obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time.

The formalizations of the above three types of security notions for TRA-codes are given as follows.

**Definition 7.** Let  $\Lambda$  be a TRA-code.  $\Lambda$  is said to be  $(n, \omega, \tau; \epsilon)$ -secure, if  $\max(P_{Server}, P_1, P_2) \leq \epsilon$ , where  $P_{Server}$ ,  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are defined as follows.

- (1) *Attacks by a dishonest time-server.* Let  $P_{Server} := \max(P_{I_S}, P_{S_S})$ , where  $P_{I_S}$  and  $P_{S_S}$  are given as follows.

- 1-1) *Impersonation attacks.* The success probability of this attack denoted by  $P_{I_S}$  is defined as follows: For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  and any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , we define  $P_{I_S}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t)$  by

$$P_{I_S}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t) := \max_{(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)} \max_{amk^*} \max_{amk^{(t)}}$$

$$\Pr(TVer(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, amk^{(t)}, U_{i_1}) = true \mid amk^*).$$

The probability  $P_{I_S}$  is defined as  $P_{I_S} := \max_{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t} P_{I_S}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t)$ .

1-2) *Substitution attacks*. The success probability of this attack denoted by  $P_{S_S}$  is defined as follows: For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  and any  $t_1, t_2 \in \mathcal{T}$ , we define  $P_{S_S}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t_1, t_2)$  by

$$P_{S_S}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t_1, t_2) := \max_{(m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2)} \max_{(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_1)}, t_1) \neq (m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2)} \max_{\text{amk}^*} \max_{\text{amk}^{(t_2)}} \\ \Pr(\text{TVer}(m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(t_2)}, U_{i_1}) = \text{true} \mid (m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_1)}, t_1), \text{amk}^*).$$

The probability  $P_{S_S}$  is defined as  $P_{S_S} := \max_{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t_1, t_2} P_{S_S}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, t_1, t_2)$ .

(2) *Attacks by colluders not including a legitimate receiver*. Let  $P_1 := \max(P_{I_1}, P_{S_1})$ , where  $P_{I_1}$  and  $P_{S_1}$  are given as follows.

2-1) *Impersonation attacks*. The success probability of this attack denoted by  $P_{I_1}$  is defined as follows: For any set of colluders  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ , any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$  and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , we define  $P_{I_1}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t)$  by

$$P_{I_1}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t) := \max_{(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)} \max_{e_W^{(S)}} \max_{e_W^{(R)}} \max_{\text{amk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(\tau)}} \\ \Pr(\text{TVer}(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(t)}, U_{i_1}) = \text{true} \\ \mid e_W^{(S)}, e_W^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(\tau)}).$$

The probability  $P_{I_1}$  is defined as  $P_{I_1} := \max_{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t} P_{I_1}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t)$ .

2-2) *Substitution attacks*. The success probability of this attack denoted by  $P_{S_1}$  is defined as follows: For any set of colluders  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ , any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$  and for any  $t_1, t_2 \in \mathcal{T}$ , we define  $P_{S_1}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t_1, t_2)$  by

$$P_{S_1}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t_1, t_2) := \max_{(m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2)} \max_{(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_1)}, t_1) \neq (m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2)} \max_{e_W^{(S)}} \max_{e_W^{(R)}} \\ \max_{\text{amk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(\tau)}} \Pr(\text{TVer}(m', \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_2)}, t_2, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(t_2)}, U_{i_1}) = \text{true} \\ \mid (m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t_1)}, t_1), e_W^{(S)}, e_W^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(\tau)}).$$

And,  $P_{S_1}$  is defined as  $P_{S_1} := \max_{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t_1, t_2} P_{S_1}(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t_1, t_2)$ .

(3) *An attack by colluders including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver*. The success probability of this attack denoted by  $P_2$  is defined as follows: For any set of colluders  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ , any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_{i_1} \notin W$  and  $U_{i_2} \in W$ , and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , we define  $P_2(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t)$  by

$$P_2(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t) := \max_{(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t)} \max_{e_W^{(S)}} \max_{e_W^{(R)}} \max_{\text{amk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(t-1)}, \text{amk}^{(t+1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(\tau)}} \\ \Pr(\text{TVer}(m, \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, t, e_{i_2}^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(t)}, U_{i_1}) = \text{true} \\ \mid e_W^{(S)}, e_W^{(R)}, \text{amk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(t-1)}, \text{amk}^{(t+1)}, \dots, \text{amk}^{(\tau)}).$$

The probability  $P_2$  is defined as  $P_2 := \max_{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t} P_2(U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, W, t)$ .

## 4.2 Construction of TRA-codes from TR-KA and A-codes

We propose a generic construction of  $(n, \omega, \tau; \epsilon)$ -secure TRA-codes from TR-KA and the traditional A-codes (e.g., [15]). First, we briefly explain the traditional A-codes as follows.

**A-codes.** We consider a scenario where there are three entities, a sender  $S$ , a receiver  $R$ , and an adversary  $A$ . The A-code  $\Theta$  consists of a three-tuple of algorithms  $(AGen, Auth, Ver)$  with three spaces,  $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ ,  $\tilde{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}$ , where they are finite sets of possible messages, possible authenticators (or tags) and possible secret-keys, respectively.  $AGen$  is a key generation algorithm, which takes a security parameter on input and outputs a secret-key  $e$ .  $Auth$  is an algorithm for generating an authenticator.  $Auth$  takes a message  $m \in \tilde{\mathcal{M}}$  and a secret-key  $e \in \tilde{\mathcal{E}}$  on input and outputs an authenticator  $\alpha \in \tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ , and we write  $\alpha = Auth(m, e)$  for it. On receiving  $(m, \alpha)$ , a receiver  $R$  can check the validity of it by using  $Ver$ .  $Ver$  takes a message  $m$ , an authenticator  $\alpha$  and a secret-key  $e$  on input, and outputs *true* or *false*, and we write  $true = Ver(m, \alpha, e)$  or  $false = Ver(m, \alpha, e)$  for it. In A-codes, there are two kinds of attacks: *impersonation attacks* and *substitution attacks*. Here,  $\Theta$  is said to be  $\epsilon$ -secure if each of success probabilities of these attacks is at most  $\epsilon$  (e.g., see [15] for details).

The detail of our generic construction of TRA-codes  $\Lambda = (TAGen, AExt, TAuth, TVer)$  by using TR-KA  $\Pi = (Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer)$  and A-codes  $\Theta = (AGen, Auth, Ver)$  is given as follows. In our construction,  $\Pi$ ,  $\Theta$  and  $\Lambda$  satisfy the following conditions:  $\mathcal{M}_A \times \mathcal{T} \subset \tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ ;  $\mathcal{TCK} \subset \tilde{\mathcal{E}}$ ;  $\mathcal{A} = \tilde{\mathcal{A}}$ ;  $AMK = \mathcal{T}MK$ ;  $ATI = \mathcal{T}I$ ;  $\mathcal{E}^{(S)} = \mathcal{TUK}^{(S)}$ ; and  $\mathcal{E}^{(R)} = \mathcal{TUK}^{(R)}$ .

1. **TAGen.** For a security parameter  $1^k$ ,  $TAGen$  outputs matching secret-keys  $e_i = (e_i^{(S)}, e_i^{(R)})$  and  $amk^*$  for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $T$ , respectively, as follows.  $TAGen$  calls  $Setup$  with input  $1^k$ , and suppose  $(tuk_1^{(S)}, tuk_1^{(R)}, tuk_2^{(S)}, tuk_2^{(R)}, \dots, tuk_n^{(S)}, tuk_n^{(R)}, tmk^*) \leftarrow Setup(1^k)$ . Then,  $TAGen$  outputs secret-keys  $e_i^{(S)} := tuk_i^{(S)}$ ,  $e_i^{(R)} := tuk_i^{(R)}$  and  $amk^* := tmk^*$  for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) and  $T$ , respectively.
2. **AExt.** For a master-key  $amk^* = tmk^*$  and time  $t$ ,  $AExt$  calls  $Ext$ , and suppose  $tmk^{(t)} = Ext(tmk^*, t)$ . Then,  $AExt$  outputs a time-signal at time  $t$ ,  $amk^{(t)} := tmk^{(t)}$ .
3. **TAuth.** For a message  $m$ , an authentication-key  $e_{i_1}^{(S)} = tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}$ , the specified time  $t$  and an identity  $U_{i_2}$ ,  $TAuth$  calls  $KeyGen$ , and suppose  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = KeyGen(tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}, t, U_{i_2})$ . Then,  $TAuth$  calls  $Auth$ , and it computes an authenticator  $\alpha = Auth((m, t), tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$ . Finally,  $TAuth$  outputs an authenticator at time  $t$ ,  $\alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} := \alpha$ .
4. **TVer.** For a message  $m$ , the specified time  $t$ , an authenticator  $\alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ , a verification-key  $e_{i_2}^{(R)} = tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}$ , a time-signal  $amk^{(t)} = tmk^{(t)}$  at the specified time  $t$  and an identity  $U_{i_1}$ ,  $TVer$  calls  $KeyDer$  with inputting them, and suppose  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} = KeyDer(tuk_{i_2}^{(R)}, tmk^{(t)}, U_{i_1})$ . Then,  $TVer$  outputs *true* if  $Ver((m, t), \alpha_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}, tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}) = true$ , and outputs *false* otherwise.

The security of the above construction is shown as follows.

**Theorem 5.** *Given an  $\epsilon$ -secure A-code  $\Theta$  and  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure TR-KA  $\Pi$  in which common-keys are uniformly distributed over  $\mathcal{TCK}$ , then the TRA-code  $\Lambda$  formed by the above construction based on  $\Theta$  and  $\Pi$  is  $(n, \omega, \tau; \epsilon)$ -secure.*

*Proof Sketch.* The proof can be directly shown by the security of TR-KA and that of the A-code. First, we describe the outline of the proof of  $P_{S_S} \leq \epsilon$ . From Definition 2,  $T$  cannot obtain any information

on a common-key shared between two honest users even if T knows a master key. Therefore, since the underlying A-code is  $\epsilon$ -secure, success probability of substitution attacks is at most  $\epsilon$ . Thus, we have  $P_{S_S} \leq \epsilon$ . In a manner similar to this, we can prove  $P_{I_S} \leq \epsilon$ . Therefore, we have  $P_{Server} = \max(P_{I_S}, P_{S_S}) \leq \epsilon$ .

Next, we describe the outline of the proof of  $P_{S_1} \leq \epsilon$ . From Definition 2, any colluding group  $W$  such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$  cannot know a uniform common-key shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  in TR-KA. Therefore, since the underlying A-code is  $\epsilon$ -secure, success probability of substitution attacks is at most  $\epsilon$ . Thus, we have  $P_{S_1} \leq \epsilon$ . In a manner similar to this, we can prove  $P_{I_1} \leq \epsilon$ . Therefore, we have  $P_1 = \max(P_{I_1}, P_{S_1}) \leq \epsilon$ .

Finally, we describe the outline of the proof of  $P_2 \leq \epsilon$ . From Definition 2, even a colluding group  $W$  including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver cannot obtain any information on a common-key at the future specified time. Hence, success probability of this attack can be reduced to that of impersonation attacks for the underlying A-code. Thus, we have  $P_2 \leq \epsilon$ .  $\square$

## 5 Relation to Information-Theoretic Key-Insulated Security

In this section, we show relationship between TR-KA and key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA for short) in information-theoretic security setting.

### 5.1 Key-Insulated Key Agreement (KI-KA)

Recently, information-theoretically secure KI-KA is proposed by Seito and Shikata [13]. In KI-KA, there are  $\tilde{n}$  users  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_{\tilde{n}}$  where  $\tilde{n}$  is a positive integer. And each user has two kinds of devices: a trusted device (e.g., a smart card, USB flash memory) which stores a master-key; and an insecure device in which a user's secret-key is stored. Here, the notion of a *secure device* implies that it is usually isolated from a network (e.g. the Internet or LAN) and that the attacker can neither wiretap nor substitute information stored in the device via the network. Here, we assume that the user  $U_i$ 's secure device is expressed as  $H_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{n}$ ). We also assume that the lifetime of systems is divided into discrete periods. And, at the beginning of each period  $j$ ,  $U_i$  receives key-updating information from  $H_i$  by connecting with  $H_i$ , then  $U_i$  computes a secret-key at the period  $j$  by using the secret-key of the previous period and key-updating information. And then, any user  $U_{i_1}$  can share a common-key with any user  $U_{i_2}$  at a period  $j$ .

Formally, we describe the definition of the model of KI-KA shown in [13].

**Definition 8 (KI-KA[13]).** A *key-insulated key-agreement* (KI-KA for short)  $\tilde{\Pi}$  involves  $2\tilde{n} + 1$  entities, TI,  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_{\tilde{n}}$  and  $H_1, H_2, \dots, H_{\tilde{n}}$ , and consists of a four-tuple of algorithms ( $KGen, KUpd^*, KUpd, KDer$ ) with six spaces,  $\mathcal{CK}, \mathcal{I}, \tilde{\mathcal{T}}, \hat{\mathcal{T}}, \mathcal{MK}$  and  $\mathcal{UK}$ , where all of the above algorithms except  $KGen$  are deterministic and all of the above spaces are finite. And, the detail of the notation is as follows.

- Entities: TI is a trusted initializer,  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{n}$ ) is a user and  $H_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{n}$ ) is a secure device for  $U_i$ . Let  $\tilde{\mathcal{U}} := \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_{\tilde{n}}\}$  be a set of users, and  $\tilde{\mathcal{H}} := \{H_1, H_2, \dots, H_{\tilde{n}}\}$  is a set of devices. It is assumed that the identity of each user  $U_i$  is also denoted by  $U_i$ .
- Spaces:  $\mathcal{CK}$  is a set of possible common-keys,  $\mathcal{I}_i$  is a set of possible key-updating information for  $U_i$ . Let  $\mathcal{I} := \mathcal{I}_1 \cup \mathcal{I}_2 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{I}_{\tilde{n}}$ . And  $\tilde{\mathcal{T}} := \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  is a set of time periods. Let  $\hat{\mathcal{T}} := \tilde{\mathcal{T}} \cup \{0\}$ . Also  $\mathcal{MK}_i$  is a set of possible master-keys for  $H_i$ . Let  $\mathcal{MK} := \mathcal{MK}_1 \cup \mathcal{MK}_2 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{MK}_{\tilde{n}}$ . And also  $\mathcal{UK}_i^{(j)}$  is a set of possible secret-keys at a period  $j$  for  $U_i$ . Let  $\mathcal{UK}_i := \mathcal{UK}_i^{(0)} \cup \mathcal{UK}_i^{(1)} \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{UK}_i^{(N)}$  and  $\mathcal{UK} := \mathcal{UK}_1 \cup \mathcal{UK}_2 \cup \dots \cup \mathcal{UK}_{\tilde{n}}$ .

- Algorithms:  $KGen$  is a key generation algorithm which on input a security parameter  $1^k$ , outputs each user  $U_i$ 's initial secret-key  $uk_i^{(0)} \in \mathcal{UK}_i^{(0)}$  (i.e., a secret-key at the period 0) and each device  $H_i$ 's master-key  $mk_i \in \mathcal{MK}_i$ . And,  $KUpd^*: \mathcal{MK} \times \tilde{\mathcal{T}} \times \tilde{\mathcal{T}} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$  is a key-updating algorithm for  $H_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{n}$ ), and we write  $mk_i^{(h,j)} = KUpd^*(mk_i, h, j)$  where  $mk_i^{(h,j)} \in \mathcal{I}_i$  is key-updating information. Also,  $KUpd: \mathcal{UK} \times \mathcal{I} \rightarrow \mathcal{UK}$  is a key-updating algorithm for  $U_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq \tilde{n}$ ), and we describe  $uk_i^{(j)} = KUpd(uk_i^{(h)}, mk_i^{(h,j)})$  where  $uk_i^{(j)} \in \mathcal{UK}_i^{(j)}$  is a  $U_i$ 's secret-key at a period  $j$ .  $KDer: \mathcal{UK} \times \tilde{\mathcal{U}} \rightarrow \mathcal{CK}$  is a key derivation algorithm, and we write  $ck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} = KDer(uk_{i_1}^{(j)}, U_{i_2})$  where  $ck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} \in \mathcal{CK}$  is a common-key shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  at a period  $j$ .

In KI-KA, it is required that the following equation holds: for all possible  $j \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ ,  $i_1, i_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, \tilde{n}\}$ ,  $uk_{i_1}^{(j)} \in \mathcal{UK}_{i_1}^{(j)}$  and  $uk_{i_2}^{(j)} \in \mathcal{UK}_{i_2}^{(j)}$ , we have  $KDer(uk_{i_1}^{(j)}, U_{i_2}) = KDer(uk_{i_2}^{(j)}, U_{i_1})$ .

And, in KI-KA, the following security goal is considered.

- The adversary does not obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users at a target period.

And, as an adversarial model, it is assume that an adversary can obtain the following information on user's keys exposed in KI-KA.

- A user's secret-key from the insecure device.
- A user's master-key exposed (or robbed) from the secure device.

Especially, in KI-KA, it is considered that the following two types of exposure from targeted users.

- Type A: Targeted users' secret-keys exposure, which models compromise of targeted users' secret-keys from their insecure devices (i.e., the attack to steal a secret-key stored in an insecure device via a network).
- Type B: Targeted users' master-keys exposure, which models compromise of their secure devices by physical means (i.e., the attack to steal a master-key stored in a secure device directly).

To show the formal definition of the above security notions, we describe the several notations. Let  $\psi$  be the number of possible users whose master-keys are exposed, let  $\lambda$  be the number of possible users whose secret-keys are exposed per period, and let  $\tilde{\omega}$  be a nonnegative integer with  $\tilde{\omega} \geq \psi + \lambda$ . And, let  $\gamma$  be the number of possible periods at which secret-keys are exposed per user. And also, let  $\Psi := \{U_{i_1}, U_{i_2}, \dots, U_{i_\psi}\} \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{\mathcal{U}}, \psi)$  be a set of users whose master-keys are exposed, and  $\mathcal{MK}_\Psi := \mathcal{MK}_{i_1} \times \mathcal{MK}_{i_2} \times \dots \times \mathcal{MK}_{i_\psi}$  be a set of master-keys exposed. Also let  $\Lambda^{(j)} := \{U_{l_1}, U_{l_2}, \dots, U_{l_\lambda}\} \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{\mathcal{U}}, \lambda)$  be a set of users whose secret-keys at the period  $j$  are exposed. Here, we note that  $\Lambda^{(j)}$  satisfies the following condition: for every  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, \tilde{n}\}$ ,  $|\{j | U_i \in \Lambda^{(j)} \text{ for some } j \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}\}| \leq \gamma$ . The above condition implies that for every  $U_i$ , the number of periods at which  $U_i$ 's secret-keys may be exposed is at most  $\gamma$ . Also, let  $\mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(j)} := \mathcal{UK}_{l_1}^{(j)} \times \mathcal{UK}_{l_2}^{(j)} \times \dots \times \mathcal{UK}_{l_\lambda}^{(j)}$  be a set of users' secret-keys exposed at the period  $j$ .

And, let  $\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}$  be a finite set of possible common-keys shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  at a period  $j$ . Also, let  $\mathcal{I}_i^{(h,j)} \subset \mathcal{I}_i$  be a finite set of possible  $U_i$ 's key-updating information which is used for key-updating process from a period  $h$  to a period  $j$ . And, let  $CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}$ ,  $MK_\Psi$  and  $UK_\Lambda^{(1)}, \dots, UK_\Lambda^{(N)}$  be random variables which take values on  $\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}$ ,  $\mathcal{MK}_\Psi$  and  $\mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(N)}$ , respectively. With these notation, we formally define security notions of KI-KA as follows.

**Definition 9 ([13]).** Let  $\tilde{\Pi}$  be a KI-KA and  $\tilde{\omega} \geq \psi + \lambda$ .  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is said to be  $(\tilde{n}, \tilde{\omega}; N, \gamma)$ -secure, if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \tilde{\mathcal{U}}$  and any  $j \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ , it holds that  $H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} | UK_{i_1}^{(j)}, U_{i_2}) = 0$ .
2. For any set of users  $\Psi \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{\mathcal{U}}, \psi)$  whose master-keys are exposed, any set of users  $\Lambda^{(j)} \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{\mathcal{U}}, \lambda)$  whose secret-keys at the period  $j$  are exposed, and any target period  $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ , it holds that

$$H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | MK_{\Psi}, UK_{\Lambda}^{(1)}, \dots, UK_{\Lambda}^{(N)}) = H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}).$$

under each of the following conditions: (a) any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin \Psi$  and  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin \Lambda^{(t)}$ ; (b) any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \Psi$  and  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin \Lambda^{(j)}$  ( $1 \leq j \leq N$ ).

In this paper, we introduce a slightly weaker security: There is no exposure of users' secret-keys at the target period; and either Type A (users' secret-key exposure) or Type B (users' master-key exposure) occurs. Formally, it is stated as follows.

**Definition 10.** Let  $\tilde{\Pi}$  be a KI-KA.  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is said to be  $(\tilde{n}, \tilde{\omega}; N, \gamma)$ -*weakly-secure*, if the following conditions are satisfied.

1. For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \tilde{\mathcal{U}}$  and any  $j \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ , it holds that  $H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} | UK_{i_1}^{(j)}, U_{i_2}) = 0$ .
2. For any  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \in \tilde{\mathcal{U}}$  and any target period  $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ , the following security conditions are satisfied:
  - (a) For any set of users  $\Lambda^{(j)} \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{\mathcal{U}}, \tilde{\omega})$  whose secret-keys at the period  $j$  ( $1 \leq j \leq N, j \neq t$ ) are exposed, it holds that

$$H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | UK_{\Lambda}^{(1)}, \dots, UK_{\Lambda}^{(t-1)}, UK_{\Lambda}^{(t+1)}, \dots, UK_{\Lambda}^{(N)}) = H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}).$$

- (b) For any set of users  $\Psi \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{\mathcal{U}}, \tilde{\omega})$  whose master-keys are exposed such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin \Psi$ , it holds that  $H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | MK_{\Psi}) = H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$ .

## 5.2 Relationship between TR-KA and KI-KA

In KI-KA, any user cannot update a secret-key without using key-updating information which is generated by the master-key. That is to say, the user's key-updating process is *controlled* by the device's master-key and key-updating information. On the other hand, in TR-KA, no receiver can derive a common-key without using a time-signal corresponding to a designated period (time). Namely, the receiver's common-key derivation process is *controlled* by the time-server's master-key and the time-signal. From the above observation, the mechanisms of KI-KA and TR-KA are similar in the point that a common-key (or a secret-key required for deriving a common-key) derivation process is *controlled* by a master-key.

The above statement is explicitly shown by proposing two generic constructions (or converters) in a simple way: one is a construction of KI-KA from TR-KA; and the other is a construction of TR-KA from KI-KA. In the following sections, we will see that the mechanisms of TR-KA and KI-KA are essentially close by showing the generic constructions.

### 5.2.1 KI-KA from TR-KA

We first propose a simple algorithm which converts a secure TR-KA  $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Ext}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{KeyDer})$  into a secure KI-KA  $\tilde{\Pi} = (\text{KGen}, \text{KUpd}^*, \text{KUpd}, \text{KDer})$ . More precisely, we propose a generic construction method of KI-KA by using TR-KA, and it meets the security requirements of KI-KA. The detail of the construction is as follows.



1. **KGen**. For a security parameter  $1^k$ ,  $KGen$  outputs matching secret-keys for  $U_1, \dots, U_{\tilde{n}}$  and  $H_1, \dots, H_{\tilde{n}}$  as follows.  $KGen$  calls  $Setup$  with taking on input  $1^k$ . Let  $(tuk_1^{(S)}, tuk_1^{(R)}, tuk_2^{(S)}, tuk_2^{(R)}, \dots, tuk_{\tilde{n}}^{(S)}, tuk_{\tilde{n}}^{(R)}, tmk^*)$  be the output from  $Setup$ . Then,  $KGen$  outputs secret-keys  $uk_i^{(0)} := (tuk_i^{(S)}, tuk_i^{(R)}, 0)$  and  $mk_i := tmk^*$  for  $U_i$  and  $H_i$ , respectively.
2. **KUpd\* and KUpd**. For two periods  $h \in \hat{\mathcal{T}}, j \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$  and  $mk_i = tmk^*$ ,  $KUpd^*$  calls  $Ext$  and generates  $tmk^{(j)} = Ext(tmk^*, j)$ . Then,  $KUpd^*$  outputs a key-updating information  $mk_i^{(h,j)} := tmk^{(j)}$ . On the other hand, for  $mk_i^{(h,j)}$  and  $uk_i^{(h)} := (tuk_i^{(S)}, tuk_i^{(R)}, h, tmk^{(h)})$ ,  $KUpd$  generates a secret-key at the period  $j$ ,  $uk_i^{(j)} := (tuk_i^{(S)}, tuk_i^{(R)}, j, tmk^{(j)})$ , and outputs it.
3. **KDer**. For  $uk_{i_1}^{(j)} = (tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}, tuk_{i_1}^{(R)}, j, tmk^{(j)})$  and an identity  $U_{i_2}$ ,  $KDer$  calls  $KeyGen$  and  $KeyDer$  and generates the following two values:

$$tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} = KeyGen(tuk_{i_1}^{(S)}, j, U_{i_2}), \quad tck_{i_2, i_1}^{(j)} = KeyDer(tuk_{i_1}^{(R)}, tmk^{(j)}, U_{i_2}).$$

Then,  $KDer$  outputs a common-key at a period  $j$ ,  $ck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} := tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} \oplus tck_{i_2, i_1}^{(j)}$ .

The security of the above construction is shown as follows.

**Theorem 6.** *If TR-KA  $\Pi$  is  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure and common-keys are uniformly distributed over  $\mathcal{TCK}$ , then the KI-KA  $\tilde{\Pi}$  formed by the above construction is  $(\tilde{n}, \tilde{\omega}; N, \gamma)$ -weakly-secure, where  $\tilde{n} = n$ ,  $\tilde{\omega} = \omega$  and  $\gamma = \tau - 1$ . Furthermore, the sizes of secret-keys required in the above construction are given as follows:*

$$|\mathcal{MK}_i| = |\mathcal{TMK}|, \quad |\mathcal{UK}_i^{(j)}| = |\mathcal{TUK}_i^{(S)}| \cdot |\mathcal{TUK}_i^{(R)}| \cdot |\mathcal{TI}^{(j)}| \cdot \tau, \\ |\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}| = |\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}|, \quad |\mathcal{I}_i^{(h, j)}| = |\mathcal{TI}^{(j)}|.$$

*Proof.* From the requirement of TR-KA shown in Section 2, it is obvious that the proposed construction satisfies the first condition in Definition 10. And, we show the proposed construction fulfills the second conditions (a) and (b) in Definition 10. In the following, suppose that  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  are target users and  $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$  is a target period, and that the adversary tries to obtain any information about a common-key  $ck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  shared between  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  at the period  $t$ .

Condition (a). We consider the following case for (a) in Definition 10:

1. No devices' master-key is compromised, and no sender's secret-keys is compromised, i.e.,  $\Psi = \emptyset$  and  $U_{i_1} \notin \Lambda^{(j)}$  for  $1 \leq j \leq N$ . Let  $\Lambda^{(j)} := \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_{\tilde{\omega}-1}, U_{i_2}\}^3$  be a set of users whose secret-keys at the period  $j$  is compromised ( $1 \leq j \leq N, j \neq t$ ); and
2. No user's secret-key at the targeted period  $t$  is compromised, i.e.,  $\Lambda^{(t)} := \emptyset$ .

Then, we have

$$H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | UK_{\Lambda}^{(1)}, \dots, UK_{\Lambda}^{(t-1)}, UK_{\Lambda}^{(t+1)}, \dots, UK_{\Lambda}^{(N)}) \\ = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \oplus TCK_{i_2, i_1}^{(t)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}, TI^{(t+1)}, \dots, TI^{(N)}) \quad (1)$$

$$= H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}, TI^{(t+1)}, \dots, TI^{(N)}) \\ = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}) \quad (2)$$

$$= H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}), \quad (3)$$

---

<sup>3</sup>The case of  $U_{i_2} \notin \Lambda^{(j)}$  can be similarly discussed, and we omit it here.

where  $W = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_{\tilde{\omega}-1}, U_{i_2}\}$ , (1) and (3) follow from the construction, and (2) follows from Definition 2.

Condition (b). We consider the following case for (b) in Definition 10:

- No user's secret-key is compromised through a whole period, i.e.  $\Lambda^{(j)} = \emptyset$  for  $1 \leq j \leq N$ . Let  $\Psi (\neq \emptyset)$  be an arbitrary set of users whose master-keys are exposed (Note that  $MK_\Psi = \{tmk^*\}$  for any  $\Psi \neq \emptyset$  from the construction).

Then, we have

$$H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | MK_\Psi) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \oplus TCK_{i_2, i_1}^{(t)} | TMK) \quad (4)$$

$$= H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} \oplus TCK_{i_2, i_1}^{(t)}) \quad (5)$$

$$= H(CK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}), \quad (6)$$

where (4) and (6) follow from the construction, and (5) follows from Definition 2.  $\square$

### 5.2.2 TR-KA from KI-KA

Next, we show a simple algorithm which converts a secure KI-KA  $\tilde{\Pi} = (KGen, KUpd^*, KUpd, KDer)$  into a secure TR-KA  $\Pi = (Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer)$ . We now describe a construction method of  $\Pi$  from  $\tilde{\Pi}$ .

1. **Setup.** For a security parameter  $1^k$ , *Setup* outputs each entity's secret-key as follows. *Setup* calls *KGen* with inputs  $1^k$  to generate secret-keys for two sets  $\tilde{\mathcal{U}} := \{U_{1.S}, U_{1.R}, U_{2.S}, U_{2.R}, \dots, U_{n.S}, U_{n.R}\}$ <sup>4</sup> and  $\tilde{\mathcal{H}} := \{H_{1.S}, H_{1.R}, H_{2.S}, H_{2.R}, \dots, H_{n.S}, H_{n.R}\}$ . Let  $(uk_{1.S}^{(0)}, uk_{1.R}^{(0)}, uk_{2.S}^{(0)}, uk_{2.R}^{(0)}, \dots, uk_{n.S}^{(0)}, uk_{n.R}^{(0)}, mk_{1.S}, mk_{1.R}, mk_{2.S}, mk_{2.R}, \dots, mk_{n.S}, mk_{n.R})$  be the output from *KGen*. Then, *Setup* outputs secret-keys  $tuk_i^{(S)} := (uk_{i.S}^{(0)}, mk_{i.S})$ ,  $tuk_i^{(R)} := uk_{i.R}^{(0)}$  and  $tmk^* := (mk_{1.R}, mk_{2.R}, \dots, mk_{n.R})$ .
2. **Ext.** For a master-key  $tmk^* = (mk_{1.R}, mk_{2.R}, \dots, mk_{n.R})$  and a period  $j$ , *Ext* calls *KUpd\**  $n$  times and generates  $mk_{i.R}^{(0,j)} = KUpd^*(mk_{i.R}, 0, j)$  ( $1 \leq j \leq n$ ). Then, *Ext* outputs a time-signal at the period  $j$ ,  $tmk^{(j)} := (mk_{1.R}^{(0,j)}, \dots, mk_{n.R}^{(0,j)})$ .
3. **KeyGen.** For  $tuk_{i_1}^{(S)} = (uk_{i_1.S}^{(0)}, mk_{i_1.S})$  and a period  $j$ , and an identity  $U_{i_2}$ , *KeyGen* calls *KUpd\** and *KUpd* generates  $mk_{i_1.S}^{(0,j)} = KUpd^*(mk_{i_1.S}, 0, j)$  and  $uk_{i_1.S}^{(j)} = KUpd(uk_{i_1.S}^{(0)}, mk_{i_1.S}^{(0,j)})$ . Then, *KeyGen* computes  $ck_{i_1.S, i_2.R}^{(j)} = KDer(uk_{i_1.S}^{(j)}, U_{i_2.R})$  and outputs a common-key at a period  $j$ ,  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} := ck_{i_1.S, i_2.R}^{(j)}$ .
4. **KeyDer.** For  $tuk_{i_2}^{(R)} = uk_{i_2.R}^{(0)}$ ,  $tmk^{(j)} = (mk_{1.R}^{(0,j)}, \dots, mk_{n.R}^{(0,j)})$  and an identity  $U_{i_1}$ , *KeyDer* calls *KUpd* and generates  $uk_{i_2.R}^{(j)} = KUpd(uk_{i_2.R}^{(0)}, mk_{i_2.R}^{(0,j)})$ . Then, *KeyDer* generates  $ck_{i_2.R, i_1.S}^{(j)} = KDer(uk_{i_2.R}^{(j)}, U_{i_1.S})$ , and outputs a common-key at a period  $j$ ,  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)} := ck_{i_2.R, i_1.S}^{(j)}$ .

We give a proof that the above construction is secure TR-KA as follows.

<sup>4</sup>In this construction, each identity  $U_i \in \mathcal{U}$  consists of two identities  $U_{i.S}, U_{i.R} \in \tilde{\mathcal{U}}$ .

**Theorem 7.** *If KI-KA  $\tilde{\Pi}$  is  $(\tilde{n}, \tilde{\omega}; N, N)$ -secure with  $\frac{1}{2}\tilde{n} \leq \tilde{\omega}$ , then the TR-KA  $\Pi$  formed by the above construction is  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure, where  $n = \frac{1}{2}\tilde{n}$ ,  $\omega \leq \tilde{\omega} - \frac{1}{2}\tilde{n}$ , and  $\tau = N$ . Furthermore, the sizes of secret-keys required in the above construction are as follows:*

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{TMK}| &= |\mathcal{MK}|^n, & |\mathcal{TUK}_i^{(S)}| &= |\mathcal{UK}_i^{(0)}| \cdot |\mathcal{MK}_i|, & |\mathcal{TUK}_i^{(R)}| &= |\mathcal{UK}_i^{(0)}|, \\ |\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}| &= |\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(j)}|, & |\mathcal{TI}^{(j)}| &= |\mathcal{I}_i^{(0, j)}|^n. \end{aligned}$$

*Proof.* We show that the proposed construction satisfies the conditions (1)-(3) in Definition 2. In the following, suppose that  $U_{i_1}$  and  $U_{i_2}$  are target users, and that  $t \in \mathcal{T}$  is the specified time.

Condition (1). Suppose  $n \leq \tilde{\omega}$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{TMK}^*) &= H(\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{MK}_\Psi) \\ &= H(\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}) \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

$$= H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}), \tag{8}$$

where  $\Psi = \{U_{1,R}, U_{2,R}, \dots, U_{n,R}\}$ , (7) follows from Definition 9, and (8) follows by the construction.

Condition (2). Suppose  $n + \omega \leq \tilde{\omega}$ . Without loss of generality, we consider the following case.

- $W = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_\omega\}$  is a set of colluders such that  $U_{i_1}, U_{i_2} \notin W$ .
- $W$  tries to obtain any information on  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$ .

Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(S)}, \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(R)}, \mathcal{TI}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{TI}^{(\tau)}) \\ &\geq H(\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{MK}_\Psi, \mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(\tau)}) \\ &= H(\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}) \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

$$= H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}), \tag{10}$$

where  $\Psi = \{U_{1,S}, U_{2,S}, \dots, U_{\omega,S}\}$  and  $\Lambda^{(j)} = \{U_{1,R}, U_{2,R}, \dots, U_{n,R}\}$  ( $1 \leq j \leq \tau$ ), (9) follows from Definition 9, and (10) follows by the construction. Obviously, we have

$$H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(S)}, \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(R)}, \mathcal{TI}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{TI}^{(\tau)}) \leq H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}).$$

Therefore, we obtain  $H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(S)}, \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(R)}, \mathcal{TI}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{TI}^{(\tau)}) = H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)})$ .

Condition (3). Suppose  $n + \omega \leq \tilde{\omega}$ . Without loss of generality, we consider the following case.

- $W := \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_{\omega-1}, U_{i_2}\}$  is a set of colluders including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver  $U_{i_2}$ .
- $W$  tries to obtain any information about  $tck_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}$  by using information on time-signals at all the time except the specified time  $t$ .

Then, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} &H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(S)}, \mathcal{TUK}_W^{(R)}, \mathcal{TI}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{TI}^{(t-1)}, \mathcal{TI}^{(t+1)}, \dots, \mathcal{TI}^{(\tau)}) \\ &\geq H(\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | \mathcal{MK}_\Psi, \mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{UK}_\Lambda^{(\tau)}) \\ &= H(\mathcal{CK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}) \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

$$= H(\mathcal{TCK}_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}), \tag{12}$$

where  $\Psi = \{U_{1.S}, U_{2.S}, \dots, U_{\omega-1.S}, U_{i_2.S}\}$  and  $\Lambda^{(j)} = \{U_{1.R}, U_{2.R}, \dots, U_{n.R}\}$  ( $1 \leq j \leq \tau$ ,  $j \neq t$ ), (11) follows from Definition 9, and (12) follows by the construction. Therefore, we have

$$H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)} | TUK_W^{(S)}, TUK_W^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}, TI^{(t+1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) = H(TCK_{i_1, i_2}^{(t)}). \quad \square$$

## 6 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we studied timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. Specifically, we first proposed a model and formalization of security for timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA) in information-theoretic security setting. In addition, we derived tight lower bounds on memory-sizes required for TR-KA, and we proposed the optimal direct construction.

Also, we proposed models and formalizations of security for timed-release encryption (TRE) and authentication-codes (TRA-codes) in information-theoretic security setting. We also presented simple generic constructions of TRE and TRA-codes, respectively. Furthermore, we derived tight lower bounds on memory-sizes required for TRE.

Moreover, we showed the relationship between TR-KA and key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA) in information-theoretic security setting. We have shown that there exists a simple algorithm which converts TR-KA into KI-KA, and vice versa. Therefore, we conclude that the mechanisms of TR-KA and KI-KA are essentially close.

It would be our future research to derive tight lower bounds on success probabilities of attacks and key-sizes required for TRA-codes.

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## Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1

The proof follows from the following lemmas.

**Lemma 1.**  $H(TUK_i^{(R)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(TCK)$  for any  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ .

*Proof.* For arbitrary  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , we take a subset  $B := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of indices of users such that  $i \notin B$ . Let  $D_k := (l_k, i)$  and  $W_k := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_k\}$  for each  $k$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ .

Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
H(TUK_i^{(R)}) &\geq H(TUK_i^{(R)} | TI^{(t)}) \\
&\geq I(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}; TUK_i^{(R)} | TI^{(t)}) \\
&= H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} | TI^{(t)}) \\
&\quad - H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} | TI^{(t)}, TUK_i^{(R)}) \\
&= H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} | TI^{(t)}) \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)} | TI^{(t)}, TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}) \\
&\geq \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)} | TUK_{W_{k-1}}^{(S)}, TI^{(t)}) \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)}) \\
&= (\omega + 1)H(TCK),
\end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

where (13) follows from the condition (2) in Definition 2.  $\square$

**Lemma 2.**  $H(TUK_i^{(S)}) \geq (\tau + \omega)H(TCK)$  for any  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ .

*Proof.* For arbitrary  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , we take a subset  $B := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of indices of users such that  $i \notin B$ . Let  $D_k := (i, l_k)$  and  $W_k := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_k\}$  for each  $k$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Also, let  $F_k^{(t)} := (TCK_{D_k}^{(1)}, TCK_{D_k}^{(2)}, \dots, TCK_{D_k}^{(t)})$  and  $G_k^{(t)} := (TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_k}^{(t)})$  for  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$  and  $1 \leq t \leq \tau$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&H(TUK_i^{(S)}) \\
&\geq H(F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(t)}) \\
&= H(F_1^{(\tau)}) + H(G_{\omega+1}^{(t)} | F_1^{(\tau)}) \\
&= \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)} | F_1^{(t-1)}) + \sum_{k=2}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}) \\
&\geq \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)} | TUK_{D_1}^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
&\quad + \sum_{k=2}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)} | TUK_{W_{k-1}}^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) \\
&= \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}) + \sum_{k=2}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)}) \\
&= (\tau + \omega)H(TCK),
\end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

where (14) follows from the conditions (2) and (3) in Definition 2.  $\square$

**Lemma 3.**  $H(TI^{(t)} | TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(TCK)$  for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . In particular,  $H(TI^{(t)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(TCK)$  for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ .

*Proof.* For arbitrary  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , we take a subset  $B := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of indices of users such that  $i = l_1$ . Let  $D_k := (l_k, i)$  and  $W_k := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_k\}$  for each  $k$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& H(TI^{(t)} \mid TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& \geq H(TI^{(t)} \mid TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& \geq I(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}; TI^{(t)} \mid TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} \mid TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& \quad - H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} \mid TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t)}) \\
& = H(TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, TCK_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} \mid TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}, TCK_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, TCK_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}) \\
& \geq \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid TUK_{W_{k-1}}^{(S)}, TUK_i^{(R)}, TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(TCK_{D_k}^{(t)}) \\
& = (\omega + 1)H(TCK),
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

where (15) follows from the condition (3) in Definition 2.  $\square$

**Lemma 4.**  $H(TMK) \geq \tau(\omega + 1)H(TCK)$ .

*Proof.* We have

$$\begin{aligned}
H(TMK) & \geq I(TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}; TMK) \\
& = H(TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) - H(TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)} \mid TMK) \\
& = H(TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(\tau)}) \\
& = \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} H(TI^{(t)} \mid TI^{(1)}, \dots, TI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = \tau(\omega + 1)H(TCK),
\end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.  $\square$

## Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3

The proof of Theorem 3 follows from the lemmas in this appendix. In this appendix, for any  $i, j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  and any  $t \in \{1, 2, \dots, \tau\}$ ,  $M_{i,j}^{(t)}$  denotes the random variable which takes plaintexts to be sent from  $U_i$  to  $U_j$  at time  $t$ , and  $M_{i,j}^{(t)}$  is i.i.d. according to  $P_M$ .

First, for TRE  $\Sigma$ , we consider the following security conditions.

(1)' For any  $U_i, U_j \in \mathcal{U}$  and any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that  $H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} \mid M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EMK) = H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} \mid EMK)$ .

(2)' For any  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $U_i, U_j \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_i, U_j \notin W$ , and for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) = H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}).$$

(3)' For any  $W \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}, \omega)$ ,  $U_i, U_j \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $U_i \notin W$  and  $U_j \in W$ , for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) \\ &= H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}). \end{aligned}$$

Then, we show the above conditions are equivalent to Definition 5.

**Lemma 5.** *A TRE  $\Sigma$  is  $(n, \omega, \tau)$ -secure if and only if  $\Sigma$  satisfies the above conditions (1)', (2)' and (3)'.*

*Proof.* Let  $Z$  be a random variable such that: (1)  $Z = EMK$ ; or (2)  $Z = (EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)})$  with  $U_i, U_j \notin W$ ; or (3)  $Z = (EK_W, DK_W, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)})$  with  $U_i \notin W$  and  $U_j \in W$ .

First, for  $H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z)$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) &= H(M_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) + H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | M_{i,j}^{(t)}, Z) \\ &= H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}) + H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | M_{i,j}^{(t)}, Z), \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

where (16) follows from that  $M_{i,j}^{(t)}$  is independent of  $Z$ .

On the other hand, we have

$$H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) = H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) + H(M_{i,j}^{(t)} | C_{i,j}^{(t)}, Z). \tag{17}$$

Therefore, by (16) and (17), the proof is completed.  $\square$

**Lemma 6.**  *$H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) \geq H(M_{i,j}^{(t)})$  for any  $i, j \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  and  $t \in \{1, 2, \dots, \tau\}$ , where  $Z$  is a random variable in the proof of Lemma 5.*

*Proof.* First, for  $H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z)$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) \\ &= H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) + H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)}, Z) \\ &= H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z). \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

On the other hand, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) \\ &= H(C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) + H(M_{i,j}^{(t)} | C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)}, Z) \\ &= H(C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z). \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$



Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) + H(EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) &\geq H(C_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) \\ &= H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z) \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

$$= H(M_{i,j}^{(t)}) + H(EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)} | Z), \quad (21)$$

where (20) follows from (18) and (19), and (21) follows from that  $M_{i,j}^{(t)}$  is independent of  $(Z, EK_i, DK_j, ETI^{(t)})$ . Hence, we have  $H(C_{i,j}^{(t)} | Z) \geq H(M_{i,j}^{(t)})$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 7.**  $H(DK_i) \geq (\omega + 1)H(M)$  for any  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ .

*Proof.* For arbitrary  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , we take a subset  $B := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of indices of users such that  $i \notin B$ . Let  $D_k := (l_k, i)$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} H(DK_i) &\geq H(DK_i | ETI^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &\geq I(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}; DK_i | ETI^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &= H(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} | ETI^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &\quad - H(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} | ETI^{(t)}, DK_i, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &= H(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} | ETI^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} | ETI^{(t)}, M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(M_{D_k}^{(t)}) \\ &= (\omega + 1)H(M), \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

where (22) is shown by following: Let  $W_k := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{k-1}, l_{k+1}, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\}$  for each  $k$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} | C_{D_k}^{(t)}, EK_{W_k}, ETI^{(t)}) \\ &= H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} | C_{D_k}^{(t)}, EK_{W_k}, ETI^{(t)}, M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}, M_{D_{k+1}}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\ &\leq H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} | M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, ETI^{(t)}) \\ &\leq H(M_{D_k}^{(t)}). \end{aligned}$$

And, we have  $H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} | C_{D_k}^{(t)}, EK_{W_k}, ETI^{(t)}) = H(M_{D_k}^{(t)})$  from the condition (2) in Definition 5. Therefore, we have  $H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} | M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}, C_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, ETI^{(t)}) = H(M_{D_k}^{(t)})$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 8.**  $H(EK_i) \geq (\tau + \omega)H(M)$  for any  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ .

*Proof.* For arbitrary  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , we take a subset  $B := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of indices of users such that  $i \notin B$ . Let  $D_k := (i, l_k)$  and  $W_k := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{k-1}, l_{k+1}, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\}$  for each  $k$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Also, let  $F_k^{(t)} := (M_{D_k}^{(1)}, M_{D_k}^{(2)}, \dots, M_{D_k}^{(t)})$ ,  $G_k^{(t)} := (M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_k}^{(t)})$ ,

$FC_k^{(t)} := (C_{D_k}^{(1)}, C_{D_k}^{(2)}, \dots, C_{D_k}^{(t)})$ , and  $GC_k^{(t)} := (C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_k}^{(t)})$  for  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$  and  $1 \leq t \leq \tau$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& H(EK_i) \\
&= H(EK_i | F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}) + H(FC_1^{(\tau)}, GC_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)} | EK_i, F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}) \\
&= H(EK_i, FC_1^{(\tau)}, GC_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}) \\
&\geq H(FC_1^{(\tau)}, GC_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}) \\
&= \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} H(C_{D_1}^{(t)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}, C_{D_1}^{(1)}, \dots, C_{D_1}^{(t-1)}) \\
&\quad + \sum_{k=2}^{\omega+1} H(C_{D_k}^{(\tau)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, FC_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}, C_{D_1}^{(\tau)}, \dots, C_{D_{k-1}}^{(\tau)}) \\
&\geq \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} H(C_{D_1}^{(t)} | DK_{W_1}, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) \\
&\quad + \sum_{k=2}^{\omega+1} H(C_{D_k}^{(\tau)} | DK_{W_k}, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) \tag{23} \\
&\geq (\tau + \omega)H(M), \tag{24}
\end{aligned}$$

where (24) follows from Lemma 6, and (23) is shown by following: For every  $t$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& H(C_{D_1}^{(t)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}, C_{D_1}^{(1)}, \dots, C_{D_1}^{(t-1)}) \\
&\geq H(C_{D_1}^{(t)} | M_{D_1}^{(t)}, DK_{W_1}, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) \\
&= H(C_{D_1}^{(t)} | DK_{W_1}, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, ETI^{(t+1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}),
\end{aligned}$$

where the above (in)equalities follow from independence of  $M_{i,j}^{(s)}$  for any  $i, j, s$ , and Lemma 5 and the condition (3)'. Next, for every  $k$ , we also have

$$\begin{aligned}
& H(C_{D_k}^{(\tau)} | F_1^{(\tau)}, FC_1^{(\tau)}, G_{\omega+1}^{(\tau)}, C_{D_1}^{(\tau)}, \dots, C_{D_{k-1}}^{(\tau)}) \\
&\geq H(C_{D_k}^{(\tau)} | M_{D_k}^{(\tau)}, DK_{W_k}, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}) \\
&= H(C_{D_k}^{(\tau)} | DK_{W_k}, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(\tau)}).
\end{aligned}$$

where the above (in)equalities follow from independence of  $M_{i,j}^{(s)}$  for any  $i, j, s$ , and Lemma 5 and the condition (2)'.  $\square$

**Lemma 9.**  $H(ETI^{(t)} | ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(M)$  for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . In particular,  $H(ETI^{(t)}) \geq (\omega + 1)H(M)$  for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ .

*Proof.* For arbitrary  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ , we take a subset  $B := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\} \subset \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  of indices

of users such that  $i = l_1$ . Let  $D_k := (l_k, i)$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& H(ETI^{(t)} \mid ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \\
& \geq H(ETI^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \\
& \geq I(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}; ETI^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = H(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \\
& \quad - H(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t)}) \\
& = H(M_{D_1}^{(t)}, M_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}) \\
& = \sum_{k=1}^{\omega+1} H(M_{D_k}^{(t)}) \\
& = (\omega + 1)H(M),
\end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

where (25) is shown by following: Let  $W_k := \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_{k-1}, l_{k+1}, \dots, l_{\omega+1}\}$  for each  $k$  with  $1 \leq k \leq \omega + 1$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_k}^{(t)}, EK_{W_k}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) \\
& = H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_k}^{(t)}, EK_{W_k}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}, M_{D_{k+1}}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}) \\
& \leq H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}) \\
& \leq H(M_{D_k}^{(t)}).
\end{aligned}$$

And, we have  $H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_k}^{(t)}, EK_{W_k}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}) = H(M_{D_k}^{(t)})$  from the condition (3) in Definition 5. Hence,  $H(M_{D_k}^{(t)} \mid C_{D_1}^{(t)}, C_{D_2}^{(t)}, \dots, C_{D_{\omega+1}}^{(t)}, DK_i, ETI^{(1)}, \dots, ETI^{(t-1)}, M_{D_1}^{(t)}, \dots, M_{D_{k-1}}^{(t)}) = H(M_{D_k}^{(t)})$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 10.**  $H(EMK) \geq \tau(\omega + 1)H(M)$ .

*Proof.* The proof can be shown by the same way as in the proof of Lemma 4.  $\square$