Self-Differential Cryptanalysis of Up to 5 Rounds of SHA-3

Itai Dinur¹, Orr Dunkelman^{1,2,*}, and Adi Shamir¹

 $^1\,$ Computer Science department, The Weizmann Institute, Rehovot, Israel $^2\,$ Computer Science Department, University of Haifa, Israel

Abstract. On October 2-nd 2012 NIST announced its selection of the Keccak scheme as the new SHA-3 hash standard. In this paper we present the first published collision finding attacks on reduced-round versions of Keccak-384 and Keccak-512, providing actual collisions for 3-round versions, and describing attacks which are much faster than birthday attacks for 4-round Keccak-384. For Keccak-256, we increase the number of rounds which can be attacked to 5. All these results are based on a new type of self-differential attack, which makes it possible to map a large number of Keccak inputs into a relatively small subset of possible outputs with a surprisingly large probability, which makes it easier to find random collisions in this subset.

Keywords: Hash function, cryptanalysis, SHA-3, Keccak, collision attack.

1 Introduction

One of the stated reasons for the recent selection of Keccak by NIST as the new SHA-3 hash standard was its exceptional resistance to cryptanalytic attacks [10]. Even though it was a prime target for several years and many cryptanalysts have tried to break it, there was very limited progress so far in finding collisions even in greatly simplified versions of its various flavors. In particular, there were no published collision finding attacks on any number of rounds of its two largest flavors (Keccak-384 and Keccak-512), and only two published collision finding attacks on Keccak-256 ([20] attacked two rounds, and [12] doubled the number of rounds to 4). One of the main reasons for this lack of progress is that the probabilities of the standard differential properties of Keccak's internal permutation are extremely small, as was rigorously shown in the recent FSE 2012 paper [11]. We bypassed this seemingly insurmountable barrier by developing a new type of differential properties, whose probability is not bounded by such a proof. By using the new properties, we provide in this paper either the first or an improved attack on all these flavors: For Keccak-384 and Keccak-512 we describe practical attacks (with actual collisions) on three rounds, and impractical attacks on four rounds of Keccak-384. For Keccak-256 we increase the largest number of rounds which can be attacked from 4 to 5.

 $^{^{\}star}$ The second author was supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation through grant No. 827/12.

Our new attacks use many ideas which were already known in some limited form, but improves and combines them in new ways. They are a special type of subset cryptanalysis, which tries to track the statistical evolution of a certain set of values through the various operations in the cryptographic scheme. This is a widely used technique, which includes as special cases most of our standard cryptanalytic attacks, including differential, integral, and linear attacks, both in the single key and in the related key cases. In general, the goal in subset cryptanalysis is to find a sufficiently large subset of inputs which are mapped with larger than expected probability to some small pre-fixed subset of all possible outputs. The first step in subset cryptanalysis is to construct a subset characteristic which associates a triplet (input subset, output subset, transition probability) to each internal operation f of the cryptosystem. The transition probability specifies the probability that a random state chosen from the input subset will be a member of the output subset after applying f. Based on standard randomness assumptions, the total probability of the characteristic is calculated by multiplying the various transition probabilities. Subset cryptanalysis is typically used in order to construct a distinguisher, which makes it possible to extract information about the last subkey of a cryptosystem. In the case of hash functions, we can use it in a different way, which we call a squeeze attack. To motivate this attack, assume that the hash function maps a set S of possible inputs into a set D of possible outputs. By the birthday paradox, we have to try a subset $S' \subseteq S$ of size $\sqrt{|D|}$ of inputs before we expect to find the first collision in D. Consider now the variant of this attack in which we discard all the outputs we generate which do not fall into a particular subset $D' \subseteq D$. Since D' is smaller than D we need fewer samples in it in order to find a collision, but finding each sample is more expensive. To find which effect is stronger, assume that the probability of picking an input in S' whose output is in D' is p, and that D' contains a fraction q of the points in D. The number of outputs in D' we need is $\sqrt{|D'|} = \sqrt{q|D|}$, and the number of inputs in S' we have to try is $\sqrt{q|D|}/p$. When the mapping is random, p = q and this variant of the attack is worse than the birthday bound for all D' which are smaller than D. However, if we can exploit some non-random behavior of the hash function in order to find sets S' and D' for which $p^2 > q$, we can get an improved collision finding algorithm. We call it a squeeze attack since we are forcing a larger than expected number of inputs to squeeze into a small subset of possible outputs in which collisions are more likely. By memorizing only such outputs and discarding all the other outputs we generate, we can reduce both the time and the space needed to find collisions in the given hash function.

This technique was used in several previous attacks, but usually in cases where p was 1 (e.g., when keyless AES preserved inputs whose left half is equal to the right half in the ALRED construction), where the idea was beneficial for any q < 1. In this paper we apply the squeeze attack to Keccak with $p \ll 1$. Our starting point is the observation that most of the operations in Keccak have potentially dangerous symmetry properties. The designers of Keccak were fully aware of this fact, and decided to use asymmetric round constants precisely in

order to avoid this problem. However, the constants they chose were of very low Hamming weight, and thus their effect was to change a fully symmetric state into an almost symmetric state. In this paper we develop a new technique called self-differential cryptanalysis, in order to follow the statistical evolution of such states through the first few rounds of Keccak. Note that in standard differential attacks we consider two different plaintexts, and follow the evolution of the difference between them. In self-differential attacks we consider only one plaintext, and follow the evolution of the differences between its parts. For example, if the symmetry we consider is that the first half of the state should be equal to the second half of the state, then we follow the evolution of the difference between these two parts through the various cryptographic operations. Note that fully symmetric states have a zero self-difference, which remains zero as the state goes through symmetry preserving operations, whereas almost symmetric states have a low Hamming weight self-difference, which in many cases remains low Hamming weight after such operations.

More formally, we construct subset characteristics such that each collection of internal states is defined using a set of relation which equates pairs of bits in the state, and define a *self-difference* as the affine solution space of these linear equations over GF(2). We call the special case of subset cryptanalysis in which the subsets used in the characteristic are self-differences, *self-differential cryptanalysis*.

2 Description of Keccak

In this section we briefly describe the sponge construction and the Keccak hash function. More details can be found in the Keccak specification [4]. The sponge construction [3] works on a state of b bits, which is split into two parts: the first part contains the first r bits of the state (called the outer part) and the second part contains the last c = b - r bits of the state (called the inner part).

Given a message, it is first padded and cut into r-bit blocks, and the b state bits are initialized to zero. The sponge construction then processes the message in two phases: In the absorbing phase, the message blocks are processed iteratively by XORing each block into the first r bits of the current state, and then applying a fixed permutation on the value of the b-bit state. After processing all the blocks, the sponge construction switches to the squeezing phase. In this phase, n output bits are produced iteratively, where in each iteration the first r bits of the state are returned as output and the permutation is applied to the state.

The Keccak hash function uses multi-rate padding: given a message, it first appends a single 1 bit. Then, it appends the minimum number of 0 bits followed by a single 1 bit, such that the length of the result is a multiple of r. Thus, multi-rate padding appends at least 2 bits and at most r+1 bits.

The Keccak versions submitted to the SHA-3 competition have b=1600 and c=2n, where $n \in \{224, 256, 384, 512\}$. The 1600-bit state can be viewed as a 3-dimensional array of bits, a[5][5][64], and each state bit is associated with 3

integer coordinates, a[x][y][z], where x and y are taken modulo 5, and z is taken modulo 64.

The Keccak permutation consists of 24 rounds, which operate on the 1600 state bits. Keccak uses the following naming conventions, which are helpful in describing its round function:

- A row is a set of 5 bits with constant y and z coordinates, i.e. a[*][y][z], or r(y, z).
- A column is a set of 5 bits with constant x and z coordinates, i.e. a[x][*][z].
- A lane is a set of 64 bits with constant x and y coordinates, i.e. a[x][y][*].
- A slice is a set of 25 bits with a constant z coordinate, i.e. a[*][*][z], or sl(z).

Each round of the Keccak permutation consists of five mappings $R = \iota \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$. The five mappings given below are applied for each x,y, and z (where the state addition operations are over GF(2)):

1. θ is a linear map, which adds to each bit in a column, the parity of two other columns

$$\theta \colon a[x][y][z] \leftarrow a[x][y][z] + \sum_{y'=0}^{4} a[x-1][y'][z] + \sum_{y'=0}^{4} a[x+1][y'][z-1]$$

2. ρ rotates the bits within each lane by T(x,y), which is a predefined constant for each lane.

$$\rho$$
: $a[x][y][z] \leftarrow a[x][y][z + T(x,y)]$

3. π reorders the lanes.

$$\pi$$
: $a[x][y][z] \leftarrow a[x'][y'][z]$, where $\begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x' \\ y' \end{pmatrix}$

4. χ is the only non-linear mapping of Keccak, working on each of the 320 rows independently.

$$\chi : a[x][y][z] \leftarrow a[x][y][z] + ((\neg a[x+1][y][z]) \land a[x+2][y][z])$$

Since χ works on each row independently, it can be viewed as an Sbox layer which simultaneously applies the same 5 bits to 5 bits Sbox to the 320 rows of the state. We note that the Sbox function is an invertible mapping, and our techniques are heavily based on the known observation that the algebraic degree the algebraic degree of each output bit of χ as a polynomial in the five input bits is only 2. The algebraic degree of the inverse mapping χ^{-1} is 3 (which was also noted in [4]).

5. ι adds a 64-bit round constant to the first lane of the state.

$$\iota: a[0][0][*] \leftarrow a[0][0][*] + RC[i_r]$$

3 Notations

Given a message M, we denote its length in bits by |M|. Unless specified otherwise, in this paper we assume that |M| = r - 2, namely we consider only single-block messages of maximal length. Given M, we denote the initial state of the Keccak permutation as the 1600-bit word $\overline{M} \triangleq M||11||0^{2n}$, where || denotes concatenation,.

The first three operations of Keccak's round function are linear mappings, and we denote their composition by $L \triangleq \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta$. We sometimes refer to L as a "half round" of the Keccak permutation, where $\iota \circ \chi$ represents the other half. We denote the Keccak nonlinear function on 5-bit words defined by varying the first index by $\chi_{|5}$. The difference distribution table (DDT) of this function is a two-dimensional 32×32 integer table, where all the differences are assumed to be over GF(2). The entry $DDT(\delta^{in}, \delta^{out})$ specifies the number of input pairs to this Sbox with difference δ^{in} that give the output difference δ^{out} (i.e., the size of the set $\{x \in \{0,1\}^5 \mid \chi_{|5}(x) + \chi_{|5}(x + \delta^{in}) = \delta^{out}\}$).

Given a set S of internal states of Keccak, we define the action of each of Keccak's mappings on the set by applying it to every element of the set (e.g., $\theta(S) = \{\theta(u) | u \in S\}$).

Given a boolean matrix A of dimension $\ell \times b$ (where b is the size of the internal state of the cipher) such that each row of A sums two variables, and an ℓ -bit vector v, we formally represent a self-difference as $(A,v) \triangleq \{w \in \{0,1\}^b | Aw = v\}$. Most of the time, it will be more convenient to represent a self-difference explicitly: let B be a $b \times (b-\ell)$ matrix that spans the null-space of A. Then given a b-bit representative vector u such that Au = v, we can describe the self-difference as $[B,u] \triangleq \{Bw+u|w\in\{0,1\}^{b-\ell}\}$. We can thus describe a self-difference either implicitly using the pair (A,v), or explicitly using the pair [B,u].

4 Overview of Our Basic Techniques

Given a subset characteristic for the compression function of a hash function, we can describe our basic squeeze attack in the following way:

- 1. Pick an arbitrary message for which the values entering the compression function are in the initial self-difference of the characteristic.
- 2. Apply the compression function, and check whether the subset characteristic is satisfied. If not, discard the message, and go back to Step 1. Otherwise, compute the output of the compression function.
- 3. Store the output in a table (along with the message). In case a collision is found, stop and output the collision. Otherwise, try with a new message in Step 1.

If the size of the output set is 2^d values, then after $2^{d/2}$ messages for which the characteristic is followed, we expect a collision due to the birthday paradox. Hence, when the probability of the subset characteristic is p, the time complexity

of finding a collision is $p^{-1} \cdot 2^{d/2}$ and the memory complexity is $2^{d/2}$. To optimize the attack, we need subset characteristic for which p is as high as possible and d is as small as possible.

4.1 Subset Characteristics Used in Our Attacks

A very interesting observation concerning Keccak is that four out of its five internal mappings (all but ι), are translation invariant in the direction of the z axis (as was already noted in the Keccak submission paper [4]). Namely, if one state is the rotation of the other with respect to the z-axis (i.e., satisfies $b[x][y][z] = a[x][y][z+\ell]$, for some value of ℓ), then applying to them any of the θ, ρ, π, χ operations, maintains equality (up to rotation by ℓ positions along the z-axis). To exploit this symmetry, we pick subsets which are invariant with respect to the rotation along the z-axis. Namely, given a rotation index i that divides 64 (i.e., $i \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32\}$), the subsets are all the states for which a[x][y][z] = a[x][y][z+i]. We give a formal definition of these subsets in Section 5.

At this point, the reader may ask what happens with the ι operation, which is not location-independent. Indeed, to deal with ι , we have to extend our point of view, and consider states for which the equality "almost holds". We give a formal definition of these subsets and the concept of "almost holds" in Section 5.

In the remainder of this overview, we assume for the sake of simplicity that i=16, i.e., the state a[x][y][z] is composed of four repetitions of slices 0–15 (or a state which is very close to be such a state). Consider a symmetric state which is indeed four repetitions of the same 16 slices. In other words, for every x, y, and $z \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 15\}$ the bits of the rotated bit set a[x][y][z], a[x][y][z+16], a[x][y][z+32] and a[x][y][z+48] have the same value. Applying any of the four operations θ, ρ, π, χ to such a state, does not disturb its symmetry. The application of ι interferes with this symmetry, since the round constants are not the same among the four copies of 16 slices. However, given the low weight of the constants used by ι , the state remains close to being symmetric.

The subsets used in our subset characteristics are *self-differences*, formally defined in Section 5, which measure how close is the state to a symmetric state. Generally speaking, this can be done by computing the difference between the first 16 slices, and each of the three other sets of 16 slices (slices 16–31, 32–47, and 48–63). Obviously, when all 4 sets are equal, the differences between them are zero and the subset is called a *zero self-difference*.

As in standard differential cryptanalysis, we can consider the difference between the sets of slices, rather than the actual values. Hence, the zero self-difference passes with probability 1 all the four operations θ, ρ, π, χ , just as a zero difference in a differential characteristic passes through any operation.

Unlike a classical differential characteristic, in a self-difference characteristic, the addition of a constant (i.e., the ι operation) effects the characteristic by

¹ Notice that we can use either Floyd's cycle finding algorithm [16] or the parallel collision search algorithm [22] to reduce the memory complexity of the attack, depending on the relative sizes of its domain and range subsets.

introducing a difference between the equal parts of the state. This difference then propagates through the other operations, and its development has to be studied and controlled. Luckily, we can construct self-differential characteristics for Keccak (with good probability) that track this evolution of "distance" from a zero self-difference through the various Keccak mappings.

Given the affine nature of self-differences, tracking its evolution through Keccak's affine mappings is trivial (and does not change the probability of the self-differential characteristic). On the other hand, applying χ , the non-linear mapping, to a randomly selected state from a self difference, the output self-difference depends on the actual input, i.e., the output can belong to one of several self-differences. Just as in differential cryptanalysis, we can choose a single output self-difference, and then calculate the probability of the transition from the input self-difference to this output self-difference.

When a state of a self-difference which is not symmetric enters the χ function, we have to consider the possible outcomes in terms of "distance" from the zero self-difference. To do so, we consider the rows on which χ operates using an object called a rotated row set, which contains the values of a specific row taken from the four parts of the state (recall that we assume that i=16). In other words, the rotated row set contains the values of r(y,z), r(y,z+16), r(y,z+32) and r(y,z+48). We further note that given the input self-difference, once the value of r(y,z) is set, we know the value of the remaining rows as well. Hence, given the value of r(y,z) we can compute the corresponding outputs, and check the resulting output self-difference.

Once we perform this operation, we can associate with each input self-difference, all the possible output self-differences (and the corresponding probabilities) by trying all 32 possible values for r(y,z). In the particular case where the input self-difference assigns a zero difference to all the rows of a rotated row set, it passes through the χ mapping with probability 1. Similarly to differential cryptanalysis, we call such a rotated row set *inactive* (with respect to the self-difference), whereas a rotated row set with a non-zero difference is called active. Again, just as in differential cryptanalysis, we would like to obtain self-differential characteristics with the highest possible probability, which is usually achieved by minimizing the number of active row sets entering the χ mapping.

Finally, we give a heuristic concerning the "quality" of a given self-difference in a characteristic. The closer the self-difference is to the zero self-difference, its weight (i.e., the minimal Hamming weight of a state in the self-difference) is lower. Since the zero self-difference contains the zero state, its weight is zero, and the weight of a self-difference measures the minimal Hamming distance between a state in the self-difference and a symmetric state. In general, a low-weight self-difference has only a few active rotated row sets, and thus passes through χ with high probability. In this paper, we construct characteristics whose self-differences

² While there may be many states with minimal Hamming weight in a self-difference, we can calculate one of them from an arbitrary state w in the self-difference: we iterate over all rotated bit sets, and for each one compute the majority of its bits in w. A rotated bit set whose majority is 1 is complemented.

have a low weight (and thus they have a high probability) by choosing low-weight self-differences as outputs, as well as a few additional techniques which will be described in the rest of this paper.

5 Self-Differences in Keccak

In this section, we give a formal definition of self-differences, and discuss how to construct self-differential characteristics for Keccak. Given a *rotation index* $i \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32\}$ (which defines how a state is partitioned into symmetric parts), we define the following naming conventions for three subsets of bits:

- Consecutive Slice Set: Given an index $j \in \{0, 1, ..., 64/i 1\}$, this set contains the 25*i* bits of the *i* slices starting from slice ij, i.e., $CSS_i(j) \triangleq sl(ij) \bigcup sl(ij+1) \bigcup ... \bigcup sl(ij+(i-1))$.
- Rotated Bit Set: Given an arbitrary state bit a[x][y][z], this set contains the 64/i bits related to a[x][y][z] by the self-difference, i.e., $RBS_i(x, y, z) \triangleq \{a[x][y][z], a[x][y][z+i], a[x][y][z+2i] \dots a[x][y][z+64-i]\}$. The full state contains 25i rotated bit sets, namely, $\{RBS_i(x, y, z)\}$, where x and y can obtain all 5 values, and $z \in \{0, 1, \dots, i-1\}$.
- Rotated Row Set: Given a row r(y, z), this set contains the bits of the 64/i rows related to r(y, z) by the self-difference, i.e., $RRS_i(y, z) \triangleq r(y, z) \bigcup r(y, z+i) \bigcup \ldots \bigcup r(y, z + (64-i))$. The full state can be divided into 5i rotated row sets, namely $RRS_i(y, z)$, where y accepts all 5 values and $z \in \{0, 1, \ldots, i-1\}$.

5.1 Representing Self-Differences

We start by formally defining a zero self-difference which contains all the symmetric states for a fixed $i \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32\}$. In a symmetric state, the 64/i bits of each of the 25i rotated bit sets $RBS_i(x, y, z)$ have the same value. Hence, each such set suggests 64/i-1 equations such that the j'th equation (for $j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, 64/i-1\}$) sums the first bit of the rotated bit set a[x][y][z] with bit a[x][y][z+ij]. We can collect all these equations to form a $(1600-25i) \times 1600$ boolean matrix A_i , such that for all symmetric states w, $A_i \cdot w = \mathbf{0}$.

Thus, the self-difference $(A_i, \mathbf{0})$ contains the states in which the bits of each rotated bit set are equal, and is an implicit representation of the zero self-difference. Since a Keccak state contains 25i rotated bit sets, the zero self-difference contains 2^{25i} internal states, indexed according to the value of these rotated bit sets.

For an explicit representation of the states in $(\mathbb{A}_i, \mathbf{0})$, we define the $1600 \times 25i$ matrix \mathbb{B}_i . Each rotated bit set $RBS_i(x, y, z)$ is associated with a 1600-bit column, indicating which 64/i of the 1600 bits of the state are part of the set $RBS_i(x, y, z)$. Since in each 1600-bit column of \mathbb{A}_i , each rotated bit set has an even parity, then \mathbb{B}_i spans the null-space of \mathbb{A}_i . Moreover, since the zero state is a member of the zero self-difference, we can represent it explicitly as $[\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}]$. Note that if we view the 25*i*-bit vector w as an assignment to the first consecutive

slice set, then the action of \mathbb{B}_i on w can be viewed as duplicating this assignment to all consecutive slice sets, and thus obtaining a state which is a member of the zero self-difference.

Using the definition of \mathbb{A}_i , we can divide all states w into sets according to the value of $\mathbb{A}_i \cdot w$. In other words, we define the self-difference (\mathbb{A}_i, v) as all the states w for which $v = \mathbb{A}_i \cdot w$. This product measures the "deviation" of a state w from being a symmetric one, as it specifies the differences between $CSS_i(0)$ and the remaining consecutive slice sets $(CSS_i(j) \text{ for } j \in \{1, \dots, 64/i-1\})$. We often use an explicit representation of (\mathbb{A}_i, v) using the pair $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$, where \hat{v} is obtained by concatenating the zero 25i-bit vector to v. We call the pair $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ the canonical explicit representation of (\mathbb{A}_i, v) . Note that since \hat{v} satisfies the difference equations of (\mathbb{A}_i, v) , this is indeed a valid representation.

5.2 The Evolution of Self-Differences Through Keccak's Permutation

To analyze the evolution of self-differences through Keccak's mappings, we assume (similarly to differential cryptanalysis) that the state is chosen from the self-difference under a uniform distribution.

The translation-invariance property of the first four Keccak mappings imply that the zero self-differences $(\mathbb{A}_i, \mathbf{0})$ for any $i \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32\}$ are invariant under these mappings. Namely, $\theta([\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}], \rho([\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}]$ and $\pi([\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \pi(\mathbf{0})]$ (and also $\chi([\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbf{0}]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \chi(\mathbf{0})]$).

In addition, due to the associativity of linear operations, the action of the first three mappings on $[\mathbb{B}_i, u]$ is determined by their action on the representative vector, i.e., $\theta([\mathbb{B}_i, u]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \theta(u)]$, $\rho([\mathbb{B}_i, u]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \rho(u)]$ and $\pi([\mathbb{B}_i, u]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \pi(u)]$. Since ι simply adds a constant to each state of the set then $\iota([\mathbb{B}_i, u]) = [\mathbb{B}_i, \iota(u)]$ as well.

The Evolution of Self-Differences through χ Since χ is a non-linear mapping, $\chi([\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}])$ is generally not contained in a single self-difference affine subspace, but rather in a collection several of self-differences. Let w be a random variable chosen uniformly from $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ such that $\chi(w) \in [\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{u}]$, then \hat{u} is a random variable that depends on w. Thus, in order to associate a transition probability to the input and output self-differences of χ , we analyze the distribution of \hat{u} .

As mentioned before, the values of $r(y, z + i), r(y, z + 2i), \dots r(y, z + 64 - i)$ are fully determined by the 5 bits of r(y, z) given the self-difference \hat{v} . Moreover, these 5 bits are uniformly distributed in the self-difference. Consequently, we can easily calculate the distribution of \hat{u} restricted to $RRS_i(y, z)$ by applying the Sboxes to each one of the 32 possible values of this rotated row set.

For i=32, each rotated row set contains exactly 2 Sboxes (rows), i.e., \hat{v} specifies a single input difference for the Sbox pair. In this case one can easily use the difference distribution table of the Sbox to determine the distribution of the output difference δ^{out} given the input difference δ^{in} .

In the self-differences that we consider in this paper, most rotated row sets $RRS_i(y,z)$ contain at most two distinct inputs to the Sbox. We call such a rotated row set sparse, and call a self-difference composed only of sparse rotated row sets, a sparse self-difference. Hence, we can use the difference distribution table also in the more general case of $i \neq 32$. In active sparse rotated row sets, one can divide the values $r(y,z), r(y,z+i), \ldots, r(y,z+64-i)$ into two groups, each with the same input to the Sbox (depending on whether \hat{v} is zero in the respective bits). Obviously, each group of Sboxes has the same output, leading to a sparse output self-difference as well (distributed according to the difference distribution table).

6 Exploiting Self-Differential Characteristics in Collision Attacks on Keccak

In order to devise efficient attacks, we need to develop methods to construct subset characteristics of high probability. We naturally looked for self-differences with as few active rotated row set as possible, and more precisely, tried to reduce the weight of the self-differences as much as possible.

6.1 Choosing the Value of the Rotation Index

Recall that a subset characteristic maps an input, selected from a subset of inputs to the compression function, to a restricted output set of size 2^d with probability p. In order to find a collision, we have to try about $p^{-1} \cdot 2^{d/2}$ such inputs, and in the case of Keccak, we need the ability to generate $p^{-1} \cdot 2^{d/2}$ single-block messages M, such that \overline{M} is a member of the initial self-difference. In our basic attack, we use a zero self-difference $(\mathbb{A}_i,\mathbf{0})$ for a fixed $i \in \{1,2,4,8,16,32\}$ (i.e., we restrict our messages M such that $\overline{M} \in (\mathbb{A}_i,\mathbf{0})$), which implies that we are free to choose the value of the first i bits in each lane of the outer (controllable) part of the initial state, not including the lane containing the padding, in which we can only choose the value of the first i-2 bits. Exploiting the fact that the initialization sets the inner (uncontrollable) part of state to 0, and the fact that we can control the values of r/64 lanes when the rate is r, we can generate $2^{r\cdot(i/64)-2}$ initial states which are symmetric. Hence, we have to ensure that $2^{r\cdot(i/64)-2} > p^{-1} \cdot 2^{d/2}$.

As we decrease the value of i, we increase the number of constraints on the self-differences, leading to a smaller expected output subset size, thus reducing the complexity of the attack. On the other hand, a value of i which is too small leads to an insufficient number of degrees of freedom for a collision attack. Hence, we choose the smallest $i \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32\}$ such that $2^{r \cdot (i/64) - 2} \ge p^{-1} \cdot 2^{d/2}$ holds. We note that the value of i determines how a state is partitioned into

³ For inactive rotated row sets, the output self-difference is necessarily 0.

⁴ The calculation for the padded lane does not apply for the case of i = 1, however, we do not use i = 1 in our attacks on Keccak.

rotated row sets, and thus it may also affect the probability p of a characteristic (i.e., we need to calculate p separately for each value of i).

6.2 Reducing the Workload of Finding Messages Conforming to the First χ Transition

In some of our attacks, the initial self-differences are not zero, but rather of a low (but non-zero) weight. In these cases, the input to the first χ mapping is a state which belongs to a non-zero self-difference $[\mathbb{B}_i,\hat{v}]$, and this transition is associated which a probability which is lower than 1. However, when \hat{v} is sparse, we can reduce the workload of finding messages conforming to the first χ transition: as mentioned before, we can analyze the transition just like in standard differential cryptanalysis. In our case, we use the fact that the algebraic degree of the Keccak Sbox is only 2. This implies that for a pair of input/output differences, $(\delta^{in}, \delta^{out})$ to/from the Sbox, the set of values that satisfy the transition $\{v_1, v_2, ..., v_l\}$ such that $\chi_{|5}(v_i) + \chi_{|5}(v_i + \delta^{in}) = \delta^{out}$ is an affine subspace.⁵

Consequently, when the self-difference $[\mathbb{B}_i,\hat{v}]$ is sparse, the set of states which satisfy the transition of the first χ mapping is affine. Due to the fact that L is affine as well, the set of initial states that satisfy the first transition is affine. Thus, we pick initial states from the self-difference which are part of the affine subspace, which guarantees that the first χ transition is satisfied. However, due to the restriction of the initial state to a smaller affine subspace, this optimization does not prevent the loss of degrees of freedom.

In case the self-difference at the entry to the first χ mapping is not sparse, we can still restrict the values of the state to an affine subspace which guarantees the transition. However, since the affine subspace may not include all the values which guarantee the transition, this may reduce the available degrees of freedom further. We note that due to the limited diffusion properties of χ , the transition of every single-bit difference in a rotated row set of \hat{v} depends on the values of at most two state bits. Hence, the total number of state bits whose values we restrict (and the total number of degrees of freedom that we lose as a result) in order to guarantee the first χ transition is upper-bounded by twice the weight of $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ (regardless of the sparsity of \hat{v}).

6.3 Bounding the Size of the Output Subset

Constructing a self-difference characteristic which span many rounds of Keccak reduces its probability significantly, leading to an inefficient collision attack which requires many degrees of freedom. Thus, instead of covering all the attacked rounds, we extend the self-difference characteristic up to some point (in our attacks, one and a half rounds before the output), and continue to exploit Keccak's properties (such as the limited diffusion of its Sbox layer) in order to bound the size output subset. This is done by extending the subset characteristic further, but without restricting its subsets to the form of $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$. In fact, since

⁵ This observation was also used in [12].

the output subset is not a self-difference (and actually not even affine), we use subset cryptanalysis in its most general form.

Linear Variable Allocation In our attacks, the self-difference part of the subset characteristics ends just before the χ layer with a $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ self-difference which usually contains many sparse rotated row sets. When $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ itself is sparse, the Sboxes of each rotated row set assume only (at most) two values, with a single input difference which is fixed by \hat{v} . Since the algebraic degree of the Keccak Sbox is only 2, all the possible output differences of the Sboxes form an affine subspace (as observed in the Keccak reference document [4]), and thus the possible values of \hat{u} at the output self-difference of χ form an affine subspace. Consequently, we can compute the possible values of \hat{u} in symbolic form by assigning to each bit of \hat{u} an affine expression of variables. Moreover, we can continue and apply L to the symbolic form of \hat{u} , and thus maintain the knowledge of the subset up to the χ function of the next round.

When $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ is not sparse, we try to find an affine subspace which contains all the possible values of \hat{u} at the output of χ (which may include some impossible values of \hat{u} , thus increasing the bound on the size of the output size). Due to the limited diffusion properties of χ , every single-bit difference in a rotated row set can result in allocation of at most two variables, hence the number of allocated variables for \hat{u} is upper-bounded by twice the weight of $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ (regardless of the sparsity of \hat{v}).

In order to distinguish the case where \hat{u} is a binary vector, or given in symbolic form, we denote the symbolic form by $\hat{\mathfrak{u}}$. We note that $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{\mathfrak{u}}]$ still represents an affine subspace whose dimension is increased compared to $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{\mathfrak{u}}]$ by the number of allocated variables. However, $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{\mathfrak{u}}]$ is not necessarily a self-difference.

Bounding the Size of the Output Subset Beyond the Last χ Mapping Assume that we have an affine subspace of the form $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{\mathfrak{u}}]$ at the entry to χ , after which χ and ι are applied, and the state is truncated and sent to the output. Our goal is to upper bound the size of the output subset without reducing its probability (which may happen if we restrict it to an affine subspace).

Clearly, the final application of ι does not affect the size of the output subset, and can be ignored. In order to obtain a good bound, we exploit the limited diffusion of χ which maps each row to itself and in particular, maps each set of 64 rows (320 consecutive bits) of the form a[*][y][*] to itself. As the output consists of the first n bits of the final state, we want to bound the number of its possible values by computing the size of the subset before the last χ mapping on its first $320 \lceil n/320 \rceil$ bits. Namely, for output sizes of 224, 256, 384 and 512, it is sufficient to compute the size of the subset before the χ mapping on its first 320, 320, 640 and 640 bits respectively. For n=384 we can achieve a better bound by using a more specific property of χ : each bit a[x][y][z] at the output of χ , depends only on the 3 input bits a[x][y][z], a[x+1][y][z] and a[x+2][y][z]. Thus, the 64 bits of the lane a[x][y][*] at the output of χ , depend only on the 3 input lanes a[x][y][*], a[x+1][y][*] and a[x+2][y][*]. In the case of n=384, the first

320 bits are mapped to themselves by χ , and the remaining 64 bits depend only on 192 bits. Thus, in order to upper bound the output subset size it is sufficient to compute the size of the subset on its first 320+192=512 bits.

We now show how to bound the size of the n-bit output subset, given that it depends only on the first n' bits before the χ mapping, and the affine subspace at the entry to χ is represented by $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{\mathfrak{u}}]$. We first assign the variables of $\hat{\mathfrak{u}}$ an arbitrary value (e.g., zero). We denote the resultant binary vector by \hat{u} , and obtain a basic bound in this simplified case, where $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{u}]$ is a self-difference: recall that each rotated row set can assume at most 32 values, hence each set of 320 bits of the form a[*][y][*] can assume at most $32^i = 2^{5i}$ values. Thus, for n = 224 and n = 256 we obtain a basic bound of 2^{5i} , and for n = 512 we obtain a basic bound of $2^{2(5i)}$. For n = 384, the computation can be split into two: the 320 LSBs of the output can assume at most 2^{5i} values, and the 64 MSBs depend on 3 input lanes and can assume at most $min(2^{64}, 2^{3i})$ values. This gives a basic bound of $2^{5i} \cdot min(2^{64}, 2^{3i})$ for n = 384. In all cases, we emphasize that the bound only depends on i and n (or n'), rather than on the actual values of the n' bits of \hat{u} .

In the symbolic case, the n' bits of $\hat{\mathfrak{u}}$ are expressions, and the basic bound applies independently for each possible value of these n' bits. Consequently, in order to upper bound the output subset size, we need to multiply the basic bound by the number of possible values that the n' expressions can assume. Since the expressions are affine, we can easily compute their number of possible values by computing their dimension using simple linear algebra.

In order to minimize the dimension of the n' expressions at the output, we have to minimize the number of variables allocated in the previous round, when extending the self-difference characteristic. Since we do not allocate any variables to inactive rotated row sets, this can be assured if the final self-difference of the characteristic (before the variable allocation) is of low weight. Thus, in addition to the influence of the weight of the self-differences on the probability p of a characteristic, the weight also plays a role in bounding the size of the output subset 2^d .

7 Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Keccak-384 and Keccak-512

In this section, we present the details of our practical 3-round collision attacks on Keccak-384 and Keccak-512 and our non-practical 4-round attack on Keccak-384. Although our techniques can be applied to all variants of Keccak, actual collisions were already presented for 4 rounds of Keccak-224 and Keccak-256 in [12], and thus we focus first on Keccak-384 and Keccak-512, for which there are no previously published collision attacks.

7.1 Practical Collisions in 3-Round Keccak-512

In order to find actual collisions in 3-round Keccak-512, we used the self-differential characteristic given in Characteristic 1 in Appendix C. This characteristic spans

only the first Keccak round and the L mapping of the second round (i.e., the first 1.5 rounds), and has a probability of 1. In our attack, we choose i=4, and we use the techniques of Section 6.3 in order to bound the size of the output subset: we use the variable allocation technique on the final self-difference of the characteristic (whose weight is 11) to allocate 22 variables and extend the characteristic beyond the χ mapping of the second round. The basic bound on the size of the output subset is $2^{2\cdot 5\cdot i}=2^{40}$, and the dimension of the first n'=640 linear expressions is 22 (the maximal possible dimension with 22 variables). This gives a bound of $2^{40+22}=2^{62}$ on the size of the output subset. Since the probability of the characteristic is 1, we need to try about 2^{31} single-block messages which give initial states in the zero self-difference $[\mathbb{B}_4,\mathbf{0}]$, in order to find a collision with high probability. Since n=512, in this case we have r=576 and we can choose a sufficient number of $2^{r\cdot(i/64)-2}=2^{34}$ messages that satisfy the constraints. We implemented the attack and obtained an actual collisions in 3-round Keccak-512, given in Collision 1 in Appendix D.

7.2 Practical Collisions in 3-Round Keccak-384

For Keccak-384, we can easily use the same characteristic (Characteristic 1 from Appendix C). However, we choose to use a different characteristic which leads to a more efficient attack, and is also used as a basis for our 4-round attack of Keccak-384 (described in the next section). The idea is to choose a low-weight initial self-difference that limits the increase in the weight caused by the second-round θ mapping, and thus reduces the weight of the self-difference at the entry to the second-round χ mapping. In particular, we make sure that θ acts as an identity on some low Hamming weight vector u_1 , which is a representative of the self-difference after the first round.

The most interesting set of states which are fixed-points of θ is the column parity kernel or CP-kernel, which was defined in the Keccak submission document [4]: a 1600-bit state is in the CP-kernel if all of its columns have an even parity, and consequently the state is a fixed-point of θ . Thus, we require that u_1 is in the CP-kernel, and also set a similar constraint on the initial self-difference, which (unlike the attack on Keccak-512) is not zero. Namely, we require that a low Hamming weight state in the initial self-difference u_0 is in the CP-kernel (otherwise θ will significantly increase the weight of the self-difference already in the first round). Techniques to find state differences that stay in the CP-kernel for two consecutive rounds were described in [11, 14, 20] in order to construct low Hamming weight classical differential characteristics. Here, we use a straightforward generalization of these techniques in order to construct low Hamming weight self-differential characteristics that fulfill the two constraints.

The best self-differential characteristic that we found (which spans 1.5 rounds of the Keccak permutation) is given in Characteristic 2 in Appendix C. Note that its final self-difference has a weight of 6, which is lower compared to the weight

 $^{^6}$ We note that the rate r of Keccak-384 is much larger than the rate of Keccak-512, and thus we could not choose a similar initial self-difference for Keccak-512.

of 11 of the final self-difference in Characteristic 1. On the other hand, the characteristic has a probability of 2^{-12} due to the transition through the first χ mapping, whereas Characteristic 1 has probability 1. However, we can easily reduce the workload of finding initial states that conform to this characteristic from the trivial 2^{12} to 1 (as specified in Section 6.2), while losing only 12 degree of freedom

In our 3-round attack on Keccak-384, we choose i=4, and we calculate the bound on the output subset as follows: we use the variable allocation technique to allocate 12 variables (which is the maximal number since the final self-difference has a weight of 6) and extend the characteristic beyond the χ mapping of the second round. The basic bound on the size of the output subset is $2^{8\cdot4}=2^{32}$, and the dimension of the first n'=512 linear expressions is 12. This gives a bound of $2^{32+12}=2^{44}$ on the size of the output subset. Since the workload to find initial states that conform to Characteristic 2 is 1, we have to try (at most) 2^{22} such initial states in order to find a collision with high probability. For n=384, we have r=832 and we can choose a sufficient number of $2^{-12} \cdot 2^{r \cdot (i/64)-2}=2^{38}$ messages that satisfy the constraints. We implemented the attack and obtained actual collisions in 3-round Keccak-384, given in Collision 2 in Appendix D.

7.3 A Collision Attack on 4-Round Keccak-384

In this subsection, we present a 4-round collision attack on Keccak-384. The attack is based on the 2.5-round self-differential characteristic given in Characteristic 3 in Appendix C, which is an extension by one round of the 1.5-round characteristic used in the 3-round attack on Keccak-384. In this attack, we choose a rotation index value of i=16 and the total probability of the characteristic is 2^{-24} . However, as in the case of the 3-round attack, the workload required to find a conforming message can easily be reduced from 2^{24} to 2^{12} .

Although the algorithm of the 4-round attack on Keccak-384 is very similar to the 3-round attack algorithm, its analysis is more complicated, since the final self-difference of Characteristic 3 has a relatively high weight of 88 (compared to the weight of 6 of the final self-difference of Characteristic 2). Thus, we have more options to allocate variables in order to extend the characteristic. In particular, we have a large number of 20 non-sparse rotated row sets, whose 4 Sboxes assume (exactly) 3 values. However, it is easy to verify that in 18 out of the 20 non-sparse rotated row sets, the possible values of \hat{u} , restricted to these rotated row sets, are still contained in an affine subspace whose dimension is at most 4.

Exploiting this observation, we can allocate 140 variables for all but 2 rotated row sets in order to extend the final self-difference of Characteristic 3 beyond the third χ mapping. We have only 2 remaining rotated row sets, which can assume $32 \cdot 32 = 2^{10}$ values, and thus contribute a multiplicative factor of at most 2^{10} to the output subset size.⁷ The basic bound for n=384 and i=4

⁷ The value of the 2 rotated row sets does not influence the basic bound and the bound computed using the symbolic calculation, and thus we set them to zero in order to proceed with the calculation of the bound on the output subset size. However, we need to multiply the result of the calculation by a factor of 2¹⁰.

is equal to $2^{8\cdot 16}=2^{128}$ (as calculated in Section 6.3), and the dimension of the first n'=512 linear expressions in the 140 variables is 132. In total, we obtain a bound of $2^{10+128+132}=2^{270}$ on the size of the output subset, and the expected time complexity of the attack is thus bounded by $2^{12}\cdot 2^{270/2}=2^{147}$. This is 2^{45} times faster than the birthday bound of 2^{192} .

Finally, we have to verify that we have sufficiently many degrees of freedom to find a collision. Indeed, we have to try about 2^{147} initial states, while we have $2^{-12} \cdot 2^{r \cdot (i/64) - 2} = 2^{196}$ states that satisfy the constraints.

8 A Collision Attack on 5-Round Keccak-256

The target difference algorithm (TDA) was developed in [12] as a technique to link a differential characteristic (which starts from an arbitrary state difference) to the initial state of the Keccak permutation, using one permutation round. More precisely, the initial state difference of the characteristic is called the target difference, and the algorithm outputs many single-block message pairs which satisfy the target difference after one permutation round. Hence, a differential characteristic leading to a collision at the output after k rounds can be leveraged to a collision attack on k+1 rounds of Keccak.

In this section, we present a 5-round collision attack on Keccak-256 which is based on an analogous variant of the TDA for self-differential cryptanalysis, and is called a *target self-difference algorithm* (TSDA). Analogously to the TDA, the TSDA is a technique that links a self-differential characteristic (which starts from an arbitrary self-difference) to the initial state of the Keccak permutation, using one permutation round. Thus, the initial self-difference of the self-differential characteristic is called the *target self-difference*, and the algorithm outputs single-block messages whose internal state belongs to the target self-difference after one permutation round.

Both the TDA, as well as the TSDA proposed in this paper are heuristic randomized algorithms, and we cannot formally prove their success. Given a subset characteristic (which is an extension of a self-differential characteristic) spanning k rounds of the Keccak permutation, a collision attack on k+1 rounds of Keccak consists of the following steps:

- 1. Run the TSDA on the target self-difference (derived from the first self-difference of the characteristic) with fresh randomness until it succeeds to output single-block messages satisfying the target self-difference after one permutation round.
- 2. Let M be the next message outputted by the TSDA (if no more messages remain, return to step 1):
 - (a) Run the Keccak permutation on \overline{M} , and check if the evolution of the state from the second round conforms with the characteristic. If not, discard M and go to step 2. Otherwise, continue and calculate the output of the hash function.

(b) Store the output in a hash table next to M, and check if it collides with an output of a different message. If a collision is found, output the colliding message pair, otherwise go to step 2.

In order to analyze the time complexity of the attack, we have to estimate the amortized time complexity of finding one message that satisfies the target self-difference after one permutation round. The amortized time is calculated as the ratio between the execution time of the TSDA and the number of messages that it returns in a single execution. If we assume that the amortized time is smaller than 1 (i.e., the amortized time is less than the execution time of the Keccak permutation), and the time of a single execution of the TSDA in step 1 is not too large, then the time complexity analysis of the attack is similar to the analysis of the basic attack given in Section 4. Given that the size of the output set is 2^d values, then the memory complexity of the attack is $2^{d/2}$, similarly to the basic attack given in Section 4.

Since the TSDA is closely related to the TDA, we give a short overview of the TDA first. More details can be found in [12].

8.1 The Target Difference Algorithm

The main element that motivates the TDA is the large number of degrees of freedom for Keccak-224 and Keccak-256. This observation allows the algorithm to restrict the set of solutions to a smaller subset that can be found relatively easily. The 1600-bit target difference that enters the algorithm is denoted by Δ_T , while the difference in the initial state is denoted by Δ_I . The algorithm fixes the input difference to the first Sbox layer $L(\Delta_I)$, which also fixes Δ_I , and implies that all the message pairs that the algorithm outputs have the same difference. Given $L(\Delta_I)$ at the input to the first Sbox layer and Δ_T at its output, the set of values that satisfy the transition is an affine subspace (see Section 6.2), and hence the algorithm actually outputs an affine subspace of message pairs. Thus, the algorithm has two phases, where in the first phase (called the difference phase) it fixes Δ_I , and in the second phase (called the value phase) it outputs the affine subspace of message pairs by solving a system of linear equations. Hence, in the difference phase the number of degrees of freedom is reduced by fixing $L(\Delta_I)$, while in the value phase there is no loss of degrees of freedom.

In the difference phase, the TDA tries to simultaneously satisfy two constraints: the first constraint restricts Δ_I to the initial state of the Keccak permutation (i.e., fixes the state bits that the adversary does not control to zero). The second difference constraint ensures that the difference transition $L(\Delta_I) \to \Delta_T$ is possible. Similarly, in the value phase, the TDA tries to simultaneously satisfy two value constraints. The first constraint restricts the value of the initial state of the messages to the initial state of the Keccak permutation. The second value constraint ensures that the difference transition $L(\Delta_I) \to \Delta_T$ occurs by restricting the values of the states before the first Sbox layer to the particular affine subspace defined by the transition. Consequently, both value constraints

can be formulated using a set of linear equations, while the second difference constraint cannot.

Although there are many solutions for most target differences, for many target differences which have a large number of inactive Sboxes, the difference phase has no solutions, and thus there are no solutions at all: every inactive Sbox in Δ_T , restricts all the 5 corresponding bits of $L(\Delta_I)$ to zero (whereas an active Sbox gives several options for the values of these 5 bits). Consequently, a large number of inactive Sboxes restricts many bits of $L(\Delta_I)$ to zero and as a result the two difference constraints may not be simultaneously satisfiable. On the other hand, the dimension of the affine space of message pairs outputted by the algorithm is expected to increase with the number of inactive Sboxes in Δ_T , given that the algorithm finds a valid Δ_I in the difference phase. This is because inactive Sboxes do not place any constraint of the actual values of the message pairs before the first Sbox layer, whereas active Sboxes restrict them to a smaller affine subspace, reducing the dimension the solution space.

8.2 The Target Self-Difference Algorithm

Given a target self-difference (A_i, t_1) after the first Keccak Sbox layer, our goal is to find messages M such that $\chi \circ L(\bar{M}) \in (A_i, t_1)$. The first step in constructing the algorithm is to choose the values of the rotation index $i \in \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32\}$ and the rate r so that the algorithm will have sufficiently many degrees of freedom: since the number of equations in A_i is 1600 - 25i and |M| = r - 2, we have r + 25i - 1602 degrees of freedom. It is easy to check that we have a positive number of degrees of freedom only for i = 32 and for the Keccak versions with $n \in \{224, 256, 384\}$: we have 350, 286 and 30 degrees of freedom for these output sizes, respectively. For i = 32, the state is split into two halves and the target self-difference specifies the difference between them. This closely resembles the case where the target difference specifies the difference between two full states, and allows us to easily adapt the techniques used by the TDA to our new TSDA.

We denote the self-difference of the initial state by (\mathbb{A}_{32}, t_0) and the self-difference after the application of L by $(\mathbb{A}_{32}, t_{0.5})$. Analogously to the TDA, our new variant fixes $(\mathbb{A}_{32}, t_{0.5})$, which also fixes (\mathbb{A}_{32}, t_0) , and implies that all the messages that the algorithm outputs are in the same self-difference. Moreover, given $(\mathbb{A}_{32}, t_{0.5})$ and (\mathbb{A}_{32}, t_1) , the set of values that satisfy each difference transition for a rotated row set (i.e., the input difference and the output difference of the two rows) is an affine subspace. Consequently, the TSDA outputs an affine subspace of messages.

Similarly to the TDA, the TSDA has two phases, where in each phase we try to simultaneously satisfy two constraints. The details of the TSDA are a straightforward adaptation of those of the TDA (which are given in [12]), and are thus not described in this paper.

⁸ However, we note that for Keccak-384 we only have a few dozens of degrees of freedom, which are insufficient for our algorithm.

8.3 Constructing and Extending the Self-Differential Characteristic

In order to exploit the TSDA, we use a self-differential characteristic starting from the second Keccak round, and link it to the initial state of Keccak using the TSDA. The considerations in constructing the characteristic that is used in this attack are different from those that are used to construct the characteristics used in Section 7: first, the initial self-difference in the characteristic used in this section starts from the second Keccak round and hence does not have to conform to the initial state of Keccak. In addition, the characteristic must handle different ι constants. The self-differential characteristic that we use for the attack in given in Characteristic 4 in Appendix C. This characteristic spans 2.5 rounds of the permutation (starting from the second round) and has a probability of 2^{-37} . Note that since the characteristic starts the second round, its initial self-difference is obtained after applying the first round ι mapping to the target self-difference.

We use the techniques of Section 6.3 in order to bound the size of the output subset after additional 1.5 rounds: we use the variable allocation technique on the final self-difference of the characteristic (whose weight is 12) to allocate 24 variables and extend the characteristic beyond the χ mapping of the fourth round. The basic bound on the size of the output subset is $2^{5i} = 2^{160}$, and the dimension of the first n' = 320 linear expressions is the maximal possible dimension of 24. This gives a bound of $2^{160+24} = 2^{184}$ on the size of the output subset. Since the probability of the characteristic is 2^{-37} , the time complexity bound of the simple collision attack given at the beginning of the section is at least $2^{37+184/2} = 2^{129}$, even if we assume that the amortized time complexity of finding one message that satisfies the target self-difference is less than 1. Thus, even under optimal assumptions, this time complexity is slightly worse than the expected time complexity of 2¹²⁸ of generic collision attacks for Keccak-256. In order to speed up the attack, we have to use additional techniques, but before describing them in Appendix B, we analyze the execution of the TSDA on the specific target self-difference derived from Characteristic 4.

8.4 Executing the Target Self-Difference Algorithm

The target self-difference calculated from Characteristic 4 has a relatively large number of 26 inactive rotated row sets. Analogously to the TDA, a large number of inactive rotated row sets may make the difference phase of the TSDA difficult to solve, but if we manage to find a solution, then the dimension of the affine message subspace outputted by the algorithm is expected to be large.

In this attack, we choose the target self-difference carefully such that the TSDA should be able to solve it in a reasonably short time, and still output an affine subspace of a relatively large dimension. To check this property, we performed hundreds of simulations of the TSDA with the chosen target self-difference on a standard PC, each time feeding the algorithm with fresh randomness. In all of our simulations, the TSDA was able to solve the challenge in less than 30 seconds, while outputting an affine subspace whose dimension ranged between 78 and 111, and was typically around 90. Thus, according to

our simulations, the amortized time complexity of finding one message that satisfies the target self-difference is significantly less than 1. We provide concrete evidence for the success of our simulations by giving an example of a message that satisfies Characteristic 4 in Message 1 in Appendix D.

8.5 The Full Attack

In order to speed up the attack, we use message modification as described in Appendix B. This technique improves the time complexity of the basic attack by a multiplicative factor which is between 2^{14} and 2^{21} , and thus we estimate the time complexity of the full attack to be between 2^{108} and 2^{115} . Since the bound on the size of the output subset is 2^{184} , the memory complexity is about $2^{184/2} = 2^{92}$.

Finally, we have to verify that we have sufficiently many degrees of freedom in order to find a collision. Namely, we have to make sure that we can find about 2¹²⁹ messages conforming to the target self-difference (even though when we use message modification we do not test all of them). Since the subspace of maximal dimension that we found using the TSDA has a dimension of 111 (which is smaller than 129), we have to execute the TSDA many times in order to collect sufficiently many messages. In Keccak-256 we have 286 degrees of freedom, hence we do not expect this to be a problem. However, we can also deal with the unlikely case that the TSDA is able to find only a very small set of all the possible solutions: 9 in this case we use the additional degrees of freedom in messages containing multiple blocks. According to our simulations, in about 20% of the cases when the c bits of the inner part of the state are chosen at random (e.g., by applying the Keccak permutation to an arbitrary single-block message), the TSDA (and the message modification algorithm) perform very similarly to the case where the c bits are zero in the initial permutation state. The 20% success rate gives us hundreds of additional degrees of freedom, which are definitely sufficient when our goal is to find a single collision.

9 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we presented the first collision attacks on round-reduced Keccak-384 and Keccak-512, and for Keccak-256, we increased the number of rounds which can be attacked from 4 to 5. Our algorithms are based on a squeeze attack which uses self-differential cryptanalysis (which is a special case of subset cryptanalysis) in order to map a large subset of inputs into a small pre-fixed subset of all possible outputs, for which the birthday bound is significantly reduced.

Self-differential cryptanalysis is also very useful in attack scenarios which are different than the squeeze attack. For example, it is possible to use selfdifferential cryptanalysis in preimage attacks on hash functions, given that the

 $^{^9}$ We can easily detect this case since we store the messages that satisfy Characteristic 4 .

target output is contained in a specific subset of outputs. Moreover, one can think of several other attacks based on self-differential cryptanalysis (such as impossible self-differential cryptanalysis and rebound attacks), which are analogous to attacks in the standard differential setting.

Extending subset cryptanalysis, and in particular self-differential cryptanalysis, seems to be an interesting and fruitful research direction. It would improve the cryptanalytic toolbox, suggest better attacks on various schemes, and may even shed some light concerning the types of constants which are hazardous to the security of the cryptosystem.

References

- Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Willi Meier. Zero-sum distinguishers for reduced Keccak-f and for the core functions of Luffa and Hamsi. NIST mailing list, 2009.
- Daniel J. Bernstein. Second preimages for 6 (7? (8??)) rounds of keccak? NIST mailing list, 2010.
- Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michael Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche. On the Indifferentiability of the Sponge Construction. In Nigel P. Smart, editor, EU-ROCRYPT, volume 4965 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 181–197. Springer, 2008.
- Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michaël Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche. The Keccak SHA-3 submission. Submission to NIST (Round 3), 2011.
- Eli Biham. New Types of Cryptanalytic Attacks Using Related Keys. J. Cryptology, 7(4):229–246, 1994.
- Alex Biryukov and David Wagner. Slide Attacks. In Lars R. Knudsen, editor, FSE, volume 1636 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 245–259. Springer, 1999.
- Charles Bouillaguet, Orr Dunkelman, Gaëtan Leurent, and Pierre-Alain Fouque. Another Look at Complementation Properties. In Seokhie Hong and Tetsu Iwata, editors, FSE, volume 6147 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 347–364. Springer, 2010.
- Christina Boura and Anne Canteaut. Zero-Sum Distinguishers for Iterated Permutations and Application to Keccak-f and Hamsi-256. In Alex Biryukov, Guang Gong, and Douglas R. Stinson, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 6544 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–17. Springer, 2010.
- 9. Anne Canteaut, editor. Fast Software Encryption 19th International Workshop, FSE 2012, Washington, DC, USA, March 19-21, 2012. Revised Selected Papers, volume 7549 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2012.
- Burr, Perlner, 10. Shu-jen Chang. Ray William E. Meltem Sönmez Turan, John M. Kelsey, Souradyuti Paul, and Lawrence Bassham. Third-Round Report of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/Round3/documents/Round3_Report_NISTIR_7896.pdf, 2012.
- 11. Joan Daemen and Gilles Van Assche. Differential Propagation Analysis of Keccak. In Canteaut [9], pages 422–441.
- 12. Itai Dinur, Orr Dunkelman, and Adi Shamir. New Attacks on Keccak-224 and Keccak-256. In Canteaut [9], pages 442–461.
- 13. Ming Duan and Xuajia Lai. Improved Zero-Sum Distinguisher for Full Round Keccak-f Permutation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/023, 2011.

- 14. Alexandre Duc, Jian Guo, Thomas Peyrin, and Lei Wei. Unaligned Rebound Attack: Application to Keccak. In Canteaut [9], pages 402–421.
- Carlo Harpes and James L. Massey. Partitioning Cryptanalysis. In Eli Biham, editor, FSE, volume 1267 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 13–27. Springer, 1997.
- 16. Donald E. Knuth. The Art of Computer Programming, Volume II: Seminumerical Algorithms, 2nd Edition. Addison-Wesley, 1981.
- 17. Tri Van Le, Rüdiger Sparr, Ralph Wernsdorf, and Yvo Desmedt. Complementation-Like and Cyclic Properties of AES Round Functions. In Hans Dobbertin, Vincent Rijmen, and Aleksandra Sowa, editors, AES Conference, volume 3373 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 128–141. Springer, 2004.
- Gregor Leander, Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem, Hoda AlKhzaimi, and Erik Zenner. A Cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: The Invariant Subspace Attack. In Phillip Rogaway, editor, CRYPTO, volume 6841 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 206–221. Springer, 2011.
- Pawel Morawiecki, Josef Pieprzyk, and Marian Srebrny. Rotational cryptanalysis of round-reduced Keccak. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/546, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
- María Naya-Plasencia, Andrea Röck, and Willi Meier. Practical Analysis of Reduced-Round Keccak. In Daniel J. Bernstein and Sanjit Chatterjee, editors, Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2011, volume 7107 of LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg, 2011.
- 21. Thomas Peyrin. Improved Differential Attacks for ECHO and Grøstl. In Tal Rabin, editor, *CRYPTO*, volume 6223 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 370–392. Springer, 2010.
- Paul C. van Oorschot and Michael J. Wiener. Improving implementable meetin-the-middle attacks by orders of magnitude. In Neal Koblitz, editor, CRYPTO, volume 1109 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 229–236. Springer, 1996.

A Appendix: Previous and Related Work

A.1 Previous Results on Keccak

During the SHA3 competition, Keccak was the target of many cryptanalytic attacks [1, 2, 4, 8, 11–14, 20]. However, only two papers deal explicitly with the resistance of Keccak to collision attacks: in [20], Naya-Plasencia et al. show practical collisions for 2-round Keccak-224 and 2-round Keccak-256, using low Hamming weight differential characteristics. In [12], Dinur et al. present practical collision attacks on 4-round Keccak-224 and 4-round Keccak-256 which use algebraic techniques in satisfying a low Hamming weight differential characteristics.

A more recent result [19] is based on the same symmetry preserving property of the Keccak permutation that we exploit in this paper. However, while we use this property in order to devise collision attacks, in [19] it is used in a different way in order to speed up preimage attacks on up to 4 Keccak rounds.

A.2 Related Work on Subset Cryptanalysis

The concept of subset cryptanalysis is closely related to many works and concepts which appeared in cryptanalysis. Most of the modern distinguishers can be viewed as special cases of this approach. For example, the main idea of partitioning cryptanalysis [15] is to divide the plaintext space and the output space (or the one-before last round value space) into sets which are related with non-trivial probabilities.

Closer analogs which track the development of the "subset" through the cryptographic primitive typically look for invariants through the primitive, e.g., fixed-points or fixed subsets. For example, in [18] a subset of invariant values under the encryption process (in weak key classes) in PRINTcipher are identified. Another example is the subset of special states identified in [17] of states whose left half is equal to the right half, which remains restricted to this subset throughout the encryption under a keyless AES.

We also note the close relationship between our approach and many of the similarity properties identified over the years. Slide attacks [6] (as well as the original flavor of related-key attacks [5]) is built over pairs of plaintexts which are shifted versions of each other in the encryption process. In many cases (e.g., Feistel ciphers), it is easy to rewrite the slide requirement as a relation between the slid pairs by defining the subsets according to the slid relation.

The most notable example of a previous paper on self-similarities is [7], which analyzes these self-similarity properties both for block ciphers and for hash functions. For example, for the compression function of the hash function Lesamnta, [7] identifies a special subset of inputs whose outputs are restricted to a small subset, thus allowing for faster collision attacks against the compression function.

Another notable work which looks at differences inside the internal state is [21], which analyzes the Grøstl hash function using the difference between the inputs to the two computation datapaths (which differ only in the constant added to each of them). By tracking these differences, the adversary is able to construct internal differentials, which predict the difference between the two datapaths. These internal differences are very closely related to self-differences with (almost) two repetitions of the state. However, in this paper we try to maintain a small distance from a symmetric state, while the internal differentials in [21] allow for a greater distance (at the cost of assuming greater control by the adversary, which translates into free-start attacks, rather than attacks on the hash function itself).

B Appendix: Speeding Up the 5-Round Attack on Keccak-256 Using Message Modification

In order to speed up the attack, we reduce the amortized time that is required in order to find a message that satisfies the self-difference of Characteristic 4 after round 2 of the Keccak permutation. Since the probability of the first χ transition in Characteristic 4 is 2^{-21} , the amortized time to find such a message is about

2²¹ in the attack given at the beginning of Section 8, and we reduce it by using message modification within the subspace of messages outputted by the TSDA.

The main observation that we use for the message modification is that we can easily find a basis for the typical subspace outputted by the TSDA, which contains many low Hamming weight 1600-bit vectors of a certain type. These vectors are non-zero vectors of the lowest Hamming weight which are symmetric (i.e., in the symmetric set for i=32) and also have even column parity. We call these vectors low Hamming weight symmetric even parity vectors, or LHSE vectors in short. Since a LHSE vector contains 2 non-zero columns, each with a Hamming weight of 2, it has a total Hamming weight of 4, and it is easy to check that there are exactly 1600 such vectors.

The reason that a typical subspace outputted by the TSDA contains many LHSE vectors can be explained as follows: take an arbitrary initial state w from the subspace outputted by the TSDA, and assume that we add to it a LHSE state w' such that the result w+w' is a valid initial state of the Keccak permutation (note that we can choose many such vectors from the 1600 TSDA vectors). In order for w+w' to also be outputted by the TSDA, it must be in the same self-difference as w, which is true since w' is symmetric. In addition, w+w' must satisfy the target self-difference after the first χ mapping. This occurs with a reasonably high probability since w satisfies it, and L(w) + L(w+w') = L(w') is a symmetric vector with a low Hamming weight of 4. Thus, $(\chi \circ L(w)) + (\chi \circ L(w+w'))$ has a good chance to be symmetric, implying that w+w' also satisfies the target self-difference after the first χ mapping.

The message modification algorithm uses a basis of the output of the TSDA with many LHSE vectors. Since there are only 1600 LHSE vectors, we can compute such a basis S exhaustively from the original basis outputted by the TSDA, and we denote by $S_1 \subseteq S$ the set of LHSE vectors in S^{10} . To simplify our notations, given an initial state w, we define the predicate $\phi(w)$ to be true if w satisfies the self-difference of Characteristic 4 after round 2 of the Keccak permutation. Assume that we found a vector w in the output subspace of the TSDA such that $\phi(w)$ holds. Let $w' \in S_1$, then the Hamming distance of R(w) and R(w+w') is small, implying that the Hamming distance of the states L(R(w))and L(R(w+w')) (which are input to the second χ mapping) is still reasonably small (although larger due to L). Thus, since $\phi(w)$ holds and the second χ transition does not depend on the values of many bits of L(R(w)), there is a good chance that those bits have the same value in L(R(w+w')), implying that $\phi(w+w')$ holds as well. Moreover, if $\phi(w'')$ holds for another vector $w'' \in S_1$, then there is a good chance that $\phi(w+w'+w'')$ holds as well. All these heuristic arguments imply that when we find w such that $\phi(w)$ holds, it is a good idea to test additional vectors in the following carefully selected subspace:

- 1. Choose an arbitrary initial state w from the subspace spanned by S.
- 2. Check if $\phi(w)$ holds, if not go to step 1.

¹⁰ Based on extensive simulations, the size of S_1 is typically more than half of the size of S

- 3. Let $S_2 = \{w' \in S1 | \phi(w + w') \text{ holds} \}.$
- 4. Iterate over all states w'' spanned by S_2 , and check for each state w + w'' if it satisfies Characteristic 4. If so, store its output and check for a collision, as in the basic attack.

In order to get a realistic estimate of the amortized time that is required in order to find a message that satisfies the self-difference of Characteristic 4 after round 2 of the Keccak permutation, we performed simulations on hundreds of subspaces which were actually returned by the TSDA. For each such subspace (whose typical dimension is about 90), we tested a total number of about 2^{30} messages using the message modification algorithm, out of which in a typical subspace, about 2^{23} messages satisfied the self-difference of Characteristic 4 after round 2. Thus, we estimate that the amortized time required in order to find a message that satisfies the self-difference of Characteristic 4 after round 2 to be about $2^{30-23} = 2^7$, which gives an improvement factor of 2^{14} compared to the 2^{21} amortized time in the basic attack given at the beginning of Section 8. We note that there are several possible improvements to this message modification algorithm, which may speed up the attack further (up to the maximal possible factor of 2^{21}). For example, we can discard subspaces outputted by the TSDA for which the size of the set S_1 is small. Another improvement possibility is to use the TSDA states to carefully "correct" states w for which $\phi(w)$ does not hold, and thus efficiently find states for which ϕ holds in the first step of the algorithm. However, we decided not to include these potential improvements in our claimed results, due to their highly speculative nature and the fact that even without them we are already well below the birthday threshold.

C Appendix: Self-Differential Characteristics for Keccak

In this section, we provide the precise self-differential characteristics (labeled as Characteristics 1–4) which we use in our collision attacks on round-reduced Keccak.

A self-difference $[\mathbb{B}_i, \hat{v}]$ is represented by a state with the lowest Hamming weight. Each state is given as a matrix of 5×5 lanes of 64 bits, ordered from left to right, where each lane is given in hexadecimal using the little-endian format. The symbol '-' is used in order to denote a zero 4-bit value.

The self-differential characteristics are given as a sequence self-differences, where the operation performed in each transition is specified between the representative states and the round numbers are specified to the right of the states.


D Appendix: Examples of Actual Collisions and a Message Conforming to Characteristic 4

We give examples of actual collisions for three rounds of Keccak-384 and Keccak-512 (labeled as Collisions 1, 2), and a message conforming to Characteristic 4 (labeled as Message 1). The padded messages and output values are given

				D.O.
				RO
	$\downarrow R$			
				D1
				πı
	$\downarrow \mathrm{L}$			
			4	


The characteristic has a rotation index value of i = 4, as described in Section 7.1.

 $\textbf{Characteristic 1:} \ \text{The 1.5-round self-differential characteristic with probability 1 used in order to find collisions in 3-round Keccak-512$



The characteristic has a rotation index value of i=4 for the 3-round attack on Keccak-384, as described in Section 7.2.

Characteristic 2: The 1.5-round self-differential characteristic with probability 2^{-12} used in order to find collisions in 3-round Keccak-384



The characteristic has a rotation index value of i=16 (this applies to the full 2.5-round characteristic used in the 4-round attack) and probability 2^{-12} , as described in Section 7.3. The total probability of the full 2.5-round characteristic is 2^{-24} .

Characteristic 3: The 1-round extension of Characteristic 2 used in the collision attack on 4-round Keccak-384

in blocks of 32-bits ordered from left to right, where each block is given in hexadecimal using the little-endian format.

IBCE-1EDC	- 68A-49EE	14A6-2999	1916-3-39	168AD8	
	-168A-49EA				
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		• • • • • • •	68AD8	R1
				68AD8	
				69AD8	
	- 00A-49LL	4A0-2B99 T	.1910-3-99	109AD0	
		$\downarrow L$			
I8-88	- 4	2		4	
A	- 4	2		4	
	-				
j	-				
i	- i	· İ	·	İ	
'	'				
		$\downarrow \chi (p =$			
	•		•	4	
8	•		•	4	
	-				
	-				
	-				
		1.			
	_	.	.	4	
	•		•	4	
	•	•	•	•	
!	•		•		
	-				
		$\downarrow L$			
8	- -4	·			
	- -4				
	- 8				
l .	•		•		
10	1		•	'	
		$\downarrow \chi$ $(p =$: <u>Z</u> ')		
8	•				
	- -4				
8	- 8				
82	- 8				
8	-				
		$\downarrow \iota$			
188_82		¥	.		
1	•	•	•		
1 '					
82					
18	-				
		$\downarrow L$			
188-82	- 4	· -			
	-				
				2	R3 5
1 ' '	-		•	•	10.0
	-1	1	1-4		

The self-differential characteristic has a rotation index value of i = 32, as described in Section 8. Characteristic 4: The characteristic with probability 2^{-37} used in the 5-round colli-

sion attack on Keccak-256

M1=

M2=

Output=

56BCC94B C4445644 D7655451 5DD96555 71FA7332 3BA30B23 958408C5 64407664 41805414 11190901 6ABAA8BA A8ABAEFA 7EF8AEEE ECCE68DC 4EC8ACEC DD5D5CCC

The messages were found using Characteristic 1.

Collision 1: A collision in 3-round Keccak-512

M1=

M2=

Output=

99999991 11199999 4440C444 405C60DC 00000000 0C100010 777677F7 73F77767 3550F597 55D57155 66666664 66666666

The messages were found using Characteristic 2.

Collision 2: A collision in 3-round Keccak-384

M=

30DFA98A B8CF5C2F A9CB0FDC 220346FD 311F1F9C 619AE337 51E70A2E FFEE7106 235FFE41 F6356D1E 7420E3BE ABC66CF9 4DB24896 A33188ED F77C08E9 1CFDE28A 27947A3B 676C430D AA73B6BE A0D27BE7 DCD08DE8 CBC00830 D58570AB 4F139EDA 81CFF59E 9E0BDA5B 73BDBE0F D3E314D9 AF9458E0 223EF917 8712F441 621C4F1F 8D0C1C43 CD89C138

Message 1: A message conforming to Characteristic 4