

The Vernam cipher is robust to small deviations from randomness

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Abstract

The Vernam cipher (or one-time pad) has played an important role in cryptography because it is a perfect secrecy system. For example, if an English text (presented in binary system) $X_1X_2\dots$ is enciphered according to the formula $Z_i = (X_i + Y_i) \bmod 2$, where $Y_1Y_2\dots$ is a key sequence generated by the Bernoulli source with equal probabilities of 0 and 1, anyone who knows $Z_1Z_2\dots$ has no information about $X_1X_2\dots$ without the knowledge of the key $Y_1Y_2\dots$ (The best strategy is to guess $X_1X_2\dots$ not paying attention to $Z_1Z_2\dots$)

But what should one say about secrecy of an analogous method where the key sequence $Y_1Y_2\dots$ is generated by the Bernoulli source with a small bias, say, $P(0) = 0.49$, $P(1) = 0.51$? To the best of our knowledge, there are no theoretical estimates for the secrecy of such a system, as well as for the general case where $X_1X_2\dots$ (the plaintext) and key sequence are described by stationary ergodic processes. We consider the running-key ciphers where the plaintext and the key are generated by stationary

ergodic sources and show how to estimate the secrecy of such systems.

In particular, it is shown that, in a certain sense, the Vernam cipher is robust to small deviations from randomness.

Keywords: running-key cipher, Vernam cipher, Shannon entropy, unconditional secrecy.

1 Introduction

We consider the classical problem of transmitting secret messages from Alice (a sender) to Bob (a receiver) via an open channel which can be accessed by Eve (an adversary). It is supposed that Alice and Bob (and nobody else) know a so-called key K which is a word in a certain alphabet. Before transmitting a message Alice encrypts it. In his turn, Bob, after having received the encrypted message (ciphertext), decrypts it to recover the initial text (plaintext).

We consider so-called running-key ciphers where the plaintext $X_1\dots X_t$, the key sequence $Y_1\dots Y_t$ and ciphertext $Z_1\dots Z_t$ belong to one alphabet A (without loss of generality we suppose that $A = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$, where $n \geq 2$). The i -th letter of the ciphertext is defined by $Z_i = c(X_i, Y_i)$, $i = 1, \dots, t$, whereas the deciphering rule is by $X_i = d(Z_i, Y_i)$, $i = 1, \dots, t$, i.e. $d(c(X_i, Y_i), Y_i) = X_i$. Here c and d are functions called coder and decoder, correspondingly. Quite often the following particular formula are used

$$Z_i = (X_i + Y_i) \pmod n, \quad X_i = (Z_i - Y_i) \pmod n, \quad (1)$$

i.e. $c(X_i, Y_i) = (X_i + Y_i) \pmod n$, $d(Z_i, Y_i) = (Z_i - Y_i) \pmod n$. In a case of two-letter alphabet (1) can be presented as follows:

$$Z_i = (X_i \oplus Y_i), \quad X_i = (Z_i \oplus Y_i) \quad (2)$$

where $a \oplus b = (a + b) \bmod 2$.

It is important to note that we consider a so-called unconditional (or information-theoretical) security. That is, the cipher is secure even when Eve has unlimited computing power. Roughly speaking, if the unconditionally secure cipher is used, Eve has many highly probable possible versions of a plaintext and, hence, cannot choose the real plaintext from them. The following informal consideration helps to understand the main idea of an approach considered later: Let there be two unconditionally secure ciphers which can be applied to one plaintext. Imagine, that for the first cipher Eve has 10 equiprobable possible deciphering texts whose overall probability equals 0.999, whereas for the second cipher there are 100 equiprobable deciphering texts with the same overall probability. Obviously, the second system is more preferable, because the uncertainty of Eve is much larger for the second system. This informal consideration is quite popular in cryptography [6, 7, 9] and we will estimate the security of a cipher by the logarithm of the total number of (almost) equiprobable possible deciphering texts whose overall probability is close to 1.

The running-key cipher (1) is called the Vernam cipher (or one-time pad) if any word $k_1 \dots k_t$, $k_i \in A$, is used as the key word with probability n^{-t} , i.e. $P(Y_1 \dots Y_t = k_1 \dots k_t) = n^{-t}$ for any $k_1 \dots k_t \in A^t$. In other words, we can say that the key letters are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and probabilities of all letters are equal.

The Vernam cipher is one of the most popular among the unconditionally secure running-key ciphers. It has played an important role in cryptography, especially since C.Shannon proved that this cipher is perfectly secure [9]. That is, the ciphertext $Z_1 \dots Z_t$ gives absolutely no additional information about the plaintext $X_1 \dots X_t$. This fact can be interpreted as follows: a priori probability of a plaintext is the same as a posteriori probability of a plaintext given the

corresponding ciphertext [9]. Using Shannon entropy, it can be expressed by the following equation $h(X_1 \dots X_t) = h(X_1 \dots X_t | Z_1 \dots Z_t)$, where $h(X_1 \dots X_t)$ and $h(X_1 \dots X_t | Z_1 \dots Z_t)$ are the entropy of the plaintext and the conditional entropy of the plaintext given the ciphertext $Z_1 \dots Z_t$, correspondingly (they will be defined below). For example, if one uses the Vernam cipher (2) to cipher an English text presented, say, in standard 7-bit binary ASCII, Eve can try to guess the plaintext not paying attention on the ciphertext.

It was shown by Shannon that any perfectly secure system must use the secret key whose length equals the plaintext length. That is why many authors considered the problem of security of systems where either the length of the key or its entropy is less than the length (or entropy) of the plaintext, see, for example, [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9] and reviews therein. But, in spite of numerical papers, some seemingly natural questions are still open. For example, what can we say about secrecy of the system (2) where it is applied to an English text (in binary presentation) and the key sequence is generated by the Bernoulli source with a small bias, say, $P(Y_i = 0) = 0.51$, $P(Y_i = 1) = 0.49$. (Informally, it is “almost” Vernam cipher). To the best of our knowledge, there are no theoretical estimates for the security of such a system, as well as for the general case where the plaintext and key are described as stationary ergodic processes.

In this paper we consider this problem for running-key ciphers (1) in a case where the plaintext $X_1 \dots X_t$ and the key sequence $Y_1 \dots Y_t$ are independently generated by stationary ergodic sources and the entropy of the key can be less than maximally possible value $\log n$ per letter (here and below $\log \equiv \log_2$). The goal of the paper is to find simple estimates of secrecy for such systems. We would like to emphasize that the unconditional secrecy is meant, i.e. it is supposed that Eve has unlimited computational power and unlimited time for computations.

It is worth noting that Shannon in his famous paper [9] mentioned that the problem of deciphering of a ciphertext and the problem of signal denoising are very close from mathematical point of view. In this paper we use some results obtained in [8] considering the problem of denoising.

2 Preliminaries

We consider the case where the plaintext $X = X_1, X_2, \dots$ and the key sequence Y_1, Y_2, \dots are independently generated by stationary ergodic processes with the finite alphabets $A = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$, $n \geq 2$.

The m -order Shannon entropy and the limit Shannon entropy are defined as follows:

$$h_m(X) = -\frac{1}{m+1} \sum_{u \in A^{m+1}} P_X(u) \log P_X(u), \quad h(X) = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} h_m(X) \quad (3)$$

where $m \geq 0$, $P_X(u)$ is the probability that $X_1 X_2 \dots X_{|u|} = u$ (this limit always exists, see, for ex., [2, 3]). Introduce also the conditional Shannon entropy

$$h_m(X|Z) = h_m(X, Z) - h_m(Z), \quad h(X|Z) = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} h_m(X|Z) \quad (4)$$

The Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem for conditional entropies can be stated as follows.

Theorem 1 (Shannon-McMillan-Breiman). *$\forall \varepsilon > 0, \forall \delta > 0$, for almost all Z_1, Z_2, \dots there exists n' such that if $n > n'$ then*

$$P \left\{ \left| -\frac{1}{n} \log P(X_1 \dots X_n | Z_1 \dots Z_n) - h(X|Z) \right| < \varepsilon \right\} \geq 1 - \delta. \quad (5)$$

The proof can be found in [2, 3].

3 Estimations of secrecy

Theorem 2. *Let a plaintext $X = X_1X_2, \dots$ and the key sequence $Y = Y_1Y_2, \dots$ be stationary ergodic processes with a finite alphabet $A = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$, $n \geq 2$, and let a running-key cipher be applied to X and Y and $Z = Z_1, Z_2, \dots$ be the ciphertext. Then, for any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta > 0$ there is such an integer n' that, with probability 1, for any $t > n'$ and $Z = Z_1, Z_2, \dots, Z_t$ there exists the set $\Psi(Z)$ for which the following properties are valid:*

i) $P(\Psi(Z)) > 1 - \delta$

ii) for any $X^1 = X_1^1, \dots, X_t^1$, $X^2 = X_1^2, \dots, X_t^2$ from $\Psi(Z)$

$$P \left\{ \frac{1}{t} |\log P(X^1|Z) - \log P(X^2|Z)| < \varepsilon \right\}$$

iii) $\liminf_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log |\Psi(Z)| \geq h(X|Z)$.

Proof. According to Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem for any $\varepsilon > 0$, $\delta > 0$ and almost all Z_1, Z_2, \dots there exists such n' that for $t > n'$

$$P \left\{ \left| -\frac{1}{t} \log P(X_1X_2\dots X_t|Z_1Z_2\dots Z_t) - h(X|Z) \right| < \varepsilon/2 \right\} \geq 1 - \delta. \quad (6)$$

Let us define

$$\Psi(Z) = \{X = X_1X_2\dots X_t : P(X_1X_2\dots X_t|Z_1Z_2\dots Z_t) - h(X|Z) < \varepsilon/2\}. \quad (7)$$

The first property i) immediately follows from (6). In order to prove ii), note that for any $X^1 = X_1^1, \dots, X_t^1$, $X^2 = X_1^2, \dots, X_t^2$ from $\Psi(Z)$ we obtain from (6), (7)

$$\frac{1}{t} |\log P(X^1|Z) - \log P(X^2|Z)| \leq \frac{1}{t} |\log P(X^1|Z) - h(X|Z)|$$

$$+\frac{1}{t} |\log P(X^2|Z) - h(X|Z)| < \varepsilon/2 + \varepsilon/2 = \varepsilon.$$

From (7) and the property i) we obtain the following: $|\Psi(Z)| > (1-\delta)2^{t(h(X|Z)-\varepsilon)}$. Taking into account that it is valid for any $\varepsilon > 0, \delta > 0$ and $t > n'$, we obtain iii). \square

So, we can see that the set of possible decipherings $\Psi(Z)$ grows exponentially, its total probability is close to 1 and probabilities of words from this set are close to each other.

Theorem 2 gives a possibility to estimate an uncertainty of a cipher based on the conditional entropy $h(X|Z)$. Sometimes it can be difficult to calculate this value because it requires knowledge of the conditional probabilities. In this case the following simpler estimate can be useful.

Corollary 1. *For almost all $Z_1Z_2\dots$*

$$\liminf_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log |\Psi(Z)| \geq h(X) + h(Y) - \log n.$$

Proof. From the well-known in Information Theory equation $h(X, Z) = h(X) + h(Z|X)$ (see [2, 3]) we obtain the following:

$$h(X|Z) = h(X, Z) - h(Z) = h(Z|X) + h(X) - h(Z).$$

Having taken into account that $\max h(Z) = \log n$ ([2, 3]), where n is the number of alphabet letters, we can derive from the latest equation that $h(X|Z) \geq h(Z|X) + h(X) - \log n$. The definition of the running-key cipher (1) shows that $h(Z|X) = h(Y)$. Taking into account two latest inequalities and the third statement iii) of Theorem 2 we obtain the statement of the corollary. \square

Comment. In Information Theory the difference between maximal value of the entropy and real one quite often is called the redundancy. Hence, from

the corollary we have new following presentations for the value $\frac{1}{t} \log |\Psi(Z)|$:

$$\liminf_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log |\Psi(Z)| \geq h(X) - r_Y, \quad \liminf_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log |\Psi(Z)| \geq h(Y) - r_X,$$

$$\liminf_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log |\Psi(Z)| \geq \log n - (r_X + r_Y), \quad (8)$$

where $r_Y = \log n - h(Y)$ and $r_X = \log n - h(X)$ are the corresponding redundancies.

Those inequalities confirm the well-known in cryptography and Information Theory fact that reduction of the redundancy improves the safety of ciphers.

Let us return to the first question of this note about the Vernam cipher with a biased key sequence. More precisely, let there be a plaintext $X_1 X_2 \dots$, $X_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and the key sequence $Y_1 Y_2 \dots$, $Y_i \in \{0, 1\}$, generated by a source whose entropy $h(Y)$ is less than 1. ($h(Y) = 1$ if and only if $Y_1 Y_2 \dots$ generated by the Bernoulli source with letter probabilities $P(0) = P(1) = 0.5$, [2, 3]). From (8) we can see that the size of the set $\Psi(Z)$ of high-probable possible decipherings grows exponentially with exponent greater than $h(X) - r_Y$, where $r_Y = 1 - h(Y)$. So, if r_Y goes to 0, the size of the set of possible probable decipherings trends to the size of this set for the case of “pure” Vernam cipher. Indeed, if $h(Y) = 1$ and, hence, $r_Y = 0$, the set $\Psi(Z)$ of high-probable possible decipherings grows exponentially with exponent $h(X)$, as it should be for the Vernam cipher. For example, it is true for the case where the key sequence $Y_1 Y_2 \dots$ is generated by the Bernoulli source with biased probabilities, say $P(0) = 0.5 - \tau$, $P(1) = 0.5 + \tau$, where τ is a small number. If τ goes to 0, the redundancy r_Y goes to 0, too, and we obtain the Vernam cipher. So, we can informally say that the Vernam cipher is robust to small deviations from randomness.

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