

Cryptography Challenges for Computational Privacy in Public Clouds

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I was like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.
- Issac Newton

Abstract—*Computational privacy* is a property of cryptographic system that ensures the privacy of data (and/or operations) while being processed at an untrusted server. Cryptography has been an indispensable tool for computer security but its readiness for this new generational shift of computing platform i.e. cloud computing is still questionable.

Theoretical constructions like Fully Homomorphic Encryption, Functional encryption, Server aided Multiparty Computation, Verifiable Computation, Instance Hiding etc. are few directions being pursued. These cryptographic techniques solve cloud privacy problems at different levels but most of them don't fit well in overall scheme of things.

We state the privacy requirements for cloud offerings in various delivery methods. We discuss the challenges with current cryptographic techniques being pursued by researchers and show that they don't cater to blanket cover these privacy requirements.

We urge the need to find generalizations and connections among these isolated techniques. As this might give more insights into the underpinnings of *Computational Privacy* and lead to better solutions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing came out of age. As it always happens, security is being an after thought. Before it is too late, its time for us to think through the tools available for us for secure cloud offerings. To best of our knowledge, the cryptographic techniques for solving cloud *computational privacy* problems are microscopic, in the sense that, the protocols, schemes, mechanisms being devised solve a discrete subset of problems. We provide a panoramic view of privacy problems in various cloud delivery methods and current cryptographic technology landscape. We emphasize the need for further generalization of different approaches and formalize the theory behind *Computational Privacy* for Cloud Computing.

A. Prior Work

With similar goals as stated in our work, a paper stating the impossibility of cryptography alone for solving privacy preserving Cloud Computing has appeared [1]. Their central idea talks about the impossibility of Fully Homomorphic

Encryption (FHE) alone for cloud privacy. Their classification hierarchy of cloud computing is not standard model and has few shortcomings as we would discuss duely. We state the security and privacy issues from a standard cloud computing definitions and discuss the challenges involved not just for FHE but also for many other techniques.

B. Outline

The rest of the paper contains as follows. Section 3 contains a quick introduction to cloud computing delivery methods and their security requirements. Section 4 contains a guided tour of various cryptographic tools available, features they have and problems they try to solve. Section 5 contains of discussion on the applicability, drawbacks of the tools for various problems. Section 6 contains the generalizations done so far and future work. Section 7 has conclusions.

II. CLOUD COMPUTING

Cloud computing has been standardized now. The principles defining the essential characteristics, delivery methods and deployment models are now well laid and widely accepted[2].

A. Delivery Methods

In this current section we present the quick introduction to delivery methods. The three delivery methods of cloud computing services are

1) *Software-As-a-Service (SaaS)*: In this method the user does not purchase software, but rather rents it for use on a subscription or pay-per-use model (an operational expense, known as OpEx). In some cases, the service is free for limited use. **Example:** Gmail , Google Drive, DropBox etc.

2) *Platform-As-a-Service (PaaS)*: In this method, the service provider offers a development environment to application developers, who develop applications and offer those services through the providers platform. **Example:** Google Gears , Microsoft Azure

3) *Infrastructure-As-a-Service (IaaS)*: In this method, the service provider offers compute, storage and networking capabilities to the user. The user would be able to run any arbitrary software of his own including operating systems etc. The physical infrastructure is handled by service provider at a remote place and virtual abstractions are given to the user. **Example:** Amazon Web Services, Google's Compute Engine.

B. Deployment Models

The deployment model for the discussion through out this paper would be *Public Clouds* and *Hybrid Clouds*. In *Private cloud* deployments cloud platform can be relied upon in the context that it wont be malicious. In *Public cloud* deployments cloud platform cannot be relied upon¹.

III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF CLOUD

An excellent and detailed coverage on the security and privacy requirements for cloud are covered in [3]. Simplistically said cloud computing is about a user giving away his data to server for carrying out some computation. We classify them based on few simple questions

- Is the data safe from unauthorized access (*privacy*) ?
- Is the data (or code) tampered (*integrity*) ?
- Is the result correct (*verifiability*) ?

1) *Privacy* : In general the term confidentiality is used for limiting access to data and privacy for users, we use the term privacy to represent both in this paper. We further classify privacy issues into *data* and *operational*

a) *Data Privacy*: refers the privacy issues related to entire user data outsourced to cloud. It is to be noted that privacy issues like *data-in-transit* and *data-at-rest* are solved using traditional cryptographic techniques and are not part of current discussion. Further requirements would be

- All the *inputs*, *outputs* of the computations being performed at cloud server should be encrypted.
- It should be possible to enforce Access Control over encrypted data as the users would have different levels of trust with different types of users.
- The intermediate results should be leak proof and data flow paths should be protected.
- Accidental data remanence by delete, erase operations should not leak any details.

All of the above requirements can be met, if we could carryout computations over encrypted data.

b) *Operational Privacy*: In *SaaS* delivery method often the operations being executed on users data is pre-defined by Cloud Service Provider. So achieving the privacy of such operations itself may not be desired. However in *PaaS* and *IaaS* delivery methods the user would run set of applications defined by her and achieving the privacy of such operations (or applications) may be desirable.

2) *Integrity*: The property is inspired from classic communication security. The quantum of communication is packet for which *integrity* can be defined and verified. In cloud computing setup, this gets tricky, since the quantum of computation cannot be defined. Even if we did it would be highly inefficient in real time. *Integrity* holds good though in long term cloud storage solutions, note that our current discussion is only for computations. One might argue that there is need to ensure integrity of operations (i.e tamper proofing code) in *PaaS* and

IaaS models. As long as the set of operations are stored on the drive of remote server, measures taken to ensure *integrity* of long term storage of data can be applied. At run time when the operations are being executed, verification of such *integrity*, would not be of much use. Either they would be highly inefficient or an adversary compromising the cloud platform itself can bypass such measures. So for this reason we strongly emphasize the need for *verifiability* of the computation.

3) *Verifiability*: As we have seen that *integrity* has not much of relevance in this current context. Verifiability (or Provenance) of the computation is very important. User should be able to verify the results of the computations are in fact correct. In other way the cloud server should be able to *prove* the validity of the results. We summarize these requirements in the below table

TABLE I. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS

Requirement	SaaS	PaaS	IaaS
Data privacy	yes	yes	yes
Operational privacy	-	yes	yes
Verifiability	yes	yes	yes

4) *Adversaries*: Multiple real world adversaries exist, the cloud platform itself, somebody compromising cloud platform, neighbors sharing the platform but all of them can be modeled as single adversary. Such differentiation is not important if the privacy and verifiability measures are in place.

IV. CRYPTO TECHNIQUES AND CHALLENGES

Many cloud privacy problems are being formalized cryptographically and solutions are being proposed. Computations over encrypted data has been achieved with various degrees of success in each of them. We give a *whirlwind tour* of those techniques here.² and discuss the challenges associated with each of these for adopting to cloud computing.

A. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

In addition to the *Keygen*, *Encrypt*, *Decrypt* methods of Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes, these schemes provide an additional algorithm *Evaluate*. Such algorithm allows computations over encrypted data, based on mathematical property called homomorphism that performs basic operations like addition and multiplication on cipher text. Recent breakthroughs in FHE [4] has got them wide attention and they are often thought to be cryptographic holy grail. They are currently highly inefficient and not practical [5].

FHE by design are two party (one client and server) model. Xiao et all proposed protocols for Multi User systems [6], that are based on symmetric Homomorphic Encryption scheme that could evaluate functions only on polynomials. Their protocols are tightly coupled with their scheme. Such limitation to two party model, make them suitable for outsourcing intensive scientific computations but not for commercial cloud applications yet.

Similar concern was raised by van Dijk, Juels in their contradictory paper [1]. They claim multi client applications would be impossible due to additional functionality needed

¹We don't consider the *Private Clouds* for the discussion

²Formal definitions of the same are out of scope for this paper

like *access control*, *re-encryption* etc. We opine such additional functionality is purely application of FHE though. ³

They are safe only in *semi-honest* adversarial model where the cloud service provider is assumed to be honest in performing the computations but are curious to get more information than they are ought to know. But in real world, we cannot assume any degree of *honesty*, some adversary compromising the cloud platform itself might turn the provider *malicious* to corrupt the data and/or computations. For this reason, Verifiability of computation is very important, the current proposed techniques that suit in cloud computing setup are still nascent [7] [8].

FHE schemes are *malleable* ⁴ by design. For this reason, they would be prone to *adaptive chosen cipher text (CCA2)* attack, in which an attacker gradually reveals the decryption key or plain text itself. This is also equivalent to, informally, an adversary being able to distinguish the cipher text based on the message they encrypt. In practice, *malleability* is avoided using padding methods like OAEP or PKCS1

Also popular PKE schemes like RSA in their basic form are deterministic in nature. It means encrypting the same message any number of times would yield same cipher text. This would leak information to an adversary if the data contains repeated patterns. In practice, the encryption process is made probabilistic using padding methods. So the choice of PKE schemes underlying FHE schemes should be inherently probabilistic in nature, else their ability to compute over encrypted data might be lost due to padding.

Little is known yet on how FHE schemes can ensure *operational privacy*. So far only evaluation of encrypted polynomials is possible[9]. If FHE can guarantee *operational privacy* then it would contradict very important results on program obfuscation [10]. Few researchers even proved that achieving multi user *computational privacy* implies program obfuscation [1]. So it is open problem still if FHE can guarantee generic *operational privacy* in cloud setup.

B. Server aided Secure Multiparty Computation

Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) solves the problem of evaluating a function jointly by multiple parties on their private inputs [11]. In their basic form these techniques have been developed for few distrustful parties to evaluate a common function over their private inputs. These protocols are highly interactive in nature. Also no assumptions are made on computational resources available with the parties. All the parties would carryout same amount of work which is orthogonal to cloud computing setting

To adapt these techniques for an asymmetric setting like cloud computing where the server has massive amounts of computing power relative to the users, *Server aided SMC* techniques have been proposed [12]

Fundamentally SMC has been proposed to carry out the computations among untrusted parties. Where as in cloud

computing model trusted parties need to carry out computation in the presence of an untrusted server. Even in a multiuser scenario, the user trusts (with various degrees) rest of the users except for the server. For example, If Patient Health Records processing is out sourced to a cloud server, the patient would trust and share parts of the information with Doctors, Insurance Companies, Drug Researchers etc with various degrees but may not trust the remote cloud server itself where the processing is being carried out.

SMC also does not make any assumptions on computing resources available with participants. But where as in cloud computing setup, server has massive computing power compared to the user.

SMC are highly interactive protocols that expect the users to be always online, where as in cloud model this expectation may not be reasonable. When just two users are involved who don't trust each other, these techniques can be adapted for few applications in cloud setup. But when the number of users grow in SMC the protocol interactions visually represent more of *mesh* but where as in cloud computing they represent a *hub-spoke* model, the hub being the server.

Also set of literature exists for achieving multi party computation using threshold homomorphic encryption [13],[14] and also multikey homomorphic encryption [15]. These techniques require few of the users to collaborate to decrypt the final result, which is not reasonable to assume especially in the cloud computing kind of setup.

So for the reasons stated above adapting SMC or its variants for cloud computing setup may not be of much help. Also there is literature around realizing SMC protocols using FHE. It would be interesting though to see if FHE can be realized using SMC.

C. Functional Encryption

Traditional encryption schemes are *all-or-nothing* meaning either the cipher text can be decrypted in its entirety or nothing can be done. But often applications would need users to have *access control* over the data, that could reveal parts of the data based on configured privileges. Interestingly below are few schemes that allow to do same

- Identity based encryption
- Attribute based encryption
- Predicate-based encryption

Few of these techniques have tasted some success for practical use. Generalization of the above techniques has been done and formalized as Functional Encryption [16]. This can be considered as one of important steps towards unified theory for computing over encrypted data. Functional Encryption by design do not provide Output Privacy. Interestingly its relations with FHE has been studied [17]. Further connections between Functional Encryption and Fully Homomorphic Encryption have been studied. This gives us a hope that Functional encryption can be further generalized with additional restrictions for output privacy.

³A formal discussion around the same is in another work in progress paper of ours

⁴It is the property of a cryptographic scheme that allows an adversary to transform cipher text to another cipher text which decrypts to a related plain text.

D. Instance hiding (IH)

If a user wants to outsource the computation of a function for a particular input x (*instance*). She transforms the input x to an encrypted input y (*thus hides it*) in such a way that the server cannot infer x from y and sends to the server. The server computes the function on y and returns the result. The user then transforms the result $f(y)$ back to the value of $f(x)$. These techniques are called *Instance Hiding* techniques [18] as they hide the actual inputs from the server. The functions that can be evaluated this way are called *encryptable functions*.

Few protocols were also proposed to achieve *operational privacy* [19] using these techniques.

Prima Facie these techniques look they can be adapted for cloud setting. But it has been proved that not all functions are *encryptable*, this means not many functions can be evaluated when the real input *instances* are *hidden* from the server.

If there aren't many *encryptable functions* then the results look contradicting with recent breakthroughs of FHE schemes. FHE schemes aim to perform generically all functions by computing fundamental operations like *add*, *multi* on transformed inputs. Of course there is no formal analysis done on connections between both of them.

E. Superimposing encrypted data

Although not so popular, its been proposed that efficient encryption of data is possible using time-reversal transformations [20]. Further using this technique, the possibilities of processing over encrypted data has been explored using superimposing such encrypted data [21].

Not much analysis is available from the research community on these techniques. We admit our own limited knowledge in this area to do thorough analysis of the same. We mention this for the sake of shedding some light, so that the community may find it useful to know an obscure technique.

F. Hardware approaches

Tamper Proof Hardware approaches have been proposed to process encrypted data. In short, the devices have the decryption key built in, all the inputs are fed to the device in encrypted form, the processing is done by decrypting them and the results are re-encrypted again. Few approaches proposed could achieve *operational privacy* by running encrypted programs[22]. Few techniques were even successful in evading few types of side channel attacks[23] Hardwiring of the decryption key is risky proposition, compromise of the key through any side channel attacks would render the device useless and compromised for ever. Even if rekeying was possible, it would be costly affair.

The success of cloud computing can be attributed to optimum utilization of underlying hardware resources using *Virtualization*. Abstraction of a *virtual machine* gives the flexibility to run on programs on shared resources. So adopting techniques that require specialized hardware would lose such abstraction and flexibility.

Also manufacturing specialized hardware, would shoot up the prices thus defeating the purpose of moving to cloud. Even if the additional cost is amortized over a period of time, its

highly unreasonable to assume the users decryption key to be residing in the datacenter of cloud server for which user has no control.

G. Specialized Operations

a) *Proxy re encryption*: techniques allows to translate a cipher text encrypted under one key to cipher text encrypted under another key without every decrypting it, provided some additional information [24], [25]. These techniques are used in distributed secure storage.

b) *Searchable encryption*: techniques allows to perform search over encrypted data [26], [27]. These techniques have been improved and implemented in MIT's cryptdb project [28].

c) *SQL-Aware encryption*: is a strategy rather than a technique in itself. Its based on the fact that all SQL Queries are made up of well defined primitive operations like *add*, *equality*, *order check* etc. So a collection of encryption schemes that allow these operations have been engineered into an RDBMS application. This made possible to execute *SQL-like* queries on encrypted databases [28].

These specialized techniques cater to small subset of functionality that can achieved. Finding connections and realizations of these specific techniques with much more generic techniques like FHE or FE might give us insights into possible efficient solutions.

V. CONCLUSION

As covered in the previous sections, many techniques have been proposed and success has been achieved at various degrees in each of them. There are many open problems discussed throughout. The theoretical community is fanatically busy solving, improving these isolated techniques day-by-day and industry is busy translating half-baked research into products. Both are equally dangerous unless we design security grounds up. There is a strong need for further generalization and formalization of all isolated techniques and to formulate the theory behind *Computational Privacy* for cloud in order to provide better solutions.

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