

A Profitable Sub-Prime Loan: Obtaining the Advantages of Composite Order in Prime-Order Bilinear Groups

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Abstract

Composite-order bilinear groups provide many structural features that have proved useful for both constructing cryptographic primitives and as a technique in security reductions. Despite these convenient features, however, composite-order bilinear groups are less desirable than prime-order bilinear groups for reasons of efficiency. A recent line of work has therefore focused on translating these structural features from the composite-order to the prime-order setting; much of this work focused on two such features, projecting and canceling, in isolation, but a recent result due to Seo and Cheon showed that both features can be obtained simultaneously in the prime-order setting.

In this paper, we reinterpret the construction of Seo and Cheon in the context of dual pairing vector spaces (which provide canceling as well as useful parameter hiding features) to obtain a unified framework that simulates all of these composite-order features in the prime-order setting. We demonstrate the strength of this framework by providing two applications: one that adds dual pairing vector spaces to the existing projection in the Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption scheme to obtain leakage resilience, and another that adds projecting to the existing dual pairing vector spaces in an IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme to “boost” its security to IND-CCA1. Our leakage-resilient BGN application is of independent interest, and it is not clear how to achieve it from pure composite-order techniques without mixing in additional vector space tools. Both applications rely solely on the Symmetric External Diffie Hellman assumption (SXDH).

1 Introduction

Since their introduction in 2005 by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [9], composite-order bilinear groups have been used to construct a diverse set of advanced cryptographic primitives, including (hierarchical) identity-based encryption [27, 29], group signatures [12, 13], and functional and attribute-based encryption [24, 28, 26]. The main assumptions used to prove the security of such schemes are variants of the *subgroup decision* assumption, which (in the simplest case) states that, for a bilinear group G of order $N = pq$, without an element of order q it should be hard to distinguish a random element of G from a random element of order p . Such assumptions crucially rely on the hardness of factoring N .

Beyond this basic assumption and its close variants, many of these schemes have exploited additional structural properties that are inherent in composite-order bilinear groups. Two such properties, *projecting* and *canceling*, were formally identified by Freeman [18]; projecting requires (roughly) that there exists a trapdoor projection map from G into its p -order subgroup (and a related map in the target group G_T), and canceling requires that elements in the p -order and q -order subgroups cancel each other out (i.e., yield the identity when paired). Additionally, Lewko [25] identified another property,

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parameter hiding, that requires (again, roughly) that elements in the p -order subgroup reveal nothing about seemingly correlated elements in the q -order subgroup.

While therefore quite attractive and rich from a structural standpoint, the use of composite-order bilinear groups comes with a number of drawbacks, both in terms of efficiency and security. Until a recent construction of Boneh, Rubin, and Silverberg [11], all known composite-order bilinear groups were on supersingular, or Type-1 [19], curves. Even in the prime-order setting, supersingular curves are already less efficient than their ordinary counterparts: speed records for the former [3, 41] are approximately six times slower than speed records for the latter [4]. In the composite-order setting, it is furthermore necessary to increase the size of the modulus by at least a factor of 10 (from 160 to at least 1024 bits) in order to make the assumption that N is hard to factor plausible. Operations performed in composite-order bilinear groups are therefore significantly slower; for example, Guillevic [21] recently observed that computing a pairing was 254 times slower. (This slowdown also extends to the non-supersingular construction of Boneh et al., and indeed to any composite-order bilinear group.) Furthermore, from a security standpoint, a number of recent results [22, 23, 20, 1] demonstrate that it is possible to efficiently compute discrete logarithms in common types of supersingular curves, so that one must be significantly more careful when working over supersingular curves than when working over their non-supersingular counterparts.

One natural question to ask is: to what extent it is possible to obtain the structural advantages of composite-order bilinear groups without the disadvantages? Although the structural properties described above might seem specific to composite-order groups, both Freeman and Lewko are in fact able to express them rather abstractly and then describe how to construct prime-order bilinear groups in which each of these individual properties are met; they also show how to translate the subgroup decision assumption into a generalized version, that in prime-order groups is implied by either Decision Linear [8] or Symmetric External Diffie Hellman (SXDH) [5].

In contrast, Meiklejohn, Shacham, and Freeman [34] showed that it was impossible to achieve projecting and canceling simultaneously under a “natural” usage of Decision Linear; as a motivation, they presented a blind signature scheme that seemingly relied upon both projecting and canceling for its proof of security. Recently, Seo and Cheon [43] showed that it was actually possible to achieve both projecting and canceling simultaneously in prime-order groups, and Seo [42] explored both possibility and impossibility results for projecting. To derive hardness of subgroup decision in their setting, however, Seo and Cheon rely on a non-standard assumption and show that this implies the hardness of subgroup decision only in a very limited case. They also provide a prime-order version of the Meiklejohn et al. blind signature that is somewhat divorced from their setting: rather than prove its security directly using projecting and canceling, they instead alter the blind signature, introduce a new property called *translating*, and then show that the modified blind signature is secure not in the projecting and canceling setting, but rather in a separate projecting and translating setting.

Our contributions. In this paper, we present in Section 3 an abstract presentation of the projecting and canceling pairing due to Seo and Cheon [43]; in the process, we eliminate their reliance on a non-standard assumption for many instances of subgroup decision, enabling us to base our applications solely on SXDH. Our presentation is based on dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [36, 37], and it can be parameterized to yield projection properties of varying strength. This perspective yields several advantages. First, all the power of DPVS is embedded inside this construction and can thus be exploited as in prior works. Second, we observe that many instances of subgroup decision problems in this framework are implied by the relatively simple SXDH assumption.

The advantages of our perspective are most clear for our BGN application, which we present in Section 4. If one starts with the goal of making the composite-order BGN scheme leakage resilient, the first obstacle one faces is the uniqueness of secret keys. Since the secret key is a factorization of

the group order, there is only secret key for each public key, making the common kind of hash proof argument for leakage resilience (as codified by Naor and Segev [35], for example) inapplicable. The DPVS techniques baked into our projecting and canceling prime-order construction remove this barrier quite naturally by allowing secret keys to be vectors that still serve as projection maps but can now be sampled from subspaces containing exponentially many potential keys. This demonstrates the benefits of adding canceling and parameter hiding to applications that are designed around projection.

As an additional application, in Section 5, we present an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that uses canceling, parameter hiding, and weak projecting properties in its proof of security. Although efficient constructions of IND-CCA2-secure IBE schemes have been previously obtained by combining IND-CPA-secure HIBE schemes with signatures [15], we nevertheless view our IBE construction as a demonstration of the applicability of our unified framework. Furthermore, our new construction does not aim to amplify security by adding new primitives; instead, it explores the existing security of the IND-CPA-secure IBE due to Boneh and Boyen [7] (which cannot be IND-CCA2 secure, as it has re-randomizable ciphertexts), and observes that, by modifying the scheme in a rather organic way and exploiting the (weak) projecting and canceling properties of the setting, we can prove IND-CCA1 security directly. Hence, we view this as an exploration of the security properties that can be proved solely from the minimalistic spirit of the Boneh-Boyen scheme.

Our two applications serve as a proof of concept for the usefulness of obtaining projecting and canceling simultaneously in the prime-order setting, and a demonstration of how to leverage such properties while relying only on relatively simple assumptions like SXDH. We believe that the usefulness of our framework extends beyond these specific examples, and we intend our work to facilitate future applications of these combined properties.

Our techniques To obtain a more user-friendly interpretation of the projecting and canceling pairing construction over prime-order groups, we begin by observing that it is essentially a concatenation of DPVS. Dual pairing vector spaces were first used in prime-order bilinear groups by Okamoto and Takashima [36, 37] and have since been employed in many works, in particular to instantiate dual system techniques (as introduced by Waters [44]) in the prime-order setting [26, 38, 25]. These previous uses of DPVS typically relied on the canceling property, variants of subgroup decision problems, and certain parameter hiding properties that are present by design in DPVS. One particularly nice feature of DPVS constructions is that a large family of useful subgroup decision variants can be proven to follow from standard assumptions like SXDH for asymmetric groups and DLIN for symmetric groups; viewing the construction of a projecting and canceling pairing as a natural extension of DPVS therefore has the twin benefits that it provides a clear guide on how to derive certain subgroup decision variants from standard assumptions, and that it comes with all the built-in tools that DPVS offers.

In particular, DPVS includes a suite of vector-space-based tools for proving leakage resilience, similar to ones used in several previous works (e.g., [35, 14, 16, 33, 31, 17]). This enables us to combine the projecting-supported limited homomorphic functionality of the BGN encryption scheme with provable leakage resilience. DPVS also supports a toolkit developed for dual system proofs (e.g., [32, 39, 40]), which is what enables us to boost our IBE to full IND-CCA1 security with just the addition of projection.

2 Definitions and Notation

In this section, we define bilinear groups and the three functional properties we would like them to satisfy: projecting, canceling, and parameter hiding. For the first two, we use the definitions of Freeman [18] (albeit in a somewhat modified form); for parameter hiding, on the other hand, we come up with a new formal framework. In addition to these functional properties, we consider the notion of subgroup decision in bilinear groups, in which a random element of a subgroup should be indistinguishable from a random

element of the full group. The variant we define, called generalized correlated subgroup decision, is very general: in addition to seeing random elements of subgroups, we allow an attacker to see elements *correlated* across subgroups (e.g., elements of different subgroups with correlated randomness), and require that it is still difficult for him to distinguish between correlated elements of different subgroups. We then see in Sections 3 and 6 that many specific instances of this general notion are implied by more standard notions of subgroup decision in both prime-order and composite-order groups.

2.1 Bilinear groups

In what follows, we refer to a *bilinear group* as a tuple $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$, where N is either prime or composite, $|G| = |H| = kN$ and $|G_T| = \ell N$ for some $k, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$, and $e : G \times H \rightarrow G_T$ is a bilinear map; i.e., e is an efficient map that satisfies both *bilinearity* ($e(x^a, y^b) = e(x, y)^{ab}$ for all $x \in G, y \in H, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$) and *non-degeneracy* (if $e(x, y) = 1$ for all $x \in G$ then $y = 1$ and if $e(x, y) = 1$ for all $y \in H$ then $x = 1$). In some bilinear groups, we may additionally include generators g and h of G and H respectively (if G and H are cyclic), information about meaningful subgroups of G and H , or some auxiliary information μ that allows for efficient membership testing in G and H (and possibly more). In what follows, we refer to the algorithm that is used to generate such a \mathcal{G} as `BilinearGen`. Beyond the security parameter, `BilinearGen` takes in an additional parameter n that specifies the number of desired subgroups; i.e., for $(N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k, n)$, we have $G = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n G_i$ and $H = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n H_i$ (where typically G_i and H_i are cyclic).

In terms of functional properties of bilinear groups, we first define both *projecting* and *canceling*; our definitions are modified versions of the ones originally given by Freeman [18]. We give three flavors of projecting. The first, *weak projecting*, considers projecting into a single subgroup of the source group, without requiring a corresponding map in the target group. The second, which we call simply *projecting*, most closely matches the definition given by Freeman, and considers projecting into a single subgroup in both the source and target groups. Lastly, we define *full projecting*, which considers projecting into every subgroup individually. As we will see in Section 3, we can satisfy all of these flavors by tweaking appropriate parameters in our prime-order construction.

Definition 2.1 (Weak projecting). *A bilinear group $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ is weakly projecting if there exist decompositions $G = G_1 \oplus G_2$ and $H = H_1 \oplus H_2$, and projection maps π_G and π_H such that $\pi_G(x_1) = x_1$ for all $x_1 \in G_1$ and $\pi_G(x_2) = 1$ for all $x_2 \in G_2$, and similarly $\pi_H(y_1) = y_1$ for all $y_1 \in H_1$ and $\pi_H(y_2) = 1$ for all $y_2 \in H_2$.*

Definition 2.2 (Projecting). *A bilinear group $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ is projecting if there exist subgroups $G' \subset G, H' \subset H$, and $G'_T \subset G_T$ such that there exist non-trivial maps $\pi_G : G \rightarrow G', \pi_H : H \rightarrow H'$, and $\pi_T : G_T \rightarrow G'_T$ such that $\pi_T(e(x, y)) = e(\pi_G(x), \pi_H(y))$ for all $x \in G, y \in H$.*

Definition 2.3 (Full projecting). *A bilinear group $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ is fully projecting if there exists some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and decompositions $G = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n G_i, H = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n H_i$, and $G_T = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n G_{T,i}$, and non-trivial maps $\pi_{G_i} : G \rightarrow G_i, \pi_{H_i} : H \rightarrow H_i$, and $\pi_{T_i} : G_T \rightarrow G_{T,i}$ for all i such that $\pi_{T_i}(e(x, y)) = e(\pi_{G_i}(x), \pi_{H_i}(y))$ for all $x \in G, y \in H$.*

Definition 2.4 (Canceling). *A bilinear group $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ is canceling if there exists some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and decompositions $G = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n G_i$ and $H = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n H_i$ such that $e(x_i, y_j) = 1$ for all $x_i \in G_i, y_j \in H_j, i \neq j$.*

2.2 Parameter hiding

Beyond projecting and canceling, we aim to define *parameter hiding*. As mentioned in the introduction, this property roughly says that elements in one subgroup should not reveal anything about related

elements in other subgroups, and was previously used, without a formal definition, by Lewko [25]. In essence, parameter hiding in composite-order groups is a simple consequence of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which tells us that if we sample a random value modulo $N = pq$, its reductions modulo p and q are uncorrelated. In the prime-order setting, a form of parameter hiding can be instantiated from dual pairing vector spaces, leveraging the fact that if one commits to only certain parts of dual orthonormal bases over \mathbb{F}_p^n , there is remaining ambiguity in the hidden basis vectors.

The main difficulty in providing a formal definition for parameter hiding is that it is not as self-contained a feature as projecting and canceling: elements within subgroups may be related to elements in other subgroups in a myriad of ways, and their relation to one another may depend both on the form of the element (which can involve any function on the exponents) and on the subgroups. We therefore do not try to consider all types of correlations, but instead focus on one simple type, defined as follows:

Definition 2.5. For a bilinear group $\mathcal{G} = (N, G = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n G_i, H = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n H_i, G_T, e, \{g_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{h_i\}_{i=1}^n)$, an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, and indices $1 \leq i_1, i_2 \leq n$, an x -correlated sample from the subgroup $G_{i_1} \oplus G_{i_2}$ is an element of the form $g_{i_1}^\alpha \cdot g_{i_2}^{\alpha x}$ for $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.

We also consider correlated samples in H , but for convenience we define a y -correlated sample from the subgroup $H_{i_1} \oplus H_{i_2}$ to be an element of the form $h_{i_1}^{\beta y} \cdot h_{i_2}^\beta$ for $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. Although we choose this type of correlation mainly for ease of exposition (and because we encounter it in Section 5), our discussion below could be adjusted to accommodate more general types of correlation, which would remain compatible with our prime-order construction in Section 3.

Intuitively then, parameter hiding says that, under certain restrictions about which subgroup elements one is allowed access to, the distributions over x -correlated samples and random samples should in fact be the same, even when x is known. (We need some restrictions because there may be testable relationships between the images of various generators in the target group.) To consider the distributions we can use—i.e., what additional information we might give out besides the samples—we consider distributions \mathcal{D} parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{ph}} = \{S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{ph}}, S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{ph}}, S_{G,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}\}$, $S_H^{\text{ph}} = \{S_{H,\text{gen}}^{\text{ph}}, S_{H,\text{sam}}^{\text{ph}}, S_{H,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}\}$, and C ; intuitively, S_G^{ph} and S_H^{ph} tell us which elements to include in the distribution, and C tells us which correlated samples to change to random. Formally, these sets are defined as follows:

- $S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{ph}}$ indicates which subgroup generators to include: For all $s_i \in S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{ph}}$, include g_{s_i} in \mathcal{D} .
- $S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{ph}}$ is a multiset that indicates which random samples to include: For all $t_i = (t_{1,i}, \dots, t_{m_i,i}) \in S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{ph}}$, include a random sample from $G_{t_{1,i}} \oplus \dots \oplus G_{t_{m_i,i}}$ in \mathcal{D} .
- $S_{G,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}$ is a set that indicates which correlated samples to include: For all $c_i = (x_i, c_{1,i}, c_{2,i}) \in S_{G,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}$, include $g_{c_{1,i}}^a \cdot g_{c_{2,i}}^{\alpha x_i}$ in \mathcal{D} , where $a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.
- S_H^{ph} is defined analogously to S_G^{ph} .
- C indicates which correlated samples to change: For all $c_i = (b_i, c'_i) \in C$, if $b_i = 0$ then $c'_i \in S_{G,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}$ and if $b_i = 1$ then $c'_i \in S_{H,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}$; i.e., we require that $C \subseteq \{0 \times S_{G,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}\} \cup \{1 \times S_{H,\text{cor}}^{\text{ph}}\}$.

Given all these sets, we now require that they are *well-behaved* in the following two ways: (1) for any changed x -correlated sample, do not reveal the corresponding subgroup generators on either side of the pairing, and (2) do not change correlated samples for the same value x in the same subgroups on opposite sides of the pairing. Formally, we express these requirements as

- Don't include generators for switched samples: For all $(b_i, (x_i, c_{1,i}, c_{2,i})) \in C$, $s_j \in S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{ph}}$, and $s_\ell \in S_{H,\text{gen}}^{\text{ph}}$, $s_j \neq c_{1,i}, c_{2,i}$ and $s_\ell \neq c_{1,i}, c_{2,i}$.
- Don't switch x -correlated samples in overlapping subgroups of G and H : For all $(0, (x_i, c_{1,i}, c_{2,i}))$, $(1, (x_j, c_{1,j}, c_{2,j})) \in C$, either $x_i \neq x_j$ or $c_{1,i} \neq c_{1,j}, c_{2,j}$ and $c_{2,i} \neq c_{1,j}, c_{2,j}$.

To see why these restrictions can be necessary, consider trying to establish that an x -correlated sample in $G_1 \oplus G_2$ is identical to a random sample in $G_1 \oplus G_2$, and suppose we are given h_1 and h_2 . If we are given $g_1^\alpha g_2^{\alpha x}$ (for some random, unknown α), then — assuming we are using a canceling pairing — we can compute $e(g_1, h_1)^\alpha$ and $e(g_2, h_2)^{\alpha x}$. When working with specific instantiations, there may be a known relationship between $e(g_1, h_1)$ and $e(g_2, h_2)$. (In fact, for our IBE construction, $e(g_1, h_1) = e(g_2, h_2)^{-1}$.) In this case, if x is known then we can test for an x -correlation in the target group, and hence distinguish an x -correlated sample from a random one. Similarly, if we have x -correlated samples $g_1^\alpha g_2^{\alpha x}$ and $h_1^{\beta x} h_2^\beta$, then pairing these yields the identity, which distinguishes them from random.

Definition 2.6 (Parameter hiding). *We say that a group $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ satisfies parameter hiding with respect to a well-behaved distribution $\mathcal{D} = (S_G^{\text{ph}}, S_H^{\text{ph}}, C)$ if \mathcal{D} is identical to the distribution in which the correlated samples indicated by C are replaced with random samples.*

Example 2.7. As an example, consider the distribution \mathcal{D} defined by $S_G^{\text{ph}} = \{\{1, 2\}, \emptyset, \{(x, 1, 2), (x, 3, 4)\}\}$, $S_H^{\text{ph}} = \{\{1, 2, 5, 6\}, \{(3, 4), (3, 4)\}, \{(y, 1, 2), (y, 3, 4)\}\}$, and $C = \{(0, (x, 3, 4)), (1, (y, 3, 4))\}$ for any $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ such that $x \neq y$; we can easily check that these sets are well-behaved in the sense defined above.

Then parameter hiding holds for $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ if for $a, b, c, d, s, t, u, v, w, z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$,

$$(N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu, g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_5, h_6, h_3^a h_4^b, h_3^c h_4^d, h_1^{ty} h_2^t, h_3^{zy} h_4^z, g_1^s g_2^{sx}, g_3^w g_4^{wx})$$

is identical to

$$(N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu, g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_5, h_6, h_3^a h_4^b, h_3^c h_4^d, h_1^{ty} h_2^t, h_3^v h_4^z, g_1^s g_2^{sx}, g_3^w g_4^u).$$

In our uses of parameter hiding in Section 5, we restrict ourselves to this one example. Again, this is due to the difficulty of providing a fully general definition of parameter hiding, as certain types of correlated samples require more entropy than others. We nevertheless do not find it to be overly limiting to consider this one example, as it keeps our constructions in Section 5 simple and tailored to the requirements that we need. We also use a variant of parameter hiding in the proof for our leakage-resilient BGN variant presented in Section 4. Here, the flexibility in the hidden parameters is leveraged to allow the simulator to leak on a secret key before fully committing to a complete basis (i.e., before determining how to form an appropriate ciphertext). The details of this can be found in the proof of Lemma 4.5.

2.3 Generalized correlated subgroup decision

Beyond functional properties of bilinear groups, we must also consider the types of security guarantees we can provide. The assumption we define, generalized correlated subgroup decision, considers indistinguishability between subgroups in a very general way: given certain subgroup generators and “correlated” elements across subgroups (i.e., elements in different subgroups that use the same randomness), it should still be hard to distinguish between elements of other subgroups. Formally, we consider sets $S_G^{\text{sgh}} = \{S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{sgh}}, S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}\}$, $S_H^{\text{sgh}} = \{S_{H,\text{gen}}^{\text{sgh}}, S_{H,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}\}$, $T_1 = \{(\ell_1, \lambda_1), \dots, (\ell_m, \lambda_m)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(\ell'_1, \lambda'_1), \dots, (\ell'_{m+1}, \lambda'_{m+1})\}$, and an indicator bit b . (We assume without loss of generality that T_2 is the larger set.) Intuitively, S_G^{sgh} and S_H^{sgh} tell us which group elements an adversary is given, and (T_1, T_2, b) tell us what the challenge terms should look like. We have the following requirements:

- $S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{sgh}}$ indicates which subgroup generators to include: Give out g_{s_i} for all $s_i \in S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{sgh}}$.
- $S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$ indicates which samples to include: For each $t_i = ((\ell_{1,i}, \lambda_{1,i}), \dots, (\ell_{m_i,i}, \lambda_{m_i,i})) \in S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$, give out $g_{\ell_{1,i}}^{a_1} \dots g_{\ell_{m_i,i}}^{a_{m_i}}$ and $g_{\lambda_{1,i}}^{a_1} \dots g_{\lambda_{m_i,i}}^{a_{m_i}}$ for $a_1, \dots, a_{m_i} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. These elements are *correlated*, in that the same randomness is used for both.

- The bit b indicates which group the challenge element comes from: $b = 0$ indicates G , and $b = 1$ indicates H .
- The sets T_1 and T_2 must differ in exactly one pair; i.e., there must exist a unique pair P such that $P \notin T_1$ but $P \in T_2$. For this pair $P = (\ell, \lambda)$, we cannot give out the subgroup generators on either side of the pairing, so we require $s_i \neq \ell$ and $s_i \neq \lambda$ for any $s_i \in S_{G,\text{gen}}^{\text{sgh}}$ or $s_i \in S_{H,\text{gen}}^{\text{sgh}}$.

If $P \in t_i$ for some $t_i \in S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}} \cup S_{H,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$, then $T_1 \cap t_i \neq \emptyset$; i.e., P can appear only in random samples that also contain another component in the challenge term. Then, assuming $b = 0$ (and replacing g with h if $b = 1$), our challenge elements are of the form $T := (g_{\ell_1}^{a_1} \cdots g_{\ell_m}^{a_m}, g_{\lambda_1}^{a_1} \cdots g_{\lambda_m}^{a_m})$ and $T' := (g_{\ell'_1}^{a_1} \cdots g_{\ell'_{m+1}}^{a_{m+1}}, g_{\lambda'_1}^{a_1} \cdots g_{\lambda'_{m+1}}^{a_{m+1}})$ for $a_1, \dots, a_{m+1} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.

Assumption 2.8 (Generalized correlated subgroup decision). *For all tuples $(S_G^{\text{sgh}}, S_H^{\text{sgh}}, T_1, T_2, b)$ satisfying the requirements specified above and for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} given $\mathcal{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k, n)$ and the elements specified by S_G^{sgh} and S_H^{sgh} , it is hard to distinguish between values T defined by (b, T_1) and values T' defined by (b, T_2) .*

As an example, consider the case in which $n = 6$ and $S_G^{\text{sgh}} = \{\{1, 2\}, \{((1, 2), (3, 4))\}\}$, $S_H^{\text{sgh}} = \{\{1, 2, 5, 6\}, \{((1, 2), (3, 4)), ((3, 4), (5, 6))\}\}$, $T_1 = \{(1, 2), (5, 6)\}$, $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, and $b = 0$. In this case, the concrete assumption is: Given \mathcal{G} and generators $g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_5, h_6$, correlated samples from $G_1 \oplus G_3$ and $G_2 \oplus G_4$, correlated samples from $H_1 \oplus H_3$ and $H_2 \oplus H_4$, and correlated samples from $H_3 \oplus H_5$ and $H_4 \oplus H_6$, it should be hard to distinguish correlated samples from $G_1 \oplus G_5$ and $G_2 \oplus G_6$ from correlated samples from $G_1 \oplus G_3 \oplus G_5$ and $G_2 \oplus G_4 \oplus G_6$.

3 A Prime-Order Bilinear Group Satisfying All Features

Our ultimate goal in this section is to define a prime-order bilinear group that satisfies all three of the properties defined in the previous section: projecting, canceling, and parameter hiding; additionally, we want to require that subgroup decision is hard in this group. Our construction can be viewed as an abstraction of the construction of Seo and Cheon [43], which they prove satisfies (regular) projecting, canceling, and a somewhat restrictive notion of subgroup decision. In contrast, our construction satisfies canceling and parameter hiding, is flexible enough to achieve any of the three flavors of projecting we defined in the previous section (depending on the parameter choices), and comes equipped with reductions for more general instances of subgroup decision.

Notationally, we augment the bilinear groups \mathcal{G} discussed in the previous section: we now focus only on the case when the group order is some prime p , and consider $\mathbb{G} = (p, B_1, B_2, B_T, E, \mu)$ built on top of $\mathcal{G} = (p, G, H, G_T, e)$; this means B_1 , B_2 , and B_T may contain multiple copies of G , H , and G_T respectively, and that the map E uses e as a component. Because we are moving to bigger spaces, we also include a value μ that allows us to test membership in B_1 and B_2 ; as an example, consider $B_1 \subset G \times G$. Then, while an efficient membership test for G implies one for $G \times G$, additional information μ may be necessary to allow one to (efficiently) test for membership in B_1 .

Our construction crucially uses dual pairing vector spaces, which were introduced by Okamoto and Takashima [36, 37] and have been previously used to provide pairings $E : G^n \times H^n \rightarrow G_T$, built on top of pairings $e : G \times H \rightarrow G_T$, that satisfy the canceling property. As we cannot have a cyclic target space if we want to satisfy projecting, however, we instead need a map whose image is G_T^d for some $d > 1$. Intuitively, we achieve this by piecing together d “blocks,” where each block is an instance of a dual pairing vector space; the construction of Seo and Cheon is then obtained as the special case in which $d = n$, and regular dual pairing vector spaces are obtained with $d = 1$. We begin with a key definition:

Definition 3.1 (Dual orthonormal). *Two bases $\mathbb{B} = (\vec{b}_1, \dots, \vec{b}_n)$ and $\mathbb{B}^* = (\vec{b}_1^*, \dots, \vec{b}_n^*)$ of \mathbb{F}_p^n are dual orthonormal if $\vec{b}_j \cdot \vec{b}_j^* \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ for all j , $1 \leq j \leq n$, and $\vec{b}_j \cdot \vec{b}_k^* \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ for all $j \neq k$.*

We note that one can efficiently sample a random pair of dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B}^*)$ by sampling first a random basis \mathbb{B} and then solving uniquely for \mathbb{B}^* using linear algebra over \mathbb{F}_p ; we denote this sampling process as $(\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B}^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^n)$. By repeating this sampling process d times, we can obtain a tuple $((\mathbb{B}_1, \mathbb{B}_1^*), \dots, (\mathbb{B}_d, \mathbb{B}_d^*))$ of d pairs of dual orthonormal bases of \mathbb{F}_p^n . We denote the vectors of \mathbb{B}_i as $(\vec{b}_{1,i}, \dots, \vec{b}_{n,i})$, and the vectors of \mathbb{B}_i^* as $(\vec{b}_{1,i}^*, \dots, \vec{b}_{n,i}^*)$. We then give the following definition:

Definition 3.2 (Concatenation). *The concatenation of bases $(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ of \mathbb{F}_p^n is a collection of n vectors $(\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_n)$ in \mathbb{F}_p^{dn} , where each $\vec{v}_j := \vec{b}_{j,1} || \dots || \vec{b}_{j,d}$. Alternatively, we can view each \vec{v}_j as a $d \times n$ matrix, where the i -th row is $\vec{b}_{j,i}$. We denote the concatenation of $(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ as $\text{Concat}(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$.*

To begin our construction, we build off $\mathcal{G} = (p, G, H, G_T, e, g, h)$, where g and h are generators of G and H respectively, and consider groups $B_1 \subset G^{dn}$ and $B_2 \subset H^{dn}$. Notationally, we write an element of B_1 as g^A , where $A = (\alpha_{i,j})_{i,j=1}^{d,n}$ is a $d \times n$ matrix and $g^A := (g^{\alpha_{1,1}}, \dots, g^{\alpha_{1,j}}, \dots, g^{\alpha_{1,n}}, g^{\alpha_{2,1}}, \dots, g^{\alpha_{d,n}})$. We similarly write elements of B_2 as h^B for a $d \times n$ matrix $B = (\beta_{ij})_{i,j=1}^{d,n}$, and furthermore define the bilinear map $E : B_1 \times B_2 \rightarrow G_T^d$ as

$$E(g^A, h^B) := \left(\prod_{k=1}^n e(g^{\alpha_{1,k}}, h^{\beta_{1,k}}), \dots, \prod_{k=1}^n e(g^{\alpha_{d,k}}, h^{\beta_{d,k}}) \right). \quad (1)$$

Observe that the i -th coordinate of the image is equal to $e(g, h)^{A_i \cdot B_i \pmod{p}}$, where A_i and B_i denote the i -th rows of A and B respectively. Then, to begin to see how our construction will satisfy projecting and canceling, we have the following lemma:

Lemma 3.3. *Let $(\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_n) = \text{Concat}(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ and $(\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_n^*) = \text{Concat}(\mathbb{B}_1^*, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d^*)$, where $(\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbb{B}_i^*)$ are dual orthonormal bases of \mathbb{F}_p^n . Then*

$$E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_j^*}) = (e(g, h), \dots, e(g, h)) \quad \forall j \quad \text{and} \quad E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_k^*}) = (1_T, \dots, 1_T) \quad \forall j \neq k.$$

Proof. By the definition of the pairing, $E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_k^*}) = \left(e(g, h)^{\vec{b}_{j,1} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,1}^*}, \dots, e(g, h)^{\vec{b}_{j,d} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,d}^*} \right)$ for any j and k . If $j = k$, then the fact that $(\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbb{B}_i^*)$ are dual orthonormal for all i implies by definition that $\vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{j,i}^* \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ for all i and j , and thus $E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_j^*}) = (e(g, h), \dots, e(g, h))$. For the second property, we again use the definition of dual orthonormal bases to see that $\vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,i}^* \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ for all $j \neq k$, and thus $E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_k^*}) = (1_T, \dots, 1_T)$. \square

While Lemma 3.3 therefore shows us directly how to obtain canceling, for projecting we are still mapping into a one-dimensional image. To obtain more dimensions, it turns out we need only perform some additional scalar multiplication. We give the following definition:

Definition 3.4 (Scaling). *Define $C = (c_{i,j})_{i,j=1}^{d,n}$ to be a $n \times d$ matrix over \mathbb{F}_p . Given bases $(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ of \mathbb{F}_p^n , we define the scaling of these bases by C to be new bases $(\mathbb{D}_1, \dots, \mathbb{D}_d)$, where $\mathbb{D}_i = (c_{1,i} \vec{b}_{1,i}, \dots, c_{n,i} \vec{b}_{n,i})$ for all i , $1 \leq i \leq d$. We denote the scaling of $(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ by C as $\text{Scale}(C, \mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$.*

Intuitively then, we use the entries in the i -th column of C to scale the vectors in the basis \mathbb{B}_i and obtain the basis \mathbb{D}_i . As we still have $\vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,i}^* \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ for $j \neq k$, multiplication by a scalar will not affect this and we still satisfy canceling. The scalar values do, however, build in extra dimensions into the image of our pairing, as demonstrated by the following lemma:

Algorithm 1 BilinearGen': generate a bilinear group \mathbb{G} that satisfies projecting and canceling

Input: $d, n \in \mathbb{N}$; distribution $\mathcal{D}_{d,n}$ over matrices in $M_{n \times d}(\mathbb{F}_p)$; security parameter 1^k .

1. $(p, G, H, G_T, e) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k, 1)$.
 2. Pick values g and h such that $G = \langle g \rangle$ and $H = \langle h \rangle$.
 3. Sample d pairs $(\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbb{B}_i^*) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^n)$ to obtain two sets $(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ and $(\mathbb{B}_1^*, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d^*)$ of bases of \mathbb{F}_p^n , where $(\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbb{B}_i^*)$ are dual orthonormal.
 4. Sample $C = (c_{ij})_{i,j=1}^{d,n} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}$ and compute $(\mathbb{D}_1, \dots, \mathbb{D}_d) := \text{Scale}(C, \mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$.
 5. For all i , $1 \leq i \leq n$, define $B_{1,i} := \langle g^{\vec{v}_i} \rangle$ and $B_{2,i} := \langle h^{\vec{v}_i^*} \rangle$, where $(\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_n) := \text{Concat}(\mathbb{D}_1, \dots, \mathbb{D}_d)$ and $(\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_n^*) := \text{Concat}(\mathbb{B}_1^*, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d^*)$.
 6. Define $B_1 := \bigoplus_{i=1}^n B_{1,i} \subset G^{dn}$, $B_2 := \bigoplus_{i=1}^n B_{2,i} \subset H^{dn}$, and $B_T := G_T^d$. Define the pairing $E : B_1 \times B_2 \rightarrow B_T$ as in Equation 1.
 7. Finally, to be able to check that an element $g^M \in G^{dn}$ for $M = (m_{ij})_{i,j=1}^{d,n}$ is an element of B_1 , we observe that the vectors $\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_n$ span an n -dimensional subspace \mathbb{V} of \mathbb{F}_p^{dn} . Thus, there must be another subspace, call it \mathbb{W} , of dimension $dn - n$, that contains all vectors in \mathbb{F}_p^{dn} that are orthogonal to vectors in \mathbb{V} . Given $\mu_2 := (h^{\vec{w}_1}, \dots, h^{\vec{w}_{(d-1)n}})$, where the $\{\vec{w}_i\}_{i=1}^{(d-1)n}$ are a basis of \mathbb{W} , one can therefore efficiently check if $g^M \in B_1$ by checking if $E(g^M, h^{\vec{w}_i}) = (1_T, \dots, 1_T)$ for all i , $1 \leq i \leq (d-1)n$. Analogously, given $\mu_1 := (g^{\vec{w}_1^*}, \dots, g^{\vec{w}_{(d-1)n}^*})$, one can check if $h^A \in B_2$ by checking if $E(g^{\vec{w}_i^*}, h^A) = (1_T, \dots, 1_T)$, where $\{\vec{w}_i^*\}_{i=1}^{(d-1)n}$ are a basis for the subspace \mathbb{W}^* of \mathbb{F}_p^n consisting of vectors orthogonal to vectors in the span of $\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_n^*$.
 8. Output $\mathbb{G} := (p, B_1, B_2, B_T, E, (\mu_1, \mu_2))$.
-

Lemma 3.5. Let $(\mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ and $(\mathbb{B}_1^*, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d^*)$ be sets of bases for \mathbb{F}_p^n such that $(\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbb{B}_i^*)$ are dual orthonormal for all i . Define $(\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_n) := \text{Concat}(\mathbb{D}_1, \dots, \mathbb{D}_d)$ and $(\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_n^*) := \text{Concat}(\mathbb{B}_1^*, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d^*)$, where $(\mathbb{D}_1, \dots, \mathbb{D}_d) = \text{Scale}(C, \mathbb{B}_1, \dots, \mathbb{B}_d)$ for some $C \in M_{n \times d}(\mathbb{F}_p)$. Then

$$E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_j^*}) = (e(g, h)^{c_{j,1}}, \dots, e(g, h)^{c_{j,d}}) \quad \forall j \quad \text{and} \quad E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_k^*}) = (1_T, \dots, 1_T) \quad \forall j \neq k.$$

Proof. By the definition of the pairing, $E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_k^*}) = \left(e(g, h)^{c_{j,1} \vec{b}_{j,1} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,1}^*}, \dots, e(g, h)^{c_{j,d} \vec{b}_{j,d} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,d}^*} \right)$ for any j and k . If $j = k$, then the fact that $(\mathbb{B}_i, \mathbb{B}_i^*)$ are dual orthonormal for all i implies by definition that $\vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{j,i}^* \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ for all i and j , and thus $c_{j,i} \vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{j,i}^* \equiv c_{j,i} \pmod{p}$ and $E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_j^*}) = (e(g, h)^{c_{j,1}}, \dots, e(g, h)^{c_{j,d}})$. For the second property, we again use the definition of dual orthonormal bases to see that $\vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,i}^* \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ for all $j \neq k$, and thus $c_{j,i} \vec{b}_{j,i} \cdot \vec{b}_{k,i}^* \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ and $E(g^{\vec{v}_j}, h^{\vec{v}_k^*}) = (1_T, \dots, 1_T)$. \square

We are now ready to give our full construction of an algorithm BilinearGen', parameterized by integers n and d , and a distribution $\mathcal{D}_{n,d}$ on $n \times d$ matrices, to achieve a setting $\mathbb{G} = (p, B_1, B_2, B_T, E, \mu)$ such that $B_1 \subset G^{dn}$, $B_2 \subset H^{dn}$, and $B_T = G_T^d$. We present this construction in Algorithm 1, and demonstrate that it satisfies projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, and subgroup decision.

The generality of this construction stems from the choices of d , n , and \mathcal{D} ; in fact, by choosing different values for these parameters, we can satisfy each of the different flavors of projecting from Section 2. To satisfy fully projecting, we choose C from a distribution over matrices of full rank n and use $d \geq n$. If we use a less restrictive distribution, we obtain weaker projection capabilities and a more efficient construction (as we can have $d < n$) when projecting onto all subgroups individually is not needed: to achieve (regular) projecting, we can use $d > 1$ and pick C to be of rank > 1 , and to achieve weak projecting we can in fact use $d = 1$ and pick C to be the vector consisting of all 1 entries. (This last case is equivalent to working in regular dual pairing vector spaces.)

Theorem 3.6. *For all values of $n \geq 2$, the bilinear group $\mathbb{G} \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \text{BilinearGen}'(1^k, n, d, \mathcal{D}_{d,n})$ satisfies canceling, fully projecting as defined in Definition 2.3 for $d \geq n$ when $\mathcal{D}_{d,n}$ is defined over full-rank matrices, projecting as defined in Definition 2.2 for $d > 1$ when $\mathcal{D}_{d,n}$ is defined over matrices of rank > 1 , and weak projecting as defined in Definition 2.1 for $d = 1$.*

Proof. Given that our construction was specifically designed to satisfy the conditions for Lemma 3.5, we immediately obtain canceling. To satisfy projecting, we additionally need to construct the projection maps π_{ij} and argue that they satisfy the requirements of Definition 2.3 (in the case that C is full rank). By the way our subgroups are defined, each projection map π_{1i} within the group B_1 must map an arbitrary element $g^{a_1 \vec{v}_1 + \dots + a_n \vec{v}_n}$ of B_1 to $g^{a_i \vec{v}_i} \in B_{1,i}$; similarly, π_{2i} must map $h^{a_1^* \vec{v}_1^* + \dots + a_n^* \vec{v}_n^*} \in B_2$ to $h^{a_i^* \vec{v}_i^*} \in B_{2,i}$. For π_{1i} , we observe that it can be computed efficiently by anyone knowing \vec{v}_i and another vector in \mathbb{F}_p^{dn} that is orthogonal to \vec{v}_k for all $k \neq i$. The situation for π_{2i} is analogous.

As for the projection maps $\pi_{T,i}$ required for the target space, we define $\pi_{T,i}$ to map an element $e(g, h)^{a_1 C_1 + \dots + a_n C_n}$ to $e(g, h)^{a_i C_i}$, where we recall C_i denotes the i -th row of the scaling matrix C (C_i is thus a vector in \mathbb{F}_p^d for all i).

Finally, we show that the required associativity property holds, namely that $E(\pi_{1,i}(g^M), \pi_{2,i}(h^A)) = \pi_{T,i}(E(g^M, h^A))$ for all elements $g^M \in B_1$, $h^A \in B_2$, and for all i , $1 \leq i \leq d$. To see this, observe that $g^M \in B_1$ implies that $g^M = g^{\alpha_1 \vec{v}_1 + \dots + \alpha_n \vec{v}_n}$ for some $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{F}_p$, and similarly that $h^A = h^{\beta_1 \vec{v}_1^* + \dots + \beta_n \vec{v}_n^*}$. We therefore have that

$$E(\pi_{1,i}(g^M), \pi_{2,i}(h^A)) = E(g^{\alpha_i \vec{v}_i}, h^{\beta_i \vec{v}_i^*}) = e(g, h)^{\alpha_i \beta_i C_i},$$

where this last equality follows from Lemma 3.5. On the other hand, we have that

$$\pi_{T,i}(E(g^M, h^A)) = \pi_{T,i}\left(\prod_{k=1}^n e(g, h)^{\alpha_k \beta_k C_k}\right) = e(g, h)^{\alpha_i \beta_i C_i},$$

and the two quantities are therefore equal.

A similar argument applies to obtaining more limited projections when C has lower rank. \square

It remains to prove that our construction also satisfies parameter hiding and subgroup hiding. For the latter property, our definition in Section 2.3 is highly general and we cannot prove that all instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision reduce to any one assumption. Instead, we show that certain “nice” instances of the assumption follow from SXDH.

Before we define a nice instance, we first restrict our attention to the case where $n = 8$, $d = 1$, C is a matrix with all 1 entries. For succinctness here and in later sections, we use $\text{BasicGen}(1^k) = \text{BilinearGen}'(1^k, 8, 1, \mathcal{D})$, where \mathcal{D} produces matrices with all 1 entries; i.e., we use BasicGen to produce the specific setting in which we are interested in Section 5.

We consider two variants of this setting, which differ only in the auxiliary information μ . For μ as defined above in Algorithm 1, we show that the required instances of the correlated subgroup decision assumption are implied by SXDH. We additionally consider a case where μ is augmented to contain the following three pieces of information: (1) the vectors \vec{v}_7 , \vec{v}_8 , \vec{v}_7^* , and \vec{v}_8^* ; (2) a random basis for the span of $(\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_6)$ inside \mathbb{F}_p^8 ; and (3) a random basis for the span of $(\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_6^*)$ inside \mathbb{F}_p^8 . With this μ , one can then perform a membership test for $G_1 \oplus \dots \oplus G_6$ on some element $g^{\vec{v}}$ by computing a basis for the orthogonal space of the span of $(\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_6)$, pairing against h raised to these vectors, and taking a dot product in \mathbb{F}_p^8 . While this additional information in μ makes some instances of subgroup decision easy, instances entirely within $G_1 \oplus \dots \oplus G_6$ and $H_1 \oplus \dots \oplus H_6$ are still implied by SXDH. To refer to this instance with augmented μ in what follows, we call it the *augmented construction*. Now, by “nice,” we mean that the instance of the assumption behaves as follows: if the challenge terms are in H (the situation is analogous if they are in G), then there is a single pair in S that is common to the challenge

sets T_1 and T_2 that appears in all tuples in $S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$ that also contain the differing pair. In other words, the given correlated samples from the opposite side of the challenge that include the differing space must also be attached to a particular space that is guaranteed to be present in the challenge term. As we will see, this feature turns out to be convenient for reducing to SXDH, as demonstrated by the following lemmas. For the augmented construction, we additionally restrict to instances where each correlated sample t_i in $S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$ or $S_{H,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$ is contained within the set $S := \{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$ (this is to avoid the additional information in μ from compromising the hardness).

Lemma 3.7. *For the augmented construction, the nice instances of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption, where additionally each correlated sample t_i in $S_{G,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$ or $S_{H,\text{sam}}^{\text{sgh}}$ is contained within the set $\{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, are implied by the SXDH assumption.*

Proof. We consider a nice instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption parameterized by sets S_G^{sgh} and S_H^{sgh} containing singletons and tuples of the pairs $(1, 2)$, $(3, 4)$, $(5, 6)$ and challenge sets T_1 and T_2 differing by one pair. We assume without loss of generality that the differing pair is $(3, 4)$, that $(1, 2)$ is a common pair to both T_1, T_2 , and the challenge terms are in G .

We assume we are given an SXDH challenge of the form (g, h, g^a, g^b, T) , where $T = g^{ab}$ or is random in G . We will simulate the specified instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption. We first choose a random dual orthonormal bases pair \mathbb{F}, \mathbb{F}^* for $\mathbb{F}_p^{\otimes 8}$. We then implicitly define \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B}^* as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{b}_1 &= a\vec{f}_3 + \vec{f}_1, \vec{b}_2 = a\vec{f}_4 + \vec{f}_2, \vec{b}_3 = \vec{f}_3, \vec{b}_4 = \vec{f}_4, \vec{b}_5 = \vec{f}_5, \vec{b}_6 = \vec{f}_6, \vec{b}_7 = \vec{f}_7, \vec{b}_8 = \vec{f}_8 \\ \vec{b}_1^* &= \vec{f}_1^*, \vec{b}_2^* = \vec{f}_2^*, \vec{b}_3^* = \vec{f}_3^* - a\vec{f}_1^*, \vec{b}_4^* = \vec{f}_4^* - a\vec{f}_2^*, \vec{b}_5^* = \vec{f}_5^*, \vec{b}_6^* = \vec{f}_6^*, \vec{b}_7^* = \vec{f}_7^*, \vec{b}_8^* = \vec{f}_8^*. \end{aligned}$$

We note that $(\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B}^*)$ are properly distributed, since applying a linear transformation to randomly sampled dual orthonormal bases while preserving orthonormality produces equivalently distributed bases. We observe that $\vec{v}_7, \vec{v}_8, \vec{v}_7^*, \vec{v}_8^*$ are known, as are the spans of $\{\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_6\}$ and $\{\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_6^*\}$. Thus we can produce the specified auxiliary information μ .

Since we have h, g, g^a , we can produce all generators *except* h_3, h_4 . Since $(3, 4)$ is the differing pair for the challenges, these generators cannot be required. Since all generators are known on the G side, any correlated samples in G are easy to produce. To produce correlated samples for tuples containing $(1, 2)$ and $(3, 4)$ in H , we simply choose random exponents $t', z \in \mathbb{F}_p$ and implicitly set $t = az + t'$. We can then produce

$$h_1^t h_3^z = h^{t' \vec{f}_1^* + z \vec{f}_3^*}, \quad h_2^t h_4^z = h^{-t' \vec{f}_2^* - z \vec{f}_4^*}.$$

To produce the challenge terms, we compute

$$T^{\vec{f}_3} (g^b)^{\vec{f}_1}, \quad T^{\vec{f}_4} (g^b)^{\vec{f}_2}.$$

If $(5, 6)$ is also common to T_1, T_2 , we can use the generators g_5, g_6 to add on properly distributed terms in these subgroups as well. \square

The same proof can also be applied more generally when μ is *not* augmented, resulting in:

Lemma 3.8. *For $\mathbb{G} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{BasicGen}(1^k)$, all nice instances of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption are implied by SXDH.*

Finally, we prove that parameter hiding holds for the augmented construction as well.

Lemma 3.9. *Parameter hiding, as in Example 2.7, holds for the augmented construction.*

Proof. This is essentially Lemmas 3 and 4 in [25], and is a consequence of the following observation. We consider sampling a random pair of dual orthonormal bases \mathbb{F}, \mathbb{F}^* of \mathbb{F}_p^8 , and let A be an invertible 2×2 matrix over \mathbb{F}_p . We consider the 8×2 matrix F whose columns are equal to \vec{f}_3 and \vec{f}_4 . Then FA is also an 8×2 matrix, and we form a new basis \mathbb{B} from \mathbb{F} and A by taking these columns in place of \vec{f}_3, \vec{f}_4 . To form the dual basis \mathbb{B}^* , we similarly multiply the matrix with columns \vec{f}_3^*, \vec{f}_4^* by the transpose of A^{-1} . It is noted in [25] that the resulting distribution of \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B}^* is equivalent to choosing this pair randomly, and in particular, this distribution is independent of the choice of A . Lemma 4 in [25] observes that if take $x \neq y$ and define \vec{x} to be the transpose of $(1, x)$ and \vec{y} to be the transpose of $(y, -1)$, then choosing random scalars γ, λ in \mathbb{F}_p and a random matrix A over \mathbb{F}_p yields that the joint distribution of $\lambda A^{-1} \vec{x}$ and $\gamma A^T \vec{y}$ is negligibly close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{F}_p^2 \times \mathbb{F}_p^2$. This is precisely our parameter hiding requirement, where A represents the ambiguity in our precise choice of the generators $\vec{b}_3, \vec{b}_4, \vec{b}_3^*, \vec{b}_4^*$, conditioned on the span of $\{\vec{b}_3, \vec{b}_4\}$ and the span of $\{\vec{b}_3^*, \vec{b}_4^*\}$ being known (in addition to the other individual \vec{b}_i and \vec{b}_i^* vectors for $i \notin \{3, 4\}$). \square

Finally, although we do not use any non-nice instances of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption in this work, it is interesting to ask which of the more complex instances can be reduced to SXDH or other static assumptions. For values of $d > 1$, the additional structure required to achieve projecting seems to make directly reducing a large space of assumptions to SXDH difficult. Nonetheless, we are able to rely only SXDH for our projecting leakage-resilient BGN variant through the use of hybrid transitions that incrementally change the rank of the scaling matrix C . We leave it as an interesting question for future work to further explore the minimal assumptions for supporting a broader class of subgroups decision variants.

4 A Leakage-Resilient BGN Variant

A very elegant use of the projecting property in the composite-order setting is the public key encryption scheme of Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [9], a scheme that is designed to allow arbitrary additions and one multiplication of ciphertexts. The basic group operation is used for ciphertext addition, while the bilinear map is applied during ciphertext multiplication. The secret key is then a projection map (which equates to a factorization of the group order) that allows the decryptor to strip off the blinding factors of the underlying ciphertexts, even after their interaction has migrated to the target group.

While these limited homomorphic properties make the BGN scheme appealing, the rigid structure of keys can be a source of frustration when one attempts to augment its functionality or security guarantees. Having the secret key reveal a factorization of the group order means that different users must generate different groups, and it additionally means that the secret key is uniquely determined (information-theoretically) from the public key. This presents a challenge, for instance, if one wants to design a variant with provable guarantees of leakage resilience.

Proofs of leakage resilience for public key encryption schemes typically follow a strategy inspired by the hash proof paradigm of Naor and Segev [35]. This paradigm starts with a scheme that has many possible secret keys for each public key. A hybrid argument is used, where the first step changes to a malformed — or *invalid* — ciphertext, that decrypts to different messages under the different secret keys associated to a fixed public key. A bound on the total leakage of the secret key is then used to argue that the adversary cannot tell which of the many possible secret keys the challenger is holding. Thus, even though the challenger may be holding a secret key that decrypts the challenge ciphertext correctly, he may as well be holding a key that decrypts it to a random message. It is then possible to argue that the scheme remains secure under leakage.

If we wish to apply this kind of proof strategy to a version of the BGN scheme, we first need a way of allowing many secret keys for each public key. The DPVS framework we described in the previous

section provides a natural answer. In this framework, the projection map is no longer a factorization, but rather a vector that comes from a suitably high-dimensional space to allow for many possibilities. This makes it rather easy to imagine a BGN variant that preserves the somewhat-homomorphic properties of ciphertexts, yet allows for an exponential number of secret keys per public key.

It is already well-known that applying DPVS and similar techniques for designing vector spaces in the exponent is a useful approach for achieving leakage resilience. For example, Lewko et al. [33] demonstrated that leakage resilience can be incorporated quite easily into dual system encryption proofs by combining mechanisms for canceling, parameter hiding, and the fact that the dot product of sufficiently long vectors over \mathbb{F}_p has convenient information-theoretic properties (roughly, the dot product modulo p is a good two-source extractor). The same high level of compatibility exists between our framework and the pre-existing leakage resilience techniques, thus allowing us to repurpose the same linear algebraic underpinnings that implement projecting and canceling in our framework to achieve leakage resilience for a BGN-type scheme.

4.1 The scheme

We use our framework from Section 3 with $n = d = 4$. For the matrix distribution \mathcal{D} , we consider all matrices whose second and third rows form a rank-1 submatrix. The setting we then work in is $\mathbb{G} \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \text{BilinearGen}'(1^k, 4, 4, \mathcal{D})$. Rather than use this framework generically, as we do in Section 5, we re-purpose the matrix C and basis vectors $(\vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_2, \vec{v}_3, \vec{v}_4), (\vec{v}_1^*, \vec{v}_2^*, \vec{v}_3^*, \vec{v}_4^*) \in \mathbb{F}_p^{16}$ — defined in Step 4 and Step 5 of Algorithm 1 respectively — and use them explicitly in our construction and proofs. Below, we use C_i to denote the i -th row of the scaling matrix C (for $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$).

- **Setup(\mathbb{G}):** Pick $r, r^* \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$ and define $\vec{u} := \sum_i \vec{v}_i, \vec{u}^* := \sum_i \vec{v}_i^*, \vec{w} := r\vec{v}_2$, and $\vec{w}^* := r^*\vec{v}_2^*$. Choose \vec{y} uniformly at random from the set of vectors in \mathbb{F}_p^4 such that $\vec{y} \cdot C_2 = 0$, noting that $\vec{y} \cdot C_3 = 0$ then holds automatically as well. Output $pk = (g, g^{\vec{u}}, g^{\vec{w}}, h^{\vec{u}^*}, h^{\vec{w}^*})$ and $sk = (\vec{y}, sk_T = e(g, h)^{\vec{y} \cdot (\sum_i C_i)})$. Note that, by construction, $\vec{y} \cdot (\sum_i C_i) = \vec{y} \cdot (C_1 + C_4)$ and, by Lemma 3.5, $E(g^{\vec{u}}, h^{\vec{u}^*}) = (e(g, h)^{\sum_j c_{j,1}}, \dots, e(g, h)^{\sum_j c_{j,4}})$.
- **Enc(pk, m):** We have two types of ciphertexts: Type A and Type B. If we want to be able to perform homomorphic operations on *any* pair of ciphertexts, a single ciphertext could include both types. To form a Type A ciphertext, choose $s \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$ and compute $ct_A := g^{m\vec{u} + s\vec{w}}$. To form a Type B ciphertext, choose $s^* \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$ and compute $ct_B := h^{m\vec{u}^* + s^*\vec{w}^*}$. Output $ct = (ct_A, ct_B)$. (Or just ct_A or ct_B , depending on the desired homomorphic properties.)
- **Eval(pk, ct_1, ct_2):** We describe two evaluation cases: addition of Type A ciphertexts (the operations are analogous for Type B ciphertexts), and multiplication of a Type A and Type B ciphertext (which can then be further added in the target space B_T).
First pick a random value $t \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$. If ct_1 and ct_2 are Type A, then return $ct = ct_1 \cdot ct_2 \cdot g^{t\vec{w}}$. If ct_1 is Type A and ct_2 is Type B, then return $ct = E(ct_1, ct_2) \cdot E(g^{\vec{w}}, h^{\vec{w}^*})^t$.
- **Dec(sk, ct):** To decrypt a ciphertext $(ct_1, ct_2, ct_3, ct_4) \in G_T^4$, compute $\prod_{i=1}^4 ct_i^{y_i} = sk_T^m$. Using knowledge of sk_T , exhaustively search for m (this is possible since we have a small message space). If ct is Type A, then compute $ct' = E(ct, \text{Enc}(pk, 1))$ and decrypt ct' (and analogously for a Type B ciphertext).

To see that decryption is correct, observe that

$$\prod_i ct_i^{y_i} = \prod_i e(g, h)^{m y_i \sum_j c_{j,i}} = e(g, h)^m \sum_i \sum_j y_i c_{j,i} = e(g, h)^m \sum_j \sum_i y_i c_{j,i} = e(g, h)^m \sum_j \vec{y} \cdot C_j = sk_T^m.$$

To see that evaluation is correct, observe that if ct_1 encrypts m_1 and ct_2 encrypts m_2 then

$$\text{ct} = g^{m_1\vec{u}+s_1\vec{w}} \cdot g^{m_2\vec{u}+s_2\vec{w}} \cdot g^{t\vec{w}} = g^{(m_1+m_2)\vec{u}+(s_1+s_2+t)\vec{w}},$$

which is a properly distributed Type A encryption of $m_1 + m_2$. Pairing a Type A ct_1 and a Type B ct_2 similarly yields a properly distributed encryption of $m_1 m_2$ in the target space, just as in BGN.

4.2 Security analysis

The security model we use is leakage against non-adaptive memory attacks, as defined by Akavia et al. [2, Definition 3]. Briefly, the attacker first declares a leakage function f mapping secret keys to $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ for a suitably small ℓ . The attacker then receives pk and $f(sk)$, and proceeds as in a standard IND-CPA game; i.e., it outputs two messages m_0 and m_1 , receives an encryption of m_b , and wins if it correctly guesses b . As in the case of the original BGN scheme, it suffices to argue security for challenge ciphertexts generated in G/H , as security for the ciphertexts generated via the multiplicative homomorphism follows from the security of ciphertexts in the base groups. While there are several other interesting models for leakage-resilient PKE security, we choose to work with this one, as it is clean and simple and thus allows us to give a concise demonstration of the use of our framework.

Theorem 4.1. *If SXDH holds in \mathbb{G} and $\ell \leq \log(p-1) - 2k$, the above construction is leakage resilient with respect to non-adaptive memory attacks.*

As in the typical hash proof system paradigm, we first define invalid ciphertexts that have more blinding randomness than honestly generated ciphertexts. Initially, these are still decrypted consistently by the set of secret keys corresponding to a fixed public key. After having transitioned to a game with an invalid challenge ciphertext, however, we gradually adjust the respective distributions of secret keys and ciphertexts to arrive at a game where, in the adversary’s view, it seems that the secret key decrypts the ciphertext randomly.

In the course of these game transitions, we use SXDH in multiple ways. First we use it to change from an honest to an invalid ciphertext by bringing in an additional blinding factor in a new subgroup. This is just a “nice” instance of subgroup decision. We will also use it to make changes to the rank of particular submatrices inside the scaling matrix C . This technique is inspired by the observation in [10] that DDH implies a rank-1 matrix in the exponent is hard to distinguish from a rank-2 matrix. To make the crucial switch from a secret key that properly decrypts the challenge ciphertext to a key that decrypts it incorrectly, we rely on an information-theoretic argument leveraging a form of parameter hiding, along with the leakage bound. Essentially, the simulator uses the remaining ambiguity in the underlying parameters (conditioned on the public key) to help it create an invalid challenge ciphertext after supplying the leakage.

We begin by defining the *invalid encryption algorithm* that blinds a $g^{m\vec{u}}$ payload with a random term $g^{\vec{\delta}}$, where $\vec{\delta}$ is sampled uniformly from the span of \vec{v}_2, \vec{v}_3 , instead of just the 1-dimensional span of \vec{v}_2 within this. Similarly, it blinds a $h^{m\vec{u}^*}$ payload with a random term $h^{\vec{\delta}^*}$ where $\vec{\delta}^*$ is sampled uniformly from the span of \vec{v}_2^*, \vec{v}_3^* instead of the 1-dimensional span of \vec{v}_2^* .

We let Game_0 denote the real security game, and Game_1 denote a game where the invalid encryption algorithm is used to create the challenge ciphertext. Note that the secret key still properly decrypts an invalid challenge ciphertext. We argue that the attacker’s advantage can change only negligibly as we transition from Game_0 to Game_1 :

Lemma 4.2. *Under the SXDH assumption, no PPT adversary can obtain a non-negligible change in advantage between Game_0 and Game_1 .*

Proof. We show how to accomplish this transition for Type A ciphertexts, relying on the DDH assumption in G . This is essentially an instance of Lemma 3.8, but we include the proof here for completeness. The case for Type B ciphertexts is analogous, relying on the DDH assumption in H . If one wants to produce a joint ciphertext that includes both a Type A and Type B encryption, then one can simply think of these two separate arguments as forming a hybrid argument for this transition that first changes the Type A part of the ciphertext and then the Type B part.

Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} whose advantage changes non-negligibly between Game_0 to Game_1 (with a Type A challenge ciphertext). We create a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} that achieves a non-negligible advantage against SXDH. \mathcal{B} is given group elements g, g^a, g^b, T in G , and it is \mathcal{B} 's task to determine if $T = g^{ab}$ or is random.

\mathcal{B} first samples dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{F}_1, \mathbb{F}_1^*), \dots, (\mathbb{F}_4, \mathbb{F}_4^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^4)$. It then samples matrix rows $C_1, C_3, C_4 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p^4$, and a random row \tilde{C}_2 from the span of C_3 . It implicitly sets $C_2 = a\tilde{C}_2$. We note that the resulting C is properly distributed for Game_0 and Game_1 .

\mathcal{B} implicitly sets:

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{v}_1 &= c_{11}\vec{f}_{11} || c_{12}\vec{f}_{12} || c_{13}\vec{f}_{13} || c_{14}\vec{f}_{14}, & \vec{v}_1^* &= \vec{f}_{11}^* || \vec{f}_{12}^* || \vec{f}_{13}^* || \vec{f}_{14}^*, \\ \vec{v}_2 &= c_{21}(\vec{f}_{21} + a\vec{f}_{31}) || c_{22}(\vec{f}_{22} + a\vec{f}_{32}) || c_{23}(\vec{f}_{23} + a\vec{f}_{33}) || c_{24}(\vec{f}_{24} + a\vec{f}_{34}), & \vec{v}_2^* &= a\vec{f}_{21}^* || a\vec{f}_{22}^* || a\vec{f}_{23}^* || a\vec{f}_{24}^*, \\ \vec{v}_3 &= c_{31}\vec{f}_{31} || c_{32}\vec{f}_{32} || c_{33}\vec{f}_{33} || c_{34}\vec{f}_{34}, & \vec{v}_3^* &= \vec{f}_{31}^* - a\vec{f}_{21}^* || \vec{f}_{32}^* - a\vec{f}_{22}^* || \vec{f}_{33}^* - a\vec{f}_{23}^* || \vec{f}_{34}^* - a\vec{f}_{24}^*, \\ \vec{v}_4 &= c_{41}\vec{f}_{41} || c_{42}\vec{f}_{42} || c_{43}\vec{f}_{43} || c_{44}\vec{f}_{44}, & \vec{v}_4^* &= \vec{f}_{41}^* || \vec{f}_{42}^* || \vec{f}_{43}^* || \vec{f}_{44}^*. \end{aligned}$$

We note that \mathcal{B} can compute $g^{\vec{v}_1}, g^{\vec{v}_2}, g^{\vec{v}_3}$, and $g^{\vec{v}_4}$, and hence can compute $g^{\vec{u}}$. It can also choose a random scalar $r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$ and compute $g^{\vec{w}} := g^{r\vec{v}_2}$. We observe that $\vec{u}^* = \vec{f}_{11}^* || \vec{f}_{31}^* + \vec{f}_{41}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{14}^* + \vec{f}_{34}^* + \vec{f}_{44}^*$ is known to \mathcal{B} , so it can also compute $h^{\vec{u}^*}$. It chooses a random $\tilde{r} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$ and sets $h^{\vec{w}^*} = h^{\tilde{r}(\vec{f}_{21}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{24}^*)}$. Observe that this results in properly distributed public parameters, which it gives to \mathcal{A} .

Since it knows the span of C_2, C_3 as well as $C_1 + C_4$ it can also honestly sample the secret key and respond to \mathcal{A} 's leakage query. \mathcal{B} also has the ability to produce either valid or invalid Type B ciphertexts (even though it cannot produce $h^{\vec{v}_3}$ by itself, it can sample random combinations of \vec{v}_2^*, \vec{v}_3^* in the exponent, which are identically distributed to random combinations of $(\vec{f}_{21}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{24}^*)$ and $(\vec{f}_{31}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{34}^*)$).

To create the challenge ciphertext of Type A, \mathcal{B} computes:

$$g^{m_b \vec{u}} T^{(c_{21}f_{31} || \dots || c_{24}f_{34})} (g^b)^{c_{21}\vec{f}_{21} || \dots || c_{24}\vec{f}_{24}}.$$

If $T = g^{ab}$, this is equal to $g^{m\vec{u} + b\vec{v}_2}$, which is a Type A ciphertext that is properly distributed for Game_0 . If T is random, this is distributed as $g^{m\vec{u} + \vec{\delta}}$ where $\vec{\delta}$ is a random linear combination of \vec{v}_2 and \vec{v}_3 . To see this, recall that C_3 is the span of C_2 . Hence, if $T = g^{ab}$, \mathcal{B} has properly simulated Game_0 , and if T is random, then \mathcal{B} has properly simulated Game_1 (with a Type A challenge ciphertext). So \mathcal{B} can leverage \mathcal{A} 's difference in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage in solving DDH in G . \square

We now define Game_2 . In this game, the scaling matrix C is chosen to be a uniformly random 4×4 matrix over \mathbb{F}_p (note that it has full rank with high probability). The ciphertext is still produced as an invalid encryption, and the secret key \vec{y} is sampled so that $\vec{y} \cdot C_2 = 0 = \vec{y} \cdot C_3$. (There is now a 2-dimensional space of such \vec{y} .)

To transition between Game_1 and Game_2 , we use the fact that DDH in G implies the hardness of distinguishing a random rank one from a random rank two matrix in the exponent. This was previously observed in [10].

Lemma 4.3. *Under DDH in G , no PPT adversary can attain a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game_1 and Game_2 .*

Proof. We suppose there is a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that exhibits a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game_1 and Game_2 , and create a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} that breaks DDH in G with a non-negligible advantage. \mathcal{B} receives $g, g^a, g^b, h, T = g^t$. Its task is to guess if $t = ab$ or is random.

\mathcal{B} chooses a random 2×4 matrix M over \mathbb{F}_p (note with high probability this has rank 2). It implicitly sets C_2, C_3 equal to the rows of:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & a \\ b & t \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} m_{11} & m_{12} & m_{13} & m_{14} \\ m_{21} & m_{22} & m_{23} & m_{24} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} m_{11} + am_{21} & m_{12} + am_{22} & m_{13} + am_{23} & m_{14} + am_{24} \\ bm_{11} + tm_{21} & bm_{12} + tm_{22} & bm_{13} + tm_{23} & bm_{14} + am_{24} \end{pmatrix}.$$

\mathcal{B} can form $g^{c_{2i}}, g^{c_{3i}}$ for each i using its knowledge of M and g, g^a, g^b, g^t . If $t = ab$, this is distributed as a random rank-1 matrix. If t is random, this is distributed as a random rank-2 matrix. We further note that \mathcal{B} can sample a vector $\vec{\gamma}$ uniformly from the orthogonal space of the rows of M , which remain orthogonal to the implicitly determined rows C_2, C_3 . We claim that $\vec{\gamma}$ is distributed as a random vector orthogonal to C_2, C_3 for either case of t . In the case that t is random, this is clear because the span of C_2, C_3 is equal to the span of the rows of M . In the case that $t = ab$, note that M_2 , the second row of M , is random conditioned on $M_1 + aM_2$, so choosing $\vec{\gamma}$ such that it is also orthogonal to the freshly random vector M_2 does not change its distribution as a uniformly random vector orthogonal to $M_1 + aM_2$.

\mathcal{B} samples dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{B}_1, \mathbb{B}_1^*), \dots, (\mathbb{B}_4, \mathbb{B}_4^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^4)$. It samples the first and fourth rows C_1 and C_4 of C randomly from \mathbb{F}_p^4 . \mathcal{B} defines:

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{v}_1 &= c_{11}\vec{b}_{11} || c_{12}\vec{b}_{12} || c_{13}\vec{b}_{13} || c_{14}\vec{b}_{14}, & \vec{v}_1^* &= \vec{b}_{11}^* || \vec{b}_{12}^* || \vec{b}_{13}^* || \vec{b}_{14}^*, \\ \vec{v}_2 &= c_{21}\vec{b}_{21} || c_{22}\vec{b}_{22} || c_{23}\vec{b}_{23} || c_{24}\vec{b}_{24}, & \vec{v}_2^* &= \vec{b}_{21}^* || \vec{b}_{22}^* || \vec{b}_{23}^* || \vec{b}_{24}^*, \\ \vec{v}_3 &= c_{31}\vec{b}_{31} || c_{32}\vec{b}_{32} || c_{33}\vec{b}_{33} || c_{34}\vec{b}_{34}, & \vec{v}_3^* &= \vec{b}_{31}^* || \vec{b}_{32}^* || \vec{b}_{33}^* || \vec{b}_{34}^*, \\ \vec{v}_4 &= c_{41}\vec{b}_{41} || c_{42}\vec{b}_{42} || c_{43}\vec{b}_{43} || c_{44}\vec{b}_{44}, & \vec{v}_4^* &= \vec{b}_{41}^* || \vec{b}_{42}^* || \vec{b}_{43}^* || \vec{b}_{44}^*. \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} can produce all of $g^{\vec{v}_1}, \dots, g^{\vec{v}_4}$ and $h^{\vec{v}_1^*}, \dots, h^{\vec{v}_4^*}$. It can then form $g^{\vec{u}}, g^{\vec{w}}, h^{\vec{u}^*}, h^{\vec{w}^*}$ appropriately and give \mathcal{A} the public parameters.

\mathcal{B} sets $\vec{y} := \vec{\gamma}$ for the secret key. It can then compute $e(g, h)^{C_1 + C_4 \cdot \vec{y}}$. It then responds to \mathcal{A} 's declared leakage function f by computing $f(\vec{y}, e(g, h)^{C_1 + C_4 \cdot \vec{y}})$ and returning the result to \mathcal{A} . Again using knowledge of $g^{\vec{v}_1}, \dots, g^{\vec{v}_3}$ and $h^{\vec{v}_1^*}, \dots, h^{\vec{v}_3^*}$, \mathcal{B} can produce a properly distributed ciphertext.

If $t = ab$, then \mathcal{B} has properly simulated Game_1 . If t is random, then \mathcal{B} has properly simulated Game_2 . Hence \mathcal{B} can leverage \mathcal{A} 's non-negligible difference in advantage to achieve non-negligible advantage against DDH in G . \square

We next define Game_3 . This is the same as Game_2 , except that the secret key \vec{y} is sample from the larger space of vectors such that $\vec{y} \cdot C_2 = 0$ (note that $\vec{y} \cdot C_3$ will no longer be zero). The element of G_T then included along with \vec{y} in the secret key will still be $e(g, h)^{\vec{y} \cdot (C_1 + C_2 + C_3 + C_4)}$, though $\vec{y} \cdot C_3$ now makes a non-zero contribution to this. It is crucial to observe that in Game_3 , the secret key no longer properly decrypts the challenge ciphertext, but it continues to properly decrypt normal ciphertexts (such as those the adversary can make for itself using the public parameters). We transition between Game_2 and Game_3 by using the following information-theoretic tool, commonly invoked in arguments for leakage resilience (see [14, 33], for instance).

Lemma 4.4. Let $m \in \mathbb{Z}$, $m \geq 3$, and let p be a prime. Let $\vec{\gamma}, \vec{\tau}$ be chosen independently and uniformly at random from \mathbb{F}_p^m , and let $\vec{\tau}' \in \mathbb{F}_p^m$ be chosen uniformly at random from the set of vectors orthogonal to γ (w.r.t the dot product modulo p). Let $F : \mathbb{F}_p^m \rightarrow W$ be some function. Then:

$$\text{dist} \left((\vec{\gamma}, F(\vec{\tau})), (\vec{\gamma}, F(\vec{\tau}')) \right) \leq \epsilon,$$

as long as

$$|W| \leq 4 \left(1 - \frac{1}{p} \right) p^{m-2} \epsilon^2.$$

Lemma 4.5. No adversary can attain at most a $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ difference in advantage between Game_2 and Game_3 as long as $\ell \leq \log(p-1) - 2\lambda$.

Proof. We suppose there is an adversary \mathcal{A} whose advantage changes noticeably between Game_2 and Game_3 . We use this to create a function F and a distinguisher \mathcal{B} that violate Lemma 4.4 for $m = 3$.

\mathcal{B} first picks dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{F}_1, \mathbb{F}_1^*), \dots, (\mathbb{F}_4, \mathbb{F}_4^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^4)$ and a row $C_2 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p^4$. It also picks a random vector $\vec{C} = (\tilde{c}_1, \dots, \tilde{c}_4)$ to be equal to $C_1 + C_2 + C_3 + C_4$. (Observe that it is not necessary to commit individually to the rows of C in order to fix the public parameters.) It chooses random values $\alpha_{ij}, \alpha_{ij}^* \in \mathbb{F}_p$ for $i, j \in [4]$ up to the constraints that $\alpha_{2j} = 1$ and $\alpha_{2j}^* = c_{2j}$ for each j , and $\sum_i \alpha_{ij} \alpha_{ij}^* = \tilde{c}_j$ for each j . It sets:

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{v}_2 &:= \vec{f}_{21} \|\vec{f}_{22} \|\vec{f}_{23} \|\vec{f}_{24}, \\ \vec{v}_2^* &:= c_{21} \vec{f}_{21}^* \|\ c_{22} \vec{f}_{22}^* \|\ c_{23} \vec{f}_{23}^* \|\ c_{24} \vec{f}_{24}^*, \\ \vec{u} &:= \alpha_{11} \vec{f}_{11} + \alpha_{21} \vec{f}_{21} + \dots + \alpha_{41} \vec{f}_{41} \|\ \dots \|\ \alpha_{14} \vec{f}_{14} + \dots + \alpha_{44} \vec{f}_{44}, \\ \vec{u}^* &:= \alpha_{11}^* \vec{f}_{11}^* + \alpha_{21}^* \vec{f}_{21}^* + \dots + \alpha_{41}^* \vec{f}_{41}^* \|\ \dots \|\ \alpha_{14}^* \vec{f}_{14}^* + \dots + \alpha_{44}^* \vec{f}_{44}^*. \end{aligned}$$

This allows it to produce public parameters, which it gives to \mathcal{A} .

Next, \mathcal{A} declares a leakage function f to be applied to \vec{y} and $e(g, h)^{\vec{C} \cdot \vec{y}}$. \mathcal{B} fixes a 4×3 matrix M over \mathbb{F}_p such that M is a bijection from 3-dimensional vectors over \mathbb{F}_p into the orthogonal space of C_2 inside \mathbb{F}_p^4 and also that $M^T M$ is equal to the 3×3 identity matrix over \mathbb{F}_p . It implicitly sets $\vec{y} = M\vec{\tau}$ and defines F such that $F(\vec{\tau}) = f(\vec{y}, e(g, h)^{\vec{C} \cdot \vec{y}})$. It then receives $\vec{\gamma}, F(\vec{\tau})$ and forwards $F(\vec{\tau})$ to \mathcal{A} as the response to the leakage query.

\mathcal{B} now chooses a random scalar $t \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p$ and sets $C_3 = M\vec{\gamma} + tC_2$. Note that with high probability, C_2 is not self-orthogonal, and hence not in the image of M , and this will then be properly distributed as a random vector. The task for \mathcal{B} is now to find settings for $\vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_3, \vec{v}_4, \vec{v}_1^*, \vec{v}_3^*, \vec{v}_4^*$ that are consistent with the values of $\vec{C}, C_3, \vec{u}, \vec{u}^*, \vec{v}_2, \vec{v}_2^*$. This is an instance of parameter-hiding: essentially \mathcal{B} will take advantage of the fact that the values it previously committed to did not in fact determine C_3 . We show how it is able to leverage the remaining degrees of freedom in the parameter settings to now accommodate this freshly chosen value of C_3 .

We consider the first four coordinates of the \vec{v}_i and \vec{v}_i^* first (and then we consider the next block of four coordinates, etc.). Our goal is to define suitable values of c_{11}, c_{41} and suitable matrices A, A^* of the form

$$A := \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & 0 & a_{13} & a_{14} \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ a_{31} & 0 & a_{33} & a_{34} \\ a_{41} & 0 & a_{43} & a_{44} \end{pmatrix}, \quad A^* := \begin{pmatrix} a_{11}^* & 0 & a_{13}^* & a_{14}^* \\ 0 & c_{21} & 0 & 0 \\ a_{31}^* & 0 & a_{33}^* & a_{34}^* \\ a_{41}^* & 0 & a_{43}^* & a_{44}^* \end{pmatrix}$$

such that

$$\vec{v}_1 = a_{11} \vec{f}_{11} + a_{13} \vec{f}_{31} + a_{14} \vec{f}_{41}, \quad \vec{v}_1^* = c_{11} (a_{11}^* \vec{f}_{11}^* + a_{13}^* \vec{f}_{31}^* + a_{14}^* \vec{f}_{41}^*),$$

$$\begin{aligned}\vec{v}_3 &= a_{31}\vec{f}_{11} + a_{33}\vec{f}_{31} + a_{34}\vec{f}_{41}, & \vec{v}_3^* &= c_{31}(a_{31}^*\vec{f}_{11}^* + a_{33}^*\vec{f}_{31}^* + a_{34}^*\vec{f}_{41}^*), \\ \vec{v}_4 &= a_{41}\vec{f}_{11} + a_{43}\vec{f}_{31} + a_{44}\vec{f}_{41}, & \vec{v}_4^* &= c_{41}(a_{41}^*\vec{f}_{11}^* + a_{43}^*\vec{f}_{31}^* + a_{44}^*\vec{f}_{41}^*)\end{aligned}$$

is a valid setting. For this, we need $A^* = (A^{-1})^T$, and we need

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_{11} &= a_{11} + a_{31} + a_{41}, & \alpha_{11}^* &= c_{11}a_{11}^* + c_{31}a_{31}^* + c_{41}a_{41}^*, \\ \alpha_{31} &= a_{13} + a_{33} + a_{43}, & \alpha_{31}^* &= c_{11}a_{13}^* + c_{31}a_{33}^* + c_{41}a_{43}^*, \\ \alpha_{41} &= a_{14} + a_{34} + a_{44}, & \alpha_{41}^* &= c_{11}a_{14}^* + c_{31}a_{34}^* + c_{41}a_{44}^*.\end{aligned}$$

To see how to solve this system of equations, we first define the matrix

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

We then observe that a matrix A will satisfy the linear restrictions above imposed by $\alpha_{11}, \alpha_{31}, \alpha_{41}$ whenever A is of the form

$$A = B^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} r & t & u \\ s & v & w \\ \alpha_{11} & \alpha_{31} & \alpha_{41} \end{pmatrix},$$

where r, t, u, s, v, w are free variables. We can then express the other constraints as:

$$(c_{11} \ c_{31} \ c_{41})(A^{-1})^T = (\alpha_{11}^* \ \alpha_{31}^* \ \alpha_{41}^*),$$

which we may rewrite as

$$(c_{11} \ c_{31} \ c_{41})B = (\alpha_{11}^* \ \alpha_{31}^* \ \alpha_{41}^*) \begin{pmatrix} r & s & \alpha_{11} \\ t & v & \alpha_{31} \\ u & w & \alpha_{41} \end{pmatrix}.$$

It is easy to see that by choosing r, t, u, s, v, w appropriately, we can make the right-hand side of this expression equal to any vector in \mathbb{F}_p^3 whose final coordinate is $\alpha_{11}\alpha_{11}^* + \alpha_{31}\alpha_{31}^* + \alpha_{41}\alpha_{41}^*$. Thus, for any choice of c_{11} and c_{41} such that $c_{11} + c_{31} + c_{41}$ equal this value, we can solve for r, s, t, u, v, w , and hence for the first four coordinates of the vectors $\vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_3, \vec{v}_4, \vec{v}_1^*, \vec{v}_3^*, \vec{v}_4^*$.

\mathcal{B} can similarly solve for suitable values for the remaining 12 coordinates of these vectors by considering each 4-coordinate block in a similar fashion. Note that applying different matrices A and $(A^{-1})^T$ as a change of basis for each $(\mathbb{F}_i, \mathbb{F}_i^*)$ still results in a proper distribution of random dual orthonormal bases in each block of 4 coordinates. Once \mathcal{B} has determined properly distributed values of $\vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_3, \vec{v}_4, \vec{v}_1^*, \vec{v}_3^*, \vec{v}_4^*$, it can easily form a properly distributed challenge ciphertext.

We observe that when $\vec{\tau}, \vec{\delta}$ are orthogonal, \vec{y} and C_3 are also orthogonal (and \vec{y} is distributed randomly up to the constraint that it is orthogonal to C_2 and C_3). In this case, \mathcal{B} properly simulates **Game**₂. However, when $\vec{\tau}, \vec{\delta}$ are uniformly random, then \vec{y} is distributed randomly up to the constraint that it is orthogonal to C_2 , and hence \mathcal{B} properly simulates **Game**₃. Lemma 4.4 thus implies Lemma 4.5. \square

We next define **Game**₄, which is the same as **Game**₃ except that C is sampled so that C_1, C_2 are random, and C_3, C_4 are sampled randomly from the span of C_1 .

Lemma 4.6. *Under DDH in G , no PPT adversary can attain a non-negligible difference in advantage between **Game**₃ and **Game**₄.*

Proof. We accomplish this transition in two phases, first moving to a $\text{Game}_{3,5}$ where C_1, C_2, C_4 are random, and C_3 is sampled from the span of C_1 . We start by supposing there is a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that exhibits a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game_3 and $\text{Game}_{3,5}$, and create a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} that breaks DDH in G with a non-negligible advantage. \mathcal{B} receives $g, g^a, g^b, h, T = g^t$. Its task is to guess if $t = ab$ or random.

As in the proof of Lemma 4.3, \mathcal{B} chooses a random matrix M and implicitly sets C_1, C_3 equal to the rows of

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & a \\ b & t \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} m_{11} & m_{12} & m_{13} & m_{14} \\ m_{21} & m_{22} & m_{23} & m_{24} \end{pmatrix}.$$

\mathcal{B} samples dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{B}_1, \mathbb{B}_1^*), \dots, (\mathbb{B}_4, \mathbb{B}_4^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^4)$. It samples $C_2, C_4 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p^4$. \mathcal{B} defines:

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{v}_1 &= c_{11}\vec{b}_{11} \| c_{12}\vec{b}_{12} \| c_{13}\vec{b}_{13} \| c_{14}\vec{b}_{14}, & \vec{v}_1^* &= \vec{b}_{11}^* \| \vec{b}_{12}^* \| \vec{b}_{13}^* \| \vec{b}_{14}^*, \\ \vec{v}_2 &= c_{21}\vec{b}_{21} \| c_{22}\vec{b}_{22} \| c_{23}\vec{b}_{23} \| c_{24}\vec{b}_{24}, & \vec{v}_2^* &= \vec{b}_{21}^* \| \vec{b}_{22}^* \| \vec{b}_{23}^* \| \vec{b}_{24}^*, \\ \vec{v}_3 &= c_{31}\vec{b}_{31} \| c_{32}\vec{b}_{32} \| c_{33}\vec{b}_{33} \| c_{34}\vec{b}_{34}, & \vec{v}_3^* &= \vec{b}_{31}^* \| \vec{b}_{32}^* \| \vec{b}_{33}^* \| \vec{b}_{34}^*, \\ \vec{v}_4 &= c_{41}\vec{b}_{41} \| c_{42}\vec{b}_{42} \| c_{43}\vec{b}_{43} \| c_{44}\vec{b}_{44}, & \vec{v}_4^* &= \vec{b}_{41}^* \| \vec{b}_{42}^* \| \vec{b}_{43}^* \| \vec{b}_{44}^*. \end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{B} can produce all of $g^{\vec{v}_1}, \dots, g^{\vec{v}_4}$ and $h^{\vec{v}_1^*}, \dots, h^{\vec{v}_4^*}$ using g, h, g^a, g^b, g^t . It can then produce $g^{\vec{u}}, g^{\vec{w}}, h^{\vec{u}^*}, h^{\vec{w}^*}$ appropriately and give \mathcal{A} the public parameters.

To form the secret key, \mathcal{B} samples a random vector \vec{y} such that $\vec{y} \cdot C_2 = 0$. We note that it can compute $e(g, h)^{(C_1+C_3+C_4) \cdot \vec{y}}$ because it can compute each $e(g, h)^{c_{1i}}$ and $e(g, h)^{c_{3i}}$ and it knows \vec{y} . This allows \mathcal{B} to respond to the leakage query made by \mathcal{A} .

Using knowledge of $g^{\vec{v}_1}, \dots, g^{\vec{v}_3}$ and $h^{\vec{v}_1^*}, \dots, h^{\vec{v}_3^*}$, \mathcal{B} can produce a properly distributed ciphertext. Now, if $t = ab$, \mathcal{B} has properly simulated Game_3 . If t is random, \mathcal{B} has properly simulated $\text{Game}_{3,5}$. Hence it can leverage \mathcal{A} 's difference in advantage to break DDH. We can similarly rule out a PPT adversary that distinguishes between $\text{Game}_{3,5}$ and Game_4 . \square

Finally, we define Game_5 , which is the same as Game_4 except that the (invalid Type A) ciphertext is distributed as $g^{\vec{z}}$ for a completely random \vec{z} in the span of $\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_4$, *independent* of the message to be encrypted. (Similarly for a Type B ciphertext it would be $h^{\vec{z}^*}$ for a random \vec{z}^* in the span of $\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_4^*$.)

Lemma 4.7. *Under the SXDH assumption, no PPT adversary can obtain a non-negligible change in advantage between Game_4 and Game_5 .*

Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we show how to accomplish this transition for Type A ciphertexts relying on the DDH assumption in G . This is again essentially an instance of Lemma 3.8, but we include the proof here for completeness. The case for Type B ciphertexts is analogous, relying on the DDH assumption in H . We also break this transition for a Type A challenge ciphertext into two stages, first moving to a $\text{Game}_{4,5}$ where only the coefficients of $\vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_2, \vec{v}_3$ in the exponent vector of the challenge ciphertext are randomized. (In Game_5 , the coefficient of \vec{v}_4 is additionally randomized.)

Suppose there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} whose advantage changes non-negligibly between Game_4 to $\text{Game}_{4,5}$ (with a Type A challenge ciphertext). We create a PPT algorithm \mathcal{B} that achieves a non-negligible advantage against SXDH. \mathcal{B} is given group elements g, g^a, g^b, T in G , and it is \mathcal{B} 's task to determine if $T = g^{ab}$ or is random.

\mathcal{B} first samples dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{F}_1, \mathbb{F}_1^*), \dots, (\mathbb{F}_4, \mathbb{F}_4^*) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Dual}(\mathbb{F}_p^4)$. It samples random matrix rows $C_1, C_2, C_4 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_p^4$. It samples \tilde{C}_3 randomly from the span of C_1 . It implicitly sets $C_3 = a\tilde{C}_3$. We note that the resulting C is properly distributed for Game_4 and Game_5 .

\mathcal{B} implicitly sets:

$$\begin{aligned}\vec{v}_1 &= c_{11}\vec{f}_{11}||c_{12}\vec{f}_{12}||c_{13}\vec{f}_{13}||c_{14}\vec{f}_{14}, \quad \vec{v}_1^* = \vec{f}_{11}^* - a\vec{f}_{31}^*||\vec{f}_{12}^* - a\vec{f}_{32}^*||\vec{f}_{13}^* - a\vec{f}_{33}^*||\vec{f}_{14}^* - a\vec{f}_{34}^*, \\ \vec{v}_2 &= c_{21}\vec{f}_{21}||c_{22}\vec{f}_{22}||c_{23}\vec{f}_{23}||c_{24}\vec{f}_{24}, \quad \vec{v}_2^* = \vec{f}_{21}^*||\vec{f}_{22}^*||\vec{f}_{23}^*||\vec{f}_{24}^*, \\ \vec{v}_3 &= \tilde{c}_{31}(\vec{f}_{31} + a\vec{f}_{11})||\tilde{c}_{32}(\vec{f}_{32} + a\vec{f}_{12})||\tilde{c}_{33}(\vec{f}_{33} + a\vec{f}_{13})||\tilde{c}_{34}(\vec{f}_{34} + a\vec{f}_{14}), \quad \vec{v}_3^* = a\vec{f}_{31}^*||a\vec{f}_{32}^*||a\vec{f}_{33}^*||a\vec{f}_{34}^*, \\ \vec{v}_4 &= c_{41}\vec{f}_{41}||c_{42}\vec{f}_{42}||c_{43}\vec{f}_{43}||c_{44}\vec{f}_{44}, \quad \vec{v}_4^* = \vec{f}_{41}^*||\vec{f}_{42}^*||\vec{f}_{43}^*||\vec{f}_{44}^*.\end{aligned}$$

We note that \mathcal{B} can compute $g^{\vec{v}_1}$, $g^{\vec{v}_2}$, $g^{\vec{v}_3}$, and $g^{\vec{v}_4}$, and hence can compute $g^{\vec{u}}$. It can also choose a random scalar $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_p$ and compute $g^{\vec{w}} := g^{r\vec{v}_2}$. We observe that $\vec{u}^* = \vec{f}_{11}^* + \vec{f}_{21}^* + \vec{f}_{41}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{14}^* + \vec{f}_{24}^* + \vec{f}_{44}^*$ is known to \mathcal{B} , so it can also compute $h^{\vec{u}^*}$. It chooses a random $r^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_p$ and sets $h^{\vec{w}^*} = h^{r^*\vec{v}_2^*}$. This results in properly distributed public parameters, which it gives to \mathcal{A} .

Since it knows C_2 , \mathcal{B} can sample a \vec{y} randomly such that $C_2 \cdot \vec{y} = 0$. It also must compute $e(g, h)^{\vec{y} \cdot (C_1 + C_3 + C_4)}$. It knows C_1, C_4 , so it easily can produce $e(g, h)^{\vec{y} \cdot (C_1 + C_4)}$. It can then produce $e(g, h)^{\vec{y} \cdot C_3}$ as $e(g^a, h)^{\vec{y} \cdot \tilde{C}_3}$ and multiply this in. This allows it to form a properly distributed secret key and respond to \mathcal{A} 's leakage query.

We note that \mathcal{B} also has the ability to produce invalid Type B ciphertexts, as it can sample random combinations of \vec{v}_2^*, \vec{v}_3^* in the exponent, which are identically distributed to random combinations of $(\vec{f}_{21}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{24}^*)$ and $(\vec{f}_{31}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{34}^*)$. Furthermore, it can produce Type B ciphertexts as they would be distributed in Game_5 , as random linear combinations of $\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_4^*$ are identically distributed to random linear combinations of $(\vec{f}_{11}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{14}^*), \dots, (\vec{f}_{41}^* || \dots || \vec{f}_{44}^*)$. (This would be needed to do a hybrid argument for a joint ciphertext that has both Type A and Type B parts.)

To create the challenge ciphertext of Type A, \mathcal{B} chooses a random $t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes:

$$g^{m_b \vec{u}} g^{t \vec{v}_2} T^{(c_{31} f_{11} || \dots || c_{34} f_{14})} (g^b)^{c_{31} \vec{f}_{31} || \dots || c_{34} \vec{f}_{34}}.$$

If $T = g^{ab}$, this is equal to $g^{m_b \vec{u} + t \vec{v}_2 + b \vec{v}_3}$, which is a Type A ciphertext that is properly distributed for Game_4 . If T is random, this is distributed as $g^{m_b \vec{u} + \vec{\delta}}$ where $\vec{\delta}$ is a random linear combination of \vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_2 , and \vec{v}_3 . To see this, recall that C_1 is the span of C_3 . Hence, if $T = g^{ab}$, \mathcal{B} has properly simulated Game_4 , and if T is random, then \mathcal{B} has properly simulated $\text{Game}_{4,5}$ (with a Type A challenge ciphertext). So \mathcal{B} can leverage \mathcal{A} 's difference in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage in solving DDH in G .

The transition from $\text{Game}_{4,5}$ to Game_5 with a Type A ciphertext is analogous, just with the roles of C_1 and C_4 reversed (note that both are in the span of C_3). \square

This completes the proof of leakage resilience for our scheme.

5 An IBE with IND-CCA1 Security

The second application we provide is an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme. Although IND-CCA2-secure IBE schemes have already been constructed, we believe our techniques are more generally useful beyond this single application.

At its heart, our construction can be thought of as a variant on the Boneh-Boyen scheme, which is IND-CPA secure (and is clearly not IND-CCA2 secure, as it has re-randomizable ciphertexts). By adding in various components in different subgroups, we first show (using canceling, parameter hiding, and subgroup decision variants) that our construction satisfies a weak notion of IND-CCA1 security, in which the adversary does not even get to see the public parameters. While such a notion might not seem to be very useful on its own, we next show that, by folding in weak projecting for additional

subgroups, we are able to boost up to full IND-CCA1 security. This is a new application of projecting that requires only a mild expansion of the structure of the original scheme and fits in nicely with the evolution of dual system encryption techniques.

The high-level idea of the construction and proof is as follows. We start with the core Boneh-Boyen construction and embed it into groups with several canceling subgroups; we then add decryption checks to confirm that the ciphertext conforms to the appropriate structure in certain subgroups. Now, we observe that if an adversary is not given the public parameters, it can attempt to produce well-formed decryption queries only using the information it gains from key requests. We can apply a dual-system encryption approach to add random components to these keys in a subgroup that we also add to the ciphertext. Now, since everything in this “semi-functional” subgroup is randomized, the adversary cannot learn the appropriate structure that is being tested for by the decryption oracle. Hence, the only successful decryption queries it can produce must avoid this semi-functional space; we can use an adversary who produces such a query while receiving elements with random semi-functional components, however, to break a variant of subgroup decision. In this weak security game where no public parameters are given out, we can therefore prove IND-CCA1 security. Our notion of the weak game here is inspired by the new interpretation of dual system encryption techniques developed by Lewko and Waters [30].

To reduce full IND-CCA1 security to this weak version, we enlarge the space of our weakly secure scheme by adding two more subgroups so that we can project separately onto the components of the embedded scheme and the additional space; our construction then places meaningful components only in this additional space. To prove security, we first expand into the embedded space using a variant of subgroup decision. We now have a “shadow” copy of the scheme, attached to both keys and ciphertexts, that is not reflected in the public parameters, and we can project separately onto the real copy and onto this shadow copy. Thus, we can reduce full security to the weak security of the shadow scheme by having the reduction create the components in the real space itself and use projection to interpolate between an adversary on the full game and a challenger for the weak game.

5.1 An IBE with weak IND-CCA1 security

We first define a weak version of IND-CCA1 security for IBE, in which the adversary does not get to see the full public parameters, but only the bilinear group:

Definition 5.1. *For a bilinear group generator BilinearGen , an IBE $(\text{Setup}, \text{KeyExt}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, an adversary \mathcal{A} , and a bit b , let $p_b^{\mathcal{A}}(k)$ be the probability of the event that $b' = 0$ in the following game:*

- *Step 1.* $\mathcal{G} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k, n)$; $(\text{params}, \text{msk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(\mathcal{G})$.
- *Step 2.* $(\text{state}, m_0, m_1, \text{id}^*) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(\text{params}, \text{msk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{KeyExt}(\text{params}, \text{msk}, \cdot)}(\mathcal{G})$.
- *Step 3.* If $|m_0| \neq |m_1|$ or \mathcal{A} queried its KeyExt oracle on id^* , output \perp . Otherwise, output $\text{ct}^* \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(\text{params}, \text{id}^*, m_b)$.
- *Step 4.* $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyExt}(\text{params}, \text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{state}, \text{ct}^*)$.

We say that the IBE satisfies weak IND-CCA1 security if for all PPT algorithms \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that $|p_0^{\mathcal{A}}(k) - p_1^{\mathcal{A}}(k)| < \nu(k)$.

For our bilinear group, we require six subgroups on each side of the pairing; this means we run $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \{g_i\}_i, \{h_i\}_i, \mu) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{BilinearGen}'(1^k, 6)$, where $G := \bigoplus_{i=1}^6 G_i = \langle g_i \rangle$, $H := \bigoplus_{i=1}^6 H_i = \langle h_i \rangle$, $e : G \times H \rightarrow G_T$, μ allows one to check membership in both G and H , and N is the maximum order of any element in these groups. We require that the message space is the cyclic subgroup generated by $e(g_1, h_1)$ in G_T . Our construction relies generically on the structure of the group and thus can be instantiated, as we see below, in either composite-order groups, using N as a product of distinct primes,

or prime-order groups, using N as a prime. In addition to the regular canceling (and parameter hiding) requirements, we also require that specific generators $g_i \in G_i$ and $h_i \in H_i$ for all i , $1 \leq i \leq 4$, are chosen such that

$$e(g_1g_2, h_1h_2) = e(g_3g_4, h_3h_4) = 1. \quad (2)$$

Although this might seem like an additional requirement, as we see below and in Section 6, this property can be trivially constructed in prime-order and composite-order settings that satisfy the regular notion of canceling. This same sort of reorganization could also be applied to the original Boneh-Boyen construction by conceptualizing keys and ciphertexts as single elements in $G \times G$ instead of as pairs of elements in G , and more generally we consider the distinction between single group elements in a larger group and tuples of elements in a smaller group a matter of taste. (Of course, thinking of $G \times G$ as a single group results in certain cases of subgroup decision problems being easy, such as distinguishing $G \times 1_G$ from $G \times G$, but these cases will not come up.) Armed with such a bilinear group, we begin by presenting our IBE construction.

- **Setup**(\mathbb{G}): Parse $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \{g_i\}_{i=1}^6, \{h_i\}_{i=1}^6, \mu)$ and pick $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. Output $params := ((N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu), g_1, g_2, A := e(g_1, h_1)^\alpha)$ and $msk := (h_1^\alpha, \{h_i\}_{i=1}^6)$.
- **KeyExt**($params, msk, id$): Pick $t, t', \gamma, \gamma', \beta, \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and compute $sk_{id,1} := h_1^\alpha h_1^{tid} h_2^t h_5^\gamma h_6^\beta$ and $sk_{id,2} := h_1^{t'id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}$. Output $sk_{id} := (sk_{id,1}, sk_{id,2})$.
- **Enc**($params, id, M$): Pick $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and compute $ct_1 := M \cdot A^s$ and $ct_2 := g_1^s \cdot g_2^{sid}$. Output $ct := (ct_1, ct_2)$.
- **Dec**($params, sk_{id}, ct$): Check that $ct_2 \in G$ and that $e(ct_2, sk_{id,2}) = 1$; output \perp if either of these does not pass. Otherwise, output $M := ct_1 \cdot e(ct_2, sk_{id,1})^{-1}$.

We note that msk can be used to decrypt directly; i.e., rather than form sk_{id} and decrypt in the usual way, we can instead compute $M = ct_1 \cdot e(ct_2, h_1^\alpha)^{-1}$.

Lemma 5.2. *If canceling and Equation 2 hold in \mathbb{G} , then the above construction describes a correct identity-based encryption scheme.*

Proof. To see that, for all identities id and messages M , $sk_{id} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyExt}(params, msk, id)$ correctly decrypts a ciphertext $ct \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(params, id, M)$, we first observe that the decryption check will pass, as

$$e(ct_2, h_1^{t'id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}) = e(g_1^s \cdot g_2^{sid}, h_1^{id} h_2)^{t'} = e(g_1^s, h_1^{id})^{t'} \cdot e(g_2^{sid}, h_2)^{t'} = (e(g_1, h_1)e(g_2, h_2))^{st'id} = 1,$$

where the first equality follows from canceling and the last equality follows from Equation 2. Additionally, decryption succeeds in recovering the message, as

$$\begin{aligned} ct_1 \cdot e(ct_2, sk_{id,1})^{-1} &= M \cdot A^s \cdot e(g_1^s g_2^{sid}, h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^\gamma \cdot h_6^\beta)^{-1} \\ &= M \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{\alpha s} \cdot e(g_1^s, h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid})^{-1} \cdot e(g_2^{sid}, h_2^t)^{-1} \\ &= M \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{\alpha s} \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{-\alpha s} \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{-st'id} \cdot e(g_2, h_2)^{-st'id} \\ &= M \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{-st'id} e(g_2, h_2)^{-st'id} \\ &= M \cdot (e(g_1, h_1)e(g_2, h_2))^{-st'id} \\ &= M, \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality again follows from canceling and the last from Equation 2. \square

Theorem 5.3. *If canceling, parameter hiding, Equation 2, and generalized correlated subgroup decision hold in \mathbb{G} , then the above construction describes a weakly IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.*

To actualize these abstract requirements, for completeness we consider in Section 6 how they are satisfied in a composite-order bilinear group. In the prime-order setting, we already gave our augmented BasicGen construction in Section 3 (which we recall uses $n = 8$, $d = 1$, a scaling matrix C with all 1 entries, and auxiliary information μ that allows for a membership test in the first six subgroups), and proved that it satisfied canceling and parameter hiding, and that all nice instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision hold if SXDH holds. Our construction also uses $g_i = g^{\vec{v}_i}$ and $h_i = h^{-\vec{v}_i^*}$, so the definition of dual orthonormal bases ensures that Equation 2 holds as well. As all the instances we use in our proof are nice, we have the following corollary:

Corollary 5.4. *If SXDH holds in $\mathbb{G} \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \text{BasicGen}(1^k)$ and \mathbb{G} uses augmented information μ , where BasicGen and augmented μ are as specified in Section 3, then the instantiation of the above construction in \mathbb{G} is a weakly IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme with identity space \mathbb{F}_p and message space G_T .*

To prove Theorem 5.3, we proceed through a series of game transitions as follows; formal descriptions of the games and proofs of their indistinguishability can be found in Appendix A.

- **Game₀.** The honest weak IND-CCA1 game.
- **Game₁.** Switch to adding in a “duplicate” component in $G_3 \oplus G_4$ to the challenge ciphertext ct_2^* ; i.e., the value $g_3^{s'} g_4^{s' id}$. This is indistinguishable from Game₀ by subgroup decision.
- **Game₂.** Switch the $G_3 \oplus G_4$ component in ct_2^* to be uniformly random. This is identical to Game₁ by parameter hiding.
- **Game₃.** Switch the keys returned by KeyExt to have random components in $H_3 \oplus H_4$ on $sk_{id,1}$ and on $sk_{id,2}$; i.e., values $h_3^{s'} h_4^{s''}$ (different values of s', s'' for $sk_{id,1}$ and $sk_{id,2}$). This is indistinguishable from Game₂ using a hybrid argument relying on subgroup decision and parameter hiding.
- **Game₄.** Switch from performing the decryption check with a term of the form $h_1^{t' id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}$ to using a term of the form $h_1^{t' id} h_2^{t'} h_3^{t'' id} h_4^{t''} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}$. This is indistinguishable from Game₃ by subgroup decision.
- **Game₅.** Switch the Dec oracle to return \perp on every query in which $\text{ct}_2 \neq 1$, and 1 if $\text{ct}_2 = 1$. This is indistinguishable from Game₄ by subgroup decision and parameter hiding.
- **Game₆.** Switch to encrypting a random message in the challenge ciphertext. This is indistinguishable from Game₅ by subgroup decision; furthermore, as there is now no information about the bit b , any adversary playing this game has advantage exactly zero.

5.2 Boosting to full IND-CCA1 security

With a weak IND-CCA1-secure IBE in place, we now consider how to augment it to achieve full IND-CCA1 security. Briefly, we do this by adding extra subgroups: to start, we assume we have a bilinear group $\tilde{\mathbb{G}} := (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e}, \tilde{\mu}) \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k, 8)$; i.e., a group such that $\tilde{G} := \bigoplus_{i=1}^8 \tilde{G}_i = \langle \tilde{g}_i \rangle$, $\tilde{H} := \bigoplus_{i=1}^8 \tilde{H}_i = \langle \tilde{h}_i \rangle$, and $\tilde{e} : \tilde{G} \times \tilde{H} \rightarrow \tilde{G}_T$, and $\tilde{\mu}$ allows one to efficiently test membership in \tilde{G} and \tilde{H} . Once again, these subgroups should all be canceling, and satisfy

$$\tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_1 \tilde{g}_2, \tilde{h}_1 \tilde{h}_2) = \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_3 \tilde{g}_4, \tilde{h}_3 \tilde{h}_4) = \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7 \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_7 \tilde{h}_8) = 1. \quad (3)$$

for a particular choice of generators \tilde{g}_i, \tilde{h}_i . Additionally, the group generation process should also produce a trapdoor τ that allows for the efficient computation of projection maps π_G and π_H such that

$\pi_G : \tilde{G} \rightarrow \tilde{G}_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \tilde{G}_6$ and $\pi_H : \tilde{H} \rightarrow \tilde{H}_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \tilde{H}_6$; i.e., these map into subgroups analogous to the ones that we used in our construction of a weak IND-CCA1-secure IBE.

Finally, if we consider explicitly the group $\mathbb{G} = (N, \oplus_{i=1}^6 G_i, \oplus_{i=1}^6 H_i, G_T, e, \mu)$ from our weakly secure construction, then it should be the case that from \mathbb{G} one can create $\tilde{\mathbb{G}} := (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e}, \tilde{\mu})$ such that $G_i = \tilde{G}_i$ and $H_i = \tilde{H}_i$ for all i , $1 \leq i \leq 6$, and τ can be derived from knowledge of μ . The message space and the space of possible identities are the same for the full scheme and the embedded weak scheme.

In our reduction to the weak IND-CCA1 security, we crucially rely on these projection maps, as well as one other property: if the groups \tilde{G} and \tilde{H} are generated from scratch, then generators for every subgroup will be known. If the groups are instead generated from the group description for the weak scheme, however, then not all such generators are known; we require that knowledge of suitable generators $\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_7$, and \tilde{h}_8 be incorporated in τ , but the rest of the generators may be unknown.

We now give our construction in this framework:

- **Setup**($\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$): Parse $\tilde{\mathbb{G}} = (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e}, \tilde{\mu}, \{\tilde{g}_i\}_{i=1}^8, \{\tilde{h}_i\}_{i=1}^8)$ and pick $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. Output $params := (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, A := \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^\alpha)$ and $msk := (\tilde{h}_7^\alpha, \{\tilde{h}_i\}_{i=1}^8)$.
- **KeyExt**($params, msk, id$): Pick $t, t', \gamma, \gamma', \delta, \delta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and compute $sk_{id,1} := \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^t \cdot \tilde{h}_5^\gamma \cdot \tilde{h}_6^\delta$ and $sk_{id,2} := \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^{\gamma'} \cdot \tilde{h}_5^{\delta'}$. Output $sk_{id} := (sk_{id,1}, sk_{id,2})$.
- **Enc**($params, id, M$): Pick $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and compute $ct_1 := M \cdot A^s$, $ct_2 := \tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid}$. Output $ct := (ct_1, ct_2)$.
- **Dec**($params, sk_{id}, ct$): First check that $ct_2 \in \tilde{G}$ and that $\tilde{e}(ct_2, sk_{id,2}) = 1$; output \perp if equality does not hold. Otherwise, output $M := ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, sk_{id,1})^{-1}$.

We note that decryption can again be simplified using msk ; in this case, we compute $M = ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_7^\alpha)^{-1}$.

Lemma 5.5. *If canceling and Equation 3 hold in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$, then the above construction describes a correct identity-based encryption scheme.*

Proof. To see that, for all identities id and messages M , $sk_{id} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KeyExt}(params, msk, id)$ correctly decrypts $ct \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(params, id, M)$, we first observe that the decryption check will pass, as $\tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_5^{\gamma'} \tilde{h}_6^{\delta'}) = 1$ by canceling, and

$$\tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \tilde{h}_8^{t'}) = \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid}, \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \tilde{h}_8^{t'}) = (\tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7) \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_8))^{st'id} = 1.$$

by canceling and Equation 3.

To additionally see that decryption will succeed in recovering the message, we have

$$\begin{aligned} ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, sk_{id,1})^{-1} &= M \cdot A^s \cdot (\tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid}, \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^t \cdot \tilde{h}_5^\gamma \cdot \tilde{h}_6^\beta)^{-1} \\ &= M \cdot \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^{\alpha s} \cdot \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7^s, \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{tid})^{-1} \cdot \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_8^{sid}, \tilde{h}_8^t)^{-1} \\ &= M \cdot e(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^{\alpha s} \cdot e(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^{-\alpha s} \cdot e(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^{-stid} \cdot e(\tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_8)^{-stid} \\ &= M \cdot (e(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7) e(\tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_8))^{-stid} \\ &= M, \end{aligned}$$

where the second equality again follows from canceling and the last from Equation 3. \square

Theorem 5.6. *If weak projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, Equation 3, and generalized correlated subgroup decision hold in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$, then the above construction is a IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.*

As we did for our weak IBE construction, we consider how to actualize these abstract requirements in both the composite-order and prime-order settings; for completeness, our composite-order construction and proofs that it satisfies these requirements can be found in Section 6. For the prime-order setting, we can now use our **BasicGen** construction from Section 3; here, as $\tilde{G} = G^8$, we can use our non-augmented construction, as testing membership in \tilde{G} reduces to testing membership in G . We have already proved this setting satisfies weak projecting, canceling, and parameter hiding, and that the nice instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision hold if SXDH holds. As with our weak IBE, Equation 3 holds trivially by the definition of dual orthonormal bases.

We must also consider how to embed \mathbb{G} into $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$ as described above; this is also quite simple, however, as we can simply use $\tilde{G}_i = G_i$. The augmented auxiliary information μ for the weak scheme furthermore enables computation of the projection maps π_G and π_H , as knowledge of the spans of $\{\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_6\}$ and $\{\vec{v}_1^*, \dots, \vec{v}_6^*\}$ allows one to compute a linear transformation that projects from \mathbb{F}_p^8 onto these spans, which can then be applied in the exponent to map onto $G_1 \oplus \dots \oplus G_6$ and $H_1 \oplus \dots \oplus H_6$.

As all of the instances of generalized correlated subgroup decision that we use in our proof of Theorem 5.6 are nice, we obtain the following corollary:

Corollary 5.7. *If SXDH holds in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$, where $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$ is constructed from $\mathbb{G} \stackrel{\S}{\leftarrow} \text{BasicGen}(1^k)$ as described above, then the instantiation of the above construction in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$ is an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme with identity space \mathbb{F}_p and message space G_T .*

To prove Theorem 5.6, we proceed through the following series of game transitions:

- **Game₀**. The honest IND-CCA1 game.
- **Game₁**. Switch the secret keys returned by **KeyExt** to have additional “duplicate” elements in $\tilde{H}_1 \oplus \tilde{H}_2$ attached; i.e., elements of the form $\tilde{h}_1^\beta \tilde{h}_1^{t'id} \tilde{h}_2^{t'}$ on $sk_{id,1}$ and $\tilde{h}_1^{t''id} \tilde{h}_2^{t''}$ on $sk_{id,2}$. Switch **Dec** to use $\tilde{h}_1^\beta \tilde{h}_7^\alpha$ in place of just \tilde{h}_7^α , and use a term of the form $\tilde{h}_1^{t''id} \tilde{h}_2^{t''} \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \tilde{h}_8^t \tilde{h}_5^{\gamma'} \tilde{h}_6^{\delta'}$ for the decryption check. This is indistinguishable from **Game₀** by subgroup decision.
- **Game₂**. Switch the challenge ciphertext to add “duplicate” terms $\tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_1, \tilde{h}_1)^{\beta s'}$ to ct_1^* and $\tilde{g}_1^{s'} \tilde{g}_2^{s'id}$ to ct_2^* . This is indistinguishable from **Game₁** by subgroup decision.

Finally, we show that if an adversary can win **Game₂** then, using weak projection, it can be used to construct an adversary that breaks the weak IND-CCA1 security of the underlying scheme (i.e., the scheme constructed in the previous section). We therefore reduce the full IND-CCA1 security of this scheme to the weak IND-CCA1 security of the embedded scheme.

Following this outline, we begin by adding in extra components to secret keys, and changing decryption accordingly.

Game₀, Game₁

- 1 $(N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e}, \{\tilde{g}_i\}_{i=1}^8, \{\tilde{h}_i\}_{i=1}^8) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k, 8); \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \leftarrow (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e})$
- 2 $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \left[\alpha, \beta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}; A \leftarrow \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^\alpha, msk \leftarrow \tilde{h}_7^\alpha, \right. \left. msk \leftarrow \tilde{h}_1^\beta \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \right]$
- 3 $params \leftarrow (\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \tilde{g}_1, \tilde{g}_2, \tilde{h}_1, \tilde{h}_2, A)$
- 4 $(state, M_0, M_1, id^*) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyExt, Dec}}(\tilde{\mathbb{G}})$
- 5 $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^*$
- 6 $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}; ct_1^* \leftarrow M_b \cdot A^s, ct_2^* \leftarrow \tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid^*}$
- 7 $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyExt}}(state, (ct_1^*, ct_2^*))$

Procedure KeyExt(*id*)

- 8 $t, t', \gamma, \gamma', \delta, \delta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \left[t, t', t'', t''', \gamma, \delta, \gamma', \delta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \right]$
- 9 $\text{return } sk_{id}^1 := \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^t \cdot \tilde{h}_5^\gamma \cdot \tilde{h}_6^\delta, sk_{id}^2 := \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^{t'} \cdot \tilde{h}_5^{\gamma'} \cdot \tilde{h}_6^{\delta'}$
- return $sk_{id,1} := \tilde{h}_1^\beta \tilde{h}_1^{t'id} \tilde{h}_2^{t''} \cdot \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^t \cdot \tilde{h}_5^\gamma \cdot \tilde{h}_6^\delta, sk_{id,2} := \tilde{h}_1^{t''id} \tilde{h}_2^{t'''} \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^{t'} \cdot \tilde{h}_5^{\gamma'} \cdot \tilde{h}_6^{\delta'}$

Procedure Dec(*id*, (ct₁, ct₂))

- 10 $t, \gamma, \delta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \left[t, t', \gamma, \delta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \right]$
- 11 $\text{if } \tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \tilde{h}_8^t \tilde{h}_5^\gamma \tilde{h}_6^\delta) \neq 1 \text{ return } \perp$ if $\tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_1^{t'id} \tilde{h}_2^{t''} \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \tilde{h}_8^t \tilde{h}_5^\gamma \tilde{h}_6^\delta) \neq 1$ return \perp
- 12 $\text{return } ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, msk)^{-1}$

Lemma 5.8. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption holds, then Game₀ is computationally indistinguishable from Game₁.*

Proof. We assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between Game₀ and Game₁ with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sgH}} := \{\{7, 8\}, \emptyset\}$, $S_H^{\text{sgH}} := \{\{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}, \emptyset\}$, $T_1 = \{(7, 8)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (7, 8)\}$, with challenge terms in \tilde{H} .

\mathcal{B} receives as input $\tilde{\mathbb{G}} = (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e})$ and elements

$$(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_3, \dots, \tilde{h}_8, T, T'),$$

where either $(T, T') = (\tilde{h}_7^v, \tilde{h}_8^v)$ or $(T, T') = (\tilde{h}_7^v \tilde{h}_1^z, \tilde{h}_8^v \tilde{h}_2^z)$ for $v, z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. \mathcal{B} implicitly sets $\alpha = v$ and gives $params := (\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, T))$ to \mathcal{A} .

On KeyExt queries for an identity *id*, \mathcal{B} picks random $t, t', \delta, \delta', \sigma, \sigma', \eta, \eta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$sk_{id,1} := T \cdot T^{\eta id} \cdot (T')^\eta \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \tilde{h}_8^t \tilde{h}_5^\delta \tilde{h}_6^\sigma, sk_{id,2} := T^{\eta' id} \cdot (T')^{\eta'} \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \tilde{h}_8^{t'} \tilde{h}_5^{\delta'} \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma'},$$

Note that if $(T, T') = (\tilde{h}_7^v, \tilde{h}_8^v)$, this is distributed as in Game₀. If instead $(T, T') = (\tilde{h}_7^v \tilde{h}_1^z, \tilde{h}_8^v \tilde{h}_2^z)$, then this is distributed as in Game₁, with $\beta := z$.

On Dec queries for (*id*, (ct₁, ct₂)), \mathcal{B} picks random values $t', \delta', \sigma', \eta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and checks that $\tilde{e}(ct_2, T^{\eta' id} \cdot (T')^{\eta'} \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \tilde{h}_8^{t'} \tilde{h}_5^{\delta'} \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma'}) = 1$ and outputs \perp if this check fails. Otherwise, it returns

$$M := ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, T \tilde{h}_7^{id} \tilde{h}_8)^{-1}.$$

Note that if $T = \tilde{h}_7^v$, this will produce the same responses as the decryption oracle in Game₀, and if $T = \tilde{h}_7^v \tilde{h}_1^z$, this will produce the same responses as the decryption oracle in Game₁.

Since \mathcal{B} knows the public parameters, it can simply use the regular encryption algorithm to produce the challenge ciphertext. It can therefore leverage \mathcal{A} 's non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between Game_0 and Game_1 to achieve a non-negligible advantage against this instance of the correlated subgroup decision problem. \square

Next, in Game_2 , we add in duplicate components to the challenge ciphertext as well. This means changing Game_1 as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Game}_1, \boxed{\text{Game}_2} \\ 6 \quad s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \boxed{s, s' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}}; \text{ct}_1^* \leftarrow M_b \cdot A^s, \boxed{\text{ct}_1^* \leftarrow M_b \cdot A^s \cdot \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_1, \tilde{h}_1)^{\beta s'}} \\ \text{ct}_2^* \leftarrow \tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid^*}, \boxed{\text{ct}_2^* \leftarrow \tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid^*} \cdot \tilde{g}_1^{s'} \cdot \tilde{g}_2^{s'id^*}} \end{array}$$

Lemma 5.9. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption holds, then Game_1 is computationally indistinguishable from Game_2 .*

Proof. We assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between Game_1 and Game_2 with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sg}^h} := \{\{7, 8\}, \emptyset\}$, $S_H^{\text{sg}^h} := \{\{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, \{(1, 2), (7, 8)\}\}\}$, $T_1 = \{(7, 8)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (7, 8)\}$, with challenge terms in \tilde{G} .

To start, \mathcal{B} receives as input $\tilde{\mathbb{G}} = (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e})$ and elements

$$(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_3, \dots, \tilde{h}_8, \tilde{h}_{1,7} := \tilde{h}_1^z \tilde{h}_7^t, \tilde{h}_{2,8} := \tilde{h}_2^z \tilde{h}_8^t, T, T'),$$

where either $(T, T') = (\tilde{g}_7^s, \tilde{g}_8^s)$ or $(T, T') = (\tilde{g}_7^s \tilde{g}_1^w, \tilde{g}_8^s \tilde{g}_2^w)$ for $z, t, s, w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. \mathcal{B} then picks a random $\alpha' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and implicitly sets $\alpha := t\alpha'$ and $\beta := z\alpha'$. It then gives $\text{params} := (\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_{1,7})^{\alpha'})$ to \mathcal{A} .

On KeyExt queries for an identity id , \mathcal{B} chooses random $\delta, \delta', \sigma, \sigma', \eta, \eta', \gamma, \gamma' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{id}^1 &:= \tilde{h}_{1,7}^{\alpha'} \tilde{h}_{1,7}^{\eta id} \tilde{h}_{2,8}^{\eta'} \tilde{h}_7^{\gamma id} \tilde{h}_8^{\gamma'} \tilde{h}_5^{\delta} \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma} = \tilde{h}_1^{z\alpha'} \tilde{h}_1^{z\eta id} \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{t\alpha'} \tilde{h}_7^{t\eta id} \cdot \tilde{h}_2^{z\eta} \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{\gamma id} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^{t\eta} \tilde{h}_8^{\gamma'} \cdot \tilde{h}_5^{\delta} \cdot \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma}, \\ sk_{id}^2 &:= \tilde{h}_{1,7}^{\eta' id} \tilde{h}_{2,8}^{\eta'} \tilde{h}_7^{\gamma' id} \tilde{h}_8^{\gamma'} \tilde{h}_5^{\delta'} \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma'} = \tilde{h}_1^{z\eta' id} \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{t\eta' id} \cdot \tilde{h}_2^{z\eta'} \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{\gamma' id} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^{t\eta'} \tilde{h}_8^{\gamma'} \cdot \tilde{h}_5^{\delta'} \cdot \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma'}, \end{aligned}$$

which, for $\beta := z\alpha'$, is distributed identically to the key computed in both Game_1 and Game_2 .

On Dec queries of the form $(id, (\text{ct}_1, \text{ct}_2))$, \mathcal{B} chooses random $\eta', \gamma', \delta', \sigma' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and checks that $\tilde{e}(\text{ct}_2, \tilde{h}_{1,7}^{\eta' id} \tilde{h}_{2,8}^{\eta'} \tilde{h}_7^{\gamma' id} \tilde{h}_8^{\gamma'} \tilde{h}_5^{\delta'} \tilde{h}_6^{\sigma'}) = 1$, and outputs \perp if any of this check fails. Otherwise, it returns

$$M := \text{ct}_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(\text{ct}_2, \tilde{h}_{1,7}^{\alpha'} \tilde{h}_7^{\eta id} \tilde{h}_8)^{-1}.$$

To produce the challenge ciphertext for id^* , \mathcal{B} picks $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ and computes

$$\text{ct}_1 := M_b \tilde{e}(T, \tilde{h}_{1,7}^{\alpha'}) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ct}_2 := T(T')^{id^*}.$$

If $(T, T') = (\tilde{g}_7^s, \tilde{g}_8^s)$, this is a properly distributed encryption of M_b for Game_1 . If instead $(T, T') = (\tilde{g}_7^s \tilde{g}_1^w, \tilde{g}_8^s \tilde{g}_2^w)$, this is a properly distributed encryption of M_b for Game_2 (with $s' = w$). Thus, \mathcal{B} can leverage \mathcal{A} 's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against this instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem. \square

Lemma 5.10. *If the embedded scheme is weakly IND-CCA1 secure and weak projecting holds in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$, then no PPT adversary can achieve a non-negligible advantage in Game_2 .*

Proof. We assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that achieves a non-negligible advantage in Game_2 , and use it to construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that has related non-negligible advantage in the weak IND-CCA1 game for the embedded scheme. To start, \mathcal{B} receives as input $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$. It then constructs $\tilde{\mathbb{G}} = (N, \tilde{G}, \tilde{H}, \tilde{G}_T, \tilde{e}, \tilde{\mu})$ with the properties described above; as a reminder, this is done in such a way that \mathcal{B} knows the trapdoor information τ and suitable generators $\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{h}_7$, and \tilde{h}_8 . It then picks $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, and gives $params := (\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \tilde{g}_7, \tilde{g}_8, \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^\alpha)$ to \mathcal{A} .

On KeyExt queries for an identity id , \mathcal{B} first outputs id as its own KeyExt query to receive back $sk_{id,1}, sk_{id,2} \in H_1 \oplus H_2 \oplus H_5 \oplus H_6$. It then chooses $t, t' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and computes its response as

$$((sk_{id,1})' := \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \cdot \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^t \cdot sk_{id,1}, (sk_{id,2})' := \tilde{h}_7^{t'id} \cdot \tilde{h}_8^{t'} \cdot sk_{id,2}).$$

We note that this produces properly distributed keys.

On Dec queries of the form $(id, (ct_1, ct_2))$, \mathcal{B} first chooses a random $t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and checks if $\tilde{e}(ct_2, h_7^{tid} h_8^t) = 1$. If this check fails, it outputs \perp . (Since t is randomly chosen, there is only a negligible chance that \mathcal{A} can produce a query that fails this check but pass the decryption check with the additional terms in \tilde{H} present.) Otherwise, it outputs its own Dec query

$$(id, 1, \pi_G(ct_2)),$$

where here 1 denotes the identity element in G_T . If it receives \perp in response, it replies with \perp to \mathcal{A} . If instead it receives some $X \in G_T$, it returns to \mathcal{A} the message

$$M := ct_1 \cdot X \cdot \left(\tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \tilde{h}_8) \right)^{-1}.$$

To see that this properly simulates the decryption oracle, note that when the decryption checks pass, we have

$$\text{Dec}(sk, (ct_1, ct_2)) = ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, (sk_{id,1})')^{-1} = ct_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(ct_2, sk_{id,1})^{-1} \cdot \left(\tilde{e}(ct_2, \tilde{h}_7^\alpha \tilde{h}_7^{tid} \tilde{h}_8) \right)^{-1}.$$

Moreover, we have

$$\tilde{e}(ct_2, sk_{id,1})^{-1} = e(\pi_G(ct_2), sk_{id,1})^{-1} = X$$

(by construction of the decryption algorithm for the embedded weakly secure scheme).

Finally, when \mathcal{A} outputs its challenge (M_0, M_1, id^*) , \mathcal{B} outputs M_0, M_1, id^* as its own challenge to receive back a ciphertext (ct'_1, ct'_2) . It then picks $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and computes

$$ct_1^* := ct'_1 \cdot \tilde{e}(\tilde{g}_7, \tilde{h}_7)^{\alpha s} \quad \text{and} \quad ct_2^* := ct'_2 \cdot \tilde{g}_7^s \cdot \tilde{g}_8^{sid},$$

and gives (ct_1, ct_2) as the challenge ciphertext to \mathcal{A} . We note that this is a properly distributed ciphertext. When \mathcal{A} outputs its guess bit b' , \mathcal{B} outputs the same bit. \square

6 A Composite-Order Instantiation of Our IBE

To show that we can instantiate our IBE constructed in Section 5 (both the weakly and fully IND-CCA1 variants), we must construct a composite-order bilinear group that satisfies weak projecting, canceling, parameter hiding, and generalized correlated subgroup decision.

We begin with a symmetric bilinear group (N, G', G'_T, e') , where $N = pqrs$ for distinct primes p, q, r , and s , and $G' = G_p \oplus G_q \oplus G_r \oplus G_s$ for $G_p = \langle g_p \rangle$, $G_q = \langle g_q \rangle$, $G_r = \langle g_r \rangle$, and $G_s = \langle g_s \rangle$. The first three primes are used in our weak scheme, and the last prime s is used to embed the weak scheme into the full scheme.

We then pick random values $a, b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and define $G := G_1 \oplus \dots \oplus G_6$ to be $G_p G_q G_r \times G_p G_q G_r$, where $G_1 := \langle (g_p, g_p^a) \rangle$, $G_2 := \langle (1, g_p^b) \rangle$, $G_3 := \langle (g_q, g_q^a) \rangle$, $G_4 := \langle (1, g_q^b) \rangle$, $G_5 := \langle (g_r, 1) \rangle$, and $G_6 := \langle (1, g_r) \rangle$. To provide a membership test for G , we assume that we are given the prime s as part of μ , so pqr and s are separately known, but it is still hard to factor pqr .

Similarly, we define $H = H_1 \oplus \dots \oplus H_6$ to be $G_p G_q G_r \times G_p G_q G_r$, where $H_1 := \langle (g_p^b, 1) \rangle$, $H_2 := \langle (g_p^a, g_p^{-1}) \rangle$, $H_3 := \langle (g_q^b, 1) \rangle$, $H_4 := \langle (g_q^a, g_q^{-1}) \rangle$, $H_5 := \langle (g_r, 1) \rangle$, and $H_6 := \langle (1, g_r) \rangle$. We define $e : G \times H \rightarrow G_T$ by

$$e((g, g'), (h, h')) := e'(g, h) \cdot e'(g', h') \quad \forall g, g', h, h' \in G',$$

and set $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T := G'_T, e, \mu)$. It is easy to verify that e satisfies both bilinearity and non-degeneracy. In addition, as pairing elements in any of the two subgroups (e.g., G_p and G_q) yields the identity, a case-by-case analysis reveals that canceling is satisfied as well; for example, to show that $e(G_1, H_3) = 1$, we observe that, to have order p , we must have $g_p = (g')^{\alpha qrs}$ for some $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, and similarly have $g_q = (g')^{\beta prs}$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, where g' is a generator of G' . We therefore have

$$e((g_p, g_p^a), (g_q^b, 1)) = e'(g_p, g_q^b) \cdot e'(g_p^a, 1) = e((g')^{\alpha qrs}, (g')^{b\beta prs}) = e(g', g')^{b\alpha\beta pqr^2 s^2} = e(g', g')^{b\alpha\beta rs \cdot N} = 1.$$

Projecting is also satisfied, as the Chinese Remainder theorem implies that we can efficiently construct, for example, a value λ_p such that

$$\lambda_p \equiv \begin{cases} 1 \pmod{p} \\ 0 \pmod{q} \\ 0 \pmod{r}, \end{cases}$$

and thus project G' into G_p and, incorporating the values a and b as well, into the subgroups G_i and H_i accordingly. Finally, Equation 2 is satisfied, as

$$e(g_1 g_2, h_1 h_2) = e'(g_p, g_p^b) \cdot e'(g_p^b, g_p^{-1}) = 1,$$

and

$$e(g_3 g_4, h_3 h_4) = e'(g_q, g_q^a) \cdot e'(g_q^a, g_q^{-1}) = 1,$$

so that $e(g_1 g_2, h_1 h_2) = e(g_3 g_4, h_3 h_4) = 1$ as required.

We note that the message space for the scheme will be the subgroup of G_T of order p . This is not the usual case, as messages are typically assumed to come from the larger group G_T . However, this strange feature is circumvented in the prime-order case, where we can adjust things to work with the typical message space of G_T . We view this composite-order construction mostly as an instructive demonstration of our proof techniques rather than as a scheme recommended for practice, so we are not overly concerned with the oddity of the message space here.

We show that parameter hiding is satisfied as well in the following lemma:

Lemma 6.1. *The parameter hiding requirement in Example 2.7 holds for $\mathcal{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ defined as above.*

Proof. To prove that the distributions in Example 2.7 are equivalent, we observe that $h_3^{zy} h_4^z = (g_q^{bzy} \cdot g_q^{az}, g_q^{-z}) = (g_q^{z(a+by)}, g_q^{-z})$ and $g_3^w g_4^{wx} = (g_q^w, g_q^{aw} \cdot g_q^{bwx}) = (g_q^w, g_q^{w(a+bx)})$. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the values of a, b modulo q are uniformly random and independent of their values modulo the other primes. Thus, when $x \neq y$, the values $ax + b$ and $ay + b$ are distributed uniformly at random modulo q , since $f(\phi) = a\phi + b$ is a pairwise independent function modulo q . \square

All it remains to show is that generalized correlated subgroup decision holds in this setting. To do this, we use the generalized subgroup decision assumption, formalized by Bellare et al. [6]. Our formalization also allows for a single prime s to be revealed, and requires subgroup decision hardness only within the subgroups of the other prime orders. We state this as follows:

Assumption 6.2. [25] *Let (S_0, S_1, \dots, S_k) be non-empty subsets of $[m]$ such that for each $2 \leq j \leq k$, either $S_j \cap S_0 = \emptyset = S_j \cap S_1$ or $S_j \cap S_0 \neq \emptyset \neq S_j \cap S_1$. Given a bilinear group generator BilinearGen , define the following distribution:*

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{G} &= (N = p_1 \dots p_m p_{m+1}, p_{m+1}, G, G_T, e) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{BilinearGen}(1^k), \\ Z_0 &\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{S_0}, Z_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{S_1}, \dots, Z_k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} G_{S_k}, \\ D &:= (\mathcal{G}, Z_2, \dots, Z_k). \end{aligned}$$

(Here, the notation G_{S_i} denotes the subgroup of order $\prod_{j \in S_i} p_j$.) Then for any PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(D, Z_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(D, Z_1) = 1]| < \nu(k).$$

Lemma 6.3. *If the generalized subgroup decision assumption holds in \mathcal{G} , so does generalized correlated subgroup decision.*

Proof. We consider an arbitrary instance of generalized correlated subgroup decision described by sets $S_H^{\text{sgH}}, S_H^{\text{sgH}}, T_1$, and T_2 ; without loss of generality we assume the challenge terms are in G . We associate the pair $(1, 2)$ with the prime p , the pair $(3, 4)$ with the prime q , and the pair $(5, 6)$ with the prime r . In this way, we can re-interpret T_1 and T_2 as subsets of $\{p, q, r\}$ that differ in precisely one element. We then consider an instance of the generalized subgroup decision assumption for the composite-order group G' where the challenge term is either a random element of the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes in T_1 or a random element of the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes in T_2 . We may assume that generators of all prime-order subgroups are given out *except* for the prime that differs between T_1 and T_2 . Also, for any subset Z of $\{p, q, r\}$ such that $T_1 \cap Z \neq \emptyset \neq T_2 \cap Z$, we may assume that a random element is given out from the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes in Z .

We now observe that such elements must suffice to produce the elements of G and H prescribed by S . We choose $a, b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and can then produce all of the required generators, since S cannot include single numbers corresponding to the prime that differentiates between T_1 and T_2 . Now, any tuple of pairs that appears in S and involves the prime for which we are not given a generator must also include a pair that is common to T_1 and T_2 . Hence, we have been given a random element X from the subgroup whose order is the product of the primes corresponding to the pairs in the tuple. To produce the correlated samples, we simply choose a random exponent $t \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and take X raised to appropriate powers in terms of a and b . For example, suppose that X is a random element of $G_p G_q$, and we are tasked with creating correlated samples from $G_1 \oplus G_3$ and $G_2 \oplus G_4$; then we produce (X, X^{ta}) and $(1, X^{tb})$. The fact that this is properly distributed as a correlated sample follows from the Chinese Remainder theorem, as the values of t modulo p and q are independent and each uniformly random. \square

By construction, we have now proved the following theorem:

Theorem 6.4. *If generalized subgroup decision holds in \mathcal{G} as described above, then the instantiation of the construction in Section 5.1 in \mathcal{G} is a weakly IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.*

We would also like to prove the corresponding theorem for the fully secure variant. To do this, we need to show that a group G of order $N = pqrs$ can be constructed using the previously defined group G' of order pqr . We observe that we could treat G' as a subgroup of this larger group $G = G' \oplus G_s$, and restrict ourselves to computations within this subgroup, letting a generator g_s for this additional subgroup be known. (While this process of restricting computation to strictly within G' might reveal s , we allow s to be known anyway.) We assume that this process of thus “embedding” a group of order pqr into a group G of order $pqrs$ for known s generates the trapdoor knowledge τ that allows one to efficiently compute projection maps from G into G' .

We then define $\tilde{G} := \tilde{G}_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \tilde{G}_8 = G^2$, with the generators $\tilde{g}_1, \dots, \tilde{g}_6$ and $\tilde{h}_1, \dots, \tilde{h}_6$ defined as before, and the additional generators defined as $\tilde{g}_7 := (g_s, g_s^{a'})$, $\tilde{g}_8 := (1, g_s^{b'})$, $\tilde{h}_7 := (g_s^{b'}, 1)$, and $\tilde{h}_8 := (g_s^{a'}, g_s^{-1})$ for $a', b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, where $N = pqrs$. We define \tilde{e} by

$$\tilde{e}((g, g'), (h, h')) := e'(g, h) \cdot e'(g', h') \quad \forall g, g', h, h' \in G,$$

and thus use $\tilde{G}_T := G'_T$. Finally, knowledge of s allows one to project onto G_{pqr} and H_{pqr} , and the correlated subgroup decision assumption for this expanded setting follows from the generalized subgroup decision assumption for G of order $N = pqrs$ by the same argument applied above for the case of three primes, which proves the following theorem:

Theorem 6.5. *If generalized subgroup decision holds in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$, then the instantiation of the construction in Section 5.2 in $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$ is an IND-CCA1-secure identity-based encryption scheme.*

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A Proofs for Our Weak IND-CCA1-Secure IBE (Section 5.1)

To prove Theorem 5.3, which says that our IBE construction is weakly IND-CCA1 secure, we proceed through the following series of game transitions:

- **Game₀**. The honest weak IND-CCA1 game.
- **Game₁**. Switch to adding in a “duplicate” component in $G_3 \oplus G_4$ to the challenge ciphertext ct_2^* ; i.e., the value $g_3^{s'} g_4^{s' id}$. This is indistinguishable from **Game₀** by subgroup decision.
- **Game₂**. Switch the $G_3 \oplus G_4$ component in ct_2^* to be uniformly random. This is identical to **Game₁** by parameter hiding.
- **Game₃**. Switch the keys returned by **KeyExt** to have random components in $H_3 \oplus H_4$ on $sk_{id,1}$ and on $sk_{id,2}$; i.e., values $h_3^{s'} h_4^{s''}$ (different values of s', s'' for $sk_{id,1}$ and $sk_{id,2}$). This is indistinguishable from **Game₂** using a hybrid argument relying on subgroup decision and parameter hiding.
- **Game₄**. Switch from performing the decryption check with a term of the form $h_1^{t' id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}$ to using a term of the form $h_1^{t' id} h_2^{t'} h_3^{t'' id} h_4^{t''} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}$. This is indistinguishable from **Game₃** by subgroup decision.
- **Game₅**. Switch the **Dec** oracle to return \perp on every query in which $\text{ct}_2 \neq 1$, and 1 if $\text{ct}_2 = 1$. This is indistinguishable from **Game₄** by subgroup decision and parameter hiding.
- **Game₆**. Switch to encrypting a random message in the challenge ciphertext. This is indistinguishable from **Game₅** by subgroup decision; furthermore, as there is now no information about the bit b , any adversary playing this game has advantage exactly zero.

Following this outline, we begin in **Game₁** by adding a “duplicate” $G_3 \oplus G_4$ component to the ciphertext.

$\text{Game}_0, \boxed{\text{Game}_1}$
1 $(N, G, H, G_T, e, \{g_i\}_{i=1}^6, \{h_i\}_{i=1}^6, \mu) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{BilinearGen}'(1^k, 6); \mathbb{G} \leftarrow (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$
2 $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, A \leftarrow e(g_1, h_1)^\alpha, msk \leftarrow h_1^\alpha$
3 $(\text{state}, M_0, M_1, id^*) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyExt}, \text{Dec}}(\mathbb{G})$
4 $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$
5 $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \boxed{s, s' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}}; ct_1^* \leftarrow M_b \cdot A^s, ct_2^* \leftarrow g_1^s g_2^{sid^*}, \boxed{ct_2^* \leftarrow g_1^s g_2^{sid^*} g_3^{s'} g_4^{s' id^*}}$
6 $b' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}^{\text{KeyExt}}(\text{state}, (ct_1^*, ct_2^*))$

Procedure KeyExt(id)
7 $t, t', \gamma, \gamma', \beta, \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$
8 return $(sk_{id,1} \leftarrow h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^{\gamma'} \cdot h_6^\beta, sk_{id,2} \leftarrow h_1^{t' id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_5^{\gamma'} \cdot h_6^{\beta'})$

Procedure Dec($id, (ct_1, ct_2)$)
9 $t', \gamma', \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$
10 if $e(ct_2, h_1^{t' id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}) \neq 1$ return \perp
11 return $ct_1 \cdot e(ct_2, msk)^{-1}$

Lemma A.1. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption and canceling hold in \mathbb{G} , then Game_1 is computationally indistinguishable from Game_0 .*

Proof. We assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between Game_0 and Game_1 with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sgn}} := \{\{1, 2\}, \emptyset\}$, $S_H^{\text{sgn}} := \{\{1, 2, 5, 6\}, \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}\}$, $T_1 = \{(1, 2)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}$, with challenge terms in G .

To start, \mathcal{B} therefore receives as input the bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$, and elements

$$(g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_5, h_6, h_{1,3} := h_1^t h_3^z, h_{2,4} := h_2^t h_4^z, T, \tilde{T}),$$

where either $(T, \tilde{T}) = (g_1^s, g_2^s)$ or $(T, \tilde{T}) = (g_1^s g_3^w, g_2^s g_4^w)$ for $t, z, s, w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. \mathcal{B} then chooses a random $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and implicitly sets $A := e(g_1, h_1)^\alpha$; it then gives \mathbb{G} to \mathcal{A} . On KeyExt queries, \mathcal{B} can use its knowledge of α to compute h_1^α and thus answer queries honestly. To answer decryption queries, \mathcal{B} performs the check in line 10 and executes line 11 honestly.

Finally, to produce the challenge ciphertext, \mathcal{B} picks $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ and computes

$$ct_1^* := M_b \cdot e(T, h_1)^\alpha \quad \text{and} \quad ct_2^* := T \cdot \tilde{T}^{id^*}.$$

If $(T, \tilde{T}) = (g_1^s, g_2^s)$, then $ct_1^* = M_b \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{\alpha s}$ and $ct_2^* = g_1^s \cdot g_2^{sid^*}$, and thus this is distributed identically to the honest ct^* in Game_0 . If instead $(T, \tilde{T}) = (g_1^s g_3^w, g_2^s g_4^w)$, then

$$ct_1^* = M_b \cdot e(g_1^s g_3^w, h_1)^\alpha = M_b \cdot e(g_1, h_1)^{\alpha s},$$

where this last equality follows from canceling, and $ct_2^* = g_1^s \cdot g_2^{sid^*} \cdot g_3^w \cdot g_4^{wid^*}$, and thus (ct_1^*, ct_2^*) is distributed identically to the ct^* in Game_1 . At the end of the game, if \mathcal{A} guesses it is in Game_0 then \mathcal{B} therefore guesses that $(T, \tilde{T}) = (g_1^s, g_2^s)$, and if \mathcal{A} guesses it is in Game_1 then \mathcal{B} guesses that $(T, \tilde{T}) = (g_1^s g_3^w, g_2^s g_4^w)$. As \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates the interaction that \mathcal{A} expects in either game and furthermore guesses correctly whenever \mathcal{A} does, \mathcal{B} succeeds with an advantage negligibly different from that of \mathcal{A} , and thus succeeds with non-negligible advantage. \square

Next, in Game_2 , we switch to using a random component in $G_3 \oplus G_4$ as opposed to a duplicate component. This means switching one line of Game_1 as follows:

$$\text{Game}_1, \boxed{\text{Game}_2}$$

$$5 \quad s, s' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \boxed{s, s_3, s_4 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}}; \text{ct}_1^* \leftarrow M_b \cdot A^s, \text{ct}_2^* \leftarrow g_1^s g_2^{s id^*} g_3^{s'} g_4^{s' id^*}, \boxed{\text{ct}_2^* \leftarrow g_1^s g_2^{s id^*} g_3^{s_3} g_4^{s_4}}$$

Lemma A.2. *If parameter hiding holds in \mathbb{G} , then Game_2 is information-theoretically indistinguishable from Game_1 .*

Proof. Given the distribution \mathcal{D} defined in Example 2.7 for $x = id^*$, one can simulate an honest interaction in Game_1 , as it provides the id^* -correlated samples $S_1 := g_1^s g_2^{s id^*}$ and $S_2 := g_3^w g_4^{w id^*}$, which can be used to form $\text{ct}_2^* := S_1 \cdot S_2$. By parameter hiding, S_2 is distributed identically to $g_3^w g_4^u$ for $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, and thus Game_1 and Game_2 are identical. \square

Next, in Game_3 , we transition to adding in random components in $H_3 \oplus H_4$ to the keys. This means changing two lines of Game_2 as follows:

$$\text{Game}_2, \boxed{\text{Game}_3}$$

$$7 \quad t, t', \gamma, \gamma', \beta, \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \boxed{t, t', t_3, t_4, t'_3, t'_4, \gamma, \gamma', \beta, \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}}$$

$$8 \quad \text{return } (sk_{id,1} \leftarrow h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^\gamma \cdot h_6^\beta, sk_{id,2} \leftarrow h_1^{t' id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_5^{\gamma'} \cdot h_6^{\beta'}),$$

$$\boxed{\text{return } (sk_{id,1} \leftarrow h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_3^{t'' id} \cdot h_4^{t''} \cdot h_5^\gamma \cdot h_6^\beta, sk_{id,2} \leftarrow h_1^{t' id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_3^{t''' id} \cdot h_4^{t'''} \cdot h_5^{\gamma'} \cdot h_6^{\beta'})}$$

To now show that adding in random $H_3 \oplus H_4$ components to extracted keys goes unnoticed, we proceed through a series of q hybrids, where q is the number of queries made to the KeyExt oracle. In the i -th hybrid, we answer the first i queries with additional component $h_3^{t'} h_4^{t''}$, and we answer the last $q-i$ queries without such components; in fact, in the reduction we answer the queries using id -correlated components in $H_3 \oplus H_4$, but we argue using parameter hiding that this is distributed identically to the keys in Game_3 . We can therefore see that the first hybrid $\text{Game}_{3,0}$ is equivalent to Game_2 , while the last hybrid $\text{Game}_{3,q}$ is equivalent to Game_3 ; to show the indistinguishability of Game_2 and Game_3 , it therefore suffices to show the following lemma:

Lemma A.3. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption and parameter hiding hold in \mathbb{G} , then $\text{Game}_{3,i}$ is computationally indistinguishable from $\text{Game}_{3,i-1}$ for all i , $1 \leq i \leq q$.*

Proof. We break the transition from $\text{Game}_{3,i-1}$ to $\text{Game}_{3,i}$ into two nearly identical steps. In the first step, we change the i -th key to have a random component in $H_3 \oplus H_4$ on $sk_{id,1}$. In the second step, we also make this change on $sk_{id,2}$. We assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that, for some i , can distinguish between the first step and $\text{Game}_{3,i-1}$ with some non-negligible advantage and use it to construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage (assuming parameter hiding holds). We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sgH}} := \{\{1, 2\}, \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}\}$, $S_H^{\text{sgH}} := \{\{1, 2, 5, 6\}, \{(3, 4), (5, 6)\}, \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}\}$, $T_1 = \{(1, 2), (5, 6)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, with challenge terms in H .

To start, \mathcal{B} therefore receives as input the bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ and elements

$$(g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_5, h_6, g_{1,3} := g_1^s g_3^w, g_{2,4} := g_2^s g_4^w, h_{3,5} := h_3^a h_5^b, h_{4,6} := h_4^a h_6^b, h_{1,3} := h_1^r h_3^v, h_{2,4} := h_2^r h_4^v, T, \tilde{T}),$$

where either $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_6^\gamma)$ or $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$ for $s, w, a, b, r, v, t, z, \gamma \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. It then chooses a random $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and implicitly sets $A := e(g_1, h_1)^\alpha$; it also gives \mathbb{G} to \mathcal{A} . For the first $i - 1$ KeyExt queries, \mathcal{B} picks $t, t', \delta, \phi, \sigma, \phi, \delta', \phi', \sigma', \phi' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{id,1} &:= h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_{3,5}^\delta \cdot h_{4,6}^\psi \cdot h_5^\sigma h_6^\phi \quad \text{and} \\ sk_{id,2} &:= h_1^{t'id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_{3,5}^{\delta'} \cdot h_{4,6}^{\psi'} \cdot h_5^{\sigma'} \cdot h_6^{\phi'}. \end{aligned}$$

To respond to the i -th query, \mathcal{B} instead chooses $\sigma, \phi, t', \sigma', \phi' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{id,1} &:= h_1^\alpha \cdot T^{id} \cdot \tilde{T} \cdot h_5^\sigma \cdot h_6^\phi \quad \text{and} \\ sk_{id,2} &:= h_1^{t'id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_5^{\sigma'} \cdot h_6^{\phi'}. \end{aligned}$$

For the rest of the queries, \mathcal{B} picks $t, t', \sigma, \phi, \sigma', \phi' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{id,1} &:= h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^\sigma \cdot h_6^\phi \quad \text{and} \\ sk_{id,2} &:= h_1^{t'id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_5^{\sigma'} \cdot h_6^{\phi'}. \end{aligned}$$

To respond to decryption queries, \mathcal{B} picks $t, \sigma, \phi \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and checks that $e(\text{ct}_2, h_1^{tid} h_2^t h_5^\sigma h_6^\phi) = 1$. If this check fails, it outputs \perp . Otherwise, it decrypts honestly using h_1^α and outputs the result.

Finally, to create the challenge ciphertext for message M_b and identity id^* , \mathcal{B} computes

$$\text{ct}_1^* := M_b \cdot e(g_{1,3}, h_1)^\alpha \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ct}_2^* = g_{1,3}(g_{2,4})^{id^*}.$$

If \mathcal{A} guesses it is in $\text{Game}_{3,i-1}$, then \mathcal{B} guesses that (T, \tilde{T}) has no H_3 or H_4 component, while if it guesses that it is in the game with the first step applied \mathcal{B} guesses that it does have this additional component. To see that \mathcal{B} guesses correctly whenever \mathcal{A} does, we observe that if $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_6^\gamma)$ then, for the i -th query,

$$sk_{id,1} = h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^{\gamma id} \cdot h_5^\sigma \cdot h_6^\gamma \cdot h_6^\phi = h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^{\gamma id + \sigma} \cdot h_6^{\gamma + \phi} = h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_5^{\sigma'} \cdot h_6^{\phi'},$$

where σ' and ϕ' are distributed uniformly at random; this is therefore distributed identically to a key in Game_2 . Similarly, if $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$ then, for the i -th query,

$$sk_{id,1} = h_1^\alpha \cdot T^{id} \cdot \tilde{T} \cdot h_5^\sigma \cdot h_6^\phi = h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_3^{z id} \cdot h_4^z \cdot h_5^{\gamma id} \cdot h_5^\sigma \cdot h_6^\gamma \cdot h_6^\phi = h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_3^{z id} \cdot h_4^z \cdot h_5^{\sigma'} \cdot h_6^{\phi'},$$

which is distributed identically to a key in Game_3 , except an id -correlated sample is used in $H_3 \oplus H_4$ in place of a random sample. As knowledge of the distribution \mathcal{D} in Example 2.7 allows one to simulate \mathcal{A} 's view, however, the requirement that $id \neq id^*$ means parameter hiding implies that this is in fact distributed identically to a key in Game_3 . As \mathcal{B} therefore perfectly simulates $\text{Game}_{3,i-1}$ in the case that $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_6^\gamma)$ and perfectly simulates $sk_{id,1}$ keys in $\text{Game}_{3,i}$ in the case that $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$, it succeeds in guessing whenever \mathcal{A} does, and thus succeeds with non-negligible advantage.

The second step of this transition adds a random component onto $sk_{id,2}$ in an analogous way, and thus the reduction here is analogous to the one just presented (using the same instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption). \square

Next, in Game_4 , we change the decryption check as follows:

	Game ₃ ,	Game ₄
9	$t', \gamma', \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$,	$t', t'', \gamma', \beta' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$
10	if $e(\text{ct}_2, h_1^{t'id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}) \neq 1$ return \perp , if $e(\text{ct}_2, h_1^{t'id} h_2^{t'} h_3^{t''id} h_4^{t''} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}) \neq 1$ return \perp	

Lemma A.4. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption holds in \mathbb{G} , then Game₄ is computationally indistinguishable from Game₃.*

Proof. We assume we have an adversary \mathcal{A} that distinguishes between Game₃ and Game₄ with some non-negligible advantage, and use it to create an adversary \mathcal{B} that solves an instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision problem with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of the assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sg}^h} := \{\{1, 2\}, \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}\}$, $S_H^{\text{sg}^h} := \{\{1, 2, 5, 6\}, \{(3, 4), (5, 6)\}, \{(1, 2), (3, 4)\}\}$, $T_1 = \{(1, 2), (5, 6)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, with challenge terms in H .

To start, \mathcal{B} therefore receives as input the bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$ and elements

$$(g_1, g_2, h_1, h_2, h_5, h_6, g_{1,3} := g_1^s g_3^w, g_{2,4} := g_2^s g_4^w, h_{3,5} := h_3^a h_5^b, h_{4,6} := h_4^a h_6^b, h_{1,3} := h_1^r h_3^v, h_{2,4} := h_2^r h_4^v, T, \tilde{T}),$$

where either $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_6^\gamma)$ or $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$ for $s, w, a, b, r, v, t, z, \gamma \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. It then chooses a random $\alpha \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and implicitly sets $A := e(g_1, h_1)^\alpha$; it also gives \mathbb{G} to \mathcal{A} .

To respond to KeyExt queries, \mathcal{B} picks $t, t', \delta, \phi, \sigma, \phi, \delta', \phi', \sigma', \phi' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{id,1} &:= h_1^\alpha \cdot h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot h_{3,5}^\delta \cdot h_{4,6}^\psi \cdot h_5^\sigma h_6^\phi \quad \text{and} \\ sk_{id,2} &:= h_1^{t'id} \cdot h_2^{t'} \cdot h_{3,5}^{\delta'} \cdot h_{4,6}^{\psi'} \cdot h_5^{\sigma'} \cdot h_6^{\phi'}. \end{aligned}$$

To respond to decryption queries, \mathcal{B} chooses $\sigma, \phi, t', t, \sigma', \phi' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and checks that

$$e(\text{ct}_2, h_1^{tid} \cdot h_2^t \cdot T^{t'id} \cdot \tilde{T}^{t'} \cdot h_5^\sigma \cdot h_6^\phi) = 1.$$

If this check fails, it outputs \perp . Otherwise, it decrypts honestly using h_1^α and outputs the result. If T and \tilde{T} have no $H_3 \oplus H_4$ components, this check matches the one in Game₃, and otherwise this matches the check in Game₄.

Finally, to create the challenge ciphertext for message M_b and identity id^* , \mathcal{B} computes

$$\text{ct}_1^* := M_b e(g_{1,3}, h_1)^\alpha \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ct}_2^* = g_{1,3} (g_{2,4})^{id^*}.$$

If \mathcal{A} guesses that it is in Game₃, \mathcal{B} guesses that $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_6^\gamma)$, and if \mathcal{A} guesses that it is in Game₄, \mathcal{B} guesses that $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$. By our argument above, and the fact that \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates either Game₃ or Game₄, \mathcal{B} guesses correctly whenever \mathcal{A} does and thus guesses with the same non-negligible advantage. \square

Next, in Game₅, we switch to returning \perp on all decryption queries, unless $\text{ct}_2 = 1$ (in which case we return 1). As we will see, this reduction is where we crucially leverage the weak IND-CCA property that the parameters are not given to the attacker.

	Game ₄	Game ₅
9	if $e(\text{ct}_2, h_1^{t'id} h_2^{t'} h_5^{\gamma'} h_6^{\beta'}) \neq 1$ return \perp	if $\text{ct}_2 = 1$ return 1
10	return $\text{ct}_1 \cdot e(\text{ct}_2, \text{msk})^{-1}$	return \perp

Lemma A.5. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption and parameter hiding hold in \mathbb{G} , then Game_4 is computationally indistinguishable from Game_5 .*

Proof. Looking at the difference between the games, we can see that the only way for an adversary to distinguish between them is to produce a decryption query $(id, (ct_1, ct_2))$ for which $ct_2 \neq 1$ but the decryption check $e(ct_2, h_1^{tid} h_2^t h_3^{t'id} h_4^{t'} h_5^\sigma h_6^\phi) = 1$ passes. By parameter hiding, we argue that, given the elements that an adversary sees in the course of the game, this probability must be negligible unless ct_2 is an element of $G_1 \oplus G_2$. If this is the case, we will use ct_2 to break an instance of the correlated subgroup decision assumption.

We consider the instance of the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sg}} := \{\{3, 4\}, \{((1, 2), (3, 4))\}\}$, $S_H^{\text{sg}} := \{\{3, 4, 5, 6\}, \{((1, 2), (5, 6))\}\}$, $T_1 := \{(3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, and $T_2 := \{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, with challenge terms in H .

To start, \mathcal{B} therefore receives as input the bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$, and elements

$$(g_3, g_4, h_3, h_4, h_5, h_6, g_{1,3} := g_1^s g_3^w, g_{2,4} := g_2^s g_4^w, h_{1,5} := h_1^a h_5^b, h_{2,6} := h_2^a h_6^b, T, \tilde{T}),$$

where either $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$ or $(T, \tilde{T}) = (h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma, h_2^t h_4^z h_6^\gamma)$ for $s, w, a, b, z, \gamma, t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.

\mathcal{B} implicitly sets $\alpha = a$ and gives \mathbb{G} to \mathcal{A} . On KeyExt queries, \mathcal{B} chooses random values $\sigma, \delta, \eta, \psi, \nu, \sigma', \delta', \eta', \psi', \nu' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$\begin{aligned} sk_{id,1} &:= h_{1,5} \cdot h_{1,5}^{\eta id} \cdot h_{2,6}^\eta h_3^\sigma h_4^\delta h_5^\psi h_6^\nu \quad \text{and} \\ sk_{id,2} &:= h_{1,5}^{\eta' id} \cdot h_{2,6}^{\eta'} h_3^{\sigma'} h_4^{\delta'} h_5^{\psi'} h_6^{\nu'}. \end{aligned}$$

By inspection, we can see that this produces keys that are distributed identically to the honest keys in both Game_4 and Game_5 . For the challenge ciphertext, \mathcal{B} similarly computes it honestly.

When \mathcal{A} queries its Dec oracle on $(id, (ct_1, ct_2))$, \mathcal{B} first checks that $e(ct_2, h_5) = e(ct_2, h_6) = 1$ and $e(ct_2, h_3) = e(ct_2, h_4) = 1$. If these checks pass, then ct_2 is contained entirely in $G_1 \oplus G_2$. In this case, either $ct_2 = 1$, in which case Game_4 and Game_5 return the same answer and thus are identical, or ct_2 can be paired against T and \tilde{T} to determine the presence of H_1 and H_2 terms; i.e., if $e(ct_2, T) = 1$ then $T = h_3^z h_5^\gamma$, and if $e(ct_2, T) \neq 1$ then $T = h_1^t h_3^z h_5^\gamma$. In the case that the checks pass and $ct_2 \neq 1$, \mathcal{B} can therefore break this variant of subgroup decision.

To argue that if $ct_2 \neq 1$ this case must happen with non-negligible probability, we claim that \mathcal{A} can, with only negligible probability, produce a query such that $e(ct_2, h_1^{tid} h_2^t h_3^{t'id} h_4^{t'} h_5^\sigma h_6^\phi) = 1$ and $e(ct_2, h_3) = e(ct_2, h_4) = e(ct_2, h_5) = e(ct_2, h_6) = 1$ does *not* hold; this implies that the case we want will happen with overwhelming probability, and thus we are done. To see this, we again use the parameter hiding in Example 2.7: in \mathcal{A} 's view, only random elements of $H_3 \oplus H_4$ appear, and h_3 and h_4 are never used individually. One can thus simulate \mathcal{A} 's view using the distribution \mathcal{D} in Example 2.7, and $h_3^{t'id} h_4^{t'}$ for a fixed id is distributed identically to a uniformly random element of $H_3 \oplus H_4$ by parameter hiding. Hence, \mathcal{A} has only a negligible chance of passing the decryption check unless $ct_2 \in G_1 \oplus G_2$, in which case either $ct_2 = 1$, in which case the games are identical, or $ct_2 \neq 1$, in which case \mathcal{B} succeeds in breaking subgroup decision. \square

Finally, in Game_6 , we switch to encrypting a random message in G_T .

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Game}_5, \boxed{\text{Game}_6} \\ 5 \quad s, s_3, s_4 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}, \boxed{M \xleftarrow{\$} G_T}; ct_1^* \leftarrow M_b \cdot A^s, \boxed{ct_1^* \leftarrow M \cdot A^s}, ct_2^* \leftarrow g_1^s g_2^{sid^*} g_3^{s_3} g_4^{s_4} \end{array}$$

Lemma A.6. *If the generalized correlated subgroup decision assumption holds, then Game_6 is computationally indistinguishable from Game_5 .*

Proof. We assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that distinguishes between these games with non-negligible advantage, and use \mathcal{A} to construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that solves an instance of the correlated subgroup decision assumption with related non-negligible advantage. We invoke the instance of this assumption parameterized by sets $S_G^{\text{sgH}} := \{\{3, 4\}, \{((1, 2), (3, 4))\}\}$, $S_H^{\text{sgH}} := \{\{3, 4, 5, 6\}, \{((1, 2), (5, 6))\}\}$, $T_1 = \{(3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, and $T_2 = \{(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)\}$, with challenge terms in H .

\mathcal{B} is therefore given as input the bilinear group $\mathbb{G} = (N, G, H, G_T, e, \mu)$, and elements

$$(g_3, g_4, h_3, h_4, h_5, h_6, g_{1,3} := g_1^s g_3^w, g_{2,4} := g_2^s g_4^w, h_{1,5} := h_1^{t'} h_5^z, h_{2,6} := h_2^{t'} h_6^z, T),$$

where either $T = h_3^r h_5^\gamma$ or $T = h_1^{\alpha'} h_3^r h_5^\gamma$ for $s, w, t', z, \alpha', r, \gamma \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.

\mathcal{B} implicitly sets $\alpha = t' + \alpha'$ (where α' is 0 if T has no h_1 component) and gives \mathbb{G} to \mathcal{A} . On KeyExt queries, \mathcal{B} chooses random values $\sigma, \sigma', \delta, \delta', \eta, \eta', \psi, \psi', \nu, \nu' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and returns

$$sk_{id,1} := T \cdot h_{1,5} \cdot h_{1,5}^{\eta id} \cdot h_{2,6}^\eta h_3^\sigma h_4^\delta h_5^\psi h_6^\nu,$$

$$sk_{id,2} := h_{1,5}^{\eta' id} \cdot h_{2,6}^{\eta'} h_3^{\sigma'} h_4^{\delta'} h_5^{\psi'} h_6^{\nu'}.$$

By inspection, we can see that this produces properly distributed keys for both Game_5 and Game_6 . On decryption queries, \mathcal{B} simply replies with \perp whenever $\text{ct}_2 \neq 1$ and with 1 whenever $\text{ct}_2 = 1$. This also matches the specifications of both Game_5 and Game_6 .

Finally, to form the challenge ciphertext, \mathcal{B} chooses random values $\beta, \phi \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and computes

$$\text{ct}_1^* := M_b e(g_{1,3}, h_{1,5}) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ct}_2^* := g_{1,3} \cdot g_{2,4}^{id^*} g_3^\beta g_4^\phi.$$

Now, if $T = h_3^r h_5^\gamma$, then $\alpha = t'$, and this is a properly distributed encryption of M_b as in Game_5 . If $T = h_1^{\alpha'} h_3^r h_5^\gamma$, however, then $\alpha = t' + \alpha'$ for a fresh random value t' , which means, using the fact that the message space is the subgroup generated by $e(g_1, h_1)$, this is distributed as an encryption of a random message as in Game_6 . If \mathcal{B} therefore guesses that $T = h_3^r h_5^\gamma$ when \mathcal{A} guesses it is in Game_5 , and that $T = h_1^{\alpha'} h_3^r h_5^\gamma$ when \mathcal{A} guesses it is in Game_6 then, because \mathcal{B} has furthermore perfectly simulated honest interactions in either game, \mathcal{B} succeeds in guessing with the same non-negligible advantage as \mathcal{A} . \square

As there is no longer any information about M_b , and thus the bit b , in the challenge ciphertext (or anywhere), \mathcal{A} therefore has advantage exactly zero in Game_6 . Furthermore, as each game was (at least) computationally indistinguishable from the previous one, \mathcal{A} can have at most negligibly different advantage in each, and thus must have negligible advantage in the weak IND-CCA1 game.