

Cryptanalysis of the SPECK Family of Block Ciphers

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Abstract. SIMON and SPECK are two families of ultra-lightweight block ciphers which were announced by the U.S. National Security Agency in June 2013. Yet, the specification discusses only the design and the performance of both cipher families and the task of analyzing their security has been left to the were proposed by the U.S. National Security Agency in June 2013. Yet, the specification paper discusses only the design and the performance of both cipher families, the task of analyzing their security has been left to the research community.

In this paper we present conventional differential as well as rectangle attacks for almost all members of the SPECK cipher family, where we target up to 11/22, 12/23, 14/16, 15/29, and 18/34 rounds of the 32-, 48-, 64-, 96-, and 128-bit version, respectively.

Keywords: Differential cryptanalysis, block cipher, lightweight, SPECK

1 Introduction

Lightweight ciphers are optimized to operate on resource-constrained devices such as RFID tags, smartcards, or FPGAs that are limited with respect to their memory, battery supply, and computing power. In such environments, hardware and software efficiency is becoming more and more important. Besides ensuring efficiency, preserving a reasonable security is a main challenge in this area that getting a lot of attention and making it one of the ongoing research problem. During the last five years, many block ciphers have been developed to address this problem, including but not limited to mCrypton [13], HIGHT [11], PRESENT [5], KATAN [7], KLEIN [9], LED [10], and PRINCE [6].

In June 2013, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) contributed to this ongoing research by proposing two ARX-based families of ultra-lightweight block ciphers, called SIMON and SPECK, where the former is optimized for hardware (like PRESENT, LED, or KATAN), and the latter for software implementations (like KLEIN). Though, due to aggressive optimizations in their round function and the used rotation constants, both families perform well in hard- *and* software. The original paper of SIMON and SPECK presented only performance, specifications and implementation footprints [1,2], and was noticed by the cryptography research community in the work by Saarinen and Engels [14] in Summer 2012.

Method	Cipher	Rounds		Data	Memory	Time
		Full	Att.	(CP)	(Bytes)	
Differential	SPECK32/64	22	11	2^{31}	$2^{33.0}$	$2^{45.2}$
	SPECK48/72	22	12	2^{44}	$2^{46.6}$	$2^{66.0}$
	SPECK48/96	23	12	2^{44}	$2^{46.6}$	$2^{66.0}$
	SPECK64/96	26	13	2^{55}	$2^{58.0}$	$2^{84.9}$
	SPECK64/128	27	13	2^{55}	$2^{58.0}$	$2^{84.9}$
	SPECK96/144	29	15	2^{87}	$2^{90.6}$	$2^{132.7}$
	SPECK128/192	33	16	2^{121}	$2^{125.0}$	$2^{182.6}$
	SPECK128/256	34	16	2^{121}	$2^{125.0}$	$2^{182.6}$
Rectangle	SPECK32/64	22	11	2^{30}	$2^{33.6}$	$2^{61.1}$
	SPECK48/72	22	11	2^{45}	$2^{45.0}$	$2^{67.0}$
	SPECK48/96	23	12	2^{45}	$2^{48.2}$	$2^{91.0}$
	SPECK64/96	26	13	2^{62}	$2^{62.0}$	$2^{91.9}$
	SPECK64/128	27	14	2^{62}	$2^{64.3}$	$2^{123.7}$
	SPECK96/144	29	15	2^{91}	$2^{91.0}$	$2^{136.0}$
	SPECK128/192	33	17	2^{126}	$2^{126.0}$	$2^{186.9}$
	SPECK128/256	34	18	2^{126}	$2^{128.3}$	$2^{251.4}$

Table 1. Summary of our results on SPECK.

The design team did not discuss any security assessment of these two ciphers regarding their resistance against common attacks and left the task of analyzing the security of their constructions to the research community.

Contribution. In this paper, we analyze SPECK regarding to its resistance against differentials cryptanalysis. We show conventional key-recovery attacks on round-reduced versions of almost all family variants. Thereupon, we mount rectangle attacks where we use parts of our characteristics to extend the number of attacked rounds for the larger versions of the cipher. A complete summary of our results can be seen in Table 1.

Outline. In what follows, we first review the necessary details of SPECK in Section 2. The sections 3 and 4 present our differential and rectangle key-recovery attacks. We conclude our paper in Section 5. Before, we list the notations used throughout this paper (see Table 2).

2 SPECK

The SPECK $2n/k$ family is a simple ARX-based Feistel network, which processes the input as two words. At the beginning of a round, the left word of the state is rotated by α bits to the left, before the right word is added to it modulo 2^n . Next, a round key K^{i-1} is XORed to the left half. The right word is then rotated by β bits to the right, before the left word is XORed to the right. This procedure

n	Word size.
$2n$	State size.
k	Size of the secret key in bits.
P_i, C_i	Plaintext-ciphertext pair.
(L^r, R^r)	Left (L) and right (R) halves of the state after encryption of Round r in a Feistel-cipher.
$L_{i,j}$	The i -th and j -th least-significant bit in L .
Δ_i	An n -bit (XOR) difference, where only the i -th bit is active. with $0 \leq i \leq n - 1$ and Δ_0 denotes the least significant bit.
$\Delta_{i,[j]}$	An n -bit truncated difference, where only the i -th bit is active and the j -th bit is unknown.
Δ^r	Difference after Round r .
$\Delta^r \xrightarrow[E]{p} \Delta^s$	A differential characteristic which yields the output difference Δ^s with probability p when encrypting over a (sub-)cipher E and starting from an input difference Δ^r .

Table 2. Notations used throughout this paper.

is depicted in Figure 1. The constants α and β are 8 and 3 for most versions of the cipher, except for SPECK32/64, which employs $\alpha = 7$ and $\beta = 2$.




Fig. 1. Schematic views on the round function (left) and the key schedule (right) of SPECK. RF_i denotes the invocation of the round function, parametrized with i as the key.

Key Schedule. In contrast to the best-known ARX cipher ThreeFish, the designers of SPECK have applied a key addition in each round. To generate the round keys, the key schedule of SPECK re-uses the round transformation. At the beginning, m variables $K^0, \ell^0, \dots, \ell^{m-2}$ are initialized with the words of the secret key: $(K^0, \ell^0, \dots, \ell^{m-2}) \leftarrow (SK^0, SK^1, \dots, SK^m)$ and the further round keys K^i are generated with the help of the following procedure:

$$\begin{aligned} \ell^{i+m-1} &= K^i \boxplus (\ell^i \ggg \alpha) \oplus i, \\ K^{i+1} &= (K^i \lll \beta) \oplus \ell^{i+m-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Differential Characteristics. We constructed differential characteristics for SPECK by starting from a difference with a single active bit in the middle, and propagate towards start and end. To minimize the number of active bits, we build our trails on the events that the addition in each round will not produce any carry bits. Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 (see Appendix A) list our characteristics for the individual versions of SPECK in detail.

3 Differential Attacks on SPECK

In the following, we describe our conventional differentials analysis of SPECK. Note that we describe only the attack on SPECK32/64 in detail since this version allows a simple practical verification. For attacks on the further versions of SPECK, we only provide the complexities and list the necessary details where these attacks differ from those in the smallest version.

3.1 Key-Recovery Attack on SPECK32/64

Here, we describe in brief an 11-round key-recovery attack on SPECK32/64. To do this, we use the characteristic from Table 5 over the rounds 4 – 11 of the cipher:

$$\Delta^4 = (\Delta_{3,10,12}, \Delta_{3,6,12,13,14}) \xleftarrow[\text{rounds 4-11}]{p=2^{-25}} (\Delta_{1,3,8,10,15}, \Delta_{5,8,10,12,15}) = \Delta^{11}.$$

Then, later we guess key bits from the first rounds, which directly provide us with information about the secret key. We also know that ΔR^2 must be $\Delta_{4,8,11,12}$.

Attack Procedure. In the following, we simply denote by \mathcal{A} a probabilistic algorithm or adversary which aims to recover the secret key for this cipher. The full attacking procedure can be split into a *collection phase*, and a *filtering phase*. The steps for the collection phase are as following:

1. Choose 2^{30} pairs (C_i, C'_i) with $C_i \oplus C'_i = \Delta^{11}$.
2. Collect the corresponding plaintext pairs (P_i, P'_i) from a decryption oracle, where $P_i = E_K^{-1}(C_i)$ and $P'_i = E_K^{-1}(C'_i)$. Store all pairs (P_i, P'_i) in a list \mathcal{P} .

The filtering phase then consists of following steps:

3. For all key combinations K^0 :
 - 3.1 Initialize *count* $\leftarrow 0$.
 - 3.2 For all pairs $(P_i, P'_i) \in \mathcal{P}$:
 - Partially encrypt (P_i, P'_i) to the state after the encryption of Round 2 and derive ΔR^2 .
 - If $\Delta R^2 = \Delta_{4,8,11,12}$, then, for all values K^1 , further encrypt (P_i, P'_i) to the state after the encryption of Round 3 and check if Δ^3 matches the expected difference. If this is the case, then increment *count*. Note that we do not guess any bits of the key in the third round, since the key addition does not affect our target difference.

3.3 If $count > 11$, mark the current value K^0 as the (or one of few) potentially correct key candidates.

This attack works because of the following reasons: the probability that a pair follows our differential characteristic is given by 2^{-25} . Hence, the probability that no more than eleven correct pairs occur when using SPECK can be approximated by

$$Pr[\mathbf{false\ random}] := Pr^{Poisson}[n = 2^{30}, p = 2^{-25}, x \leq 11] \approx 1.70 \cdot 10^{-5}.$$

In this point, we also need to consider the probability of a false positive key. The probability that a pair produces the Δ^3 by random is 2^{-32} . So, for one specific value of the guessed keys, the probability that more than eleven false-positive pairs occur is

$$1 - Pr^{Poisson}[n = 2^{30}, p = 2^{-32}, x \leq 11] \approx 2^{-53.38}.$$

Since \mathcal{A} guesses 32 key bits, the probability that any key candidate produces more than eleven false-positive pairs is about

$$Pr[\mathbf{false\ real}] := 1 - Pr^{Poisson}[n = 2^{32}, p = 2^{-53.38}, x \leq 0] \approx 3.67 \cdot 10^{-7}.$$

Concluding, the error probability of \mathcal{A} becomes very close to 0, if it interprets a key candidate as the secret key when at least eleven pairs satisfy Δ^3 . At the end, \mathcal{A} can use those correct text pairs for its found key candidate, and perform further partial encryptions over the rounds 4 and 5, to identify the correct values of K^2 and K^3 .

Attack Complexity. The straight-forward application of our attack requires 2^{31} chosen ciphertexts. Concerning the memory complexity, \mathcal{A} can store either a list of counters for all key candidates or a list of all plaintext pairs – the latter option gives us a memory complexity of $2^{31} \cdot 32/8 = 2^{33}$ bytes. The computational effort for the collection phase, C_{texts} , is equivalent to 2^{31} full decryptions performed by the oracle. The filtering effort, C_{filter} , is twofold. First, for 2^{16} values K^0 , we encrypt all pairs over the first two rounds. All pairs satisfying ΔR^2 and happening with probability 2^{-16} in average, are further encrypted over Round 3 for all values K^1 . The brute-force effort to find the remaining bits of K^2 and K^3 , $C_{\text{bruteforce}}$, can be overestimated by 2^{32} full encryptions. Summing up, we have

$$\underbrace{2 \cdot 2^{30}}_{C_{\text{texts}}} + \underbrace{\left(2^{16} \cdot \frac{2}{11} + 2^{-16} \cdot 2^{16+16} \cdot \frac{1}{11}\right) \cdot 2 \cdot 2^{30}}_{C_{\text{filter}}} + \underbrace{2^{32}}_{C_{\text{bruteforce}}} \approx 2^{45.2} \text{ encryptions.}$$

For the further versions of SPECK, we can apply a similar procedure and get the following results which are summarized in Table 3.

State size	Key size	Rds.	Pr[diff.]	Prs.	Known bits		Key bits	Thresh. prs.
					at Δ^2	at Δ^3		
32	64	11	2^{-25}	2^{30}	16	32	32	> 11
48	all	12	2^{-38}	2^{43}	24	48	48	> 11
64	all	13	2^{-49}	2^{54}	32	64	64	> 11
96	all	15	2^{-81}	2^{86}	48	96	96	> 11
128	all	16	2^{-115}	2^{120}	64	128	128	> 11

Table 3. Parameters of our differential attacks on SPECK2n/k. Rds. = rounds, prs. = pairs.

4 Rectangle Attacks on SPECK

4.1 Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks

Boomerangs [15] are differential-based attacks that allow an adversary to concatenate two “short” differential characteristics, which is beneficial for primitives where “long” characteristics would have a very low probability. Boomerang attacks have been first introduced by Wagner in 1999 [15], and were later transformed into a chosen-plaintext attack by Kelsey, Kohno, and Schneier [12], which they called it an *amplified boomerang*. In 2001, Biham, Dunkelman, and Keller added further improvements and renamed it to the *rectangle attack* [3]. In 2002, the same authors made more improvements for boomerang- and rectangle-based key-recovery attacks [4]. In 2010, Dunkelman, Keller, and Shamir [8] extended the technique by introducing the sandwich attack, where the adversary can insert a round between the two sub-ciphers if they have a differential with high characteristic probability.

Boomerang Attacks. In the basic setting of the attack, an adversary \mathcal{A} first decomposes a given cipher E into two sub-ciphers $E = E_2 \circ E_1$, where it uses two differentials

$$\alpha \xrightarrow[E_1]{p} \beta \text{ and } \gamma \xrightarrow[E_2]{q} \delta,$$

with probability p and q , respectively. Then, \mathcal{A} collects a pair (P, P') with $P \oplus P' = \alpha$ and asks an encryption oracle for their corresponding ciphertexts (C, C') . As a next, it derives two new ciphertexts $D = C \oplus \delta$ and $D' = C' \oplus \delta$, and asks the decryption oracle for their corresponding plaintexts (Q, Q') . If $Q \oplus Q' = \alpha$, then the adversary obtains a *correct quartet*. Each quartet (P, P', Q, Q') , has a probability of p^2 , where their respective outputs after E_1 , (R, R', S, S') , applies: $R \oplus R' = \beta$ and $S \oplus S' = \beta$. At this point, one is interested in the case when $R \oplus S = \gamma$ and automatically $R' \oplus S' = \gamma$, which is called the boomerang property. With probability q^2 , the ciphertexts of such a quartet will produce the differences $C \oplus D = \delta$ and $C' \oplus D' = \delta$ and one obtains the correct quartet. Assuming that the adversary collects m pairs with difference α , then, the expected number of correct quartets is $m^2 \cdot 2^{-n} \cdot (pq)^2$.

For a random permutation, the number of correct quartets would be $m^2 \cdot 2^{-2n}$. So, in order to mount the attack, it must apply that $pq > 2^{-n/2}$. However, in this case, the adversary can count more correct quartets than the one would expect from a random permutation and it can distinguish E from random.

Amplified Boomerang/Rectangle Attacks. The standard boomerang procedure explained above represents an adaptive chosen plain-/ciphertext attack. Since this is a less practical scenario, Kelsey, Kohno, and Schneier developed amplified boomerangs which are pure chosen-plaintext attacks.

Following their method, the adversary chooses $\frac{2^{n/2+2}}{pq}$ plaintext pairs and let the oracle to encrypt them. Since any two pairs can be used to form a quartet, this gives the adversary $\frac{2^{n+3}}{p^2q^2}$ possible quartets. The difference γ holds with probability 2^{-n} after E_0 , so one can expect a few correct quartets for which holds $C \oplus D = C' \oplus D' = \delta$.

4.2 Rectangle Attack on SPECK32/64

In this section, we present rectangle attacks on round-reduced versions of SPECK. For $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ and $\gamma \rightarrow \delta$, we use only those parts of our characteristic in Appendix A which have a high probability.

In the following, we describe an 11-round rectangle attack on SPECK32/64 in detail. Since our attacks on the further versions of SPECK work similar, we only specify the used trails and their complexities here. For the smallest version we use the trails

$$\alpha = (\Delta_{11,12}, \Delta_4) \xrightarrow[E_0]{p=2^{-6}} (\Delta_{15}, \Delta_{1,3,10,15}) = \beta,$$

and

$$\gamma = (\Delta_{11,12}, \Delta_4) \xrightarrow[E_1]{q=2^{-6}} (\Delta_{15}, \Delta_{1,3,10,15}) = \delta.$$

Here, E_0 represents the rounds 4-7, and E_1 the rounds 8-11. The procedure for our attacks is as follows:

1. Choose $\frac{2^{n/2+2}}{pq} = \frac{2^{32/2+2}}{2^{-6}2^{-6}} = 2^{30}$ ciphertext pairs.
2. Initialize a set \mathcal{K} of $2^{|K^0|+|K^1|} = 2^{16+16} = 2^{32}$ counters for all subkey bits in K^0 and K^1 .
3. Ask an oracle for the decryption (P, Q) of all chosen ciphertext pairs and store them in a hash table.
4. For all possible values of the subkeys $K^0 \| K^1$:
 - 4.1 Encrypt all pairs (P, Q) over the first three rounds, and store the results as (S, T) .
 - 4.2 For all combination of pairs (S, T) , (S', T') , check whether their difference is equal to α , $(S \oplus S' = T \oplus T' = \alpha)$. If yes, then increment the counter for the current key candidate.
5. Output the key candidate with the maximal count in \mathcal{K} .

Attack Complexity. The attack requires 2^{31} chosen ciphertexts as a data complexity. Concerning the memory complexity, \mathcal{A} need to store the encryption of all plaintext pairs beside the list of counters. So, it becomes $2^{31} \cdot 32/8 + 2^{32} \approx 2^{33.6}$ bytes. The computational effort for the collection phase, C_{texts} , is equivalent to 2^{31} full decryptions performed by the oracle. The filtering effort consists of encrypting 2^{30} pairs for 2^{32} key candidates over the first three rounds. The brute-force effort to find the remaining bits of K^2 and K^3 , $C_{\text{bruteforce}}$, can be overestimated by 2^{32} full encryptions. Summing up, we have

$$\underbrace{2 \cdot 2^{30}}_{C_{\text{texts}}} + \underbrace{\left(2^{32} \cdot \frac{3}{11}\right) \cdot 2 \cdot 2^{30}}_{C_{\text{filter}}} + \underbrace{2^{32}}_{C_{\text{bruteforce}}} \approx 2^{61.1} \text{ encryptions.}$$

We can apply a similar procedure in order to mount attacks on the further versions of SPECK. The parameters of our attacks with error probabilities of the adversary are summarized in Table 4.

State size	Key size	Rounds	$(pq)^2$	C_{data}	C_{memory}	C_{time}
32	64	11	2^{-24}	2^{30}	$2^{33.6}$	$2^{61.1}$
48	72	11	2^{-36}	2^{45}	$2^{45.0}$	$2^{67.0}$
48	96	12	2^{-36}	2^{45}	$2^{48.2}$	$2^{91.0}$
64	96	13	2^{-54}	2^{62}	$2^{62.0}$	$2^{91.9}$
64	128	14	2^{-54}	2^{62}	$2^{64.3}$	$2^{123.7}$
96	144	15	2^{-80}	2^{91}	$2^{91.0}$	$2^{136.0}$
128	192	17	2^{-118}	2^{126}	$2^{126.0}$	$2^{186.9}$
128	256	18	2^{-118}	2^{126}	$2^{128.3}$	$2^{251.4}$

Table 4. Parameters of our rectangle attacks on SPECK $2n/k$.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we analyzed the security of the lightweight block cipher family SPECK by applying differential and rectangle as summarized in Table 1. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first security analysis for SPECK, since the proposal did not include any form of security assessment. We could easily find conventional differentials for all versions of the cipher which helped us to mount differential and boomerang attacks on versions with up to half of the total number of rounds.

Since SPECK has a very simple ARX structure, any new attack on generalized ARX ciphers such as ThreeFish would be a threat to the security of SPECK. However, one positive security aspect of the NSA construction is the round-wise key addition and the simple, yet powerful key schedule, which protects very effectively against slide and meet-in-the-middle attacks over a reasonable

number of rounds, as we noted during our studies. The security analysis in this paper can be seen as a starting point for upcoming research on the SPECK block cipher family. It would be interesting to see further investigation by using more sophisticated methods of cryptanalysis or improvements of our current results.

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A Differential Characteristics for SPECK2n/k

Rd.	SPECK32/k			SPECK48/k		
	ΔL^i	ΔR^i	ℓ	ΔL^i	ΔR^i	ℓ
0	$\Delta_{10,11,15}$	$\Delta_{4,8,11,12}$	0	$\Delta_{0,3,8,9,11,20,22}$	$\Delta_{0,3,6,9,11,16}$	0
1	$\Delta_{3,10,12}$	$\Delta_{3,6,12,13,14}$	-6	$\Delta_{1,6,9,11,12,14,19}$	$\Delta_{1,3,11}$	-7
2	$\Delta_{5,15}$	$\Delta_{0,8,14}$	-4	$\Delta_{4,6,17,22}$	$\Delta_{14,17,22}$	-5
3	$\Delta_{0,9}$	$\Delta_{2,9,10}$	-5	$\Delta_{9,17,20}$	$\Delta_{1,9}$	-3
4	$\Delta_{11,12}$	Δ_4	-3	Δ_{12}	Δ_4	-1
5	Δ_6	0	0	0	Δ_7	-1
6	Δ_{15}	Δ_{15}	-1	Δ_7	$\Delta_{7,10}$	-2
7	$\Delta_{8,15}$	$\Delta_{1,8,15}$	-2	$\Delta_{7,10,23}$	$\Delta_{7,13,23}$	-4
8	Δ_{15}	$\Delta_{1,3,10,15}$	-4	$\Delta_{2,7,13,15}$	$\Delta_{7,10,13,15,16}$	-7
9	$\Delta_{1,3,8,10,15}$	$\Delta_{5,8,10,12,15}$		$\Delta_{5,10,13,15,16,18,23}$	$\Delta_{5,15,19,23}$	-8
10				$\Delta_{2,7,8,10,19,21,23}$	$\Delta_{7,10,18,19,21-23}$	
Σ			-25			-38

Table 5. Differential characteristics for the smaller variants of SPECK2n/k. ℓ denotes $\log_2(\mathbf{Pr})$.

Rd.	SPECK64/ k		
	ΔL^i	ΔR^i	ℓ
0	$\Delta_{6,17,22,27,28}$	$\Delta_{14,17,27}$	0
1	$\Delta_{9,17,19,20,27,30}$	$\Delta_{9,19,27}$	-7
2	$\Delta_{1,11,12,22,27}$	$\Delta_{1,11,27,30}$	-9
3	$\Delta_{1,3,4,11,14,19,25,27,30}$	$\Delta_{3,11,19,25,27}$	-9
4	$\Delta_{6,17,22,28}$	$\Delta_{14,17,30}$	-5
5	$\Delta_{9,17,20}$	$\Delta_{1,9}$	-3
6	Δ_{12}	Δ_4	-1
7	0	Δ_7	-1
8	Δ_7	$\Delta_{7,10}$	-2
9	$\Delta_{7,10,31}$	$\Delta_{7,13,31}$	-4
10	$\Delta_{2,7,13,23}$	$\Delta_{7,10,13,16,23}$	-8
11	$\Delta_{5,7,10,13,15,16,23,26,31}$	$\Delta_{5,7,15,19,23,31}$	-8
Σ			-49

Table 6. Differential characteristics for SPECK64/ k . ℓ denotes $\log_2(\mathbf{Pr})$.

Rd.	SPECK96/ k		
	ΔL^i	ΔR^i	ℓ
0	$\Delta_{0,1,5,6,10,12,16,26,27,37,38}$	$\Delta_{1,2,5,18,27,37,46}$	0
1	$\Delta_{1,4,5,8,19,27,29,30,37,40,41,45}$	$\Delta_{19,21,27,29,37,41,45}$	-13
2	$\Delta_{0,11,22,27,32,33,44}$	$\Delta_{11,24,27,30,33,40}$	-11
3	$\Delta_{3,11,14,19,25,27,30,33,36}$	$\Delta_{3,11,19,25,43}$	-9
4	$\Delta_{6,17,22,28}$	$\Delta_{14,17,46}$	-5
5	$\Delta_{9,17,20}$	$\Delta_{1,9}$	-3
6	Δ_{12}	Δ_4	-1
7	0	Δ_7	-1
8	Δ_7	$\Delta_{7,10}$	-2
9	$\Delta_{7,10,47}$	$\Delta_{7,13,47}$	-4
10	$\Delta_{2,7,13,39}$	$\Delta_{7,10,13,16,39}$	-8
11	$\Delta_{5,7,10,13,16,31,39,42,47}$	$\Delta_{5,7,19,31,39,47}$	-10
12	$\Delta_{2,7,8,19,23,34,45}$	$\Delta_{7,10,19,22,23,42,45}$	-12
13	$\Delta_{0,7,10,11,15,19,22,23,26,37,45,47}$	$\Delta_{7,11,13,15,19,23,25,37,47}$	-12
Σ			-81

Table 7. Differential characteristics for SPECK96/ k . ℓ denotes $\log_2(\mathbf{Pr})$.

Rd.	SPECK128/ k		ℓ
	ΔL^i	ΔR^i	
0	$\Delta_{5,10,16,26,27,37,38,42,48,49,54,58,60}$	$\Delta_{5,18,27,34,37,46,49,50,2}$	0
1	$\Delta_{5,8,19,27,29,30,37,40,41,49,52,61}$	$\Delta_{19,21,27,29,41,53,61}$	-13
2	$\Delta_{11,22,27,32,33,44,0}$	$\Delta_{11,24,27,30,33,56}$	-11
3	$\Delta_{11,14,19,25,27,30,33,36,3}$	$\Delta_{11,19,25,59,3}$	-9
4	$\Delta_{6,17,22,28}$	$\Delta_{14,17,62}$	-5
5	$\Delta_{20,17,9}$	$\Delta_{9,1}$	-3
6	Δ_{12}	Δ_4	-1
7	0	Δ_7	-1
8	Δ_7	$\Delta_{7,10}$	-3
9	$\Delta_{7,10,63}$	$\Delta_{7,13,63}$	-4
10	$\Delta_{7,13,55,2}$	$\Delta_{7,10,13,16,55}$	-8
11	$\Delta_{5,7,10,13,16,47,55,58,63}$	$\Delta_{5,7,19,47,55,63}$	-11
12	$\Delta_{7,8,19,39,50,61,2}$	$\Delta_{7,10,19,22,39,58,61}$	-12
13	$\Delta_{7,10,11,19,22,31,39,42,53,61,63,0}$	$\Delta_{7,11,13,19,25,31,39,53,63}$	-17
14	$\Delta_{7,13,14,19,23,25,34,39,45,55,56,2,3}$	$\Delta_{7,10,13,16,19,22,23,25,28,39,42,45,55,3}$	
Σ			-115

Table 8. Differential characteristics for SPECK128/ k . ℓ denotes $\log_2(\mathbf{Pr})$.