

One-Sided Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation

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Abstract

Adaptive security is a strong security notion that captures additional security threats that are not addressed by static corruptions. For instance, it captures real-world scenarios where “hackers” actively break into computers, possibly while they are executing secure protocols. Studying this setting is interesting from both theoretical and practical points of view. A primary building block in designing adaptively secure protocols is a non-committing encryption (NCE) that implements secure communication channels in the presence of adaptive corruptions. Current constructions require a number of public key operations that grows linearly with the length of the message. Furthermore, general two-party protocols require a number of NCE calls that is linear in the circuit size.

In this paper we study the two-party setting in which at most one of the parties is adaptively corrupted, which we believe is the right security notion in the two-party setting. We study the feasibility of (1) NCE with constant number of public key operations for large message spaces, (2) Oblivious transfer with constant number of public key operations for large sender’s input spaces, and (3) constant round secure computation protocols with a number of NCE calls, and an overall number of public key operations, that are independent of the circuit size. Our study demonstrates that such primitives indeed exist in the presence of single corruptions, while this is not known for fully adaptive security (where both parties may get corrupted).

Keywords: Secure Two-Party Computation, Adaptive Security, Non-Committing Encryption, Oblivious Transfer

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Secure two-party computation. In the setting of secure two-party computation, two parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some function of their inputs while preserving certain security properties like privacy, correctness and more. In this setting, security is formalized by viewing a protocol execution as if the computation is executed in an ideal setting where the parties send inputs to a trusted party that performs the computation and returns its result (also known by simulation-based security). Starting with the work of [Yao82, GMW87], it is by now well known that (in various settings) any polynomial-time function can be compiled into a secure function evaluation protocol with practical complexity; see [BDOZ11, LP12, DPSZ12, NNOB12] for a few recent works. The security proofs of these constructions assume that a party is statically corrupted. Meaning, corruptions take place at the outset of the protocol execution and the identities of the corrupted parties are fixed throughout the computation. Adaptive security is a stronger notion where corruptions takes place *at any point* during the course of the protocol execution. That is, upon corruption the adversary sees the internal data of the corrupted party which includes its input, randomness and the incoming messages. This notion is much stronger than static security due to the fact that the adversary may choose at any point which party to corrupt, even after the protocol is completed! It therefore models more accurately real world threats.

Typically, when dealing with adaptive corruptions we distinguish between corruptions with erasures and without erasures. In the former case honest parties are trusted to erase data if are instructed to do so by the protocol, whereas in the latter case no such assumption is made. This assumption is often problematic since it relies on the willingness of the honest parties to carry out this instruction without the ability to verify its execution. In settings where the parties are distrustful it may not be a good idea to base security on such an assumption. In addition, it is generally unrealistic to trust parties to fully erase data since this may depend on the operating system. Nevertheless, assuming that there are no erasures comes with a price since the complexity of adaptively secure protocols without erasures is much higher than the analogue complexity of protocols that rely on erasures. In this paper we do not rely on erasures.

Adaptive security. It is known by now that security against adaptive attacks captures important real-world concerns that are not addressed by static corruptions. For instance, such attacks capture scenarios where “hackers” actively break into computers, possibly while they are running secure protocols, or when the adversary learns from the communication which parties are worth to corrupt more than others. This later issue can be demonstrated by the following example. Consider a protocol where some party (denoted by the dealer) shares a secret among a public set of \sqrt{n} parties, picked at random from a larger set of n parties. This scheme is insecure in the adaptive model if the adversary corrupts \sqrt{n} parties since it can always corrupt the particular set of parties that share the secret. In the static setting the adversary corrupts the exact same set of parties that share the secret with a negligible probability in n .

Other difficulties also arise when proving security. Consider the following protocol for transferring a message: A receiver picks a public key and sends it to a sender that uses it to encrypt its message. Then, security in the static model is simple and relies on the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme. However, this protocol is insecure in the adaptive model since standard semantically secure encryption binds the receiver to a single message (meaning, given the public key, a ciphertext can only be decrypted into a single value). Thus, upon corrupting the receiver at the end of the protocol execution it would not be possible to “explain” the simulated ciphertext with respect to the real message. This implies that adaptive security is much harder to achieve.

Adaptively secure two-party computation. In the two-party setting there are scenarios where the system is comprised from two devices communicating between themselves without being part of a bigger system. For instance, consider a scenario where two devices share an access to an encrypted database that contains highly sensitive data (like passwords). Moreover, the devices communicate via secure computation but do not communicate with other devices due to high risk of breaking into the database. Thus, attacking one of the devices does not disclose any useful information about the content of the database, while attacking both devices is a much harder task. It is reasonable to assume that the devices are not necessarily statically corrupted since they are protected by other means, while attackers may constantly try to break into these devices (even while running secure computation).

In 2011, RSA secureID authentication products were breached by hackers that leveraged the stolen information from RSA in order to attack the U.S. defence contractor Lockheed Martin. The attackers targeted SecurID data as part of a broader scheme to steal defense secrets and related intellectual property. Distributing the SecureID secret keys between two devices potentially enables to defend against such an attack since in order to access these keys the attackers need to *adaptively* corrupt both devices, which is less likely to occur. Many other applications face similar threats when attempt to securely protect their databases.

We therefore focus on a security notion that seems the most appropriate in this context. In this paper, we study secure two-party computation with single adaptive corruptions in the non-erasure model where at most one party is adaptively corrupted. To distinguish this notion from fully adaptive security, where both parties may get corrupted, we denote it by *one-sided* adaptive security. Our goal in this work is to make progress in the study of the efficiency of two-party protocols with one-sided security. Our measure of efficiency is the number of public key encryption (PKE) operations captured by the number of exponentiations in several important groups (e.g., groups where the DDH assumption is hard and composite order groups where the assumptions DCR and QR are hard), and further considered in prior works such as [GWZ09]. Finally, our proofs are given in the universal composable (UC) setting [Can01] with a common reference string (CRS) setup. The reductions of our non-committing encryption and oblivious transfer with one-sided security are tight. The reductions of our general two-party protocols are tighter than in prior works since we do not need to encrypt the entire communication using non-committing encryption; see more details below. All our theorems *are not* known to hold in the fully adaptive setting.

1.2 Our Results

One-sided NCE with constant overhead. A non-committing encryption (NCE) scheme [CFGN96] implements secure channels in the presence of adaptive corruptions and is an important building block in designing adaptively secure protocols. In [DN00], Damgård and Nielsen presented a theoretical improvement in the one-sided setting by designing an NCE under strictly weaker assumptions than simulatable public key encryption scheme (the assumption for fully adaptive NCE). Nevertheless, all known one-sided [CFGN96, DN00] and fully adaptive NCE constructions [DN00, CDSMW09a] require $\mathcal{O}(1)$ PKE operations for each transmitted bit. It was unknown whether this bound can be reduced for one-sided NCEs and even matched with the overhead of standard PKEs.

We suggest a new approach for designing NCEs secure against one-sided adaptive attacks. Our protocols are built on two cryptographic building blocks that are non-committing with respect to a single party. We denote these by NCE for the sender and NCE for the receiver. *Non-committing for the receiver* (NCER) implies that one can efficiently generate a secret key that decrypts a simulated ciphertext into any plaintext. Whereas *non-committing for the sender* (NCES) implies that one can efficiently generate randomness for any plaintext for proving that a ciphertext, encrypted under a fake key, encrypts this plaintext. A core building block in our one-sided construction is (a variant) of the following protocol, in which the receiver generates two sets of public/secret keys; one pair of keys for each public key system, and sends these public

keys to the sender. Next, the sender partitions its message into two shares and encrypts the distinct shares under the distinct public keys. Finally, the receiver decrypts the ciphertexts and reconstructs the message. Both NCES and NCER are semantically secure PKEs that as efficient as standard PKEs. Informally, we prove that,

Theorem 1.1 (Informal) *Assume the existence of NCER and NCES with constant number of PKE operations for message space $\{0, 1\}^q$ and simulatable PKE. Then there exists a one-sided NCE with constant number of PKE operations for message space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter.*

Importantly, the security of this protocol only works if the simulator knows the identity of the corrupted party since fake public keys and ciphertexts cannot be explained as valid ones. We resolve this issue by slightly modifying this protocol using somewhat NCE [GWZ09] in order to encrypt only three bits. Namely, we use somewhat NCE to encrypt the *choice* of having fake/valid keys and ciphertexts (which only requires a single non-committing bit per choice). This enables the simulator to “explain” fake keys/ciphertext as valid and vice versa using only a constant number of asymmetric operations. In this work we consider two implementations of NCER and NCES. For polynomial-size message spaces the implementations are secure under the DDH assumption, whereas for exponential-size message spaces security holds under the DCR assumption. The NCER implementations are taken from [JL00, CHK05]. NCES was further discussed in [FHKW10] and realized under the DDH assumption in [BHY09] using the closely related notion of lossy encryption.¹ In this paper we realize NCES under the DCR assumption.

One-sided oblivious transfer with constant overhead. We use our one-sided NCEs to implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT) between a sender and a receiver. We consider a generic framework that abstracts the statically secure OT of [PVW08] that is based on a dual-mode PKE primitive, while encrypting only a small portion of the communication using our one-sided NCE. Our construction requires a constant number of PKE operations for an input space $\{0, 1\}^q$ of the sender, where $q = O(n)$. This is significantly better than the fully adaptively secure OT of [GWZ09] (currently the most efficient fully adaptive construction), that requires $O(q)$ such operations. We prove that:

Theorem 1.2 (Informal) *Assume the existence of one-sided NCE with constant number of PKE operations for message space $\{0, 1\}^q$ and dual-mode PKE. Then there exists a one-sided OT with constant number of PKE operations for sender’s input space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter.*

We build our one-sided OT based on the PVW protocol with the following modifications. (1) First, we require that the sender sends its ciphertexts via a one-sided non-committing channel (based on our previous result, this only inflates the overhead by a constant). (2) We fix the common parameters of the dual-mode PKE in a single mode (instead of alternating between two modes as in the [GWZ09] protocol). To ensure correctness, we employ a special type of ZK PoK which uses a novel technique; see below for more details. Finally, we discuss two instantiations based on the DDH and QR assumptions.

Constant round one-sided secure computation. Theoretically, it is well known that any statically secure protocol can be transformed into a one-sided adaptively secure protocol by encrypting the *entire* communication using NCE. This approach, adopted by [KO04], implies that the number of PKE operations grows linearly with the circuit size times a computational security parameter.² A different approach in the OT-hybrid model was taken in [IPS08] and achieved a similar overhead as well.

¹This notion differs from NCES by not requiring an efficient opening algorithm that enables to equivocate the ciphertext’s randomness. We further observe that the notion of NCES is also similar to mixed commitments [DN02].

²We note that this statement is valid regarding protocols that do not employ fully homomorphic encryptions (FHE). To this end, we only consider protocols that do not take the FHE approach. As a side note, it was recently observed in [KTZ13] that adaptive security is impossible for FHE satisfying compactness.

In this work we demonstrate the feasibility of designing generic constant round protocols based on Yao’s garbled circuit technique with one-sided security, tolerating semi-honest and malicious attacks. Our main observation implies that one-sided security can be obtained even if only the keys corresponding to the inputs and output wires are communicated via a one-sided adaptively secure channel. This implies that the bulk of communication is transmitted as in the static setting. Using our one-sided secure primitives we obtain protocols that outperform the constant round one-sided constructions of [KO04, IPS08] and all known generic fully adaptively secure two-party protocols. Our proofs take a different simulation approach, circumventing the difficulties arise due to the simulation technique from [LP09] that builds a fake circuit (which cannot be applied in the adaptive setting). Specifically, we prove that

Theorem 1.3 (Informal) *Under the assumptions of achieving statically secure two-party computation and one-sided OT with constant number of PKE operations for sender’s input space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter, there exists a constant round one-sided semi-honest adaptively secure two-party protocol that requires $O(|C|)$ private key operations and $O(|\text{input}| + |\text{output}|)$ public key operations.*

In order to obtain one-sided security against malicious attacks we adapt the cut-and-choose based protocol introduced in [LP12]. The idea of the cut-and-choose technique is to ask one party to send s garbled circuits and later open half of them by the choice of the other party. This ensures that with very high probability the majority of the unopened circuits are valid. Proving security in the one-sided setting requires dealing with new subtleties and requires a modified cut-and-choose OT protocol, since [LP12] defines the public parameters of their cut-and-choose OT protocol in a way that precludes the equivocation of the receiver’s input. Our result in the malicious setting follows.

Theorem 1.4 (Informal.) *Under the assumptions of achieving static security in [LP12], one-sided cut-and-choose OT with constant number of PKE operations for sender’s input space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter, and simulatable PKE, there exists a constant round one-sided malicious adaptively secure two-party protocol that requires $O(s \cdot |C|)$ private key operations and $O(s \cdot (|\text{input}| + |\text{output}|))$ public key operations where s is a statistical parameter that determines the cut-and-choose soundness error.*

This asymptotic efficiency is significantly better than the efficiency of the prior protocols [KO04, IPS08].

Witness equivocal UC ZK PoK for compound statements. As a side result, we demonstrate a technique for efficiently generating statically secure UC ZK PoK for known Σ -protocols. Our protocols use a new approach where the prover commits to an additional transcript which enables to extract the witness with a constant overhead.

We further focus on compound statements (where the statement is comprised of sub-statements for which the prover only knows a subset of the witnesses), and denote a UC ZK PoK by *witness equivocal* if the simulator knows the witnesses for *all* sub-statements but not which subset is given to the real prover. We extend our proofs for this notion to the adaptive setting as well. In particular, the simulator must be able to convince an adaptive adversary that it does *not know* a different subset of witnesses. This notion is weaker than the typical one-sided security notion (that requires simulation without the knowledge of any witness), but is still meaningful in designing one-sided secure protocols. In this work, we build witness equivocal UC ZK PoKs for a class of fundamental compound Σ -protocols, without relying on NCE. Our protocols are round efficient and achieve a negligible soundness error. Finally, they are proven secure in the UC framework [Can01].

To conclude, our results may imply that one-sided security is strictly easier to achieve than fully adaptive security, and for some applications this is indeed the right notion to consider. We leave open the feasibility of constant round one-sided secure protocols in the multi-party setting. Currently, it is not clear how to

extend our techniques beyond the two-party setting (such as within the [BMR90] protocol), and achieve secure constructions with a number of PKE operations that does not depend on the circuit size.

1.3 Prior Work

We describe prior work on NCE, adaptively secure OT and two-party computation.

Non-committing encryption. One-sided NCE was introduced in [CFGN96] which demonstrated feasibility of the primitive under the RSA assumption. Next, NCE was studied in [DN00, CDSMW09a]. The construction of [DN00] requires constant rounds on the average and is based on simulatable PKE, whereas [CDSMW09a] presents an improved expected two rounds NCE based on a weaker primitive. [DN00] further presented a one-sided NCE based on a weakened simulatable PKE notion. The computational overhead of these constructions is $\mathcal{O}(1)$ PKE operations for each transmitted bit. An exception is the somewhat NCE introduced in [GWZ09] (see Section 3.3 for more details). This primitive enables to send arbitrarily long messages at the cost of $\log \ell$ PKE operations, where ℓ is the equivocality parameter that determines the number of messages the simulator needs to explain. This construction improves over NCEs for sufficiently small ℓ 's. Finally, in [Nie02] Nielsen proved that adaptively secure non-interactive encryption scheme must have a decryption key that is at least as long as the transmitted message.

Adaptively secure oblivious transfer. [Bea97, CLOS02] designed semi-honest adaptively secure OT (using NCE) and then compiled it into the malicious setting using generic ZK proofs. More recently, in a weaker model that assumes erasures, Lindell [Lin09] used the method of [WW06] to design an efficient transformation from any static OT to a semi-honest composable adaptively secure OT. Another recent work by Garay *et al.* [GWZ09] presented a UC adaptively secure OT, building on the static OT of [PVW08] and somewhat NCE. This paper introduces an OT protocol with security under a weaker *semi-adaptive* notion, that is then compiled into a fully adaptively secure OT by encrypting the transcript of the protocol using somewhat NCE.³ Finally, [CDSMW09b] presented an improved compiler for a UC adaptively secure OT in the malicious setting (using NCE as well).

Adaptively secure two-party computation. In the non-erasure model, adaptively secure computation has been extensively studied [CLOS02, DN03, CDD⁺04, KO04, IPS08, Lin09, CDSMW09a, CDSMW09b, GS12]. Starting with the work of [CLOS02], it is known by now how to adaptively compute any well-formed two-party functionality. The followup work of [DN03] showed how to use a threshold encryption to achieve UC adaptive security but requires honest majority. A generic compiler from static to adaptive security was shown in [CDD⁺04] (yet without considering post-execution corruptions). Then the work by Katz and Ostrovsky [KO04] studied the round complexity in the one-sided setting. Their protocol is the first round efficient construction, yet it takes the naive approach of encrypting the entire communication using NCE. Moreover, the work of [IPS08] provided a UC adaptively secure protocol given an adaptively secure OT. Their compiler generates one-sided schemes that either require a number of adaptively secure OTs that is proportional to the circuit's size, or a super constant number of rounds. Finally, a recent work by Garg and Sahai [GS12] shows adaptively secure constant round protocols tolerating $n - 1$ out of n corrupted parties using a non-black box simulation approach. Their approach uses the OT hybrid compiler of [IPS08].

In the erasure model, one of the earliest works by Beaver and Haber [BH92] showed an efficient generic transformation from adaptively secure protocols with ideally secure communication channels, to adaptively secure protocols with standard (authenticated) communication channels. A more recent work by Lindell [Lin09] presents an efficient semi-honest constant round two-party protocol with adaptive security.

³We stress that the semi-adaptive notion is incomparable to the one-sided notion since the former assumes that either one party is statically corrupted or none of the parties get corrupted.

2 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by n . A function $\mu(\cdot)$ is *negligible* if for every polynomial $p(\cdot)$ there exists a value N such that for all $n > N$ it holds that $\mu(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$. We denote by $a \leftarrow A$ the random sampling of element a from a set A and write PPT for probabilistic polynomial-time. We denote the message spaces of our non-committing encryption schemes and the message space of the sender in our OT protocols by $\{0, 1\}^q$ for $q = O(n)$.

We specify the definitions of computational indistinguishability and statistical distance.

Definition 2.1 (Computational indistinguishability by circuits) *Let $X = \{X_n(a)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, a \in \{0,1\}^*}$ and $Y = \{Y_n(a)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}, a \in \{0,1\}^*}$ be distribution ensembles. We say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable, denoted $X \approx_c Y$, if for every family $\{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of polynomial-size circuits, there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$ such that for all $a \in \{0, 1\}^*$,*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{C}_n(X_n(a)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{C}_n(Y_n(a)) = 1]| < \mu(n).$$

Definition 2.2 (Statistical distance) *Let X_n and Y_n be random variables accepting values taken from a finite domain $\Omega \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$. The statistical distance between X_n and Y_n is*

$$SD(X_n, Y_n) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} |\Pr[X_n = \omega] - \Pr[Y_n = \omega]|.$$

We say that X_n and Y_n are ϵ -close if their statistical distance is at most $SD(X_n, Y_n) \leq \epsilon(n)$. We say that X_n and Y_n are statistically close, denoted $X_n \approx_s Y_n$, if $\epsilon(n)$ is negligible in n .

2.1 Public Key Encryption Scheme

We specify the definitions of public key encryption and IND-CPA.

Definition 2.3 (PKE) *We say that $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a public-key encryption scheme if $\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ are polynomial-time algorithms specified as follows:*

- Gen , given a security parameter n (in unary), outputs keys (PK, SK) , where PK is a public key and SK is a secret key. We denote this by $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$.
- Enc , given the public key PK and a plaintext message m , outputs a ciphertext c encrypting m . We denote this by $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m)$; and when emphasizing the randomness r used for encryption, we denote this by $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m; r)$.
- Dec , given the public key PK , secret key SK and a ciphertext c , outputs a plaintext message m s.t. there exists randomness r for which $c = \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m; r)$ (or \perp if no such message exists). We denote this by $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{PK}, \text{SK}}(c)$.

For a public key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ and a non-uniform adversary $\text{ADV} = (\text{ADV}_1, \text{ADV}_2)$, we consider the following IND-CPA game:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n). \\ & (m_0, m_1, \text{history}) \leftarrow \text{ADV}_1(\text{PK}), \text{ s.t. } |m_0| = |m_1|. \\ & c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m_b), \text{ where } b \in_R \{0, 1\}. \\ & b' \leftarrow \text{ADV}_2(c, \text{history}). \\ & \text{ADV wins if } b' = b. \end{aligned}$$

Denote by $\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \text{ADV}}(n)$ the probability that ADV wins the IND-CPA game.

Definition 2.4 (IND-CPA) A public key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ has indistinguishable encryptions under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), if for every non-uniform adversary $\text{ADV} = (\text{ADV}_1, \text{ADV}_2)$ there exists a negligible function negl such that $\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \text{ADV}}(n) \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$.

2.2 Simulatable Public Key Encryption

A simulatable public key encryption scheme is an IND-CPA secure PKE with four additional algorithms. I.e., an oblivious public key generator $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ and a corresponding key faking algorithm $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}^{-1}$, and an oblivious ciphertext generator $\widetilde{\text{Enc}}$ and a corresponding ciphertext faking algorithm $\widetilde{\text{Enc}}^{-1}$. Intuitively, the key faking algorithm is used to explain a legitimately generated public key as an obviously generated public key. Similarly, the ciphertext faking algorithm is used to explain a legitimately generated ciphertext as an obviously generated one.

Definition 2.5 (Simulatable PKE [DN00]) A Simulatable PKE is a tuple of algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \widetilde{\text{Gen}}, \widetilde{\text{Gen}}^{-1}, \widetilde{\text{Enc}}, \widetilde{\text{Enc}}^{-1})$ that satisfy the following properties:

- **IND-CPA.** $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is IND-CPA secure as in Definition 2.4.
- **Oblivious public key generation.** Consider the experiment $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$, $r \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Gen}}^{-1}(\text{PK})$ and $\text{PK}' \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Gen}}(r')$. Then, $(r, \text{PK}) \approx_c (r', \text{PK}')$.
- **Oblivious ciphertext generation.** For any message m in the appropriate domain, consider the experiment $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$, $c_1 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Enc}}_{\text{PK}}(r_1)$, $c_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m; r_2)$, $r'_1 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Enc}}^{-1}(c_2)$. Then $(\text{PK}, r_1, c_1) \approx_c (\text{PK}, r'_1, c_2)$.

The El Gamal PKE [Gam85] is one example for simulatable PKE.

2.3 Dual-Mode PKE

A dual-mode PKE Π_{DUAL} is specified by the algorithms $(\text{Setup}, \text{dGen}, \text{dEnc}, \text{dDec}, \text{FindBranch}, \text{TrapKeyGen})$ described below.

- **Setup** is the algorithm for generating system parameters. Given a security parameter n and a mode $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$, the algorithm outputs (CRS, t) . The CRS is a common string for the remaining algorithms, and t is a trapdoor value that enables either the FindBranch or TrapKeyGen algorithm depending on the mode. The setup algorithm for messy and decryption mode are distinguished as SetupMessy and SetupDecryption; namely $\text{SetupMessy} := \text{Setup}(1^n, 0)$ and $\text{SetupDecryption} := \text{Setup}(1^n, 1)$.
- **dGen** is the key generation algorithm that takes a bit α and the CRS as input. If $\alpha = 0$, then it generates left public and secret key pair. Otherwise, it creates right public and secret key pair.
- **dEnc** is the encryption algorithm that takes a bit β , a public key PK and a message m as input. If $\beta = 0$, then it creates the left encryption of m , else it creates the right encryption.
- **dDec** decrypts a message given a ciphertext and a secret key SK.
- **FindBranch** finds whether a given public key (in messy mode) is left key or right key given the messy mode trapdoor t .

- TrapKeyGen generates a public key and two secret keys using the decryption mode trapdoor t such that both left encryption as well as the right encryption using the public key can be decrypted using the secret keys.

Definition 2.6 (Dual-mode PKE) A dual-mode PKE is a tuple of algorithms described above that satisfy the following properties:

1. **Completeness.** For every mode $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$, every $(CRS, t) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n, \mu)$, every $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$, every $(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{dGen}(\alpha)$, and every $m \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, decryption is correct when the public key type matches the encryption type, i.e., $\text{dDec}_{SK}(\text{dEnc}_{PK}(m, \alpha)) = m$.
2. **Indistinguishability of modes.** The CRS generated by SetupMessy and SetupDecryption are computationally indistinguishable, i.e., $\text{SetupMessy}(1^n) \approx_c \text{SetupDecryption}(1^n)$.
3. **Trapdoor extraction of key type (messy mode).** For every $(CRS, t) \leftarrow \text{SetupMessy}(1^n)$ and every (possibly malformed) PK, FindBranch(t, PK) outputs the public key type $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$. Encryption at branch $1 - \alpha$ is then message-lossy; namely, for every $m_0, m_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, $\text{dEnc}_{PK}(m_0, 1 - \alpha) \approx_s \text{dEnc}_{PK}(m_1, 1 - \alpha)$.
4. **Trapdoor generation of keys decrypt both branches (decryption mode).** For every $(CRS, t) \leftarrow \text{SetupDecryption}(1^n)$, TrapKeyGen(t) outputs (PK, SK_0, SK_1) such that for every α , $(PK, SK_\alpha) \approx_c \text{dGen}(\alpha)$.

2.4 Hardness Assumptions

Our constructions rely on the following hardness assumptions.

Definition 2.7 (DDH) We say that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard relative to \mathcal{G} if for all polynomial-sized circuits $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}$ there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\left| \Pr [\mathcal{C}_n(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^z) = 1] - \Pr [\mathcal{C}_n(\mathbb{G}, q, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n),$$

where $(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$ and the probabilities are taken over the choices of g and $x, y, z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

We require the DDH assumption to hold for prime order groups.

Definition 2.8 (DCR) We say that the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) problem is hard relative to \mathcal{G} if for all polynomial-sized circuits $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}$ there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\left| \Pr [\mathcal{C}_n(N, z) = 1 \mid z = y^N \bmod N^2] - \Pr [\mathcal{C}_n(N, z) = 1 \mid z = (1 + N)^r \cdot y^N \bmod N^2] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n),$$

where $N \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$, N is a random n -bit RSA composite, r is chosen at random in \mathbb{Z}_N and the probabilities are taken over the choices of N, y and r .

Definition 2.9 (QR) We say that the Quadratic Residuosity (QR) problem is hard relative to \mathcal{G} if for all polynomial-sized circuits $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}$ there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\left| \Pr [\mathcal{C}_n(N, z) = 1 \mid z \leftarrow \mathbb{QR}_N] - \Pr [\mathcal{C}_n(N, z) = 1 \mid z \leftarrow \mathbb{J}_N \setminus \mathbb{QR}_N] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n),$$

where $N \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$, N is a random n -bit RSA composite, \mathbb{J}_N denote the group of Jacobi symbol (+1) elements of \mathbb{Z}_N^* , $\mathbb{QR}_N = \{x^2 : x \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*\}$ denote \mathbb{J}_N 's subgroup of quadratic residues and the probabilities are taken over the choices of N, z .

2.5 Security Definitions

In the following, we formalize the notion of UC one-sided adaptive security [Can01]. Formally, a two-party computation protocol is cast by specifying the participating parties P_0 and P_1 and a functionality $f : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^*$, where $f = (f_0, f_1)$ mapping pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). That is, for every pair of inputs $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ the output pair is a random variable $(f_0(x_0, x_1), f_1(x_0, x_1))$ ranging over pair of strings. The first party with input x_0 wishes to receive $f_0(x_0, x_1)$, while the second party with input x_1 wishes to obtain $f_1(x_0, x_1)$.

2.5.1 One-sided Adaptive Security

We begin by introducing the formal definition of one-sided adaptive security in the UC framework. In the two-party setting, a real execution of some protocol Π_f that implements f is run between two parties P_0 and P_1 in the presence of an adversary ADV and an environment ENV (that is given an input z , a random tape r_{ENV} and a security parameter n), and is modeled as a sequence of activations of the entities. ENV is activated first and generates the inputs for the other entities. Then the protocol proceeds by having the parties communicating with each other, and ADV exchanges messages with ENV. Upon completing the real execution ENV outputs a bit.

In the ideal model, the computation involves an incorruptible trusted third party \mathcal{F}_f which receives the parties' inputs, computes the function f on these inputs and returns to each party its respective output. The parties are replaced by dummy parties that do not communicate with each other, such that whenever a dummy party is activated it sends its input to the ideal functionality. Upon completing the ideal execution ENV outputs a bit. We say that a protocol Π_f UC realizes functionality \mathcal{F}_f if for any real world adversary ADV there is a ideal world adversary SIM such that no ENV can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV and the parties running Π_f in a real execution or with SIM and the dummy parties in an ideal execution. Details follow.

Execution in the real model. We now proceed with a real world execution, where a real two-party protocol is executed. Whenever ENV is activated it first and fixes input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for party P_i . Each party P_i then starts the execution with an input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$, a random tape r_i and a security parameter n . A *one-sided* adversary ADV is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machine that is given a random tape r_{ADV} and a security parameter n . At the outset of the protocol, ADV receives some initial information from ENV. Then the computation proceeds in rounds such that in each round ADV sees all the messages sent between the parties. At the beginning of each round, ADV may choose to corrupt P_{i^*} for $i^* \in \{0, 1\}$. Upon corrupting P_{i^*} , ADV learns its input and the random tape, and obtains some auxiliary information from ENV. In case ADV is malicious P_{i^*} follows ADV's instructions from the time it is corrupted. At the end of the protocol execution the honest parties locally compute their outputs and output the value specified by the protocol, whereas the corrupted party outputs a special symbol \perp . The adversary ADV outputs an arbitrary function of its internal state that includes, r_{ADV} , the messages received from ENV and the corrupted party's view. Next, a post-execution corruption process begins. Namely, ENV first learns the outputs. Then, ADV and ENV interact in at most one additional round. If none of the parties is corrupted yet, ENV can ask ADV to corrupt P_{i^*} for $i^* \in \{0, 1\}$, receiving back the state of this party. At the end ENV outputs a bit.

Let f be as specified above and Π_f be a two-party protocol that computes f . We denote by the variable $\mathbf{OREAL}_{\Pi_f, \text{ADV}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z, \vec{r})$ the output of ENV on input z , random tape r_{ENV} and a security parameter n upon interacting with ADV and parties P_0, P_1 that engage in protocol Π_f on inputs r_{ADV} and $(x_0, r_0), (x_1, r_1)$, respectively, where $\vec{r} = (r_{\text{ENV}}, r_{\text{ADV}}, r_0, r_1)$. Let $\mathbf{OREAL}_{\Pi_f, \text{ADV}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z)$ denote a random variable describing $\mathbf{OREAL}_{\Pi_f, \text{ADV}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z, \vec{r})$ where the random tapes are chosen

uniformly. Let $\mathbf{OREAL}_{\Pi_f, \text{ADV}, \text{ENV}}$ denote the distribution ensemble:

$$\{\mathbf{OREAL}_{\Pi_f, \text{ADV}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z)\}_{x_0, x_1, z \in \{0,1\}^*, n \in \mathbb{N}}.$$

Execution in the ideal model. A one-sided ideal world adversary SIM is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machine that is given a random tape r_{SIM} and a security parameter n . The ideal process is defined with respect to a trusted party that implements functionality \mathcal{F}_f as follows:

First corruption phase: SIM receives some auxiliary information from ENV. Next, SIM may decide whether to corrupt party P_{i^*} for $i^* \in \{0, 1\}$. Upon corrupting party P_{i^*} , SIM learns its input x_{i^*} . In addition, ENV hands some auxiliary information to SIM.

Computation phase: In the semi-honest setting, each party forwards its input to the trusted party. In the malicious settings, the corrupted party hands \mathcal{F}_f the values handed to it by SIM. The trusted party computes $(y_0, y_1) = f(x_0, x_1)$ and hands each P_i the value y_i . SIM receives the output of the corrupted party.

Second corruption phase: SIM continues to another corruption phase, where it might choose to corrupt P_{i^*} for $i^* \in \{0, 1\}$ (in case it did not corrupt any party in the first corruption phase), where this choice is made based on SIM's random tape and all the information gathered so far. Upon corrupting P_{i^*} , SIM learns its input x_{i^*} . ENV hands SIM some auxiliary information.

Output: The uncorrupted party P_{1-i^*} outputs y_{1-i^*} and the corrupted party outputs \perp . SIM outputs an arbitrary efficient function of its view. ENV learns all the outputs.

Post-execution corruption phase: After the outputs are generated, SIM proceeds with ENV in at most one round of interaction, where ENV can instruct SIM to corrupt P_{i^*} for $i^* \in \{0, 1\}$ (if none of the parties are corrupted yet). SIM generates some arbitrary answer and might choose to corrupt P_{i^*} . The interaction continues until ENV halts with an output.

We denote by $\mathbf{OIDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_f, \text{SIM}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z, \vec{r})$ the output of ENV on input z , random tape r_{ENV} and security parameter n upon interacting with SIM and parties P_0, P_1 , running an ideal process with inputs r_{SIM} and x_0, x_1 , respectively, where $\vec{r} = (r_{\text{ENV}}, r_{\text{SIM}})$. Let $\mathbf{OIDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_f, \text{SIM}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z)$ denote a random variable describing $\mathbf{OIDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_f, \text{SIM}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z, \vec{r})$ when the random tapes r_{ENV} and r_{ADV} are chosen uniformly. Let $\mathbf{OIDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_f, \text{SIM}, \text{ENV}}$ denote the distribution ensemble:

$$\{\mathbf{OIDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_f, \text{SIM}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z)\}_{x_0, x_1, z \in \{0,1\}^*, n \in \mathbb{N}}$$

Then we define security as follows.

Definition 2.10 *Let \mathcal{F}_f and Π_f be as defined above. Protocol Π_f UC realizes \mathcal{F}_f in the presence of one-sided semi-honest/malicious adversaries if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time one-sided semi-honest/malicious adversary ADV, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time ideal adversary SIM such that:*

$$\begin{aligned} & \{\mathbf{OIDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_f, \text{SIM}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z)\}_{x_0, x_1, z \in \{0,1\}^*, n \in \mathbb{N}} \\ & \approx_c \{\mathbf{OREAL}_{\Pi_f, \text{ADV}, \text{ENV}}(n, x_0, x_1, z)\}_{x_0, x_1, z \in \{0,1\}^*, n \in \mathbb{N}} \end{aligned}$$

where $|x_0| = |x_1|$.

Composition. In order to simplify our security proofs we consider a hybrid setting where the parties implement some functionalities using ideal calls. We rely on the composition theorem introduced by Canetti [Can01] in the adaptive setting. (Note that we are only interested in cases where the same party is corrupted with respect to all composed protocols.)

2.5.2 Concrete Functionalities

We specify the definition of three important functionalities for this work.

Secure communication (SC). We define the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SC}}(m, -) \mapsto (-, m)$ for securely communicating a message m from P_0 to P_1 .

Oblivious transfer (OT). The 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer functionality is defined by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OT}}((x_0, x_1), \sigma) \mapsto (-, x_\sigma)$. In a bit OT $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}$, whereas in a string OT $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK PoK). Let \mathcal{NP} relation \mathcal{R} associated with the language $L_{\mathcal{R}} = \{x \mid \exists w \text{ s.t. } (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}\}$. Then, we define the ZK PoK functionality for \mathcal{R} by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}}((x, w), x) \mapsto (-, (x, b))$ where $b = \text{Accept}$ if $\mathcal{R}(x, w) = 1$ and $b = \text{Reject}$ if $\mathcal{R}(x, w) = 0$.

3 Different Notions of Non-Committing Encryptions (NCE)

3.1 NCE for the Receiver

An NCE for the receiver is a semantically secure PKE with an additional property that enables generating a secret key that decrypts a *simulated* (i.e., fake) ciphertext into any plaintext. Specifically, the scheme operates in two modes. The “real mode” enables to encrypt and decrypt as in the standard definition of PKE. The “simulated mode” enables to generate simulated ciphertexts that are computationally indistinguishable from real ciphertexts. Moreover, using a special trapdoor one can produce a secret key that decrypts a fake ciphertext into any plaintext. Intuitively, this implies that simulated ciphertexts are generated in a lossy mode where the plaintext is not well defined given the ciphertext and the public key. This leaves enough entropy for the secret key to be sampled in a way that determines the desired plaintext. We continue with a formal definition of NCE for the receiver.

Definition 3.1 (NCE for the receiver (NCER)) *An NCE for the receiver encryption scheme is a tuple of algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Enc}^*, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ specified as follows:*

- $\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ are as specified in Definition 2.3.
- Enc^* , given the public key PK output a ciphertext c^* and a trapdoor t_{c^*} .
- Equivocate , given the secret key SK , trapdoor t_{c^*} and a plaintext m , output SK^* such that $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{SK}^*}(c^*)$.

Definition 3.2 (Secure NCER) *An NCE for the receiver $\Pi_{\text{NCER}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Enc}^*, \text{Equivocate})$ is secure if it satisfies the following properties:*

- $\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ imply an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme as in Definition 2.4.

- The following ciphertext indistinguishability holds for any plaintext m : $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}^*, c^*, m)$ and $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}, c, m)$ are computationally indistinguishable, for $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$, $(c^*, t_{c^*}) \leftarrow \text{Enc}^*(\text{PK})$, $\text{SK}^* \leftarrow \text{Equivocate}(\text{SK}, c^*, t_{c^*}, m)$ and $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m)$.

We now review two implementations of NCER under the DDH and DCR assumptions.

NCER under the DDH assumption for polynomial-size message spaces. NCER for polynomial message space can be constructed under the DDH assumption [JL00, CHK05]. For simplicity we consider a binary plaintext space. Let $(g_0, g_1, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$ be an algorithm that given a security parameter n , returns a group description $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{G}_{g_0, g_1, p}$ specified by its generators g_0, g_1 and its order p . Then define $\Pi_{\text{NCER}}^{\text{DDH}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Enc}^*, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ as follows.

- Gen, given the security parameter n , set $(g_0, g_1, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$. Choose uniformly random $x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ and compute $h = g_0^x g_1^y$. Output the secret key $\text{SK} = (x, y)$ and the public key $\text{PK} = (g_0, g_1, h)$.
- Enc, given the public key PK and a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{G}$, choose a uniformly random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Output the ciphertext $(g_0^r, g_1^r, m \cdot h^r)$.
- Enc^{*}, given the public key PK choose uniformly random $r_1, r_2, r_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Output the fake ciphertext $(g_0^{r_1}, g_0^{r_2}, g_0^{r_3})$ and trapdoor $t_{c^*} = (r_1, r_2, r_3)$.
- Dec, given the secret key (x, y) and a ciphertext (c_0, c_1, Φ) , output $\Phi \cdot (c_0^x c_1^y)^{-1}$.
- Equivocate, given (x, y) , a simulated ciphertext c^* , trapdoor $t_{c^*} = (r_1, r_2, r_3)$ and a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{G}$ output $\text{SK}^* = (x^*, y^*)$ by solving the system of linear equations induced by the exponents of the public key and ciphertext $c^* = (g_0^{r_1}, g_0^{r_2}, g_0^{r_3})$.⁴

Proposition 3.1 ([JL00, CHK05]) Assume that the DDH assumption is hard in \mathbb{G} . Then $\Pi_{\text{NCER}}^{\text{DDH}}$ is a secure NCER.

It is easy to verify that real and simulated ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable under the DDH assumption since the only difference is with respect to the first two group elements, the third group element induces a linear combination of the first two elements and the secret key in the exponent.

NCER under the DCR assumption for exponential-size message spaces. NCER for exponential message space can be constructed under the DCR assumption [CHK05]. Let $(p', q') \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$ be an algorithm that given a security parameter n returns two random n bit primes p' and q' such that $p = 2p' + 1$ and $q = 2q' + 1$ are also primes. Let $N = pq$ and $N' = p'q'$. Define $\Pi_{\text{NCER}}^{\text{DCR}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Enc}^*, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ as follows.

- Gen, given the security parameter n , run $(p', q') \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$ and set $p = 2p' + 1$, $q = 2q' + 1$, $N = pq$ and $N' = p'q'$. Choose random $x_0, x_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^2/4}$ and a random $g' \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ and compute $g_0 = g'^{2N}$, $h_0 = g^{x_0}$ and $h_1 = g_0^{x_1}$. Output public key $\text{PK} = (N, g_0, h_0, h_1)$ and secret key $\text{SK} = (x_0, x_1)$.
- Enc, given the public key PK and a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, choose a uniformly random $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N/4}$ and output ciphertext

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m; t) = (g_0^t \bmod N^2, (1 + N)^m h_0^t \bmod N^2, h_1^t \bmod N^2).$$

⁴In order to compute such a secret key the Equivocate algorithm has to know $\log_{g_0} g_1$ and $\log_{g_0} m$. The requirement of knowing $\log_{g_0} m$ makes this scheme work only for messages from polynomial-size spaces.

- Enc*, given the public key PK choose uniformly random $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)/4}$, compute the fake ciphertext

$$c^* \leftarrow (c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*) = ((1 + N) \cdot g_0^t \bmod N^2, (c_0^*)^{x_0} \bmod N^2, (c_0^*)^{x_1} \bmod N^2).$$

- Dec, given the secret key (x_0, x_1) and a ciphertext (c_0, c_1, c_2) , check whether $c_0^{2x_1} = (c_2)^2$; if not output \perp . Then set $\hat{m} = (c_1/c_0^{x_0})^{N+1}$. If $\hat{m} = 1 + mN$ for some $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, then output m ; else output \perp .
- Equivocate, given N' , (x_0, x_1) , a ciphertext (c_0, c_1, c_2) and a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, output $\text{SK}^* = (x_0^*, x_1)$, where $x_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{NN'}$ is the unique solution to the equations $x_0^* = x \bmod N'$ and $x_0^* = x_0 - m \bmod N$. These equations have a unique solution due to the fact that $\gcd(N, N') = 1$ and the solution can be obtained employing Chinese Remainder Theorem.

It can be verified that the secret key SK^* matches the public key PK and also decrypts the ‘simulated’ ciphertext to the required message m . The first and third component of PK remains the same since x_1 has not been changed. Now $g^{x_0^*} = g^{x_0^* \bmod N'} = g^{x_0 \bmod N'} = g^{x_0} = h_0$. Using the fact that the order of $(1 + N)$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ is N , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{c_1}{c_0^{x_0^*}} \right)^{N+1} &= \left(\frac{(1 + N)^{x_0} g_0^{tx_0}}{(1 + N)^{x_0^*} g_0^{tx_0^*}} \right)^{N+1} \\ &= \left((1 + N)^{x_0 - x_0^* \bmod N} \right)^{N+1} = (1 + N)^m = (1 + mN). \end{aligned}$$

Proposition 3.2 ([CHK05]) *Assume that the DCR assumption is hard in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$. Then $\Pi_{\text{NCR}}^{\text{DCR}}$ is a secure NCER.*

It is easy to verify that real and simulated ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable under the DCR assumption since the only difference is with respect to the first element (which is an $2N$ th power in a real ciphertext and not an $2N$ th power in a simulated ciphertext). The other two elements are powers of the first element. Furthermore $\text{SK} = (x_0, x_1)$ and $\text{SK}^* = (x_0^*, x_1)$ are statistically close since $x_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^2/4}$ and $x_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{NN'}$ and the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_{NN'}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2/4}$ is statistically close.

3.2 NCE for the Sender

NCE for the sender is a semantically secure PKE with an additional property that enables generating a fake public key, such that any ciphertext encrypted under this key can be viewed as the encryption of any message together with the matched randomness. Specifically, the scheme operates in two modes. The ‘real mode’ that enables to encrypt and decrypt as in standard PKEs and the ‘simulated mode’ that enables to generate simulated public keys and an additional trapdoor, such that the two modes keys are computationally indistinguishable. In addition, given this trapdoor and a ciphertext generated using the simulated public key, one can produce randomness that is consistent with any plaintext. We continue with a formal definition.

Definition 3.3 (NCE for the sender (NCES)) *An NCE for the sender encryption scheme is a tuple of algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Gen}^*, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ specified as follows:*

- Gen, Enc, Dec are as specified in Definition 2.3.
- Gen^* generates public key PK^* and a trapdoor t_{PK^*} .
- Equivocate, given a ciphertext c^* computed using PK^* , a trapdoor t_{PK^*} and a plaintext m , output r such that $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m, r)$.

Definition 3.4 (Secure NCES) An NCE for the sender $\Pi_{\text{NCES}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Gen}^*, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ is secure if it satisfies the following properties:

- $\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ imply an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme as in Definition 2.4.
- The following public key indistinguishability holds for any plaintext m : $(\text{PK}^*, r^*, m, c^*)$ and (PK, r, m, c) are computationally indistinguishable, for $(\text{PK}^*, t_{\text{PK}^*}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}^*(1^n)$, $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}^*}(m', r')$, $r^* \leftarrow \text{Equivocate}(c^*, t_{\text{PK}^*}, m)$ and $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(m, r)$.

We review the DDH based implementation from [BHY09] and then present our DCR based implementation.

NCES under the DDH assumption for polynomial-size message spaces. For simplicity we consider a binary plaintext space. Let $(g_0, g_1, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$ be an algorithm that given a security parameter n returns a group description $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{G}_{g_0, g_1, p}$ specified by its generators g_0, g_1 and its order p . Then define $\Pi_{\text{NCES}}^{\text{DDH}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Gen}^*, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ as follows.

- Gen , given the security parameter n , set $(g_0, g_1, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$. Choose uniformly random $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and compute $h_i = g_i^x$ for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$. Output the secret key $\text{SK} = x$ and the public key $\text{PK} = (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$.
- Gen^* , given the security parameter n , set $(g_0, g_1, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)$. Choose uniformly random $x_0, x_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ and $h_i = g_i^{x_i}$ for all $i \in \{0, 1\}$. Output the trapdoor $t_{\text{PK}^*} = (x_0, x_1)$ and the public key $\text{PK}^* = (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$.
- Enc , given the public key PK (or PK^*) and a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{G}$, choose a uniformly random $s, t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Output the ciphertext $(g_0^s g_1^t, g_0^m \cdot (h_0^s h_1^t))$.
- Dec , given the secret key x and a ciphertext (g_c, h_c) , output $h_c \cdot (g_c^x)^{-1}$.
- Equivocate , given the fake key $\text{PK}^* = (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$, trapdoor t_{PK^*} , a ciphertext $c^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}^*}(m; (s', t'))$ and a plaintext m , output (s, t) such that $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m; (s, t))$ by solving the system of linear equations induced by the exponents of the two elements in ciphertext.⁵

Proposition 3.3 Assume that the DDH assumption is hard in \mathbb{G} . Then $\Pi_{\text{NCES}}^{\text{DDH}}$ is a secure NCES.

Proof: It is easy to verify that real and simulated public keys are computationally indistinguishable under the DDH assumption even in the presence of the randomness of the encryption. Proving indistinguishability of a real and simulated public key in the presence of the randomness used for encryption is sufficient since a ciphertext is a linear combination of the public key using the randomness for encryption both in the real as well as in the simulated world. The proof follows by a reduction to the DDH assumption as follows. Given a tuple (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) adversary ADV_{DDH} that attempts to decide whether the give tuple is a DH tuple or not, fixes this tuple as the public key, encrypts a message m under this key and output the public key, ciphertext, m and the randomness it used to generate the ciphertext. It then invokes the adversary $\text{ADV}_{\text{NCES}}^{\text{DDH}}$ for our scheme that can tell apart (with non-negligible probability) a simulated public key from a valid public key. ADV_{DDH} outputs what $\text{ADV}_{\text{NCES}}^{\text{DDH}}$ outputs. Clearly, ADV_{DDH} can decide if a given tuple is a DH tuple. ■

⁵In order to compute such randomness the Equivocate algorithm has to know $\log_{g_0} g_1$ and $\log_{g_0} m$. The requirement of knowing $\log_{g_0} m$ makes this scheme work only for messages from polynomial-size spaces.

NCES under the DCR assumption for exponential-size message spaces. In what follows, we introduce a new NCE for the sender based on the security of the DCR assumption. This allows us to fix the composite as part of the CRS when appropriate. Our scheme is based on the PKE from [CHK05], building on earlier work by Cramer and Shoup [CS02]. Let $N = pq$ be an RSA modulus, then define $\Pi_{\text{NCES}}^{\text{DCR}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Gen}^*, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ an NCES as follows.

- **Gen**, given the security parameter n , generate an RSA modulus $N = pq$ with $p = 2p' + 1$ and $q = 2q' + 1$ where p, q, p', q' are primes. Pick $g' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ and $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^2/4}$ and set $g_0 = g'^{2N} \bmod N^2$ and $h_0 = g_0^\alpha \bmod N^2$. Choose a random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N/4}$ and compute $g_1 = g_0^r \bmod N^2, h_1 = ((1 + N) \cdot h_0^r) \bmod N^2$. Output $\text{PK} = (N, g_0, h_0, g_1, h_1)$ and secret key $\text{SK} = \alpha$.
- **Gen***, given the security parameter n , generate N, g_0, h_0 as in **Gen**. Choose a random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N/4}$ and compute $g_1 = g_0^r \bmod N^2, h_1 = h_0^r \bmod N^2$. Output $\text{PK}^* = (N, g_0, h_0, g_1, h_1)$ and trapdoor $t_{\text{PK}^*} = r$.
- **Enc**, given the public key $\text{PK} = (N, g_0, h_0, g_1, h_1)$ (or PK^*) and a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, choose a random $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N/4}$ and output the ciphertext

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m; t) = ((g_1^m g_0^t) \bmod N^2, (h_1^m h_0^t) \bmod N^2).$$

- **Dec**, given the public key $\text{PK} = (N, g_0, h_0, g_1, h_1)$, secret key $\text{SK} = \alpha$ and ciphertext $c = (g_c, h_c)$, compute \hat{m} as follows and output $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that $\hat{m} = 1 + mN$.

$$\hat{m} = (h_c / g_c^\alpha)^{N+1} = [(1 + N)^m]^{N+1} = (1 + N)^m.$$

- **Equivocate**, given $\Phi(N)$, the fake key $\text{PK}^* = (N, g_0, h_0, g_1, h_1)$, trapdoor $t_{\text{PK}^*} = r$, a ciphertext $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}^*}(m; t) = (g_c, h_c)$ and a message m' , output $t' = (rm + t - rm') \bmod \Phi(N)/4$. It is easy to see that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}^*}(m'; t') &= \left((g_1^{m'} g_0^{t'}) \bmod N^2, (h_1^{m'} h_0^{t'}) \bmod N^2 \right) \\ &= \left((g_0^{rm'} g_0^{(rm+t-rm')}) \bmod N^2, (h_0^{rm'} h_0^{(rm+t-rm')}) \bmod N^2 \right) = c. \end{aligned}$$

Next, we show that this scheme meets Definitions 3.4.

Proposition 3.4 *Assume that the DCR assumption is hard in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$. Then $\Pi_{\text{NCES}}^{\text{DCR}}$ is a secure NCES.*

Proof: Given the public key $\text{PK} = (N, g_0, h_0, g_1, h_1)$ and two messages $m, m' \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, we show that encryptions of m and m' are computationally close. Namely tuples, (1) $((g_1^m g_0^t) \bmod N^2, (h_1^m h_0^t) \bmod N^2)$ and (2) $((g_1^{m'} g_0^t) \bmod N^2, (h_1^{m'} h_0^t) \bmod N^2)$ are computationally close. This follows immediately from the IND-CPA security proof for the modified scheme in [DJ03] (cf. Theorem 2 of [DJ03]).

The fact that fake and valid public keys are computationally indistinguishable follows from the IND-CPA security of [CHK05] and [CS02] and the former proof (for the DDH based scheme). As the former key is an encryption of zero whereas the latter key is an encryption of one. ■

3.3 Somewhat Non-Committing Encryption [GWZ09]

The idea of somewhat NCE is to exploit the fact that it is often unnecessary for the simulator to explain a fake ciphertext for *any* plaintext. Instead, in many scenarios it suffices to explain a fake ciphertext with respect to a small set of size ℓ determined in advance (where ℓ might be as small as 2). Therefore there are

two parameters that are considered here: a plaintext of bit length l and an equivocality parameter ℓ which is the number of plaintexts that the simulator needs to explain a ciphertext for (namely, the non-committed domain size). Note that for fully NCE $\ell = 2^l$. Somewhat NCE typically improves over fully NCE whenever ℓ is very small but the plaintext length is still large, say $O(n)$ for n the security parameter.

[GWZ09] design somewhat NCE using three primitives: simulatable PKE (cf. Definition 2.2), NCE (for the purpose of sending a short index of length $\log \ell$), and a secret key encryption (SKE). Let $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \widetilde{\text{Gen}}, \widetilde{\text{Gen}}^{-1}, \widetilde{\text{Enc}}, \widetilde{\text{Enc}}^{-1})$ be a simulatable PKE and $(\text{Gen}^{\text{SKE}}, \text{Enc}^{\text{SKE}}, \text{Dec}^{\text{SKE}})$ be an SKE in which the ciphertexts are indistinguishable from uniformly random values of the same length. In more details,

Setup Phase.

- SEN sends a random index $i \in [\ell]$ using NCE.
- SEN generates ℓ public keys. For $j \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \setminus \{i\}$, the keys $\text{PK}_j \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Gen}}(1^n)$ are generated obliviously while $(\text{PK}_i, \text{SK}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$. SEN sends the keys $\text{PK}_1, \dots, \text{PK}_\ell$ and stores SK_i .
- REC generates $K \leftarrow \text{Gen}^{\text{SKE}}(1^n)$ and computes $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PK}_i}(K)$. REC also generates $c_j \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Enc}}_{\text{PK}_i}(1^n)$ obliviously for $j \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \setminus \{i\}$. Finally it sends ciphertexts c_1, \dots, c_ℓ .
- SEN decrypts the key $K \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{SK}_i}(c_i)$. Both parties store K, i .

Transfer Phase.

- SEN computes $C_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_K^{\text{SKE}}(m)$ and chooses C_j for $j \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \setminus \{i\}$ uniformly at random of the appropriate length. S sends (C_1, \dots, C_ℓ) .
- REC ignores everything other than C_i and decrypts $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}_K^{\text{SKE}}(C_i)$.

In case of no corruptions the simulator simulates both parties as follows: it first generates the keys and the ciphertexts in the setup phase using Gen and Enc , and generates ℓ keys for a symmetric key encryption. In the transfer phase the simulator uses these symmetric keys to encrypt all ℓ plaintexts. Assume that the adversary corrupts a party at the end of this phase then the simulator obtains the message m , say the k th element in $[\ell]$. It then explains the index of this element via the NCE and uses the key and ciphertext faking algorithms to explain the other public key/ciphertext pairs as being obliviously generated. Given that the k th simulatable PKE ciphertext encrypts the secret key K , it holds that the k th SKE ciphertext encrypts the message m . This simulation strategy works for corruption at any point of the execution.

4 One-sided Adaptively Secure NCE

In this section we design one-sided NCE, building on NCE for the sender (NCES) and NCE for the receiver (NCER). Namely, NCER implies that for any plaintext there exists an efficiently generated secret key that decrypts a fake ciphertext into that plaintext (see Definition 3.1). Furthermore, NCES implies that for any plaintext there exists efficiently generated randomness for proving that a ciphertext, encrypted under a fake key, encrypts that plaintext (see Definition 3.3).

The idea of our protocol is to have the receiver create two public/secret key pairs where the first pair is for NCES and the second pair is for NCER. The receiver sends the public keys and the sender encrypts two shares of its message m , each share with a different key. Upon receiving the ciphertexts the receiver recovers the message by decrypting the ciphertexts. Therefore, equivocality of the sender's input can be achieved if the public key of the NCES is fake, whereas, equivocality of the receiver's input can be achieved if the ciphertext of the NCER is fake. Nevertheless, this idea only works if the simulator is aware of the identity of the corrupted party prior to the protocol execution in order to decide whether the keys or the ciphertexts should be explained as valid upon corruption (since it cannot explain fake keys/ciphertext as valid). We resolve this problem using somewhat NCE in order to commit to *the choice* of having fake/valid

keys and ciphertexts. Specifically, it enables the simulator to “explain” fake keys/ciphertext as valid and vice versa using only a constant number of asymmetric operations, as each such non-committing bit requires an equivocation space of size 2. (An overview of somewhat NCE is given in Section 3.3.)

Formally, denote by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SC}}(m, -) \mapsto (-, m)$ the secure message transfer functionality, and let $\Pi_{\text{NCES}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Gen}^*, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ and $\Pi_{\text{NCER}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Enc}^*, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ denote secure NCES and NCER for a message space $\{0, 1\}^q$. Consider the following one-sided protocol for \mathcal{F}_{SC} .

Protocol 1 (One-sided NCE (Π_{OSNCE}))

- **Inputs:** Sender SEN is given input message $m \in \{0, 1\}^q$. Both parties are given security parameter 1^n .
- **The Protocol:**
 1. **Message from the receiver.** REC invokes $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ of Π_{NCES} and Π_{NCER} and obtains two public/secret key pairs $(\text{PK}_0, \text{SK}_0)$ and $(\text{PK}_1, \text{SK}_1)$, respectively. REC sends PK_1 on clear and PK_0 using somewhat NCE with equivocality parameter $\ell = 2$.
 2. **Message from the sender.** Upon receiving PK_0 and PK_1 , SEN creates two shares of m , m_0 and m_1 , such that $m = m_0 \oplus m_1$. It then encrypts each m_i using PK_i , creating ciphertext c_i , and sends c_0 and c_1 using two instances of somewhat NCE with equivocality parameter $\ell = 2$.
 3. **Output.** Upon receiving c_0, c_1 , REC decrypts c_i using SK_i and outputs the bitwise XOR of the decrypted plaintexts.

Note that the message space of our one-sided NCE is equivalent to the message space of the NCES/NCER schemes, where q can be as large as n . Therefore, our protocol transmits q -bits messages using a *constant number of PKE operations*, as opposed to fully adaptive NCEs that require $O(q)$ such operations. We provide two instantiations for the above protocol. One for polynomial-size message spaces using DDH based NCES and NCER, and another for exponential-size message spaces using DCR based NCES and NCER. We conclude with the following theorem and the complete proof.

Theorem 4.1 *Assume the existence of NCER and NCES with constant number of PKE operations for message space $\{0, 1\}^q$ and simulatable PKE. Then Protocol 1 UC realizes \mathcal{F}_{SC} in the presence of one-sided adaptive malicious adversaries with constant number of PKE operations for message space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter.*

Intuitively, security follows due to the fact that the simulator is not committed to either valid keys or valid ciphertexts. Thus, upon corrupting one of the parties it is able to explain that party’s internal state, while equivocating the communication and make it consistent with message m . For instance, if the sender is corrupted after simulating its message, the simulator can explain PK_0 as a fake key. Thus, the ciphertext encrypted under this key can be explained with respect to any plaintext. More formally,

Proof: Let ADV be a malicious probabilistic polynomial-time adversary attacking Protocol 1 by adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{SC} such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{SC} and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with \mathcal{F}_{SC} and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. We explain the strategy of the simulation for all corruption cases.

Simulating the communication with ENV. Every input value received by the simulator from ENV is written on ADV’s input tape. Likewise, every output value written by ADV on its output tape is copied to the simulator’s output tape (to be read by its environment ENV).

SEN is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the honest receiver by sending to ADV, PK_0 using the somewhat NCE and PK_1 in clear. Upon receiving two ciphertexts c_0 and c_1 from ADV, SIM extracts m by computing $\text{Dec}_{SK_0}(c_0) \oplus \text{Dec}_{SK_1}(c_1)$. SIM externally forwards m to the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{SC} .

REC is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and obtains REC's output m from \mathcal{F}_{SC} . SIM invokes ADV and receives PK_0 from ADV via the somewhat NCE and PK_1 in clear. Next, SIM completes the execution playing the role of the honest sender on input m . Note that it does not make a difference whether REC generates invalid public keys since SIM knows m and thus perfectly emulates the receiver's view.

If none of the parties is corrupted as above, SIM emulates the receiver's message as follows. It creates public/secret key pair (PK_1, SK_1) for $\Pi_{N_{CER}}$ and sends the public key in clear. It then creates a valid public/secret key pair (PK_0, SK_0) and a fake public key with a trapdoor $(PK_0^*, t_{PK_0^*})$ for $\Pi_{N_{CES}}$ (using Gen and Gen^* , respectively). SIM sends (PK_0, PK_0^*) using somewhat NCE. Namely, the simulator does not send the valid PK_0 as the honest receiver would do, rather it encrypts both valid and invalid keys within the somewhat NCE.

SEN is corrupted after Step 1 is concluded. Since no message was sent yet on behalf of the sender, SIM completes the simulation playing the role of the honest sender using m .

REC is corrupted after Step 1 is concluded. Upon receiving m , SIM explains the receiver's internal state which is independent of the message m so far. Specifically, it reveals the randomness for generating PK_0, SK_0 and PK_1, SK_1 and presents the randomness for the valid key PK_0 being the message sent by the somewhat NCE. SIM plays the role of the honest sender with input m as the message.

If none of the above corruption cases occur, SIM emulates the sender's message as follows. It first chooses two random shares m'_0, m'_1 and generates a pair of ciphertexts (c_0, c_0^*) for $\Pi_{N_{CES}}$ that encrypts m'_0 using PK_0 and PK_0^* . It then generates a pair of ciphertexts (c_1, c_1^*) for $\Pi_{N_{CER}}$ such that c_1 is a valid encryption of m'_1 using the public key PK_1 , and c_1^* is a fake ciphertext generated using Enc^* and PK_1 . SIM sends (c_0, c_0^*) and (c_1^*, c_1) via two instances of somewhat NCE.

SEN is corrupted after Step 2 is concluded. Upon receiving a corruption instruction from ENV, SIM corrupts the ideal SEN and obtains SEN's input m . It then explains the sender's internal state as follows. It explains PK_0^* for being the public key sent by the receiver using the somewhat NCE. Furthermore, it presents the randomness for c_0^* and c_1 being the ciphertexts sent via the somewhat NCE. Finally, it computes $r'' \leftarrow \text{Equivocate}_{PK_0^*}(t_{PK_0^*}, m'_0, r, m''_0)$ for m''_0 such that $m = m''_0 \oplus m'_1$ and r the randomness used to encrypt m'_0 , and presents r'' as the randomness used to generate c_0^* that encrypts m''_0 . The randomness used for generating c_1 is revealed honestly.

REC is corrupted after Step 2 is concluded. Upon receiving a corruption instruction from ENV, SIM corrupts the ideal REC and obtains REC's output m . It then explains the receiver's internal state as follows. It presents the randomness for PK_0 for being the public key sent via the somewhat NCE and presents the randomness for generating (PK_0, SK_0) . It then explains c_0 and c_1^* for being sent via the somewhat NCE. Finally, it generates a secret key SK_1^* so that $m''_1 \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{SK_1^*}(c_1^*)$ and $m''_1 \oplus m'_0 = m$. That is, it explains (PK_1, SK_1^*) as the other pair of keys generated by the receiver.

We now show that for every corruption case described above, there is not any polynomial-time ENV that distinguishes with a non-negligible probability the real execution with ADV and the simulated execution with SIM.

SEN/REC is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. In these corruption cases there is no difference between the real execution and the simulated execution and the views are statistically indistinguishable.

SEN/REC is corrupted after Step 1 is concluded. In these cases the only difference between the real and simulated executions is with respect to the somewhat NCE that delivers the public key of NCES. Specifically, in the real execution it always delivers a valid public key while in the simulated execution it delivers a fake key. Indistinguishability follows from the security of the somewhat NCE. Namely, assume that the receiver is corrupted. Then security is reduced to the security of the underlying secret key encryption used within the somewhat NCE. In the reduction, the distinguisher receives a ciphertext that either encrypts a random message or an invalid public key (where the former ciphertext is indistinguishable from a uniform string chosen obviously in the protocol of [GWZ09], see Section 3.3 for the transfer phase). The distinguisher completes the setup phase as the honest sender would do, receiving a secret key. Note that the receiver in our one-sided protocol plays the role of the sender in the somewhat NCE protocol. Next, in the transfer phase the distinguisher plugs-in the challenge ciphertext and computes another ciphertext of a valid public key using the secret key it previously received, and outputs whatever the adversary does. A similar reduction can be built when the sender is corrupted.

SEN/REC is corrupted after Step 2 is concluded. Here the adversary sees in the simulation either a fake public key or a fake ciphertext. Indistinguishability follows from the security of Π_{NCES} and Π_{NCEr} and the security of somewhat NCE. More concretely, assume that the receiver is corrupted. We build a distinguisher that receives either a valid or an invalid ciphertext and a corresponding secret key that decrypts the ciphertext into the sender's message. The distinguisher then uses these values in its simulation of the one-sided NCE protocol and outputs whatever the adversary does. A similar reduction can be built when the sender is corrupted where here the distinguisher attempts to distinguish between a valid and invalid public keys.



5 One-Sided Adaptively Secure OT

A common approach to design an adaptive OT [Bea98, CLOS02] is by having the receiver generate two public keys (PK_0, PK_1) such that it only knows the secret key associated with PK_σ . The sender then encrypts x_0, x_1 under these respective keys so that the receiver decrypts the σ th ciphertext. The security of this protocol in the adaptive setting holds if the underlying encryption scheme is an *augmented non-committing encryption scheme* [CLOS02]. In this section we follow the approach from [GWZ09] and build one-sided OT based on the static OT from [PVW08], which is based on a primitive called *dual-mode PKE*.

The [PVW08] OT. Dual-mode PKE is an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme that is initialized with system parameters of two types. For each type one can generate two types of public/secret key pair, labeled by the left key pair and the right key pair. Similarly, the encryption algorithm generates a left or a right ciphertext. Moreover, if the key label matches the ciphertext label (i.e., a left ciphertext is generated under the left public key), then the ciphertext can be correctly decrypted. (A formal definition of dual-mode PKE is given in Section 2.3.) This primitive was introduced in [PVW08] which demonstrates its usefulness in designing efficient statically secure OTs under various assumptions. First, the receiver generates a left key if $\sigma = 0$, and a right key otherwise. In response, the sender generates a left ciphertext for x_0 and a right ciphertext for x_1 . The receiver then decrypts the σ th ciphertext.

The security of dual-mode PKE relies on the two indistinguishable modes of generating the system parameters: *messy* and *decryption* mode. In a messy mode the system parameters are generated together with a messy trapdoor. Using this trapdoor, any public key (even malformed ones) can be labeled as a left or as a right key. Moreover, when the key type does not match the ciphertext type, the ciphertext becomes statistically independent of the plaintext. The messy mode is used to ensure security when the receiver is corrupted since it allows to extract the receiver’s input bit while hiding the sender’s other input. On the other hand, the system parameters in a decryption mode are generated together with a decryption trapdoor that can be used to decrypt both left and right ciphertexts. Moreover, left public keys are statistically indistinguishable from right keys. The decryption mode is used to ensure security when the sender is corrupted since the decryption trapdoor enables to extract the sender’s inputs while statistically hiding the receiver’s input. [PVW08] instantiated dual-mode PKE and their generic OT construction based on various assumptions, such as DDH, QR and lattice-based assumptions. We recall their instantiation based on DDH in Appendix A. In a followup work [GWZ09], Garay et al. extended the dual-mode definition into enhanced dual-model PKE in order to enable equivocation of the sender’s input relative to the ciphertext that encrypts $x_{1-\sigma}$ in a messy mode. Our protocol implies equivocation for the sender via our one-sided NCE which implies that we can use the simpler dual-mode primitive.

Our construction. We build our one-sided OT based on the PVW protocol considering the following modifications. (1) First, we require that the sender sends its ciphertexts using one-sided NCE (see Section 4). (2) We fix the system parameters in a decryption mode, which immediately implies extractability of the sender’s input and equivocality of the receiver’s input. We further achieve equivocality of the sender’s input using our one-sided NCE. In order to ensure extractability of the receiver’s input we employ a special type of ZK PoK. Namely, this proof exploits the fact that the simulator knows both witnesses for the proof yet it does not know which witness will be used by the real receiver, since this choice depends on σ . Specifically, it allows the simulator to use both witnesses and later convince the adversary that it indeed used a particular witness. In addition, it enables to extract σ since the real receiver does not know both witnesses. We denote these proofs for compound statements by witness equivocal and refer to Section 7.2 for more details.

Our construction is one-sided UC secure in the presence of malicious adversaries, and uses a number of non-committed bits that is *independent* of the sender’s input size or the overall communication complexity. We formally denote the dual-mode PKE of [PVW08] by $\Pi_{\text{DUAL}} = (\text{SetupMessy}, \text{SetupDecryption}, \text{dGen}, \text{dEnc}, \text{dDec}, \text{FindBranch}, \text{TrapKeyGen})$ and describe our construction in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{SC}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}})$ -hybrid model, where \mathcal{F}_{SC} is instantiated with one-sided NCE. Furthermore, the latter functionality is required to ensure the correctness of the public key and is defined for a compound statement that is comprised from the following two relations,

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{LEFT}} = \{(\text{PK}, r_0) \mid (\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, 0; r_0)\},$$

where CRS are the system parameters. Similarly, we define $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RIGHT}}$ for the right keys. Specifically, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$ receives a public key PK and randomness r_σ for $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}$ and returns `Accept` if either $\sigma = 0$ and $\text{PK} = \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, 0; r_0)$, or $\sigma = 1$ and $\text{PK} = \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, 1; r_1)$ holds. Security is proven by implementing this functionality using a witness equivocal ZK PoK that allows the simulator to equivocate the witness during the simulation (i.e., explaining the proof transcript with respect to either r_0 or r_1). We consider two instantiations of dual-mode PKE (based on the DDH and QR assumptions). For each implementation we design a concrete ZK PoK, proving that the prover knows r_σ with respect to $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}$; see details below.

We define our OT protocol as follows,

Protocol 2 (One-sided OT (Π_{OT}))

- **Inputs:** Sender SEN has $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^q$ and receiver REC has $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}$.

- **CRS:** CRS such that $(\text{CRS}, t) \leftarrow \text{SetupDecryption}$.

- **The Protocol:**

1. REC sends SEN PK, where $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, \sigma; r_\sigma)$. REC calls $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$ with (PK, r_σ) .
2. Upon receiving *Accept* from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$ and PK from REC, SEN generates $c_0 \leftarrow \text{dEnc}_{\text{PK}}(x_0, 0)$ and $c_1 \leftarrow \text{dEnc}_{\text{PK}}(x_1, 1)$. SEN calls \mathcal{F}_{SC} twice with inputs c_0 and c_1 , respectively.
3. Upon receiving (c_0, c_1) , REC outputs $\text{dDec}_{\text{SK}}(c_\sigma)$.

Theorem 5.1 *Assume the existence of one-sided NCE with constant number of PKE operations for message space $\{0, 1\}^q$ and dual-mode PKE. Then Protocol 2 UC realizes \mathcal{F}_{OT} in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{SC}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}})$ -hybrid model in the presence of one-sided adaptive malicious adversaries with constant number of PKE operations for sender's input space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter.*

Proof: Let ADV be a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious adversary attacking Protocol2 by adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with \mathcal{F}_{OT} and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. Upon computing $(\text{CRS}, t) \leftarrow \text{SetupDecryption}(1^n)$, SIM proceeds as follows:

Simulating the communication with ENV. Every input value received by the simulator from ENV is written on ADV's input tape. Likewise, every output value written by ADV on its output tape is copied to the simulator's output tape (to be read by its environment ENV).

SEN is corrupted at the outset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the receiver by running $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}_0, \text{SK}_1) \leftarrow \text{TrapKeyGen}(t)$. It then sends PK and an *Accept* message to ADV on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$. Whenever ADV returns c_0, c_1 via \mathcal{F}_{SC} , SIM extracts SEN's inputs x_0, x_1 by invoking $\text{dDec}_{\text{SK}_0}(c_0)$ and $\text{dDec}_{\text{SK}_1}(c_1)$ as in static case. It then sends x_0, x_1 to \mathcal{F}_{OT} and completes the execution playing the role of the receiver using an arbitrary σ .

Note that, in contrast to the hybrid execution where the receiver uses its real input σ to dGen in order to create public/secret keys pair, the simulator does not know σ and thus creates the keys using TrapKeyGen . Nevertheless, when the CRS is set in a decryption mode the left public key is statistically indistinguishable from right public key. Furthermore, the keys (PK, SK_i) that are generated by TrapKeyGen are statistically close to the keys generated by dGen with input bit i . This implies that the hybrid and simulated executions are statistically close.

REC is corrupted at the outset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and receives its public key PK and a witness r_σ on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$. Given r_σ , SIM checks if PK is the left or the right key and use it to extract the receiver's input σ . It then sends σ to \mathcal{F}_{OT} , receiving back x_σ . Finally, SIM computes the sender's message using x_σ and an arbitrary $x_{1-\sigma}$.

Unlike in the hybrid execution, the simulator uses an arbitrary $x_{1-\sigma}$ instead of the real $x_{1-\sigma}$. However, a decryption mode implies computational privacy of $x_{1-\sigma}$. Therefore, the hybrid view is also computationally indistinguishable from the simulated view as in the static setting proven in [PVW08].

If none of the above corruption cases occur SIM invokes $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}_0, \text{SK}_1) \leftarrow \text{TrapKeyGen}(t)$ and sends PK to the sender. Note that the simulator knows a witness r_0 such that $\text{PK} = \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, 0; r_0)$ and a witness r_1 such that $\text{PK} = \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, 1; r_1)$.

SEN is corrupted between Steps 1 and 2. SIM trivially explains the the sender’s internal state since SEN did not compute any message so far. The simulator completes the simulation by playing the role of REC using arbitrary σ as in the case when the sender is corrupted at the outset of the execution.

Indistinguishability for this case follows similarly to the prior corruption case when SEN is corrupted at the outset of the execution.

REC is corrupted between Steps 1 and 2. Upon corrupting the receiver SIM obtains σ, x_σ from \mathcal{F}_{OT} and explains the receiver’s internal state as follows. It first explains r_σ as the witness given to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$ and PK as the outcome of $\text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, \sigma; r_\sigma)$. The simulator completes the simulation playing the role of the honest sender with x_σ and an arbitrary $x_{1-\sigma}$.

Indistinguishability for this case in the hybrid setting follows similarly to the prior corruption case, since the only difference in the simulation is relative to the witness equivocality proof which only makes a difference in the real execution.

If none of the above corruption cases occur then SIM chooses two arbitrary inputs x'_0, x'_1 for the sender and encrypts them using the dual-mode encryption. Denote these ciphertexts by c'_0, c'_1 . SIM pretends sending these ciphertexts using \mathcal{F}_{SC} .

SEN is corrupted after Step 2. Upon corrupting the sender, SIM obtains (x_0, x_1) from \mathcal{F}_{OT} . It then explains the sender’s internal state as follows. It first computes c_0, c_1 that encrypts x_0 and x_1 respectively. It then explains c_0 and c_1 as being sent using \mathcal{F}_{SC} .

In the hybrid setting indistinguishability follows as in the prior corruption case of the sender, since the simulator emulates the sender’s message via the one-sided non-committing channel. In the real execution, security is reduced to the security of the one-sided encryption scheme implementation.

REC is corrupted after Step 2. Upon corrupting the receiver, SIM obtains REC’s input and output (σ, x_σ) from \mathcal{F}_{OT} . It then explains the receiver’s internal state as follows. It first explains r_σ as the witness given to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RLR}}$ and PK as the outcome of $\text{dGen}(\text{CRS}, \sigma; r_\sigma)$. Finally, it explains the output of \mathcal{F}_{SC} as c_σ so that c_σ is indeed a valid encryption of x_σ .

Indistinguishability follows similarly to the prior corruption case of the receiver since the second message is computed by the sender which is not corrupted.

■

Concrete instantiations. In the DDH-based instantiation the CRS is a Diffie-Hellman tuple (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) and the trapdoor is $\log_{g_0} g_1$. Moreover, the concrete ZK PoK functionality is $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RDL,OR}}$ which is invoked with the statement and witness $((g_0 h_0, g_\sigma^r h_\sigma^r), (g_1 h_1, g_\sigma^r h_\sigma^r), r)$, such that $\text{PK} = (g_\sigma^r, h_\sigma^r)$, $\text{SK} = r$ and $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. (See Appendix A for the DDH based OT of [PVW08]).

In the QR-based instantiation the CRS is a quadratic residue y and the trapdoor is s such that $y = s^2 \pmod N$ and N is an RSA composite. The concrete ZK PoK functionality is $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RQR,OR}}$ which is invoked with the statement and witness $((y \cdot \text{PK}, \text{PK}), r)$, such that $\text{PK} = r^2/y^\sigma$, $\text{SK} = r$ and $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.

6 Constant Round One-Sided Adaptively Secure Computation

In the following section we demonstrate the feasibility of one-sided adaptively secure two-party protocols in the presence of semi-honest and malicious adversaries. Our constructions are constant round and UC secure and use a number of non-committed bits that is independent of the circuit size, thus reduce the number of PKE operations so that it only depends on the input and output lengths.

6.1 A High-Level Overview of Yao’s Garbling Technique

We briefly describe the garbling technique of Yao as described by Lindell and Pinkas in [LP09]. In this construction, the desired function f is represented by a boolean circuit C that is computed gate by gate from the input wires to the output wires. In the following, we distinguish four different types of wires used in a given boolean circuit: **(a)** circuit-input wires; **(b)** circuit-output wires; **(c)** gate-input wires (that enter some gate g); and **(d)** gate-output wires (that leave some gate g). The underlying idea is to associate every wire w with two random values, say k_w^0, k_w^1 , such that k_w^0 represents the bit 0 and k_w^1 represents the bit 1. The garbled table for each gate maps random input values to random output values, with the property that given two input values it is only possible to learn the output value that corresponds to the output bit. This is accomplished by viewing the four potential inputs to the gate k_1^0, k_1^1 (values associated with the first input wire) and k_2^0, k_2^1 (values associated with the second input wire), as encryption keys. So that the output key values k_3^0, k_3^1 are encrypted under the appropriate input keys. For instance, let g be a NAND gate. Then, k_3^1 (that corresponds to bit 1) is encrypted under the pair of keys associated with the values $(0, 0)$, $(0, 1)$, $(1, 0)$. Whereas, k_3^0 is encrypted under the pair of keys associated with $(1, 1)$ which yields the following four ciphertexts

$$\text{Enc}_{k_1^0}(\text{Enc}_{k_2^0}(k_3^1)), \text{Enc}_{k_1^0}(\text{Enc}_{k_2^1}(k_3^1)), \text{Enc}_{k_1^1}(\text{Enc}_{k_2^0}(k_3^1)) \text{ and } \text{Enc}_{k_1^1}(\text{Enc}_{k_2^1}(k_3^0)),$$

where Enc is a private key encryption scheme ($\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$) that has *indistinguishable encryptions* for multiple messages, and an *elusive efficiently verifiable range*; see [LP09] for the formal definitions. These ciphertexts are randomly permuted in order to obtain the garbled table for gate g . Then, given the input wire keys k_1^α, k_2^β that correspond to the bits α and β and the garbled table containing the four encryptions, it is possible to obtain the output wire key $k_3^{g(\alpha, \beta)}$. The description of the garbled circuit is concluded with the *output decryption tables*, mapping the random values on the circuit output wires back to their corresponding boolean values.

6.2 One-Sided Yao for Semi-Honest Adversaries

Our first construction adapts the semi-honest two-party protocol [Yao82, LP09] into the one-sided adaptive setting at a cost of $\mathcal{O}(|C|)$ private key operations and $\mathcal{O}(|\text{input}| + |\text{output}|)$ public key operations. Using our one-sided secure primitives we obtain efficient protocols that outperform the constant round one-sided constructions of [KO04, IPS08] and all known fully adaptively secure two-party protocols. Namely, we show that one-sided security can be obtained by only communicating the keys corresponding to the input/output wires via a non-committing channel. This implies that the number of PKE operations *does not* depend on the garbled circuit size as in prior work.

Informally, the input keys that correspond to P_0 ’s input are transferred to P_1 using somewhat NCE with equivocation parameter $\ell = 2$, whereas P_1 ’s input keys are sent using one-sided OT. Next, the entire garbled circuit (without the output decryption table) is sent to P_1 using a standard communication channel. P_1 evaluates the garbled circuit and finds the keys for the output wires. The parties then run a one-sided bit OT for each output key where P_1 plays the role of the receiver, and learns the output bit that corresponds to its output wire. Finally, P_1 sends P_0 the output using one-sided NCE. We note that obtaining the output via one-sided OT is crucial to our proof since it enables us to circumvent the difficulties arise when implementing the simulation technique from [LP09] that uses a fake circuit. To carry out these OTs successfully we require that the keys associated with a output wire have distinct most significant bits that are fixed independently of the bits they correspond to. For simplicity we only consider deterministic and same-output functionalities. This can be further generalized using the reductions specified in [Gol04]. The formal description of our one-sided semi-honest protocol Π_f^{SH} is given below in the \mathcal{F}_{OT} -hybrid model.

Protocol 3 (One-sided adaptively secure semi-honest Yao (Π_f^{SH}))

- **Inputs:** P_0 has $x_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and P_1 has $x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$. Let $x_0 = x_0^1, \dots, x_0^n$ and $x_1 = x_1^1, \dots, x_1^n$.
- **Auxiliary Input:** A boolean circuit C such that for every $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $C(x, y) = f(x, y)$ where $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Furthermore, we assume that C is such that if a circuit-output wire leaves some gate, then the gate has no other wires leading from it into other gates (i.e. no circuit-output wire is also a gate-output wire). Likewise, a circuit-input wire that is also a circuit-output wire enters no gates.
- **The Protocol:**
 1. **Setup and garbling circuit computation.** P_0 constructs garbled circuit $G(C)$ as described in Section 6.1 subject to the constraint that the keys corresponding to each circuit-output wire have a distinct most significant bit.
 2. **Transferring the garbled circuit and input keys to P_1 .** Let (k_i^0, k_i^1) be the key pair corresponding to the circuit-input wire that takes the i th bit of x_0 and let (k_{n+i}^0, k_{n+i}^1) be the key pair corresponding to the circuit-input wire that takes the i th bit of x_1 . Then,
 - (a) For all $i \in [1, \dots, n]$, P_0 sends $k_i^{x_0^i}$ using an instance of somewhat NCE with $\ell = 2$.
 - (b) For all $i \in [1, \dots, n]$, P_0 and P_1 call \mathcal{F}_{OT} with input (k_{n+i}^0, k_{n+i}^1) and x_1^i , respectively. Let $k_{n+i}^{x_1^i}$ denotes P_1 's i th output.
 - (c) P_0 sends $G(C)$ without the output decryption table to P_1 .
 3. **Circuit evaluation and interactive output computation.** P_1 evaluates $G(C)$ on the above input keys and obtains the keys that correspond to $f(x_0, x_1)$ in the circuit-output wires. Let (k_{2n+i}^0, k_{2n+i}^1) be the key pair corresponding to the i th circuit-output wire with distinct most significant bits. Also assume P_1 obtains key k_{2n+i}^α corresponding to the i th circuit-output wire of $G(C)$. Then,
 - (a) For all $i \in [1, \dots, n]$, P_0 and P_1 call \mathcal{F}_{OT} in which P_0 's input equals $(0, 1)$ if the most significant bit of k_{2n+i}^0 is 0, and $(1, 0)$ otherwise. P_1 's input is the most significant bit of k_{2n+i}^α .
 - (b) P_1 computes $f(x_0, x_1)$ by concatenating the bits received from the above n calls.
 4. **Output communication.** P_1 sends y using an instance of one-sided NCE.

Theorem 6.1 (One-sided semi-honest) *Let f be a deterministic same-output functionality and assume that the encryption scheme for garbling has indistinguishable encryptions under chosen plaintext attacks, and an elusive and efficiently verifiable range. Furthermore, assume that \mathcal{F}_{OT} is realized in the presence of one-sided semi-honest adversaries with constant number of PKE operations for sender's input space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter. Then Protocol 3 UC realizes \mathcal{F}_f in the presence of one-sided semi-honest adversaries at a cost of $\mathcal{O}(|C|)$ private key operations and $\mathcal{O}(|\text{input}| + |\text{output}|)$ public key operations.*

We note that the ideal OT calls in Step 2 can be realized using string one-sided OTs, whereas the OT calls in Step 3 can be replaced with bit one-sided OTs.

Proof: Our proof is shown in the \mathcal{F}_{OT} -hybrid model. Let ADV be a probabilistic polynomial-time semi-honest adversary attacking Protocol 3 by adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_f such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_f and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with \mathcal{F}_f and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. We now explain the actions of the simulation for the following corruption cases: **(1)** No corruption takes place; **(2)** Corruption takes place at the outset. **(3)** Corruption takes place between Steps 2 and 3. **(4)** Corruption takes place between Steps 3 and 4. **(5)** Corruption takes place at the end. We now describe the simulator for all these cases considering the corruption of each party. These cases cover all potential cases of corruption.

No corruption. When no corruptions take place the simulator simulates both P_0 and P_1 as follows:

1. **Setup and garbling circuit C.** SIM chooses $2n$ random keys for P_0 's input denoted by $k_1^0, k_1^1, \dots, k_n^0, k_n^1$, $2n$ random keys for P_1 's input denoted by $k_{n+1}^0, k_{n+1}^1, \dots, k_{2n}^0, k_{2n}^1$ and $2n$ random keys for the output denoted by $k_{2n+1}^0, k_{2n+1}^1, \dots, k_{3n}^0, k_{3n}^1$, such that the most significant bit of k_{2n+i}^0 and k_{2n+i}^1 for all $i = 1, \dots, n$ is distinct. SIM completes the construction of the garbled circuit $G(C)$ for C as the honest P_0 would do.
2. **Transferring the garbled circuit and input keys to P_1 .** In order to transfer the keys that correspond to the input of P_1 , SIM simulates P_0 (playing the role of SEN) on inputs (k_{n+i}^0, k_{n+i}^1) and P_1 (playing the role of REC) on input 0 within the i th \mathcal{F}_{OT} , for $i = 1, \dots, n$.
For $i = 1, \dots, n$, SIM simulates P_0 sending k_i^0 via somewhat NCE with $\ell = 2$.
Finally, SIM simulates P_0 sending $G(C)$ without the output table.
3. **Circuit evaluation and Interactive Output computation.** SIM simulates P_0 (playing the role of REC) and P_1 (playing the role of SEN) engaging in n ideal OT calls, such that for every i the input of P_0 equals $(0, 1)$ if the most significant bit of k_{2n+i}^0 is 0, and $(1, 0)$ otherwise. The input of P_1 is always 0.
4. **Output Communication.** SIM sends P_1 the string 0^n using a one-sided NCE channel.

Corruption at the outset of the protocol execution.

- **P_0 is corrupted.** SIM receives P_0 's input x_0 and its output y . It then plays the role of P_1 as in the no corruptions case except that in the final step SIM simulates P_1 sending y via a one-sided NCE channel.
- **P_1 is corrupted.** SIM receives P_1 's input x_1 and its output y . It then plays the role of P_0 as in the no corruptions case except that in the output computation phase, SIM simulates P_0 sending input (y_i, y_i) via the i th call of \mathcal{F}_{OT} . This ensures that ADV outputs y irrespective of the keys it inputs.

Corruption between Steps 2 and 3.

- **P_0 is corrupted.** The simulator simulates P_0 and P_1 as in Steps 1 and 2 of the no corruptions case. Upon corrupting P_0 the simulator receives P_0 's input x_0 and its output y . It then explains the internal state of P_0 until Step 2 as follows. The setup and the garbling circuit construction are trivially explained. Moreover, P_0 's input to \mathcal{F}_{OT} calls for the key transfer are explained as in the simulation of no corruption. Finally, P_0 's input to the i th invocation of the somewhat NCE is explained as $k_i^{x_i^0}$ where x_i^0 is the i th bit of x_i . SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P_1 as in the no corruptions case except that in the final step it simulates P_1 sending y via the one-sided NCE.
- **P_1 is corrupted.** SIM simulates P_0 and P_1 as in the no corruptions case in Steps 1 and 2. Upon corrupting P_1 the simulator receives P_1 's input x_1 and its output y . It then explains the internal state of P_1 as follows. P_1 's input and output pair for the i th \mathcal{F}_{OT} key transfer call are explained as $(x_1^i, k_{n+i}^{x_1^i})$. Moreover, P_0 's input to the somewhat NCE channel is explained as k_i^0 . SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P_0 as in the no corruptions case, except that in the output computation phase it simulates P_0 sending input (y_i, y_i) to the i th call of \mathcal{F}_{OT} .

Corruption between Steps 3 and 4.

- **P_0 is corrupted.** The simulator simulates P_0 and P_1 as in Steps 1, 2 and 3 of the no corruptions case. Upon corrupting P_0 the simulator receives P_0 's input x_0 and its output y . It then explains the internal state of P_0 as follows. The consistency check up to Step 2 is as in the previous corruption case for P_0 . In Step 3, P_0 's input to \mathcal{F}_{OT} for the output computation phase is explained as in the simulation for the no corruptions case. SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P_1 as in the no corruptions case, except that in the final step SIM simulates P_1 sending input y via a one-sided NCE channel. This ensures that ADV receives y as the circuit output.
- **P_1 is corrupted.** The simulator simulates P_0 and P_1 as in the Steps 1, 2 and 3 of the no corruptions case. Upon corrupting P_1 the simulator receives P_1 's input x_1 and its output y . It then explains the internal state of P_1 as follows. The consistency check up to Step 2 is as in the previous corruption case for P_1 . In Step 3, P_1 's input and output pair for the i th \mathcal{F}_{OT} call in the output computation phase is explained as b, y_i , where b is the most significant bit of the key that is associated with the i th output wire. SIM completes the simulation playing the role of P_0 as in the no corruptions case.

Corruption at the end.

- **P_1 is corrupted.** Upon corrupting P_1 the simulator receives P_1 's input x_1 and its output y . It then explains the internal state of P_1 as follows. The consistency check up to Step 3 is as in the previous corruption case for P_1 . In Step 4, it explains P_1 's input to the somewhat NCE channel as y .

This completes the description of all corruption cases. Note that the only differences between the simulation and the hybrid executions is with respect to the information sent via the somewhat and one-sided NCE channels and the oblivious transfer. These however are computationally indistinguishable due to the IND-CPA security of the encryption schemes and the one-sided security of the OT. ■

6.3 Security against Malicious Adversaries

Next, we modify Π_f^{SH} and adapt the cut-and-choose OT protocol introduced in [LP12] in order to achieve security against malicious adversaries. The idea of the cut-and-choose technique is to ask P_0 to send s garbled circuits and later open half of them (aka, *check circuits*) by the choice of P_1 . This ensures that with very high probability the majority of the unopened circuits (aka, *evaluation circuits*) are valid. The cut-and-choose OT primitive of [LP12] allows P_1 to choose a secret random subset \mathcal{J} of size $s/2$ for which it learns both keys for each input wire that corresponds to the check circuits, and the keys associated with its input with respect to the evaluation circuits.

In order to ensure that P_0 hands P_1 consistent input keys for all the circuits, the [LP12] protocol ensures that the keys associated with P_0 's input are obtained via a Diffie-Hellman pseudorandom synthesizer [NR95]. Namely, P_0 chooses values $g^{a_1^0}, g^{a_1^1}, \dots, g^{a_n^0}, g^{a_n^1}$ and g^{c_1}, \dots, g^{c_s} , where n is the input/output length, s is the cut-and-choose parameter and g is a generator of a prime order group \mathbb{G} . So that the pair of keys associated with the i th input of P_0 in the j th circuit is $(g^{a_i^0 c_j}, g^{a_i^1 c_j})$.⁶ Given values $\{g^{a_i^0}, g^{a_i^1}, g^{c_j}\}$ and any subset of keys associated with P_0 's input, the remaining keys associated with its input are pseudorandom by the DDH assumption. Furthermore, when the keys are prepared this way P_0 can efficiently prove that it used the same input for all circuits. P_1 then evaluates the evaluation circuits and takes the majority value for the final output. In Section 6.3.1 we demonstrate how to adapt the cut-and-choose OT protocol

⁶The actual key pair used in the circuit garbling is derived from $(g^{a_i^0 c_j}, g^{a_i^1 c_j})$ using an extractor. A universal hash function is used in [LP12] for this purpose, where the seeds for the function are picked by P_0 before it knows \mathcal{J} .

into the one-sided setting using the building blocks introduced in this paper. This requires dealing with new subtleties regarding the system parameters and the ZK proofs. Formally, we prove

Theorem 6.2 (One-sided malicious) *Let f be a deterministic same-output functionality and assume that the encryption scheme for garbling has indistinguishable encryptions under chosen plaintext attacks, an elusive and efficiently verifiable range, and that the DDH and DCR assumptions are hard in the respective groups. Then Protocol Π_f^{MAL} UC realizes \mathcal{F}_f in the presence of one-sided malicious adversaries at a cost of $\mathcal{O}(s \cdot |C|)$ private key operations and $\mathcal{O}(s \cdot (|\text{input}| + |\text{output}|))$ public key operations where s is a statistical parameter that determines the cut-and-choose soundness error.*

Specifically, the concrete DCR assumption implies cut-and-choose OT with constant number of PKE operations for sender’s input space $\{0, 1\}^q$, where $q = O(n)$ and n is the security parameter. Overall, the efficiency of Π_f^{MAL} is $\mathcal{O}(s \cdot |C|)$ private key operations and $\mathcal{O}(s \cdot (|\text{input}| + |\text{output}|))$ public key operations where s is a statistical parameter that determines the cut-and-choose soundness error.

6.3.1 One-sided Single Choice Cut-and-Choose OT

We describe next the single choice cut-and-choose OT functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$ from [LP12] and present a protocol that implements this functionality with UC one-sided malicious security. In Section 6.3.2 we briefly describe our batch single choice cut-and-choose OT construction using a single choice cut-and-choose OT, which is used as a building block in our two-party protocol. Formally, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$ is defined as follows

1. Inputs:

- (a) SEN inputs a vector of pairs $\{(x_0^j, x_1^j)\}_{j=1}^s$.
- (b) REC inputs a bit σ and a set of indices $\mathcal{J} \subset [s]$ of size exactly $s/2$.

2. Output: If \mathcal{J} is not of size $s/2$, then SEN and REC receive \perp as output. Otherwise,

- (a) For all $j \in \mathcal{J}$, REC obtains the pair (x_0^j, x_1^j) .
- (b) For all $j \notin \mathcal{J}$, REC obtains x_σ^j .

This functionality is implemented in [LP12] by invoking the DDH based [PVW08] OT s times (see Appendix A for the complete details), where the receiver generates the system parameters in a decryption mode for $s/2$ indices corresponding to \mathcal{J} and the remaining system parameters are generated in a messy mode. The decryption mode trapdoor enables the receiver to learn both sender’s inputs for the instances corresponding to \mathcal{J} . This idea is coupled with two proofs that are run by the receiver: **(i)** a ZK PoK for proving that half of the system parameters set is in a messy mode which essentially boils down to a ZK PoK realizing functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,COMP}}(s,s/2)}$ (namely, the statement is a set of s tuples and the prover proves the knowledge of $s/2$ Diffie-Hellman tuples within this set). **(ii)** A ZK PoK to ensure that the same input bit σ has been used for all s instances which boils down to a ZK proof realizing functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}(s)}$ (namely, the statement contains two sets of tuples, each of size s , for which the prover proves that one of the sets contains DH tuples). See Section 7.2 for more details on the ZK PoK functionalities.

Our first step towards making the [LP12] construction one-sided adaptively secure is to invoke our one-sided OT scheme s times with all system parameters in a decryption mode. Notably, we cannot use the messy mode for the $s/2$ instances not in \mathcal{J} as in the static settings since that would preclude the equivocation of the receiver’s bit. Similarly to [LP12], our constructions have two phases; a *setup phase* and a *transfer phase*. In the setup phase, the receiver generates the system parameters in a decryption mode for the $s/2$ OTs corresponding to indices in \mathcal{J} , while the remaining system parameters are generated in the same mode but in a way that does not allow REC to learn the trapdoor. This is obtained by fixing two random generators g_0, g_1 ,

so that the receiver sets the first component of every CRS from the system parameters to be g_0 . Moreover, the second component in positions $j \notin \mathcal{J}$ is a power of g_1 , else this element is a power of g_0 . Note that REC does not know $\log_{g_0} g_1$ which is the decryption mode trapdoor for $j \notin \mathcal{J}$. To ensure correctness, REC proves that it knows the discrete logarithm of the second element with respect to g_1 of at least $s/2$ pairs. This is achieved using a witness equivocal proof for functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL,COMP}}(s,s/2)}$ described in Section 7.2.

In the transfer phase, the receiver uses these system parameters to create a public/secret key pair for each OT execution, for keys not in the set \mathcal{J} . For the rest of the OT executions the receiver invokes the TrapKeyGen algorithm of the dual-mode PKE and obtains a public key and two secret keys that enable it to decrypt both of the sender's inputs. In order to ensure that the receiver uses the same input bit σ for all OTs the receiver proves its behavior using the proof specified above. Finally, we prove the equivocality of the sender's input and the receiver's output based on our one-sided NCE.

Formally, let the DDH based dual-mode PKE of [PVW08] be specified by $\Pi_{\text{DUAL}} = (\text{SetupMessy}, \text{SetupDecryption}, \text{dGen}, \text{dEnc}, \text{dDec}, \text{FindBranch}, \text{TrapKeyGen})$. We denote our one-sided OT by Π_{CCOT} and present it in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{SC}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL,COMP}}(s,s/2)}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}(s)})$ -hybrid model.

Protocol 4 (One-sided adaptive single choice cut-and-choose OT (Π_{CCOT}))

- **Inputs:** SEN inputs a vector of pairs $\{(x_0^i, x_1^i)\}_{i=1}^s$ and REC inputs a bit σ and a set of indices $\mathcal{J} \subset [s]$ of size exactly $s/2$.
- **Auxiliary Inputs:** Both parties hold a security parameter 1^n and \mathbb{G}, p , where \mathbb{G} is an efficient representation of a group of order p and p is of length n .
- **CRS:** The CRS consists of a pair of random group elements g_0, g_1 from \mathbb{G} .
- **Setup phase:**
 1. REC chooses a random $x_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $g_1^j = g_0^{x_j}$ for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$ and $g_1^j = g_1^{x_j}$ otherwise.
For all j , REC chooses a random $y_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $\text{CRS}_j = (g_0, g_1^j, h_0^j = (g_0)^{y_j}, h_1^j = (g_1^j)^{y_j})$. It then sends $\{\text{CRS}_j\}_{j=1}^s$ to SEN.
Furthermore, for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$, REC stores the decryption mode trapdoor $t_j = x_j$.
 2. REC calls $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL,COMP}}(s,s/2)}$ with $(\{g_1, g_1^j\}_{j=1}^s, \{x_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}})$ to prove the knowledge of the discrete logarithms of $s/2$ values within the second element in $\{\text{CRS}_j\}_j$ and with respect to g_1 .
- **Transfer phase (repeated in parallel for all j):**
 1. For all $j \notin \mathcal{J}$, REC computes $(\text{PK}_j, \text{SK}_j) = ((g_j, h_j), r_j) \leftarrow \text{dGen}(\text{CRS}_j, \sigma)$.
For all $j \in \mathcal{J}$, REC computes $(\text{PK}_j, \text{SK}_j^0, \text{SK}_j^1) = ((g_j, h_j), r_j, r_j/t_j) \leftarrow \text{TrapKeyGen}(\text{CRS}_j, t_j)$.
Finally, REC sends the set $\{\text{PK}_j\}_{j=1}^s$ and stores the secret keys.
 2. REC calls $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}(s)}$ with input $((\{(g_0, h_0^j, g_j, h_j)\}_{j=1}^s, \{(g_1^j, h_1^j, g_j, h_j)\}_{j=1}^s, \{r_j\}_{j=1}^s)$ to prove that all the tuples in one of the sets $\{(g_0, h_0^j, g_j, h_j)\}_{j=1}^s$ or $\{(g_1^j, h_1^j, g_j, h_j)\}_{j=1}^s$ are DH tuples.
 3. For all j , SEN generates $c_0^j \leftarrow \text{dEnc}_{\text{PK}_j}(x_0^j, 0)$ and $c_1^j \leftarrow \text{dEnc}_{\text{PK}_j}(x_1^j, 1)$. Let $c_0^j = (c_{00}^j, c_{01}^j)$ and $c_1^j = (c_{10}^j, c_{11}^j)$. SEN calls \mathcal{F}_{SC} with c_{01}^j and c_{11}^j .
- **Output:** Upon receiving (c_{01}^j, c_{11}^j) from \mathcal{F}_{SC} ,
 1. REC outputs $x_\sigma^j \leftarrow \text{dDec}_{\text{SK}_j}(c_\sigma^j)$ for all $j \notin \mathcal{J}$.
 2. REC outputs $(x_0^j, x_1^j) \leftarrow (\text{dDec}_{\text{SK}_j^0}(c_0^j), \text{dDec}_{\text{SK}_j^1}(c_1^j))$ for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$.

Theorem 6.3 Assume that the DDH assumption is hard in \mathbb{G} . Then Protocol 4 UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$ in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{SC}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL,COMP}}(s,s/2)}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}(s)})$ -hybrid model in the presence of one-sided malicious adversaries.

Proof: Let ADV be a probabilistic polynomial-time malicious adversary attacking Protocol 4 by that adaptively corrupting one of the parties. We construct an adversary SIM for the ideal functionality of a single choice cut-and-choose oblivious transfer $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$ such that no environment ENV distinguishes with a non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with ADV in the real setting or with SIM in the ideal setting. We recall that SIM interacts with the ideal functionality and the environment ENV. We refer to the interaction of SIM with the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$ and ENV as the external interaction. The interaction of SIM with the simulated ADV is the internal interaction. We now explain the actions of the simulator for all corruption cases. SIM begins by creating a CRS (g_0, g_1) and storing $x = \log_{g_0} g_1$. It then proceeds as follows:

Simulating the communication with ENV. Every input value received by the simulator from ENV is written on ADV's input tape. Likewise, every output value written by ADV on its output tape is copied to the simulator's output tape (to be read by its environment ENV).

The sender is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the receiver as follows. In the setup phase it picks s system parameters in a decryption mode in which it knows their trapdoors. Namely for each $j = 1, \dots, s$, it creates $\text{CRS}_j = (g_0, g_1^j, h_0^j, h_1^j)$ where $g_1^j = (g_0)^{x_j}$, $h_0^j = (g_0)^{y_j}$ and $h_1^j = (g_1^j)^{y_j} = (g_0^{x_j})^{y_j}$ for random x_j 's and y_j 's, and records the trapdoor $t_j = x_j$. The simulator further computes $x'_j = \log_{g_1} g_1^j$ for all j using the knowledge of $x = \log_{g_0} g_1$. It then chooses an arbitrary set \mathcal{J}' of size $s/2$ and sends `Accept` to ADV on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL,COMP}}(s, s/2)}$ for the statement $\{g_1, g_1^j\}_{j=1}^s$. Note that the simulator knows discrete log for each pair of (g_1, g_1^j) in the statement.

SIM also emulates REC by sending the adversary the system parameters.

In the transfer phase the simulator invokes `TrapKeyGen` for all $j = 1, \dots, s$ and computes $(\text{PK}_j, \text{SK}_j^0, \text{SK}_j^1) = ((g_j, h_j), r_j, r_j/t_j) \leftarrow \text{TrapKeyGen}(\text{CRS}_j, t_j)$ for $j = 1, \dots, s$, and sends the public keys to SEN. It further sends `Accept` to ADV on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}(s)}$. Upon receiving ADV's message, SIM extracts the sender's input (x_0^j, x_1^j) using $\text{SK}_j^0, \text{SK}_j^1$ for every $j = 1, \dots, s$ and sends it to the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$.

Note that the adversary's views differ only with respect to the ZK statements, since in a decryption mode the receiver's bit is perfectly hidden as well as the subset picked by the receiver. Now, since the proofs are run via ideal calls the simulated and hybrid views are statistically close.

The receiver is corrupted at the onset of the protocol. SIM begins by activating ADV and emulates the sender by receiving the witnesses on the behalf of the ZK PoK functionalities in the setup and transfer phases. It extracts \mathcal{J} and σ and sends them to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$, receiving back (x_0^j, x_1^j) for $j \in \mathcal{J}$ and x_σ^j for $j \notin \mathcal{J}$. SIM chooses an arbitrary $x_{1-\sigma}^j$ for all $j \notin \mathcal{J}$ and emulates the role of SEN using inputs (x_0^j, x_1^j) for all $j = 1, \dots, s$.

The difference between the simulated and hybrid views is with respect to keys $x_{1-\sigma}^j$ for all $j \notin \mathcal{J}$ for which the simulator uses arbitrary values. Security is implied by the dual-mode privacy when a left ciphertext is computed with a right key (or vice versa).

If none of the parties gets corrupted at the onset of the protocol execution SIM plays the role of the receiver in the setup phase using an arbitrary subset \mathcal{J}' for the receiver. Note that SIM knows all the witnesses for the proof in the setup phase (i.e., the discrete logarithms of $\{g_1^j\}_{j=1}^s$ with respect to g_1 for all s values). It can thus equivocate the proof with respect to the real set \mathcal{J} . SIM further plays the

role of the receiver in the transfer phase using an arbitrary σ' for the receiver. Specifically the simulator simulates the receiver by invoking TrapKeyGen for all $j = 1, \dots, s$, computing $(\text{PK}_j, \text{SK}_j^0, \text{SK}_j^1) = ((g_j, h_j), r_j, r_j/t_j) \leftarrow \text{TrapKeyGen}(\text{CRS}_j, t_j)$. It then sends the public keys to SEN and an `Accept` message on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}(s)}}$. Note that SIM knows witnesses for both sub statements $\{(g_0, h_0^j, g_j, h_j)\}_{j=1}^s$ and $\{(g_1^j, h_1^j, g_j, h_j)\}_{j=1}^s$, which equal $\{r_j\}_{j=1}^s$ for the first set and $\{r_j/t_j\}_{j=1}^s$ for the second set.

The sender is corrupted between Steps 2 and 3. Upon corrupting SEN, SIM explains the internal state of the sender by honestly presenting the randomness used so far on the sender's behalf. Finally, SIM completes the execution in the transfer phase by playing the role of the receiver using an arbitrarily chosen σ' . Security in this case follows using the same argument as in the previous corruption case.

The receiver is corrupted between Steps 2 and 3. Upon corrupting REC, SIM receives \mathcal{J} and σ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$. It then explains the internal state of REC as follows. It first explains the witness for the ZK PoK functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL,COMP}(s,s/2)}}$ as the discrete logarithms of $\{g_1^j\}_{j \notin \mathcal{J}}$ with respect to g_1 . It also explains the witness for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}(s)}}$ as the witness for σ th set. Finally, it plays the role of the sender as in the previous corruption case. Security follows similarity to the previous corruption case. (In the real execution we rely on the witness equivocality of the ZK proofs).

If none of the parties gets corrupted yet SIM plays the role of the sender in the transfer phase using arbitrary (x_0^j, x_1^j) for $j = 1, \dots, s$.

The sender is corrupted after simulating the Sender's message in the data transfer phase. Upon corrupting SEN, SIM receives (x_0^j, x_1^j) for $j = 1, \dots, s$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$. It then explains the internal state of SEN by explaining the inputs to \mathcal{F}_{SC} as the encryptions for the real inputs. Security follows from the fact that the receiver's input is statistically hidden given the public keys.

The receiver is corrupted after simulating the Sender's message in the data transfer phase. Upon corrupting REC, SIM receives $\mathcal{J}, \sigma, \{x_0^j, x_1^j\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}}$ and $\{x_\sigma^j\}_{j \notin \mathcal{J}}$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}$. It then explains the internal state of REC as in the previous corruption case and in addition, it explains the messages received from \mathcal{F}_{SC} as the encryptions of $\{x_0^j, x_1^j\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}}$ and $\{x_\sigma^j\}_{j \notin \mathcal{J}}$. Security follows due to the same argument as in the previous corruption case.

■

6.3.2 Malicious One-Sided Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation

First, we remark that the single choice cut-and-choose protocol is executed for every input bit of P_1 in the main two-party computation protocol, but with respect to *the same* set \mathcal{J} . In order to ensure that the same \mathcal{J} is indeed used the parties engage in a *batch single choice cut-and-choose OT* where a single setup phase is run first, followed by n parallel invocations of the transfer phase. We note that CRS and the set \mathcal{J} are fixed in the setup phase and remain the same for all n parallel invocations of the transfer phase. We denote the batch functionality by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}^{\text{BATCH}}$ and the protocol by $\Pi_{\text{CCOT}}^{\text{BATCH}}$.

We are now ready to describe the steps of our generic protocol Π_f^{MAL} computing any functionality f on inputs x_0 and x_1 . We continue with a high-level overview of [LP12] adapted to the one-sided setting.

Step 1. P_0 constructs s copies of Yao's garbled circuit for computing the function f . All wires keys are picked at random. Keys that are associated with P_0 's input wires are picked as follows. P_0 picks n pairs of random values $((a_1^0, a_1^1), \dots, (a_n^0, a_n^1))$ and (c_1, \dots, c_s) and sets the keys associated with the

i th input wire of the j th circuit as the pair $(g^{a_i^0 c_j}, g^{a_i^1 c_j})$. These values constitute commitments to all $2ns$ keys of P_0 .⁷ This set of keys forms a pseudorandom synthesizer [NR95], implying that if some subset of the keys is revealed then the remaining keys are still pseudorandom. We also require that each pair of keys that is associated with a circuit output wire differs within the most significant bit.

Step 2. The parties call $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}^{\text{BATCH}}$ where P_0 inputs the key pairs associated with P_1 's input and P_1 inputs its input x_1 and a random subset $\mathcal{J} \subset [s]$ of size $s/2$. P_1 receives from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}^{\text{BATCH}}$ the keys that are associated with its input wires for the $s/2$ circuits indexed by \mathcal{J} (denoted the check circuits). In addition, it receives the keys corresponding to its input for the remaining circuits (denoted the evaluation circuits).

Step 3. P_0 sends P_1 s copies of the garbled circuit (except for the output tables) and the values $((g^{a_1^0}, g^{a_1^1}), \dots, (g^{a_n^0}, g^{a_n^1}), (g^{c_1}, \dots, g^{c_s}))$ which are the commitments to the input keys on the wires associated with P_0 's input. At this point P_0 is committed to all the keys associated with the s circuits.

Step 4. P_1 reveals \mathcal{J} and proves that it used this subset in the cut-and-choose OT protocol by sending the keys that are associated with P_1 's first input bit in each check circuit. Note that P_1 knows the keys corresponding to both bits only for the check circuits.

Step 5. In order to let P_1 know the keys for the input wires of P_0 within the check circuits, P_0 sends c_j for $j \in \mathcal{J}$. P_1 computes the key pair $(g^{a_i^0 c_j}, g^{a_i^1 c_j})$.

Step 6. P_1 verifies the validity of the check circuits using all the keys associated with their input wires. This ensures that the evaluation circuits are correct with high probability.

Step 7. In order to complete the evaluation phase P_1 is given the keys for the input wires of P_0 . P_0 must be forced to give the keys that are associated with the same input for all circuits. Specifically, the following code is executed for all input bits of P_0 :

1. For every evaluation circuit C_j , P_0 sends $y_{i,j} = g^{a_i^{x_0^i} c_j}$ using an instance of somewhat NCE with $\ell = 2$, where x_0^i is the i th input bit of P_0 .
2. P_0 then proves that $a_i^{x_0^i}$ is in common for all keys associated with the i th input bit, which is reduced to showing that either the set $\{(g, g^{a_i^{x_0^i}}, g^{c_j}, y_{i,j})\}_{j=1}^s$ or the set $\{(g, g^{a_i^{1-x_0^i}}, g^{c_j}, y_{i,j})\}_{j=1}^s$ is comprised of DH tuples. Notably, it is sufficient to use a single UC ZK proof for the simpler relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}$ since the above statement can be compressed into a compound statement of two DH tuples as follows: P_0 first chooses s random values $\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sends them to P_1 . Both parties compute $\tilde{g} = \prod_{j=1}^s (g^{c_j})^{\gamma_j}$, $\tilde{y} = \prod_{j=1}^s (y_{i,j})^{\gamma_j}$, of which P_0 proves that either $(g, g^{a_i^{x_0^i}}, \tilde{g}, \tilde{y})$ or $(g, g^{a_i^{1-x_0^i}}, \tilde{g}, \tilde{y})$ is a DH tuple.

Step 8. Upon receiving `Accept` from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}}$, P_1 completes the evaluation of the circuits. Namely, for every $i \in [1, \dots, ns]$ P_0 and P_1 call \mathcal{F}_{OT} in which P_0 's input equals $(0, 1)$ if the most significant bit of the output wire key is associated with 0, and $(1, 0)$ otherwise. Moreover, P_1 's input is the most significant bit of its output key. P_1 concatenates the bits obtained from these OTs and sets the majority of these values as the output y .

⁷Recall that the actual symmetric keys of the i th input within the j th circuit are derived from $(g^{a_i^0 c_j}, g^{a_i^1 c_j})$ using randomness extractor such as a universal hash function.

Step 9. P_1 sends y using an instance of one-sided NCE.

To ensure the one-sided security of Π_f^{MAL} we realize the functionalities used in the protocol as follows: **(1)** $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CCOT}}^{\text{BATCH}}$ is realized in **Step 2** using our one-sided batch single choice cut-and-choose OT. This implies the equivocation of P_1 's input. **(2)** The statement of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}}$ is transferred in **Step 7.1** via a somewhat NCE with $\ell = 2$. To obtain a witness equivocal proof for functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\text{DDH,OR}}}$ (invoked in **Step 7.2**), it is sufficient to employ a standard static proof realizing this ZK functionality where the prover sends the third message of the proof using a somewhat NCE with $\ell = 2$ (this is due to the fact that we anyway send the statement using a somewhat NCE). Specifically, a statically secure proof is sufficient whenever both the statement and the third message of the (Σ -protocol) proof can be equivocated. This implies the equivocation of P_0 's input. **(3)** Finally, in **Step 8** the \mathcal{F}_{OT} calls are realized using one-sided bit OT. This implies output equivocation.

7 Efficient Statically Secure and Witness Equivocal UC ZK PoKs

We present two results in this section. First, we show a technique for generating efficient statically secure UC ZK PoK for various Σ -protocols. Our protocols take a new approach where the prover commits to an additional transcript which, in turn, enables witness extraction without using rewinding. Our instantiations imply UC ZK PoK constructions that incur constant overhead and achieve negligible soundness error.

Next, we show how to generate efficient witness equivocal UC ZK PoK for various *compound* Σ -protocols. The additional feature that witness equivocal UC ZK PoK offers over statically secure UC ZK PoK is that it allows the simulator to equivocate the simulated proof upon corrupting the prover. Interestingly, we build witness equivocal UC ZK PoKs for a class of fundamental compound Σ -protocols without relying on NCE. Our approach yields witness equivocal UC ZK PoK only for compound statements where the simulator knows the witnesses for all sub-statements (but not the real witness). This notion is weaker than the notion of one-sided UC ZK PoK where the simulator is required to simulate the proof obliviously of the witness, and later prove consistency with respect to the real witness. Our protocols are round efficient with constant overhead and ensure a negligible soundness error.

We briefly describe our technique for generating efficient UC ZK PoK for Σ -protocols. Recall that in order to obtain a UC secure ZK PoK for a Σ -protocol it suffices to build a straight line simulator and witness extractor in the CRS model. A straight line simulator can be obtained by using standard techniques of committing the challenge of the verifier at the onset of the proof using UC commitments [DN02]. In what follows, we will focus on designing straight line extractors. We begin with a generalization of our UC ZK PoKs for Σ -protocols for relations of the form $\mathcal{R}_\Gamma = \left\{ ((\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \tilde{\mathbb{H}}, y), x) \mid y = \Gamma(x) \right\}$ defined with respect to a one-way homomorphic mapping $\Gamma : \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \rightarrow \tilde{\mathbb{H}}$ from a source group $(\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \oplus)$ to a target group $(\tilde{\mathbb{H}}, \odot)$. (Where Γ is homomorphic if $\Gamma(x_0 \oplus x_1) = \Gamma(x_0) \odot \Gamma(x_1)$).⁸ Loosely speaking, given a Σ -protocol Π_Γ for \mathcal{R}_Γ we modify Π_Γ by instructing the prover to send two responses z, z' to a pair of distinct challenges c, c' queried by the verifier. The former response z is sent on clear and publicly verified as specified in Π_Γ , whereas the latter response z' is encrypted using a homomorphic PKE with plaintext space $\tilde{\mathbb{G}}$. Moreover, the validity of z' is carried out by a UC ZK proof of consistency. Clearly, the efficiency of the new proof depends heavily on the overhead of this ZK proof. Observe also that an extractor can be easily constructed for this proof by placing a public key for the homomorphic PKE in the CRS, of which the extractor knows the corresponding secret key. Our technique also generalizes to proofs for compound statements [CDS94].

⁸This notation covers many basic relations such as discrete logarithm and quadratic residuosity.

7.1 Efficient Statically Secure UC ZK PoK for Σ -Protocols

DL-based UC secure ZK PoK. We continue with illustrating our technique on the Σ -protocol for proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm in a prime order group \mathbb{G} . We instantiate $(\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \oplus)$ with $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +)$ for operation $+$ denoting addition in \mathbb{Z}_p , and $(\tilde{\mathbb{H}}, \odot)$ with (\mathbb{G}, \cdot) for operation \cdot denoting multiplication in \mathbb{G} . Furthermore, the one-way group homomorphism is defined by $\Gamma(x) = \text{EXP}(x) = g^x$ where g is a generator of \mathbb{G} and induces the relation

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{DL}} = \{((\mathbb{G}, g, h), x) \mid h = g^x\}.$$

We first apply our technique on the Σ -protocol due to [Sch89] and instantiate the homomorphic PKE with the additively homomorphic PKE of Paillier [Pai99] defined by $\text{Enc}_{\text{PK}}(x; r) = (1 + N)^x \cdot r^N \bmod N^2$ where N is an RSA composite. Formally,

Protocol 5 (UC ZK PoK of DL (Π_{DL}))

- **CRS:** A public key PK for Paillier PKE.
- **Joint statement:** The description of a group \mathbb{G} of prime order p and a generator g , and the public statement h .
- **Auxiliary input for the prover:** $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $h = g^x$.
- **The Protocol:**
 1. Prover P picks a random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sends the verifier $a = g^r$.
 2. Verifier V returns random challenges $c, c' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.
 3. P sends $z \leftarrow r + cx \bmod p$ and encrypts $z' \leftarrow r + c'x \bmod p$ using PK, generating ciphertext e . P sends z and e to V and proves in UC ZK that the plaintext of e and the discrete log of $ah^{c'}$ are the same.
 4. V accepts if the ZK proof is verified correctly and $g^z = ah^c$.

The proof used in Step 3 is obtained from a Σ -protocol for the following relation

$$\mathcal{R}_1 = \{((N, \text{PK}, e, \mathbb{G}, g, h), (x, \alpha)) \mid e = (1 + N)^x \alpha^N \bmod N^2 \wedge h = g^x\}.$$

Namely, the goal is to prove consistency of discrete logarithms with respect to two different group orders with generators $(1 + N)$ and g , respectively. This can be achieved by combining the proof of knowledge of discrete logarithms over the integers [DJN10] and the proof of plaintext knowledge for Paillier (we note that [DJN10] shows a proof for consistent exponents, i.e., for DH tuples, but the same proof technique works here as well). Namely, the prover selects at random y and β , computes $e' = (1 + N)^y \beta^N \bmod N^2$ and $h' = g^y$ and sends e', h' to the verifier, who returns a random challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. The prover then replies with $z = y + cx$ (over integers) and $\gamma = \alpha \beta^c \bmod N$. However, to ensure the privacy of x within $y + cx$, y must be chosen so that its length is at least $|c| + |x| + \kappa$, where κ is a statistical parameter. The verifier then accepts if $(1 + N)^z \gamma^N \bmod N^2 = e' e^c \bmod N^2$ and $g^z = h' h^c$. We further note that the above proof requires a special care since it must ensure that the exact same value x is encrypted under Paillier rather than $x + ip$, for p the order of \mathbb{G} and i some integer. Nevertheless, an extractor that decrypts and learns $x + ip$ can still find x . Thus our extractor first learns z' by decrypting the Paillier ciphertext and then extracts x from z and z' . Finally, the above Σ -protocol and the PoK presented in Protocol 5 are proving in the UC framework using standard techniques of committing the verifier's challenge at the beginning of the proof using UC commitment scheme [GK96]. We denote the UC ZK PoK for \mathcal{R}_{DL} as Π_{DL} .

Proposition 7.1 *Assume that the DCR and DDH assumptions are hard in the respective groups. Then Protocol 5 UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RDL}}$.*

Informally, the proof follows by having the extractor pick a pair of keys (PK, SK) and place PK in the CRS. Then, whenever receiving ciphertext e from the prover, the extractor decrypts it using SK and extracts the witness from z and z' .

Consistency of discrete logarithms. Next, we consider a UC PoK for the following relation

$$\underline{\mathcal{R}}_{\text{DDH}} = \{((\mathbb{G}, g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1), x) \mid h_0 = g_0^x \wedge h_1 = g_1^x\}.$$

Here $(\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \oplus)$ is instantiated with $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +)$ and $(\tilde{\mathbb{H}}, \odot)$ with $(\mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G}, \cdot)$. We further define by $\Gamma(x) = (g_0^x, g_1^x)$ where g_0, g_1 are two generators in \mathbb{G} . As above, we use Paillier PKE to encrypt the second reply of the prover. The proof is an immediate extension of the Protocol 5 and the standard Σ -protocol for \mathcal{R}_{DDH} . The underlying ZK proof for proving the correctness of the plaintext encrypted by the prover is an extension of the proof for the relation used in Protocol 5. Specifically, the relation for the underlying ZK proof is:

$$\mathcal{R}_2 = \{((N, \text{PK}, e, \mathbb{G}, g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1), (x, \alpha)) \mid e = (1 + N)^x \alpha^N \bmod N^2 \wedge h_0 = g_0^x \wedge h_1 = g_1^x\}.$$

UC PoKs for N th root and quadratic residuosity. The proof we consider here is a proof of knowledge of an N th root formally defined by,

$$\underline{\mathcal{R}}_{\text{NR}} = \{((u, N), v) \mid u = v^N \bmod N^2\}.$$

We instantiate $(\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \oplus)$ with (\mathbb{Z}_N^*, \cdot) and $(\tilde{\mathbb{H}}, \odot)$ with $(\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*, \cdot)$, where multiplication is computed in the respective group. Furthermore, $\Gamma(x) = x^N \bmod N^2$. Note that in order to encrypt the message of the prover we need to use a multiplicative PKE, and we therefore consider a variant of El Gamal PKE that operates in \mathbb{Z}_N^* for a message space $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$. Specifically, encrypting a message $m \in \mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$ is computed by $(e_1, e_2) = (g^r \bmod N, m \cdot h^r \bmod N)$ where g is a random element in $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$, $h = g^x \bmod N$ with a secret key $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)/4}$ and randomness $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)/4}$. The security of this scheme is based on the composite DDH assumption [DJ03] in \mathbb{Z}_N^* (defined below). In the proof below, the verifier is required to ensure that $z'^N = au^{2c'}$. This is achieved by raising the ciphertext $e = (e_1, e_2)$ encrypting z' to the power of N component-wise modulo N^2 , and then have the prover prove that $e_1^N, e_2^N / au^{2c'}$ is a Diffie-Hellman tuple in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$. Such a ZK proof is provided in [DJN10]. Namely, we use $2c'$ instead of c' to ensure that z' is in $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$.

The Composite DDH Assumption. Let $N = pq$ be an RSA modulus and g is an element of $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$ the group of squares in \mathbb{Z}_N^* . Then values a and b are chosen uniformly at random in $\mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)/4}$ and the value y is either random in $\mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$ or satisfies $y = g^{ab} \bmod N$. Finally, the assumption asserts that for any polynomial-time algorithm, the advantage in guessing which way y was sampled when given $(N, g, g^a \bmod N, g^b \bmod N, y)$ is negligibly close to $1/2$.

Protocol 6 (UC ZK PoK for \mathcal{R}_{NR} (Π_{NR}))

- **Joint statement:** $u \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$.
- **Auxiliary input for the prover:** $v \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ such that $u = v^N \bmod N^2$.
- **CRS:** A composite N and a public key $\text{PK} = (\mathbb{G}, h = g^x)$ for El Gamal PKE in \mathbb{Z}_N^* .
- **The Protocol:**
 1. Prover P picks a random $r' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and sends verifier V the value a where $a = r'^N \bmod N^2$ where $r \leftarrow r'^2 \bmod N$.
 2. V returns random challenges $c, c' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.
 3. P sets $z \leftarrow rv^c \bmod N$ and $z' \leftarrow rv^{2c'} \bmod N$, and encrypts z' using PK (note that $z' \in \mathbb{Q}\mathbb{R}_N$). Denote the generated ciphertext by $e = (e_1, e_2)$. P sends V values z and e and proves in UC ZK that the decryption of $e^N \bmod N^2$ corresponds to $au^{2c'} \bmod N^2$. That is, P proves that $(\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*, g, h, e_1^N, e_2^N / au^{2c'})$ is a Diffie-Hellman tuple in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ using the proof from [DJN10].

4. \forall accepts if he accepts in the ZK proof and if $z^N = au^c \pmod{N^2}$.

Proposition 7.2 *Assume that the DCR and composite DDH assumptions are hard in the respective groups. Then Protocol 6 UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RNR}}$.*

Finally, we consider a proof of knowledge of a square root that is formally defined by,

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{QR}} = \{(u, N), v \mid u = v^2 \pmod{N}\}.$$

We instantiate $(\tilde{\mathbb{G}}, \oplus)$ with (\mathbb{Z}_N^*, \cdot) and $(\tilde{\mathbb{H}}, \odot)$ with (\mathbb{QR}_N, \cdot) , where multiplication is computed in the respective groups. Furthermore, $\Gamma(x) = x^2 \pmod{N}$. Following a similar technique used for the ZK PoK of \mathcal{R}_{NR} we design a proof for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RQR}}$ based on the QR and composite DDH assumptions.

Proposition 7.3 *Assume that the QR and composite DDH assumptions are hard in the respective groups. Then there exists a protocol Π_{QR} that UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\text{RQR}}$.*

7.2 Efficient Witness Equivocal UC ZK PoK for Compound Statements

The proof technique discussed above cannot be used in the adaptive setting since it does not allow witness equivocation. Fortunately, in this work we only need to consider compound statements for which the simulator knows all witnesses but does not know which one to use during the simulation, since this choice depends on the input of the real prover. In compound statements for Σ -protocols the prover separates the challenge c that is given by the verifier into two values; c_1 and c_2 such that $c = c_1 \oplus c_2$. Assume w.l.o.g. that the prover does not have a witness for the first statement, then it always chooses c_1 in which it knows how to complete the proof (similarly to what the simulator does), and uses its witness for the other statement to complete the second proof on a given challenge c_2 . Note that the verifier cannot distinguish whether the prover knows the first or the second witness (or both); see [CDS94] for more details.

Nevertheless, allowing the simulator to use all potential witnesses in the adaptive setting is not equivocal, since an adversary that corrupts the prover can detect a simulated execution by simply computing multiple witnesses when given the prover's internal state. In order to resolve this difficulty we instruct the prover to obliviously sample the ciphertexts for the statements it does not know the witness for, i.e., sampling a ciphertext without knowing the corresponding plaintext. This property holds with respect to both homomorphic PKEs used in our proofs in order to encrypt the response for the second challenge.

This type of compound statements generalizes to s sub-statements for which the prover proves the knowledge of witnesses of some subset. For this general case, [CDS94] suggest to split the challenge using a perfect secret sharing scheme, e.g. Shamir's secret sharing scheme. First, the sub-statements are divided into two sets such that the prover knows the witnesses for the statements in set \mathcal{J} , but not the witnesses for the sub-statements in $\bar{\mathcal{J}}$. The prover then creates challenges c_i for the sub-statements in $\bar{\mathcal{J}}$. Finally, the set $\{c_j\}_{j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}}$ and the verifier's challenge c are interpreted as $|\bar{\mathcal{J}}|$ shares and the secret in a secret sharing scheme with s participants and a threshold $|\bar{\mathcal{J}}| + 1$. Thus, the values c and $\{c_j\}_{j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}}$ completely define all the s shares. In the special case where $s = 2$ the prover runs the honest verifier zero-knowledge simulator for the sub-statements in $\bar{\mathcal{J}}$ using challenges $\{c_j\}_{j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}}$. For the sub-statements in \mathcal{J} it defines the challenges as defined by the shares $\{c_j\}_{j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}}$ for the secret c and generates a response using its witnesses. The prover also sends the s shares of c to the verifier who checks that indeed the shares define c with threshold $|\bar{\mathcal{J}}| + 1$. We conclude with the following theorem.

Theorem 7.1 *Assume the existence of homomorphic PKE with respect to a group \mathbb{H} and operation \odot , that supports oblivious and invertible sampling of ciphertexts. Then, for every Σ -protocol designed for a compound statement as above and one-way group homomorphism $\Gamma : \tilde{\mathbb{G}} \rightarrow \tilde{\mathbb{H}}$, there exists a witness equivocal UC ZK PoK that introduces a negligible soundness error and constant overhead.*

We use the notation of $\Pi_{\Gamma, \text{OR}}$ for denoting the compound extended proof of Π_{Γ} where both statements are proven in \mathcal{R}_{Γ} and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ZKPoK}}^{\mathcal{R}_{\Gamma, \text{OR}}}$ to denote the ideal functionality for $\Pi_{\Gamma, \text{OR}}$. We consider a proof $\Pi_{\text{DDH,OR}(s)}$ where the statement is a combination of two sub-statements, each sub-statement contains s tuples. That is, the statement is a proof of knowledge of which one of the two sets is DH tuples. Finally, we consider a proof $\Pi_{\Gamma, \text{COMP}(s,t)}$ where the statement consists of s sub-statements of \mathcal{R}_{Γ} and the prover proves the knowledge of t sub-statements out of s (for some $t < s$).

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A The DDH-Based OT from [PVW08]

In this section we recall the DDH-based PVW OT construction [PVW08]. We begin with their DDH-based dual-mode PKE Π_{DUAL} that is specified by the algorithms (SetupMessy, SetupDecryption, dGen, dEnc, dDec, FindBranch, TrapKeyGen) described below.

- SetupMessy and SetupDecryption are the two algorithms for generating system parameters in messy and decryption mode respectively. Both starts by choosing $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{G}_{g,p}$ specified by a generator g and its prime order p .
 SetupMessy(1^n): Choose (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) such that g_0, g_1 are random generators in \mathbb{G} and $h_i = g_i^{y_i}$ for $y_0, y_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. The CRS is (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) and the decryption trapdoor t is (y_0, y_1) .
 SetupDecryption(1^n): Choose (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) such that g_0 is a random generator in \mathbb{G} and $g_1 = g_0^x$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $h_i = g_i^y$ for $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. The CRS is (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) and the decryption trapdoor t is x .
- dGen is the key generation algorithm that takes a bit α and the CRS as input. If $\alpha = 0$, then it generates left public and secret key pair. Otherwise, it creates right public and secret key pair.
 dGen(α): Choose $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let $g = g_\alpha^r$ and $h = h_\alpha^r$, then $\text{PK} = (g, h)$ and $\text{SK} = r$.
- dEnc is the encryption algorithm that takes a bit β , a public key $\text{PK} = (g, h)$ and a message m as input. If $\beta = 0$, the it creates the left encryption of m , else it creates the right encryption. Given β , it chooses u, v and computes the ciphertext as $c \leftarrow ((g_\beta)^u (h_\beta)^v, g^u h^v m)$.
- dDec decrypts a message given a ciphertext and a secret key SK . Given $c = (c_0, c_1)$, it outputs $c_1 / (c_0)^{\text{SK}}$.
- FindBranch(t, PK) finds whether a given public key (in messy mode) is left key or right key given the messy mode trapdoor $t = (y_0, y_1)$ such that $y_0 \neq y_1$. Given a public key $\text{PK} = (g, h)$ created when the CRS is in messy mode, the algorithm says PK is a left key if $h = g^{y_0}$ and right key otherwise.
- TrapKeyGen(t) generates a public key and two secret keys using the decryption mode trapdoor t such that both left encryption as well as the right encryption using the public key can be decrypted using the secret keys. Given decryption mode trapdoor t , it picks a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $\text{PK} = (g_0^r, h_0^r)$ and outputs $\text{PK}, r, r/t$.

Protocol 7 (UC static malicious OT)

- **Inputs:** Sender SEN has $x_0, x_1 \in \{0, 1\}$ and receiver REC has $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}$.
- **Auxiliary Input:** A group description $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{G}_{g,p}$ specified by a generator g and its prime order p .
- **CRS:** (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1) generated either by SetupMessy or SetupDecryption.
- **The Protocol:**

1. **Message from the receiver.** REC picks sends SEN PK, where $(PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{dGen}(\sigma)$.
2. **Message from the sender.** Upon receiving two elements $PK = (g, h)$, SEN generates $c_0 \leftarrow \text{dEnc}_{PK}(x_0, 0)$ and $c_1 \leftarrow \text{dEnc}_{PK}(x_1, 1)$ and sends (c_0, c_1) to REC.
3. **Output.** Upon receiving $(c_0 = (c_{00}, c_{01}), c_1 = (c_{10}, c_{11}))$, REC outputs $\text{dDec}_{SK}(c_\sigma)$.

Theorem A.1 ([PVW08]) Assume that Π_{DUAL} is a dual-mode PKE. Then Protocol 7 UC realizes \mathcal{F}_{OT} in the presence of static malicious adversaries.