

# Indistinguishability Obfuscation from Semantically-Secure Multilinear Encodings

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## Abstract

We define a notion of semantic security of multilinear (a.k.a. graded) encoding schemes, which stipulates security of a general (but quite restrictive) *class* of DDH-type assumptions: roughly speaking, we require that for *every* distribution  $D$  over two *constant-length* sequences  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1$  and auxiliary elements  $\vec{z}$  such that all arithmetic circuits (respecting the multilinear restrictions) are *constant* with overwhelming probability over  $(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})$ ,  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , we have that encodings of  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  are computationally indistinguishable from encodings of  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ . Assuming the existence of semantically secure multilinear encodings and the LWE assumption, we demonstrate the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits. We additionally show that if we assume subexponential hardness, then it suffices to consider a *single* (falsifiable) instance of semantical security (i.e., that semantical security holds w.r.t to a particular distribution  $D$ ) to obtain the same result.

We rely on the beautiful candidate obfuscation constructions of Garg et al (FOCS'13), Brakerski and Rothblum (TCC'14) and Barak et al (EuroCrypt'14) that were proven secure only in idealized generic multilinear encoding models, and develop new techniques for demonstrating security in the standard model, based only on semantic security of multilinear encodings (which trivially holds in the generic multilinear encoding model).

We also investigate various ways of defining an “uber assumption” (i.e., a super-assumption) for multilinear encodings, and show that the perhaps most natural way of formalizing the assumption that “any DDH-type assumption that holds in the generic model also holds against nuPPT attackers” is false.

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# 1 Introduction

The goal of *program obfuscation* is to “scramble” a computer program, hiding its implementation details (making it hard to “reverse-engineer”), while preserving the functionality (i.e, input/output behavior) of the program. Precisely defining what it means to “scramble” a program is non-trivial: on the one hand, we want a definition that can be plausibly satisfied, on the other hand, we want a definition that is useful for applications.

A first formal definition of such program obfuscation was provided by Hada [Had00]: roughly speaking, Hada’s definition—let us refer to it as *strongly virtual black-box*—is formalized using the simulation paradigm. It requires that anything an attacker can learn from the obfuscated code, could be simulated using just black-box access to the functionality.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, as noted by Hada, only learnable functionalities can satisfy such a strong notion of obfuscation: if the attacker simply outputs the code it is given, the simulator must be able to recover the code by simply querying the functionality and thus the functionality must be learnable.

An in-depth study of program obfuscation was initiated in the seminal work of Barak, Goldreich, Impagliazzo, Rudich, Sahai, Vadhan, and Yang [BGI<sup>+</sup>01]. Their central result shows that even if we consider a more relaxed simulation-based definition of program obfuscation—called *virtual black-box (VBB)* obfuscation—where the attacker is restricted to simply outputting a single bit, impossibility can still be established.<sup>2</sup> Their result is even stronger, demonstrating the existence of families of functions such that given black-box access to  $f_s$  (for a randomly chosen  $s$ ), not even a *single* bit of  $s$  can be guessed with probability significantly better than  $1/2$ , but given the code of any program that computes  $f_s$ , the entire secret  $s$  can be recovered. Thus, even quite weak simulation-based notions of obfuscation are impossible.

But weaker notions of obfuscation may be achievable, and may still suffice for (some) applications. Indeed, Barak *et al.* [BGI<sup>+</sup>01] also suggested two such notions:

- The notion of *indistinguishability obfuscation*, first defined by Barak *et al.* [BGI<sup>+</sup>01] and explored by Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], roughly speaking requires that obfuscations  $\mathcal{O}(C_1)$  and  $\mathcal{O}(C_2)$  of any two *equivalent* circuits  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  (i.e., whose outputs agree on all inputs) from some class  $\mathcal{C}$  are computationally indistinguishable.
- The notion of *differing-input obfuscation*, first defined by Barak *et al.* [BGI<sup>+</sup>01] and explored by Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14] and by Ananth, Boneh, Garg, Sahai and Zhandry [ABG<sup>+</sup>13] strengthens the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation to also require that even if  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  are not equivalent circuits, if an attacker can distinguish obfuscations  $\mathcal{O}(C_1)$  and  $\mathcal{O}(C_2)$ , then the attacker must “know” an input  $x$  such that  $C_1(x) \neq C_2(x)$ , and this input can be efficiently “extracted” from  $A$ .

In a very recent breakthrough result, Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai, and Waters [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] provided the first candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits, based on so-called *multilinear (a.k.a. graded) encodings* [BS03, Rot13, GGH13a]—for which candidate constructions were recently discovered in the seminal work of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a], and more recently, alternative constructions were provided by Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi [CLT<sup>+</sup>13].

The obfuscator construction of Garg et al proceeds in two steps. They first provide a candidate construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\text{NC}^1$  (this construction is essentially assumed to be secure); next, they demonstrate a “bootstrapping” theorem showing how to use fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes [Gen09] and indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$  to obtain indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits. Further constructions of obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$

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<sup>1</sup>Hada actually considered a slight distributional weakening of this definition.

<sup>2</sup>A similar notion of security (without referring to obfuscation) was considered even earlier by Canetti [Can97] in the special case of what is now referred to as *point-function obfuscation*.

were subsequently provided by Brakerski and Rothblum [BR14] and Barak, Garg, Kalai, Paneth and Sahai [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]—in fact, these constructions achieve the even stronger notion of virtual-black-box obfuscation in idealized “generic” multilinear encoding models. Additionally, Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14] present an alternative bootstrapping theorem, showing how to employ differing-input obfuscations for  $\text{NC}^1$  to obtain differing-input (and thus also indistinguishability) obfuscation for both circuits and Turing machines. (Ananth et al [ABG<sup>+</sup>13] also provide Turing machine differing-input obfuscators, but start instead from differing-input obfuscators for polynomial-size circuits.)

In parallel with the development of candidate obfuscation constructions, several surprising applications of both indistinguishability and differing-input obfuscations have emerged: for instance, in the works of Garg et al [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], Sahai and Waters [SW13], Hohenberger, Sahai and Waters [HSW13], Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14], Boneh and Zhandry [BZ13], Garg, Gentry, Halevi and Raykova [GGHR14], Bitansky, Canetti, Paneth and Rosen [BCPR13], Boyle and Pass [BP13]. Most notable among these is the work of Sahai and Waters [SW13] (and the “punctured program” paradigm it introduces) which shows that for some interesting applications of virtual black-box obfuscation (such as turning private-key primitives into public-key one), the weaker notion of indistinguishability obfuscation suffices. Furthermore, as shown by Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07], indistinguishability obfuscators provide a very nice “best-possible” obfuscation guarantee: if a functionality can be VBB obfuscated (even non-efficiently!), then any indistinguishability obfuscator for this functionality is VBB secure. Finally, as shown by Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14] indistinguishability obfuscation in fact implies a notion of differing-input obfuscation (when restricted to programs that differ on polynomially-many inputs); and this notion already suffices for some applications of differing-input obfuscation [BST13].

## 1.1 Towards “Provably-Secure” Obfuscation

But despite these amazing developments, the following question remains wide open:

*Can the security of general-purpose obfuscations be reduced to some “natural” intractability assumption?*

Note that while the construction of indistinguishability obfuscation of Garg et al is based on *some* intractability assumption, the assumption is very tightly tied to their scheme—in essence, the assumption stipulates that their scheme is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator.

The VBB constructions of Brakerski and Rothblum [BR14] and Barak et al [BGK<sup>+</sup>13] give us more confidence in the plausible security of their obfuscators, in that they show that at least “generic” attacks—that treat multilinear encoding as if they were “physical envelopes” on which multilinear operations can be performed—cannot be used to break security of the obfuscators. But at the same time, non-generic attacks against their scheme are known—since general-purpose VBB obfuscation is impossible. Thus, it is not clear to what extent security arguments in the generic multilinear encoding model should make us more confident that these constructions satisfy e.g., a notion of indistinguishability obfuscation. In particular, the question of to what extent one can capture “real-world” security properties from security proofs in the generic model through a “meta-assumption” (regarding multilinear encoding) was raised (but not investigated) in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]; see Remark 1 there.

In this work, we initiate a study of the above-mentioned question:

- We are concerned with the question of whether some *succinct* and *general* assumption (that is interesting in its own right, and is not “tailored” to a particular obfuscation construction) about some *low-level primitive* for which candidate constructions are known (e.g., multilinear encodings), can be used to obtain indistinguishability obfuscation.
- More importantly, we are interested in *reducing* the security of the obfuscation to some *simpler* assumption, not just in terms of “description size” but in terms of computational complexity—

that is, we are not interested in assumptions that “directly” (without any security reduction) imply security of the obfuscation.

- Finally, ideally, we would like the assumption to be *efficiently falsifiable* [Nao03], so that it is possible to efficiently check whether the assumption is broken. This is particularly pressing since the assumption that a particular scheme (e.g., one of the schemes of [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b, BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13]) is an indistinguishability obfuscator is not an efficiently falsifiable assumption, making it hard to check whether they can be broken or not: a presumed attacker must exhibit two *functionally-equivalent* circuits  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  that it can distinguish obfuscations of; but checking whether two circuits are functionally equivalent may not be polynomial-time computable.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2 Security of Multilinear Encodings

Towards explaining the assumptions we consider, let us start by briefly recalling multilinear (a.k.a. graded) encoding schemes [GGH13a, GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]. Roughly speaking, such schemes enable anyone that has access to a *public parameter*  $\mathbf{pp}$  and *encodings*  $E_S^x = \text{Enc}(x, S)$ ,  $E_{S'}^y = \text{Enc}(y, S')$  of ring elements  $x, y$  under the sets  $S, S' \subset [k]$  to *efficiently*:<sup>4</sup>

- compute an encoding  $E_{S \cup S'}^{x \cdot y}$  of  $x \cdot y$  under the set  $S \cup S'$ , as long as  $S \cap S' = \emptyset$ ;
- compute an encoding  $E_S^{x+y}$  of  $x + y$  under the set  $S$  as long as  $S = S'$ ;
- compute an encoding  $E_S^{x-y}$  of  $x - y$  under the set  $S$  as long as  $S = S'$ .

(Given just access to the public-parameter  $\mathbf{pp}$ , generating an encoding to a particular element  $x$  may not be efficient; however, it can be efficiently done given access to the *secret parameter*  $\mathbf{sp}$ .) Additionally, given an encoding  $E_S^x$  where the set  $S$  is the whole universe  $[k]$ —called the “target set”—we can efficiently check whether  $x = 0$  (i.e., we can “zero-test” encodings under the target set  $[k]$ .) In essence, multilinear encodings enable computations of certain restricted set of arithmetic circuits (determined by the sets  $S$  under which the elements are encoded) and finally determine whether the output of the circuit is 0; we refer to these as the *legal arithmetic circuits*.

**Semantical Security of Multilinear Encodings** The above description only explains the *functionality* of multilinear encodings, but does not discuss *security*. As far as we are aware, there have been two approaches to defining security of multilinear encodings. The first approach, initiated in [GGH13a], stipulates specific hardness assumptions closely related to the DDH assumption. The second approach instead focuses on *generic attackers* and assumes that the attacker does not get to see the actual encodings but instead can only access them through legal arithmetic circuits.

In this work, we consider the first approach, but consider general *classes* of DDH-type assumption. As we shall shortly see, already coming up with reasonable definition of security for multilinear encodings

<sup>3</sup>In fact, assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions it is easy to come up with a method to sample  $C_1, C_2, z$  such that with high probability  $C_1(z) \neq C_2(z)$  (and thus, given  $z$ , we can easily distinguish obfuscations of them), yet the pair of circuits  $(C_1, C_2)$  are indistinguishable from a pair of functionally equivalent circuits. In particular, (mirroring the ideas from the lower bound for witness encryption of [GGSW13]), given a statement  $x$ , let  $C_b^x$  be an obfuscation of a circuit that given a witness  $w$  outputs  $b$  iff  $w$  is an NP-witness for the statement  $x$  (and  $\perp$  otherwise). If  $x$  is false, then by the indistinguishability obfuscation property,  $(C_0^x, C_1^x)$  is indistinguishable from two obfuscations of the *same* constant  $\perp$  function. This still holds even if we sample a true  $x$  (and its associated witness  $z$ ) from a hard-on-the-average language (as long as we do not give  $z$  to the distinguisher). Yet given the trapdoor  $z$ , we can clearly distinguish  $C_0^x, C_1^x$  and also obfuscations of them. Thus, there are “fake attacks” on indistinguishability obfuscation that cannot be efficiently distinguished from a real attack.

<sup>4</sup>Just as [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13], we here rely on “set-based” graded encoding; these were originally called “generalized” graded encodings in [GGH13a]. Following [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b, BGK<sup>+</sup>13] (and in particular the notion of a “multilinear jigsaw puzzles” in [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]), we additionally enable anyone with the secret parameter to encode *any* elements (as opposed to just *random* elements as in [GGH13a]).

is a non-trivial and subtle task. For concreteness, let us start by stipulating a DDH-type assumption for multilinear encoding, similar in spirit to the “graded DDH (GDDH)” assumption of Garg et al [GGH13a] for “symmetric” multilinear encodings. Consider sampling  $n$  random elements  $\vec{z}$ , and let  $m_0$  be the product of the elements in  $\vec{z}$ , and  $m_1$  be just a random element. The asymmetric GDDH (aGDDH) requires that encodings of  $m_0, \vec{z}$  and  $m_1, \vec{z}$  under sets  $S, \vec{T}$  are indistinguishable if (a)  $S$  is target set  $[k]$ , and (b)  $S$  and is not the disjoint union of the sets in  $\vec{T}$ . That is, encodings of  $m_0, \vec{z}$  and  $m_1, \vec{z}$  under the sets  $S, \vec{T}$  are indistinguishable as long as the sets  $\vec{T}$  prevent “legally” obtain the product of the elements in  $\vec{z}$  and subtracting them from  $m_0$  or  $m_1$ .

Note that for any such sets  $S, \vec{T}$ , the particular (joint) distribution  $D$  over  $m_0, m_1, \vec{z}$  has a nice “zero-knowledge” property w.r.t. to the set of legal arithmetic circuits (w.r.t.,  $\vec{S}, T$ ): every legal arithmetic circuit  $C$  is *constant* over  $(m_b, \vec{z})$ ,  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  with overwhelming probability; that is, there exists some bit  $c$  such that with overwhelming probability over  $m_0, m_1, \vec{z} \leftarrow D$ ,  $C(m_b, \vec{z}) = c$  for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . We refer to any distribution  $D$  satisfying this “zero-knowledge” property as being *valid* (w.r.t.  $S, \vec{T}$ ).

Our notion of *single-message* semantical security now states that for every  $S, \vec{T}$ , every valid (w.r.t.  $S, \vec{T}$ ) distribution  $D$  over  $m_0, m_1, \vec{z}$ , it holds that encodings of  $m_0, \vec{z}$  and  $m_1, \vec{z}$  under the sets  $S, \vec{T}$  are computationally indistinguishable. We analogously define stronger notions of *constant-message* and *multi-message* semantical security, where  $m_0, m_1$  (and  $S$ ) are replaced by either constant-length or arbitrary polynomial-length vectors of elements.

At this point the careful reader may wonder, why do we restrict to “zero-knowledge” distributions  $D$ ? Why not—similarly to e.g., the uber assumption of [BBG05] in the context of bilinear maps—consider *any* distribution  $D$  that makes it impossible for generic attackers to distinguish  $m_0, \vec{z}$ , and  $m_1, \vec{z}$ ? As we discuss in Section 1.3, the most natural formalization of this approach can be broken assuming standard cryptographic hardness assumptions; this is what motivates us to restrict to “zero-knowledge distributions”.

**Obfuscation from Semantically-Secure Multilinear Encodings** As a starting point, we observe that slight variants of the constructions of [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13] can be shown to satisfy indistinguishability obfuscation for  $\text{NC}_1$  assuming *multi-message* semantically-secure multilinear encodings. In essence, this follows from the fact that these construction simply release encodings of some elements; let  $\vec{m}_0$  denote the elements corresponding to an obfuscation of some program  $\Pi_0$ , and  $\vec{m}_1$  the elements corresponding to an obfuscation of some functionally equivalent program  $\Pi_1$ . The analyses of [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13] implicitly show that all *polynomial-size* legal arithmetic circuits are constant with overwhelming probability over both  $\vec{m}_0$  and  $\vec{m}_1$ . By slightly tweaking the constructions and the analyses<sup>5</sup>, we can extend this to hold against *all* (arbitrary-size) legal arithmetic circuits, and thus indistinguishability of the encodings (which implies indistinguishability of the obfuscations) follows as a direct consequence of the multi-message security assumption.

This observation does take care of our first desiderata (of basing the security of obfuscation on a *succinct* and *general* assumption. But it does not deal with our second desiderata of *reducing* security to a *simpler* assumption—in particular, simply assuming that the (slight variants of the) schemes of [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13] are secure is a special case of the multi-message security assumption.

Our central result shows how to construct indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$  based on the existence of *constant-message* semantically-secure multilinear encodings; in the sequel, we simply refer to such schemes as being semantically secure (dropping “constant-message” from the notation). Note that the constant-message restriction not only simplifies (and reduces the complexity) of the assumption, it also takes us a step closer to the more standard GDDH assumption. (As far as we know, essentially all DDH-type assumptions in “standard”/bilinear or multilinear settings consider a constant-message setting, stipulating indistinguishability of either a *single* or a *constant* number of elements in the presence of polynomially many auxiliary elements. It is thus safe to say that such constant-message assumptions

<sup>5</sup>Briefly, we need to tweak the construction to ensure a “perfect” simulation property.

are significantly better understood their multi-message counterpart.)

**Theorem 1** (Informally stated). *Assume the existence of semantically secure multilinear encodings. Then there exists an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\text{NC}^1$ .*

As far as we know, this is the first result presenting indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$  based on any type of assumption with a “non-trivial” security reduction w.r.t. arbitrary nuPPT attackers (as opposed to restricted “generic” attackers).

If additionally assuming the existence of a leveled FHE [RAD78, Gen09] with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ —implied, for instance, by the LWE assumption [BV11, BGV12]—this construction can be bootstrapped up to obtain indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits by relying on the technique from [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b].

**Theorem 2** (Informally stated). *Assume the existence of semantically secure multilinear encodings and a leveled FHE with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ . Then there exists indistinguishability obfuscators for  $P/\text{poly}$ .*

**Semantical Security w.r.t. Restricted Classes of Distributions** Our most basic notion of semantical security requires indistinguishability to hold w.r.t. to *any* “valid” message distribution. This may seem like a strong assumption. Firstly, such a notion can clearly not be satisfied by a *deterministic* encoding schemes (as envisioned in the original work of [BS03])—we can never expect encodings of 0 and 1 (under a non target set, and without any auxiliary inputs) to be indistinguishable. Secondly, even if we have a randomized encoding scheme in mind (such as the candidates of [GGH13a, CLT<sup>+</sup>13]), giving the attacker access to encodings of *arbitrary* elements may be dangerous: As mentioned in [GGH13a], attacks (referred to as “weak discrete logarithm attacks”) on their scheme are known in settings where the attacker can get access to “non-trivial” encodings of 0 under any *non-target* set  $S \subset [k]$ . (We mention that, as far as we know, no such attacks are currently known on the candidate construction of [CLT<sup>+</sup>13].)

For the purposes of the results in our paper, however, it suffices to consider a notion of semantical security w.r.t. *restricted classes of distributions*  $D$ . In particular, to deal with both of the above issues, we consider “high-entropy” distributions  $D$  that sample elements  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  such that 1) each individual element has high-entropy, and 2) any element, associated with a *non-target* set  $S \subset [k]$ , that can be obtained by applying “legal” algebraic operations to  $(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})$  (for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ) has high-entropy (and thus is non-zero with overwhelming probability).<sup>6</sup> We refer to such message distributions as being *entropically valid*.

**Basing Security on a Single Falsifiable Assumption** The assumption that a scheme satisfies semantical security w.r.t. some class of distributions may perhaps be best viewed as a *class of assumptions* (or a “meta-assumption”, just like the “uber assumption” of [BBG05]), or alternatively as an *interactive assumption*, where the attacker first selects the sets  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$  and the distribution  $D$ , and then gets a challenge according to the distribution.

This view-point also clarifies that even for the above-mentioned restricted classes of message distributions, semantical security is not an *efficiently falsifiable* assumption [Nao03]: the problem is that there may not exist an efficient way of checking whether a distribution  $D$  is valid (which requires checking that all set-respecting circuits are constant with overwhelming probability).

We finally show that we can base our construction on a *single-instance* of this class of assumptions, albeit at the cost of assuming *subexponential hardness* of semantical security w.r.t. this specific instance. More precisely, we show the existence of an efficiently samplable distribution  $\text{Sam}$  over sets  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$  (where  $|\vec{S}| = O(1)$ ) and (provably) entropically valid message distributions  $D$  such it suffices to assume the existence of an encodings scheme that is entropic semantically secure w.r.t., this particular distribution

<sup>6</sup>Technically, by high-entropy, we here mean that the min-entropy is at least  $\log |R| - O(\log \log |R|)$  where  $R$  is the ring associated with the encodings; that is, the min-entropy is “almost” optimal (i.e.,  $\log |R|$ ).

over sets and messages *subexponentially small indistinguishability gap*. Note that this is a non-interactive and efficiently falsifiable (decisional) assumption—in essence, it is a specific instance of a DDH-type assumption over multilinear encodings (which satisfies the same nice “zero-knowledge property” as the aGDDH assumptions, and thus is trivially secure in the generic model.)

**Theorem 3** (Informally stated). *There exists an efficiently samplable distribution  $\text{Sam}$  over sets  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$  (such that  $|\vec{S}| = O(1)$ ) and entropically valid message distributions  $D$  (w.r.t. these sets) such that the existence of an encoding scheme that is semantically secure w.r.t. the specific instance-distribution  $\text{Sam}$  with subexponential indistinguishability gap implies the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$ .*

As before, this construction can be bootstrapped up to  $\text{P/poly}$  by additionally assuming the existence of a leveled FHE with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ .

### 1.3 Alternative Security Notions for Multilinear Encodings

A natural question is whether there are reasonable qualitative strengthenings of semantical security that can be used to achieve stronger notions of obfuscation, such as e.g., differing-input (a.k.a. extractability) obfuscation. Towards this, we investigate various ways of defining a “super” (or uber) assumption for multilinear encodings. A natural way of defining security of multilinear encodings would be to require that for specific classes of problems, generic attacks cannot be beaten (this is the approach alluded to in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]). Perhaps the most natural instantiation of this in the context of a multilinear DDH assumption would be to require that for any distribution  $D$  over  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  (where  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1$  are constant-length sequences), if encodings of  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  and  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  are indistinguishable w.r.t. to generic attackers, then they are also indistinguishable w.r.t. arbitrary nuPPT attacker; in essence, “if a DDH-type assumption holds w.r.t. to generic attacks, then it also holds with respect to nuPPT attackers”. We refer to this notion of security as *extractable uber security*.<sup>7</sup>

Our second main result shows that, assuming the existence of a leveled FHE with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ , there do not exist extractable uber-secure multilinear encodings (even if we only require security to hold w.r.t high-entropy distributions  $D$ ). In particular, we give a concrete example of a DDH-type assumption that holds in the generic model but is false w.r.t. nuPPT attacker; in our opinion, this yields strong evidence that security in the generic model is not indicative of real-life security—even for very simple tasks—and motivates why our notion of semantical security restricts to “zero-knowledge” distributions.

**Theorem 4.** *[Informally stated] Assume the existence of a leveled FHE with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ . Then no multilinear encodings can satisfy extractable (entropic) uber security.*

This impossibility result is demonstrated by relying on our construction of indistinguishability obfuscators, showing that if the underlying multilinear encodings satisfy the extractable uber security, the overall construction will satisfy a “too strong” notion of obfuscation.

We finally consider several plausible ways of defining uber security for multilinear encodings, which circumvent the above impossibility results; in a nutshell, the idea is to require indistinguishability of encodings only if the elements are *statistically* close w.r.t. *unbounded* generic attackers (that are restricted to making polynomially many zero-test queries). We highlight that none of these assumptions are needed for our construction of an indistinguishability obfuscation (and are stronger than semantical security), but they may find other applications.

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<sup>7</sup>We use the adjective “extractable” as this security notion implies that if an nuPPT attacker can distinguish encodings, then the arithmetic circuits needed to distinguish the elements can be efficiently extracted out.

## 1.4 Construction Overview

Following the original work of Garg et al (as well as subsequent works), our construction proceeds in three steps:

- We view the  $\text{NC}^1$  circuit to be obfuscated as a *branching program*  $BP$  (using Barrington’s Theorem [Bar86])—that is, the program is described by  $m$  pairs of matrices  $(B_{i,0}, B_{i,1})$ , each one labelled with an input bit  $\text{inp}(i)$ , and the program is evaluated computing by for each  $i \in [m]$ , choosing one of the two matrices  $(B_{i,0}, B_{i,1})$ , based on the input, computing the product, and finally based on the product determining the output—there is a unique “accept” (i.e., output 1) matrix, and a unique “reject” (i.e., output 0) matrix.
- The branching program  $BP$  is *randomized* using Kilian’s technique [Kil88] (roughly, each pair of matrices is appropriately multiplied with the same random matrix  $R$  while ensuring that the output is the same), and then “randomized” some more—each individual matrix is multiplied by a random *scalar*  $\alpha$ . Let us refer to this step as **Rand**.
- Finally the randomized matrices are encoded using multilinear encodings with the sets selected appropriately. We here rely on a (simple version) of the *straddling set* idea of [BGK<sup>+</sup>13] to determine the sets. We refer to this step as **Encode**.

(The original construction as well as the subsequent works also consisted of several other steps, but for our purposes these will not be needed.) The obfuscated program is now evaluated by using the multilinear operations to evaluate the branching program and finally appropriately use the zero-test to determine the output of the program. Let us refer to this construction as the “basic obfuscator”.

Roughly speaking, the idea behind the basic obfuscator is that the multilinear encodings *intuitively* ensure that any attacker getting the encoding needs to multiply matrices along paths that corresponds to some input to the branching program (the straddling sets are used to ensure that the input is used consistently in the evaluation)<sup>8</sup>; the scalars  $\alpha$ , roughly speaking, ensure that a potential attacker without loss of generality can use a *single* “multiplication-path” and still succeed with roughly the same probability, and finally, Kilian’s randomization steps ensures that if an attacker *only* operates on matrices along a single path that corresponds to some input  $x$  (in a consistent way), then its output can be perfectly simulated given just the output of the circuit on input  $x$ . (The final step relies on the fact that the output of the circuit uniquely determines product of the branching program along the path, and Kilian’s randomization then ensures that the matrices along the path are random conditioned on the product being this unique value.) Thus, if an attacker can tell apart obfuscations of two programs  $BP_0, BP_1$ , there must exist some input on which they produce different outputs. The above intuitions can indeed be formalized w.r.t. *generic attackers* (that only operate on the encodings in a legal way, respecting the set restrictions), relying on arguments from [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13]. This already suffices to prove that the basic obfuscator is an indistinguishability obfuscator assuming the encodings are *multi-message* semantically secure.

To base security on the weaker assumption of (constant-message) semantical security, we will add an additional program transformation steps before the **Rand** and **Encode** steps. Roughly speaking, we would like to have a method  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)$  that “merges”  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  into a single branching program that evaluates  $BP_b$ ; additionally, we require that  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$  only differ in a constant number of matrices. We achieve this merge procedure by connecting together  $BP_0, BP_1$  into a branching program of double width and adding two “switch” matrices in the beginning and the end, determining if we should go “up” or “down”. Thus, to switch between  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  (which is functionally equivalent to  $BP_0$ ) and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$  (which is functionally equivalent to  $BP_1$ ) we just need to switch the “switch matrices”. More precisely, given branching programs  $BP_0$  and

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<sup>8</sup>The encodings, however, still permit an attacker to add elements within matrices.



$BP_1$  described respectively by pairs of matrices  $\{(B_{i,0}^0, B_{i,1}^0), (B_{i,0}^1, B_{i,1}^1)\}_{i \in [m]}$ , we construct a merged program  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)$  described by  $\{(\hat{B}_{i,0}^0, \hat{B}_{i,1}^0)\}_{i \in [m]}$  such that

$$\hat{B}_{i,b}^0 = \hat{B}_{i,b}^1 = \begin{pmatrix} B_{(i-1),b}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & B_{(i-1),b}^1 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{for all } 2 \leq i \leq m+1 \text{ and } b \in \{0,1\}$$

and the first and last matrices are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{B}_{1,b}^0 &= \hat{B}_{m+2,b}^0 = I_{2w \times 2w} && \text{for } b \in \{0,1\} \\ \hat{B}_{1,b}^1 &= \hat{B}_{m+2,b}^1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & I_{w \times w} \\ I_{w \times w} & 0 \end{pmatrix} && \text{for } b \in \{0,1\} \end{aligned}$$

It directly follows from the construction that  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$  differ only in the first and the last matrices (i.e., the “switch” matrices). Furthermore, it is not hard to see that  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)$  is functionally equivalent to  $BP_b$ .

Our candidate obfuscator is now defined as  $i\mathcal{O}(B) = \text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP, I, 0)))$ , where  $I$  is simply a “dummy” program of the same size as  $BP$ .<sup>9</sup>

The idea behind the merge procedure is that to prove that obfuscations of two programs  $BP_0, BP_1$  are indistinguishable, we can come up with a sequence of hybrid experiments that start with  $i\mathcal{O}(BP_0)$  and end with  $i\mathcal{O}(BP_1)$ , but between any two hybrids only changes a constant number of encodings, and thus we may rely on semantic security of multilinear encodings to formalize the above intuitions. At a high level, our strategy will be to matrix-by-matrix, replace the dummy branching program in the obfuscation of  $BP_0$  with the branching program for  $BP_1$ . Once the entire dummy branching program has been replaced by  $BP_1$ , we flip the “switch” so that the composite branching program now computes the branching program for  $BP_1$ . We then replace the branching program for  $BP_0$  with  $BP_1$ , matrix by matrix, so that we have two copies of the branching program for  $BP_1$ . We now flip the “switch” again, and finally restore the dummy branching program, so that we end up with one copy of  $BP_1$  and one copy of the dummy, which is now a valid obfuscation of  $BP_1$ . In this way, we transition from an obfuscation of  $BP_0$  to an obfuscation of  $BP_1$ , while only changing a small piece of the obfuscation in each step. (On a very high-level, this approach is somewhat reminiscent of the Naor-Yung “two-key” approach in the context of CCA security [NY90] and the “two-key” bootstrapping result for indistinguishability obfuscation due to Garg et al [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]—in all these approaches the length of the scheme is artificially doubled to facilitate a hybrid argument. It is perhaps even more reminiscent of the Feige-Shamir “trapdoor witness” approach for constructing zero-knowledge arguments [FS90], whereby an additional “dummy” trapdoor witness is introduced in the construction to enable the security proof.)

More precisely, consider the following sequence of hybrids.

- We start off with  $i\mathcal{O}(BP_0) = \text{Enc}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, I, 0)))$
- We consider a sequence of hybrids where we gradually change the dummy program  $I$  to become  $BP_1$ ; that is, we consider  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP', 0)))$ , where  $BP'$  is “step-wise” being populated with elements from  $BP_1$ .
- We reach  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)))$ .
- We turn the “switch” :  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)))$ .
- We consider a sequence of hybrids where we gradually change the  $BP_0$  to become  $BP_1$ ; that is, we consider  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP', BP_1, 1)))$ , where  $BP'$  is “step-wise” being populated with elements from  $BP_1$ .

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<sup>9</sup>This description oversimplifies a bit. Formally, the  $\text{Rand}$  step needs to depend on the field size used in the  $\text{Encode}$  steps, and thus in our formal treatment we combine these two steps together.

- We reach  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP_1, 1)))$ .
- We turn the “switch” back:  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP_1, 0)))$ .
- We consider a sequence of hybrids where we gradually change the second  $BP_1$  to become  $I$ ; that is, we consider  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP', 0)))$ , where  $BP'$  is “step-wise” being populated with elements from  $I$ .
- We reach  $\text{Encode}(\text{Rand}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, I, 0))) = i\mathcal{O}(BP_1)$ .

By construction we have that if  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  are functionally equivalent, then so will all the hybrid programs—the key point is that we only “morph” between two branching programs on the “inactive” part of the merged branching program. Furthermore, by construction, between any two hybrids we only change a constant number of elements. Thus, if some distinguisher can tell apart  $i\mathcal{O}(BP_0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(BP_1)$ , it must be able to tell apart two consecutive hybrids. But, by semantic security it then follows that some “legal” arithmetic circuit can tell apart the encodings in the two hybrids. Roughly speaking, we can now rely on simulation security of the basic obfuscator w.r.t. to just *legal* arithmetic circuits to complete the argument.

There is a catch with the final step though. Recall that to rely on Kilian’s simulation argument it was crucial that there are *unique* accept and reject matrices. For our “merged” programs, this is no longer the case (the output matrix is also a function of the second “dummy” program). We overcome this issue by noting that the *first column* of the output matrix actually is unique, and this is all we need to determine the output of the branching program. Consequently it suffices to release encodings of the *just* first column (as opposed to the whole matrices) of the last matrix pair in the branching program, and we can still determine the output of the branching program. As we show, for such a modified scheme, we can also simulate the (randomized) matrices along an “input-path” given just the first column of the output matrix. This concludes the description of our indistinguishability obfuscator.

## 1.5 Conclusion and Discussion

We have introduced a new security notion, *semantical security*, for multilinear (a.k.a. graded) encodings, which captures a general (but quite restrictive) *class* of DDH-type assumption over multilinear encodings. Our main result demonstrates the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators ( $i\mathcal{O}$ ) assuming the existence of semantically secure multilinear encodings and the LWE assumption; as far as we know, this yields the first construction of  $i\mathcal{O}$  based on a succinct and simple-to-state assumption about some algebraic primitive (namely, multilinear encodings) for which candidate constructions are known.

We additionally show that it suffices to assume the existence of encodings schemes that satisfy a *specific, falsifiable, instance* of semantical security (i.e., that a specific DDH-type assumption in the class holds w.r.t. the encoding scheme); this time, however, we need to assume *subexponentially-hard* semantical security. This shows that under subexponential reductions, indistinguishability obfuscation can be based on a single, non-interactive and falsifiable, assumption.

We finally consider various strengthenings of semantical security, which (among other things) motivate why in our definition of semantical security, we restrict the class of DDH-type assumptions: we show that the assumption that “every DDH-type assumptions that holds against generic attackers holds against nuPPT attackers” is false.

Our work leaves open several interesting questions:

- Can we base  $i\mathcal{O}$  on *polynomial-hardness* of a falsifiable (and preferably non-interactive) assumption (using a security-preserving reduction)? Note that for many *applications* of  $i\mathcal{O}$  (e.g., functional encryption [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]) it suffices to require indistinguishability for restricted distributions of

programs that (with overwhelming probability) are *provably* functionally equivalent; for these applications, our proof already shows they can be based on specific, falsifiable, instances of semantical security (without assuming subexponential hardness).

- Even in the regime of subexponential hardness, the specific DDH-type assumption that we use—although it is a special case of semantical security—is not particularly natural, and doesn’t have a particularly “simple” description. In essence, we consider semantical security with respect to distributions over elements that describe the obfuscation of a random branching program. (As such, in our eyes, perhaps the best reason to believe this assumption is true that it is a falsifiable special case of semantical security). It would be much more desirable to base security on semantical security w.r.t. a single *simple* and *natural* distribution over  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ , where, for instance, similar to the GDDH assumption,  $\vec{z}$  are uniformly random elements. We conjecture that our assumption actually can be “massaged” into a nicer looking assumption, closer in spirit to the GDDH assumption, and we are currently working on formalizing this.

We mention a very recent work by Gentry, Lewko and Waters [GLW14] that bases *witness encryption* [GGSW13] on exponential hardness of some nicer looking assumptions over multilinear encodings (closer in spirit to the GDDH assumption); however, in contrast to our work they rely on multilinear (graded) encodings over composite-order rings (for which the only candidate is a modified variant of [CLT<sup>+</sup>13]) or require more complex assumptions over prime-order rings (that still are false for the [GGH13a] construction); additionally, they requires more functionalities from graded encodings than we do (in particular, “ring-sampling”, “re-randomization”, “subring generation”, and “subring sampling”; see [GLW14]).

## 1.6 Outline of the Paper

We provide some preliminaries in Section 2. We define semantical security of multilinear (aka graded) encodings in Section 3. Our construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator is provided in Section 4 and its proof of security is found in Section 5. We show how to slightly modify the construction to be based on a single (falsifiable) instance of semantical security in Section 6. We finally study alternative notions of security for multilinear encodings in Section 7.

## 2 Preliminaries

Let  $\mathbb{N}$  denote the set of positive integers, and  $[n]$  denote the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . Let  $\mathbb{Z}$  denote the integers, and  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  the integers modulo  $p$ . Given a string  $x$ , we let  $x[i]$ , or equivalently  $x_i$ , denote the  $i$ -th bit of  $x$ . For a matrix  $M$ , we let  $M[i, j]$  denote the entry of  $M$  in the  $i$ th row and  $j$ th column. We use  $\mathbf{e}_k$  to denote the vector that is 1 in position  $k$ , and 0 in all other positions. The length of  $\mathbf{e}_k$  is generally clear from the context. We use  $I_{w \times w}$  to denote the identity matrix with dimension  $w \times w$ .

By a probabilistic algorithm we mean a Turing machine that receives an auxiliary random tape as input. If  $M$  is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input  $x$ ,  $M(x)$  represents the distribution of outputs of  $M(x)$  when the random tape is chosen uniformly.  $M(x; r)$  denotes the output of  $M$  on input  $x$  when the random tape is fixed to  $r$ . An oracle algorithm  $M^O$  is a machine  $M$  that gets oracle access to another machine  $O$ , that is, it can access  $O$ ’s functionality as a black-box.

By  $x \leftarrow S$ , we denote an element  $x$  is sampled from a distribution  $S$ . If  $F$  is a finite set, then  $x \leftarrow F$  means  $x$  is sampled uniformly from the set  $F$ . To denote the ordered sequence in which the experiments happen we use semicolon, e.g.  $(x \leftarrow S; (y, z) \leftarrow A(x))$ . Using this notation we can describe probability of events. For example, if  $p(\cdot, \cdot)$  denotes a predicate, then  $\Pr[x \leftarrow S; (y, z) \leftarrow A(x) : p(y, z)]$  is the probability that the predicate  $p(y, z)$  is true in the ordered sequence of experiments  $(x \leftarrow S; (y, z) \leftarrow A(x))$ . The notation  $\{(x \leftarrow S; (y, z) \leftarrow A(x) : (y, z))\}$  denotes the resulting probability distribution

$\{(y, z)\}$  generated by the ordered sequence of experiments  $(x \leftarrow S; (y, z) \leftarrow A(x))$ . We define the support of a distribution  $\text{supp}(S)$  to be  $\{y : \Pr[x \leftarrow S : x = y] > 0\}$ .

By  $\text{isZero}$ , we denote the predicate such that  $\text{isZero}(x) = 1$  exactly when  $x = 0$ , and  $\text{isZero}(x) = 0$  otherwise.

## 2.1 Obfuscation

We recall the definition of indistinguishability obfuscation due to [BGI<sup>+</sup>01].

**Definition 1** (Indistinguishability Obfuscator). *A uniform PPT machine  $i\mathcal{O}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of circuits  $\{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  if the following conditions are satisfied*

- **Correctness:** *There exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , for all  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , we have*

$$\Pr[C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C) : \forall x, C'(x) = C(x)] \geq 1 - \varepsilon(n)$$

- **Security:** *For every pair of circuit ensembles  $\{C_n^0\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\{C_n^1\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  such that for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , for every pair of circuits  $C_n^0, C_n^1 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  such that  $C_n^0(x) = C_n^1(x)$  for all  $x$  the following holds: For every nuPPT adversary  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,*

$$|\Pr[C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^0) : A(1^n, C') = 1] - \Pr[C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^1) : A(1^n, C') = 1]| \leq \varepsilon(n)$$

*We additionally say that  $i\mathcal{O}$  is subexponentially-secure if there exists some constant  $\alpha > 0$  such that for every nuPPT  $A$  the above indistinguishability gap is bounded by  $\varepsilon(n) = 2^{-O(n^\alpha)}$ .*

**Note:** We observe that the above definition allows for a negligible correctness error. That is, for any circuit  $C$ , there is a negligible fraction of “bad” randomness  $r$  such that  $i\mathcal{O}(C; r)$  is not functionally equivalent to  $C$ . However, if we can efficiently check if  $r$  is “bad”, we can modify  $i\mathcal{O}$  so that  $i\mathcal{O}(C; r)$  outputs  $C$  in the clear if  $r$  is “bad”. Then the modified  $i\mathcal{O}$  has perfect correctness, and its security remains intact since only a negligible fraction of  $r$  are “bad”. We note that our construction, as well as all previous ones, have the property that a “bad”  $r$  can be efficiently detected, and thus these schemes can be modified to have perfect correctness.

We now recall the definitions of  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\text{NC}^1$  and  $\text{P/poly}$ .

**Definition 2** (Indistinguishability Obfuscator for  $\text{NC}^1$ ). *A uniform PPT machine  $i\mathcal{O}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\text{NC}^1$  if for every constant  $c$ ,  $i\mathcal{O}(c, \cdot, \cdot)$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}^c = \{\mathcal{C}_n^c\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  where  $\mathcal{C}_n^c$  is the set of circuits that have size at most  $n^c$ , and have depth at most  $c \log n$ .*

**Definition 3** (Indistinguishability Obfuscator for  $\text{P/poly}$ ). *A uniform PPT machine  $i\mathcal{O}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\text{P/poly}$  if for every constant  $c$ ,  $i\mathcal{O}(c, \cdot, \cdot)$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of circuits  $\mathcal{P}^c = \{\mathcal{P}_n^c\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  where  $\mathcal{P}_n^c$  is the set of circuits that have size at most  $n^c$ .*

The following simple lemma will be useful in the sequel.

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $i\mathcal{O}$  be a (subexponentially-secure) indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\text{NC}^1$ . Then  $i\mathcal{O}'$  defined as  $i\mathcal{O}'(c, 1^n, C) = i\mathcal{O}(1^{n^c}, C)$  is a (subexponentially-secure) indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\text{NC}^1$ .*

*Proof.* Consider any pair of circuit ensembles  $\{C_n^0\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}, \{C_n^1\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  in  $\mathcal{C}^c$ . Assume for contradiction that there exists some nuPPT  $A$  and a polynomial  $p(\cdot)$  such that  $A(1^n)$  distinguishes  $i\mathcal{O}'(c, 1^n, C_n^0) = i\mathcal{O}(1^{n^c}, C_n^0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}'(c, 1^n, C_n^1) = i\mathcal{O}(1^{n^c}, C_n^1)$  with probability  $1/p(n)$  for infinitely many  $n$ . Note that for every  $n$ ,  $C_n^0, C_n^1 \in \mathcal{C}_{n^c}^1$ . Thus, for infinitely many  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , there exists circuits  $C_n^0, C_n^1 \in \mathcal{C}_{n^c}^1$  such

that  $A(1^n)$  distinguishes  $i\mathcal{O}(1^{n^c}, C_n^0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(1^{n^c}, C_n^1)$  with probability  $1/p(n)$ . In other words, for infinitely many  $n' \in \mathbb{N}$  of the form  $n' = n^c$ , there exist circuits  $\tilde{C}_{n'}^0 = C_n^0$ ,  $\tilde{C}_{n'}^1 = C_n^1$  such that the nuPPT  $A'(1^{n'}) = A(1^n)$  distinguishes  $i\mathcal{O}(1^{n'}, \tilde{C}_{n'}^0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(1^{n'}, \tilde{C}_{n'}^1)$  with probability  $1/p(n) = 1/p(n^{1/c})$ , which contradicts that  $i\mathcal{O}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $C^1$ .

The same argument also works in the context of subexponential security.  $\square$

## 2.2 Branching programs for $\text{NC}^1$

We recall the notion of a branching program.

**Definition 4** (Matrix Branching Program). *A branching program of width  $w$  and length  $m$  for  $n$ -bit inputs is given by a sequence:*

$$BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^m,$$

where each  $B_{i,b}$  is a permutation matrix in  $\{0, 1\}^{w \times w}$  and  $\text{inp}(i) \in [n]$  is the input bit position examined in step  $i$ . Then the output of the branching program on input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  is as follows:

$$BP(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } (\prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_1. \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The branching program is said to be oblivious if  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$  is a fixed function, independent of the function being evaluated.

The above definition differs slightly from the definition of matrix branching programs generally used, which have the slightly stronger requirement that  $\prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} = I_{w \times w}$  when  $BP(x)$  is accepting, and  $\prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} = P_{\text{reject}}$  for some fixed permutation matrix  $P_{\text{reject}} \neq I_{w \times w}$  when  $BP(x)$  is rejecting. More generally,

**Definition 5.** *The branching program is said to have fixed accept and reject matrices  $P_{\text{accept}}$  and  $P_{\text{reject}}$  if, for all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,*

$$\prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} = \begin{cases} P_{\text{accept}} & \text{when } BP(x) = 1 \\ P_{\text{reject}} & \text{when } BP(x) = 0 \end{cases}$$

We now have the following theorem due to Barrington:

**Theorem 6.** ([Bar86]) *For any depth  $d$  and input length  $n$ , there exists a length  $m = 4^d$ , a labeling function  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ , an accepting permutation  $P_{\text{accept}}$  with  $P_{\text{accept}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_1$ , and a rejecting permutation  $P_{\text{reject}}$  with  $P_{\text{reject}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_k$  where  $k \neq 1$  such that, for every fan-in 2 boolean circuit  $C$  of depth  $d$  and  $n$  input bits, there exists an oblivious matrix branching program  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^m$ , of width 5 and length  $m$  that computes the same function as the circuit  $C$ .*

In particular, every circuit in  $\text{NC}^1$  has a polynomial length branching program of width 5. Further, two circuits of the same depth  $d$  will have the same fixed accepting and rejecting permutations  $P_{\text{accept}}$  and  $P_{\text{reject}}$ , and a fixed labelling function  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ .

## 3 Semantically Secure Graded Encoding Schemes

In this section we define what it means for a graded encoding scheme to be semantically secure. We start by recalling the notion of graded encoding schemes due to Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a].

### 3.1 Graded Encoding Schemes

Graded (multilinear) encoding schemes were originally introduced in the work of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a]. Just as [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13], we here rely on “set-based” (or “asymmetric”) graded encoding; these were originally called “generalized” graded encodings in [GGH13a]. Following [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b, BGK<sup>+</sup>13] and the notion of “multilinear jigsaw puzzles” from [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], we additionally enable anyone with the secret parameter to encode *any* elements (as opposed to just *random* elements as in [GGH13a]).

**Definition 6** ( $(k, R)$ -Graded Encoding Scheme). *A  $(k, R)$ -graded encoding scheme for  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and ring  $R$  is a collection of sets  $\{E_S^\alpha : \alpha \in R, S \subseteq [k]\}$  with the following properties*

- *For every  $S \subseteq [k]$  the sets  $\{E_S^\alpha : \alpha \in R\}$  are disjoint.*
- *There are associative binary operations  $\oplus$  and  $\ominus$  such that for every  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R, S \subseteq [k], u_1 \in E_S^{\alpha_1}$  and  $u_2 \in E_S^{\alpha_2}$  it holds that  $u_1 \oplus u_2 \in E_S^{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}$  and  $u_1 \ominus u_2 \in E_S^{\alpha_1 - \alpha_2}$  where ‘+’ and ‘−’ are the addition and subtraction operations in  $R$ .*
- *There is an associative binary operation  $\otimes$  such that for every  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R, S_1, S_2 \subseteq [k]$  such that  $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset, u_1 \in E_{S_1}^{\alpha_1}$  and  $u_2 \in E_{S_2}^{\alpha_2}$  it holds that  $u_1 \otimes u_2 \in E_{S_1 \cup S_2}^{\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2}$  where ‘ $\cdot$ ’ is multiplication in  $R$ .*

**Definition 7** (Graded Encoded Scheme). *A graded encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}$  is associated with a tuple of PPT algorithms,  $(\text{InstGen}_\mathcal{E}, \text{Enc}_\mathcal{E}, \text{Add}_\mathcal{E}, \text{Sub}_\mathcal{E}, \text{Mult}_\mathcal{E}, \text{isZero}_\mathcal{E})$  which behave as follows:*

- *Instance Generation:  $\text{InstGen}_\mathcal{E}$  takes as input the security parameter  $1^n$  and multilinearity parameter  $1^k$ , and outputs secret parameters  $\text{sp}$  and public parameters  $\text{pp}$  which describe a  $(k, R)$ -graded encoding scheme  $\{E_S^\alpha : \alpha \in R, S \subseteq [k]\}$ . We refer to  $E_S^\alpha$  as the set of encodings of the pair  $(\alpha, S)$ . We restrict to graded encoding schemes where  $R$  is  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  and  $p$  is a prime exponential in  $n$  and  $k$ .*
- *Encoding:  $\text{Enc}_\mathcal{E}$  takes as input the secret parameters  $\text{sp}$ , an element  $\alpha \in R$  and set  $S \subseteq [k]$ , and outputs a random encoding of the pair  $(\alpha, S)$ .*
- *Addition:  $\text{Add}_\mathcal{E}$  takes as input the public parameters  $\text{pp}$  and encodings  $u_1 \in E_{S_1}^{\alpha_1}, u_2 \in E_{S_2}^{\alpha_2}$ , and outputs an encoding of the pair  $(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2, S)$  if  $S_1 = S_2 = S$  and outputs  $\perp$  otherwise.*
- *Negation:  $\text{Sub}_\mathcal{E}$  takes as input the public parameters  $\text{pp}$  and encodings  $u_1 \in E_{S_1}^{\alpha_1}, u_2 \in E_{S_2}^{\alpha_2}$ , and outputs an encoding of the pair  $(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2, S)$  if  $S_1 = S_2 = S$  and outputs  $\perp$  otherwise.*
- *Multiplication:  $\text{Mult}_\mathcal{E}$  takes as input the the public parameters  $\text{pp}$  and encodings  $u_1 \in E_{S_1}^{\alpha_1}, u_2 \in E_{S_2}^{\alpha_2}$ , and outputs an encoding of the pair  $(\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2, S_1 \cup S_2)$  if  $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset$  and outputs  $\perp$  otherwise.*
- *Zero testing:  $\text{isZero}_\mathcal{E}$  takes as input the public parameters  $\text{pp}$  and an encoding  $u \in E_S(\alpha)$ , and outputs 1 if and only if  $\alpha = 0$  and  $S$  is the universe set  $[k]$ .<sup>10</sup>*

*Whenever it is clear from the context, to simplify notation we drop the subscript  $\mathcal{E}$  when we refer to the above procedures (and simply call them  $\text{InstGen}, \text{Enc}, \dots$ ).*

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<sup>10</sup>In the candidate scheme given by [GGH13a],  $\text{isZero}$  may not have perfect correctness: the generated instances  $(\text{pp}, \text{sp})$  can be “bad” with some negligible probability, so that there could exist an encoding  $u$  of a nonzero element where  $\text{isZero}(\text{pp}, u) = 1$ . However, these “bad” parameters can be efficiently detected during the execution of  $\text{InstGen}$ . We can thus modify the encoding scheme to simply set  $\text{Enc}(\text{pp}, e) = e$  whenever the parameters are “bad” (and appropriately modify  $\text{Add}, \text{Sub}, \text{Mult}$  and  $\text{isZero}$  so that they operate on “unencoded” elements. This change ensures that, for every  $\text{pp}$ , including “bad” ones, the zero test procedure  $\text{isZero}$  works with perfect correctness. We note that since bad parameters occur only with negligible probability, this change does not affect the security of the encodings.

In known candidate constructions [GGH13a, CLT<sup>+</sup>13], encodings are “noisy” and the noise level increases with each operation; the parameters, however, are set so that any  $\text{poly}(n, k)$  operations can be performed without running into trouble. For convenience of notation (and just like all other works in the area), we ignore this noise issue.<sup>11</sup>

Note that the above procedures allow algebraic operations on the encodings in a restricted way. Given the public parameters and encodings made under the sets  $\vec{S}$ , one can only perform algebraic operations that are allowed by the structure of the sets in  $\vec{S}$ . We call such operations  $\vec{S}$ -respecting and formalize this notion as follows:

**Definition 8** (Set Respecting Arithmetic Circuits). *For any sequence  $\vec{S}$  of subsets of  $[k]$ , we say that an arithmetic circuit  $C$  (i.e. gates perform only ring operations  $\{+, -, \cdot\}$ ) is  $\vec{S}$ -respecting if it holds that*

- *Every input wire of  $C$  is tagged with some set in  $\vec{S}$ .*
- *For every  $+$  and  $-$  gate in  $C$ , if the tags of the two input wires are the same set  $S$  then the output wire of the gate is tagged with  $S$ . Otherwise the output wire is tagged with  $\perp$ .*
- *For every  $\cdot$  gate in  $C$ , if the tags of the two input wires are sets  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  and  $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset$  then the output wire of the gate is tagged with  $S_1 \cup S_2$ . Otherwise the output wire is tagged with  $\perp$ .*
- *It holds that the output wire is tagged with the universe set  $[k]$ .*<sup>12</sup>

*We say that a circuit  $C$  is weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting if all the above conditions hold except the last, that is, the output wire may be tagged with some set  $T \subseteq [k]$ , where  $T$  is not necessarily equal to  $[k]$ . We say that  $C$  is non terminal  $\vec{S}$ -respecting if  $T$  is a strict subset of  $[k]$ .*

### 3.2 Semantical Security

We now turn to defining semantical security of graded encoding schemes. Towards explaining our notion of semantical security, let us first consider a “DDH-type” assumption for (asymmetric) multilinear encodings, similar in spirit to the “graded DDH” assumption of Garg et al [GGH13a] (which was in the context of symmetric multilinear encodings, whereas we here consider asymmetric ones). Consider a distribution  $D$  sampling  $n$  random elements  $\vec{z}$ , and let  $m_0 = \prod_{i \in [n]} z_i$  be the product of the elements in  $\vec{z}$ , and  $m_1 = z'$  be just a random element. A DDH-type assumption—let us refer to it as the “asymmetric graded DDH assumption (aGDDH)” —would require that encodings of  $m_0, \vec{z}$  and  $m_1, \vec{z}$  under the sets  $S, \vec{T}$  are indistinguishable as long as (a)  $S$  is the target set  $[k]$ , and (b)  $S$  is not the disjoint union of the sets in  $\vec{T}$ ; that is, the set-restrictions prohibit “legally” multiplying all the elements of  $\vec{z}$  and subtracting them from  $m_0$  or  $m_1$ .  $\vec{z}$ .

Note that for any such sets  $S, \vec{T}$ , the particular (joint) distribution  $D$  over  $m_0, m_1, \vec{z}$  has a nice “zero-knowledge” property w.r.t. to the set of  $(S, \vec{T})$ -respecting circuits: for every  $(S, \vec{T})$ -respecting circuit  $C$ ,  $\text{isZero}(C(\cdot))$  is *constant* over  $(m_b, \vec{z})$ ,  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  with overwhelming probability: that is, there exists some bit  $c$  such that with overwhelming probability over  $m_0, m_1, \vec{z} \leftarrow D$ ,  $\text{isZero}(C(m_b, \vec{z})) = c$  for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ . To see this, note that any such  $\text{isZero}(C(m, \vec{z}))$  function is of the form  $\text{isZero}(a \cdot m + p(\vec{z}))$  where  $p(\cdot)$  is a polynomial of degree at most  $n - 1$ . If  $a = 0$  and  $p(\cdot)$  is the zero-polynomial, then clearly the function evaluates to 1. If either  $a = 1$  or  $p(\cdot)$  is a non-zero polynomial, then no matter whether  $m = m_0$  or  $m = m_1$ ,  $\text{isZero}(C(\cdot, \cdot))$  is evaluating a non-zero polynomial of degree at most  $n$  at a random point; by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, with overwhelming probability (proportional to the field size), both these polynomials will evaluate to a non-zero value, and thus the zero-test will output 0.

<sup>11</sup>The above definition can be easily generalized to deal with the candidates by only requiring that the above conditions hold when  $u_1, u_2$  have been obtained by  $\text{poly}(n, k)$  operations.

<sup>12</sup>For ease of notation, we assume that the description of a set  $S$  also contains a description of the universe set  $[k]$ .

We refer to any distribution  $D$  satisfying the above “zero-knowledge property” as being *valid* w.r.t.  $S, \vec{T}$ . We formalize this notion through what we refer to as a  $(S, \vec{T})$ -*respecting message sampler*. As mentioned in the introduction, for our purposes, we need to consider a more general setting where  $m_0, m_1$ , and  $S$  are replaced by *constant-length* vectors  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{S}$ ; for generality, we provide a definition that considers arbitrary length vectors of messages.

**Definition 9** (Respecting Message Sampler). *Let  $\mathcal{E}$  be a graded encoding scheme, and  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be an ensemble of pairs of sequences of sets over  $[k_n]$ . We say that a nuPPT  $M$  is a  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler (or valid w.r.t.  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ) if*

- $M$  on input  $1^n$  and a public parameter  $\mathbf{pp}$  computes the ring  $R$  associated with  $\mathbf{pp}$  and next based on only  $1^n$  and  $R$  generates and outputs a pair  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1)$  of sequences of  $|S_n|$  ring elements and a sequence  $\vec{z}$  of  $|T_n|$  ring elements;
- There exists a polynomial  $Q(\cdot, \cdot)$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , every  $(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp})$  in the support of  $\text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k_n})$ , every  $(\vec{S}, \vec{T})$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C$ , there exists a constant  $c \in \{0, 1\}$  such that for any  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$\Pr[(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) : \text{isZero}(C(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})) = c] \geq 1 - Q(n, k_n)/|R|.$$

Let us comment that Definition 9 allows the message sampler  $M$  to select  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  based on the ring  $R = \mathbb{Z}_p$ ; note that this is needed even to model the aGDDH assumption (or else we could not define what it means to pick a uniform element in the ring). On the other hand, to make the notion of valid message samplers as restrictive as possible, we prevent the message selection from depending on  $\mathbf{pp}$  in any other way. Looking ahead, this restriction makes the notion somewhat nicer behaved; see Lemma 7.

We can now define what it means for a graded encoding scheme to be semantically secure. Roughly speaking, we require that encodings of  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  under the sets  $(\vec{S}, \vec{T})$  are indistinguishable as long as  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  is sampled by a message sampler that is valid w.r.t.  $(\vec{S}, \vec{T})$ .

**Definition 10** (Semantic Security). *Let  $\mathcal{E}$  be a graded encoding scheme and  $q(\cdot)$  and  $c(\cdot)$  be polynomials. We say a graded encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}$  is  $(c, q)$ -semantically secure if for every polynomial  $k(\cdot)$ , every ensemble  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  where  $\vec{S}_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n$  are sequences of subsets of  $[k(n)]$  of length  $c(k(n))$  and  $q(k(n))$  respectively, for every  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -set-respecting message sampler  $M$  and every nuPPT adversary  $A$ , there exists a negligible function  $\epsilon$  such that for every security parameter  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,*

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{Output}_0(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{Output}_1(1^n) = 1]| \leq \epsilon(n)$$

where  $\mathbf{Output}_b(1^n)$  is  $A$ 's output in the following game:

- Let  $(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k(n)})$ .
- Let  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp})$ .
- Let  $\vec{u}_b \leftarrow \{\text{Enc}(\mathbf{sp}, \vec{m}_0[i], \vec{S}_n[i])\}_{i=1}^{c(k(n))}, \{\text{Enc}(\mathbf{sp}, \vec{z}[i], \vec{T}_n[i])\}_{i=1}^{q(k(n))}$ .
- Finally, run  $A(1^n, \mathbf{pp}, \vec{u}_b)$ .

We say that  $\mathcal{E}$  is (constant-message) semantically secure if it is  $(O(1), O(k))$ -semantically secure; we say that  $\mathcal{E}$  multi-message semantically secure if it is  $(O(k), O(k))$ -semantically secure. We additionally say that  $\mathcal{E}$  is subexponentially-hard semantically secure if there exists some constant  $\alpha > 0$  such that for every nuPPT  $A$  the above indistinguishability gap is bounded by  $\epsilon(n) = 2^{-O(n^\alpha)}$ .<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>We could also have considered an even stronger notion where the adversary  $A$  is allowed to be of subexponential-size; this will not be needed for our result, but may be useful in other contexts.



In analogy with the GDDH assumption, our notion of semantical security restricts to the case when the number of elements encoded is  $O(k)$ . As the following lemma (whose proof is delegated to Appendix C) shows, any such encoding scheme can be modified to one that is secure as long as the number of elements in  $\vec{z}$  is (a-priori) polynomially bounded.

**Lemma 7.** *Let  $c, \epsilon$  be constants and let  $\mathcal{E}$  be a  $(c, k^\epsilon)$ -semantically secure encoding scheme. Then for every polynomial  $q(k)$  there exists a  $(c, q(k))$ -semantically secure encoding scheme.*

Also, note that our notion of semantical security requires that security holds w.r.t. to *any* polynomial multilinearity parameter  $k(\cdot)$ ; again, this is without loss of generality: Any encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}$  that is semantically secure when restricting to  $k(n) < n$  can be turned into a new scheme  $\mathcal{E}'$  that is (full-fledged) semantically secure, by simply letting  $\text{InstGen}'(1^n, 1^k) = \text{InstGen}(1^{n+k}, 1^k)$ .

Finally, one may also consider a notion of *unbounded* semantical security (that is provably stronger than semantical security)<sup>14</sup> which requires that  $\mathcal{E}$  is  $(O(1), q(k))$ -semantically secure for *every* polynomial  $q(k)$ ; this notion is not needed for our results.

Let us end this section by remarking that (sub-exponentially hard) semantical security trivially holds against polynomial-time “generic” attackers that are restricted to “legally” operating on the encodings—in fact, it holds even against *unbounded* generic attackers that are restricted to only making polynomially (or even subexponentially) many zero-test queries: recall that each legal zero-test query is constant with overwhelming probability (whether we operate on  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  or  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ ) and thus by a Union Bound, the output of any generic attacker restricted to polynomially many zero-test queries is also constant with overwhelming probability; see Section 7 for a formal statement.

**Semantical Security w.r.t. Restricted Classes of Message Samplers** For our specific construction of indistinguishability obfuscators it suffices to assume the existence of *semantically secure encodings w.r.t. restricted classes of message samplers*  $M$ , where the  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting condition on  $M$  is replaced by some stronger restriction on  $M$ . In particular, it suffices to restrict to message samplers  $M$  that induce a *high-entropy* distribution over  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ —not only the individual elements have high min-entropy but also any element computed by applying a “non-terminal” sequence of legal arithmetic operations to  $\vec{m}_b, \vec{z}$  (for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ). More precisely, we say that a  $M$  is a *H-entropic*  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler if  $M$  is  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting, where the sets  $S_n$  and  $T_n$  are over the universe set  $[k_n]$  and additionally:

- For every security parameter  $n$ , every  $\text{pp} \in \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k_n})$  describing a ring  $R$ , every non-terminal  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C$  that computes a non-zero polynomial in its inputs, it holds that for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$H_\infty(C(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})) \geq H(\log |R|)$$

where  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \text{pp})$ .

We here focus on “very” high entropy message samplers, where  $H(n) = n - O(\log n)$ , and refer to such message samplers as simply *entropic*  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler (or entropically valid), and refer to encoding schemes satisfying semantical security w.r.t. such restricted message samplers as *entropic semantically secure*.

Additionally, for our purposes, we may consider semantic security with respect to even more restricted types of message samplers  $M$  and sets  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$ . In particular, where: (1) Each individual element sampled is statistically close to a uniform ring element; (2) Elements sampled are “almost” pair-wise independent: each pair of elements encoded is statistically close to two uniform ring elements;

<sup>14</sup>Any semantically secure encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}$  can be modified into a new encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}'$  that still is semantically secure but not unbounded semantically secure. Simply let each encoding additionally release a random share of a secret-sharing of  $\text{sp}$ . If few shares are released (i.e.,  $\vec{z}$  is small) security is untouched, but if many shares are released security is trivially broken.

(3) The sets contained in the sequences  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n$  are pairs of indices  $\{i, j\}$ ,  $i, j \in [k_n]$ . Properties 1, 2 are natural abstractions of what happens in the GDDH assumption (property 2 is a relaxation of the independence, as opposed to just pair-wise independence, property satisfied by the GDDH assumption). Property 3 implies that (if we consider a arithmetic circuit) exactly  $k/2$  multiplications on the elements must be performed before a zero-testing can be done; combined with the above entropic message sampler condition, this implies that any set-respecting arithmetic circuit of multiplicative degree smaller than  $k/2$  produces a high-entropy element when applied to the sampled elements.<sup>15</sup>

## 4 Our $i\mathcal{O}$ Construction

In this section, we describe our construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator  $i\mathcal{O}$ . We will prove its security in Section 5 based on the existence multilinear encodings schemes that satisfy entropic semantical security. In Section 6 we show how to modify the construction to base it on a single (falsifiable) instance of entropic semantical security; this time, however, we require subexponentially-hard semantical security.

As in previous works [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b, BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>13], the strategy for our construction will be to convert an  $\text{NC}^1$  circuit into an oblivious matrix branching program, apply Kilian’s randomization technique to the matrices, and then encode these matrices using the graded encoding scheme. The encoding will be using a so-called “straddling set system” (as in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]) that will enforce that any arithmetic circuit operating on these encodings can be decomposed into a sum of terms such that each term can be expressed using only encodings that come from one branch of the branching program (more specifically, from the path through the branching program corresponding to evaluating a particular input  $x$  to the branching program).

The biggest change from previous work is that before randomizing and encoding the branching program, we double its width by chaining a dummy branching program to it that computes the constant 1, and then add a branch at the very start that chooses whether to use the true program or the dummy, based on a “switch”.

At a high level, to show indistinguishability of obfuscations of  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ , our strategy will be to obfuscate the branching program for  $C_1$  together with the dummy, and then, matrix by matrix, replace the dummy branching program with the branching program for  $C_2$ . Once the entire dummy branching program has been replaced by  $C_2$ , we flip the “switch” so that the composite branching program now computes the branching program for  $C_2$ . We then replace the branching program for  $C_1$  with  $C_2$ , matrix by matrix, so that we have two copies of the branching program for  $C_2$ . We now flip the “switch” again, and finally restore the dummy branching program, so that we end up with one copy of  $C_2$  and one copy of the dummy.

In this way, we transition from an obfuscation of  $C_1$  to an obfuscation of  $C_2$ , while only changing a small piece of the obfuscation in each step, namely a single level of the underlying branching program. We will later show, in the following section, that each step of the transitions must be indistinguishable based on our hardness assumption. In particular, we show that no algebraic adversary can distinguish between two hybrids, and thus the two distributions should be computationally indistinguishable based on our assumption.

### 4.1 Merging Branching Programs

We now describe a method `Merge` for combining two branching programs together to create a composite branching program of double width, in a way that enables switching by changing only a small number of matrices.

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<sup>15</sup>We thank Shai Halevi for this observation (and more generally for suggesting that we consider the output of low-degree arithmetic circuits as an alternative to our entropic condition.).

**Construction 1** (Merging branching programs). Let  $BP_0 = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}^0, B_{i,1}^0\}_{i=1}^m$  and  $BP_1 = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}^1, B_{i,1}^1\}_{i=1}^m$  be oblivious matrix branching programs, each of width  $w$  and length  $m$  for  $n$  input bits. (We assume that the same labelling function  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$  is used for each of  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$ , and this is without loss of generality because we can add extra dummy levels so that this property holds.)

Define branching programs  $\widehat{BP}_0 = \{\text{inp}'(i), \hat{B}_{i,0}^0, \hat{B}_{i,1}^0\}_{i=1}^{m+2}$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1 = \{\text{inp}'(i), \hat{B}_{i,0}^1, \hat{B}_{i,1}^1\}_{i=1}^{m+2}$ , each of width  $2w$  and length  $m+2$  on  $l$  input bits, where:

$$\text{inp}'(i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} 1, & \text{when } i = 1 \\ \text{inp}(i-1), & \text{when } 2 \leq i \leq m+1 \\ 1, & \text{when } i = m+2 \end{cases}$$

and, for all levels except the first and the last,  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  agree, given by:

$$\hat{B}_{i,b}^0 = \hat{B}_{i,b}^1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} B_{(i-1),b}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & B_{(i-1),b}^1 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{for all } 2 \leq i \leq m+1 \text{ and } b \in \{0,1\}$$

and the first and last levels are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{B}_{1,b}^0 &= \hat{B}_{m+2,b}^0 = I_{2w \times 2w} && \text{for } b \in \{0,1\} \\ \hat{B}_{1,b}^1 &= \hat{B}_{m+2,b}^1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & I_{w \times w} \\ I_{w \times w} & 0 \end{pmatrix} && \text{for } b \in \{0,1\} \end{aligned}$$

We define  $\text{Merge}$  so that  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0) = \widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1) = \widehat{BP}_1$ .

We will show that  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  are matrix branching programs that compute the same functions as  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  respectively, with the additional feature that  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  differ from each other in only two levels, namely the first and the last. Further, since  $\text{inp}'$  does not depend on the function being computed,  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  are *oblivious* matrix branching programs.

Accordingly, with respect to  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)$  we will often use the phrase *active branching program* to refer to  $BP_b$ .

**Claim 8.** For  $BP_0 = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}^0, B_{i,1}^0\}_{i=1}^m$  and  $BP_1 = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}^1, B_{i,1}^1\}_{i=1}^m$  each of width  $w$  and length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits, define  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  as above. Then, for each  $b \in \{0,1\}$ ,  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ ,

$$\prod_{i=1}^{m+2} \hat{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^b = \begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^b & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^{1-b} \end{pmatrix}$$

*Proof.* We observe that  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  agree on each level except the first and last, that is,

$$\hat{B}_{i,b}^0 = \hat{B}_{i,b}^1 = \begin{pmatrix} B_{(i-1),b}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & B_{(i-1),b}^1 \end{pmatrix} \quad \forall \quad i : 2 \leq i \leq m+1, \quad b \in \{0,1\}$$

Then we have, for any  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{i=2}^{m+1} \hat{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^0 &= \prod_{i=2}^{m+1} \hat{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^1 = \prod_{i=2}^{m+1} \begin{pmatrix} B_{(i-1),x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & B_{(i-1),x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^1 \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^m \begin{pmatrix} B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Where the change of indices in the second step follows because  $\text{inp}'(i) = \text{inp}(i-1)$  when  $2 \leq i \leq m+1$ . We now consider the two case for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ .

**Case 1: ( $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{0}$ )**

In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{i=1}^{m+2} \widehat{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^0 &= I_{2w \times 2w} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot I_{2w \times 2w} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

as required.

**Case 2: ( $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{1}$ )**

In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{i=1}^{m+2} \widehat{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^1 &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 & I_{w \times w} \\ I_{w \times w} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 0 & I_{w \times w} \\ I_{w \times w} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 \\ \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 0 & I_{w \times w} \\ I_{w \times w} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^1 & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^0 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

as required. □

**Claim 9.** For all  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  each of width  $w$  and length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits, for each  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , for all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

$$\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)(x) = BP_b(x)$$

*Proof.* Let  $BP_0 = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}^0, B_{i,1}^0\}_{i=1}^m$  and  $BP_1 = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}^1, B_{i,1}^1\}_{i=1}^m$ . Define  $\widehat{BP}_0 = \text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1 = \text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$  as above. We observe that for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)(x) = 1 \\ \iff &\left( \prod_{i=1}^{m+2} \widehat{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}'(i)]}^b \right) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_1 \\ \iff &\begin{pmatrix} \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^b & 0 \\ 0 & \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^{1-b} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_1 \quad (\text{from Claim 8}) \\ \iff &\left( \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}^b \right) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_1 \\ \iff &BP_b(x) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Thus  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)(x) = BP_b(x)$ . □

The following claim illustrates some useful properties of the **Merge** procedure that we will use later. Firstly it notes that changing the bit **Merge** gets as input changes only the “switch” matrices in the first and last level of the program **Merge** outputs. Secondly, changing one level of a program **Merge** gets as input changes the output program in one level only. Finally, the first column of the output matrix of the widened program output by **Merge** depends only on the first column of the output matrix of the active program. The claim follows by observing the definition of **Merge**.

**Claim 10.** Let  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  be length  $m$ , width  $w$  branching programs, with input length  $n$ .

- $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$  differ in only 4 matrices, the matrices corresponding to the first and last level.
- Let  $BP'_1$  be a length  $m$  branching program that differs from  $BP_1$  in only the  $i^{\text{th}}$  level for some  $i \in [m]$ . Then for both  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP'_1, b)$  also differ only in the  $i^{\text{th}}$  level. A similar statement holds for branching programs  $BP'_0$  that differ from  $BP_0$  in only one level.
- For any  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , let  $BP = \text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, b)$ , and  $P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(\cdot)$  and  $P_{\text{out}}^{BP_b}(\cdot)$  be the functions computing the output matrices on a given input for  $BP$  and  $BP_b$  respectively. Then for every input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

$$\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP_b}(x)))$$

where  $\text{extend}$  extends a length  $w$  vector by appending  $w$  zeroes to the end.

## 4.2 Randomizing Branching Programs

We now describe Kilian's randomization technique [Kil88] for a branching program, adapted to our setting, by defining a process  $\text{Rand}$  that randomizes the matrices of a branching program  $BP$ . We will decompose the randomization into two parts,  $\text{Rand}^B$  and  $\text{Rand}^\alpha$ , defined below, and define  $\text{Rand}$  as their composition.

**Definition 11** ( $\text{Rand}^B$ ). Let  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^m$  be a branching program of width  $w$  and length  $m$ , with length- $n$  inputs. Let  $p$  be a prime exponential in  $n$ . Then the process  $\text{Rand}^B(BP, p)$  samples  $m$  random invertible matrices  $R_1, R_2, \dots, R_m \in Z_p^{w \times w}$  uniformly and independently, and computes

$$\tilde{B}_{i,b} = R_{(i-1)} \cdot B_{i,b} \cdot R_i^{-1} \quad \text{for every } i \in [m], \text{ and } b \in \{0, 1\}$$

where  $R_0$  is defined as  $I_{w \times w}$ , and

$$\mathbf{t} = R_m \cdot \mathbf{e}_1$$

$\text{Rand}^B$  then outputs

$$(\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}, p)$$

**Definition 12** ( $\text{Rand}^\alpha$ ). Let  $(\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}, p)$  be the output of  $\text{Rand}^B(BP, p)$  as defined above. On this input,  $\text{Rand}^\alpha(\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, p)$  samples  $2m$  non-zero scalars  $\{\alpha_{i,b} \in Z_p : i \in [m], b \in \{0, 1\}\}$  uniformly and independently, and outputs

$$(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$$

**Definition 13** ( $\text{Rand}$ ). Let  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^m$  be a branching program of width  $w$  and length  $m$ , with length- $n$  inputs. Let  $p$  be a prime exponential in  $n$ . Then we define  $\text{Rand}(BP, p)$  to be:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Rand}(BP, p) &= (\text{Rand}^\alpha(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) \\ &= (\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \end{aligned}$$

Where  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$  are as computed in the executions of  $\text{Rand}^\alpha$  and  $\text{Rand}^B$ .

**Execution of a randomized branching program:** To compute  $BP(x)$  from the output of  $\text{Rand}(BP, p)$ , given some input labelling function  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ , and  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , we compute

$$\text{Out}(x) = \left( \prod_{i=1}^m \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \right) \cdot \mathbf{t}$$

Where  $\text{Out} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^w$  is a  $w \times 1$  vector. The intermediate multiplications cause each  $R_i^{-1}$  to cancel each  $R_i$ , and  $R_0 = I_{w \times w}$ , so the above computation can also be expressed as:

$$\text{Out}(x) = \left( \prod_{i=1}^m \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \cdot B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \right) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1$$

When  $BP(x) = 1$ , we have that

$$\prod_{i=1}^m \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \cdot B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \left( \prod_{i=1}^m \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \right) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1$$

When  $BP(x) = 0$ , we have that

$$\prod_{i=1}^m \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \cdot B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \left( \prod_{i=1}^m \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} \right) \cdot \mathbf{e}_k$$

for  $k \neq 1$ . Hence, to compute  $BP(x)$ , we compute  $\text{Out}(x)$  and output 0 if  $\text{Out}(x)[1] = 0$ , and 1 otherwise.

**Simulating a randomized branching program:** Previous works ([BGK<sup>+</sup>13, BR14]) followed [Kil88] to show how to simulate the distribution of any single path corresponding to an input  $x$  using just  $BP(x)$ . However, the simulator required that branching programs have unique accept and reject matrices  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{accept}}$  and  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{reject}}$ .

We would also like a theorem, along the lines of [Kil88], that shows that any single path through a randomized branching program  $BP$  corresponding to an input  $x$  can be simulated knowing just the accept/reject behavior of  $BP$  on  $x$  (i.e. by knowing whether  $BP(x) = 1$ ).

In our setting, however, branching programs only meet the relaxed requirement that the output matrix  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)$  computed by evaluating  $BP$  on input  $x$  satisfies  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1 = \mathbf{e}_1 \iff BP(x) = 1$ . There can thus be multiple accept and reject matrices, and the particular accept or reject matrix output by  $BP$  can depend both on  $x$  and on the specific implementation of  $BP$  (and not simply its accept/reject behavior). In contrast, in previous works, because  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{accept}}$  and  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{reject}}$  were unique, knowing just the accept/reject behavior of  $BP$  on  $x$  also determines  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)$ .

What we will show is that, for the particular randomization scheme chosen above, we can simulate any single path through a randomized branching program  $BP$  corresponding to an input  $x$  without knowing the exact accept/reject matrix  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)$ , but rather just knowing the first column  $\mathbf{p}_{\text{out}}(x) = \text{col}_1(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x))$ .

This will be sufficient for our applications, because the class of branching programs we randomize will have the property that there are fixed columns  $\mathbf{p}_{\text{accept}} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^w$  and  $\mathbf{p}_{\text{reject}} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^w$  such that for all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , if  $BP(x) = 1$  then  $\text{col}_1(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)) = \mathbf{p}_{\text{accept}}$ , and if  $BP(x) = 0$  then  $\text{col}_1(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)) = \mathbf{p}_{\text{reject}}$ . In the case of such programs,  $\text{col}_1(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x))$  is determined solely by  $BP(x)$ , and not the particular implementation of  $BP$ . Thus, for these programs, we can simulate given only  $BP(x)$ .

Before we show this theorem, we define notation for a path through a branching program corresponding to an input  $x$ .

**Definition 14** ( $\text{proj}_x$ ). Let  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$  be an input labelling function, and, for any  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ , define  $\text{proj}_x$ , relative to  $\text{inp}$ , such that for any branching program  $BP$  with labelling function  $\text{inp}$ , for any prime  $p \in \mathbb{N}$ , and for any  $(\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}^B(BP, p)$

$$\text{proj}_x(\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = (\{\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t}),$$

that is,  $\text{proj}_x$  selects the elements from  $(\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$  used when evaluating input  $x$ .

We now show a version of Kilian's theorem, adapted to our construction.

**Theorem 11.** *There exists an efficient simulator  $\text{KSim}$  such that the following holds. Let  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i \in [m]}$  be a width- $w$  branching program of length  $m$  on  $n$  bit inputs, and  $p$  a prime exponential in  $n$ . Let  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  be an input to  $BP$ , and let  $b_i = x[\text{inp}(i)]$  for each  $i \in [m]$ . Let  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x) = \prod_{i=1}^m B_{i,b_i}$  denote the matrix obtained by evaluating  $BP$  on  $x$ , and let  $\mathbf{p}_{\text{out}}(x) = \text{col}_1(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x))$  denote the first column of this output. Let  $\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))$  be defined respecting the labelling function  $\text{inp}$ . Then  $\text{KSim}(1^m, p, \mathbf{p}_{\text{out}}(x))$  is identically distributed to  $\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))$ .*

*Proof.* We begin by defining  $\text{KSim}(1^m, p, BP(x))$  as follows:

- For each  $i$ ,  $\text{KSim}$  selects  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$  to be a uniformly random invertible matrix in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{w \times w}$ .
- $\text{KSim}$  selects  $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^w$  solving

$$\left( \prod_{i \in [m]} \tilde{B}_{i,b_i} \right) \cdot \mathbf{t} = \mathbf{p}_{\text{out}}(x) \tag{1}$$

where  $b_i = x[\text{inp}(i)]$  for each  $i$ .

- $\text{KSim}$  outputs  $\{\{\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t}\}$

We want to show that the distribution output by  $\text{KSim}$  matches the real distribution of  $\{\{\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t}\}$  in the output of  $\text{Rand}^B(BP, p)$ . But from [Kil88], we have the following:

**Claim 12.** *The distribution of  $\{\{\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, R_m\}$  can be exactly sampled given  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)$ , by sampling  $\{\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}\}_{i \in [m]}$ ,  $R_m$  to be uniformly random and independent invertible matrices in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{w \times w}$  subject to*

$$\left( \prod_{i \in [m]} \tilde{B}_{i,b_i} \right) \cdot R_m = \mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x) \tag{2}$$

The above claim implies the following:

**Claim 13.** *The distribution of  $\{\{\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, R_m\}$  can be sampled by independently choosing each  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$  uniform and invertible, and fixing  $R_m$  solving equation (2).*

*Proof.* This follows because for every choice of invertible  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$ , there exists  $R_m$  solving equation (2) given by

$$R_m = \left( \prod_{i \in [m]} \tilde{B}_{i,b_i} \right)^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x) \tag{3}$$

Further, every solution to equation (2) can be represented as invertible  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$ , and an  $R_m$  solving equation (3). Thus choosing a random solution to equation (2) corresponds to independently choosing each  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$  uniformly and invertible, and fixing  $R_m$  solving equation (3).  $\square$

From the above argument, we have that the distribution of  $\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$  is exactly the same as the distribution produced by independently choosing each  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$  uniform and invertible, fixing  $R_m$  solving equation (3), setting  $\mathbf{t}$  to be the first column of  $R_m$ , and outputting  $\{\{\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t}\}$ . But note that each column  $\text{col}_i(R_m), i \in [w]$  is the unique solution to

$$\left( \prod_{i \in [m]} \tilde{B}_{i,b_i} \right) \cdot \text{col}_i(R_m) = \text{col}_i(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x))$$

Thus we have that each  $\tilde{B}_{i,b_i}$  is independent, uniform, and invertible, and, using  $i = 1$ ,  $\mathbf{t}$  is the unique solution to

$$\left( \prod_{i \in [m]} \tilde{B}_{i,b_i} \right) \cdot \mathbf{t} = \mathbf{p}_{\text{out}}(x)$$

and, in particular, that  $\mathbf{t}$  is determined by *only* the first column of  $\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x)$ . Thus, we see that the distribution of  $\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))$  is exactly the same as that output by  $\text{KSim}$ .  $\square$

### 4.3 Choosing a Set System

In this section we will describe how to choose a collection of sets under which to encode a randomized branching program using the graded encoding scheme. Our selection of sets will closely follow [BGK<sup>+</sup>13], in that we use straddling set systems. However, one difference is that while they use dual input branching programs, we restrict our attention to single-input schemes. As a consequence, the sets will be simpler and consist of fewer elements.

We first define straddling set systems.

**Definition 15** (Straddling Set Systems [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]). *A straddling set system with  $n$  entries is a collection of sets  $\mathbb{S}_n = \{S_{i,b} : i \in [n], b \in \{0, 1\}\}$  over a universe  $U$ , such that:*

$$\bigcup_{i \in [n]} S_{i,0} = \bigcup_{i \in [n]} S_{i,1} = U$$

and for every distinct non-empty sets  $C, D \subseteq \mathbb{S}_n$ , we have that if:

1. (Disjoint Sets:)  $C$  contains only disjoint sets.  $D$  contains only disjoint sets.
2. (Collision:)  $\bigcup_{S \in C} S = \bigcup_{S \in D} S$

Then it must be that  $\exists b \in \{0, 1\}$  such that:

$$C = \{S_{j,b}\}_{j \in [n]} \quad , \quad D = \{S_{j,(1-b)}\}_{j \in [n]}$$

Informally, the guarantee provided by a straddling set system is that only way to exactly cover  $U$  using elements from  $\mathbb{S}_n$  is to use either all sets  $\{S_{i,0}\}_{i \in [n]}$  or all sets  $\{S_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}$ . We use a slight variant of their construction, choosing  $U$  to be  $[2n]$ , each  $S_{i,0}$  to be one of  $\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}, \dots, \{2n-1, 2n\}$ , and each  $S_{i,1}$  to be one of  $\{1, 2n\}, \{2, 3\}, \{4, 5\}, \dots, \{2n-2, 2n-1\}$ .<sup>16</sup> By a proof exactly following [BGK<sup>+</sup>13], we have that this construction is a straddling set system.

**Theorem 14** (Following Construction 1 in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]). *For every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , there exists a straddling set system  $\mathbb{S}_n$  with  $n$  entries, over a universe  $U$  of  $2n$  elements; furthermore, each set in the straddling set system has size exactly two.*

<sup>16</sup>In the construction of [BGK<sup>+</sup>13],  $U = [2n-1]$ , and each  $S_{i,0}$  is one of  $\{1\}, \{2, 3\}, \dots, \{2n-2, 2n-1\}$ , and each  $S_{i,1}$  is one of  $\{1, 2\}, \{3, 4\}, \dots, \{2n-1\}$ . We could have also worked with this construction, but modify it slightly to ensure that all encodings are under sets of size exactly two.



We now define the process **SetSystem** which takes as input the length  $m$  of a branching program, the number of input bits  $n$ , and the input labelling function  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$  for a branching program. **SetSystem** will output the collection of straddling set systems that we will use to encode any branching program of length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits, with labelling function  $\text{inp}$ .

**Execution of  $\text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp})$ :**

We let  $n_j$  denote the number of levels that inspect the  $j$ th input bit in  $\text{inp}$ . That is,

$$n_j = |\{i \in [m] : \text{inp}(i) = j\}|$$

For every  $j \in [n]$ , **SetSystem** chooses  $\mathbb{S}^j$  to be a straddling set system with  $n_j$  entries over a set  $U_j$ , such that the sets  $U_1, \dots, U_n$  are disjoint. Let  $U = \bigcup_{j \in [n]} U_j$ . **SetSystem** then chooses  $S_t$  be a set of two elements<sup>17</sup>, disjoint from  $U$ . We associate the set system  $\mathbb{S}^j$  with the  $j$ 'th input bit of the branching program corresponding to  $\text{inp}$ . **SetSystem** then re-indexes the elements of  $\mathbb{S}^j$  to match the steps of the branching program as described by  $\text{inp}$ , so that:

$$\mathbb{S}^j = \{S_{i,b} : \text{inp}(i) = j, b \in \{0, 1\}\}$$

By this indexing, we also have that  $S_{i,b} \in \mathbb{S}^{\text{inp}(i)}$  for every  $i \in [m]$ , for every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ .

Let  $k = |U \cup S_t|$ , and WLOG, assume that the  $U^j$ s and  $S_t$  are disjoint subsets of  $[k]$  (otherwise **SetSystem** relabels the elements to satisfy this property).

**SetSystem** then outputs

$$k, \quad \{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \quad S_t$$

#### 4.4 Obfuscating Branching Programs

In this section, we will describe a process **Obf** that obfuscates a given branching program  $BP$ . This process will use **Rand** and **SetSystem** as subroutines. The output of **Obf** will be a randomized width-10 oblivious matrix branching program, encoded under the graded encoding scheme.

**Description of  $\text{Obf}(BP)$  :**

**Input.** **Obf** takes as input an oblivious permutation branching program  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^m$  of width  $w$  and length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits.

**Choosing sets.** **Obf** runs  $\text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp})$  and receives  $k, \{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m+2], b \in \{0,1\}}, S_t$ .

**Initializing the GES.** **Obf** runs  $\text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^k)$  and receives secret parameters  $\text{sp}$  and public parameters  $\text{pp}$  which describe a  $(k, R)$ -graded encoding scheme. We assume the ring  $R$  is equal to  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  for some  $p$  exponential in  $n$  and  $k$ .

**Randomizing BP.** **Obf** executes  $\text{Rand}(BP, p)$ , and obtains its output,  $\{\{\text{inp}(i), \alpha_{i,0} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,0}, \alpha_{i,1} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,1}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t}\}$

**Output.** **Obf** outputs:

$$\text{pp}, \quad \{\text{inp}(i), \quad \text{Enc}(\text{sp}, \alpha_{i,0} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,0}, S_{i,0}), \quad \text{Enc}(\text{sp}, \alpha_{i,0} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,0}, S_{i,1})\}_{i \in [m]}, \quad \text{Enc}(\text{sp}, \mathbf{t}, S_t)$$

We also define a generic version of **Obf**, which we refer to as **GObf**. Its output will be used to initialize an oracle  $\mathcal{M}$  for the idealized version of the graded encoded scheme.  $\text{GObf}(BP, \text{pp})$  acts

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<sup>17</sup>We make this choice to ensure that every set in the output of **SetSystem** consists of exactly two indices  $\{i, j\}$  for  $i, j \in [k]$

exactly as  $\text{Obf}(BP)$ , except that it works with a fixed public parameter  $\mathbf{pp}$  supplied as input, and in the **Output** step,  $\text{GObf}$  outputs

$$\mathbf{pp}, \quad \{\text{inp}(i), (\alpha_{i,0} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,0}, S_{i,0}), (\alpha_{i,1} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,1}, S_{i,1})\}_{i \in [m]}, \quad (\mathbf{t}, S_t)$$

that is, the output before it is encoded under the multilinear encoding scheme.

#### 4.5 Putting it all together: Obfuscating $\text{NC}^1$ circuits

We now define our indistinguishability obfuscator  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ , as follows (by Lemma 5, this implies  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\text{NC}^1$ ):

**Description of  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C)$  :**

1.  $i\mathcal{O}$  verifies that input  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n^1$  (that is,  $C$  is a circuit with size at most  $n$  and depth at most  $\log(n)$ ), and aborts otherwise.
2.  $i\mathcal{O}$  uses Barrington's Theorem to convert  $C$  into an oblivious width 5 permutation branching program. It pads this branching program as follows: First, it increases the number of input bits to the branching program to  $n$ . Next, it adds dummy levels to the end of the branching program until its length is the same as the longest branching program for a circuit in  $\mathcal{C}_n^1$  (which is  $O(4^{\log(n)}) = O(n^2)$ ). Then, for every level in the branching program, it replaces it with  $n$  dummy levels that read every bit of the input in sequential order, inserting the original level into the corresponding position in this sequence.

This procedure ensures that every padded branching program for a circuit in  $\mathcal{C}_n^c$  has the same length, same number of input bits, and the same input labelling function  $\text{inp}$  as the padded branching program for any other circuit in  $\mathcal{C}_n^1$ . Let the padded branching program be  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^m$ .

3.  $i\mathcal{O}$  generates a dummy width-5 branching program  $I = \{\text{inp}(i), I_{5 \times 5}, I_{5 \times 5}\}_{i=1}^m$  of length  $m$ , where each permutation matrix at each level is the identity matrix.  $i\mathcal{O}$  then computes  $\widehat{BP} = \text{Merge}(BP, I, 0)$ .
4.  $i\mathcal{O}$  outputs  $\text{Obf}(\widehat{BP})$ , which yields the public parameter  $\mathbf{pp}$  for the graded encoding scheme, together with the encoded branching program  $\{\text{inp}(i), \text{Enc}(\alpha_{i,0} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,0}, S_{i,0}), \text{Enc}(\alpha_{i,1} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,1}, S_{i,1})\}_{i \in [m+2]}, \text{Enc}(\mathbf{t}, S_t)$ .

**Correctness of  $i\mathcal{O}$ :** In order to compute the output of  $C(x)$  given its obfuscation  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C)$ , we perform matrix multiplication on the encoded matrices using the functions **Add** and **Mult** of the graded encoding scheme. That is, letting  $b_i = x[\text{inp}(i)]$  for each  $i \in [m+2]$ , we compute the encoding of

$$\text{Out}(x) = \left( \prod_{i=1}^{m+2} \alpha_{i,b_i} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b_i} \right) \cdot \mathbf{t}$$

and perform  $\text{isZero}$  on the encoding of  $\text{Out}(x)[1]$  (Note we can only evaluate this expression if it is  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, but we will show that it is momentarily). From the correctness of the underlying randomized branching program, we have that  $C(x) = 0 \iff \text{Out}(x)[1] = 0$ . Thus,  $i\mathcal{O}$  is correct as long as the above computation is a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit.

Note that when multiplying two matrices  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  encoded under  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  respectively, the multiplication is  $\vec{S}$ -respecting as long as  $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset$ . Thus it suffices to show that the sets encoding the matrices being multiplied, namely:

$$S_{1,b_1}, \quad S_{2,b_2}, \quad \dots, \quad S_{m+2,b_{m+2}}, \quad S_t$$

are all disjoint, and that their union is  $[k]$ .

Disjointness follows by observing that each of  $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n, B_t$  is disjoint, and further that for each  $j \in [n]$ , for any  $i, i'$  such that  $\text{inp}(i) = \text{inp}(i') = j$ , we have that  $b_i = b_{i'} = x[\text{inp}(i)]$  and  $S_{i,b_i}$  and  $S_{i',b_{i'}}$  are both elements of the straddling set system  $\mathbb{S}^{\text{inp}(i)}$ , so  $S_{i,b_i} \cap S_{i',b_{i'}} = \emptyset$ .

To show that the union of the sets is  $[k]$ , we note that

$$\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{m+2} S_{i,b_i}\right) \cup S_t = \left(\bigcup_{j=1}^n \bigcup_{i:\text{inp}(i)=j} S_{i,x[j]}\right) \cup S_t = \left(\bigcup_{j=1}^n U_j\right) \cup S_t = [k]$$

by construction. Thus we have that  $i\mathcal{O}$  is correct.

## 5 Proof of Security

**Theorem 15.** *Assume the existence of an entropic semantically secure multilinear encoding scheme. Then there exists indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$ .*

*Proof.* We show that the obfuscator defined in Section 4 is an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ . By Lemma 5, this suffices to show the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\text{NC}^1$ . Assume for contradiction that there exists a nuPPT distinguisher  $D$  and polynomial  $p$  such that for infinitely many  $n$ , there exist functionally equivalent circuits  $C_n^0, C_n^1 \in \mathcal{C}_n^1$  such that  $D$  distinguishes  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^1)$  with advantage  $1/p(n)$ . For any  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , let  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  be the branching programs of length  $m = \text{poly}(n)$  obtained by applying Theorem 6 to the circuits  $C_n^0$  and  $C_n^1$  respectively, and padding them so they have the same length and same input labelling function.

We organize the proof in three parts. In the first part we show that if  $D$  distinguishes between obfuscations of  $C_n^0$  and  $C_n^1$  then there exists “widened” branching programs  $BP$  and  $BP'$  that differ in only few matrices and evaluate the same function such that  $D$  distinguishes between  $\text{Obf}(BP)$  and  $\text{Obf}(BP')$ . Furthermore, the first column of the output matrix is the same for  $BP$  and  $BP'$ , and depends only on the output of the program. More concretely, there exist vectors  $v_0$  and  $v_1$  such that for all inputs  $x$  the first column of the output matrix for both  $BP$  and  $BP'$  is always  $v_{BP(x)}$ .

In the second part, we apply the semantic security of the graded encoding scheme used. In particular, we construct a message sampler  $M$  which samples  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  such that  $\text{Obf}(BP)$  is simply the encoding of  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $\text{Obf}(BP')$  is the encoding of  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$ . In the third part, we show that if  $BP$  and  $BP'$  agree on all inputs, then the message sampler  $M$  is valid in the sense of Definition 9 and therefore  $D$  breaks the semantic security of the encoding scheme used, hence a contradiction.

### 5.1 Setting up $BP$ and $BP'$ via a Hybrid Argument

Let  $\text{Hyb}_i$  be a procedure that takes an input two length  $m$  branching programs  $P_0$  and  $P_1$  (with the same labeling function) and outputs a “hybrid” length  $m$  branching program whose first  $i$  levels are identical to the first  $i$  levels of  $P_0$  and all the other levels are identical to those of  $P_1$ . Formally, let  $P_0 = \{\text{inp}(j), B_{j,0}, B_{j,1}\}_{j \in [m]}$  and  $P_1 = \{\text{inp}(j), B'_{j,0}, B'_{j,1}\}_{j \in [m]}$ .

$$\text{Hyb}_i(P_0, P_1) = \{\text{inp}(j), B_{j,0}, B_{j,1}\}_{j=1}^i, \{\text{inp}(j), B'_{j,0}, B'_{j,1}\}_{j=i+1}^m$$

For every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  we define hybrid distributions in the following way.

- We start with  $H_0$  which is the obfuscation of the circuit  $C_n^0$ .

$$H_0 = i\mathcal{O}(c, 1^n, C_n^0) = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, I, 0))$$

- For  $i = 1, 2 \dots m$ , let

$$H_i = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, \text{Hyb}_i(BP_1, I), 0))$$

We change, one level at a time, the second branching program  $\text{Merge}$  takes as input from  $I$  to  $BP_1$ .

- We have that  $H_m = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0))$ . We change the “switch” input to  $\text{Merge}$  so that the second branching program  $BP_1$  is active.

$$H_{m+1} = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1))$$

- For  $i = 1, 2 \dots m$ , let

$$H_{m+i+1} = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(\text{Hyb}_i(BP_1, BP_0), BP_1, 1))$$

We change the first program  $\text{Merge}$  takes as input from  $BP_0$  to  $BP_1$ , one level at a time as before.

- We have that  $H_{2m+1} = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP_1, 1))$ . We switch back so that the first program is active (which in this case is the same as the second program  $BP_1$ )

$$H_{2m+2} = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP_1, 0))$$

- For  $i = 1, 2 \dots m$ , let

$$H_{2m+i+2} = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, \text{Hyb}_i(I, BP_1), 0))$$

We change the second program  $\text{Merge}$  takes as input from  $BP_1$  to  $I$ , one level at a time as before. Finally we get

$$H_{3m+2} = i\mathcal{O}(c, 1^n, C_n^1) = \text{Obf}(\text{Merge}(BP_1, I, 0))$$

which is the obfuscation of the circuit  $C_n^1$ .

Recall that by assumption  $D$  distinguishes between  $\{i\mathcal{O}(c, 1^n, C_n^0)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\{i\mathcal{O}(c, 1^n, C_n^1)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ . That is, there is a polynomial  $p$  such that for infinitely many  $n$

$$|Pr[D(1^n, H_0) = 1] - Pr[D(1^n, H_{3m+2})]| > 1/p(n)$$

By the above hybrid argument,  $D$  must distinguish between a pair of consecutive hybrids. That is, there exists some  $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, 3m+1\}$  such that

$$|Pr[D(1^n, H_i) = 1] - Pr[D(1^n, H_{i+1})]| > 1/4mp(n)$$

We now show that  $H_i$  and  $H_{i+1}$  can be expressed as the  $\text{Obf}(BP)$  and  $\text{Obf}(BP')$  respectively where  $BP$  and  $BP'$  are (widened) branching programs that differ in only two levels and agree on all inputs. Furthermore, both  $BP$  and  $BP'$  have the property that for all inputs  $x$  the first column of the output matrix  $\text{col}_1(\mathbf{P}_{\text{out}}(x))$  is the same for  $BP$  and  $BP'$ , and depends only on the output of these programs on  $x$ . More formally,

**Claim 16.** *There exist branching programs  $BP$  and  $BP'$  of length  $m' = m + 2$  and width 10 such that*

- $H_i = \text{Obf}(BP)$  and  $H_{i+1} = \text{Obf}(BP')$ .
- $BP$  and  $BP'$  differ in at most 2 levels.
- For all  $x$ ,  $BP(x) = BP'(x)$ .

- Let  $P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(\cdot)$  and  $P_{\text{out}}^{BP'}(\cdot)$  be the functions computing the output matrices for  $BP$  and  $BP'$  respectively. There exist length 10 vectors  $v_0$  and  $v_1$  such that for every  $x$ ,  $\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP'}(x)) = v_{BP(x)}$

*Proof.* Let  $v_1 = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{accept}}))$  and  $v_0 = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{reject}}))$  where  $P_{\text{accept}}$  and  $P_{\text{reject}}$  are the accepting and rejecting matrices from Theorem 6 for branching programs of input lengths  $n$ , and  $\text{extend}$  extends a length  $w$  vector by appending  $w$  zeroes. We consider three cases: when  $i$  is equal to  $m$ ,  $2m+1$  and otherwise.

**Case 1:  $i = m$ :** By definition of  $H_i$  and  $H_{i+1}$ , the branching programs  $BP$  and  $BP'$  are  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$  respectively. By Claim 10,  $BP$  and  $BP'$  differ in the “switch” matrices, which make up the first and last level. Furthermore,  $BP$  and  $BP'$  compute  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  respectively which are equivalent programs by assumption. It remains to show the fourth condition. By Claim 10, the first column of the output matrix for a widened branching program only depends on the first column of the output matrix of the active program. Hence, for every input  $x$ ,  $\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP_0}(x)))$ . By Theorem 6,  $P_{\text{out}}^{BP_0}(x)$  is either  $P_{\text{accept}}$  or  $P_{\text{reject}}$  depending on the output  $BP_0(x)$ . Therefore, for all inputs  $x$  such that  $BP(x) = 0$ ,

$$\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{reject}})) = v_0$$

Similarly, for all inputs  $x$  such that  $BP(x) = 1$ ,

$$\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{accept}})) = v_1$$

The same argument holds for  $BP'$  too, in which case  $BP_1$  is active and has the same accepting and rejecting permutations  $P_{\text{accept}}$  and  $P_{\text{reject}}$  by Theorem 6. Therefore, for all inputs  $x$ ,

$$\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP'}(x)) = v_{BP_1(x)}$$

Since  $BP_0(x) = BP_1(x) = BP(x)$  for all  $x$ , the claim follows.

**Case 2:  $i = 2m+1$ :** By definition of  $H_i$  and  $H_{i+1}$ , the branching programs  $BP$  and  $BP'$  are  $\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_1, BP_1, 1)$  respectively. As before, these programs differ in the first and level only. Furthermore, both  $BP$  and  $BP'$  compute the same function, as the active program is the same ( $BP_1$ ). Also, directly from Claim 10 and Theorem 6 we have that for all inputs  $x$ ,

$$\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP'}(x)) = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP_1}(x))) = v_{BP_1(x)} = v_{BP(x)}$$

**Case 3:  $i \neq m$  and  $i \neq 2m+1$ :** First, consider the subcase when  $i < m$  or  $i > 2m+1$ . The programs  $BP$  and  $BP'$  are of the form  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, P_i)$  and  $\text{Merge}(BP_0, P_{i+1})$  respectively where  $P_i$  and  $P_{i+1}$  are branching programs that differ only in the  $i+1^{\text{th}}$  level. By Claim 10,  $BP$  and  $BP'$  differ only in the  $i+1^{\text{th}}$  level too. Furthermore, in both  $BP$  and  $BP'$ , the active program is  $BP_0$ . Hence  $BP$  and  $BP'$  compute the same function and similarly as the previous case, we have that for all inputs  $x$ ,

$$\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP}(x)) = \text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP'}(x)) = \text{extend}(\text{col}_1(P_{\text{out}}^{BP_0}(x))) = v_{BP_0(x)} = v_{BP(x)}$$

The case when  $m < i < 2m+1$  follows similarly. This concludes the proof of the claim.  $\square$

This concludes the first part of the proof. At this point we have that there is a polynomial  $p$  such that for infinitely many  $n$  there exist branching programs  $BP$  and  $BP'$  with the properties described in Claim 16 such that

$$|Pr[D(1^n, \text{Obf}(BP)) = 1] - Pr[D(1^n, \text{Obf}(BP'))]| > 1/4mp(n)$$

In the next part we show that the distinguisher  $D$  can be used to break the semantic security game of the graded encoding scheme used by  $\text{Obf}$ .

## 5.2 Applying Semantic Security

Fix  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , and let  $BP = \{\text{inp}(i), B_{i,0}, B_{i,1}\}_{i \in [m']}$  and  $BP' = \{\text{inp}(i), B'_{i,0}, B'_{i,1}\}_{i \in [m']}$ . Let  $l_1, l_2 \in [m]$  be the levels in which  $BP$  and  $BP'$  differ. All other matrices of  $BP$  and  $BP'$  are the same. That is, for every  $i \notin \{l_1, l_2\}, b \in \{0, 1\}$  we have that  $B_{i,b} = B'_{i,b}$ .

Let  $(k, \{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, S_{\mathbf{t}}) = \text{SetSystem}(m', n', \text{inp})$  where  $n'$  is the input length of the branching programs  $BP, BP'$ , and let

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{S}_n &= \{S_{l_1,b}, S_{l_2,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}} \\ \vec{T}_n &= (\{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m']/\{l_1, l_2\}, b \in \{0,1\}}, S_{\mathbf{t}}) \end{aligned}$$

We now define a message sampler  $M$  as follows. When run with security parameter  $1^n$ ,  $M$  gets  $BP$  and  $BP'$  as non-uniform advice. On input  $1^n$ , public parameters  $\text{pp}$  that describe a  $(k, \mathbb{Z}_p)$ -graded encoding scheme,  $M$  samples  $m'$  random invertible  $10 \times 10$  matrices over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ,  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m']}$  and  $2m'$  random scalars from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ,  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m'], b \in \{0,1\}}$ .  $M$  then uses these matrices and scalars to randomize  $BP$  and  $BP'$  as described by  $\text{Rand}(\cdot, p)$  to obtain  $\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m'], b \in \{0,1\}}$ ,  $\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}'_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m'], b \in \{0,1\}}$  and  $\mathbf{t}$ .  $M$  outputs

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{m}_0 &= (\{\alpha_{l_1,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{l_1,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}, \{\alpha_{l_2,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{l_2,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}) \\ \vec{m}_1 &= (\{\alpha_{l_1,b} \cdot \tilde{B}'_{l_1,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}, \{\alpha_{l_2,b} \cdot \tilde{B}'_{l_2,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}) \\ \vec{z} &= (\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m']/\{l_1, l_2\}, b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \end{aligned}$$

We observe that  $D(1^n, \text{Obf}(BP))$  (resp.  $D(1^n, \text{Obf}(BP'))$ ) is simply the output of  $D$  when playing the semantic security game in Definition 10 parameterized by the bit  $b = 0$  (resp.  $b = 1$ ) with the message sampler  $M$  and sets  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$  (as defined above). To see this, observe that the distribution of  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  is identical to  $\text{Rand}(BP, p)$  and the distribution of  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  is identical to  $\text{Rand}(BP', p)$ . When these elements are encoded under sets  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n$  then we obtain the distributions  $\text{Obf}(BP)$  and  $\text{Obf}(BP')$  respectively.

Recall that for infinitely many  $n$ ,

$$|Pr[D(1^n, \text{Obf}(BP)) = 1] - Pr[D(1^n, \text{Obf}(BP'))]| > 1/4mp(n)$$

Since the graded encoding scheme is semantically secure, and  $|\vec{S}_n| \in O(1)$  and  $|\vec{T}_n| \in O(k)$ , it must be that  $M$  is not a  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler. In the remainder of the proof we show that if  $BP$  and  $BP'$  agree on all inputs then  $M$  is a  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler, hence implying a contradiction. Similar statements were shown in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13] and [BR14]. In particular,  $\text{GObf}$  is a simplified version of the obfuscator of [BGK<sup>+</sup>13], which [BGK<sup>+</sup>13] shows is VBB secure against algebraic adversaries. We will follow the structure of the proof in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13], but cannot use it in a black-box way due to the differences in the construction and the fact that their proof only works for branching programs that have unique accepting and rejecting output matrices. The branching programs we consider may not have this property.

## 5.3 Showing that $M$ is a Valid Message Sampler

To prove that  $M$  is a  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler we need to show that there exists a polynomial  $Q$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , every  $(\text{sp}, \text{pp})$  in the support of  $\text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^k)$ , and every  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C$ , there exists a constant  $c \in \{0, 1\}$  such that for any  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$Pr[(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \text{pp}) : \text{isZero}(C(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})) = c] \geq 1 - Q(n, k)/|R|.$$

where  $R$  is the ring associated with  $\text{pp}$ . We show that the result of applying any  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C$  on  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  (resp.  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$ ), can be *simulated* with overwhelming probability given

just  $BP$ . This implies (by a union bound over  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ) that for every such  $C$  there exists some bit  $c$  such that with overwhelming probability  $C(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z}) = c$  for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , and thus  $M$  is  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting. It suffices to show the following lemma and to note that  $BP$  and  $BP'$  are functionally equivalent.

**Lemma 17.** *There exists a Turing machine  $\text{CSim}$  such that for every  $m, n, w \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $v_0, v_1 \in \{0, 1\}^w$ , labeling function  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ , prime number  $p$ , and  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C$  where  $\vec{S} = \text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp})$ , the following holds. For every branching program  $BP$  of length  $m$ , width  $w$  and labeling function  $\text{inp}$  for which on every input  $x$ ,  $\text{col}_1(\text{P}_{\text{out}}(x)) = v_{BP(x)}$  it holds that*

$$\Pr[\text{isZero}(C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))) \neq \text{CSim}^{BP}(1^m, p, C, v_0, v_1)] \leq 32wm/p$$

The proof of the lemma follows the structure of the VBB simulation in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13], appropriately adapted to deal with the fact that our branching programs do not have a unique output by relying on Theorem 11.

*Proof.* Roughly speaking the lemma follows from the property that  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuits, due to the straddling set systems in  $\vec{S}$ , can only evaluate expressions that are “consistent” with some inputs. In particular, following [BGK<sup>+</sup>13], the polynomial evaluated by  $C$  can be expressed as the sum of *single-input terms* where each *single-input term* is a function of elements that are consistent with some single input to the branching program. Next, we rely on Theorem 11 to show that the sum of these single-input terms will depend only on the value of the branching program on these inputs.

The following proposition states that the function a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit computes can be expressed as the sum of several *single-input terms*. This decomposition is very similar to the one shown in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13].<sup>18</sup>

**Proposition 1.** *Fix  $m, n, w \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ . Let  $\vec{S} = \text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp}) = (\{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, S_t)$ , and let  $C$  be any  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit. There exists a set  $X \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  of inputs such that*

(i)

$$C(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \equiv \sum_{x \in X} C_x(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$$

where each  $C_x$  is a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit, whose input wires are labelled only with sets respecting a single input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , that is, only with sets  $\in \{S_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}\}_{i \in [m]} \cup \{S_t\}$ .

(ii) *For each  $C_x$  above, for every branching program  $BP$  of width  $w$  and length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits, with input labelling function  $\text{inp}$ , every prime  $p$ , and every  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}(BP, p)$*

$$C_x(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \alpha_x \cdot p_x(\{\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t})$$

where  $p_x$  is some polynomial, and  $\alpha_x = (\prod_{i \in [m]} \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]})$ . Furthermore, when  $p_x$  is viewed as a sum of monomials, each monomial contains exactly one entry from each  $\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}$ , and one entry from  $\mathbf{t}$ .

The proof of Proposition 1 uses the following lemma:

**Lemma 18.** *Fix  $m, n, w \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ . Let  $\vec{S} = \text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp}) = (\{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, S_t)$ , and let  $C$  be any weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit whose output wire is tagged with  $T \subseteq [k]$ . Then there exists a set  $U \subseteq \{0, 1, *\}^m$  such that for every branching program  $BP$  of width  $w$  and length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits, with input tagging function  $\text{inp}$ , every prime  $p$ , and every  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}(BP, p)$ ,*

<sup>18</sup>The key difference is that [BGK<sup>+</sup>13] proves such a decomposition for “dual-input” branching program, and use the “dual-input” property to show that there are only polynomially many terms in the decomposition.

(i)

$$C(\{\alpha_{i,b}\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \equiv \sum_{u \in U} C_u(\{\alpha_{i,b}\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$$

where each  $C_u$  is a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit, whose input wires are tagged only with sets  $\in \{S_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *}\cup \{S_t\}$ , and whose output wire is tagged with  $T$ .

(ii) Each  $C_u$  above is the sum of several “monomial” circuits, where each monomial circuit performs only multiplications of elements in  $(\{\alpha_{i,b}\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$ , is weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, and has output wire tagged with  $T$ .

(iii) For each  $C_u$  above,

$$C_u(\{\alpha_{i,b}\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \alpha_u \cdot p_u(\{\tilde{B}_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *}, \mathbf{t})$$

where  $p_u$  is some polynomial, and  $\alpha_u = (\prod_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *} \alpha_{i,u[i]})$ . Furthermore, when  $p_u$  is viewed as a sum of monomials, each monomial contains exactly one entry from each  $\tilde{B}_{i,u[i]}$  such that  $u[i] \neq *$ , and possibly one entry from  $\mathbf{t}$ . Further,  $p_u$  can be computed by a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire is tagged with  $T$ .

The lemma can be proved using a simple induction. We provide a complete proof of the lemma in Appendix B. Given this lemma, the proof of Proposition 1 is as follows:

*Proof. Part (i)* We consider the special case of Lemma 18 part (i), in which  $C$  is  $\vec{S}$ -respecting (as opposed to only weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting). In this case, we have that each  $C_u$  in the decomposition of  $C$  is also  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, and in particular, each  $C_u$  for  $u \in U$  has its output wire tagged with the universe set  $[k]$ .

We first observe that for any  $C_u$  in the decomposition of  $C$ ,  $u$  cannot contain  $*$ . This is because the output of  $C_u$  is tagged with  $[k]$ , and thus must have at least one input wire tagged with either of  $S_{i,0}$  or  $S_{i,1}$  for each  $i$ , or else the straddling set  $\mathbb{S}^{\text{inp}(i)}$  will be incomplete, and thus the output wire cannot be tagged with  $[k]$ .

Further, we observe that for every  $u \in U$ , for every  $j \in [n]$ , there must be a bit  $b_j \in \{0,1\}$  such that for every  $i \in [m]$  such that  $\text{inp}(i) = j$ ,  $u[i] = b_j$ . This can be seen by considering any monomial circuit in  $C_u$  individually. Recall from Lemma 18 part (ii) that  $C_u$  is formed by summing some number of monomial circuits, each of which is  $\vec{S}$ -respecting and has output wire tagged with  $[k]$ . This means that  $\mathbb{S}^j \subseteq [k]$  is covered by the elements of the monomial. However, since  $\mathbb{S}^j$  is constructed as a straddling set, the only way to cover  $\mathbb{S}^j$  in a monomial circuit that only contains multiplication gates, is by using either all sets from  $\{S_{i,0} : \text{inp}(i) = j\}_{i \in [m]}$  or all sets from  $\{S_{i,1} : \text{inp}(i) = j\}_{i \in [m]}$ . This means, correspondingly, that  $u$  must be such that there is a bit  $b_j \in \{0,1\}$ , for every  $i \in [m]$  such that  $\text{inp}(i) = j$ ,  $u[i] = b_j$ . Define  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  so that  $x[j] = b_j$  for all  $j \in [n]$ . In this way, we can define a one-to-one correspondence from each  $u \in U$  to corresponding  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ , and we simply relabel each  $C_u$  to the corresponding  $C_x$  to get the desired decomposition of  $C$ . We observe that the additional conditions on each  $C_x$  can be achieved from the corresponding conditions on  $C_u$  as guaranteed by Lemma 18.

**Part (ii)** Part (ii) follows directly from Part (i) of this proposition, together with Lemma 18 part (iii), and the observation that each  $C_u$  in Lemma 18 is relabelled to  $C_x$  for some  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  in Part (i) of this proposition.  $\square$

Now we are ready to describe the simulator CSim. CSim gets as input  $1^m$ , prime  $p$ , a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit  $C$ , vectors  $v_0, v_1$  and has oracle access to a length  $m$  branching program  $BP$ . Let  $X$  be the set of inputs and  $\{p_x\}_{x \in X}$  be the single-input polynomials corresponding to the decomposition of  $C$ . For



every  $x \in X$ , CSim queries  $BP$  on  $x$ , samples  $d_x \leftarrow \text{KSim}(1^m, p, v_{BP(x)})$  and checks whether  $p_x(d_x) = 0$ . CSim outputs 1 if and only if for every input  $x \in X$ ,  $p_x(d_x) = 0$ .

Now we prove correctness of our simulation. First, we prove some claims that will be useful. In each of these claims, let  $\text{proj}_x$  be defined with respect to the labeling function  $\text{inp}$  of the branching program  $BP$ . The following claim states that if  $C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$  is always zero, then every single-input term is always zero.

**Claim 19.** *If  $\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] = 1$  then for every input  $x \in X$ ,*

$$\Pr[p_x(\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] = 1$$

*Proof.* Consider a fixed  $d = (\{\tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$  in the support of  $\text{Rand}^B(BP, p)$  and let  $C_d(\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}) = C(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$ . By Proposition 1, we know that

$$C_d(\{\alpha_{i,b}\}) = \sum_{x \in X} \left( \prod_{i \in [m]} \alpha_{i, \text{inp}(i)} \right) p_x(\text{proj}_x(d))$$

and  $C_d$  is a degree  $m + 2$  polynomial. By assumption,  $C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$  is always zero (over the support of  $\text{Rand}(BP, p)$ ); hence,  $C_d(\{\alpha_{i,b}\}) = 0$  for all non-zero  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}$ . By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, this can happen only if  $C_d$  is the zero polynomial. By the structure of  $C_d$ , this implies that for every  $x \in X$ ,  $p_x(\text{proj}_x(d)) = 0$ . This argument works for every fixed value of  $d$ , hence we have that for every  $x \in X$ ,  $\Pr[p_x(\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] = 1$ .  $\square$

The next claim states that if  $C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$  is not always zero, then it is zero with small probability. Furthermore, there exists a single-input term that is zero with small probability.

**Claim 20.** *For any  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit  $C$ , if  $\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1$  then the following holds.*

1.  $\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] \leq 16wm/p$
2. *There exists  $x \in X$  such that  $\Pr[p_x(\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] \leq 16wm/p$ , where  $X$  is obtained from the decomposition of  $C$  by Proposition 1.*

*Proof.* We start by showing part 1.

**Part 1:** If  $\text{Rand}(BP, p) = \text{Rand}^\alpha(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))$  can be expressed as a low-degree ( $\leq 2w$ ) polynomial on uniformly random values in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ —namely, the  $\alpha$ 's and the randomization matrices  $R_i$ 's—then by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the first part of the claim directly follows. However, there are two barriers to applying this argument:

- $\text{Rand}^B$  does not sample uniformly random matrices  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}$ ; rather, it chooses uniformly random *invertible* matrices  $R_i$ . Similarly,  $\text{Rand}^\alpha$  does not sample uniformly random  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$ ; rather, it chooses uniformly random *non-zero*  $\alpha_{i,b}$ .
- $\text{Rand}^B$  also needs to compute inverses  $R_i^{-1}$  to  $R_i$  for every  $i \in [m]$  (which may no longer be expressed as low degree polynomials in the matrices  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}$ ).

To handle the second issue, consider the distribution  $\text{Rand}_{\text{adj}}^B(BP, p)$  that is defined exactly as  $\text{Rand}^B(BP, p)$  except that for every  $i \in [m]$  it uses  $\text{adj}(R_i) = R_i^{-1} \det(R_i)$  instead of  $R_i^{-1}$ . Note that every entry of the adjoint of a  $w \times w$  matrix  $M$  is some cofactor of  $M$  (obtained by the determinant of the  $w - 1 \times w - 1$  matrix obtained by deleting some row and column of  $A$ ). Hence every entry of  $\text{adj}(R_i)$  can be expressed as a degree  $w$  polynomial in  $R_i$ . Let  $\text{Rand}_{\text{adj}}(BP, p) = \text{Rand}^\alpha(\text{Rand}_{\text{adj}}^B(BP, p))$ . It follows that  $\text{Rand}_{\text{adj}}(BP, p)$  is computed by degree (at most)  $2w$  polynomial in the matrices  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}$  and scalars  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$ .

Furthermore, we show that  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = 0] = Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0]$ . Recall that by Proposition 1,

$$C \equiv \sum_{x \in X} C_x$$

and for each  $C_x$  above and every  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}(BP, p)$ ,

$$C_x(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \alpha_x \cdot p_x(\{\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t})$$

where  $\alpha_x = (\prod_{i \in [m]} \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]})$  and  $p_x$  is a polynomial such that, when viewed as a sum of monomials, each monomial contains exactly one entry from each  $\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}$ , and one entry from  $\mathbf{t}$ . Recall that for every  $i \in [m]$ ,

$$\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} = R_{i-1} B_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]} R_i^{-1}$$

For every  $i \in [m]$ , replacing  $R_i^{-1}$  with  $adj(R_i)$  has the effect of multiplying each monomial in  $p_x$  with the scalar  $det(R_i)$ . Hence

$$C_x(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = (\prod_{i \in [m]} det(R_i)) \cdot C_x(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$$

Since  $C$  is the sum of such  $C_x$  terms, it holds that  $C(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = (\prod_{i \in [m]} det(R_i)) C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$ . For every  $i \in [m]$ , by invertibility,  $det(R_i) \neq 0$  and hence

$$Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = 0] = Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0]$$

So far, we have that  $\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)$  is computed by a degree  $2w$  polynomial in the matrices  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}$  and scalars  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$ . However the first issue remains: each  $R_i$  is uniformly random invertible and each  $\alpha_{i,b}$  is uniformly random non-zero, whereas we need them to be uniformly random. Consider the distribution  $\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)$  that is obtained by the computing the same polynomial on uniformly random matrices  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}$  and scalars  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$  over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . In Claim 29, we show that the statistical distance between  $\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)$  and  $\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)$  is at most  $8wm/p$ . Furthermore, the support of  $\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)$  contains the support of  $\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)$ . This implies that if  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1$  then  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1$ .

We now turn to proving the statement of the claim. Using facts shown above, we have that

$$Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1 \implies Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1 \implies Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1$$

By Proposition 1,  $C$  evaluates a  $m+1$  degree polynomial, and  $\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)$  is computed by a degree  $2w$  polynomial in uniformly random values in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma,

$$Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1 \implies Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)) = 0] \leq 2w(m+1)/p \leq 8wm/p$$

We have that the statistical distance between  $\text{Rand}_{adj,U}(BP, p)$  and  $\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)$  is at most  $8wm/p$ . Therefore,  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] = Pr[C(\text{Rand}_{adj}(BP, p)) = 0] \leq 16wm/p$  thus proving the first part of the claim. We proceed to show part 2.

**Part 2:** By Proposition 1, for every  $x \in X$ , there exists a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C_x$  such that for every  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}(BP, p)$ ,

$$C_x(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \alpha_x \cdot p_x(\{\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t})$$

where  $\alpha_x = (\prod_{i \in [m]} \alpha_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]})$  and  $C = \sum_{x \in X} C_x$ . In particular,  $p_x(\{\tilde{B}_{i,x[\text{inp}(i)]}\}_{i \in [m]}, \mathbf{t}) = 0$  iff  $C_x(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = 0$  (since  $\alpha_{i,b}$  is non-zero).

Thus, we have that

$$Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] = Pr[C_x(\text{Rand}^\alpha(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] = Pr[p_x(\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0]$$

There must exist an input  $x \in X$  such that  $Pr[C_x(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1$  or else  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] = 1$ . By the first part of the claim, it follows that

$$Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] \leq 16wm/p,$$

which concludes the proof.  $\square$

Now we analyze the correctness of the simulator  $\text{CSim}$ . We consider the following two cases: when  $C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))$  is always zero, and otherwise.

**Case 1:**  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] = 1$ : In this case we will show that the simulation always succeeds. If  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] = 1$  then by Claim 19, for every  $x \in X$ ,  $Pr[p_x(\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] = 1$ . Recall that  $\text{KSim}(1^m, p, v_{BP(x)})$  simulates  $\text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))$  perfectly. Therefore,  $\text{CSim}$  always outputs 1 and hence succeeds.

**Case 2:**  $Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = 0] < 1$ : In this case, by the first part of Claim 20 we have that

$$Pr[\text{isZero}(C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))) = 1] \leq 16wm/p$$

By the perfect simulation of  $\text{KSim}$ , we have that

$$Pr[\text{CSim}^{BP} = 1] = Pr[\forall x (d_x \leftarrow \text{proj}_x(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p)) : p_x(d_x) = 0)]$$

By second part of Claim 20 there exists input  $x_C$  such that  $Pr[p_{x_C}(\text{proj}_{x_C}(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] \leq 16wm/p$ . Therefore,

$$Pr[\text{CSim}^{BP} = 1] \leq Pr[p_{x_C}(\text{proj}_{x_C}(\text{Rand}^B(BP, p))) = 0] \leq 16wm/p$$

Therefore, by a union bound we have that

$$Pr[\text{isZero}(C(\mathcal{D})) = \text{CSim}^{BP} = 0] > 1 - 32wm/p$$

This concludes the proof of the lemma.  $\square$

$\square$

$\square$

## 5.4 Restricting to Entropic Message Samplers

We here show that the message sampler  $M$  satisfies the required high-entropy condition (required by the notion of entropic semantical security); that is,  $M$  is entropically valid.

Recall that the message sampler  $M$  in the proof of Theorem 15 gets as input the description of a ring  $R = \mathbb{Z}_p$  and samples  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  such that  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  are the “randomizations” (as defined in the description of  $\text{Rand}$ ) of fixed branching programs. We now show the following proposition, which combined with the fact that the length  $m$  of the branching programs is polynomial in  $\log |R|$  (recall that  $R = \mathbb{Z}_p$  where  $p$  is a prime exponential in the multilinearity parameter  $k$  which is  $< 3m$ ), implies that the output of a non-terminal set-respecting circuit on input  $(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})$  (for both  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ) has min-entropy  $\log |R| - O(\log \log |R|)$ , as required.

**Proposition 2.** *Let  $BP$  be a branching program of length  $m$ , width  $w$ , input length  $n$  and input labeling function  $\text{inp}$ . Let  $p$  be a prime and  $\vec{S} = \text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp})$ . Let  $C$  be a non-terminal  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit that computes a non-zero polynomial. Then we have that*

$$H_\infty(C(\text{Rand}(BP, p))) \geq \log\left(\frac{p}{12wm}\right)$$

or equivalently, for any fixed output  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

$$\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = a] \leq 12wm/p$$

*Proof.* Let  $T$  be the set that tags the output wire of  $C$  as per the construction given in Definition 8. Since  $C$  is non-terminal  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, we have that  $T$  is a strict subset of  $[k]$  where  $(k, \vec{S}) = \text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp})$ . By Lemma 18 part (iii), there exists a set  $U$  of labels  $u \in \{0, 1, *\}$  such that for every  $(\{\alpha_{j,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}(BP, p)$  we have that

$$C(\{\alpha_{j,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \sum_{u \in U} \alpha_u \cdot p_u(\{\tilde{B}_{j,u[j]}\}_{j \in [m]: u[j] \neq *, \mathbf{t}}) \quad (4)$$

where  $\alpha_u = \prod_{j \in [m]: u[j] \neq *} \alpha_{j,u[j]}$ . Furthermore, each  $p_u$  is computed by a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire is also tagged with  $T$ . Since  $C$  computes a non-zero polynomial, there must exist  $v \in U$  such that  $p_v$  is a non-zero polynomial. We now have the following claim.

**Claim 21.**  $\Pr[p_v(\{\tilde{B}_{j,v[j]}\}_{j \in [m]: v[j] \neq *, \mathbf{t}}) = 0] \leq 10wm/p$ .

*Proof.* To see this, we first observe that since  $T$  is a strict subset of  $[k]$  and  $p_v$  is computed by a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire is tagged with  $T$ , either  $p_v$  does not operate on some level of the branching program or it does not operate on  $\mathbf{t}$ ; that is, either,

- there exists  $j \in [m]$  such that  $v[j] = *$ , or
- $p_v$  is not a function of  $\mathbf{t}$ .

In the first case, by an argument similar to that in Claim 13, we can show that the distribution  $(\{\tilde{B}_{j,v[j]}\}_{j \in [m]: v[j] \neq *, \mathbf{t}})$  is identical to the distribution  $(\{R_j\}_{j \in [m]: v[j] \neq *, \text{col}_1(R_{m+1})})$  where  $\{R_j\}_{j=1}^{m+1}$  are random invertible matrices over  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{w \times w}$ . By Claim 29, this distribution is statistically  $8wm/p$ -close to the distribution where each matrix entry is uniformly random in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . Furthermore, since  $p_v$  is computed by a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit, it is of degree at most  $m+1 < 2wm$ . By the Schwartz Zippel lemma, the evaluation of  $p_v$  on such random inputs from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  is zero with probability at most  $2wm/p$ . All in all, we have  $\Pr[p_v(\{\tilde{B}_{j,v[j]}\}_{j \in [m]: v[j] \neq *, \mathbf{t}}) = 0] \leq 10wm/p$ .

In the second case,  $p_v$  acts on the  $\{\tilde{B}_{j,v[j]}\}_{j \in [m]}$ . Following Claim 13, this distribution is identical to that of  $m$  random invertible matrices over  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{w \times w}$ . Similarly to the first case, it follows that  $\Pr[p_v(\{\tilde{B}_{j,v[j]}\}_{j \in [m]}) = 0] \leq 10wm/p$ .  $\square$

Let  $E$  be the event that  $p_v(\{\tilde{B}_{j,v[j]}\}_{j \in [m]: v[j] \neq *, \mathbf{t}}) \neq 0$ . For any fixed output  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  we have that

$$\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = a] \leq \Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = a | E] + \Pr[\bar{E}] \quad (5)$$

For a fixed  $\{\tilde{B}_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$  let  $q_{(\tilde{B}, a)}$  be a polynomial in variables  $\{\alpha_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$  such that

$$q_{(\tilde{B}, a)}(\{\alpha_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}) = C(\{\alpha_{j,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}) - a$$

When the event  $E$  occurs, we claim that the resulting polynomial  $q_{(\tilde{B}, a)}$  is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most  $m$ . This can be easily seen given the decomposition of  $C$  in (4). When  $q_{(\tilde{B}, a)}$  is a

non-zero polynomial then by the Schwartz Zippel lemma, its evaluation on uniformly random non-zero inputs  $\{\alpha_{j,b}\}_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$  is zero with probability at most  $m/p - 1 \leq 2wm/p$ . Therefore, we have

$$\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = a | E] = \Pr[q_{\vec{B}}(\{\alpha_{j,b}\}) = 0 | E] \leq \frac{2wm}{p} \quad (6)$$

Combining (6) and (5) and Claim 21, we have  $\Pr[C(\text{Rand}(BP, p)) = a] \leq 12wm/p$ .  $\square$

## 5.5 Achieving Obfuscation for Arbitrary Programs

[GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] show that any indistinguishability obfuscation scheme for  $\text{NC}^1$  can be bootstrapped into an indistinguishability obfuscation scheme for all poly-sized circuits using FHE. That is, they prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 22** ([GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]). *Assume the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\text{NC}^1$  and a leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ . Then there exists an indistinguishability obfuscator  $i\mathcal{O}'$  for  $P/\text{poly}$ .*

Applying their construction to our indistinguishability obfuscator yields an indistinguishability obfuscator for arbitrary polynomial size circuits:

**Theorem 23.** *Assume the existence of a entropic semantically secure multilinear encoding scheme and a leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ . Then there exists indistinguishability obfuscators for  $P/\text{poly}$ .*

## 6 $i\mathcal{O}$ from Single-Distribution Semantical Security

The assumption that a scheme satisfies semantical security w.r.t. some class of message samplers may perhaps be best viewed as a *class of assumptions* (or a “meta-assumption”, just like the “uber assumption” of [BBG05]), or alternatively as an *interactive assumption*, where the attacker first selects the sets  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$  and the message sampler  $M$ , and then gets a challenge according to the message sampler.

This view point also clarifies that even for the above-mentioned restricted classes of message distributions, semantical security is not an *efficiently falsifiable* assumption [Nao03]: the problem is that there may not exist an efficient way of checking whether a message sampler is valid (which requires checking that all set-respecting circuits are constant with overwhelming probability).

We here show that a single, falsifiable, instance of this class of assumptions suffices for proving security of indistinguishability obfuscator, albeit at the cost of subexponential hardness.

### 6.1 Single-Distribution Semantical Security

Let us start by formalizing a “single-distribution” version of semantical security, where we restrict semantical security to hold w.r.t. to a single *efficiently samplable* distribution over pairs of message samplers  $M$ , and sets  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$ . We call this distribution over message samplers and sets an *instance sampler*. Analogously to the notion of a valid message sampler, we now define a notion of a *valid instance sampler* as follows:

**Definition 16.** *We say that a PPT  $\text{Sam}$  is a  $(c, q)$ -(entropically) valid instance sampler if*

- *There exist a polynomial  $k(\cdot)$ , such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , for every  $r_n \in \{0, 1\}^\infty$ ,  $\text{Sam}(1^n, r_n)$  outputs a tuple  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n)$ , where  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n$  are sequences of sets over  $[k(n)]$  with  $|\vec{S}_n| = c(k(n))$  and  $|\vec{T}_n| = q(k(n))$ .*

- For every sequence of random tapes  $\{r_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ,  $\{M_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  is (entropically)  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting, where for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n) \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1^n; r_n)$ .

**Definition 17** (Single-distribution Semantic Security). *Let  $\mathcal{E}$  be a graded encoding scheme and  $\text{Sam}$  be a  $(c, q)$ -valid instance sampler. We say that  $\mathcal{E}$  is semantically secure w.r.t.  $\text{Sam}$  if for every nuPPT adversary  $A$ , there exists a negligible function  $\epsilon$  such that for every security parameter  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,*

$$|Pr[\mathbf{Output}'_0(1^n) = 1] - Pr[\mathbf{Output}'_1(1^n) = 1]| \leq \epsilon(n)$$

where  $\mathbf{Output}'_b(1^n)$  is  $A$ 's output in the following game:

- Let  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1^n)$ .
- Let  $k_n$  be such that  $\vec{S}_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n$  are sequences of sets over  $[k_n]$ . Let  $(\text{sp}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k_n})$ .
- Let  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z} \leftarrow M_n(1^n, \text{pp})$ .
- Let  $\vec{u}_b \leftarrow \{\text{Enc}(\text{sp}, \vec{m}_0[i], \vec{S}_n[i])\}_{i=1}^{c(n)}, \{\text{Enc}(\text{sp}, \vec{z}[i], \vec{T}_n[i])\}_{i=1}^{q(n)}$ .
- Finally, run  $A(1^n, \text{pp}, (\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n), M_n, \vec{u}_b)$ .

Note that given an  $(O(1), O(k))$ -valid instance sampler  $\text{Sam}$ , the assumption that  $\mathcal{E}$  is semantically-secure w.r.t.  $\text{Sam}$  is a special case of the assumption that  $\mathcal{E}$  is (constant-message) semantically secure; if  $\mathcal{E}$  is not semantically secure w.r.t.  $\text{Sam}$ , there exists ensembles  $\{r_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ,  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\{M_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  such that  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n = \text{Sam}(1^n; r_n)$  (and thus  $\{M_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  is a valid message sampler for  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ , yet the nuPPT  $A(1^n, \cdot, \vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n, \cdot)$  breaks semantical security when considering  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\{M_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ .

Furthermore, that given an  $(O(1), O(k))$ -(entropically) valid instance sampler  $\text{Sam}$ , the assumption that  $\mathcal{E}$  is semantically-secure w.r.t.  $\text{Sam}$  is a non-interactive and efficiently falsifiable (decisional) assumption—in essence, it is a specific instance of a DDH-type assumption over multilinear encodings.

## 6.2 Basing Security on Single-Distribution Semantical Security

We now show how to slightly modify the construction  $i\mathcal{O}$  from Section 4 so that we can base it on single-distribution semantical security assumption. This time, however, we require subexponentially-hard semantical security (and as such the assumption is incomparable to the one needed for the scheme from Section 4.)

Towards this, we introduce a new technical notion of “random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$ ” and first show that our indistinguishability obfuscator in fact can be proven to satisfy (subexponentially-secure) random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\text{NC}^1$  can be based on (subexponentially-hard) single-distribution semantical security. We next show that subexponentially-secure random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\text{NC}^1$  implies (full-fledged)  $i\mathcal{O}$ .

### 6.2.1 Random-Program $i\mathcal{O}$

Let us first recall a different “merge” procedure from the work of Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14]: Given two  $\text{NC}_1$  circuits  $C_0, C_1$  taking (at most)  $n$ -bit inputs, and a string  $z$ , let  $\widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_0, C_1, z)$  be a circuit that on input  $x$  runs  $C_0(x)$  if  $x \geq z$  and  $C_1(x)$  otherwise. ([BCP14] use this type of merged circuits to perform a binary search and prove that indistinguishability obfuscation implies differing-input obfuscation for circuits that differ in only polynomially many inputs.) Also,  $\widehat{\text{Merge}}$  is defined such that  $\widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_0, C_1, 0) = C_0$  and  $\widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_0, C_1, 2^n) = C_1$ . It is easy to see that an  $\text{NC}_1$  circuit computing  $\widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_0, C_1, z)$  can be efficiently found given  $\text{NC}_1$  circuits  $C_0, C_1$  and  $z$ ; (abusing notation) let  $\widehat{\text{Merge}}$  denote an efficient procedure that outputs such a circuit.

We now define a (rather technical) weaker version of indistinguishability obfuscation—which we refer to as *random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$* —and note that our earlier  $i\mathcal{O}$  construction shows that there exists a

$(O(1), O(k))$ -valid instance sampler **Sam** such that semantically-secure multilinear encodings w.r.t. **Sam** imply random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\mathcal{C}^1$  (recall that  $\mathcal{C}^c = \{\mathcal{C}_n^c\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  where  $\mathcal{C}_n^c$  is the set of circuits that have depth at most  $c \log n$  and size at most  $n^c$ .)

**Definition 18** (Random-Program Indistinguishability Obfuscator). *A uniform PPT machine  $i\mathcal{O}$  is a random-program indistinguishability obfuscator for the class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}^1$  if it satisfies the same correctness condition as in Definition 1 but the security condition is replaced by:*

- **Security:** For every nuPPT adversary  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\epsilon$  such that for all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{EXP}_0(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{EXP}_1(1^n) = 1]| \leq \epsilon(n)$$

where,  $\mathbf{EXP}_b(1^n)$  denotes the output of the following experiment:

- Uniformly sample  $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_n^1$  and  $z \in [0, \dots, 2^n - 1]$ ;
- If  $C_0(z) \neq C_1(z)$ , let  $C_1 = C_0$ ;
- Let  $C'_b = \widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_0, C_1, z + b')$  for  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C'_b)$ ;
- Finally output  $A(1^n, C'_0, C'_1, z, C')$ .

We additionally say that  $i\mathcal{O}$  is exponentially-secure if for every nuPPT  $A$  the above indistinguishability gap is bounded by  $\epsilon(n) = 2^{-O(n^2)}$ .

Note that by definition, the circuits  $C'_0, C'_1$  in the experiment above are always functionally equivalent and thus “standard”  $i\mathcal{O}$  implies random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$ . Furthermore, note that assuming that a scheme satisfies random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$  is a non-interactive assumption that is efficiently falsifiable; this is what enables us to base it on single-distribution semantical security. (We mention a very recent work by Gentry, Lewko and Waters [GLW14] in the context of *witness encryption* [GGSW13] that similarly defines a falsifiable primitive “positional witness encryption” that implies the full-fledged notion with an exponential security loss.)

**Theorem 24.** *There exists an  $(O(1), O(k))$ -entropically valid instance sampler **Sam**, such that if there exists an encoding scheme that is (subexponentially-hard) semantically secure w.r.t. **Sam**, then there exists a (exponentially-secure) random-program indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ .*

*Proof.* Consider the obfuscator  $i\mathcal{O}$  presented in Section 4. We first show that it is a random-program indistinguishability obfuscator based on single-distribution semantical security, and next show how to achieve exponential security assuming subexponentially-hard single-distribution semantical security (and by increasing the security parameter.)

Note that to satisfy random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$ , we only require indistinguishability of obfuscations of the programs  $C'_0, C'_1$  sampled in  $\mathbf{EXP}_b$  (which by definition are functionally equivalent). By the proof in Section 5, in essence, it now follows that we only need to appeal to semantical security w.r.t to an instance sampler **Sam** that samples programs  $C'_0, C'_1$  as in  $\mathbf{EXP}_b$ , samples a random hybrid index  $j$  and outputs sets  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$  and the message sampler  $M$  used in the reduction to semantical security when comparing hybrids  $j$  and  $j + 1$ . More formally, for any circuits  $C'_0$  and  $C'_1$  sampled in  $\mathbf{EXP}_b(1^n)$  from  $\mathcal{C}_n^1$ , let  $c^*$  be the constant such that the sizes and depths of  $C'_0$  and  $C'_1$  are bounded by  $n^{c^*}$  and  $c^* \log(n)$  respectively, and let  $h(n)$  be the number of hybrids in the reduction to semantic security (Section 5) corresponding to  $i\mathcal{O}(c^*, 1^n, C'_0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(c^*, 1^n, C'_1)$ , and let constant  $c$  and polynomials  $k(\cdot)$  and  $q(\cdot)$  be such that  $\vec{S}, \vec{T}$  used in these hybrids of have the sizes  $c$  and  $q(k(n))$  respectively, and are sets over  $[k(n)]$ . Recall that each of these hybrids correspond to one step in the transition from a branching program for  $C'_0$  to a branching program  $C'_1$ , where each step changes at most two levels of the branching program.

(Since  $i\mathcal{O}$  is defined in a “size-preserving” manner, we assume that every pair of circuits  $C'_0$  and  $C'_1$  sampled in  $\mathbf{EXP}_b(1^n)$  use the same number of hybrids and the same sets for those hybrids.) We now define  $\mathbf{Sam}(1^n; r_n)$  as follows: Using random coins  $r_n$ ,  $\mathbf{Sam}$  samples  $C'_0$  and  $C'_1$  as in  $\mathbf{EXP}_b(1^n)$  from  $\mathcal{C}_n^1$ , and chooses a random hybrid index  $j \in [h(n) - 1]$ . Next, it outputs the sets  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$  and message sampler  $M_n$  used in the reduction to semantic security when comparing hybrids  $j$  and  $j + 1$  for programs  $C'_0, C'_1$ .

Note that since each pair of the circuits  $C'_0, C'_1$  sampled in  $\mathbf{EXP}$  are functionally equivalent, by the proof as in Section 5.3 (more specifically, Lemma 17), we have that the messages  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  output by  $M_n$  are such that every  $(\vec{S}, \vec{T})$ -respecting circuit is constant on both  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  and  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ , except with probability at most  $Q(n, k)/|R|$  for some fixed polynomial  $Q(\cdot, \cdot)$ . Thus, for every sequence of random tapes  $\{r_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ,  $\{M_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  is  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting, where for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n = \mathbf{Sam}(1^n; r_n)$ . We conclude that  $\mathbf{Sam}$  is a  $(O(1), O(k))$ -valid instance sampler.

We now show that if  $\mathcal{E}$  is semantically secure with respect to  $\mathbf{Sam}$ , then  $i\mathcal{O}$  is a random-program indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ . Consider some nuPPT attacker  $A$  for the random-program indistinguishability obfuscation security game and define the hybrid experiments  $\mathbf{Hyb}_b^j(1^n)$  for every  $j \in [h(n) - 1]$ , as follows:

- Let  $(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp}) \leftarrow \mathbf{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k(n)})$ .
- For  $r_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\infty$ , let  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n, M_n) \leftarrow \mathbf{Sam}^j(1^n, r_n)$ , where  $\mathbf{Sam}^j(1^n; r_n)$  is the same as  $\mathbf{Sam}(1^n; r_n)$  defined above, except it always chooses hybrid  $j$  (instead of picking the hybrid index at random). Let  $C'_0$  and  $C'_1$  be the circuits underlying  $M_n$ , and  $z$  be the merge index underlying  $M_n$ . (We assume  $M_n$  is defined so that this information is efficiently extractable.)
- Sample  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M_n(1^n, \mathbf{pp})$ .
- Let  $\vec{u}_b \leftarrow \{\mathbf{Enc}(\mathbf{sp}, \vec{m}_0[i], \vec{S}_n[i])\}_{i=1}^c, \{\mathbf{Enc}(\mathbf{sp}, \vec{z}[i], \vec{T}_n[i])\}_{i=1}^{q(k(n))}$ .
- Finally, run  $A(1^n, C'_0, C'_1, z, (\mathbf{pp}, \vec{u}_b))$ .

Observe that  $\mathbf{Hyb}_0^0(1^n) = \mathbf{EXP}_0(1^n)$ ,  $\mathbf{Hyb}_1^{h(n)-1}(1^n) = \mathbf{EXP}_1(1^n)$ , and, for every  $i \in [h(n) - 2]$ ,  $\mathbf{Hyb}_1^i(1^n) = \mathbf{Hyb}_0^{i+1}(1^n)$ . Thus we have a sequence of  $h(n)$  hybrids from  $\mathbf{EXP}_0(1^n)$  to  $\mathbf{EXP}_1(1^n)$ , so if  $A$  distinguishes  $\mathbf{EXP}_0(1^n)$  and  $\mathbf{EXP}_1(1^n)$  with probability  $\epsilon$ , there exists some  $j^*$  such that it distinguishes  $\mathbf{Hyb}_0^{j^*}(1^n)$  and  $\mathbf{Hyb}_1^{j^*}(1^n)$  with probability  $\epsilon/h(n)$ . We now define a nuPPT attacker  $A'$  for semantical security w.r.t.  $\mathbf{Sam}$ : For each  $n$ ,  $A'$  receives as non-uniform advice the index  $j^*$  and proceeds as follows:  $A'(1^n, \mathbf{pp}, (\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n), M_n, \vec{u}_b)$  examines  $M_n$  and extracts  $C'_0, C'_1, z$  and  $j$  from it, and if  $j = j^*$  executes  $A(1^n, C'_0, C'_1, z, (\mathbf{pp}, \vec{u}_b))$ , and otherwise simply outputs 1. Note that if  $j = j^*$ ,  $A'$  has distinguishing advantage  $\epsilon/h(n)$  and otherwise it outputs 1; it follows that  $A'$  total distinguishing advantage is  $\epsilon/h^2(n)$ . It follows that if  $\mathcal{E}$  is entropic semantically secure w.r.t.  $\mathbf{Sam}$  then  $i\mathcal{O}$  is a random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ .

Finally, we observe that relying on subexponentially-hard entropic semantic security w.r.t.  $\mathbf{Sam}$  with constant  $\alpha$ ,  $i\mathcal{O}$  can be modified into an exponentially-secure random-program indistinguishability obfuscator. We change  $i\mathcal{O}$  to simply run the underlying multilinear encoding scheme with security parameter  $n' = n^{2/\alpha}$ . It follows from the above proof that if the advantage of any adversary for the semantic security of the multilinear encoding scheme is bounded by  $2^{-O(n'^\alpha)}$  then the advantage of any adversary for the random-program obfuscation of  $i\mathcal{O}$  is bounded by  $2^{-O(n^2)}$ .  $\square$

**From Random-Program  $i\mathcal{O}$  to Full-Fledged  $i\mathcal{O}$ .** We now show that the existence of exponentially-secure random-program  $i\mathcal{O}$  for the class  $\mathcal{C}^1$  implies the existence of (full-fledged)  $i\mathcal{O}$  for  $\mathbf{NC}^1$ .



**Theorem 25.** *If there exists PPT  $i\mathcal{O}$  that is a exponentially-secure random-program indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ , then there exists a PPT  $i\mathcal{O}'$  that is a subexponentially-secure indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathsf{NC}^1$ .*

*Proof.* Assume the existence of a PPT  $i\mathcal{O}$  that is a exponentially-secure random-program indistinguishability obfuscator for the class  $\mathcal{C}^1$ . We show that  $i\mathcal{O}$  is a (subexponentially-secure) indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathcal{C}^1$ ; by Lemma 5, this suffices for concluding the existence of (subexponentially-secure) indistinguishability obfuscators for  $\mathsf{NC}^1$ .

Assume there exists some nuPPT  $A$  such that for infinitely many  $n$ , there exists a pair of functionally equivalent circuits  $C_n^0, C_n^1 \in \mathcal{C}_n^1$  such that  $A$  distinguishes  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^0)$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^1)$  with probability, say,  $2^{-n}$ . For any such  $n$ , consider a sequence of  $2^n + 1$  hybrid distributions, where

- $H_0 = i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^0) = i\mathcal{O}(1^n, \widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_n^0, C_n^1, 0))$
- $H_i = i\mathcal{O}(1^n, \widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_n^0, C_n^1, i))$  for  $i \in [1, \dots, 2^n - 1]$
- $H_{2^n} = i\mathcal{O}(1^n, C_n^1) = i\mathcal{O}(1^n, \widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_n^0, C_n^1, 2^n))$

There must exist some  $z$  such that  $A$  distinguishes  $H_z$  and  $H_{z+1}$  with advantage at least  $2^{-n} \cdot 2^{-n} = 2^{-2n}$ . Thus, there exists some sequence of programs  $\{C_n^0, C_n^1\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  where  $C_n^0, C_n^1 \in \mathcal{C}_n^c$  and a sequence of inputs  $\{z_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ,  $z_n \in [0, \dots, 2^n - 1]$ , such that for infinitely many  $n$ ,  $A$  distinguishes  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, \widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_n^0, C_n^1, z_n))$  and  $i\mathcal{O}(1^n, \widehat{\text{Merge}}(C_n^0, C_n^1, z_n + 1))$  with advantage  $2^{-2n}$ .

We now construct a nuPPT  $A'$  attacking the random-program indistinguishability property of  $i\mathcal{O}'$ :  $A'$  (non-uniformly) incorporates  $\{C_n^0, C_n^1\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and  $\{z_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  and on input  $1^n, C^0, C^1, z, C$  checks whether for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $C^b = C_n^b$  and  $z = z_n$ ; if so, it outputs  $A(1^n, C)$ , and otherwise it outputs 1. Let us now analyze the success probability of  $A'$ :

- Conditioned on the inputs being “correct” (i.e., for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $C^b = C_n^b$  and  $z = z_n$ ), then  $A'$  distinguishes  $\mathbf{EXP}^0$  and  $\mathbf{EXP}^1$  with advantage  $2^{-2n}$ .
- Conditioned on the inputs not being “correct”,  $A'$ ’s output is 1.

Since the inputs are chosen at random, it follows that  $A'$  has a total distinguishing advantage of at least  $2^{-3n} \cdot 2^{-2n} = 2^{-5n}$ , which contradicts the assumption that  $i\mathcal{O}$  is an exponentially secure random-program indistinguishability obfuscator.  $\square$

Combing the above theorems, we get the following corollary.

**Theorem 26.** *There exists an  $(O(1), O(k))$ -entropically valid instance sampler  $\text{Sam}$ , such that if there exists an encoding scheme that is subexponentially-hard semantically secure w.r.t.  $\text{Sam}$ , then there exists a subexponentially-secure indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathsf{NC}^1$ .*

## 7 Alternative Security Notions for Multilinear Encodings

In this section we consider alternative ways of defining security of multilinear encodings. First, in section 7.1 we show that semantical security holds (in a very strong sense) w.r.t. generic attackers. Next, in section 7.2 we consider various “uber assumptions” (similar to the uber-assumption of [BBG05] in the context of bilinear maps)<sup>19</sup> which capture the intuition that “if a DDH-type assumption holds w.r.t. to generic attacks, then it also holds with respect to nuPPT attackers”. As we shall see the perhaps most natural formalization of this notion is *false* (under standard cryptographic assumptions)—in particular, we give a concrete example of a DDH-type assumption that holds in the generic model but is false w.r.t. nuPPT attackers. We finally consider alternative ways for formalizing such an uber assumption.

<sup>19</sup>We thank Shai Halevi for pointing out the connection with [BBG05].

## 7.1 Semantical Security w.r.t. Algebraic Attackers

We begin by showing that semantic security holds in the generic model. We formally define an *algebraic adversary* (or generic adversary) by considering adversaries that interact with the following oracle.

**Definition 19** (Oracle  $\mathcal{M}$ ). *Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be an oracle which operates as follows:*

- $\mathcal{M}$  gets as initial input a ring  $R$ ,  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and list  $L$  of  $m$  pairs  $\{(\alpha_i, S_i)\}_{i=1}^m$ ,  $\alpha \in R$  and  $S \subseteq [k]$ .
- Every oracle query to  $\mathcal{M}$  is an arithmetic circuit  $C : R^m \rightarrow R$ . When queried with  $C$ ,  $\mathcal{M}$  checks whether  $C$  is a  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit where  $\vec{S} = \{S_i\}_{i=1}^m$ . If not,  $\mathcal{M}$  outputs  $\perp$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{M}$  computes  $C$  on  $\{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^m$  and outputs 1 if and only if the output of  $C$  is zero, and outputs 0 otherwise.

To formalize that (even subexponentially-hard) semantical security holds w.r.t. generic attackers, we define a stronger notion of a set-respecting message samplers—which requires not only that the output of every set-respecting circuit is constant with overwhelming probability, but also that this holds for the output of any *unbounded* algebraic attacker that is restricted to *polynomially-many* zero-test queries—and show that this notion in fact already is implied by the standard one. This shows that semantical security holds in a very strong sense w.r.t. to generic attackers.

**Definition 20** (Strongly Respecting Message Sampler). *We say that a nuPPT  $M$  is a strongly  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler (or strongly valid w.r.t.  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ) if it satisfies the same conditions as in Definition 9 but where the second bullet is replaced by the following:*

- For every polynomial  $p$ , there exists some polynomial  $Q$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , every  $(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp})$  in the support of  $\text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k_n})$ , every (deterministic) oracle algorithm  $A$  that on input  $1^n$  makes at most  $p(n)$  oracle queries, there exists some string  $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^*$  such that

$$\Pr[(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) : A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_0)}(1^n) = A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_1)}(1^n) = \alpha] \geq 1 - Q(n, k_n)/|R|.$$

where  $\vec{p}_b = \{(m_b[i], S_i)\}_{i=1}^{c(n)}, \{(z[i], T_i)\}_{i=1}^{q(n)}$  and  $c(n)$  and  $q(n)$  are the lengths of  $\vec{S}_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n$  respectively.

Note that validity is the special case of strong validity where we restrict to the case when  $p(n) = 1$ .

**Theorem 27.** *A message sampler  $M$  is strongly  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting if and only if it is  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting.*

*Proof.* The "only if" direction is trivial (as mentioned, if  $p(n) = 1$  strong validity collapses down to validity). To prove the "if direction", consider some  $M$ ,  $p(\cdot)$ , security parameter  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp}) \in \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k(n)})$  where  $\mathbf{pp}$  defines a ring  $R$ , and oracle machine  $A$  (the algebraic adversary) such that  $A(1^n)$  makes at most  $p(n)$  oracle queries. From semantic security of  $\mathcal{E}$ , we have that there exists some polynomial  $Q(\cdot, \cdot)$  such that for every  $(\vec{S}, \vec{T})$ -respecting arithmetic circuit  $C$ , there exists a constant  $c_C \in \{0, 1\}$  such that for every  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$\Pr[(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) : \text{isZero}(C(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})) \neq c_C] \leq Q(n, k(n))/|R|$$

For  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , consider an execution of both  $A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_b)}(1^n)$  where  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  are sampled by  $M$ . Note that except with probability  $Q(n, k(n))/|R|$  it holds the first oracle query  $C_1$  by  $A$  is answered as  $c_{C_1}$ . Analogously, if the first  $i$  queries  $C_1, \dots, C_i$  were answered as  $c_{C_1}, \dots, c_{C_i}$ , then except with probability  $Q(n, k(n))/|R|$ , the  $(i+1)$ th query  $C_{i+1}$  will be answered as  $c_{C_{i+1}}$ . It follows that except with probability  $p(n)Q(n, k(n))/|R|$  over  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ , the output of  $A$  is identical to the output of an execution of  $A$  where every oracle query  $C$  is answered by the bit  $c_C$ . Thus, for every algebraic attacker  $A$  there exists some string  $\alpha$ —namely the output of  $A$  where every oracle query  $C$  is answered by  $c_C$ —such that for  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , except with probability  $p(n)Q(n, k(n))/|R|$ , the output of  $A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_b)}(1^n)$  is  $\alpha$ .  $\square$

Note that for the above proof to go through it is crucial that we restrict the algebraic attacker to making polynomially-many (or subexponentially-many) oracle queries. This is not just an anomaly of the proof: if we allow the attacker to make an unbounded number of queries, then strong validity would no longer imply validity; we discuss this point further in Section 7.2.2.

## 7.2 Uber Assumptions for Multilinear Encodings

A natural question is whether there are reasonable qualitative strengthenings of semantical security that can be used to achieve stronger notions of obfuscation, such as differing-input (a.k.a. extractability) obfuscation. We here consider such a strengthening.

At first sight, it may seem like the most natural way of defining security of multilinear encodings would be to require that for specific classes of problems, generic attacks cannot be beaten (this is the approach alluded to in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13]). A natural “uber assumption” (similar to the uber-assumption of [BBG05] in the context of bilinear maps) would be to require that “if a DDH-type assumption holds w.r.t. to generic attacks, then it also holds with respect to nuPPT attackers”. Let us now formalize this notion.

### 7.2.1 Extractable Uber Security

We start by defining a notion of a *computationally valid* message sampler: roughly speaking, we want to capture the intuition that no generic attacker can distinguish  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  from  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$ . To get a definition that is as strong as possible, we require indistinguishability to hold in a *pointwise* sense: with overwhelming probability, the output of  $A^{\mathcal{M}(\text{pp}, \vec{p}_0)}(1^n, \text{pp})$  is required to be the same as the output of  $A^{\mathcal{M}(\text{pp}, \vec{p}_1)}(1^n, \text{pp})$ .

**Definition 21** (Computationally Respecting Message Sampler). *We say that a nuPPT  $M$  is a computationally  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler (or computationally valid w.r.t.  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ) if it satisfies the same conditions as in Definition 9 but where the second bullet is replaced by the following:*

- For every nuPPT oracle machine  $A$ , there exists some negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,

$$\Pr[(\text{sp}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k_n}), (\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \text{pp}) : A^{\mathcal{M}(\text{pp}, \vec{p}_0)}(1^n, \text{pp}) \neq A^{\mathcal{M}(\text{pp}, \vec{p}_1)}(1^n, \text{pp})] \leq \varepsilon(n)$$

where  $\vec{p}_b = \{(m_b[i], S_i)\}_{i=1}^{c(n)}, \{(z[i], T_i)\}_{i=1}^{q(n)}$  and  $c(n)$  and  $q(n)$  are the lengths of  $\vec{S}_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n$  respectively.

Note that computational validity differs from strong validity (which is equivalent to “plain” validity) in two main aspects: 1) we no longer require the output of the algebraic attacker to be *constant* with overwhelming probability; rather, we only require that it cannot tell apart  $\vec{m}_0$  and  $\vec{m}_1$ , and 2) the algebraic attacker is restricted to be nuPPT (as opposed to being unbounded and only making polynomially many queries).

We now define *extractable “uber security”* in exactly the same way as semantic security except that we only require the message sampler to be computationally valid (and define entropic uber security in the analogous way). In other words, extractable uber security implies that whenever  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  and  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  are *pointwise computationally indistinguishable* w.r.t. legal algebraic attackers, encodings of them are computationally indistinguishable. (We use the term “extractable” since this notion of security requires that if encodings can be distinguished, then we can efficiently find (or “extract”) set-respecting circuits that distinguish the elements.)

We now have the following theorem.

**Theorem 28.** *Assume the existence of a leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme with decryption in  $\text{NC}^1$ . Then no graded encoding scheme satisfies entropic extractable uber security.*

*Proof.* Consider any graded encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}$ . To show that  $\mathcal{E}$  is not entropic extractable uber secure we need to show that there exists an entropic computationally respecting message sampler  $M$  and  $PPT$  adversary  $A$  such that  $A$  distinguishes between encodings of  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  where  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M$ .

Our  $M$  will sample obfuscations of the following circuit family, that was shown to be unobfuscatable in the virtual black box setting [BGI<sup>+</sup>01]. Let  $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval})$  be a semantically secure fully homomorphic encryption scheme with ciphertext size  $N(\cdot)$ ; for simplicity of exposition, let us first assume that it is an “unleveled” FHE. For each security parameter  $n$ , consider the class of circuits

$$\mathcal{C}_n = \{C_{n,a,b,v,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}\}_{a,b \in \{0,1\}^n, v \in \{0,1\}, (\text{pk},\text{sk}) \in \text{Gen}(1^n), \hat{a} \in \text{Enc}(\text{pk},a)}$$

taking  $N(n)$ -bit inputs, where

$$C_{n,a,b,v,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}(x) = \begin{cases} (\text{pk}, \hat{a}) & \text{if } x = 0 \\ b & \text{if } x = a \\ v & \text{if } \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, x) = b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then  $M(1^n, \text{pp})$  operates as follows, given public parameters  $\text{pp}$  to a graded encoding scheme it first computes the ring  $R = \mathbb{Z}_p$  associated with  $\text{pp}$ .

- $M$  samples  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$  and  $a, b \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$  uniformly at random, and computes  $\hat{a} = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, a)$ .
- $M$  generates branching programs  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  corresponding to  $C_{n,a,b,0,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}$  and  $C_{n,a,b,1,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}$  respectively, and computes  $\widehat{BP}_0 = \text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 0)$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1 = \text{Merge}(BP_0, BP_1, 1)$ , each of width 10 and length  $m$ . Recall, from Claim 10, that  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  differ only in levels 1 and  $m$ , and that  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  are functionally equivalent to  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  respectively.
- $M$  samples  $m$  random invertible matrices over  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{10 \times 10}$ ,  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}$  and  $2m$  random scalars from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ,  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$ .  $M$  then uses these matrices and scalars to randomize  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$  as described by  $\text{Rand}(\cdot, p)$  to obtain  $\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$ ,  $\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}'_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$  and  $\mathbf{t}$ .
- $M$  outputs

$$\vec{m}_0 = (\{\alpha_{1,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{1,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}, \{\alpha_{m,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{m,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}})$$

$$\vec{m}_1 = (\{\alpha_{1,b} \cdot \tilde{B}'_{1,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}, \{\alpha_{m,b} \cdot \tilde{B}'_{m,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}})$$

$$\vec{z} = (\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m']/\{1,m\}, b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$$

Note that  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  is identically distributed to  $\text{Rand}(\widehat{BP}_0, p)$  and similarly  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  is identically distributed to  $\text{Rand}(\widehat{BP}_1, p)$ . As a result, by Proposition 2, we have that  $M$  is an entropic message sampler.

Let  $(\{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, S_{\mathbf{t}}) = \text{SetSystem}(m, N, \text{inp})$ , where  $\text{inp}$  is the labelling function for the branching programs  $\widehat{BP}_0$  and  $\widehat{BP}_1$ , and let

$$\vec{S}_n = \{S_{1,b}, S_{m,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$$

$$\vec{T}_n = (\{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m']/\{1,m\}, b \in \{0,1\}}, S_{\mathbf{t}})$$

We show that  $M$  is a computationally  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler, *i.e.* no nuPPT oracle machine  $A'$  can pointwise distinguish the oracles  $\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$ . We note that by Lemma

17 and a Union Bound over  $A'$ 's queries, the output of  $A'^{\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})}$  (resp.  $A'^{\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})}$ ) can be simulated with only oracle access to  $BP_0$  (resp.  $BP_1$ ), or equivalently, to  $C_{n,a,b,0,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}$  (resp.  $C_{n,a,b,1,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}$ )<sup>20</sup>. In fact, with high probability over the randomness of  $M$ ,  $A'$  and the simulator, the simulator's output is identical to the output of  $A'$ . We observe that this simulation can be made *efficient* using the techniques introduced in [BGK<sup>+</sup>13] (i.e. by modifying  $BP_0$  and  $BP_1$  to be *dual-input* branching programs and correspondingly changing **SetSystem**); this requires encodings elements using sets of size 4 (as opposed to 2 as in our original construction). Let this efficient simulator be **Sim**.

We would now like to argue that with high probability over the randomness of  $M$  and **Sim**,  $\text{Sim}^{BP_0} = \text{Sim}^{BP_1}$ . Recall that the circuits  $C_{n,a,b,0,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}$  (equivalent to  $BP_0$ ) and  $C_{n,a,b,1,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}$  (equivalent to  $BP_1$ ) differ only on inputs  $x$  for which  $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, x) = b$  (on these inputs  $C_{n,a,b,0,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}(x) = 0$ , whereas  $C_{n,a,b,1,\text{pk},\text{sk},\hat{a}}(x) = 1$ ). Since  $b$  was randomly chosen from an exponentially large set of values, to find such an input with noticeable probability, **Sim** must query one of the circuits on input  $a$  with noticeable probability, otherwise its view is independent of  $b$ . However, if the original ciphertext  $\hat{a}$  is an encryption of 0 instead of  $a$ , then the view of **Sim** is independent of  $a$ , and thus **Sim** can only query  $a$  with negligible probability. Thus by the semantic security of the *FHE* scheme, the probability that **Sim** can query  $a$  when given  $BP_0$  or  $BP_1$  is negligible. This implies that the outputs of  $\text{Sim}^{BP_0}$  and  $\text{Sim}^{BP_1}$  differ with only negligible probability.

We now have that :

- $A'^{\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})} = \text{Sim}^{BP_0}$ , except with negligible probability;
- $\text{Sim}^{BP_0} = \text{Sim}^{BP_1}$ , except with negligible probability;
- $\text{Sim}^{BP_1} = A'^{\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})}$ , except with negligible probability.

By a union bound, we have that  $A'^{\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})} = A'^{\mathcal{M}(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})}$ , except with negligible probability. Thus  $M$  must be a computationally respecting sampler. Finally, it follows using identically the same argument as in Section 5.4 that the message sampler satisfies the required high-entropy condition and thus is an entropic computationally respecting message sampler.

Now we will show an *nuPPT* adversary  $A$  that distinguishes between encodings of  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  when encoded under sets  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$ . Note that given encodings of one of  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$ ,  $A$  in fact receives either  $\text{Obf}(\widehat{BP_0})$  or  $\text{Obf}(\widehat{BP_1})$ . Let us refer to this input to  $A$  as  $O$ .

$A$  evaluates  $O$  on input 0 to receive  $(\text{pk}, \hat{a})$ , and then simply homomorphically evaluates  $O$  on the ciphertext  $\hat{a}$  in order to generate a valid encryption of the hidden value  $b$ , and then feeds this new ciphertext back into  $O$  to reveal the secret bit  $v$ , and then outputs  $v$ . Thus  $A$  succeeds in distinguishing  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(\vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  with probability 1. Additionally, note that since  $O$  is a constant-width branching program,  $O$  can be computed by a  $\text{NC}^1$  circuit, thus for this argument it suffices to use a leveled FHE.

We thus have that no graded encoding scheme can satisfy entropic extractable uber security.  $\square$

Note that the above proof in fact rules out also entropic extractable uber security with respect to a slight relaxation of simple message samplers, where instead of restricting to encodings under sets of size 2, we restrict to sets of size 4.

## 7.2.2 “Plain” Uber Security

Due to the above impossibility result, we here consider a weaker variant of an uber security—which we simply refer to as (plain) “uber security”, where we strengthen the “computational validity” condition to a “weak validity” condition where the algebraic attacker is allowed to be unbounded while making polynomially many queries. Note that weak validity differs from strong validity only in the respect

<sup>20</sup>To apply the Union Bound it is important that the query response  $C(\vec{m}_b, \vec{z})$  depends only on the queried arithmetic circuit  $C$  and the input-output behavior of  $BP_b$  as shown in Lemma 17

that weak validity does not require the output of the algebraic attacker is *constant* (with overwhelming probability).

**Definition 22** (Weakly Respecting Message Sampler). *We say that a nuPPT  $M$  is a weakly  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler (or weakly valid w.r.t.  $\{(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ ) if it satisfies the same conditions as in Definition 9 but where the second bullet is replaced by the following:*

- For every polynomial  $p$ , there exists some polynomial  $Q$  such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , every  $(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp})$  in the support of  $\text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k_n})$ , every (deterministic) oracle algorithm  $A$  that on input  $1^n$  makes at most  $p(n)$  oracle queries,

$$\Pr[(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) : A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_0)}(1^n) = A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_1)}(1^n)] \geq 1 - Q(n, k_n)/|R|.$$

where  $\vec{p}_b = \{(m_b[i], S_i)\}_{i=1}^{c(n)}, \{(z[i], T_i)\}_{i=1}^{q(n)}$  and  $c(n)$  and  $q(n)$  are the lengths of  $\vec{S}_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n$  respectively.

We define “*uber security*” in exactly the same way as semantic security except that we only require the message sampler to be weakly valid (and define entropic uber security in the analogous way). In other words, uber security implies that whenever  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  and  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  are *pointwise statistically close* w.r.t. legal algebraic attackers, encodings of them computationally indistinguishable.

Let us remark that for uber security to imply semantical security, it is important that we restrict the algebraic attacker (in the definition of a weakly valid message sampler) to only make polynomially many queries. Otherwise, even the aGDDH distribution (described in Section 3) is not weakly valid: With high probability over  $(m_0, m_1, \vec{z})$  sampled from the aGDDH distribution, there always exists *some* legal arithmetic circuit  $C$  such that  $\text{isZero}(C(m_0, \vec{z})) \neq \text{isZero}(C(m_1, \vec{z}))$ .<sup>21</sup> Therefore, an unbounded-query algebraic adversary could simply go over all legal arithmetic circuits and distinguish the elements.

We are not aware of any attacks (like those against *extractable* uber security) against “plain” uber security, and it thus seems like a reasonable strengthening of semantical security, which may have other applications. In fact, we may consider an even further strengthening of this notion—which we refer to as *statistical uber security*—by replacing the the weakly valid message sampler by a *super weakly valid* message sampler which only requires  $\vec{m}_0, \vec{z}$  and  $\vec{m}_1, \vec{z}$  to be *statistically indistinguishable* by algebraic attackers (as opposed to be *pointwise* statistically indistinguishable); that is, the second bullet in Definition 9 is replaced by:

- For every (computationally unbounded) oracle machine  $A$  that makes at most polynomially many oracle queries, there exists a negligible function  $\varepsilon$  such that for every security parameter  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} & |\Pr[(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k(n)}), (\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) : A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_0)}(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) = 1] - \\ & \Pr[(\mathbf{sp}, \mathbf{pp}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k(n)}), (\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) : A^{\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{pp}, \vec{p}_1)}(1^n, \mathbf{pp}) = 1]| \leq \varepsilon(n) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\vec{p}_b = \{(m_b[i], S_i)\}_{i=1}^{c(n)}, \{(z[i], T_i)\}_{i=1}^{q(n)}$  and  $c(n)$  and  $q(n)$  are the lengths of  $\vec{S}_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n$  respectively.

### 7.3 Strong Semantical and Uber Security

Recall that in the definition of both validity and weak validity, we consider *arbitrary-size* set-respecting circuits. We may weaken both validity conditions (and thus obtain stronger notion of semantical and uber security) by restricting attention to only polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. Note that in the

<sup>21</sup>Consider a very simple aGDDH instance, where  $|\vec{z}| = 2, T_1 = T_2 = S = [k]$ . For non-zero  $z_1, z_2$ , there always exists some  $a$  such that the circuit  $C(m, z_1, z_2) = \text{isZero}(m - az_1)$  yields different outputs on input  $(m_0, \vec{z})$  and  $(m_1, \vec{z})$ —namely,  $a = z_2$ .

context of uber security, this takes us a step closer to extractable uber security (which is impossible under reasonable assumption): we restrict to algebraic attackers that make polynomially-many queries and each query is polynomial-size, but the attacker may generate these queries (and generate its final output) in a computationally unbounded way. We refer to these notions respectively as *strong semantical security* and *strong uber security*.

## 7.4 Weak Semantic Security

We end this section by considering a *weaker* notion of semantical security—let us refer to it as *weak semantical security*—where the definition of a valid message sampler requires the the answer to every set-respecting circuit is *actually* constant (as opposed to only being constant with overwhelming probability); a similar relaxation can be applied also to uber security. While we do not know whether any of these weaker assumptions suffices for obtaining obfuscation (and they do not imply the aGDDH assumption), the weak notion of semantical security suffices for obtaining *witness encryption* [GGSW13]—roughly speaking, the notion of witness encryption enables a sender to encrypt a message  $m$  using an NP-statement  $x$  such that a) if the statement is false, then encodings of any two messages are indistinguishable, and b) if the statement is true, then anyone who has a witness  $w$  for  $x$  can recover  $m$ . Let us briefly sketch this construction:<sup>22</sup> As in [GGSW13], we focus on the NP-language **Exact-Cover** where an  $x$  instance consist of sets  $S_1, \dots, S_n \subseteq [k]$ ; for a true instance, there exists some “exact cover” of  $[k]$  using a subset of the sets, whereas for a false instance no such exact cover exists. Now, to encrypt the bit  $m$  under the instance  $S_1, \dots, S_n$ , use a multilinear encoding scheme over the set  $[k + 1]$ , encode 1 under each of the sets  $S_1, \dots, S_n$  and finally encode  $m$  under the set  $\{k + 1\}$ . Clearly anyone who knows an exact cover can obtain an encoding of  $m$  under  $[k + 1]$  (by appropriately multiplying the sets corresponding to the exact cover and additionally the encoding of  $m$  under  $\{k + 1\}$ ). On the other hand, if the instance is false, there is no exact cover, and thus “legal” algebraic operation can never be used to obtain an encoding under the full set  $[k + 1]$  and thus zero-testing can never be used; thus indistinguishability of encryptions follows by weak semantical security.

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<sup>22</sup>The observation that semantically secure multilinear encoding directly implies witness encryption was obtained in a conversation with Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi.

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## A Technical Lemma

**Claim 29.** Fix  $m, w \in \mathbb{N}$ , and let  $p \in \mathbb{N}$  be a prime. Let  $\mathcal{D}_0$  be the following distribution:

$$\mathcal{D}_0 = \{ \{R_i\}_{i \in [m]}, \{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}} \}$$

where each  $R_i$  is a uniformly random invertible matrix in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{w \times w}$  (i.e.  $\det(R_i) \neq 0$ , and each  $\alpha_{i,b}$  is a uniformly random non-zero scalar in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ).

Let  $\mathcal{D}_1$  be a distribution defined identically to  $\mathcal{D}_0$ , except with each  $R_i$  being a uniformly random (not necessarily invertible) matrix in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{w \times w}$ , and each  $\alpha_{i,b}$  a uniformly random (not necessarily non-zero) scalar in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ .

Then:

$$\Delta(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) \leq 8wm/p$$

where  $\Delta(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1)$  denotes the statistical distance between distributions  $\mathcal{D}_0$  and  $\mathcal{D}_1$ .

*Proof.* Note that  $\mathcal{D}_0$  and  $\mathcal{D}_1$  are each uniformly distributed on their respective supports, and that  $\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0) \subseteq \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)$ . Then the statistical distance between  $\mathcal{D}_0$  and  $\mathcal{D}_1$  can be computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) &= \sum_{d \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0) \cup \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)} |\Pr[\mathcal{D}_0 = d] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}_1 = d]| \\ &= \sum_{d \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)} |\Pr[\mathcal{D}_0 = d] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}_1 = d]| + \sum_{d \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1) \setminus \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)} |\Pr[\mathcal{D}_1 = d]| \\ &= \sum_{d \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)} \left| \frac{1}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)|} - \frac{1}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|} \right| + \sum_{d \in \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1) \setminus \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)} \left| \frac{1}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|} \right| \\ &= (|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)| \cdot \left| \frac{1}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)|} - \frac{1}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|} \right|) + (|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1) \setminus \text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)| \cdot \left| \frac{1}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|} \right|) \\ &= 2 \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)|}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|} \right) \end{aligned}$$

But notice that  $(1 - \frac{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)|}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|})$  can be interpreted as  $\Pr[\exists i \in [m], b \in \{0, 1\} : \det(R_i) = 0 \vee \alpha_{i,b} = 0]$ . For each  $i \in [m]$ , the probability  $\det(R_i) = 0$  can be bounded by applying the Schwartz-Zippel lemma to the  $\det(\cdot)$ , which is a polynomial of degree  $w$ . Thus we have that  $\Pr[\det(R_i) = 0] \leq w/p$ . Further, each  $\alpha_{i,b}$  is zero with probability  $1/p$ . Hence, applying a union bound, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1) &= 2 \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_0)|}{|\text{supp}(\mathcal{D}_1)|} \right) \\ &\leq 2 \cdot (2m/p + mw/p) \\ &\leq 8wm/p \end{aligned}$$

□

## B Proof of Lemma 18

In this section, we prove Lemma 18, restated below for clarity:

**Lemma 22.** Fix  $m, n, w \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\text{inp} : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ . Let  $\vec{S} = \text{SetSystem}(m, n, \text{inp}) = (\{S_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, S_t)$ , and let  $C$  be any weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit whose output wire is tagged with  $T \subseteq [k]$ . Then there exists a set  $U \subseteq \{0, 1, *\}^m$  such that for every branching program  $BP$  of width  $w$  and length  $m$  on  $n$  input bits, with input tagging function  $\text{inp}$ , every prime  $p$ , and every  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow \text{Rand}(BP, p)$ ,

(i)

$$C(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) \equiv \sum_{u \in U} C_u(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$$

where each  $C_u$  is a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting arithmetic circuit, whose input wires are tagged only with sets  $\in \{S_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]: u[i] \neq *} \cup \{S_t\}$ , and whose output wire is tagged with  $T$ .

- (ii) Each  $C_u$  above is the sum of several “monomial” circuits, where each monomial circuit performs only multiplications of elements in  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in m, b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$ , is weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, and has output wire tagged with  $T$ .
- (iii) For each  $C_u$  above,

$$C_u(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \alpha_u \cdot p_u(\{\tilde{B}_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]: u[i] \neq *}, \mathbf{t})$$

where  $p_u$  is some polynomial, and  $\alpha_u = (\prod_{i \in [m]: u[i] \neq *} \alpha_{i,u[i]})$ . Furthermore, when  $p_u$  is viewed as a sum of monomials, each monomial contains exactly one entry from each  $\tilde{B}_{i,u[i]}$  such that  $u[i] \neq *$ , and possibly one entry from  $\mathbf{t}$ . Further,  $p_u$  can be computed by a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire is tagged with  $T$ .

*Proof. Part (i)* We begin by expressing the circuit  $C$  as a polynomial in variables  $(\{\alpha_{i,b} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in m, b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t})$ , in the form of a sum of monomials (possibly exponentially many). We do so recursively: we associate each wire  $w$  of the circuit with a multiset  $S_w$  of pairs of monomials and signs (“+1” or “-1”), such that the sum of the monomials multiplied by their respective signs computes the same value as the value computed by the circuit at that wire. We eventually output the multiset of monomial pairs corresponding to the output wire. We compute the sets of monomials as follows:

- Any input wire of the circuit reading input variable  $v$  can be represented as the set  $\{(v, +)\}$ .
- The output wire of an addition gate can be represented as the union of the multisets of monomial pairs representing the gates left and right children.
- The output wire of an subtraction gate can be similarly represented as the union of the multisets of the gate’s left input wire, and of its right input wire with the “sign” component of every pair negated (from “+1” to “-1” and vice versa), to reflect subtraction.
- For the output wire of a multiplication gate, for each pair  $(M_1, s_1)$  in the multiset of its left input and each pair  $(M_2, s_2)$  in the multiset of its right input, we add  $(M_1 \cdot M_2, s_1 \cdot s_2)$  to the multiset of the output wire.

We note that it holds inductively in the above process that the sum of the monomials in the multiset associated with each wire  $w$  in  $C$ , multiplied by its appropriate sign, equals the value computed on that wire  $w$ .

We also show that each monomial in the set corresponding to a wire can be computed by a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire has the same tag as the wire. This can again be seen inductively:

- This property holds at any input wire of  $C$ , since the only monomial in the set can be computed using the input wire itself as the “monomial circuit”.
- This property also holds at any output wire of an addition or subtraction gate, since the circuit corresponding to any monomial in this wire’s set is the same as the circuit for the monomial from the corresponding incoming wire to the gate.
- Finally, at the output wire of a multiplication gate  $G$ , for any monomial  $M$  in this wire’s set computed as the product of monomials  $M1$  and  $M2$ , the circuit for  $M$  is simply the circuit for each of  $M1$  and  $M2$ , joined by a multiplication gate. Since  $G$  performs a set respecting multiplication, and the output wires of  $M1$  and  $M2$ ’s circuits have the same tags as the input wires of  $G$ , we have that the multiplication joining  $M1$  and  $M2$ ’s circuits to produce  $M$ ’s circuit is set-respecting, and so the circuit corresponding to  $M$  is a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire has the same tag as the output wire of  $G$ .

Thus each of the monomials in the decomposition of  $C$  can be represented as a weakly set-respecting arithmetic circuit with output wire tagged with  $T$ , where this circuit simply multiplies together all terms in the monomial in some order, and performs no additions. Finally, the tags of the input wires of these monomial circuits must be mutually disjoint, otherwise the monomial circuit would perform a non-set-respecting multiplication at some level.

We label each monomial  $M$  with an element  $u \in \{0, 1, *\}^m$ , where  $u[i] = b$  if  $S_{i,b}$  is the label on one of input wires in  $M$ 's circuit representation, and  $u[i] = *$  if neither  $S_{i,0}$  and  $S_{i,1}$  are labels on any of  $M$ 's input wires. We note that no monomial can have both  $S_{i,0}$  and  $S_{i,1}$  on its input wires because these two sets are not disjoint, and the tags of the input wires of the monomial circuits must be mutually disjoint.

We now let  $C_u$  be the circuit representing the subtraction of all monomials in the the decomposition of  $C$  labelled with  $u$  and sign  $(-1)$  from the sum of all monomials in the the decomposition of  $C$  labelled with  $u$  and sign  $(+1)$ . Since each monomial can be represented as a weakly set-respecting circuit with output wire tagged with  $T$ , adding several monomials together is a set-respecting operation, as is subtracting several monomials from the sum, and thus each  $C_u$  is a weakly set-respecting circuit. Further, since each monomial circuit has output wire tagged with  $T$ , each  $C_u$  also has output wire tagged with  $T$ . Further, by the way we labelled each monomial, each of the input wires of  $C_u$  is tagged only with sets  $\in \{S_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *} \cup \{S_t\}$ . Finally, if we sum over all the  $u$ , we capture all the monomials in the decomposition of  $C$  multiplied by their respective signs, so we have that  $\sum_u C_u = C$ .

**Part (ii)** We observe that by construction of  $C_u$ , it is a sum of several monomial circuits each of which performs only multiplications of its inputs, is weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, and has output wire tagged with  $T$ .

**Part (iii)** From part (ii), we have that for each  $C_u$ , it is a sum of several monomial circuits each of which performs only multiplications of its inputs, is weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, and has output wire tagged with  $T$ . Furthermore, for each such monomial circuit the input tags are drawn from sets  $\in \{S_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *} \cup \{S_t\}$ . In fact, each of these monomials must contain exactly one input wire tagged with each of the sets in  $\{S_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *}$ , and exactly one set tagged with  $S_t$  if and only if  $S_t \subseteq T$ . This means that each of these monomials is the product of one element chosen from each of the matrices  $(\{\alpha_{i,u[i]} \cdot \tilde{B}_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in m:u[i] \neq *}$ , and possibly one element from  $\mathbf{t}$ . Thus each monomial in the decomposition of  $C_u$  has a common factor of  $\alpha_u = (\prod_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *} \alpha_{i,u[i]})$ .

We can now write  $C_u$  as a polynomial (namely the sum of its monomials multiplied by their respective signs), and by factoring  $\alpha_u$  from each of it monomials and letting  $p_u$  be the remaining polynomial, we have, as required, that

$$C_u(\{\alpha_{i,b} \tilde{B}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{t}) = \alpha_u \cdot p_u(\{\tilde{B}_{i,u[i]}\}_{i \in [m]:u[i] \neq *}, \mathbf{t})$$

Finally, we note that computing  $p_u$  is the same as computing  $C_u$  if the alphas are set to 1. Since  $C_u$  is  $\vec{S}$ -respecting, we thus have that  $p_u$  can be computed by a weakly  $\vec{S}$ -respecting circuit whose output wire is tagged with  $T$ .  $\square$

## C Proof of Lemma 7

In this section we prove Lemma 7, restated below for clarity.

**Lemma 30.** *Let  $c, \varepsilon \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathcal{E}$  be an  $(c, k^\varepsilon)$ -semantically secure encoding scheme. Then for every polynomial  $q(k)$  there exists a  $(c, q(k))$ -semantically secure encoding scheme.*

*Proof.* Consider any polynomial  $q(\cdot)$  and constants  $c, \varepsilon$ . Given a  $(c, k^\varepsilon)$ -semantically secure encoding  $\mathcal{E}$ , we construct a new multilinear encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}'$  and prove that  $\mathcal{E}'$  is  $(c, q(k))$ -semantically secure. Let  $(\text{InstGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Add}, \text{Sub}, \text{Mult}, \text{isZero})$  be the algorithms associated with  $\mathcal{E}$ . We define a new encoding scheme  $\mathcal{E}' = (\text{InstGen}', \text{Enc}', \text{Add}', \text{Sub}', \text{Mult}', \text{isZero}')$  as follows.

- $\text{InstGen}'$  on input  $(1^n, 1^k)$  runs  $(\text{pp}, \text{sp}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{(q(k)+1)^{1/\varepsilon}})$  and generates an encoding of a uniformly random non-zero element  $e$  under the set  $\{k+1, \dots, (q(k)+1)^{1/\varepsilon}\}$  by running  $u^1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{sp}, e, \{k+1, \dots, (q(k)+1)^{1/\varepsilon}\})$ .  $\text{InstGen}'$  outputs  $(\text{pp}, u^1)$  as the public parameters and  $\text{sp}$  as the secret parameters.
- $\text{Enc}'$ ,  $\text{Add}'$ ,  $\text{Sub}'$ ,  $\text{Mult}'$  are identical to  $\text{Enc}$ ,  $\text{Add}$ ,  $\text{Sub}$ ,  $\text{Mult}$  respectively.
- $\text{isZero}'$  takes as input public parameters  $(\text{pp}, u^1)$  and an encoding  $u$  under the set  $[k]$  to zero-test.  $\text{isZero}'$  simply outputs  $\text{isZero}(\text{Mult}(\text{pp}, u, u^1))$ . The correctness of  $\text{isZero}'$  follows from that of  $\text{isZero}$  and the fact that  $\text{Mult}(\text{pp}, u, u^1)$  returns an encoding, under the set  $[(q(k)+1)^{1/\varepsilon}]$ , of an element which is zero if and only if  $u$  is an encoding of zero.

It is easy to see that the correctness of  $\mathcal{E}'$  follows from that of  $\mathcal{E}$ .

We now show that  $\mathcal{E}'$  is  $(c, q(k))$ -semantically secure. Assume for contradiction there exists a polynomial  $k'(\cdot)$ , ensemble  $\{\vec{S}'_n, \vec{T}'_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  of sets where  $|\vec{S}'_n| = c$ ,  $|\vec{T}'_n| = q(k'(n))$ ,  $\{\vec{S}'_n, \vec{T}'_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler  $M'$  and nuPPT adversary  $A'$  such that for sufficiently large  $n$ ,  $A'$  distinguishes encodings of elements as described in the semantic security game in Definition 10.

Let  $k(\cdot)$  be a polynomial such that  $k(n) = (q(k'(n)) + 1)^{1/\varepsilon}$ . For every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , let  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n$  be a sequence of sets over  $[k(n)]$  where  $\vec{S}_n = \vec{S}'_n$  and  $\vec{T}_n = (\vec{T}'_n, \{k'(n) + 1, \dots, k(n)\})$ . We will construct a  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting message sampler  $M$  and nuPPT adversary  $A$  such that  $(M, A)$  breaks the  $(c, k^\varepsilon)$ -semantic security of  $\mathcal{E}$ .

We define the message sampler  $M$  as follows: on input  $1^n$ ,  $\text{pp} \in \text{InstGen}(1^n, 1^{k(n)})$ ,  $M$  samples  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z}) \leftarrow M'(1^n, \text{pp})$ . and outputs the elements  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, (\vec{z}, e))$  where  $e$  is a uniformly random non-zero element, *i.e.*  $M$  outputs the same elements sampled by  $M'$  with an additional element  $e$ . Note that  $M'$  samples elements based only on the ring associated with the public parameters  $\text{pp}$ , which in this case, is the same ring associated with  $\text{pp}' \in \text{InstGen}'(1^n, 1^{k'(n)})$ .

To show that  $M$  is  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting, we claim that for any  $(\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n)$ -respecting circuit  $C$  acting on  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, (\vec{z}, e))$  there exists a  $(\vec{S}'_n, \vec{T}'_n)$ -respecting circuit  $C'$  acting on  $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1, \vec{z})$  such that  $\text{isZero}(C(\cdot)) = \text{isZero}(C'(\cdot))$ .  $C'$  is simply the circuit  $C$  computes to obtain an element corresponding to the set  $[k'(n)]$ , with which it must multiply an element under the set  $\{k'(n) + 1, \dots, k(n)\}$  to reach the target set  $[k(n)]$ . Since  $M'$  is  $\{\vec{S}'_n, \vec{T}'_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting, the output of  $\text{isZero}(C'(\cdot))$  is constant with overwhelming probability. Therefore, the output of  $\text{isZero}(C(\cdot))$  is constant with overwhelming probability too, and  $M$  is  $\{\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ -respecting.

We now define a nuPPT adversary  $A$  that breaks the semantic security of  $\mathcal{E}$ . On input encodings  $\vec{u}$  and public parameters  $\text{pp}$ ,  $A$  simply removes the last encoding  $u$  from  $\vec{u}$  and runs  $A'$  on input public parameters  $(\text{pp}, u)$  and the remaining encodings. Observe that for any security parameter  $n$ , the output of  $A$  in the semantic security game in Definition 10 when played with message sampler  $M$  and sets  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n$  is identical to the output of  $A'$  in the game played with message sampler  $M'$  and sets  $\vec{S}'_n, \vec{T}'_n$ . Recall that  $\vec{S}_n, \vec{T}_n$  are sequences of sets over  $[k(n)]$  and  $|\vec{S}_n| = c$  and  $|\vec{T}_n| = k(n)^\varepsilon$ . Therefore, this contradicts the  $(c, k^\varepsilon)$ -semantic security of  $\mathcal{E}$ .  $\square$