

Exact Smooth Projective Hash Function based on LWE

From worst-case Assumptions up to Universal Composability

Abstract

Smooth Projective Hash Functions are one of the base tools to build interactive protocols; and this notion has led to the construction of numerous protocols enjoying strong security notions, such as the security in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) model or even *Universal Composability* (UC).

Yet, the construction of SPHF has been almost limited to discrete-logarithm or pairing type assumptions up to now. This stands in contrast with domains such as homomorphic encryption or functional encryption, where *Lattice Based Cryptography* has already caught up and overtook discrete-log/pairing based cryptography. So far, work in the direction of UC based on lattices is almost restricted to a paper from Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters (Crypto 2008) dealing with Oblivious Transfer in the UC framework, and work in the direction of password-authenticated key exchange protocols (PAKE) to one from Katz and Vaikuntanathan (Asiacrypt 2009) on a 3-round Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, but restraining itself to the BPR model. It seems that dealing with errors in those contexts is not as easy as it is for encryption.

In this work, we identify the problem at its source, namely, the lattice version of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol: the key agreement is only approximate. We explicit a simple folklore trick to obtain true, *exact*, one-round key exchange from LWE. We then show that this trick can be adapted to various lattice encryption schemes, leading, with some technicalities, to exact SPHF's. From there, we derive three new results, namely the first lattice-based following protocols: a one-round PAKE secure in the BPR model, a 3-round PAKE secure in the UC model, and a UC commitment scheme, all of them based on SIS and LWE assumptions.

Keywords: LWE encryption, Lattices, Universal Composability, Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange, UC Commitment, Smooth Projective Hash Functions

1 Introduction

In the recent years, lattice based cryptography has been able to mimic many constructions from the discrete-logarithm/pairing world, and even go beyond. The incentives to switch to lattices are numerous; they offer strong security guarantees, such as hardness under worst-case assumptions, and potential resistance to quantum algorithms. They also offer better asymptotic security and good parallelism. And even more interestingly, lattice problems such as LWE have shown to be extremely versatile, allowing the construction of primitives which existence has been a long term open problem, such as Fully Homomorphic Encryption, following the breakthrough work of Gentry [31]. Also, in the domain of functional encryption, LWE-based constructions have caught-up on, and then improved upon pairing-based cryptography, with the recent results of functional encryption for arbitrary circuits [33, 29].

Yet, there is one primitive, called Smooth Projective Hash Function, for which LWE based constructions are still far behind discrete-logarithm constructions. Smooth Projective Hash Functions (or SPHF) were introduced by Cramer and Shoup [22] in order to achieve IND-CCA security from IND-CPA encryption schemes, and generalized by Gennaro and Lindell [30]. They have recently shown to be quite useful for many other purposes, for example they allow implicit designated-verifier proofs of membership [2, 12], that is proof that a value verifies some relation, that can only convince one chosen verifier.

A simple application of SPHF —but extremely useful example in practice— is *Password-Authenticated Key Exchange* (it was proposed in the works of [37, 30], as part of what is now known as the KOY-GL paradigm). A PAKE is a protocol similar to key exchange, with the feature that it is successful only if the parties share a common password (which they usually commit to). This mechanism can offer security against offline dictionary attacks (formally called security in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway setting [8]), and therefore protecting users from being impersonated, even if they use low-entropy passwords.

We emphasize that PAKE have direct *real-world* applications; for example they would defend web-users against most account theft techniques. It is one of the rare primitive beyond the basic cryptographic primitives —encryption, signature, key exchange— that has been standardized¹ and broadly deployed².

Those PAKE protocols have recently reached the ultimate security notion called *Universal Composability* [19, 2, 39, 9]. The UC framework, introduced by Canetti [16] is a increasingly popular simulation-based security paradigm (but only studied by Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters [47] in the context of lattice-based protocols —to construct Oblivious Transfer). It guarantees that a protocol, possibly running concurrently with arbitrary —even insecure— protocols, proven secure in this framework remains secure. Such framework allows to split the design of a complex protocol into that of simpler sub-protocols. It is particularly useful in the case of PAKE, since it ensures that the protocol remains secure even in case a user mistypes or reuses the password (there is no particular assumption on the distribution of passwords).

PAKE protocols using the KOY-GL paradigm rely on a central cryptographic tool, called commitments. These commitments allow, in a two-phase protocol between two parties, a committer to give the receiver an *in silico* analogue of a sealed envelope containing a value m , and then the committer to reveal m so that the receiver can verify it. The security definition for commitment schemes in the UC framework was presented by Canetti and Fischlin [17]. Several UC-secure commitment schemes in the CRS model have been proposed since. Ostrovsky, and Sahai [20] proposed inefficient non-interactive schemes

¹SPEKE: RFC5931, RFC6617, IEEE P1363.2, U.S. Patent 6,226,383

²J-PAKE: [35, 49], implemented in OPENSLL, NSS, used by FIREFOX-SYNC, <https://wiki.mozilla.org/Services/KeyExchange>

from general primitives. On the other hand, Damgård and Nielsen [23], and Camenisch and Shoup [15] (among others) presented interactive constructions from several number-theoretic assumptions.

Lindell [41] has recently presented the first very efficient commitment scheme proven in the UC framework. They can be viewed as combinations of Cramer-Shoup encryption schemes and Σ -protocols. This scheme has recently been revised by Blazy *et al.* in [11] where they reduce the number of rounds of the adaptive version. Fischlin, Libert and Manulis [26] adapted the scheme secure against static corruptions by using non-interactive Groth-Sahai proofs [34] to make it non-interactive. SPHF is one of the essential ingredients to construct those commitments with very strong properties [2, 1] in particular when in the context of PAKE schemes.

But as we mentioned earlier, building SPHF's from lattice assumptions has remained an open problem until now. Precisely none of the aforementioned constructions are based on worst-case assumption such as the lattice problems LWE or SIS. The only exception we know of are works of Katz and Vaikuntanathan [38], later improved by Ding and Fan [24]. It is the first known PAKE in the standard model based on lattices; but it requires 3-rounds and can only be proven secure in the BPR [8] setting. The authors proceed as follows: first, they construct an *approximate* SPHF, and from there, derive their PAKE. The fact that the SPHF is only approximate seems to be at least a painful technicality, if not a real issue to construct stronger, or better schemes.

It is quite possible that the recent *candidate* for multi-linear maps of Garg *et al.* [27] could also be an alternate solution to build lattice-related SPHF's by mimicking pairing-based constructions; yet, it remains to be proved. More importantly, this would *not* make those SPHF's *lattice-based* since the security of [27] is heuristic, not well understood for now, and not known to be as hard as any natural lattice problem. In that regard, the eventuality that the construction of Garg *et al.* is indeed secure should only be used for construction that are completely new as indistinguishability Obfuscation [28]. In short, assuming security of [27] would be an overkill for our applications, and it is much preferable to rely on LWE and SIS for they have many cryptographic virtues.

1.1 This work

In this work we show how to construct an *exact* (as opposed to approximate) SPHF from lattice based assumption (namely LWE and SIS), and derive several applications out of it. To be precise, we call our construction exact in the sense that the result is exact most of the time (i.e. except with negligible probability), as opposed to *approximate* construction, that always contains a small error.

Exact Key-Exchange To build such an exact SPHF, we first analyze where the issue of approximation arises between the simplest protocols from both the discrete-log world and lattice world. At high level, the so called Regev's Dual Encryption scheme, can be seen as a lattice analogue of ElGamal. Changing one's point of view, allows one to see ElGamal encryption as key Exchange protocol, precisely, a Diffie-Hellman one-round Key Exchange. If one applies the same change of viewpoint on Regev's Dual scheme, one only obtains an *approximate* key exchange protocol; and to be useful, the parties need an extra round to get rid of the error. In some more advanced protocols, this error might simply be impossible to handle.

Still, one notices the fact that as an encryption scheme, the Dual Regev cryptosystem is not *approximate*, and decryption almost always leads to the original ciphertext. This is due to the use of a simple error correcting code ECC; first step of decryption leads to a noisy codeword; and by design one can recover from this error: $\text{ECC}^{-1}(\text{ECC}(M) + e) = M$ for any message M and small error $e \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Yet, to get exact key exchange from this $\text{ECC} : \{0,1\} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ one would require that $\text{ECC}^{-1}(x + e) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(x)$ for any x and any small errors e . Obviously this would imply that ECC^{-1} is a constant function. A folklore workaround is to restrict this requirement to hold only for all but a negligible fraction of the x 's by tolerating negligible probability of failure of the protocol. This becomes actually doable when the set of the x 's is superpolynomially larger than the set of errors.

SPHF construction While we warm with building an exact SPHF on the CPA-secure Dual Regev Encryption scheme, the real goal for applications is to build an exact SPHF over a lattice based CCA scheme (or equivalently, a Tag-Based Encryption scheme). Our construction is adapted from the trapdoored scheme of Micciancio and Peikert. Our raw SPHF only offers a weak form of smoothness; fortunately it can be amplified to the usual smoothness using $O(\lambda)$ parallel repetition of the protocol. Still, we first only obtain a SPHF for 1 bit of input and 1 bit of output; a naive approach would require $O(\lambda^3)$ repetitions to get λ bits for inputs and outputs. Using linear codes and hashing over \mathbb{Z}_2 , we are able to reduce the number of repetitions to $\tilde{O}(\lambda)$ for a full-fledged SPHF with λ bits of input/output.

PAKE and LAKE Once those SPHF are created, our new results come almost generically following techniques introduced in [9, 10]. One just has to supersede the CCA-1 encryption with a Strong-One Time Signature to achieve CCA-2 security, and then adapt a technique known as Double Cramer-Shoup [9]. This allows us to achieve the first One-Round PAKE on Lattices, and the first UC-secure PAKE protocol on Lattices (with only 3 rounds). Both PAKE can even be extended to *Language-Authenticated-Key-Exchange* for a certain class of languages.

UC commitment Once we have our Double Micciancio-Peikert like encryption —our lattice Analogue of the Double Cramer-Shoup— with just an additional twist we can manage to create a UC Commitment by simply adapting Lindell’s commitment to provide the first Lattice-Based UC-Commitment, furthermore in the adaptive setting.

1.2 Open questions

Dealing with approximation. It is unclear if it is really necessary to get rid of approximation and resort to an exact SPHF to obtain such protocols based on lattice problems with security in the UC model. Yet, our new SPHF certainly is a convenient tool, offering a simpler and more modular interface for the construction, the security proofs, and the understanding of such advanced protocols.

In a very recent work [46], Peikert presented a light-bandwidth reconciliation mechanism to handle more efficiently the natural error of lattice based cryptosystems; one of the application is a 3-round AKE (without password) in the SK model (a model weaker than UC). It is quite possible that one could build a more efficient 3-round UC-secure PAKE by combining the ideas of [46] and our construction; mostly ³ by trying to decrease the modulus q to $\text{poly}(n)$. A much more challenging problem would be to achieve any of the above protocol, or even simple Key Exchange with small modulus $q = \text{poly}(n)$ in only one round.

Narrowed down definitions and generic results. Once our SPHF is build, we rely on known techniques to build our other protocols. It remains that parts of the proofs needs to be redone, because we lack truly generic result relating SPHF, PAKE, LAKE and commitments; we believe this would be an interesting open problem. Additionally, when building our 1-bit SPHF we encounter an interesting relaxation of smoothness, which we strengthen using amplification techniques. Yet, this relaxation could well be the “right” notion for small domains, since SPHF have mostly be studied and used for large domains until now.

1.3 Outline of the paper.

We left out most of the non-essential technicalities out of the body of this paper; for a quick read one may follow the section ordering up to appendices. For a deeper understanding of our construction, the reader is advised to follow the path given below.

We start with section 2 where we present lattice assumptions and a simple Key Exchange protocol from lattices. Technical preliminaries can be found in the Appendix A.

Before reading our main construction in section 3, the Micciancio-Peikert based SPHF; one may warm-up with the Appendix B where a simpler SPHF based on Dual Regev scheme is presented, but is only CPA-secure. Section 3 is completed by the Appendix C for the security proof of our variant of the Micciancio-Peikert; and the Appendix D for the doubled version, our lattice analog of the so-called double Cramer-Shoup. A detachable Cheat Sheet is given on the last page (App. F) to give a clear parallel between classical schemes on discrete-log, on the one we use here on lattices.

The last section 4 presents our applications. First we present the first PAKE with UC security from lattices in Sec. 4.2. Dropping UC-security, in 4.3 we also have a 1-round PAKE in the BPR model. finally in Section 4.4, we provide the first Lattice-based UC commitment. This section is completed by the Appendix E where we present the UC framework, define functionalities and give the UC-security proofs.

2 Lattice preliminaries

Due to lack of space we restrict this preliminary section to the necessary requirements on lattice based-cryptography for the understanding of further constructions leaving many technical preliminaries to the Appendix A. Therefore standard security definitions of Tag-based encryption, One Time signature and SPHF are differed to the Appendix A.1. Complements on lattices are provided in A.2 followed by some information theoretic tools in A.3. Finally in A.4 we show construction of useful tools from lattices: trapdoor commitments and one-time-signature.

2.1 Lattice Problems

Definition 2.1 (The Short Integer Solution Problem, SIS) *The Short Integer Solution problem $\text{SIS}_{n,m,q,\beta}$, with m unknowns, $n \leq m$ equations modulo q and norm-bound β is as follows: given a random matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ chosen uniformly, find a non-zero short vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ such that $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{0}$ and $\|\mathbf{v}\| \leq \beta$.*

Definition 2.2 (The Learning with Errors Problem, dLWE, decisional version) *The Learning with Errors Problem, decisional version, $\text{dLWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$, with n unknown, $m \geq n$ samples, modulo q and with errors distribution χ is as follows: for a random secret \mathbf{s} uniformly chosen in \mathbb{Z}_q^n , and given m samples either all of the form $(\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a} \rangle + e)$ where $e \leftarrow \chi$, or from the uniform distribution $(\mathbf{a}, b) \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q)$; decide if the samples comes from the former or the latter case.*

³The switch to ring-based SPHF is essentially generic since there are based on the trapdoors of [43]

Worst-case to Average-Case Connection Both SIS and LWE enjoy strong security guarantees for certain range of parameters. Precisely, SIS is as hard in the average-case as certain lattice problems (unique-SVP or SIVP) in the worst-case, as proved originally by Ajtai and later generalized [3, 44, 32]. On the other hand the problem LWE was popularized by the work of Regev [48], proving similar average-case to worst-case reduction from LWE to gap-SVP, but the reduction is a quantum algorithm. Of course, the parameters of the underlying lattice problems depends on the parameters of SIS and LWE; see [48, 44] for the precise statement.

Error Distribution The hardness results of [48] for LWE hold for Discrete Gaussian error distributions $\chi = D_{\mathbb{Z},s}$, where s denotes (up to a constant factor) the standard deviation. Due to space restriction, we defer definition to appendix, definition A.7. For our overview, we only require a bound on the size of vectors sampled according to that distribution:

Lemma 2.3 (Tailcut of discrete Gaussians [5, 44]) *For any $s > 0$ and $c > 1/\sqrt{2\pi}$, and any m -dimensional lattice L , and vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $\rho_s((L + \mathbf{x}) \setminus c \cdot s\sqrt{m}\mathfrak{B}) < 2C^m \rho_s(L)$, where $C = c\sqrt{2\pi}e \cdot e^{-\pi c^2} < 1$, and \mathfrak{B} is the centered unit ball. In particular, for $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m,s}$, $\|\mathbf{x}\| \leq s\sqrt{m}$ except with negligible probability in m .*

Strong LWE. In typical LWE based encryption, the parameters are chosen as follow: $n = \Omega(\lambda)$, $q \leq 2^{\text{poly}(n)}$, $m = O(n \log q)$ and the error distribution to be the discrete Gaussian $D_{\mathbb{Z},s}$ of standard deviation $s = q/\text{poly}(n)$. For such parameters, the best known attacks runs in time $2^{\Omega(\lambda)}$. Yet, one might use smaller error parameter s , at the cost of some security; this was necessary for the first constructions of FHE from LWE [13] (but was recently overcome [14]). It was also the case for the early result of Banerjee *et al.* [7] to prove the hardness of *Learning with Rounding*⁴. Actually, the reason we need such parameters is similar to the one of [7]: we wish that for a uniform random value $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, adding an error $e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}$, s to x doesn't modifies its higher bit, except maybe with negligible probability.

Specifically, polynomial attacks are known when s is as small as $q/2^{\Omega(n)}$, yet if $s \geq q/f(n)$ for a sub-exponential function the best known attacks are subexponential. For the sake of clarity, one could set our parameters to $q = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, and $s = q/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$; for all we know, those parameters may well require $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$ time to break; and it will guarantee that our protocols fails with negligible probability $2^{-\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$; that is to obtain λ bits of security on should choose $n = \Omega(\lambda^2)$, which does impact the efficiency in a significant way. It is indeed convenient to think of protocols with negligible probability of failure in theory, especially in the UC model: it allows one to repeat sequentially or concurrently polynomially many instances of various protocols, while maintaining overall failure probability negligible. In practice, the situation might not be so catastrophic: in many scenario an error probability of 2^{-30} is perfectly acceptable for a 128-bit secure cryptosystem.

2.2 Achieving One-Round Exact Key Exchange

We now discuss the question of approximation in relation to LWE based Key exchange. While the passively secure Key Exchange protocol presented below is not formally used for our construction, it offers a simple context to give intuition on problem related to error and our proposed solution.

LWE Encryption and Approximate Key Exchange Before giving formal definitions, let us re-interpret the LWE encryption scheme of Regev [48] as a ‘‘approximate key exchange’’. Let n denotes the security parameter, and let $q \leq 2^{\text{poly}(n)}$ and $m = \text{poly}(n)$ be such that $m \geq O(n \log(q))$. Assuming the parties do have a common reference string parsed as a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, it is possible to re-interpret the previous scheme as an approximate 1-round key exchange protocol as explained in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Approximate Key Exchange from LWE

At the end of this protocol, one notices that we have $k_A = k_B + \langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle$. Since \mathbf{t} and \mathbf{e} are small, we have $k_A \approx k_B$, yet for any third party that doesn't know anything about random values $\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}$, k_A and k_B are computationally indistinguishable from random under the decisional LWE assumption.

There are now two ways to use this approximate exchanged key to have an exact shared secret.

⁴It was also partially overcome in [4], but only for bounded amount of LWR samples, which is not enough for the constructions of [7].

LWE Encryption The typical encryption scheme (as in [48]) would use k_A as a one-pad together with a (very simple) error correcting code to build the cipher $c = \text{ECC}(M) + k_A$; decryption procedure would use k_B to recover the message $M' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(c - k_B) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\text{ECC}(M) + \langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle)$. The error-correction for binary messages is simply defined as follow:

Definition 2.4 For any positive integer q , we define the error correcting code ECC and the correcting function ECC^{-1}

$$\text{ECC}(M \in \{0, 1\}) = \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor \cdot M \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ECC}^{-1}(x \in \mathbb{Z}_q) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \in \{ \lfloor -\frac{q}{4} \rfloor \dots \lfloor \frac{q}{4} \rfloor \} \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

One easily verifies that decryption is correct as soon as parameter choice are such that $|\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle| < q/4$. In particular, assume the error is Gaussian of standard deviation s , then, except with probability negligible in n , one has $|\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle| \leq \sqrt{nm}s$: correctness can be guaranteed for $s = q/\text{poly}(n)$. Later on, we will focus on the dual version of that encryption scheme; that is after the key exchange of Figure 1, Bob encrypt $c = \text{ECC}(M) + k_B$ and Alice Decrypt.

Both this encryption scheme and its dual naturally leads to an exact two-round Key exchange protocol: one party simply choose at random the shared key and send it encrypted to the other party.

One Round Key Exchange from LWE with super-polynomially small error It is in fact possible to avoid adding a second round to obtain exact key exchange, by allowing failure to happen with negligible probability, and basing ourself on the strong version of LWE, that is when the error to modulus ratio s/q is polynomially small.

Notice that at the end of the KE protocol of fig. 1, $k_A = k_B + \langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle$, where k_B is uniformly random and $\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle$ is small. The intuition is that, if we round both k_A and k_B , there is some probability that both rounded value will be equal. More precisely, using our previous error correcting code:

Lemma 2.5 Let $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $\Delta \geq 1$ be implicit functions of λ such that q/Δ is superpolynomial in λ . Then, for any $e \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $|e| \leq \Delta$, with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ over the choice of $x \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ one has

$$\text{ECC}^{-1}(x + e) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(x) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ECC}^{-1}\left(x \pm \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor + e\right) - \text{ECC}^{-1}(x) = 1 \pmod 2$$

Proof: Notice that, $x \notin \{-\Delta, \dots, \Delta\} \cup \{\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor - \Delta, \dots, \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor + \Delta\} \Rightarrow \text{ECC}^{-1}(x) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(x + e)$. We conclude that $\text{ECC}^{-1}(x + e) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(x)$ holds except with probability $4\Delta/q = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. The second equation is similar. ■

Since k_A is uniformly random, we have $\text{ECC}^{-1}(k_A) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(k_B)$ except with negligible probability $4\Delta/q = \text{negl}(\lambda)$; in other words, we can obtain exact key exchange that fails only with negligible probability as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Exact Key Exchange from LWE

The previous idea is highly related to the work of [7] especially their hardness proof of LWR; yet we were unable to build a better key exchange directly from LWR. Indeed, even if, in Figure 1, one replaces Bob's random errors e by a deterministic rounding error, the protocol still doesn't converge exactly.

3 Exact Smooth Projective Hash Functions from LWE

Smooth Projective Hash functions were initially introduced by Cramer and Shoup [22]. Since then, they have come in different flavors, up to the [39]-Smooth Projective Hash Functions, and an explicit instantiation in the case of Cramer-Shoup Ciphertext was given in [9].

In this section, we present a new instantiation of such CCA Smooth Projective Hash Function on Lattices; based on a variant of [43]. For a warm-up, the reader can start with the Appendix B that present a CPA-SPHF based on the dual Regev Encryption scheme discussed previously. The Appendix F offers a parallel between lattice and discrete-log constructions.

3.1 A Variant of Micciancio-Peikert Tag-Based CCA Encryption

In the next section, we detail our construction of a SPHF over a tag-based CCA-1 encryption. We will use a variant of Micciancio and Peikert scheme, with the following key modification to be compatible with our SPHF. While the original scheme encodes the message in the lower-order bits of the ciphertext, we need it to be encoded in the higher order bits following the procedure described earlier.

Parameters. For the rest of the section, we let $\mathbf{G} = [1 \ 2 \ \dots \ 2^{k-1}] \otimes \mathbf{Id}_n \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times nk}$ be the gadget matrix as defined in [43] and let ECC be the error correcting code as in Definition 2.4. The parameter will be assumed to be as follows: $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and it is a power of 2, $q = 2^k$ for some integer $k = \Omega(\lambda)$, $\bar{m} = \Omega(nk)$, $m = \bar{m} + nk$ and finally $s = q/f(n)$ where f is superpolynomial but subexponential in n , in particular $s = q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Tag Space. The tag space will be denoted by $\mathcal{T} \subset \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$. For the constructions of [43], the requirement on the set \mathcal{T} are that, for all $\mathbf{T} \in \mathcal{T}$, \mathbf{T} is invertible; and, for two distinct $\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{T}' \in \mathcal{T}$, $\mathbf{T} - \mathbf{T}'$ is invertible and finally that it is large: $|\mathcal{T}| \geq 2^{O(n)}$. A construction for such a tag-space is given in [43], based on embeddings of polynomial fields in the matrix ring $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$. Invertibility of tags is required for decryption, while invertibility of difference of tags will be used in the security proof.

Theorem 3.1 (Reformulation of Theorem 4 from [43]) *With the parameters as above, there exists an implicit function $B = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and an algorithm Invert , that given inputs $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\bar{m} \times nk}$, $\mathbf{A} = [\bar{\mathbf{A}} | -\bar{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, an invertible matrix $\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ and a vector $\mathbf{b} = (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ for some $(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ outputs this couple (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) under the condition that $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq q/B\sqrt{s_1(\mathbf{R})^2 + 1}$, where s_1 denotes the largest singular value of \mathbf{R} , except with negligible probability over the choice of $\bar{\mathbf{A}} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{\bar{m} \times n})$.*

Description of the Modified Tag Based Encryption Scheme. The tag-based encryption scheme [43] is based on the trapdoor generation technique presented in Lemma A.13. The encryption $\text{MP}_1 = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space $\{0, 1\}$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{KG}(1^n)$: choose a random matrix $\bar{\mathbf{A}} = \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \bar{m}})$ and $\mathbf{R} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^{\bar{m} \times nk}$. Define the encryption key $\text{ek} = \mathbf{A} = [\bar{\mathbf{A}} | -\bar{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and the decryption key $\text{dk} = (\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A})$.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{ek} = \mathbf{A}, \text{tag} = \mathbf{T} \in \mathcal{T}, M \in \{0, 1\}; \text{wit} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n) \times D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, s})$: Output

$$\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(M)]^\top \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m.$$

- $\text{Dec}(\text{dk} = (\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A}), \text{tag} = \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{c})$: Compute $(\mathbf{s}_0, \mathbf{e}_0) = \text{Invert}(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{c})$ and $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{e}_1) = \text{Invert}(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(1)])$, so that

$$\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \cdot \mathbf{s}_0 + \mathbf{e}_0 \text{ and } \mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \cdot \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{e}_1 + [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(1)]$$

If $\|\mathbf{e}_0\| \leq s\sqrt{m}$ output $M' = 0$; If $\|\mathbf{e}_1\| \leq s\sqrt{m}$ output $M' = 1$; Otherwise Output \perp

Correctness. From Theorem 3.1, one easily verifies that if \mathbf{c} is an encryption of $M \in \{0, 1\}$, then, $(\mathbf{s}_M, \mathbf{e}_M)$ as defined in the decryption algorithm above, verifies $(\mathbf{s}_M, \mathbf{e}_M) = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e})$, where (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) are the random inputs of the encryption algorithm. In particular $\|\mathbf{e}_M\| = \|\mathbf{e}\| \leq s\sqrt{m}$ with overwhelming probability. It remains to check that we can't have both inequalities $\|\mathbf{e}_i\| \leq s\sqrt{m}$ holding at the same time.

If it were the case, one would have

$$2 \cdot (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top (\mathbf{s}_0 - \mathbf{s}_1) + 2 \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0 - \mathbf{e}_1) = -2[\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(1)] \pmod{q}$$

Since $2 \cdot \text{ECC}(1) = 0 \pmod{q}$ this would imply the existence of two solutions to $(\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \mathbf{s}' + \mathbf{e}' = \mathbf{0}$, namely $(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{e}') = (\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})$ and $(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{e}') = 2(\mathbf{s}_0 - \mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{e}_0 - \mathbf{e}_1)$. For both solutions $\|\mathbf{e}'\| \leq q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$, which contradicts Theorem 3.1. indeed this theorem implies that the function $(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{e}') \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \times D \mapsto (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \mathbf{s}' + \mathbf{e}'$ is invertible, therefore injective for an error domain $D = \mathbb{Z}^m \cap r \cdot \mathcal{B}$ up to an error radius $r = q/\text{poly}(\lambda)$; while he have found a collision for a radius $r = q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$. In lattice terms, it would mean that the lattice spanned by the columns of $(\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top$ contains a very short vector.

CCA-1 and CCA-2 Security. The security proof of the modified scheme (Theorem 3.2) is mostly similar to the one of the original scheme of [43]. It is given in appendix C.

Theorem 3.2 (Security of MP_1) *The above scheme, MP_1 is selectively secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if dLWE holds.*

As explained in [40, 18], we recall that a CCA-1 scheme can easily be transformed to a CCA-2 scheme using a simple combination with a Strong OTS (see the Appendix A.1.5)

For lack of space, we recall in the Appendix A.4.1 how to obtain a strong one-time signature from a trapdoor commitment, which definition and construction will be also given. In the following the CCA-2 scheme will be called MP_2 and the CCA-1 scheme will be called MP_1 . We will implicitly also consider the modification of consider MP_2 and MP_1 with the modification of section 3.3 to adapt to the size of the input-output of the SPHF.

3.2 SPHF on the previous CCA Encryption Scheme

We now describe our SPHF on the CCA-1 scheme described in the previous section. Note that this also leads to an SPHF on the CCA-2 scheme if we furthermore check the one-time signature used to transform the CCA-1 scheme to a CCA-2 scheme.

- HashKG: output a vector chosen from the Gaussian, $\mathbf{hk} = \mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log m})}^m$, where $m = \bar{m} + nk$ as defined in Section 3.1.
- ProjKG($\mathbf{ek} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times nk}$, $\mathbf{hk} = \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$): output $\mathbf{hp} = (\mathbf{hp}_1, \mathbf{hp}_2)$ where $\mathbf{hp}_1 = \mathbf{w}_1 = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $\mathbf{hp}_2 = \mathbf{w}_2 = [\mathbf{0}_{n \times \bar{m}} | \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, where $\mathbf{0}_{n \times \bar{m}}$ is the zero matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \bar{m}}$.
- ProjHash($\mathbf{hp} = \mathbf{w}_1, \mathbf{w}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $\mathbf{wit} = \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $\mathbf{T} \in \mathcal{T}$): output $H' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{w}_1, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}_2, \mathbf{T}^\top \mathbf{s} \rangle) \in \{0, 1\}$.
- Hash($\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, M' , $\mathbf{hk} = \mathbf{v}$): compute $\mathfrak{h} = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(M')] \rangle$, and output $H = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\mathfrak{h}) \in \{0, 1\}$.

Correctness. Following the idea of [38], for correctness, we will consider sub-languages \bar{L}_M , of honestly generated encryption of a bit M . Precisely, we set

$$\bar{L}_M = \{ \mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(M)] \text{ where } \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \text{ with } \|\mathbf{e}\| \leq s \cdot \sqrt{m} \},$$

Lemma 2.3 ensures that $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq s \cdot \sqrt{m}$ holds for honestly generated ciphertext. We will define languages L_M in equation (1) that cover the ciphertext space \mathbb{Z}_q^m , and verify that $\bar{L}_M \subset L_M$. Let $\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}])^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(M)] \in \bar{L}_M$.

$$\begin{aligned} H' &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{w}_1, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{w}_2, \mathbf{T}^\top \mathbf{s} \rangle) \\ &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle [\mathbf{0}_{n \times \bar{m}} | \mathbf{G}] \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{T}^\top \mathbf{s} \rangle) \\ &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{A}^\top \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{v}, [\mathbf{0}_{n \times \bar{m}} | \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}]^\top \mathbf{s} \rangle) \\ &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\mathfrak{h} - \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle) \end{aligned}$$

Notice that \mathfrak{h} is uniformly random in \mathbb{Z}_q , while $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \leq \|\mathbf{e}\| \|\mathbf{v}\| \leq s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})m$, where the bound $\|\mathbf{v}\|$ follows from Lemma 2.3. Therefore, by Lemma 2.5, $H' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\mathfrak{h} - \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle) = H$ except with negligible probability.

Weak Smoothness. We first prove a weak smoothness property and then we use a simple amplification technique to reach standard Smoothness definition for SPHF. Let us start with some technical lemmata.

Lemma 3.3 (Smoothness of \mathbf{v} knowing $\mathbf{w}^\top = (\mathbf{w}_1^\top | \mathbf{w}_2^\top)$) *Let parameters n, q, m be as in the rest of this section. Set Λ to be the lattice $\Lambda^\perp \left(\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} \right)$, with matrices \mathbf{A} drawn uniformly in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Then, except with probability $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ we have $\eta_\epsilon(\Lambda) \leq \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ for some negligible function $\epsilon(n)$.*

Proof: The proof is adapted from [32, Lemma 5.3]. Consider the lattice Λ^* spanned by the columns of $\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}^\top$ and the vectors of \mathbb{Z}_q^m ; it is the (scaled) dual of Λ . We will first show that the minimal distance $\lambda_1^\infty(\Lambda^*)$ is at least $q/4$ with overwhelming probability, and conclude using [32, Lemma 2.6] (original lemma comes from [45, 6]) that $\eta_\epsilon(\Lambda) \leq \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ for some negligible function $\epsilon(n)$.

Recall that $\mathbf{G} = [1 \ 2 \ \dots \ 2^{k-1}] \otimes \mathbf{Id}_n \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times nk}$, and note that for any non-zero scalar $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the vector $\mathbf{t} = s \cdot (1 \ 2 \ \dots \ 2^{k-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^k$ has at least one coordinate equal to 2^{k-1} , since $q = 2^k$, in particular, for all vectors non-zero $\mathbf{s}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \setminus \{0\}$, $\|\mathbf{G}^\top \mathbf{s}'\|_\infty = q/2$. We now want to prove that $\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}^\top \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{s} \\ \mathbf{s}' \end{bmatrix}$ for all non-zero pair $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. If $\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{0}$, then $\mathbf{s} \neq \mathbf{0}$ and we are done. Otherwise, consider the sets $\mathcal{S} = \bigcup_{\mathbf{s}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} C + \mathbf{G}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s}'$ for $C = \{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \mid \|\mathbf{x}\|_\infty < q/4 \}$ the m -dimensional hypercube of radius $q/4$. The size of \mathcal{S} is at most $2^n \cdot (q/2)^m$; therefore, over the randomness of \mathbf{A} , for a fixed \mathbf{s} , the probability that $\mathbf{A}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s}$ falls in this set is at most $2^n \cdot (q/2)^m$. Taking the union bound over all non-zero \mathbf{s} , we conclude that $\lambda_1^\infty(\Lambda) \geq q/4$ except with probability $q^n \cdot 2^{n-m} \leq 2^{-\Omega(n)}$. ■

Corollary 3.4 (Unpredictability of $v_m \bmod 2$) *For $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log m})}^m$, conditioned on the fact that $\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{w}$, the marginal distribution of $v_m \bmod 2$ is ϵ -close to the uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_2)$ for some negligible function $\epsilon(n)$.*

Proof: Consider $\Lambda' = \{ \mathbf{v} \in \Lambda \mid v_m = 0 \bmod 2 \}$; it is a lattice and $2\Lambda \subset \Lambda'$, therefore, for any ϵ ,

$$\eta_\epsilon(\Lambda') \leq \eta_\epsilon(\Lambda) \leq 2\eta_\epsilon(\Lambda) \leq \omega(\sqrt{\log m}).$$

This implies that $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^m \bmod \Lambda'$ is ϵ -close to the uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^m \bmod \Lambda')$ by Lemma A.9, or equivalently that $(\mathbf{w} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \mathbf{v}, v_m)$ is ϵ -close to the uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_2)$. ■

For a fixed encryption key \mathbf{A} and projected key \mathbf{w} we will now define the languages L_0 and L_1 . For a ciphertext $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, we define for all bits i, j the following the following conditional probability

$$P_{H,M,j}(\mathbf{c}) = \mathbb{P}_{\mathbf{v}} \left(\text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(M)] \rangle) = H \mid \left[\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{A} & \\ \hline \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{G} \end{array} \right] \cdot \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{w} \wedge v_m = j \bmod 2 \right)$$

$$P_{H,M}(\mathbf{c}) = \mathbb{P}_{\mathbf{v}} \left(\underbrace{\text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(M)] \rangle)}_{\text{Hash}(\mathbf{c}, M, \mathbf{v})} = H \mid \left[\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{A} & \\ \hline \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{G} \end{array} \right] \cdot \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{w} \right)$$

We can now define the languages

$$L_0 = \left\{ \mathbf{c} \mid \left(\max_H P_{H,0}(\mathbf{c}) \right) \geq \left(\max_H P_{H,1}(\mathbf{c}) \right) \right\} \quad \text{and} \quad L_1 = \left\{ \mathbf{c} \mid \left(\max_H P_{H,0}(\mathbf{c}) \right) < \left(\max_H P_{H,1}(\mathbf{c}) \right) \right\}. \quad (1)$$

Intuitively, the language L_M is the language of ciphertext \mathbf{c} such than $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{c}, M, \mathbf{v})$ is more predictable than $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{c}, 1-M, \mathbf{v})$ over the marginal distribution of \mathbf{v} knowing \mathbf{w} .

By lemma 3.4, for any bit M , and vector \mathbf{c} we have that $P_{H,M}(\mathbf{c}) \in [1 - \epsilon, 1 + \epsilon] \cdot (P_{H,M,0}(\mathbf{c}) + P_{H,M,1}(\mathbf{c}))/2$ for some negligible ϵ . Moreover, if $v_m = 0 \bmod 2$, we have $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0} | \text{ECC}(1)] \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{c} \rangle$, therefore $P_{H,0,0}(\mathbf{c}) = P_{H,1,0}(\mathbf{c})$. Symmetrically, $P_{H,0,1}(\mathbf{c}) = 1 - P_{H,1,1}(\mathbf{c})$. Combining those equality, we obtain

$$\forall H, H', \quad P_{H,0}(\mathbf{c}) + P_{H',1}(\mathbf{c}) \leq \frac{3}{2} + \epsilon \quad \text{for some negligible } \epsilon, \quad (2)$$

(one first establish it for $H = H'$ and discuss whether $P_{H,\cdot}(\mathbf{c}) \geq 1/2$ or not). We conclude that for any $\mathbf{c} \in L_M$,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_H P_{H,1-M}(\mathbf{c}) &\leq \max_H P_{H,M}(\mathbf{c}) \leq 3/2 + \epsilon - \max_H P_{H,1-M}(\mathbf{c}) \\ &\leq 3/4 + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

In other words, the marginal distribution of $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{c}, 1-M, \mathbf{v})$ knowing \mathbf{w} is a Bernoulli distribution of bias $c \in [1/4 - \epsilon, 3/4 + \epsilon]$. While this does not provide perfect smoothness ($c = 1/2$), that is enough entropy so that we can proceed to smoothness amplification.

It remains to check that our languages are consistent with the one from correctness, that is $\bar{L}_M \subset L_M$. Note that, for $\mathbf{v} \in \bar{L}_0$, our correctness implies that $(\max_H P_{H,0}(\mathbf{c})) \geq 1 - \epsilon$ for some negligible ϵ . By inequality (2) this implies that $(\max_H P_{H,1}(\mathbf{c})) \leq 1/2 + \epsilon \leq (\max_H P_{H,0}(\mathbf{c}))$, that is $\mathbf{v} \in L_0$. The proof of $\bar{L}_1 \subset L_1$ is perfectly symmetrical.

Smoothness Amplification. To obtain perfect Smoothness⁵ one would repeat (in parallel) this protocol, say a times, and xor the a results. Smoothness is ensured for the following languages : $L_M^a = \{(\mathbf{c}_1 \dots \mathbf{c}_a) \mid \#\{i \mid \mathbf{c}_i \in L_M\} > a/2\}$ up to a statistical distance of $2^{-\Omega(a)}$. In the next section, we will see that this amplification comes at much reduced cost when one builds an SPHF for larger inputs and outputs.

Pseudo-Randomness. Once again, under the indistinguishability of the encryption, we can transform a commitment to a word in the language, to a commitment to a word outside of the language, hence an adversary against the Pseudo-Randomness either break the Smoothness (which, information theoretically he can not) or the indistinguishability of the encryption.

3.3 Multi-bit Domain and Codomain Extension

If one want to build an SPHF_p^k , an SPHF with p bits of inputs and k bits of output (typically to derive a k -bit key out of a p -bit password) an obvious solution is to repeat the protocol (with a perfectly smooth function) and obtain $p \cdot k$ hash values $h_{i,j}$, and derives a shared key $(\bigoplus_{j=1}^p h_{1,j}, \dots, \bigoplus_{j=1}^p h_{k,j}) \in \mathbb{Z}_2^k$. With the additional smoothness amplification, this would however come at a cost of repeating the protocol $a \cdot p \cdot k$.

Fortunately, using information theoretic techniques, one can derive a much more efficient construction, requiring only $\tilde{O}(p + k + a)$ repetition of the protocol. Let $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{Z}_2^p \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^r$ be a random linear code, for some $r \geq p$; we recall in Appendix (Lemma A.15) that such codes have Hamming distance at least d whenever $r \geq \tilde{O}(p + d + a)$ except with probability $2^{-\Omega(a)}$. Let $\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^{k \times r}$ be drawn uniformly. The protocol is as follows: repeat in parallel the previous weakly-smooth 1-bit SPHF for each of the r bits of $\mathcal{C}(M)$ and obtain $\mathbf{h} = (h_1, \dots, h_r)$; finally derive the key $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{h} \in \mathbb{Z}_2^k$.

⁵It is not clear whether this amplification is necessary: it could be that for small domains the right smoothness notion is a bounded correlation such as equation (2). After all, even with perfect smoothness, for a SPHF a one bit of input and one bit of output, a correct guess of 3/4 is what one obtains by trying to guess an M at random, output c a valid encryption of M , compute H' properly hoping that $H = H'$. Yet, strong smoothness implies that for at least one of the two value of $M = 0$ or 1 , H will be perfectly unpredictable; our relaxed notion allows the unpredictability to be split among the to cases $M = 0$ or 1 . Such refinement of standard definitions is beyond the scope of this paper.

While correctness is trivial, to prove smoothness, first define the languages

$$L_M^C = \left\{ (\mathbf{c}_1 \dots \mathbf{c}_r) \in \prod_{i=1}^r L_{x_i} \text{ for some } \mathbf{x} = (x_1 \dots x_r) \in \mathbb{Z}_2^r \text{ s.t. } \|\mathcal{C}(M) - \mathbf{x}\|_{\text{Hamming}} < d/2 \right\}.$$

Now, let's take some $(\mathbf{c}_1 \dots \mathbf{c}_r) \notin L_M^C$; by definition there exists a set of indexes \mathcal{I} of size at least $d/2$ such that $\forall i \in \mathcal{I}, \mathbf{c}_i \notin L_{\mathcal{C}(M)_i}$. Using our weak smoothness property this implies that \mathbf{h} has at least $\frac{d}{2} \log_2(4/3 - \epsilon)$ bits of min-entropy. By standard leftover hash lemma, the outputted key $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{h} \in \mathbb{Z}_2^k$ will be 2^{-a} -close to uniform as soon as $\frac{d}{2} \log_2(4/3 - \epsilon) \geq k + 2a$.

4 Applications: Password Authenticated Key-Exchange and UC Commitment

4.1 A Commitment based on Micciancio-Peikert Encryption

In a nutshell, when dealing with PAKE schemes constructed from the KOY-GL approach (with each player sending a commitment and a projection key for an SPHF), the UC framework requires that the first commitment sent is simultaneously extractable (in case it is sent by the adversary, the simulator needs to extract the value committed to) and equivocable (in case it is sent by an honest player, the simulator needs to be able to change its mind later on). The first solution was given in [19] but requires another commitment sent in a pre-flow and the use of a simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to ensure that the values committed to are the same in both flows. More recently, it was shown that it is indeed possible to construct a commitment both extractable and equivocable [2, 41, 9]. We follow their approach here.

Both the revisited Micciancio-Peikert Encryption, and the following Double Commitment can naturally extend these encryption and commitment schemes to vectors of k bits as implied previously by our notions of Multi-Bit Domain and Codomain extensions. For readability, we omit the one time signature in the coming instantiations, but it remains mandatory for CCA-2 consideration.

4.1.1 Double Micciancio-Peikert Commitment.

To fulfill the equivocability on the first commitment, we need to be able to give a “doubled” variant of our revision of the Micciancio-Peikert Encryption.⁶ See the Appendix D for more details, but we briefly present here the commitment scheme that we will use in the rest of this paper in conjunction with SPHF.

To make it equivocable, we double the commitment process, in two steps. The CRS additionally contains an encryption key for a trapdoor commitment ck (the trapdoor for equivocability is then called \aleph , see Section A.4.1 for more details).

We are going to require two Collision Resistant Hash Function \mathfrak{H}_K and $\mathfrak{H}_{K'}$. The Double Micciancio-Peikert Encryption encryption scheme, denoted DMP and detailed in the Appendix D is

$$\text{DMP.Encrypt}(\mathcal{L}, \text{ek}, M, N; \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \text{MP}_2.\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \mathbf{T}, M; \mathbf{r}), \mathcal{C}' \leftarrow \text{MP}_1.\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \mathbf{T}, N; \mathbf{s}))$$

where $\mathbf{T} = \mathfrak{H}_K(\mathcal{L})$ is computed during the generation of \mathcal{C} and transferred for the generation of \mathcal{C}' . \mathcal{L} is the label is going to include information like the session id, the users involved, the verification key vk, \dots We recall that the difference between MP_2 and MP_1 , defined after the theorem 3.2, resides in the fact that the MP_1 version is not accompanied by a Strong One-Time Signature, so it is not CCA-2.

We will use DMPCom to denote the use of DMP with the encryption key ek . The usual commit/decommit processes are described on Figure 8 in the Appendix D. We clearly cannot do the decommit phase (otherwise we reveal the password used), so that we need a variant of this commitment, where one can implicitly check the opening with an SPHF. This DMPCom' scheme can be found on Figure 3. We stress that at this stage, the initial perfectly hiding commitment needs to be to the value $\chi = \mathfrak{H}_{K'}(\mathcal{C}')$; later in this paper (see Section 4.4), when we present our UC Commitment, we use instead $\chi = \mathfrak{H}_{K'}(M, \mathcal{C}')$ (for an explicit check).

The DMPCom' scheme in this way is not formally extractable/binding: the sender can indeed encrypt M in \mathcal{C} and $N \neq 0$ in \mathcal{C}' , and then, the global ciphertext $\mathcal{C} + \zeta \mathcal{C}'$ contains $M' = M + \zeta N \neq M$, versus the value M extractable from \mathcal{C} . However as M' is unknown before ζ is sent, if one checks the membership of M' to a sparse language, it will unlikely be true.

A first naive way, to achieve this property is to use a naive amplification technique on the challenge ζ , as we are later considering language of bits / strings of bits, linear amplification may probably lead to more efficient instantiations. For simplicity, we will describe the schemes with a single ζ supposed to lead to enough entropy.

4.2 A Three-Round PAKE proven in the UC framework

The only existing lattice-based construction of PAKE is given in [38, 24]. It is a 3-round protocol, proven in a variant of the BPR model [8]. We give two improvements of this protocol in this section. First, in this subsection, we give an equivalent 3-round protocol, but this time proven in the UC framework [16, 19]. To do so, we are going to use the homomorphic

⁶This is an artificial tool to allow both extraction and equivocation. Indeed, any IND-CCA labeled encryption scheme can be used as a non-malleable and extractable labeled commitment scheme. In order to add the equivocability, one can use a technique inspired from [41, 9].




Figure 3: DMPCom' Commitment Scheme for SPHF

P_i uses a password W_i and P_j uses a password W_j . We denote $\mathcal{L} = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$.

- First Round: P_i (with random tape ω_i) first generates a pair of signing/verification keys $(\text{SK}_i, \text{VK}_i)$ and a DMPCom' commitment on W_i in $(\mathcal{C}_i, \mathcal{C}'_i)$, with randomness $(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{r}'_i)$, under the label $\mathcal{L}_i = (\mathcal{L}, \text{VK}_i)$: $(\mathcal{C}_i, \mathcal{C}'_i) = \text{DMPCom}'(\mathcal{L}_i, \text{ek}, W_i, 0; \mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{r}'_i)$. It also computes a Trapdoor commitment on \mathcal{C}'_i in \mathcal{C}''_i (with randomness \mathbf{t}): $\chi = \mathfrak{H}_{K'}(\mathcal{C}'_i)$ and $\mathcal{C}''_i = \text{Trap.Commit}(\chi; \mathbf{t})$. It then sends $(\text{VK}_i, \mathcal{C}_i, \mathcal{C}''_i)$ to P_j ;
- Second Round: P_j (with random tape ω_j) computes a MP_2 encryption on W_j in $\text{Com}_j = \mathcal{C}_j$, with witness \mathbf{r}_j , under the label $\mathcal{L}_j = \mathcal{L}$ and $\mathbf{T}_j = \mathfrak{H}_K(\mathcal{L}_j)$: $\mathcal{C}_j = \text{MP}_2(\text{ek}, \mathbf{T}_j, W_j; \mathbf{r}_j)$. It then generates a challenge ζ on \mathcal{C}_i and hashing/projection keys hk_i and the corresponding hp_i for the equality test on Com_i : “Com_i is a valid commitment of W_j ”. It then sends $(\mathcal{C}_j, \zeta, \text{hp}_i)$ to P_i ;
- Third Round: user P_i can compute $\text{Com}_i = \mathcal{C}_i + \zeta \mathcal{C}'_i$ and witness $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{r}_i + \zeta \mathbf{r}'_i$, it generates hashing/projection keys hk_j and hp_j for the equality test on Com_j . It finally signs all the flows using SK_i in σ_i and sends $(\mathcal{C}'_i, \mathbf{t}, \text{hp}_j, \sigma_i)$ to P_j ;
- Hashing: P_j first checks the signature and the validity of the Trapdoor commitment (thanks to \mathbf{t}), it computes $\text{Com}_i = \mathcal{C}_i + \zeta \mathcal{C}'_i$. P_i computes K_i and P_j computes K_j as follows:

$$K_i = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_j, L'_j, \mathcal{L}, \text{Com}_j) \oplus \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_i, L_i, \mathcal{L}_i, \text{Com}_i; \mathbf{z})$$

$$K_j = \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}_j, L_j, \mathcal{L}, \text{Com}_j; \mathbf{r}_j) \oplus \text{Hash}(\text{hk}_i, L'_i, \mathcal{L}_i, \text{Com}_i)$$

Figure 4: Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange

properties on the randomness in the CCA-1 encryption from [43], upgraded to CCA-2 with a strong one-time signature and the previous home-made smooth projective hash functions. Secondly, in the next subsection we give a one-round protocol in the BPR model [8] by taking advantage of the strong properties of the SPHF we present in Section 3.2. The projection key can indeed be computed before having seen the corresponding commitment, which enables us to get rid of the other rounds.

4.2.1 Functionality of Password-Authenticated Key Exchange

We use the functionality of PAKE presented in [19]. We recall it in Appendix E for lack of space.

4.2.2 Construction of our Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

We use the generic construction given in [9], as described on Figure 4. This protocol consists in three rounds, the first and the third one being a double Micciancio-Peikert commitment sent by P_i . We thus need this player to generate a pair of one-time signature keys $(\text{SK}_i, \text{VK}_i)$ in order to sign his second flow and avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. Since P_j is the second player to send his flow, a simple Micciancio-Peikert commitment, as presented in Section 3.1 is enough. Both players also send a projection key to each other, in order to check the validity of these commitments, and thus that they share the same password. This will lead to a session key constructed from the two (projected) hash values. Note that the projection key needs to be sent by P_j before having sent the entire Com_i sent by P_i , but the SPHF indeed only depends on \mathcal{C}_i , already known by P_j . Furthermore, the SPHF constructed in Section 3.2 has the nice property that the projection key does not depend on the commitment. This is a stronger property than the one presented in [38]. Speaking in terms of languages to be consistent with the presentation of our SPHF in Section 3.2, P_i uses a password W_i and expects P_j to own the same password, i.e. a word in the language $L'_j = L_i = \{W_i\}$. Similarly, P_j uses a password W_j and expects P_i to own the same password, i.e. a word in the language $L_i = L_j = \{W_j\}$.

Theorem 4.1 *Our PAKE scheme from Figure 4 realizes the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ functionality in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model, in the presence of static adversaries, under the LWE and SIS assumptions and the security of the One-Time Signature.*

Technically, one can use a CPA encryption for \mathcal{C}_j , so for optimization purpose it would be better to use the Dual Regev Encryption and its associated SPHF in this case, however for a symmetrical approach in design, we use our revisited Micciancio-Peikert MP_2 on both sides, once in the Dual Commitment scheme for P_i , and once directly for P_j .

4.2.3 Extension to LAKE

Recent works [9, 10] also used SPHF to build protocols more modular than classical PAKE, where they do not restrain the languages to only words. This primitive, called LAKE for Language Authenticated Key Exchange, allows two users, Alice and Bob, each owning a word in a specific language, to agree on a shared high entropy secret if each user knows a word in the language the other thinks about. This notion supersedes PAKE, verifier-based PAKE, Secret Handshakes, CAKEs, ...

Our PAKE is a LAKE for singleton language. We can then combine those languages using operation on SPHF presented in [2] to efficiently construct LAKE for languages that are expressed by a (\wedge, \vee) -formula over those base languages. Also, using the naive multi-bit extension of our SPHF it is possible, using the same techniques as [2] to build LAKE for languages of the form $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{J}} = \{w \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, w_i = 0, \forall j \in \mathcal{J}, w_j = 1\}$; in other words, wild-carded bit-strings; and then combine them again by (\wedge, \vee) -formulae.

4.3 A One-Round PAKE

As explained earlier, Katz and Vaikuntanathan [38] recently proposed the first PAKE protocol based on lattices, using a general framework following KOY-GL's approach [37, 30]. As in their article, we consider here the standard notions of security [8, 37, 30] but we improve the efficiency of their construction by giving a one-round protocol.

The high-level idea follows that of [39, 10]: In the KOY-GL framework, each player sends an encryption of the password, and then uses an SPHF on the partner's ciphertext to check whether it actually contains the same password. The two hash values are then xored to produce the session key. If the encrypted passwords are the same, the different ways to compute the hash values (Hash and ProjHash) give the same results. If the passwords differ, the smoothness makes the values computed by each player independent. To this aim, the authors need an SPHF on a labeled IND-CCA encryption scheme.

Moreover, to allow a one-round PAKE, the ciphertext and the projection key on the partner's ciphertext should be sent together, before having seen the partner's ciphertext: the projection key should thus be independent of the ciphertext. In addition, the adversary can wait to have received the partner's projection key before generating the ciphertext, and thus a stronger smoothness is required. This is exactly why we need a strong type of SPHF_p^k , as constructed in Section 3.2, in the one-round PAKE framework. The protocol is presented on Figure 5.




Figure 5: One-Round PAKE

Theorem 4.2 *Our one-round PAKE scheme from Figure 5 is secure in the BPR model, under the LWE and SIS assumptions.*

Proof: Since the scheme exactly follows the scheme given in [10], we only have to check that our primitives (MP_2 encryption and SPHF) fulfill the same properties in order to be able to apply modularly the proof given in [10, Theorem 4]. This was done in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, which concludes the proof. ■

4.4 The First UC Commitment Based in Lattices

On Figure 6, we will provide the first UC commitment based on Lattices. This scheme is inspired by the ideas from [41, 11]. We will consider a bit commitment, and using techniques explained before, this can easily be generalized to any bitstring.

4.4.1 Functionality of Commitment.

We use the functionality of Commitment presented in [17, 41]. We recall it in Appendix E for lack of space.

We have a CRS, consisting of $(ck, ek, \mathfrak{H}_K, \mathfrak{H}_{K'})$, respectively the commitment key for a trapdoor commitment, the encryption key for a Micciancio Peikert like scheme, and randomly drawn from a collision-resistant hash function family \mathcal{H} , one arriving in the tagspace, the other in the bitstring space.

The commit phase. Upon receiving a message $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, x)$, party P_i works as follows, where $x \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\text{sid}, \text{ssid} \in \{0, 1\}^{\log^2(n)/4}$.

1. P_i picks $\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, sets $\mathcal{L}_i = (\mathcal{L}, \text{vk})$ and computes $(C_1, C_2) = \text{DMP}(\mathcal{L}, ek, 0; \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s})$ with noise $\mathbf{e}_r, \mathbf{e}_s$.
 P_i picks $\mathbf{t}_1, \mathbf{t}_2 \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \mathbf{s}}$.
He computes $c_t^1 = \text{Trap.Commit}(\xi, (C_1); \mathbf{t}_1)$, $c_t^2 = \text{Trap.Commit}(\xi, (x, C_2, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j); \mathbf{t}_2)$.
He sends (c_t^1, c_t^2) to P_j .
2. P_j picks $\zeta \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^*$ and sends it to P_i .
3. P_i now computes $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{r} + \zeta \mathbf{s}$, $\mathbf{e}_z = \mathbf{e}_r + \zeta \mathbf{e}_s$, and erases $\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}_r, \mathbf{e}_s$.
He also opens c_t^1 by sending (C_1, \mathbf{t}_1) to P_j .
4. P_j verifies the consistency of c_t^1 using $\text{Trap.Open}(ck, C_1, c_t^1, \mathbf{t}_1)$.
If yes, he stores $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, C_1, \zeta, \mathbf{e}_z, c_t^2)$ and outputs $(\text{receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$.
He ignores any later commitment messages with the same $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ from P_i .

The decommit phase. Upon receiving a message $(\text{reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$, P_i works as follows:

1. P_i sends $(x, C_2, \mathbf{t}_2, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$ to P_j .
2. P_j outputs $(\text{reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, x)$ if and only if c_t^2 is consistent and \mathbf{e}_z is of appropriate size and:

$$\text{MP}_2(ek, \mathbf{T}, x; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z) = C_1 + \zeta C_2$$

Figure 6: Our New Commitment Protocol UC-Secure against Adaptive Adversaries

4.4.2 Description of the Protocol.

The commit phase requires only 3 rounds, and the decommit is straightforward.

As explained when we introduced the DMP scheme in Section 4.2, we are now going to include the value x in the second Trapdoor Commitment to prevent the adversary from trying to open his commitment to another value. We stress again that the verification of the strong one time signature is implied every time someone receives a MP_2 encryption. This is required to be able to rely on the IND-CCA-2 property in the simulation. We only describe the adaptive version of this protocol, one can easily switch commitment rounds to the decommitment to obtain a fair comparison with Lindell's protocol with static corruption. We describe the version on one bit, once again we could just use multiple commitment to extend to any message.

Theorem 4.3 *Our Commitment scheme from Figure 6 realizes the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$ functionality in the \mathcal{F}_{crs} -hybrid model, in the presence of adaptive adversaries, under the LWE and SIS assumptions.*

The complete proof, and the associated simulator can be found in the Appendix E.5.

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A Technical preliminaries

A.1 Security Definition

A.1.1 Public Key Encryption Scheme.

A public key encryption scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} is defined as follows:

- $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow_s \text{KG}(1^n)$: the randomized key generation algorithm with security parameter $n \in \mathbb{N}$;
- $c \leftarrow_s \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, m)$: the randomized encryption algorithm encrypts the message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ to get a ciphertext C ;
- $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{dk}, c)$: the (deterministic) decryption algorithm decrypts the ciphertext c to get back the plaintext or a rejection symbol.

PKE is perfectly correct if for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, all $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow_s \text{KG}(1^n)$ and all messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$ we have $\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{dk}, \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, m)) = m] = 1$.

Definition A.1 (Security of Public Key Encryption) *Public key encryption scheme PKE is (τ, ε, Q) -secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-2) if and only if*

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}, Q}^{\text{CCA-2}}(n) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq \varepsilon$$

holds for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} with running time τ , where $\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, Q}^{\text{CCA-2}}(n)$ is defined in Table 1. $\text{Dec}(c)$ is an oracle returns $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{dk}, c)$ and \mathcal{A} can only query $\text{Dec}(\cdot)$ at most $Q = \text{poly}(n)$ times.

Specially, there are two weaker notions on the public key encryption: if $Q = 0$, then we say the scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA); if the adversary \mathcal{A} is not allowed to query $\text{Dec}(\cdot)$ after seeing the challenge ciphertext c^* , then we say the scheme is secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-1).

<p>Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}, Q}^{\text{CCA-2}}(n)$ $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow_s \text{KG}(1^n)$; $(m_0, m_1, St) \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(\cdot)}(\text{ek})$; $b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$; $c^* \leftarrow_s \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, m_b)$ $b' \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(\cdot)}(c^*, St)$; If $b' = b$ then return 1 else return 0.</p>
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Table 1: Security Experiment for Public Key Encryption

A.1.2 Tag-based Encryption Scheme.

A tag-based encryption [40] is similar to the public key encryption except that the encryption and decryption operations take an additional tag, which is a binary string of appropriate length and need not have any particular internal structure. Formally, a tag-based encryption scheme $\text{TBE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with tag space \mathcal{T} and message space \mathcal{M} is defined as follows:

- $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow_s \text{KG}(1^n)$: the randomized key generation algorithm with security parameter $n \in \mathbb{N}$;

- $c \leftarrow_s \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, t, m)$: the randomized encryption algorithm encrypts the message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ with tag $t \in \mathcal{T}$ to get a ciphertext C ;
- $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{dk}, t, c)$: the (deterministic) decryption algorithm decrypts the ciphertext c with tag t to get back the plaintext or a rejection symbol.

TBE is perfectly correct if for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, all $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow_s \text{KG}(1^n)$, all tags t and messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$ we have $\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{dk}, t, \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, t, m)) = m] = 1$.

Definition A.2 (Security of Tag-based Encryption) *Tag-based encryption scheme TBE is (τ, ε, Q) -selective-tag weak security against chosen ciphertext attacks (tbe-stag-cca) if and only if*

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}, Q}^{\text{tbe-stag-cca}}(n) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq \varepsilon$$

holds for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} with running time τ , where $\text{Exp}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}, Q}^{\text{tbe-stag-cca}}(n)$ is defined in Table 2. $\text{ODec}(t, c)$ is an oracle returns $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{dk}, t, c)$ with restriction that \mathcal{A} is not allowed to query with target tag t^* . \mathcal{A} can only query $\text{ODec}(\cdot, \cdot)$ at most $Q = \text{poly}(n)$ times.

<p>Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}, Q}^{\text{tbe-stag-cca}}(n)$ $t^* \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}(1^n)$; $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow_s \text{KG}(1^n)$; $(m_0, m_1, St) \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}^{\text{ODec}(\cdot, \cdot)}(\text{ek})$; $b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$; $c^* \leftarrow_s \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, t^*, m_b)$ $b' \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}^{\text{ODec}(\cdot, \cdot)}(c^*, St)$; If $b' = b$ then return 1 else return 0.</p>

Table 2: Security Experiment for Tag-based Encryption

As shown in [40, 18], tbe-stag-cca encryption scheme can be transferred into a CCA-2 public key encryption by using a Strong One-time Signature.

A.1.3 Trapdoor Commitment.

A commitment is defined as $\text{COM} = (\text{CKG}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open})$:

- $(\text{ck}, \text{td}) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n)$: the randomized key generation algorithm outputs the commitment key ck and the trapdoor td ;
- $(c, r) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, m)$: the randomized commitment algorithm inputs the commitment key ck and the message m and then it outputs the commitment value c and the opening information w ;
- $1/0 \leftarrow \text{Open}(\text{ck}, m, c, r)$: the deterministic opening algorithm decommits the commitment value c with the opening information r . If c is indeed the commitment of m then it outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0.

Definition A.3 (Trapdoor Commitment) *A commitment scheme COM with message space \mathcal{M} is called trapdoor commitment if it satisfies the followings:*

- **Perfect hiding.** *This property states the following two distributions are identical:*

$$\begin{aligned} &\{c_0 : (\text{ck}, \text{td}) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n), (c_0, r_0) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, m_0)\} \\ &\{c_1 : (\text{ck}, \text{td}) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n), (c_1, r_1) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, m_1)\} \end{aligned}$$

where $m_0 \neq m_1$.

- **Computational binding.** *COM is (τ, ε) -binding if the following holds for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} with running time τ :*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{ck}, \text{td}) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n); ((m_0, c, r_0), (m_1, c, r_1)) \leftarrow_s \mathcal{A}(\text{ck}) : \\ \text{Open}(\text{ck}, m_0, c, r_0) = \text{Open}(\text{ck}, m_1, c, r_1) = 1 \wedge (m_0, r_0) \neq (m_1, r_1) \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon.$$

- **Perfect trapdoor opening.** *There exist an efficient algorithm Topen given the trapdoor td can open the commitment to any message. Formally, the following holds:*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{ck}, \text{td}) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n); m_0, m_1 \leftarrow_s \mathcal{M}; (c_0, r_0) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}, m_0); \\ r_1 \leftarrow_s \text{Topen}(\text{td}, (m_0, r_0), m_1) : \text{Open}(\text{ck}, m_1, c_0, r_1) = 1 \wedge m_0 \neq m_1 \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

A.1.4 One time Signature

A signature scheme SIG with message space \mathcal{M} is defined as a triple of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms $\text{SIG} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$:

- $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow_s \text{Gen}(1^n)$: the randomized key generation algorithm takes as an input the unary representation of the security parameter 1^n and outputs a verification key vk and signing key sk .
- $s \leftarrow_s \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)$: the randomized signing algorithm takes as input a signing key sk and message m and outputs a signature s .
- $0/1 \leftarrow \text{Verify}(\text{vk}, m, s)$: the deterministic verification algorithm takes as input a verification key vk and a message-signature pair (m, s) outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).

SIG is perfectly correct if for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, all $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow_s \text{Gen}(1^n)$, all $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and all $s \leftarrow_s \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)$ that $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, m, s) = 1$.

Definition A.4 (Strong one-time signatures) Signature scheme SIG is (τ, ε) -strong existential unforgeable under one-time chosen-message attacks (S-OTS) iff

$$\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mathcal{F}}^{\text{S-OTS}}(n) = 1] \leq \varepsilon$$

holds for any PPT adversary \mathcal{F} with running time τ , where $\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mathcal{F}, q}^{\text{S-OTS}}(n)$ is defined in Table 3.

<p>Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mathcal{F}}^{\text{S-OTS}}(n)$ $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow_s \text{Gen}(1^n)$; $(m^*, s^*) \leftarrow_s \mathcal{F}^{\text{OSign}(\cdot)}(\text{vk})$, where the oracle $\text{OSign}(\cdot) := \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, \cdot)$ can be asked at most once If $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, m^*, s^*) = 1$ and $(m^*, s^*) \neq (m_1, s_1)$ then return 1, else return 0.</p>
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Table 3: Security experiment for strong one-time signature.

A.1.5 CCA-2 security from One Time Signature

As explained in [40, 18], we recall that a CCA-1 scheme can easily be transformed to a CCA-2 scheme using a simple combination with a Strong OTS following the construction in Figure 7. This leads to the following result:

Lemma A.5 Assuming the TBE scheme is selective-tag chosen-ciphertext secure, the OTS is a strong, one-time signature scheme, then the public-key encryption scheme presented in Figure 7 is chosen-ciphertext secure.

<p>Encrypt(ek, M): Generates: $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{OTS.Gen}(1^n)$ Computes: $C \leftarrow \text{TBE.Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M)$ $\sigma \leftarrow \text{OTS.Sign}(\text{sk}, C)$ Returns $\mathcal{C} = (C, \text{vk}, \sigma)$.</p>	<p>Decrypt($\text{dk}, (C, \text{vk}, \sigma)$): Check that $\text{OTS.Verify}(\text{vk}, C, \sigma)$ If verifies correctly, computes: $M = \text{TBE.Decrypt}(\text{dk}, \text{vk}, C)$</p>
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Figure 7: Generic Construction of a CCA-2 encryption from a TBE and a Strong-OTS.

A.1.6 UC framework

We focus in this paper on protocols whose security is proven in the universal composability framework, more precisely on password-authenticated key-exchange (PAKE) and commitments. In a nutshell, this framework allows the protocols to remain secure when composed in an arbitrary environment, which reveals particularly useful in the case of password-based protocols. This simulation-based notion of security relies on the use of ideal functionalities, which capture all the necessary properties of the protocols and the means of an adversary. For clarity, we defer in Appendix E the ideal functionalities of PAKE and commitments. The interested reader is referred to [16, 19, 41] for details.

A.1.7 Smooth Projective Hash Functions

Smooth projective hash functions (SPHF) were introduced by Cramer and Shoup [22] for constructing encryption schemes. A projective hashing family is a family of hash functions that can be evaluated in two ways: using the (secret) *hashing* key, one can compute the function on every point in its domain, whereas using the (public) *projected* key one can only compute the function on a special subset of its domain. Such a family is deemed *smooth* if the value of the hash function on any point outside the special subset is independent of the projected key. The notion of SPHF has found applications in various contexts in cryptography (e.g. [30, 36, 2]), and we will rely on it, for most of our constructions.

Definition A.6 (Smooth Projective Hashing System) A Smooth Projective Hash Function over a language $\mathcal{L} \subset X$ onto a set \mathcal{H} , is defined by five algorithms (Setup, HashKG, ProjKG, Hash, ProjHash):

- Setup(1^n) where 1^n is the security parameter, generates the global parameters params of the scheme, and the description of an \mathcal{NP} language \mathcal{L} ;
- HashKG(\mathcal{L} , params), outputs a hashing key hk for the language \mathcal{L} ;
- ProjKG(hk , (\mathcal{L} , params), W), derives the projection key hp , possibly depending on the word W [30, 2] thanks to the hashing key hk .
- Hash(hk , (\mathcal{L} , params), W), outputs a hash value $H \in \mathcal{H}$, thanks to the hashing key hk , and W
- ProjHash(hp , (\mathcal{L} , params), W , w), outputs the hash value $H' \in \mathcal{H}$, thanks to the projection key hp and the witness w that $W \in \mathcal{L}$.

In the following, we consider \mathcal{L} as a hard-partitioned subset of X , i.e. it is computationally hard to distinguish a random element in \mathcal{L} from a random element in $X \setminus \mathcal{L}$.

A Smooth Projective Hash Function should satisfy the following properties:

- *Correctness*: Let $W \in \mathcal{L}$ and w a witness of this membership. Then, for all hashing keys hk and associated projection keys hp we have $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), W) = \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), W, w)$.
- *Smoothness*: For all $W \in X \setminus \mathcal{L}$ the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_0 &= \left\{ (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}, W, \text{hp}, H) \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{params} = \text{Setup}(1^n), \text{hk} = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), \\ \text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), W), H = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), W) \end{array} \right\} \\ \Delta_1 &= \left\{ (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}, W, \text{hp}, H) \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{params} = \text{Setup}(1^n), \text{hk} = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), \\ \text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{params}), W), H \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H} \end{array} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

- *Pseudo-Randomness*: If $W \in \mathcal{L}$, then without a witness of membership the two previous distributions should remain computationally indistinguishable: for any adversary \mathcal{A} within reasonable time

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SPHF}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr}}(n) = \Pr_{\Delta_1}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{L}, \text{params}, W, \text{hp}, H) = 1] - \Pr_{\Delta_0}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{L}, \text{params}, W, \text{hp}, H) = 1] \text{ is negligible.}$$

In the special case of languages on Lattices: Katz and Vaikuntanathan have proposed a relaxed definition of Smooth Projective Hash Functions with only an approximated Correctness. This notion echoes to the approximate decryption on ciphertext, where in some cases because of the noise, a decryption on the message might not lead to the initial ciphertext, and so here, in some negligible occasions, an honestly computed projective hash for a word in the language may not be equal to the corresponding hash.

Also, due to approximation in the decryption algorithm, and possibly the acceptance of improperly generated ciphertext, we want a better control on the languages. To languages L_b that corresponds to ciphertext where the decryption leads to the bit b , we associate the sub-language \tilde{L}_b that corresponds to valid encryption of the bit b . Assuming the encryption scheme has an approximate correctness, we have $\tilde{L}_b \subset L_b$ except for a negligible amount of values. However there can be values dishonestly generated that can still be decrypted, so one should assume $\tilde{L}_b \subsetneq L_b$.

This has an impact on the previous security definitions, the correctness will only be studied for words in \tilde{L}_b as we really care about honest things done by honest user, while the smoothness will be studied for elements outside L_b as the adversary might do improperly generated ciphertext on purpose.

A.2 Facts about Lattices

For integers n, m and for a prime q , let $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. The m -dimensional integer lattice $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ is defined as

$$\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A}) := \{\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}\}.$$

For any $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, define the coset

$$\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^{\perp}(\mathbf{A}) := \{\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \bmod q\}.$$

For our applications, note that if $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times n}$ is chosen uniformly at random, and if $m \geq \Omega(n \log q)$ then the functions $f_{\mathbf{A}} : \mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^m \mapsto \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ form a pairwise-independent family, in particular for $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\{0, 1\})$, $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}$ is negligibly close to the uniform distribution $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$.

A.2.1 Discrete Gaussian Distributions

Definition A.7 The (unnormalized) weight of Gaussian distribution of parameter $s \in \mathbb{R}$ and center $c \in \mathbb{R}$ at $x \in \mathbb{R}$ is defined by $\rho_{s,c}(x) = \exp\left(-\pi \frac{(x-c)^2}{s^2}\right)$, and more generally, the spherical Gaussian distribution of parameter $s > 0$ and center $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is defined over \mathbb{R}^n as

$$\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x}) = e^{-\pi \frac{(\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c})^2}{s^2}}.$$

The discrete Gaussian distribution over \mathbb{Z} is defined by the probabilities $D_{\mathbb{Z},s,c}(x) = \rho_{s,c}(x)/\rho_{s,c}(\mathbb{Z})$ for any $x \in \mathbb{Z}$, and more generally, over a lattice L by

$$D_{L,s,c}(\mathbf{x}) = \rho_{s,c}(\mathbf{x})/\rho_{s,c}(L) \text{ for any } \mathbf{x} \in L.$$

The following lemmas are useful for this paper:

Definition A.8 [Smoothing Parameter [44]] For any n -dimensional lattice L and any real $\epsilon > 0$, the smoothing parameter $\eta_{\epsilon}(L)$ (see [44]) is the smallest real $s > 0$ such that $\rho_{1/s}(\hat{L} \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}) \leq \epsilon$.

Lemma A.9 (Implicit in [44, Lemma 4.4]) For any lattice full rank lattice $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^m$, and $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$, if $\sigma \geq \eta_{\epsilon}(\Lambda)$ the distribution $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{R}^m, \sigma} \bmod \Lambda$ is at ℓ_{∞} distance at most $O(\epsilon)$ from uniform over $\mathbb{R}^m \bmod \Lambda$.

In particular if $\Lambda = \Lambda^{\perp}(\mathbf{B})$ for a full rank matrix $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$ the distribution of $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbf{v} \bmod q$ for $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}$ is at distance $O(\epsilon)$ from uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q^n .

Lemma A.10 (Lemma 3.3 of [44]) For any lattice $L \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ of dimension n and any $\epsilon \in (0, 1]$,

$$\eta_{\epsilon}(L) \leq \sqrt{\ln(2n(1+1/\epsilon))}/\pi \cdot \lambda_n(L)$$

where $\lambda_n(L)$ denotes the largest minima of L . In particular, if \mathbf{B} is a basis of L , for any super-logarithmic function $\omega(\log n)$ there exists a negligible function $\epsilon(n)$ such that $\eta_{\epsilon}(L) \leq \|\mathbf{B}\| \sqrt{\omega(\log n)}$.

Corollary A.11 (Smoothing Lemma over \mathbb{Z}) The statistical distance between $D_{\mathbb{Z}, d \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})} \bmod d$ the discrete Gaussian taken modulo $d \in \mathbb{Z}$, and $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_d)$ the uniform distribution over \mathbb{Z}_d , is negligible in λ .

Lemma A.12 (Smoothing Lemma for random lattice, Corollary 5.4 of [32]) Let n be a positive integer and q be a prime, and let integer $m \geq 2n \log q$. Then for all but a $2q^{-n}$ fraction of all $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and for any $s \geq \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, the distribution of the syndrome $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} \bmod q$ is statically close to uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q^n , where \mathbf{x} is from $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, s}$.

Lemma A.13 (Theorem 5.1 of [43]) There is an efficient randomized algorithm $\text{GenTrap}^{\mathcal{D}}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ that, given any integers $n \geq 1$, $q \geq 2$, and sufficiently large $m = O(n \log q)$, outputs a parity-check matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and a trapdoor \mathbf{R} such that the distribution of \mathbf{A} is $\text{negl}(n)$ -far from uniform and \mathbf{R} is sampled from the Gaussian \mathcal{D} . Moreover, there are efficient algorithms Invert and SampleD that with overwhelming probability over all random choices, do the followings:

- For $\mathbf{b}^t = \mathbf{s}^t \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}^t$ is arbitrary and either $\|\mathbf{e}\| < q/O(\sqrt{n \log q})$ or $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q}$ for $1/\alpha \geq \sqrt{n \log q} \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log q})$, the deterministic algorithm $\text{Invert}(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b})$ outputs \mathbf{s} and \mathbf{e} ;
- For any $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and large enough $s = O(\sqrt{n \log q})$, there is an efficient randomized algorithm $\text{SampleD}(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}, s)$ that samples from a distribution with $\text{negl}(n)$ statistical distance of $D_{\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^{\perp}(\mathbf{A}), s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}$.

A.3 Information-theoretic Facts

A distribution D is said to be ϵ -uniform if its statistical distance from the uniform distribution is at most ϵ . Let X and Y be finite sets. A family \mathcal{H} of hash functions from X to Y is said to be pairwise-independent if for all distinct $x, x' \in X$, $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[h(x) = h(x')] = 1/|Y|$.

Lemma A.14 (Leftover Hash Lemma) Let \mathcal{H} be a family of pairwise-independent hash functions from X to Y . Suppose that $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$ and $x \leftarrow X$ are chosen uniformly and independently. Then, $(h, h(x))$ is $\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{|Y|/|X|}$ -uniform over $\mathcal{H} \times Y$.

Lemma A.15 (Hamming distance of a random linear code) Let $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^{r \times p}$ be a uniformly random binary matrix, and define the linear code $\mathcal{C} : \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_2^p \mapsto \mathbf{C}\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_2^r$. Then, if $r \geq p + (d+1) \log_2 r + a$, except with probability less than 2^{-a} over the randomness of \mathbf{C} , the hamming distance of the code \mathcal{C} is at least d .

Proof: The proof is similar to the one already done in the lattice case, our Lemma 3.3, or [32, Lemma 5.3]. Let \mathcal{B} denotes the Hamming ball of radius d in dimension r ; the cardinal of \mathcal{B} is at most r^{d+1} . For each non-zero $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_2^p \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, the probability over \mathcal{C} that $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{x}$ falls in \mathcal{B} is at most $r^{d+1}/2^r$; taking the union bound over all \mathbf{x} 's, we conclude that \mathcal{C} has distance at least d except with probability $2^{-r+p+(d+1)\log_2 r}$. ■

A.4 Useful Cryptographic tools from Lattices

A.4.1 Trapdoor Commitment

We construct a trapdoor commitment from SIS assumption, following the chameleon hash from [21] but with the Micciancio-Peikert trapdoor generation [43] (see Lemma A.13 for more details). A chameleon hash is equivalent to the trapdoor commitment, if one view the perfect uniformity of the chameleon hash as the perfect hiding of the commitment, the collision-resistance as the computational binding, and the chameleon property as the perfect trapdoor opening.

For simplicity, we only present the scheme and the security proof is straightforward following the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [21]:

Let $k = \lceil \log q \rceil = O(\log n)$ and $m = O(nk)$. Let $\mathcal{D} = D_{\mathbb{Z}^m \times nk, \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}$ be the Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^m \times nk$ with parameter $\omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ and let $s = O(\sqrt{nk})$ be a Gaussian parameter. Define the randomness space $\mathcal{R} := D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}$. Then the commitment scheme $\text{COM}_{\text{SIS}} = (\text{CKG}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open})$ with message space $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{CKG}(1^n)$: choose a random matrix $\mathbf{A}_0 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell}$. Sample $(\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{R}_1) \leftarrow_s \text{GenTrap}^{\mathcal{D}}(1^n, 1^m, q)$. Define $\text{ck} := (\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1)$ and $\text{td} := \mathbf{R}_1$.
- $\text{Commit}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{m})$: choose a vector \mathbf{r} from the Gaussian distribution $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}$, $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}$. Compute the commitment value $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{r}$. Return the commitment \mathbf{c} and the opening information \mathbf{r} .
- $\text{Open}(\text{ck}, \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{r})$: accept if $\|\mathbf{r}\| \leq s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \cdot \sqrt{m}$ and $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{r}$; otherwise, reject.

As a trapdoor commitment, there exist an efficient trapdoor opening algorithm for COM_{SIS} :

- $\text{Topen}(\text{td}, (\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{r}_0), \mathbf{m}_1)$: compute $\mathbf{u} = (\mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m}_0 + \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{r}_0) - \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m}_1$ and sample $\mathbf{r}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ according to $D_{\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^\perp(\mathbf{A}_1), s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}$, $\mathbf{r}_1 \leftarrow_s \text{SampleD}(\mathbf{R}_1, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{u}, s)$.

Note that the trapdoor opening Topen works in a stronger sense, where Topen inputs the commitment value \mathbf{c}_0 instead of $(\mathbf{m}_0, \mathbf{r}_0)$, since in the construction $\mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m}_0 + \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{r}_0 = \mathbf{c}_0$.

A.4.2 Strong One-Time Signature

The simplest way to obtain the strong one-time signature from lattices is to implement Lamport's construction with the following SIS function $f_{\mathbf{A}} : \mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^m \mapsto \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} \bmod q$ for appropriate parameter choices of $n, q, m \geq n \log q$ and a random matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. It is easy to see this Lamport construction is a strong one-time signature, since $f_{\mathbf{A}}$ is not only one-way but also collision resistant.

An alternative efficient construction was proposed by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [42], which shows that a ring-variant of SIS leads to a strong one-time signature scheme with quasi-linear efficiency.

To be consistent with the tag-based encryption from Sect. 3.1, we use the following strong one-time signature from our trapdoor commitment. We firstly present the generic construction from trapdoor commitments and its security proof and then implement it by using the scheme from Sect. A.4.1.

GENERIC SCHEME. Let $\text{COM} = (\text{CKG}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Topen})$ be a trapdoor commitment. Then our strong one-time signature $\text{SIG}_{\text{Trap}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ is defined as follows. Without loss of generality, we assume the message space is the same as the commitment space; otherwise, one can use a collision-resistant hash function to make them consistent.

- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$: sample $(\text{ck}_1, \text{td}_1) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n)$ and $(\text{ck}_2, \text{td}_2) \leftarrow_s \text{CKG}(1^n)$. Compute $(\hat{c}, \hat{r}) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}_1, 0)$ where 0 can be any dummy message. Define $\text{vk} := (\text{ck}_1, \text{ck}_2, \hat{c})$ and $\text{sk} := (\text{td}_1, \hat{r})$.
- $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)$: compute $(c_2, r_2) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}_2, m)$ and trapdoor open $r_1 \leftarrow_s \text{Topen}(\text{td}_1, (0, \hat{r}), c_2)$. Define the signature as $s := (r_1, c_2, r_2)$.
- $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, m, s = (r_1, c_2, r_2))$: check if $\text{Open}(\text{ck}_2, m, c_2, r_2) = 1$ and $\text{Open}(\text{ck}_1, c_2, \hat{c}, r_1) = 1$.

Correctness is easy to verify by the perfect trapdoor opening of COM .

Theorem A.16 (Security of SIG_{Trap}) *If COM is a trapdoor commitment with (τ, ε) -binding, then SIG_{Trap} is a (τ', ε') -secure strong one-time signature with $\varepsilon' \leq 2\varepsilon$ and $\tau' = O(\tau)$.*

Proof: We prove Theorem A.16 by defining the following games. Let \mathcal{F} be the forger for SIG_{Trap} and S_i be the event that $\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mathcal{F}}^{\text{S-OTS}}(n)$ outputs 1 in game \mathbf{G}_i :

Game \mathbf{G}_0 : This is the original attack game for the strong one-time signature. It is trivial that $\Pr[S_0] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{SIG}, \mathcal{F}}^{\text{S-OTS}}(n) = 1]$.

Game \mathbf{G}_1 : When the adversary \mathcal{F} outputs the forgery $(m^*, s^* = (r_1^*, c_2^*, r_2^*))$, we abort if $(m^*, r_2^*) \neq (m, r_2)$ but $c_2^* = c_2$, where m is \mathcal{F} 's one-time signing query and $s = (r_1, c_2, r_2)$ is the respond. It is clear to see the difference between \mathbf{G}_1 and \mathbf{G}_0 is bounded by the computational binding of the commitment scheme.

$$|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_0]| \leq \varepsilon.$$

Game \mathbf{G}_2 : We simulate the signing query by using the trapdoor opening $\text{Topen}(\text{td}_2, (\cdot, \cdot), \cdot)$ on the second commitment and also change the key generation as follows:

- In the key generation, we compute (vk, sk) as in the real scheme. Additionally, we pick a random message $m' \leftarrow_s \mathcal{M}$ and compute $(c_2, r_2') \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}_2, m')$. Keep (m', c_2, r_2') as secret and define $\text{sk}' := (\text{sk}, (m', c_2, r_2'))$.
- In the signing, upon receiving m , generate $r_2 \leftarrow_s \text{Topen}(\text{td}_2, (m', r_2'), m)$ and compute r_1 as in the real scheme, $r_1 \leftarrow_s \text{Topen}(\text{td}_1, (0, \hat{r}), c_2)$. Define the signature of m as $s := (r_1, c_2, r_2)$.

By the perfectly trapdoor opening, c_2 is the correct commitment of m , and formally $\text{Open}(\text{ck}_2, m, c_2, r_2) = 1$. Then \mathbf{G}_2 and \mathbf{G}_1 are identical.

$$\Pr[S_2] = \Pr[S_1]$$

Game \mathbf{G}_3 : We continue to modify the key generation and signing query as follows:

- In the key generation, we compute \hat{c} as $(\hat{c}, \hat{r}) \leftarrow_s \text{Commit}(\text{ck}_1, c_2)$, instead of using the dummy message 0. And the rest are the same as in \mathbf{G}_2 .
- In the signing, we generate r_2 as in \mathbf{G}_2 and define $r_1 := \hat{r}$.

The differences between \mathbf{G}_3 and \mathbf{G}_2 are: in \mathbf{G}_3 \hat{c} is the commitment of c_2 , while in \mathbf{G}_2 \hat{c} is the commitment of 0. By the perfectly hiding, those are identical.

$$\Pr[S_3] = \Pr[S_2].$$

Moreover, \mathbf{G}_3 can be generated without using td_2 . Assume ck_2 is given by the computational binding challenge. If the adversary \mathcal{F} break the strong one-time signature, then we can break the computational binding of the commitment in the following way: once \mathcal{F} outputs a forgery $(m^*, s^* = (r_1^*, c_2^*, r_2^*)) \neq (m, s = (r_1, c_2, r_2))$, if $(m^*, s^* = (r_1^*, c_2^*, r_2^*))$ is a valid forgery, then $((c_2^*, \hat{c}, r_1^*), (c_2, \hat{c}, r_1))$ is the correct answer for the computational binding challenge. The reasons are as follows:

- If $(m^*, r_2^*) \neq (m, r_2)$ then $c_2^* \neq c_2$ from \mathbf{G}_1 . As a valid forgery, $\text{Open}(\text{ck}_1, c_2^*, \hat{c}, r_1^*) = \text{Open}(\text{ck}_1, c_2, \hat{c}, r_1) = 1$ holds. Then $((c_2^*, \hat{c}, r_1^*), (c_2, \hat{c}, r_1))$ is indeed the correct answer.
- If $(m^*, r_2^*) = (m, r_2)$ then $(c_2^*, r_1^*) \neq (c_2, r_1)$. It easy to see $((c_2^*, \hat{c}, r_1^*), (c_2, \hat{c}, r_1))$ is the correct answer.

Thus, we have $\Pr[S_3] = \varepsilon$.

Combining all the above games, we have $\varepsilon' \leq 2\varepsilon$. ■

IMPLEMENTATION FROM SIS. We fix the parameter n, p, k, m and also the Gaussian parameter s and Gaussian distribution \mathcal{D} in the same way as Sect. A.4.1. Let $\mathfrak{H}_K : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \mapsto \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be a collision-resistant hash function, which is easy to construction. A naive way to implement \mathfrak{H}_K is to view the element $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ as a ℓ -bit string for an appropriate ℓ . Then the strong one-time signature SIG_{SIS} from SIS is defined as follows:

- **Gen**(1^n): pick a random matrix $\mathbf{A}_0 \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell}$ and sample $(\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{R}_1) \leftarrow_s \text{GenTrap}^{\mathcal{D}}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ and $(\mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{R}_2) \leftarrow_s \text{GenTrap}^{\mathcal{D}}(1^n, 1^m, q)$. Choose a uniformly random vector $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Define the verification key $\text{vk} := (\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{u}, \mathfrak{H}_K)$ and the signing key $\text{sk} := \mathbf{R}_1$.
- **Sign**(sk, \mathbf{m}): sample $\mathbf{r}_2 \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}_q^{m, s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n})}}$. Compute $\mathbf{c}_2 = \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{A}_2 \mathbf{r}_2$ and $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{u} - \mathbf{A}_0 \cdot \mathfrak{H}_K(\mathbf{c}_2)$. Sample $\mathbf{r}_1 \leftarrow \text{SampleD}(\mathbf{R}_1, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{y}, s)$. Define the signature $\mathbf{s} := (\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \mathbf{r}_2)$.
- **Verify**($\text{vk}, (\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{s})$): phase \mathbf{s} as $\mathbf{s} = (\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \mathbf{r}_2)$. Check if $\|\mathbf{r}_1\| \leq s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \cdot \sqrt{m}$ and $\|\mathbf{r}_2\| \leq s \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \cdot \sqrt{m}$. If both hold, then continue to check if $\mathbf{c}_2 = \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{A}_2 \mathbf{r}_2$ and $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}_0 \cdot \mathfrak{H}_K(\mathbf{c}_2) + \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{r}_1$.

B Warm-up: SPHF On a CPA Encryption Scheme

To warm up, we start by presenting an Exact Smooth Projective Hash Function on a CPA LWE encryption, namely Dual Regev encryption [48]. A cheat-sheet detailing the parallel with SPHF on ElGamal is provided in App. F for readers used to discrete-log based protocols.

B.1 A CPA Encryption Scheme: Dual Regev Encryption

- $\text{KG}(1^n)$: Choose a uniform random matrix $\bar{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\bar{\mathbf{t}}$ uniform in $\{0, 1\}^m$; set $\mathbf{a} = \bar{\mathbf{A}} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{t}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and $\mathbf{A} = [\bar{\mathbf{A}}|\mathbf{a}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+1)}$. Output the key pair $(\text{dk} = \bar{\mathbf{t}}, \text{ek} = \mathbf{A})$.
- $\text{Encrypt}(M \in \{0, 1\}, \text{ek} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+1)}; \text{wit} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n) \times D_{\mathbb{Z}, \mathbf{s}}^{m+1})$: output the ciphertext $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{A}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + [\mathbf{0}_m | \text{ECC}(M)] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m+1}$, where $\mathbf{0}_m$ is the zero vector in \mathbb{Z}_q^m .
- $\text{Decrypt}(\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m+1}, \text{dk} = \bar{\mathbf{t}} \in \{0, 1\}^m)$: consider $\mathbf{t}^\top = [-\bar{\mathbf{t}}^\top | 1]$, and output $M' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{c} \rangle) \in \{0, 1\}$

Correctness. Let $(\text{dk}, \text{ek}) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^n)$, $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(M, \text{ek} = \mathbf{A}; (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n) \times D_{\mathbb{Z}, \mathbf{s}}^{m+1})$ and finally $M' = \text{Decrypt}(\mathbf{c}, \text{dk} = \bar{\mathbf{t}})$. Note that, by construction of $\text{ek} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+1)}$, that $\mathbf{t}^\top = [-\bar{\mathbf{t}}^\top | 1]$ verifies $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{t} = [\bar{\mathbf{A}} | \bar{\mathbf{A}} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{t}}] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} -\bar{\mathbf{t}} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}_n$. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} M' &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{c} \rangle) = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\mathbf{t}^\top \cdot (\mathbf{A}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + [\mathbf{0}_m | \text{ECC}(M)])) \\ &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle + \text{ECC}(M)) = M \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from the fact that $\langle \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \leq s(m+1) \leq q/4$ (Lemma 2.3 bounds $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq s\sqrt{m+1}$ and \mathbf{t} is ternary).

CPA security (sketch). Use Leftover Hash Lemma to argue that \mathbf{a} is uniform and independent of $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$: \mathbf{A} is uniform, in particular it looks like a valid LWE matrix. Then the reduction to dLWE is straightforward.

B.2 A new SPHF on Dual Regev Encryption

We are now going to present a SPHF on the Dual Regev Encryption, while we are not going to use it directly in our constructions, this is a nice ground to see the technical difficulties on building a Smooth Projective Hashing System on Lattices. For readers that are mostly familiar with discrete-log based protocols, a step by step comparison between how SPHF on ElGamal and SPHF on Dual Regev is provided in the Appendix F. In our upcoming applications, we are going to encrypt using an encryption key part of the crs. Users will be expected to do an implicit decommitment of their ciphertext. In other words, they are going to convince a verifier that their ciphertext is indeed a valid encryption of message M .

To do so, we are now going to build a Smooth Projective Hash Function on language of valid Dual Regev Encryptions of a message.

- HashKG : Output a uniformly chosen $\text{hk} = \mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^{m+1}$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{ek} = \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+1)}, \text{hk} = \mathbf{v} \in D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^{m+1})$: output $\text{hp} = \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp} = \mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \text{wit} = \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n)$: output $H' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{s} \rangle) \in \{0, 1\}$
- $\text{Hash}(\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m+1}, M', \text{hk} = \mathbf{v})$: output $H = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{v}, (\mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0}_m | \text{ECC}(M')])^\top \rangle) \in \{0, 1\}$

For correctness and smoothness, we check that

$$\begin{aligned} H' - H &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{s} \rangle) - \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{c} - [\mathbf{0}_m | M]^\top \rangle) \\ &= \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle) - \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{A}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + [\mathbf{0}_m | \text{ECC}(M)] - [\mathbf{0}_m | \text{ECC}(M')] \rangle). \end{aligned}$$

Correctness. We consider the language of honest encryption of M , so we handle only encryption of M with a reasonably small randomness, by opposition to all ciphertexts that can be decrypted to M . Correctness is here to protect honest prover, so this restriction still keeps this property. (Invalid) Encryption of M with a randomness too big are part of the language but are only adversary generated, so their output can be wrong without impacting a normal execution.⁷

If $M = M'$, we have $H' - H = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle) - \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle)$. Notice that $\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$ follows a uniform distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q the randomness of \mathbf{s} , while $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \leq \|\mathbf{v}\| \|\mathbf{e}\|$. Since \mathbf{v} is binary, we have $\|\mathbf{v}\| \leq \sqrt{m+1}$, while $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq 2\sqrt{m+1} \cdot s$ except with probability negligible in n , according to Lemma 2.3. We conclude using Lemma 2.5 that $H = H'$ except with probability negligible in n .

⁷For reference, [38] call this sub-language $\bar{L} \subset L$.

Smoothness. We now have to handle two different cases:

- Valid encryption of $M \neq M'$, then $\text{ECC}(M) - \text{ECC}(M') = \pm \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor$; therefore

$$H - H' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle) - \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{s} \rangle \pm \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor v_{m+1} + \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle) = v_{m+1} \pmod{2}$$

where the last equality holds except with negligible probability, following the same argumentation as above based on Lemmata 2.3 and 2.5. v_{m+1} is perfectly hidden under the leftover hash lemma, hence an adversary cannot compute a valid H' for a word outside a language with an advantage significantly bigger than a random guess.

- For cipher that have not been properly generated, the smoothness proof is quite more involved; it requires first establishing a weak smoothness property, and apply amplification techniques; this goes beyond the scope of this warm-up. Full details are provided for the CCA variant in section

Pseudo-Randomness. Under the CPA security of the encryption scheme, we can transform a commitment to a word in the language, to a commitment to a word outside of the language, hence an adversary against the pseudo-randomness either breaks the smoothness (which, information theoretically he cannot) or the indistinguishability of the encryption.

C Proof of Our Variant of Micciancio Peikert Encryption

We now give the proof of Theorem 3.2, i.e. the CCA-1 security of the tag-based encryption scheme MP_1 .

Proof: We prove Theorem 3.2 by defining the following games. Let \mathcal{M} be an adversary against the tbe-stag-cca security (as defined in Def. A.2) of MP_1 . Define S_i be the event that $\text{Exp}_{\text{MP}_1, \mathcal{M}, Q}^{\text{tbe-stag-cca}}(n)$ outputs 1 in game \mathbf{G}_i :

Game \mathbf{G}_0 : This is the original attack game for the tbe-stag-cca security. It is trivial that

$$\Pr[S_0] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{MP}_1, \mathcal{M}, Q}^{\text{tbe-stag-cca}}(n) = 1].$$

Game \mathbf{G}_1 : In this game, we change the key generation and the way to answer challenge ciphertext. Note that, in the definition of tbe-stag-cca security, we choose a uniform tag $\mathbf{T}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{T})$ related to the challenge ciphertext before the key generation. We change the simulation as follows:

- Key generation: choose $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$ and \mathbf{R} as in the definition. Then define the encryption key to be $ek' := \mathbf{A}' = [\bar{\mathbf{A}}] - \mathbf{T}^* \mathbf{G} - \bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}$ and the decryption key $dk = (\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{A}')$. Note that $[\bar{\mathbf{A}}] - \bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}$ is statistically closed to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, by the Leftover-Hash Lemma A.14. That implies $[\bar{\mathbf{A}}] - \mathbf{T}^* \mathbf{G} - \bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}$ is also statistically closed to the uniform distribution and independent to \mathbf{T}^* .
- Answering decryption queries: on input (\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{c}) , check if $\mathbf{T} \in \mathcal{T}$. Note that \mathbf{T}^* is still uniform in \mathcal{T} from the adversary point of view, therefore, unless with negligible probability $\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{T}^*$, since \mathcal{T} is exponentially large. Call $(s_0, \mathbf{e}_0) = \text{Invert}(\mathbf{R}, [\bar{\mathbf{A}}] - \bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{T} - \mathbf{T}^*, \mathbf{c})$ and $(s_1, \mathbf{e}_1) = \text{Invert}(\mathbf{R}, [\bar{\mathbf{A}}] - \bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{T} - \mathbf{T}^*, \mathbf{c} - (\mathbf{0}, \text{ECC}(1)))$. And we apply Step 2 to 4 as in the original scheme. Since $\mathbf{T} - \mathbf{T}^*$ is invertible, by the correctness of Invert , we can decrypt the ciphertext correctly.
- Computing challenge ciphertext: choose $\mathbf{s}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$, $\bar{\mathbf{e}}^* \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}^{\bar{m}}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{e}}^* \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}^{nk}$ and $\mathbf{e}^* = (\bar{\mathbf{e}}^*, \hat{\mathbf{e}}^*)$. Compute $\mathbf{c}_0^* = \bar{\mathbf{A}}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \bar{\mathbf{e}}^\top \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\bar{m}}$ and $\mathbf{c}_1^* = -\mathbf{c}_0^* \mathbf{R} + \hat{\mathbf{e}}^\top + (\mathbf{0}_{nk-1}, \text{ECC}(M))^\top \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{nk}$. Define $\mathbf{c}^* := (\mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*)$. Note that, by the definition of the simulated encryption key ek' , $\mathbf{A} + [\mathbf{0} | \mathbf{T}^* \mathbf{G}] = [\bar{\mathbf{A}}] - \bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}$.

We show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext is $\text{negl}(n)$ -far from the one of \mathbf{G}_0 . It is clear that \mathbf{c}_0^* is distributed identically as in \mathbf{G}_0 . By substitution, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1^* &= -\mathbf{c}_0^* \mathbf{R} + \hat{\mathbf{e}}^\top + (\mathbf{0}_{nk-1}, \text{ECC}(M))^\top \\ &= (-\bar{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R})^\top \mathbf{s} + (\bar{\mathbf{e}}^\top \mathbf{R} + \hat{\mathbf{e}}^\top) + (\mathbf{0}_{nk-1}, \text{ECC}(M))^\top \end{aligned}$$

By the similar argument as in game H_1 of Theorem 6.3, we have $\langle \bar{\mathbf{e}}, \mathbf{r}_i \rangle + \hat{e}_i$ is $\text{negl}(n)$ -far from $D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}$, where \mathbf{r}_i is the i -th column of \mathbf{R} and \hat{e}_i is the i -th component of $\hat{\mathbf{e}}$. That implies $\bar{\mathbf{e}}^\top \mathbf{R} + \hat{\mathbf{e}}^\top$ is $\text{negl}(n)$ -far from $D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}^{nk}$.

As shown in above, \mathbf{G}_1 and \mathbf{G}_0 are statistically closed:

$$|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_0]| \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

Game \mathbf{G}_2 : We only change \mathbf{c}_0^* to be uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{\bar{m}}$. We construct the following reduction to show that the difference between \mathbf{G}_2 and \mathbf{G}_1 is bounded by the decisional LWE assumption dLWE: let $(\bar{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{\bar{m}}$ be the dLWE

challenge. We simply simulate the key generation and the decryption oracle as in \mathbf{G}_1 except that we set $\mathbf{c}_0^* = \mathbf{b}$ and compute \mathbf{c}_1^* as in \mathbf{G}_1 . Then if \mathbf{b} follows the LWE distribution, then the challenge ciphertext is identical to that in \mathbf{G}_1 ; otherwise, it is identical to \mathbf{G}_2 . Thus, we have

$$|\Pr[S_2] - \Pr[S_1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{dLWE}},$$

where Adv_{dLWE} is the advantage of solving dLWE problem.

Again by the Leftover-Hash Lemma, in this game $(\mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*)$ is $\text{negl}(n)$ -far from the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^m \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{nk}$. Thus, the challenge ciphertext $\mathbf{c}^* = (\mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*)$ is independent from the encrypted message in a statistically sense. Thus, $\Pr[S_2] = \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$, and we have Theorem 3.2. ■

D The Double Micciancio Peikert Encryption

Recently, Lindell [41] proposed a highly efficient UC commitment, we are going to use an adaptation that does not need to be UC secure. We will then show that the decommitment check can be done in an implicit way with an appropriate smooth projective hash function. Basically, the technique consists in setting $\mathbf{T} = \mathfrak{H}_K'(\mathfrak{L}, \text{vk})$, encrypting b in $\mathcal{C} = \text{MP}_2(\text{ek}, b, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{r})$, and then encrypting 0 in $\mathcal{C}' = \text{MP}_1(\text{ek}, 0, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{s})$, with the same \mathbf{T} . For a given challenge ζ , we can see that $\mathcal{C} + \zeta\mathcal{C}' = \text{MP}_1(\text{ek}, b, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{r} + \zeta\mathbf{s})$.

This section may be seen as redundant with the presentation in Section 4.4, it is just here to clarify some techniques, and underlines the fact that we do not need this commitment to be UC to use it in our UC PAKE, only a sketch of the proof is given as it is more meticulously handled in the UC part in section E.5.

It makes use of an equivocable Trapdoor commitment as described in Section A.4.1.

To achieve the CCA-2 security each MP_2 ciphertext is sent with a Strong-OTS, which is verified immediately by the verifier, for clarity they are omitted in the scheme below, but we insist that the verification key of the signature is included in the computation of the tag (even if we omit it from now on for simplicity).

One can observe that for a single bit, the adversary has a probability of 1/2 to guess the correct output, however using a naive amplification techniques like explained for the SPHF_p^k this can be reduced. Once again this is omitted, especially considering we are going to use the scheme in a multi-bits setting which might lead to further optimization with linear amplification.

D.1 Description.

Our commitment, which includes labels, is depicted on Figure 8. We assume we commit a bit b , we will denote $M = \text{ECC}(b)$ for sake of simplicity.




Figure 8: DMP Commitment Scheme

D.2 Analysis.

Let us briefly show the properties of this commitment:

- **Hiding property:** M is committed in the Trapdoor commitment \mathcal{C}'' , that does not leak any information, and in the MP_2 encryption \mathcal{C} , that is indistinguishable, even with access to the decryption oracle (extractability). This also implies non-malleability when we add the Strong One-Time Signature.

- Binding property: M , after having been hashed, is committed in the Trapdoor commitment C' , that is computationally binding.
- Extractability: using the decryption key of the MP_2 encryption scheme, one can extract b from C . Later, one has to open the ciphertext $C + \zeta C'$ with b' . If C' was generated honestly this value is equal to b with overwhelming probability. If the ciphertext C' is not an honestly generated encryption of 0, then the value b' could not be predicted by the adversary at the beginning of the protocol. As this value is in $\{0, 1\}$, we have a good prognostic for a value with probability 0.5, and then amplification techniques will render this probability negligible.
- Equivocability: if one wants to open with M' , one can just compute N such that $\zeta N = (M' - M)$, encrypt N in $C' = MP_1(\text{ek}, N, \mathbf{T}; s)$, and update χ and t , using the trapdoor for equivocability.

To allow an implicit verification with an SPHF, one forgets about the decryption algorithm, and use the previously described $SPHF_p^k$.

D.3 Security of the Encryption Scheme

We are going to sketch the security of the DMP encryption. This is mostly a transposition of the Double Cramer Shoup from [9], no particularity arises during the proof. (As we need to add a Strong-OTS to the Micciancio Peikert like encryption, the security of this signature will also appear).

D.3.1 Security model.

This scheme is indistinguishable against *partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext* attacks, where a partial-decryption oracle only is available, but even when we allow the adversary to choose M and N in two different steps (see the security game below), under the LWE assumption and if one uses collision-resistant hash functions $\mathfrak{H}_K, \mathfrak{H}_{K'}$ and a Strong-OTS.

Indistinguishability against partial-decryption chosen-ciphertext attacks, in two steps: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where the adversary \mathcal{A} keeps some internal state between the various calls FIND_M , FIND_N and GUESS . In the first stage FIND_M , it receives the encryption key ek ; in the second stage FIND_N , it receives the encryption of M_b : $C^* = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, M_b, \mathbf{T}^*)$; in the last stage GUESS it receives the encryption of N_b : $C'^* = \text{Encrypt}'(\text{ek}, N_b, \mathbf{T}^*)$. During all these stages, it can make use of the oracle $\text{ODecrypt}(\mathcal{L}, C)$, that outputs the decryption of C under the label \mathcal{L} and the challenge decryption key dk , using $\text{PDecrypt}(\mathcal{L}, \text{dk}, C)$. The input queries (\mathcal{L}, C) are added to the list \mathcal{CT} .

```

Exp_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-pd-cca}-b}(n)
1. params \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n); (\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{params})
2. (\mathcal{L}^*, M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND}_M : \text{ek}, \text{ODecrypt}(\cdot, \cdot))
3. C^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, M_b, \mathbf{T}^*)
4. (N_0, N_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND}_N : C^*, \text{ODecrypt}(\cdot, \cdot))
5. C'^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}'(\text{ek}, N_b, \mathbf{T}^*)
6. b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{GUESS} : C'^*, \text{ODecrypt}(\cdot, \cdot))
7. IF (\mathcal{L}^*, C^*) \in \mathcal{CT} RETURN 0
8. ELSE RETURN b'

```

The advantages are, where q_d is the number of decryption queries:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind-pd-cca}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-pd-cca}-1}(n) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-pd-cca}-0}(n) = 1]$$

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind-pd-cca}}(q_d, t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind-pd-cca}}(\mathcal{A}).$$

Theorem D.1 *The DMP encryption scheme is IND-PD-CCA if \mathfrak{H}_K is a collision-resistant hash function family, under the LWE and SIS assumption.*

Corollary D.2 *The Multiple $n - MP_2$ encryption scheme is IND-CCA if \mathfrak{H}_K is a collision-resistant hash function family, under the LWE and SIS assumption.*

D.3.2 Security proof. (sketch)

In this section, we only give a high level idea of what happens in the ind-pd-cca security proof, for that we show how to use \mathcal{A} to answer to a CCA-2 challenger.

- In the initial game \mathcal{G}_0 ,

- \mathcal{A} 's decryption queries are answered by \mathcal{B} , simply using the normal decryption.
 - When \mathcal{A} submits the first challenge M_0, M_1 , with a label \mathcal{L}^* , \mathcal{B} chooses a random bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ and encrypts M_b :
 - When \mathcal{A} submits the second challenge N_0, N_1 , and do a MP_1 encryption of N_b (i.e. without the Strong-OTS).
 - When \mathcal{A} returns b' , \mathcal{B} outputs $b' \stackrel{?}{=} b$.
- In game \mathcal{G}_1 , we handle cases where $M_0 \neq M_1$, we simply rely on the simulator of the CCA-2 security of the MP_2 encryption (with the Strong-OTS):
 - Decryption queries are answered by the simulator of the CCA-2.
 - When \mathcal{A} submits the first challenge M_0, M_1 , with a label \mathcal{L}^* , the simulator from CCA-2 gives us a challenge C_b
 - When \mathcal{A} submits the second challenge N_0, N_1 :
 - * If $N_0 = N_1$, \mathcal{B} proceeds honestly
 - * If $M_0 = N_0$, and so $M_1 = N_1$, one simply randomizes C_b (without the signature it is easy), to generate C'_b
 - * Else this means $N_b = M_b + 1 \pmod 2$, hence we randomize into C'_b by starting from $C_b - (\mathbf{0}|\text{ECC}(1))$.
 - When \mathcal{A} returns b' , \mathcal{B} forwards b' to the CCA-2 challenger.
 - In game \mathcal{G}_2 , we handle $M_0 = M_1$, we will once again use a CCA-2 challenger, but with N_0, N_1, \mathcal{L}^* , as we can do the first encryption honestly.

As \mathcal{A} answers the correct bit b' with non-negligible probability and our simulation is perfect, we manage to break the CCA-2 security of the revisited Micciancio Peikert Scheme, hence either the LWE and SIS assumptions, or the collision resistance of the Hash Function.

E Omitted Proofs for the Applications to UC PAKE and UC Commitment

E.1 Quick Presentation of the UC Framework

Throughout this paper we assume basic familiarity with the universal composability framework. Here we provide a brief overview of the framework. The interested reader is referred to [16] for complete details. In a nutshell, security in the UC framework is defined in terms of an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} , which is basically a trusted party that interacts with a set of players to compute some given function f . In particular, the players hand their input to \mathcal{F} which computes f on the received inputs and gives back to each player the appropriate output. Thus, in this idealized setting, security is inherently guaranteed, as any adversary, controlling some of the parties, can only learn (and possibly modify) the data of corrupted players. In order to prove that a candidate protocol π realizes the ideal functionality, one considers an environment \mathcal{Z} , which is allowed to provide inputs to all the participants and that aims to distinguish the case where it receives the outputs produced from a real execution of the protocol (involving all the parties and an adversary \mathcal{A} , controlling some of the parties and the communication among them), from the case where it receives outputs obtained from an ideal execution of the protocol (involving only dummy parties interacting with \mathcal{F} and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} also interacting with \mathcal{F}). Then we say that π realizes the functionality \mathcal{F} if for every (polynomially bounded) \mathcal{A} , there exists a (polynomially bounded) \mathcal{S} such that no (polynomially bounded) \mathcal{Z} can distinguish a real execution of the protocol from an ideal one with a significant advantage. In particular, the universal composability theorem assures us that π continues to behave like the ideal functionality even if it is executed in an arbitrary network environment.

As a consequence, the formal security proof is performed by showing that for any external entity, that gives inputs to the honest players and gets the outputs but that also controls the adversary, the executions in the two above worlds are indistinguishable. More concretely, in order to prove that a protocol \mathcal{P} realizes an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} , we consider an environment \mathcal{Z} which can choose inputs given to all the honest players and receives back the outputs they get, but which also controls an adversary \mathcal{A} . Its goal is to distinguish in which case it is: either the real world with concrete interactions between the players and the adversary, or the ideal world in which players simply forward everything to and from the ideal functionality and the adversary interacts with a simulator \mathcal{S} to attack the ideal functionality. We have to build a simulator \mathcal{S} that makes the two views indistinguishable to the environment: since the combination of the adversary and the simulator cannot cause any damage against the ideal functionality, this shows that the adversary cannot cause any damage either against the real protocol.

The main constraint is that the simulator cannot rewind the execution as often done in classical proofs, since it interacts with an adversary under the control of the environment: there is no possible rewind in the real world, it is thus impossible too in the ideal world.

The adversary \mathcal{A} has access to the communication but nothing else, and namely not to the inputs/outputs for the honest players. In case of corruption, it gets complete access to inputs and the internal memory of the honest player, and then gets control of it.

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ is parametrized by a security parameter k . It interacts with an adversary \mathcal{S} and a set of parties P_1, \dots, P_n via the following queries:

- **Upon receiving a query (NewSession, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j , pw) from party P_i :**

Send (NewSession, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j) to \mathcal{S} . If this is the first NewSession query, or if this is the second NewSession query and there is a record (sid, ssid, P_j, P_i, pw'), then record (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, pw) and mark this record fresh.

- **Upon receiving a query (TestPwd, sid, ssid, P_i, pw') from the adversary \mathcal{S} :**

If there is a record of the form (P_i, P_j, pw) which is fresh, then do: If $\text{pw} = \text{pw}'$, mark the record compromised and reply to \mathcal{S} with “correct guess”. If $\text{pw} \neq \text{pw}'$, mark the record interrupted and reply with “wrong guess”.

- **Upon receiving a query (NewKey, sid, ssid, P_i, sk) from the adversary \mathcal{S} :**

If there is a record of the form (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, pw), and this is the first NewKey query for P_i , then:

- If this record is compromised, or either P_i or P_j is corrupted, then output (sid, ssid, sk) to player P_i .
- If this record is fresh, and there is a record (P_j, P_i, pw') with $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, and a key sk' was sent to P_j , and (P_j, P_i, pw) was fresh at the time, then output (sid, ssid, sk') to P_i .
- In any other case, pick a new random key sk' of length n and send (sid, ssid, sk') to P_i .

Either way, mark the record (sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, pw) as completed.

Figure 9: Ideal Functionality for PAKE $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$ with session identifier sid proceeds as follows, running with parties P_1, \dots, P_n , a parameter 1^{1^n} , and an adversary \mathcal{S} :

- **Commit phase:** Upon receiving a message (Commit, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, x) from P_i where $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{polylog}k}$, record the tuple (ssid, P_i, P_j, x) and generate a delayed output (receipt, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j) to P_j . Ignore further Commit-message with the same (sid, ssid).
- **Reveal phase:** Upon receiving a message of the form (reveal, sid, ssid) from party P_i , if a tuple (ssid, P_i, P_j, x) was previously recorded, then generate a delayed output (reveal, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, x) to P_j . Ignore further reveal-message with the same (sid, ssid) from P_i .

Figure 10: Ideal Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$ for Commitment

E.2 The Ideal Functionality of Password-Based Authenticated Key-Exchange

We present the PAKE ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ on Figure 9). It was described in [19]. The main idea behind this functionality is as follows: If neither party is corrupted, then they both end up with the same uniformly-distributed session key, and the adversary learns nothing about it (except that it was indeed generated). However, if one party is corrupted, or if the adversary successfully guessed the player’s password (the session is then marked as **compromised**), then it is granted the right to fully determine its session key. Note that as soon as a party is corrupted, the adversary learns its key: There is in fact nothing lost by allowing it to determine the key. In addition, the players become aware of a failed attempt of the adversary at guessing a password. This is modelled by marking the session as **interrupted**. In this case, the two players are given independently-chosen random keys. A session that is nor **compromised** nor **interrupted** is called **fresh**. In such a case, the two parties receive the same, uniformly distributed session key. Finally notice that the functionality is not in charge of providing the password(s) to the participants. The passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where two honest players execute the protocol with two different passwords: This models, for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where the password is used in different protocols. Also note that allowing the environment to choose the passwords guarantees forward secrecy.

In case of corruption, the adversary learns the password of the corrupted player, after the **NewKey**-query, it additionally learns the session key.

E.3 The Ideal Functionality of Commitment

A UC-secure commitment scheme provides all the properties previously given: it should be hiding and binding, but also extractable and equivocal, and even non-malleable.

The ideal functionality is presented on Figure 10. It is borrowed from [16, 41], where a delayed output is an output first sent to the adversary \mathcal{S} that eventually decides if and when the message is actually delivered to the recipient. This models denial of services from the adversary.

E.4 Security Proof of the UC PAKE (Theorem 4.1)

For the sake of simplicity, we give in Figure 11 an explicit version of the protocol described in Figure 4. We omit the additional verification that all the committed values are in the correct subsets, since in the proof below we will always easily guarantee this membership. As explained in Section 4.2, for the sake of simplicity, we denote by a unique ζ , and a unique z_i , the list of all the necessary challenges ζ , and their answers, for the bits of the password, in order to ensure that the probability that an adversary can gain something by cheating in \mathcal{C}'_i is negligible (see details in the proof). Similarly, we mention a unique SPHF, omitting the details of its construction as a conjunction of SPHF.

The proof heavily relies on the properties of the commitments and smooth projective hash functions given in Section 4.2, 3 and Appendix D.




Figure 11: Description of the password-authenticated key-exchange protocol for players (P_i, ssid) , with index i , password W_i , random tape ω_i , label $\mathfrak{L}_i = (\mathfrak{L}, VK_i)$, languages $\mathbf{L}_i = \mathbf{L}'_i = \{W_i\}$ and (P_j, ssid) , with index j , password W_j , random tape ω_j , label $\mathfrak{L}_j = \mathfrak{L}$, languages $\mathbf{L}_j = \mathbf{L}'_j = \{W_j\}$. The label is $\mathfrak{L} = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j)$. The random values used in the commitments (witnesses) are all included in $(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{r}'_i)$ and \mathbf{r}_j .

E.4.1 Sketch of Proof

The proof follows that of similar protocols [19, 2, 9]. In order to prove Theorem 4.1, we need to construct, for any real-world adversary \mathcal{A} (controlling some dishonest parties), an ideal-world adversary \mathcal{S} (interacting with dummy parties and the split functionality $s\mathcal{F}_{\text{LAKE}}$) such that no environment \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between an execution with \mathcal{A} in the real world and \mathcal{S} in the ideal world with non-negligible probability.

When initialized with security parameter k , the simulator first generates the CRS for the commitment (public parameters but also extraction and equivocation trapdoors). It then initializes the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} , giving it these values. The simulator then starts its interaction with the environment \mathcal{Z} , the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ and its subroutine \mathcal{A} .

Since we are in the static-corruption model, the adversary can only corrupt players before the execution of the protocol. We assume players to be honest or not at the beginning, and they cannot be corrupted afterwards. However, this does not prevent the adversary from modifying flows coming from the players. Indeed, since we are in a weak authenticated setting, when a player acts dishonestly (even without being aware of it), it is either corrupted, hence the adversary knows its private values and acts on its behalf; or the adversary tries to impersonate it with chosen/guessed inputs. In both cases, we say the

player is \mathcal{A} -controlled. Following [19], we say that a flow is *oracle-generated* if it was sent by an honest player and arrives without any alteration to the player it was meant to. We say it is *non-oracle-generated* otherwise, that is if it was sent by a \mathcal{A} -controlled player (which means corrupted, or which flows have been modified by the adversary). The one-time signatures are aimed at avoiding changes of players during a session: if flow – one is oracle-generated for P_i , then flow – three cannot be non-oracle-generated without causing the protocol to fail because of the signature, for which the adversary does not know the signing key. On the other hand, if flow – one is non-oracle-generated for P_i , then flow – three cannot be oracle-generated without causing the protocol to fail, since the honest player would sign wrong flows (the flows the player sent before the adversary alters them). In both cases, the verifications of the signatures will fail at Steps (R4) and P_j will abort. One can note that since there is one flow only in the protocol for P_j , its signature is not required.

E.4.2 Description of the Simulator

For the most part, the simulator simulates the protocol by executing it honestly on behalf of the honest parties, but using random dummy witnesses as inputs since the secret inputs (given to them by the environment) are unknown to the simulator. Furthermore, the commitment sent by P_i is equivocal, enabling the simulator to change its mind later on. And both commitments are extractable, enabling the simulator to recover the password used by the adversary. In the whole proof, in case the extraction fails, the simulator acts as if the simulation should fail. Indeed, the language of the smooth projective hash function not only verifies the equations, but also that the ciphertext is valid, and this verification will fail. More details follow.

We come back again to the case of our equivocal commitment with SPHF that is not a really extractable (binding) commitment since the player can open it in a different way one would extract it, in case the second ciphertext does not encrypt to 0 values: if extraction leads to an inconsistent tuple, there is little chance that with the random ζ it becomes consistent; if extraction leads to a consistent tuple, there is little chance that with the random ζ it remains consistent, and then the real-life protocol will fail, whereas the ideal-one was successful at the TestPwd-time. But then, because of the positive TestPwd-answer, the NewKey-query takes the key-input into consideration, that is random on the initiator side because of the SPHF on an invalid word, and thus indistinguishable from the environment point of view from a failed session: this is a denial of service, the adversary should already be aware of.

We now describe the simulator in the three possible cases. During all these simulations, \mathcal{S} knows the equivocability trapdoor of the trapdoor commitment and the decryption keys of the two encryption schemes.

Case 1: P_i is \mathcal{A} -controlled and P_j is honest. In this case, \mathcal{S} has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the honest player P_j .

STEP (I1). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its flow – one, from which \mathcal{S} extracts W_i .

STEP (R2). The simulator asks a TestPwd query to the functionality to check whether P_j should have the password W_i (which means the protocol should succeed). In case of a success, \mathcal{S} generates honestly the flow on behalf of P_j , in particular an encryption \mathcal{C}_j on $W_j = W_i$. Otherwise, \mathcal{S} produces an encryption \mathcal{C}_j on a dummy W_j . It then generates a challenge value ζ and the hashing keys (hk_i, hp_i) on \mathcal{C}_i . It sends the flow-two message $(\mathcal{C}_j, \zeta, hp_i)$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_j .

STEP (I3). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its flow – three.

STEP (R4). Upon receiving $m = (\text{flow – three}, \mathcal{C}'_i, t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$, \mathcal{S} makes the verification checks, and possibly aborts. In case of correct checks, \mathcal{S} already knows whether the protocol should succeed, thanks to the TestPwd query. If the protocol is a success, then \mathcal{S} computes receiver session key honestly, and makes a NewKey to P_j . Otherwise, \mathcal{S} makes a NewKey to P_j with a random key that will anyway not be used.

Case 2: P_i is honest and P_j is \mathcal{A} -controlled. In this case, \mathcal{S} has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the honest player P_i .

STEP (I1). \mathcal{S} generates a flow-one message by committing to a dummy password W_i and chooses a key pair (SK_i, VK_i) for a one-time signature scheme. It gives this message $(VK_i, \mathcal{C}_i, \mathcal{C}'_i)$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of $(P_i, ssid)$.

STEP (R2). This step is taken care of by the adversary, who sends its flow – two = $(\mathcal{C}_j, \zeta, hp_i)$, from which \mathcal{S} extracts the committed password W_j .

STEP (I3). \mathcal{S} makes a TestPwd query to the functionality to know whether the password of P_i is indeed W_j (i.e. whether the protocol should succeed). In case of a success, \mathcal{S} uses the equivocability trapdoor for each ζ to update the corresponding \mathcal{C}'_i and t in order to contain the new consistent $W_i = W_j$ with respect to the challenge ζ . If the protocol should be a success, then \mathcal{S} computes P_i 's session key honestly, and makes a NewKey to P_i . Otherwise, \mathcal{S} makes a NewKey to P_i with a random key that will anyway not be used. \mathcal{S} sends the flow-three message $(\mathcal{C}'_i, t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_i , where σ_i is the signature on all the previous information.

STEP (R4). This step is taken care of by the adversary.

Case 3: P_i and P_j are honest. In this case, \mathcal{S} has to simulate the concrete messages in the real-life from the two honest players P_i and P_j . Since no player is controlled by \mathcal{A} , the TestPwd query will not provide any answer to the simulator. But thanks to the semantic security of the commitments, dummy values can be committed, no external adversary will make any difference.

STEP (I1). \mathcal{S} generates a flow-one message by committing to a dummy password W_i and chooses a key pair (SK_i, VK_i) for a one-time signature scheme. It gives this message (VK_i, C_i, C_i') to \mathcal{A} on behalf of $(P_i, ssid)$.

STEP (R2). \mathcal{S} generates an encryption \mathcal{C}_j on a dummy password W_j . It then generates a challenge value ζ and the hashing keys (hk_i, hp_i) on \mathcal{C}_i . It sends the flow-two message $(\mathcal{C}_j, \zeta, hp_i)$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_j .

STEP (I3). \mathcal{S} makes a NewKey to P_i with a random key that will anyway not be used, since no player is corrupted. \mathcal{S} sends the flow-three message $(C_i', t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_i , where σ_i is the signature on all the previous information.

STEP (R4). Upon receiving $m = (\text{flow} - \text{three}, C_i', t, hp_j, \sigma_i)$ from its peer session $(P_i; ssid)$, the signature is necessarily correct. \mathcal{S} makes a NewKey to P_j with a random key that will anyway not be used, since no player is corrupted.

E.4.3 Description of the Games

Game G_0 : This is the real game, where every flow from honest players are generated correctly by the simulator which knows the inputs sent by the environment to the players. There is no use of the ideal functionality for the moment.

Game G_1 : In this game, the simulator knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i when generating the CRS. But this game is almost the same as the previous one except the way sk_j is generated when P_i is corrupted and P_j honest. In all the other cases, the simulator does as in G_0 by playing honestly (still knowing its private values). When P_i is corrupted and P_j honest, \mathcal{S} does as before until (R4), but then, it extracts the values committed to by the adversary in Com_i (using the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i) and checks whether the password is consistent with the value sent to P_j by the environment. If the passwords are not consistent (or decryption rejects), P_j is given a random session key sk_j . This game is statistically indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF on Com_i .

Game G_2 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i when generating the CRS. This game is almost the same as the previous one except that \mathcal{S} extracts the values committed to by the adversary in \mathcal{C}_i to check consistency of the passwords, and does not wait until Com_i . If the passwords are not consistent (or decryption rejects), P_j is given a random session key sk_j .

The game is indistinguishable from the previous one except if Com_i contains consistent values whereas \mathcal{C}_i does not, but because of the unpredictability of the amplified challenges ζ , and the trapdoor commitment that is computationally binding under the SIS problem, the probability is negligible.

The distance between the two games is thus bounded by the probability to break the binding property of the trapdoor commitment.

Game G_3 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i when generating the CRS, as in G_2 . Actually, in the above game, when P_i is corrupted and P_j honest, if the extracted password from \mathcal{C}_i is not consistent, P_j does not have to compute hash values. The random coins are not needed anymore. In this game, in this particular case, \mathcal{S} generates \mathcal{C}_j with a dummy password \widetilde{W}_j .

This game is computationally indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the IND-CPA property of the encryption scheme involved in \mathcal{C}_j . To prove this indistinguishability, one makes q hybrid games, where q is the number of such sessions where P_i is corrupted and P_j is honest but extracted languages from \mathcal{C}_i are not consistent with inputs to P_j . More precisely, in the k -th hybrid game G_k (for $1 \leq k \leq q$), in all such sessions before the k -th one, \mathcal{C}_j is generated by encrypting \widetilde{W}_j , in all sessions after the k -th one, \mathcal{C}_j is generated by encrypting W_j , and in the k -th session, \mathcal{C}_j is generated by calling the left-or-right encryption oracle on (W_j, \widetilde{W}_j) . It is clear that the game G_2 corresponds to G_1 with the “left” oracle, and the game G_3 corresponds to G_q with the “right” oracle. And each time, G_k with the right oracle is identical to G_{k+1} with the “left” oracle, while every game G_k is an IND-CPA game. It is possible to use the encryption oracle because the random coins are not needed in these sessions.

Game G_4 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i when generating the CRS, as in G_2 . Now, when P_i is corrupted and P_j honest, if the extracted password from \mathcal{C}_i is consistent, \mathcal{S} knows W_j (the same as the value W_i sent by the environment). It uses it to generate the ciphertext \mathcal{C}_j . \mathcal{S} can compute the correct value sk_j from the random coins, and gives it to P_j .

This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the former one.

Note that the value sk_j computed by \mathcal{S} can be computed by the adversary if the latter indeed sent a valid password W_i in \mathcal{C}_i (that is not explicitly checked in this game). Otherwise, sk_j looks random from the smoothness of the SPHF. As a consequence, in this game, sessions where P_i is corrupted and P_j is honest look ideal, while one does not need anymore the inputs from the environment sent to P_j to simulate honest players.

Game G_5 : We now consider the case where P_i is honest. The simulator has to simulate P_i behavior. To do so, it will know the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment. But for other cases, the simulator still knows the decryption

key for \mathcal{C}_i when generating the CRS. In $(I1)$, the simulator still encrypts W_i from the environment to produce \mathcal{C}_i . It chooses at random a dummy value \mathcal{C}'_i and computes honestly the equivocal commitment \mathcal{C}''_i , knowing the random value \mathbf{t}_i . In $(I3)$, after receiving ζ from P_j , it chooses random coins \mathbf{z}_i and computes Com_i as the encryption of W_i with the random coins \mathbf{z}_i . (Since this is a double encryption scheme, it uses the redundancy from \mathcal{C}_i : namely for k -DMPCOM, it uses \mathbf{T} from \mathcal{C}_i). Thanks to the homomorphic property, it can compute \mathcal{C}'_i so that $\zeta\mathcal{C}'_i = (\text{Com}_i - \mathcal{C}_i)$, and equivocate \mathcal{C}''_i . \mathcal{C}'_i should be an encryption of 0 under the random coins \mathbf{r}'_i that are implicitly defined, but unknown. Thanks to the properties of the different commitments recalled in Appendix D, and the perfect-hiding property of the trapdoor commitment, this is a perfect simulation. It then computes the hash values honestly, using \mathbf{z}_i .

Game \mathcal{G}_6 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS. When P_i is honest, \mathcal{S} generates the commitment \mathcal{C}_i by choosing a dummy password \widetilde{W}_i instead of W_i . Everything else is unchanged from \mathcal{G}_5 .

This game is thus indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the IND-CCA property of the encryption scheme involved in \mathcal{C}_i . As for the proof of indistinguishability of Game \mathcal{G}_3 , we do a sequence of hybrid games, where \mathcal{C}_i is generated by either encrypting W_i or \widetilde{W}_i , or asking the left-or-right oracle on (W_i, \widetilde{W}_i) . We replace the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i by access to the decryption oracle on \mathcal{C}_i . Then, one has to take care that no decryption query is asked on one of the challenge ciphertexts involved in the sequence of games. This would mean that the adversary would replay in another session a ciphertext oracle-generated in another session. Because of the label which contains the verification key oracle-generated, one can safely reject the ciphertext.

Game \mathcal{G}_7 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS. When P_i is honest, \mathcal{S} generates the commitment \mathcal{C}_i by choosing a dummy password \widetilde{W}_i . It then computes \mathcal{C}'_i by encrypting the value $(W_i - \widetilde{W}_i)/\zeta$ with randomness $\mathbf{z}_i - \mathbf{r}_i/\zeta$. This leads to the same computations of \mathcal{C}_i and \mathcal{C}'_i as in the former game. The rest is done as above.

This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the former one.

Game \mathcal{G}_8 : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS. When P_i and P_j are both honest, if the words and languages are correct, players are both given the same random session key $\text{sk}_i = \text{sk}_j$. If the passwords are not compatible, random independent session keys are given.

Since the initiation flow $I1$ contained an oracle-generated verification key, unless the adversary managed to forge signatures, all the flows are oracle-generated. First, because of the pseudo-randomness of the SPHF, H_i is unpredictable, and independent of H'_j , hence sk_i looks random. Then, if the passwords are compatible, we already have $\text{sk}_j = \text{sk}_i$ in the previous game. However, if they are not compatible, either H'_i is independent of H_i , or H'_j is independent of H_j , and in any case, sk_j where already independent of sk_i in the previous game. This game is thus computationally indistinguishable from the former one, under the pseudo-randomness of the two SPHF.

Game \mathcal{G}_9 : In this above game, the hash values do not have to be computed anymore when P_i and P_j are both honest. The random coins are not needed anymore.

In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS. When P_i and P_j are both honest, \mathcal{S} generates \mathcal{C}'_i and \mathcal{C}_j with dummy values \widetilde{W}_i and \widetilde{W}_j . In this game, sessions where P_i and P_j are both honest look ideal, while one does not need anymore the inputs from the environment sent to P_i and P_j to simulate honest players.

This game is computationally indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the IND-PD-CCA and IND-CPA properties of the encryption schemes involved in \mathcal{C}'_i and \mathcal{C}_j . For the proof on indistinguishability between the two games, we make two successive sequences of hybrid games, as for the proof of indistinguishability of Game \mathcal{G}_3 . One with the IND-PD-CCA game: a sequence of hybrid games, where \mathcal{C}_i is generated by encrypting \widetilde{W}_i , and \mathcal{C}'_i by encrypting either W_i or \widetilde{W}_i , but in the critical session, one asks for the left-or-right oracle Encrypt on $(\widetilde{W}_i, \widetilde{W}_i)$, and the left-or-right oracle $\text{Encrypt}'$ on $(\widetilde{W}_i, \widetilde{W}_i)$. The decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i is replaced by an access to the decryption oracle on \mathcal{C}_i . As above, one has to take care that no decryption query is asked on a challenge ciphertext \mathcal{C}'_i , but the latter cannot be valid since it is computed from \mathcal{C}_i values not controlled by the adversary. The second hybrid sequence uses IND-CPA games on \mathcal{C}_j exactly as in the proof of indistinguishability of Game \mathcal{G}_3 .

Game \mathcal{G}_{10} : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_i and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS, but also the decryption key for \mathcal{C}_j . When P_i is honest and P_j corrupted, \mathcal{S} extracts the password committed to by the adversary in \mathcal{C}_j . It checks whether it is consistent with the password sent to P_i by the environment. If the passwords are not consistent (or decryption rejects), P_i is given a random session key sk_i .

This game is statistically indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the smoothness of the SPHF.

Game \mathcal{G}_{11} : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption keys for \mathcal{C}_i and \mathcal{C}_j and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS.

In the above game, when P_i is honest and P_j corrupted, if the extracted password from \mathcal{C}_j is not consistent, P_i does not have to compute hash values. The random coins are not needed anymore. In this game, in this particular case, \mathcal{S} generates \mathcal{C}'_i with a dummy random \widetilde{W}_i .

This game is computationally indistinguishable from the former one thanks to the IND-PD-CCA property of the encryption scheme involved in C'_i . The proof uses the same sequence of hybrid games with the IND-PD-CCA game on (C_i, C'_i) as in the proof of indistinguishability of Game G_9 .

Game G_{12} : In this game, the simulator still knows the decryption keys for C_i and C_j and the equivocability trapdoor for the trapdoor commitment when generating the CRS. Now, when P_i is honest and P_j corrupted, if the extracted password from C_j is consistent, \mathcal{S} knows W_i (the same as the value W_j sent by the environment). It uses it to generate the ciphertext C'_i . \mathcal{S} can compute the correct value sk_i from the random coins, and gives it to P_i . In this game, sessions where P_i is honest and P_j is corrupted look ideal, while one does not need anymore the inputs from the environment sent to P_i to simulate honest players.

This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the former one.

Game G_{13} : In this game, \mathcal{S} now uses the ideal functionality: NewSession-queries for honest players are automatically forwarded to the ideal functionality, for corrupted players, they are done by \mathcal{S} using the values extracted from C_i or C_j . In order to check consistency of the passwords, \mathcal{S} asks for a TestPw. When one player is corrupted, it learns the outcome: success or failure. It can continue the simulation in an appropriate way.

E.5 Security Proof of the UC Commitment (Theorem 4.3)

We now provide a full proof, with a sequence of games, that the protocol presented on Figure 6 emulates the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$ against adaptive corruptions with erasures. This sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary interacts with real players, and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator that makes the interface between the ideal functionality and the adversary.

We denote by $C_3 = C_1 + \zeta C_2$, the tuple involved in the last check. It should be a partial encryption of x under randomness $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{r} + \zeta \mathbf{s}$ and noise $\mathbf{e}_z = \mathbf{e}_r + \zeta \mathbf{e}_s : C_3 = \text{MP}_1(\text{ek}, x, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$.

E.5.1 Description of the Games

Game G_0 : This is the real game, in which every flow from the honest players is generated correctly by the simulator which knows the input x sent by the environment to the sender. There is no use of the ideal functionality for the moment.

Game G_1 : In this game, we focus on the simulation of an honest receiver interacting with a corrupted sender. Executions with an honest sender are still simulated as before, using the input x . The simulator will generate the CRS in such a way it knows the Micciancio Peikert decryption key, but not the trapdoor for the commitment.

Upon receiving the values (c_t^1, c_t^2) from the adversary, the simulator simply chooses a challenge ζ at random and sends it to the adversary, as P_j would do with P_i . After receiving the values (C_1, \mathbf{t}_1) , the simulator checks the consistency of the Trapdoor commitment c_t^1 and aborts in case of failure. It then uses the decryption key to recover the value x' sent by the adversary. In case of invalid ciphertext, one sets $x' = \perp$. It stores $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, C_1, \zeta, c_t^2)$ and $(x', \text{sid}, P_i, P_j)$ (this will correspond later to the Commit query to the ideal functionality, in the ideal game). Upon receiving the values $(x, C_2, \mathbf{t}_2, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$, the simulator does as P_j would do in checking the commitment c_t^2 and that $C_3 = \text{MP}_1(\text{ek}, x, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$, but accepts x' as the opening for the commitment.

The only difference with the previous game is that P_i will accept x' , as decrypted from $C_1 = \text{MP}_2(\text{ek}, x', \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{r})$, for the decommitment instead of the value x output at the decommitment time, which matches with $C_3 = \text{MP}_1(\text{ek}, x, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$, but that is also contained in c_t^2 together with C_2 . We will show that under the binding property of the Trapdoor commitment, one has $x' = x$ with overwhelming probability, and thus there is no real difference.

Let us assume that $x' \neq x$ in at least one of such executions.

This is now where the amplification used on the ζ will come into play. Naively, one will consider an execution with an opening different from the extracted value. When one rewinds on a single challenge ζ , one hopes to force the adversary to open to another value and argues that this way he has some unpredictability issue with his initial commitment. However, as once again in bit-commitment the message space is only $\{0, 1\}$ the adversary has a probability of 0.5 to open to the value he expected. Using a naive amplification by sending ℓ ζ values, this probability is reduced to 0.5^ℓ so to a negligible outcome. One can always use a more advanced amplification as long a similar property is provided.

We stress that the rewind here is just for the proof of indistinguishability of the two games, but not in the simulation.

In case of corruption of the receiver, one can note that he has no secret.

Game G_2 : In this game, we start modifying the simulation of an honest sender, still knowing his input x . For the honest verifier against a corrupted sender, we still have to know the Micciancio Peikert decryption key to run the same simulation as in the previous game. But we now need to know the \aleph trapdoor used for equivocating the trapdoor commitment.

This game is almost the same as the previous one excepted the way the double ciphertext is generated: $(C_1, C_2) = \text{DMP}(x, y; \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s})$, for a random y instead of 0. The rest of the commit phase is unchanged.

At the decommit phase, \mathcal{S} chooses random coins \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z and computes $C_3 = \text{MP}_1(\text{ek}, x, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$, and then “repairs” C_2 such that $\zeta C_2 = (C_3 - C_1)$, and \mathbf{t}_2 for being able to open c_t^2 to this new value.

Thanks to the homomorphic property, the repaired C_2 is similar to a correct ciphertext of 0, and the equivocating of the Trapdoor commitment guarantees a correct opening. This game is thus perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

In case a corruption of P_i occurs before the decommit phase, the simulator anticipates the equivocating of c_t^2 .

Game G_3 : One can note that in the previous game, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{e}_r is not used anymore to compute \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z . One could thus ignore it, unless \mathcal{P}_i gets corrupted before ζ has been sent, since we should be able to give it. But in such a case, one can compute again C_1 knowing \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{e}_r and equivocate c_i^1 . We then alter again the way the double ciphertext is generated: $(C_1, C_2) = \text{DMP}(\mathcal{L}_i, \text{ek}, x', y; \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s})$, for random x' and y . Everything remains unchanged.

The unique change is thus the ciphertext C_1 that encrypts a random x' instead of x . One can run the IND-CCA security game, in an hybrid way, to show this game is indistinguishable from the previous one. To this aim, one has to show that the random coins \mathbf{r} are not needed to be known, and that the challenge ciphertexts are never asked for decryption (where the decryption key here is replaced by an access to the decryption oracle, hence the IND-CCA security game). The former point has been discussed above. For the latter, we have shown that the value actually encrypted in C_1 by the corrupted sender is the value sent at the decommit phase, which would even break the one-wayness of the encryption. Hence, if such a replay happens, one knows that the decommit phase will fail.

In case of corruption of \mathcal{P}_i before receiving ζ , Trapdoor commitments only have been sent, and they can thus be equivocated with correct values (given by either the ideal functionality or the adversary). In case of corruption of \mathcal{P}_i after having received ζ , one does as before, anticipating the equivocation of c_i^2 .

Game G_4 : This is the ideal game, in which the simulator works as described below: when \mathcal{P}_i is corrupted, one uses the decryption of C_1 to send the Commit query to the ideal functionality, when \mathcal{P}_i is honest one can wait for the receipt and reveal confirmations from the adversary to conclude the simulation of the real flows.

E.5.2 Description of the Simulator

Setup. The simulator generates the parameters, knowing the Micciancio Peikert decryption key and the equivocation trapdoor.

When \mathcal{P}_i is honest.

COMMIT STAGE: Upon receiving the information that a commitment has been performed, with $(\text{receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$, \mathcal{S} computes $(C_1, C_2) = \text{DMP}(x', y; \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s})$, for random x' and y but then follows as \mathcal{P}_i would do. If \mathcal{P}_j is honest too, one just has to send a random ζ .

In case of corruption of \mathcal{P}_i before receiving ζ , one can equivocate c_i^1 , otherwise one equivocates c_i^2 , as explained above, in both cases using the value given either by the ideal functionality or the adversary, according to the time of the corruption.

DECOMMIT STAGE: Upon receiving the information that the decommitment has been performed on x , with $(\text{reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j, x)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$, \mathcal{S} exploits the equivocability of the Trapdoor commitment: it first chooses a random \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z and computes the ciphertext $C_3 = \text{MP}_1(\mathcal{L}_i, \text{ek}, x, \mathbf{T}; \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{e}_z)$. It then adapts C_2 so that $\zeta C_2 = (C_3 - C_1)$ and uses the trapdoor for the commitment to produce a new value \mathbf{t}_2 corresponding to the new value C_2 . It then simulates the decommit phase to \mathcal{P}_j .

When \mathcal{P}_i is corrupted and \mathcal{P}_j is honest.

COMMIT STAGE: Upon receiving (C_1, \mathbf{t}_1) from the adversary, \mathcal{S} decrypts the ciphertext C_1 and extracts x . If the decryption is invalid, \mathcal{S} sends $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j, \perp)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{mcom}}$. Otherwise, \mathcal{S} sends $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j, x)$.

DECOMMIT STAGE: \mathcal{S} acts as a regular honest user \mathcal{P}_j from the incoming message of \mathcal{A} on behalf of \mathcal{P}_i . In case of validity, it sends the query $(\text{reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$.

F Cheat Sheet, Discrete-log and Lattice-Based Cryptography

In Figure 12, we compare pairing-based encryptions, and their equivalent over Lattices. We recall the parameters for each of those construction

- Dual Regev SPHF parameters (Appendix B): $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $q = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, $m \geq \Omega(nk)$, a and finally $s = q/f(n)$ where f is superpolynomial but subexponential in n , in particular $s = q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$.
- Micciancio Peikert SPHF parameters (Section 3.1): $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $q = 2^k$ for some integer $k = \Omega(\lambda)$, $\bar{m} = \Omega(nk)$, $m = \bar{m} + nk$ and finally $s = q/f(n)$ where f is superpolynomial but subexponential in n , in particular $s = q \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

	ElGamal [25]	Dual Regev [32]
Setup	(p, \mathbb{G}, g)	$(n, m, q, s, \bar{\mathbf{A}} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}))$
KG(1^n)	$\text{dk} = (t \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_p) -1)^\top$ $\text{ek} = A = (g g^t)$	$\text{dk} = (\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\{0, 1\}^m) -1);$ $\text{ek} = \mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{A} (\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{t})] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m+1}$
Encrypt($\text{ek}, M; s$)	$M \in \mathbb{G}, s \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_p)$ $\mathbf{c} = (A^\top)^s + (0 M)^\top$	$M \in \{0, 1\}, \mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n), \mathbf{e} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}^{m+1}$ $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{A}^\top \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + (0 \text{ECC}(M))^\top \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m+1}$
Decrypt(dk, \mathbf{c})	$M' = \mathbf{c}^{\text{dk}}$	$M' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \text{dk}, \mathbf{c} \rangle) \in \{0, 1\}$
CPA-Security	Under DDH	Under LWE
SPHF:		
HashKG	$\text{hk} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_p^2)$	$\text{hk} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^{m+1}$
ProjKG(ek, hk)	$\text{hp} = A^{\text{hk}}$	$\text{hp} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \text{hk}$
ProjHash(hp, s)	$H' = \text{hp}^s$	$H' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \text{hp}, s \rangle)$
Hash($\mathbf{c}, M', \text{hk}$)	$H = (\mathbf{c} - (0 M)^\top)^{\text{hk}}$	$H = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \text{hk}, \mathbf{c} - (0 \text{ECC}(M')^\top) \rangle)$
	Cramer Shoup[22]	Micciancio Peikert [43]
Setup	$(p, \mathbb{G}, \bar{\mathbf{A}} = (g_1, g_2), \mathcal{H})$	$(n, m, q, s, \bar{\mathbf{A}})$
KG(1^n)	$\text{dk}_1 = (1, -z \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p, 0, 0)^\top$ $\text{dk}_2 = \mathbf{R}_1, \mathbf{R}_2 = (x_1, x_2)^\top, (y_1, y_2)^\top \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ $\text{ek} = A, G = (g_1^t \bar{\mathbf{A}} \bar{\mathbf{A}}^{\mathbf{R}_1}), \bar{\mathbf{A}}^{\mathbf{R}_2}$	$\text{dk} = (\mathbf{R} \mathbf{1});$ $\text{ek} = (\mathbf{A} = [\bar{\mathbf{A}} -\mathbf{R}\bar{\mathbf{A}}], \mathbf{G})$
Encrypt($\text{ek}, M; s$)	$M \in \mathbb{G}, s \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ $\mathbf{c} = ((A + (0 G^\xi))^\top)^s + (M 0)^\top$	$M \in \{0, 1\}, s \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n), \mathbf{e} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}^m, \mathbf{T} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}$ $\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{A} + (0 \mathbf{T}\mathbf{G}))^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} + (0 \text{ECC}(M))^\top$
Decrypt(dk, \mathbf{c})	$\mathcal{C}^{(0 \text{dk}_{2,1} \xi \text{dk}_{2,2} -1)} \stackrel{?}{=} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{G}}$ $M' = \mathbf{c}^{\text{dk}_1}$	Verify(OTS) $M' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \text{dk}_T, \mathbf{c} \rangle)$
CCA-Security	Under DDH	Under LWE
SPHF:		
HashKG	$\text{hk} = u, \mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p^3$	$\text{hk} = \mathbf{v} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}, \omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda})}^m$
ProjKG(ek, hk)	$\text{hp} = (A^\mathbf{v}, (A_1 0 G)^{(u 0 \mathbf{v}_4)})$	$\text{hp} = (\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{v}, (\bar{\mathbf{0}} \mathbf{G}) \cdot (0 \mathbf{v}_*))$
ProjHash(hp, s)	$H' = \text{hp}_1^s \cdot \text{hp}_2^{\xi s}$	$H' = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \text{hp}_1, s \rangle + \langle \text{hp}_2, \mathbf{T}^\top s \rangle)$
Hash($\mathbf{c}, M', \text{hk}$)	$\mathcal{C} = \mathbf{c} - (M' 0)^\top$ $H = \mathcal{C}^{\mathbf{v} + \xi(u 0)}$	$\mathcal{C} = \mathbf{c} - (0 \text{ECC}(M')^\top)$ $H = \text{ECC}^{-1}(\langle \text{hk}, \mathcal{C} \rangle)$

Figure 12: Parallel comparison between classical encryptions on discrete-log and lattices, and the associated SPHF