

Implementing Pairing-Based Cryptosystems in USB Tokens

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Abstract In the last decade, pairing-based cryptography has been the most intensively studied subject in the cryptography field. Various optimization techniques have been developed to speed up the pairing computation. However, implementing a pairing-based cryptosystem in resource constrained devices has been less tried. Moreover, due to progress on solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), those implementations are no longer safe to use. In this paper, we report an implementation of a couple of pairing-based cryptosystems at a high security level on a 32-bit microcontroller in a USB token. It shows that USB token supporting secure pairing-based cryptosystems is viable.

Keywords Software implementation · Pairing · Identity-based cryptography

1 Introduction

Since the seminal work of Joux's tripartite key agreement protocol [25] and Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara's non-interactive identity-based key agreement [33], particularly after Boneh-Franklin [7] introduced identity-based encryption with pairings, there have been a flood of innovative work to create various new cryptosystems using pairings, including short signatures [13, 35], identity-based encryptions [5, 8], identity-based signatures [18, 14], attribute-based encryptions [21], etc. We refer the interested reader to the book "Identity-Based Cryptography" [26] for more references.

Meanwhile, because of its great complexity, computing pairing efficiently at proper security levels is also of

great interest. During the past ten years, many optimizations to the Miller algorithm [23] have been proposed to speed up cryptographic-friendly pairings [12, 11, 22, 28, 30, 34, 3, 20]. Although, great progress has been made, the complexity of pairing computation is still much greater than the traditional cryptographic operations such as the elliptic curve point scalar or even the big size integer modular multiplication at the same security level. This explains why most of the work focuses on algorithm implementation on generic CPUs and only a few attempts to compute pairings in resource constrained devices [9, 31, 19, 29] have been reported.

In [9], Bertoni et al. described an implementation of Tate [12] pairing on a supersingular curve over a 512-bit prime base field on a ST22 processor aiming at RSA-1024 bit security level. With the increase of computation power, now the digital society is moving towards a higher security level. It is generally verified that the Tate pairing on supersingular curves defined over prime fields is not a promising choice for high security levels, as it requires a large base field. Scott et al. attempted to improve the pairing efficiency on this platform by using Eta pairing [11] on a supersingular curve over a 379-bit binary field [31]. This implementation clearly shows better performance and was considered to be easier to scale to higher security levels. Unfortunately recent progress [1] on computing the DLP shows it is unwise to use supersingular curves over characteristic 2 or 3 fields to implement pairing-based cryptosystems. In [19], on the Philips HiPerSmart platform Devegili et al. implemented the Ate pairing [22] on the Barreto-Naehrig curves [16] aiming at the RSA-3072 security level, and it takes approximately 3 seconds to complete the computation. The performance of several implementations on 8-bit or 16-bit microcon-

trollers such as on MSP430 [29] is even worse because the computation capability of those chips is weaker.

Instead of proposing new hardware implementation for better performance or giving a slow implementation on an unsuitable architecture, we choose a 32-bit microcontroller which is mainly used to make USB tokens for security applications such as executing ECC or RSA algorithms. We report an efficient implementation of a couple of identity-based cryptosystems on the chip. Particularly, we give a full implementation of identity-based encryption scheme SK-KEM [8] and identity-based signature scheme BLMQ-IBS [14], both are standardized in [24]. For the implementation, we not only need to choose proper curve parameters concerning the schemes but also consider various restrictions posed by the chosen chip. We shall make use of the existing mathematic hardware module, which boosts medium size integer modular multiplications, to implement pairing at a high security level. The final product as a secure USB token can complete all the required cryptographic operations in just over half a second. The presented curve parameters may also benefit the security of other elliptic curve cryptosystems.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, pairing is briefly introduced. The implemented identity-based cryptosystems are reviewed in Section 3. The chosen chip is described in Section 4. Curve parameters for the cryptosystems are presented in Section 5. The details of implementation and computation performance analysis are reported in Section 6.

2 Pairings

A pairing is a bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$ where $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ are additive groups and \mathbb{G}_3 is a multiplicative group. All three groups have prime order r . For cryptographic purpose, a pairing should be well defined with bilinearity, non-degenerate and easy to compute. In particular, for all $(P, Q) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2$ and for all $(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_r$,

$$e([a]P, [b]Q) = e(P, Q)^{ab}.$$

Let $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ be an elliptic curve defined over field \mathbb{F}_p . Let k be the least positive integer such that $r \mid p^k - 1$ and $r^2 \nmid p^k - 1$. Such integer k is called the embedding degree of r with regard to \mathbb{F}_p . For every $Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})$ and integer s , let $f_{s,Q}$ be the \mathbb{F}_{p^k} -rational function with divisor

$$(f_{s,Q}) = s(Q) - ([s]Q) - (s-1)(\infty)$$

where ∞ represents the infinity point.

On elliptic curves several pairings satisfying the cryptographic requirements can be defined. So far the most efficient one is the optimal Ate pairing [22, 34]. The Ate pairing over $\mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_1$ can be defined by

$$a(Q, P) = f_{t-1,Q}(P)^{(p^k-1)/r},$$

where $\mathbb{G}_1 = E[r] \cap \text{Ker}(\pi_p - [1]) = E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$ and $\mathbb{G}_2 = E[r] \cap \text{Ker}(\pi_p - [p]) \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})[r]$ with the Frobenius endomorphism $\pi_p : E \rightarrow E$ given by $\pi_p(x, y) = (x^p, y^p)$. t is the trace of Frobenius of the curve and $\mathbb{G}_3 = \mathbb{F}_{p^k}^* / (\mathbb{F}_{p^k}^*)^r$.

To compute pairing, the Miller algorithm [23] is used to evaluate function $f_{t-1,Q}$ at point P . The complexity of the process is mainly decided by the Miller iterations t . Vercauteren [34] showed the Miller iterations may be further reduced for certain curves to define the optimal Ate pairing. More details of such pairing with some chosen curve parameters will be given in Section 5.

3 Identity-Based Cryptosystems

We implement two identity-based cryptosystems SK-KEM [8] and BLMQ-IBS [14], both use the Sakai-Kasahara key generation algorithm [32] to generate identity private keys. The key generation algorithm proceeds as follow.

Setup $\mathbb{G}_{\text{ID}}(1^\kappa)$. On input 1^κ , the algorithm works as follows:

1. Generate three cyclic groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_3 of prime order r and a bilinear pairing map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$. Pick random generator $P_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1^*, P_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$.
2. Pick a random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ and compute $P_{\text{pub}} = [s]P_1$.
3. Pick a cryptographic hash function

$$H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^*$$

4. Output the master public key $M_{\text{p\text{t}}} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3, \hat{e}, P_1, P_2, P_{\text{pub}}, H_1)$ and the master secret key $M_{\text{s\text{t}}} = s$.

Extract $\mathbb{X}_{\text{ID}}(M_{\text{p\text{t}}}, M_{\text{s\text{t}}}, \text{ID}_A)$. Given an identifier string $\text{ID}_A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ of entity A , $M_{\text{p\text{t}}}$ and $M_{\text{s\text{t}}}$, the algorithm returns $D_A = [\frac{1}{s+H_1(\text{ID}_A)}]P_2$.

SK-KEM is an identity-based key encapsulation mechanism with the encapsulate algorithm $\mathbb{E}_{\text{ID-KEM}}$ and decapsulate algorithm $\mathbb{D}_{\text{ID-KEM}}$ as shown in Table 1, where

$$\begin{aligned} H_2 : \mathbb{G}_3 &\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, \\ H_3 : \{0, 1\}^n &\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^*, \\ H_4 : \{0, 1\}^n &\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_d}, \end{aligned}$$

for data encapsulation mechanism key length l_d and random variable length n .

BLMQ-IBS is an identity-based signature scheme with the **Sign** and **Verify** algorithm as shown in Table 2,

Table 1 SK-KEM

$\mathbb{E}_{\text{ID-KEM}}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $m \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ - $x \leftarrow H_3(m)$ - $Q_A \leftarrow P_{\text{pub}} + [H_1(\text{ID}_A)]P_1$ - $C_1 = [x]Q_A$ - $C_2 = m \oplus H_2(\hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^x)$ - $K \leftarrow H_4(m)$ - Return $(K, \langle C_1, C_2 \rangle)$
$\mathbb{D}_{\text{ID-KEM}}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, D_A, \langle C_1, C_2 \rangle)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $\alpha \leftarrow \hat{e}(C_1, D_A)$ - $m = C_2 \oplus H_2(\alpha)$ - $x \leftarrow H_3(m)$ - $Q_A \leftarrow P_{\text{pub}} + [H_1(\text{ID}_A)]P_1$ - $U \leftarrow [x]Q_A$ - If $C_1 \neq U$, return \perp - $K \leftarrow H_4(m)$ - Return K

Table 2 BLMQ-IBS

$\text{Sign}(M_{\text{pt}}, D_A, M)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ - $y \leftarrow \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^x$ - $h \leftarrow H_2(M, y)$ - $S = [x + h]D_A$ - Return $\langle h, S \rangle$
$\text{Verify}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, M, \langle h, S \rangle)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $Q_A \leftarrow P_{\text{pub}} + [H_1(\text{ID}_A)]P_1$ - $y' \leftarrow \hat{e}(Q_A, S) \cdot \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^{-h}$ - $h' \leftarrow H_2(M, y')$ - If $h \neq h'$, return Failed - Return OK

where $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_3 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ and M is the signed message.

The SK key generation algorithm bases its security on the following the ℓ -SDH assumption [8, 14].

Assumption 1 ℓ -Strong Diffie-Hellman (ℓ -SDH)

Let P be an element of prime order r in an Abelian group. For a positive integer ℓ , and $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_r^*$, given $([\alpha]P, [\alpha^2]P, \dots, [\alpha^\ell]P)$, computing $(h, [\frac{1}{\alpha+h}]P)$ for some $h \in \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ is hard.

Cheon presented an algorithm showing that the computational complexity of ℓ -SDH can be reduced by $O(\sqrt{\ell})$ from that of the DLP in the group [17]. Here we restate Cheon's two main results:

Theorem 1 Let P be an element of prime order r in an Abelian group. Suppose that ℓ is a positive divisor of $r - 1$. If $P, P_1 = [\alpha]P$ and $P_\ell = [\alpha^\ell]P$ are given, α

can be computed in $O(\log r \cdot (\sqrt{(r-1)/\ell} + \sqrt{\ell}))$ group operations using $O(\max\{\sqrt{(r-1)/\ell}, \sqrt{\ell}\})$ memory.

Theorem 2 Let P be an element of prime order r in an Abelian group. Suppose that ℓ is a positive divisor of $r + 1$. If $P_i = [\alpha^i]P$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, 2\ell$ are given, α can be computed in $O(\log r \cdot (\sqrt{(r+1)/\ell} + \ell))$ group operations using $O(\max\{\sqrt{(r+1)/\ell}, 2\ell\})$ memory.

We assume that the adversary can obtain private keys because the adversary may be the user of the system and may also compromise other users' private keys. By assuming an adversary \mathcal{A} has gathered ℓ different pairs of public/private keys $(h_i, [\frac{1}{s+h_i}]P_2)$ with $h_i = H_1(\text{ID}_i)$, using Cheon's algorithm \mathcal{A} can recover the master secret key in the following manner.

- Randomly sample $h_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_r^*$ different from h_i for $1 \leq i \leq \ell$.
- Set $\alpha = s + h_0$ which \mathcal{A} does not know, and

$$Q = [\frac{1}{(s+h_1) \cdots (s+h_\ell)}]P_2.$$

- For $j = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$, \mathcal{A} computes

$$[\alpha^j]Q = [\frac{(s+h_0)^j}{(s+h_1) \cdots (s+h_\ell)}]P_2 = [\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \frac{c_{ij}}{s+h_i}]P_2$$

where $c_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}_r$ are computable from h_i 's.

- Given $[\alpha^j]Q$ for $0 \leq j \leq \ell - 1$, use Cheon's algorithm to compute α and so $s = \alpha - h_0$.

By Theorem 2 the complexity of the above attack to recover the master secret key s in SK-KEM/BLMQ-IBS is with $O(\log r \cdot (\sqrt{2(r+1)/\ell} + \ell/2))$ group operations using $O(\max\{\sqrt{2(r+1)/\ell}, \ell\})$ memory. Note that if there is a divisor d of $r - 1$ with $d \leq \ell$ and $d \approx \ell$, then the attack is still working with similar computational complexity by Theorem 1.

To defend Cheon's attack on SK key generation algorithm, it is better to have both $r - 1$ and $r + 1$ with small divisors as few as possible. In Section 5, we show such curve parameters can be found.

4 The AisinoChip's AC4384 Architecture

AC4384 is a microcontroller supplied by AisinoChip [2]. The chip has a 32-bit RISC core designed specifically for secure applications including USB tokens or smart cards. This core has a 32-bit load/store architecture and is able to complete 32x16 multiplication in a single cycle. It equips with 16 32-bit general purpose registers and can complete a branch execution in two cycles. The chip has 4K CPU cache, 32K SDRAM and 384K eflash. The maximum clock speed is 100MHz.

For the purpose of high speed security applications such as ECC or RSA, the chip is incorporated with a mathematic module which is capable of computing 192 to 1024-bit integer modular multiplication at high speed. The module supports modular multiplication pre-computation. The pre-computation is done once for every different modular and the pre-computed value is loaded before each modular multiplication. This module shall be used to boost the underlining field multiplication in pairing.

Table 3 shows the time of main operations in a 256-bit prime field. The modular addition and subtraction are implemented in assembly code. From the table we can see the timing ratio between modular multiplication and addition or subtraction with random values is about 3.4.

Table 3 Timing of 256-bit Prime Field Operations

Operation	Condition	Timing
$A + B \bmod P$	$A + B < P$	0.0024ms
$A + B \bmod P$	$A + B \geq P$	0.0047ms
$A - B \bmod P$	$A \geq B$	0.0024ms
$A - B \bmod P$	$A < B$	0.0047ms
$A \times B \bmod P$	pre-computed	0.012ms
$A \times B \bmod P$	normal	0.024ms

5 Curve Parameters

For pairing-based cryptosystems, one should keep the right balance between the intended security level and system efficiency. Pairing may be used to convert DLP in \mathbb{G}_1 or \mathbb{G}_2 into the corresponding problem in \mathbb{G}_3 . For pairings defined on elliptic curves, this has serious security implications. There exist algorithms for DLP in the finite fields running much faster than the best known general algorithms for the elliptic curve DLP. This requires \mathbb{G}_3 to be large enough to make sure the DLP in \mathbb{G}_3 at least has the same complexity as those in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 . On the other hand, pairing computation involves many operations in \mathbb{G}_3 and if \mathbb{G}_3 is too large, the computation would become very slow.

Barreto-Naehrig curves [16] defined over a 256-bit prime field is the de facto choice to implement pairing-based cryptosystems at the RSA-3072 security level. The standard Weierstrass representation of the curves is

$$Y^2 = X^3 + B.$$

The characteristic p of the prime field, the prime group order r of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$, the trace t of the Frobenius of the

curves are parameterised by the variable u as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} p(u) &= 36u^4 + 36u^3 + 24u^2 + 6u + 1 \\ r(u) &= 36u^4 + 36u^3 + 18u^2 + 6u + 1 \\ t(u) &= 6u^2 + 1 \end{aligned}$$

The optimal Ate pairing on E is defined as [34] $a_{\text{opt}}(Q, P) =$

$$[f_{z,Q}(P) \cdot l_{[z]Q, \pi_p(Q)}(P) \cdot l_{[z]Q + \pi_p(Q), -\pi_p^2(Q)}(P)]^{(p^{12}-1)/r}$$

where $z = 6u + 2$ and $l_{Q_1, Q_2}(P)$ is the equation of the line corresponding to the addition of Q_1 and Q_2 and its evaluation at P .

A Barreto-Naehrig curve admits a sextic twist $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$. The D-type sextic twist is defined as $Y^2 = X^3 + B/\xi$, where $\xi \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ is an element that is neither a square nor a cube in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} [19].

Regarding to the implemented cryptosystems, to defend Cheon's attack, we may choose r such that both $r - 1$ and $r + 1$ have small divisors as few as possible. At the same time to keep the Miller iterations few, $|z|$ should have low hamming weight (HW) or short non-adjacent form (NAF). Shorter NAF of $|u|$ also benefits the final exponentiation in pairing computation.

Table 4 Curve Parameters

– **Barreto-Naehrig Curve 1:** p is 264-bit prime.

$$\begin{aligned} B &= 2 \\ u &= 18000000002840543 \\ p(u) &= \text{B640000004C6A1FDAB8C03C8} \\ &\quad \text{A47B7DABE6C3DC8D9E7C76} \\ &\quad \text{F1D30469A1D3A7840E9B} \\ r(u) &= \text{B640000004C6A1FDAB8C03C8} \\ &\quad \text{A47B7DABD943DC8D9E4F2E} \\ &\quad \text{931D0443A8D4D04DF165} \\ t(u) &= \text{D800000002D485EB60025F8FE} \\ &\quad \text{D7361D37} \\ r(u) - 1 &= 2^2 \times 3 \times 5 \times \\ &\quad \text{68D1EC4A0419(47-bit)} \times \\ &\quad \text{4CCCCCCCCD4D9AA7(63-bit)} \\ &\quad \times \text{18BA64EDD57110C5DBB8D7} \\ &\quad \text{55A70745054D0AB9(149-bit)} \\ r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 3 \times 73 \times \\ &\quad \text{30E236F939FA7D(54-bit)} \times \\ &\quad \text{7BF6E71655DDCA91C1(71-bit)} \\ &\quad \times \text{1EDB6DB6DBD537B3E924E} \\ &\quad \text{9148FA2C4D51(129-bit)} \\ |z| &= 9000000000F181F94 \\ \text{HW}(|u|) &= 10 \\ \text{NAF-length}(|u|) &= 10 \\ \text{HW}(|z|) &= 16 \\ \text{NAF-length}(|z|) &= 10 \end{aligned}$$

– **Barreto-Naehrig Curve 2:** p is a 254-bit prime.

$$\begin{aligned}
 B &= 3 \\
 u &= 4000000001E11061 \\
 p(u) &= 24000000043A64DAD02FABEC8 \\
 &\quad 3B0BDA0A0A60F7F7E1723468 \\
 &\quad B1BFE04FF448327 \\
 r(u) &= 24000000043A64DAD02FABEC8 \\
 &\quad 3B0BDA040A60F7F7873F2238B \\
 &\quad 06CE0DADEEE6A1 \\
 t(u) &= 6000000005A3312300152FF7515 \\
 &\quad 59C87 \\
 r(u) - 1 &= 2^5 \times 3 \times 7 \times \\
 &\quad 924924924D70257(60\text{-bit}) \times \\
 &\quad 18000000021D326D800FE3F982 \\
 &\quad A38E58BACBA39D99F77C7 \\
 &\quad (185\text{-bit}) \\
 r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 5 \times 29 \times \\
 &\quad 13C1F0BB9E04B(49\text{-bit}) \times \\
 &\quad 894161E4B4F7A84E65(72\text{-bit}) \times \\
 &\quad 3000000002D19892400A97FBAE \\
 &\quad 4DFF67(126\text{-bit}) \\
 |z| &= 1800000000B466248 \\
 \text{HW}(|u|) &= 10 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|u|) &= 8 \\
 \text{HW}(|z|) &= 13 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|z|) &= 13
 \end{aligned}$$

For the strict RSA-3072 security level, one may choose slightly larger field to compensate the complexity deduction due to the attack. On the other hand, to benefit the computation with the lazy reduction technique [3], a 254-bit prime p was proposed to implement pairings. We also give a 254-bit prime curve example, although our implementation on AC4384 does not use the technique.

Table 4 gives two curve parameter examples. One is defined over a 264-bit field for better security, the other is defined over a 254-bit field for better performance. A few more curve parameter sets with $|u|$ having lower hamming weights or shorter NAF are presented in Appendix. The given curve parameters may also be used for other elliptic curve cryptosystems such as [6] in practice to shield attacks making use of access to a Static Diffie-Hellman oracle [10, 17].

According to [27], while the special form of p can be used to construct a more efficient number field sieve, the complexity of DLP in \mathbb{G}_3 reduced to $L_{p^{12}}(1/3, (\frac{80}{9})^{1/3})$ is still greater than the one of the integer factorization problem. The parameters of Curve 1 provides security at the RSA-3072 security level against Cheon’s attack if an attacker collects less than 2^{47} private keys. For the parameters of Curve 2, if an attacker collects less than 2^{49} private keys, the cryptosystems may still stand

above the AES-122 bit security level against Cheon’s attack.

6 Implementation Issues

Since Barreto et al.’s major improvement [12] to the Miller algorithm, during the years, steady improvements have been made, one over the other. Now pairings on Barreto-Naehrig curves at the RSA-3072 security level may be computed on general CPUs within a millisecond [3].

Our implementation makes use of those techniques suitable for the chosen architecture with a few exceptions. First, as the chip has a hardware module for modular multiplications (but no inversion), we use the homogeneous projective coordinate and do not consider the lazy reduction optimization [3]. Second, on the chip the timing of modular square (SQR) and modular multiplication (MUL) is the same and the ratio between MUL and addition (ADD) or subtraction (SUB) (3.4 as shown in Table 3) is not high. Hence, those tricks intended to make use the timing difference between SQR and MUL should be avoided if they increase ADD or SUB operations. Third, when the efficiency of the implemented cryptosystems is above the acceptable level, reducing the code size and storage requirement become the first priority. Those speed optimizations requiring extra complicated functions or extra memory is excluded.

Following lists the optimization techniques to the Miller algorithm adopted in the implementation:

- Use the BKLS algorithm [12] which removes denominators from the Miller algorithm.
- Represent the first input of a_{opt} on the sextic twist of the Barreto-Naehrig curve, i.e, Q now is in $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})[r]$ [19]. Q is untwisted back to $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}})$ during the line evaluation $l, \cdot(\cdot)$ in Algorithm 1.
- Represent $\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}}$ as a tower of finite extensions as suggested in [19]:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbb{F}_{p^2} &= \mathbb{F}_p[X]/(X^2 - \beta), \beta \text{ is a non-quadratic in } \mathbb{F}_p \\
 \mathbb{F}_{p^6} &= \mathbb{F}_{p^2}[Y]/(Y^3 - \xi), \xi \text{ is neither a square} \\
 &\quad \text{nor a cube in } \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \\
 \mathbb{F}_{p^{12}} &= \mathbb{F}_{p^6}[Z]/(Z^2 - \mu), \mu \text{ is a non-quadratic in } \mathbb{F}_{p^6}
 \end{aligned}$$

For the two curves listed in Section 5, β, ξ and μ ’s value is listed in Table 5.

Table 5 Parameters for Extension Field Representation

	β	ξ	μ
Curve 1	-2	$-1 - \sqrt{\beta}$	$\sqrt[3]{\xi}$
Curve 2	-1	$1 + \sqrt{\beta}$	$\sqrt[3]{\xi}$

- Use the efficient formulas proposed in [4] to evaluate $l_{\cdot}(\cdot)$ in Algorithm 1, particularly pre-computed $-P$ is used.
- Use the fact that the value of $l_{\cdot}(\cdot)$ in Algorithm 1 is sparse in $\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}}$ to improve the efficiency of field multiplication in line 4, 6, 8, 13 and 15 [3].
- Use the method in [30] to compute the final exponentiation in line 16 in Algorithm 1. The implementation does not adopt the slightly faster method in [20] for compatibility reason. Exponentiation to power of p are computed using Frobenius function with only one pre-computation [19].
- Use NAF to represent both $|z|$ in Algorithm 1 and $|u|$ in the final exponentiation computation.
- Replace any inversion in $\mathbb{F}_{p^{12}}$ with conjugation *conj* if possible as suggested in [3].
- Use Lucas ladder [15] to compute the cryptographic scheme involved exponentiations in \mathbb{G}_3 if the pre-computation is not applied.

Algorithm 1: BKLS Algorithm for Optimal Ate Pairing on B-N Curve

Input: $P \in \mathbb{G}_1, Q \in \mathbb{G}_2, u, |z| = |6u + 2| = (1, z_{s-1}, \dots, z_0)_{\text{NAF}}$

Output: $a_{\text{opt}}(Q, P)$

```

1  $Z \leftarrow Q, f \leftarrow 1;$ 
2 for  $i \leftarrow s_1; i \geq 0; i--$  do
3    $f \leftarrow f^2;$ 
4    $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_{Z,Z}(-P), Z \leftarrow [2]Z;$ 
5   if  $z_i = 1$  then
6      $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_{Z,Q}(P), Z \leftarrow Z + Q;$ 
7   if  $z_i = -1$  then
8      $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_{Z,-Q}(P), Z \leftarrow Z - Q;$ 
9 if  $u < 0$  then
10   $f \leftarrow \text{conj}(f);$ 
11   $Z = -Z;$ 
12  $T \leftarrow \pi_p(Q);$ 
13  $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_{Z,T}(P), Z \leftarrow Z + T;$ 
14  $T \leftarrow -\pi_p(T);$ 
15  $f \leftarrow f \cdot l_{Z,T}(P), Z \leftarrow Z + T;$ 
16  $f \leftarrow f^{(p^{12}-1)/r};$ 
17 return  $f;$ 

```

The performance of the optimal Ate pairing and point scalar is measured on two platforms: the AC4384 microcontroller and the i7-4650U 1.70GHz (boosted to 2.3GHz). On the i7 machine, prime field elements are in Montgomery representation and underlying integer operations are completed with the GMP library v5.1.2. The whole library is compiled using GCC v4.4.7 with option $-\mathbf{O2}$. On AC4384 microcontroller the code is compiled in favor of small code size instead of efficiency. Hence here instead of going after a speed record, we

merely show that implementation of IBC on such type of chips may achieve reasonably good performance.

The pairing is computed with at most 131 variables in \mathbb{F}_p , each is stored in a 36-byte array. The total 4716 bytes are reserved in advance from a global memory shared with other routines implemented in the USB token.

SK-KEM uses identity private keys in \mathbb{G}_2 to reduce ciphertext size and improves encryption/decryption speed. BLMQ-IBS may use identity private keys in \mathbb{G}_1 for smaller signature size and faster signing operation. If a user has only one identity private key used in both schemes, it is better to map the private key in \mathbb{G}_2 because the signing operation in BLMQ-IBS has no heavy pairing operation and the point scalar in \mathbb{G}_2 can be completed fairly fast. In this case, to reduce the code size the point scalar in \mathbb{G}_2 may be computed with the same $l_{\cdot}(\cdot)$ in Algorithm 1 but without evaluating on point P .

Table 6 lists the timing of optimal Ate pairing and point scalar in \mathbb{G}_2 over Curve 1 and 2. Table 7 lists the timing of SK-KEM decryption and BLMQ-IBS signing operation over Curve 1 and 2 with identity private keys generated in \mathbb{G}_2 .

Table 6 Timing of Group Operations

	AC4384	i7-4650U
a_{opt}^{254} Pairing	0.52s	1.65ms/1.37ms ^(\&)
a_{opt}^{264} Pairing	0.47s	1.79ms/1.55ms ^(\&)
Point Scalar in \mathbb{G}_1^{254}	0.10s	0.27ms ^(A) /0.17ms ^(\&)
Point Scalar in \mathbb{G}_1^{264}	0.10s	0.33ms ^(A) /0.20ms ^(\&)
Point Scalar in \mathbb{G}_2^{254}	0.25s	0.99ms ^(A) /0.25ms ^(\&)
Point Scalar in \mathbb{G}_2^{264}	0.24s	1.11ms ^(A) /0.30ms ^(\&)
Exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_3^{254}	0.28s	0.94ms/0.47ms ^(\&)
Exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_3^{264}	0.27s	1.06ms/0.56ms ^(\&)

& Pre-computation result.

A Point scalar in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 is computed with the standard method and may be optimized with the endomorphism map and less memory allocation.

Table 7 Timing of Decrypt/Sign Operations

	AC4384	i7-4650U
SK-KEM $_{\mathbb{G}_2}^{254}$ Dec	0.66s	1.99ms/1.61ms ^(\&)
SK-KEM $_{\mathbb{G}_2}^{264}$ Dec	0.61s	2.19ms/1.82ms ^(\&)
BLMQ-IBS $_{\mathbb{G}_2}^{254}$ Sign	0.55s	1.97ms/0.79ms ^(*)
BLMQ-IBS $_{\mathbb{G}_2}^{264}$ Sign	0.53s	2.23ms/0.94ms ^(*)

^{\&} Pre-computation of point scalar with P_1 and $\hat{e}(\cdot, D_A)$ is applied.

^{*} Pre-computation of point scalar with private key D_A and exponentiation with $\hat{e}(P_1, P_2)$ is applied.

Two platforms show different performance behaviors. Curve 2 involves significantly more ADD/SUB operations for pairing computation, point scalar in \mathbb{G}_2 and exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_3 than Curve 1, while there is no timing difference between 254 and 264-bit MUL on AC4384. Hence the schemes implemented with Curve 1 perform slightly better on AC4384 even if a few more MULs are computed. On the other hand, with the lazy reduction on i7 CPU, the cost of extra ADD/SUB operations is compensated with the gain of fewer and faster MUL operations on Curve 2, so schemes implemented with Curve 2 are faster than with Curve 1.

7 Conclusion

Pairing-based cryptosystems have been intensively studied for more than ten years. Several identity-based schemes from pairings have already been standardized and widely deployed. Many optimization techniques have been developed to improve such systems' efficiency. In this paper, by carefully choosing curve parameters and adopting many those state-of-art improvements, we have successfully implemented two important identity-based cryptosystems on a 32-bit microcontroller. The final product as a USB token shows identity-based cryptography is able to perform decently well at a high security level in a resource constrained device.

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Appendix

Here we give a couple of extra curve parameter sets of which $|u|$ has slightly low hamming weights and $r(u) - 1$ or $r(u) + 1$ has divisors of around 40 bits. The implementation of optimal Ate pairing on these curve parameters on the i7 CPU is slower than on the ones given in Section 5. If one is willing to accept parameters with $r(u) - 1$ or $r(u) + 1$ having divisors of around 30 bits, she may use those parameters resulting in better system efficiency such as those with $u = -40000FEFF7FFFFF6$.

– **Barreto-Naehrig Curve 3:** p is 264-bit prime.

$$\begin{aligned}
 B &= 5 \\
 u &= -18000200000013804 \\
 p(u) &= B6403CC0079A50C3B29813F9F \\
 &\quad 84313D3F36D74ECB9C9F13987 \\
 &\quad 248B1DB77E88CC69 \\
 r(u) &= B6403CC0079A50C3B29813F9F \\
 &\quad 84313D3E5ED72ACB9B1DB49 \\
 &\quad 3D50851DAE94CE4C09 \\
 t(u) &= D800240001815F049D4060008E9 \\
 &\quad BA8061 \\
 r(u) - 1 &= 2^3 \times 3^2 \times \\
 &\quad 200002AAAAAC4AB(62\text{-bit}) \times \\
 &\quad 14400510006C315F9CBA1917E9 \\
 &\quad 23B4A9109C293CF609A8292B \\
 &\quad (197\text{-bit}) \\
 r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 5 \times 297B8FF5B95(42\text{-bit}) \times \\
 &\quad 29A7F38A869F523593FA651 \\
 &\quad (90\text{-bit}) \times 2B333A6666B37967 \\
 &\quad 52A67999B61F219AD(130\text{-bit}) \\
 |z| &= 90000C00000075016 \\
 \text{HW}(|u|) &= 8 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|u|) &= 7 \\
 \text{HW}(|z|) &= 12 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|z|) &= 11 \\
 \beta &= -5 \\
 \xi &= \sqrt{\beta} \\
 \mu &= \sqrt[3]{\xi}
 \end{aligned}$$

– **Barreto-Naehrig Curve 4:** p is a 254-bit prime.

$$\begin{aligned}
 B &= 5 \\
 u &= -400010000000F108 \\
 p(u) &= 240024000D82209306E179BB4 \\
 &\quad 521C1FD7FCDF4058082AF1C \\
 &\quad 0194453316D2D7D1 \\
 r(u) &= 240024000D82209306E179BB4 \\
 &\quad 521C1FD1FCDC4057A7FDC0 \\
 &\quad 34CCE452DC5327651 \\
 t(u) &= 600030000602D318B4C6000551 \\
 &\quad A06181 \\
 r(u) - 1 &= 2^4 \times 3 \times 7 \times \\
 &\quad 19864F3D291 \text{ (41-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 124929249249697 \text{ (57-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad B35CE76183E5F192B \text{ (68-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 1578F9956E01AB6113375 \\
 &\quad \text{(81-bit)} \\
 r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 11 \times 13 \times \\
 &\quad 17A8B7604589170D \text{ (61-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 27F3D6A82B6CE201 \text{ (62-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 8BA32E8BABA7048106F17464 \\
 &\quad D3D2023 \text{ (124-bit)} \\
 |z| &= 1800060000005A62E \\
 \text{HW}(|u|) &= 8 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|u|) &= 6 \\
 \text{HW}(|z|) &= 14 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|z|) &= 13 \\
 \beta &= -5 \\
 \xi &= \sqrt{\beta} \\
 \mu &= \sqrt[3]{\xi}
 \end{aligned}$$

– **Barreto-Naehrig Curve 5:** p is a 254-bit prime.

$$\begin{aligned}
 B &= 2 \\
 u &= -40000FEFF7FFFFFF6 \\
 p(u) &= 240023DBFB65022FB6D6B42E \\
 &\quad F2DF822F34ECBEEA7A27C12 \\
 &\quad 0863C9C54B006147D \\
 r(u) &= 240023DBFB65022FB6D6B42E \\
 &\quad F2DF822ED4EC8F1A8C33C13 \\
 &\quad 884C414D0F0061225 \\
 t(u) &= 60002FCFEDF3FFE80178878 \\
 &\quad 3C0000259 \\
 r(u) - 1 &= 2^2 \times 3 \times \\
 &\quad 200007F7FBFFFFFB \text{ (62-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 180011EDFB770057C1AAF589 \\
 &\quad E768012691F7B793E7FFE619 \\
 &\quad \text{(189-bit)} \\
 r(u) + 1 &= 2 \times 193 \times \\
 &\quad 54BC6217D \text{ (35-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 290DB508C7F \text{ (42-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 4AF782A8D59 \text{ (43-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 417BD1FB7B63B \text{ (51-bit)} \times \\
 &\quad 1774D71493CDEA971C7B \\
 &\quad \text{(77-bit)} \\
 |z| &= 180005F9FCFFFFFC2 \\
 \text{HW}(|u|) &= 41 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|u|) &= 6 \\
 \text{HW}(|z|) &= 39 \\
 \text{NAF-length}(|z|) &= 10 \\
 \beta &= -2 \\
 \xi &= \sqrt{\beta} \\
 \mu &= \sqrt[3]{\xi}
 \end{aligned}$$