

Template Attacks Based On Priori Knowledge

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Abstract. Template Attacks consist of two stages, the profiling stage and the extraction stage. In order to improve the classification performance of Template Attacks, a feasible and usual way is to characterize signals and noises more accurately. Under the assumption that a reference device is fully controlled by the attacker, in the profiling stage, the attacker can operate the reference device as many times as possible and samples a large number of actual power traces to help accurately characterize signals and noises at different interesting points. However, in some practical scenarios, this is not always the case and the attacker can only have access to a *limited* number of actual power traces. In this paper, we show that the attacker can still make Template Attacks practical and more powerful in the above scenario if he could obtain the priori knowledge about the reference device. The priori knowledge is just a kind of prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component of the instantaneous power consumption, rather than an accurate estimation of it. Evaluation results exhibit that leaking this kind of priori knowledge poses serious threat to the physical security of cryptographic devices.

Keywords: Side-Channel Attacks, Power Analysis Attacks, Template Attacks, Priori Knowledge.

1 Introduction

Template Attacks was proposed by S. Chari et al. in 2002 [1], and it is widely accepted to be the strongest side-channel attacks from an information theoretic point of view. As an important tools, Template Attacks are also used to evaluate the physical security of cryptographic devices.

Template Attacks consist of two stages. The first stage is the profiling stage and the second stage is the extraction stage. In the profiling stage, one has a reference device identical or similar to the targeted device and builds templates for each key-dependent operation with the reference device. In the extraction stage, one can exploit a small number of actual power traces measured from the targeted device and the templates to classify the correct (sub)key.

Now, let's focus on the practical attack scenarios. In order to improve the classification performance of Template Attacks, a feasible and usual way is to

characterize signals and noises more accurate. Under the assumption that a reference device is fully controlled by the attacker, in the profiling stage, the attacker can operate the reference device as many times as possible and samples a large number of actual power traces to help accurately characterize signals and noises at different interesting points. However, in some practical scenarios, this is not always the case and the attacker can only have access to a *limited* number of actual power traces (For example, the attacker can only obtain less than 5,000 actual power traces.). For example, a common countermeasure is used to limit the number of invocations that the reference device can perform in certain time interval, or that the reference device performs under one key for limited number of invocations and then the key is refreshed. In these cases, the attacker can only have access to limited number of actual power traces from the reference device. Furthermore, the signals and noises may not be characterized accurately enough if the attacker uses classical way of building templates with limited number of actual power traces.

Motivations Although enough actual power traces needed to accurately characterize signals and noises can not be obtained in the above cases, it is still possible for a seasoned attacker to possess the priori knowledge about the reference device (as well as the targeted device) in practice. Specifically speaking, the priori knowledge is just a kind of prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component of the instantaneous power consumption, rather than an accurate estimation of it. There are many possible ways that the attacker could obtain the priori knowledge in practice. We only show three of them here.

Example 1: The attacker may obtain the priori knowledge about the reference device from his *previous* experiments of conducting Template Attacks against a device identical or similar to the reference device.

Remark. One of the feasible ways that the attacker can easily obtain the priori knowledge in this example is in the following. Assume that the attacker obtains some actual power traces (or other kinds of sampling data) from his previous experiments of conducting Template Attacks against a device identical or similar to the reference device. When the attacker knows the type of the prior distribution is a normal distribution (According to the instantaneous power consumption characteristics of most cryptography devices, this is the most common case in practice (pp.62-65 in [9]).), he can easily compute the mean value and the variance of the normal distribution with the sampling data to estimate the normal distribution.

Example 2: The attacker may obtain some actual power traces or other potential useful information (e.g. Signal-to-Noise Ratio (pp.73 in [9]) et al.) of a device identical or similar to the reference device from Internet (e.g. [18, 19]) and infers the prior distribution with the actual power traces and the useful information.

Example 3: For a sophisticated attacker, after obtaining actual power traces from the reference device in the profiling stage, he can use the actual power traces to obtain an interval estimation of the actual value of the signal component

and *roughly* infers the prior distribution is a kind of distribution over the interval (e.g. normal distribution or uniform distribution).

To sum up, for a seasoned attacker, it is not only reasonable but also realistic for him to possess the priori knowledge about the reference device from a practical point of view. Therefore, we need to answer two natural and important questions when the attacker can not obtain enough actual power traces in the profiling stage but has the priori knowledge about the reference device. The first question is that how can the attacker exploit the priori knowledge in a correct and feasible way to improve the classification performance of Template Attacks? The second question is that whether or not the priori knowledge (even if may not be very accurate) will make Template Attacks practical and more powerful (i.e. achieve higher classification performance)? In this paper, we try to answer these two important questions.

Contributions Main contributions of this paper are two-folds.

Firstly, based on the method of Bayes estimation [13], we theoretically give out a correct and feasible way of exploiting the priori knowledge when the attacker conducts Template Attacks with limited number of actual power traces in the profiling stage.

Secondly, we verify our way of exploiting the priori knowledge by both simulated and practical experiments. Evaluation results show that Template Attacks will be practical and more powerful if the attacker can possess accurate priori knowledge. Additionally, the more accurate the priori knowledge is, the more powerful Template Attacks will be.

These discoveries enable us to realize that Template Attacks may be more powerful than we previously think if the attacker obtains the priori knowledge about the reference device.

Related Work The paper [2] provided answers to some basic and practical issues of Template Attacks, such as how to choose interesting points in an efficient way and how to preprocess noisy data. The paper [4] proposed efficient methods to avoid several possible numerical obstacles when implementing Template Attacks. The paper [10] presented a variant of Template Attacks that can be applied to block ciphers when the plaintext and ciphertext used are unknown. In [7], Template Attacks were used to attack a masking protected implementation of a block cipher. Recently, a simple pre-processing technique of Template Attacks, normalizing the sample values using the means and variances was evaluated for various sizes of test data [6]. The paper [20] showed how to best evaluate the profiling stage and the extraction stage of profiled side-channel attacks by using the information theoretic metric and the security metric.

Principal Component Analysis (PCA)-Based Template Attacks were investigated in [3]. However, this kind of Template Attacks may not improve the classification performance [6]. Therefore, PCA-Based Template Attacks are not used widely in practice. LDA-based Template Attacks were introduced in [8]. This kind of Template Attacks depends on the condition of equal covariances [4] (Please see Section 2.1.1 for more details.), which does not hold in most settings. Therefore, it is not a better choice compared with PCA-based Template Attacks

in most settings [4]. However, no previous work considered our important questions.

Organization of This Paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic concept of Template Attacks and the method of Bayes estimation. In Section 3, we give out a correct and reasonable way of exploiting the priori knowledge to make Template Attacks practical and more powerful. In Section 4, we verify the way of exploiting the priori knowledge by simulated and practical experiments. In Section 5, we conclude the whole paper.

2 Preliminaries

Template Attacks mainly include: Classical Template Attacks [1] and Reduced Template Attacks (pp.108 in [9]). In this section, we briefly review Classical Template Attacks, Reduced Template Attacks, and the method of Bayes estimation.

2.1 Classical Template Attacks

We will introduce the two stages of Classical Template Attacks: the profiling stage and the extraction stage.

The Profiling Stage Assume that there exist K different (sub)keys $key_i, i = 0, 1, \dots, K - 1$ which need to be classified. Also, there exist K different key-dependent operations $O_i, i = 0, 1, \dots, K - 1$. Usually, one will generate K templates, one for each key-dependent operation O_i . One can exploit some methods to choose N interesting points $(P_0, P_1, \dots, P_{N-1})$. The interesting points are those time samples that contain the most information about the characterized key-dependent operations. Each template is composed of a mean vector and a covariance matrix. The mean vector is used to estimate the signal component of side-channel leakages. It is the average signal vector $\mathbf{M}_i = (M_i[P_0], \dots, M_i[P_{N-1}])$ for each one of the key-dependent operations. The covariance matrix is used to estimate the probability density of the noise component at different interesting points. It is assumed that noises at different interesting points approximately follow the multivariate normal distribution. A N dimensional noise vector $\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})$ is extracted from each actual power trace $\mathbf{S} = (S[P_0], \dots, S[P_{N-1}])$ representing the template's key dependency O_i as $\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S}) = (S[P_0] - M_i[P_0], \dots, S[P_{N-1}] - M_i[P_{N-1}])$. One computes the $(N \times N)$ covariance matrix \mathbf{C}_i from these noise vectors. The probability density of the noises occurring under key-dependent operation O_i is given by the N dimensional multivariate Gaussian distribution $p_i(\cdot)$, where the probability of observing a noise vector $\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})$ is:

$$p_i(\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N |\mathbf{C}_i|}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S}) \mathbf{C}_i^{-1} \mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})^T\right) \quad \mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S}) \in \mathbb{R}^N. \quad (1)$$

In equation (1), the symbol $|\mathbf{C}_i|$ denotes the determinant of \mathbf{C}_i and the symbol \mathbf{C}_i^{-1} denotes its inverse. We know that the matrix \mathbf{C}_i is the estimation of the true

covariance Σ_i . The condition of equal covariances [4] means that the leakages from different key-dependent operations have the same true covariance $\Sigma = \Sigma_0 = \Sigma_1 = \dots = \Sigma_{K-1}$. In most settings, the condition of equal covariances does not hold. Therefore, in this paper, we only consider the devices in which the condition of equal covariances does not hold.

The Extraction Stage Assume that one obtains t actual power traces (denoted by $\mathbf{S}_1, \mathbf{S}_2, \dots, \mathbf{S}_t$) from the targeted device in the extraction stage. When the actual power traces are statistically independent, one will apply maximum likelihood approach on the product of conditional probabilities (pp.156 in [9]), i.e.

$$key_{ck} := \operatorname{argmax}_{key_i} \left\{ \prod_{j=1}^t \Pr(\mathbf{S}_j | key_i), i = 0, 1, \dots, K-1 \right\},$$

where $\Pr(\mathbf{S}_j | key_i) = p_{f(\mathbf{S}_j, key_i)}(n_{f(\mathbf{S}_j, key_i)}(\mathbf{S}_j))$. The key_{ck} is considered to be the correct (sub)key. The output of the function $f(\mathbf{S}_j, key_i)$ is the index of a key-dependent operation. For example, when one attacks the output of a S-box (denoted by $Sbox$) in the first round of AES-128, one builds templates for each output of the S-box. In this case, $f(\mathbf{S}_j, key_i) = Sbox(mes_j \oplus key_i)$, where mes_j is the plaintext corresponding to the actual power trace \mathbf{S}_j .

2.2 Reduced Template Attacks

In order to avoid numerical obstacles with the inversion of the covariance matrix \mathbf{C}_i , one can set the covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. This essentially means that one does not take the covariances between the interesting points into account. A template that only consists of a mean vector is called a reduced template (pp.108 in [9]). Naturally, Template Attacks based on reduced templates are called Reduced Template Attacks. In Reduced Template Attacks, the probability density of the noises occurring under key-dependent operation O_i is given by the distribution $p'_i(\cdot)$, where the probability of observing a noise vector $\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})$ is:

$$p'_i(\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^N}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})\mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S})^T\right) \quad \mathbf{n}_i(\mathbf{S}) \in \mathbb{R}^N.$$

2.3 Bayes Estimation

In the following, we briefly introduce the method of Bayes estimation [13]. We first introduce the definition of Bayes estimators. Then, we introduce how to compute a Bayes estimator.

Definition 1. *An estimator is a real-valued function δ defined over the sample space. It is used to estimate an estimand, $g(\theta)$, a real-valued function of the parameter θ [13].*

Suppose an unknown parameter θ is known to have a prior distribution Λ (The prior distribution can be discrete or continuous distribution. In this paper, we only assume the prior distribution is continuous.). Quite generally, suppose that the consequences of estimating $g(\theta)$ by a value $\delta(X)$ (based on some measurements X) are measured by $L(\theta, \delta(X))$. Of the *loss function* L , we shall assume that

$$L(\theta, \delta(X)) \geq 0 \text{ for all } \theta \text{ and } \delta(X),$$

and

$$L[\theta, g(\theta)] = 0 \text{ for all } \theta,$$

so that the loss is zero when the correct value is estimated. The accuracy, or rather inaccuracy, of an estimator δ is then measured by the *risk function*

$$R(\theta, \delta) = E_{\theta}\{L[\theta, \delta(X)]\},$$

the long-term average loss resulting from the use of $\delta(X)$. This defines the risk function as a function of $\delta(X)$. An estimator $\delta(X)$ minimizing

$$r(\Lambda, \delta) = \int R(\theta, \delta) d\Lambda(\theta)$$

is called a *Bayes estimator* with respect to the prior distribution Λ . Note that, the distribution Λ is a probability distribution of the parameter θ , that is,

$$\int d\Lambda(\theta) = 1.$$

Now, we will introduce how to compute a Bayes estimator of an unknown parameter θ . Let $\lambda(\theta)$ denote the prior probability density of the parameter θ . The prior probability density of the population (or discrete probability function) is denoted by $f(X; \theta)$. If one extracts n samples (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) from the population, then the probability density of this group of samples is

$$f(X_1; \theta) f(X_2; \theta) \cdots f(X_n; \theta).$$

Thereby, we can compute the marginal density

$$p(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = \int \lambda(\theta) f(X_1; \theta) f(X_2; \theta) \cdots f(X_n; \theta) d\theta.$$

Then, the following posterior probability density is computed:

$$\lambda(\theta|X_1, \dots, X_n) = \lambda(\theta) f(X_1; \theta) \cdots f(X_n; \theta) / p(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n). \quad (2)$$

In general, the Bayes estimator of the parameter θ is set to be the mean value of $\lambda(\theta|X_1, \dots, X_n)$.

3 How to Use The Priori Knowledge For Template Attacks

In this section, we introduce how to use the priori knowledge for Template Attacks. The usage of the priori knowledge for Template Attacks is the same for both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks.

It is well known that the instantaneous power consumption PC_{total} can be modeled as the sum of an operation-dependent component PC_{op} , a data-dependent component PC_{data} , the electronic noise $PC_{el.noise}$, and a constant component PC_{const} (pp.62-65 in [9]), i.e.

$$PC_{total} = PC_{op} + PC_{data} + PC_{el.noise} + PC_{const}.$$

The value $PC_{op} + PC_{data}$ (or $PC_{op} + PC_{data} + PC_{const}$) can be viewed as the signal component and the value $PC_{el.noise}$ can be viewed as the noise component. Usually, for each point P_j in an actual power trace, its power consumption PC_{total} follows a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu_j, \sigma_j^2)$ and the electronic noise $PC_{el.noise}$ follows the normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_j^2)$ (pp.62-65 in [9]). For fixed operation on fixed data, due to

$$Var(PC_{op}) = Var(PC_{data}) = Var(PC_{const}) = 0,$$

it has that $PC_{op} + PC_{data} + PC_{el.noise} = \mu_j$. Therefore, we can reasonably assume the prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component obtained by the attacker is a normal distribution due to the existence of the electronic noise.

The more accurate the signal component (the value of μ_j) is estimated, the more accurate the noise component (the value $PC_{total} - \mu_j$) will be estimated. For an interesting point, if the signal component and the noise component are accurately estimated, accurate templates (reduced templates) will be built and better classification performance of Template Attacks (both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks) will be achieved. In the classical way of building templates (reduced templates), for an interesting point, the attacker computes the mean value of the samples to estimate the actual value of the signal component μ_j . Specifically speaking, for the key-dependent operation O_i , the point P_j is an interesting point and the attacker obtains n actual power traces ($\mathbf{S}_1, \mathbf{S}_2, \dots, \mathbf{S}_n$) in the profiling stage to build the template for the key-dependent operation O_i . Therefore, the attacker obtains n values of the power consumption of the point P_j , one from each actual power trace. The n values are $S_1[P_j], S_2[P_j], \dots, S_n[P_j]$. The actual value of the signal component μ_j is estimated by μ'_j as follows:

$$\mu'_j = M_i[P_j] = \sum_{k=1}^n S_k[P_j]/n.$$

However, in our scenario, the attacker not only has n actual power traces (obtained from the reference device), but also possesses a kind of priori knowledge

about the reference device. The priori knowledge is a kind of prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component μ_j . Let's consider the most common case. Assume that the attacker knows that the actual value of the signal component μ_j follows the normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\theta_1, \theta_2^2)$ (Note that, the normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\theta_1, \theta_2^2)$ itself may not be very accurate. However, from the priori knowledge, the parameters θ_1, θ_2^2 are known to the attacker.) but does not know what the actual value of the signal component μ_j accurately is. The attacker can use the method of Bayes estimation to estimate the actual value of the signal component μ_j with the priori knowledge as follows: The attacker computes the probability density of the actual value of the signal component μ_j from priori knowledge as

$$\lambda(\mu_j) = (\sqrt{2\pi}\theta_2)^{-1} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\theta_2^2}(\mu_j - \theta_1)^2\right].$$

Moreover, the power consumption of the point P_j satisfies the following probability density function:

$$f(x; \mu_j, \sigma_j) = (\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_j)^{-1} \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\sigma_j^2}(x - \mu_j)^2\right].$$

Although the value σ_j is not known to the attacker, it does not affect the process of computing the Bayes estimator of the actual value of the signal component μ_j . What the attacker needs is just an accurate estimation of the actual value of the signal component μ_j . From equation (2), the attacker computes the posterior probability density:

$$\lambda(\mu_j | S_1[P_j], \dots, S_n[P_j]) = \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2\theta_2^2}(\mu_j - \theta_1)^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^n (S_k[P_j] - \mu_j)^2\right] / C_1,$$

the constant C_1 only has relation with $\theta_1, \theta_2, S_1[P_j], \dots, S_n[P_j]$ and has no relation with μ_j . It has that

$$-\frac{1}{2\theta_2^2}(\mu_j - \theta_1)^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^n (S_k[P_j] - \mu_j)^2 = -\frac{1}{2A^2}(\mu_j - B)^2 + C_2,$$

where

$$A^2 = 1/(n + 1/\theta_2^2),$$

$$B = (nM_i[P_j] + \theta_1/\theta_2^2)/(n + 1/\theta_2^2),$$

and C_2 has no relation with μ_j . Furthermore, the attacker can obtain

$$\lambda(\mu_j | S_1[P_j], \dots, S_n[P_j]) = C_3 \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2A^2}(\mu_j - B)^2\right],$$

where $C_3 = C_1 e^{C_2}$. Because it has that

$$\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \lambda(\mu_j | S_1[P_j], \dots, S_n[P_j]) d\mu_j = 1,$$

hence $C_3 = (\sqrt{2\pi}A)^{-1}$. Up to now, the attacker obtains the Bayes estimator of the actual value of the signal component μ_j as

$$\mu_j'' = \frac{n}{n + 1/\theta_2^2} \left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^n S_k[P_j]}{n} \right) + \frac{1/\theta_2^2}{n + 1/\theta_2^2} \theta_1. \quad (3)$$

The equation (3) shows that if the attacker does not have the priori knowledge (i.e. the prior distribution $\mathcal{N}(\theta_1, \theta_2^2)$), he can only use $\sum_{k=1}^n S_k[P_j]/n$ to estimate the actual value of the signal component μ_j . If the attacker does not have actual power traces obtained from the reference device, he can only use the priori knowledge (i.e. the value θ_1) to estimate the actual value of the signal component μ_j . If the attacker has actual power traces obtained from the reference device as well as the priori knowledge, by equation (3), he will use the weighted average of $\sum_{k=1}^n S_k[P_j]/n$ and θ_1 to estimate the actual value of the signal component μ_j under the ratio $n : 1/\theta_2^2$. This ratio is reasonable and the relevant reasons are as follows. On one hand, when more actual power traces are obtained from the reference device by the attacker, the proportion of $\sum_{k=1}^n S_k[P_j]/n$ should be larger. On the other hand, when the value θ_2^2 is smaller (This means that the prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component μ_j is more accurate.), the proportion of θ_1 should be larger.

Other details of building templates (reduced templates) remain unchanged. Our method only exploits the priori knowledge to estimate the actual value of the signal component more accurately. In the next section, we will experimentally verify the classification performance of Template Attacks with priori knowledge.

4 Experimental Evaluations

For the implementation of a cryptographic algorithm with countermeasures, one usually first tries his best to use some methods to delete the countermeasures from actual power traces. If the countermeasures can be deleted, then one tries to recover the correct (sub)key using classical attack methods against unprotected implementation. For example, if one has actual power traces with random delays [11], he may first use the method proposed in [12] to remove the random delays from actual power traces and then uses classical attack methods to recover the correct (sub)key. The methods of deleting countermeasures from actual power traces are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, considering actual power traces without any countermeasures shows the upper bound of the physical security of the targeted device. Therefore, we take unprotected AES-128 implementation as example.

We verified both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks by conducting simulated and practical experiments. In both simulated and practical experiments, we tried to attack the output of the S-boxes in the first round of AES-128¹. Before introducing the specific experiment details, we first intro-

¹ Due to the length of the output of every S-box is 8 bits long, we need to build 256 templates, one for each output.

duce how to get the prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component for every interesting point for both simulated and practical experiments.

The paper [17] showed that Reduced Template Attacks are more powerful compared with Classical Template Attacks when the number of actual power traces used in the profiling stage is limited. Therefore, we mainly exploit Reduced Template Attacks to exhibit our discoveries in this paper (Note that, our method can be used for both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks.).

For simplicity, for both simulated and practical experiments, let np denote the number of traces used in the profiling stage and let ne denote the number of traces used in the extraction stage. In this paper, we use the typical metric *Guessing Entropy* [5] as the metric about the classification performance of Template Attacks (Many other papers also used Guessing Entropy (e.g. [4, 14, 15])).

4.1 How to Get The Prior Knowledge

In order to get the priori knowledge, we simulated the cases that the attacker can obtain the priori knowledge from his previous experiments of conducting Template Attacks against a device identical or similar to the reference device.

For both simulated and practical experiments, we get the prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component for every interesting point using the traces which were generated in the same way as those were used in the two stages of Template Attacks (both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks). In this way, we can clearly give out an upper bound of how powerful Template Attacks will become by exploiting the priori knowledge.

In both simulated and practical experiments, for each key-dependent operation O_i , we considered the prior distribution of the actual value of the signal component μ_j of each interesting point P_j with four different levels of accuracy and assumed the prior distribution is a normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\theta_1, \theta_2^2)$.

For each key-dependent operation O_i , we generated 400 traces (simulated traces or actual power traces). The 400 traces were used to estimate the priori knowledge (i.e. the parameters θ_1 and θ_2^2 for the prior distribution) for every interesting point as follows. We repeated a process 300 times. Every time, we chose 16 traces (Let $m = 16$ and the 16 traces are denoted by S_1, \dots, S_m .) from the 400 traces uniformly at random and computed $\sum_{k=1}^m S_k[P_j]/m$. Therefore, there were 300 different values of $\sum_{k=1}^m S_k[P_j]/m$ (Note that, we can not guarantee the attacker can *directly* obtain the 300 different values *all the time* from his previous experiments of conducting Template Attacks. In this paper, we consider the case that the attacker possesses the priori knowledge. In the real world, the priori knowledge may be obtained by the attacker in many possible ways from his previous experiments of conducting Template Attacks. In order to simulate these cases, in our experiments, we used the 300 different values to estimate the priori knowledge.). The mean value of the 300 different values was set to be θ_1 and the variance of the 300 different values was set to be θ_2^2 . In this way, we obtained the estimation of the parameters θ_1 and θ_2^2 .

Similarly, we additionally let $m = 32, 64, 128$ and obtained four different estimation of the prior distribution. Clearly, when the value m is larger, the estimation of θ_1 and θ_2^2 is more accurate. Therefore, we obtained estimation of the parameters θ_1 and θ_2^2 with four different levels of accuracy. The corresponding four normal distributions represent the priori knowledge which the attacker can possess in practical attack scenarios.

We considered many kinds of Template Attacks and define the following symbols to denote them. In all the experiments, we let the symbol “CTA” denotes the Classical Template Attacks without any priori knowledge. The symbol “CTA-16” denotes Classical Template Attacks based on priori knowledge (i.e. The actual value of the signal component μ_j is estimated by equation (3).) which is obtained when the value m equals to 16. Similarly, we define the symbols “CTA-32”, “CTA-64”, and “CTA-128” to denote the cases that the value m equals to 32, 64, and 128 respectively. We let the symbol “RTA” denotes the Reduced Template Attacks without any priori knowledge. The symbol “RTA-16” denotes Reduced Template Attacks based on priori knowledge which is obtained when the value m equals to 16. Similarly, we define the symbols “RTA-32”, “RTA-64”, and “RTA-128” to denote the cases that the value m equals to 32, 64, and 128 respectively.

4.2 Simulated Experiments

In all simulated experiments, we chose 4 interesting points and the typical Hamming-Weight power model (pp.40-41 in [9]) was adopted to describe the power consumption. In all simulated experiments, the standard deviation of simulated Gaussian noise is denoted by σ . We employed three different noise levels to test the influence of noises on the classification performance of Template Attacks. The standard deviations of simulated Gaussian noise for the three noise levels were 2, 3, and 4.

For fixed noise level (The value of σ is fixed.), we respectively used 2,000, 4,000, and 6,000 simulated traces to build the 256 reduced templates for Reduced Template Attacks (This means that the attacker respectively obtained 2,000, 4,000, and 6,000 simulated traces from the reference device in the profiling stage.). The simulated traces were generated with a fixed subkey and random plaintext inputs. We generated additional 100,000 simulated traces with another fixed subkey and random plaintext inputs. The 100,000 simulated traces were used in the extraction stage. For fixed np and σ , we tested the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks (RTA, RTA-16, RTA-32, RTA-64, and RTA-128) when the attacker could use ne simulated traces in the extraction stage as follows. We respectively repeated the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks 1,000 times. For each time, we chose ne simulated traces from the 100,000 simulated traces uniformly at random and the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks were conducted with the same ne simulated traces. We respectively computed the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks with the results of the 1,000 times attacks. The Guessing Entropy of




Fig. 1. The simulated experiment results

the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks for different values of np and σ is shown in Figure 1.

Table 1. The simulated experiment results for the case $np = 2,000, ne = 20, \sigma = 4$

RTA	RTA-16	RTA-32	RTA-64	RTA-128
22.94	17.50	14.65	11.49	8.53

The Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks for the case $\{np = 2,000, ne = 20, \sigma = 4\}$ is shown in Table 1. From Figure 1 and Table 1, we find that the classification performance of Reduced Template Attacks with accurate priori knowledge will be obvious better than that of Reduced Template Attacks without priori knowledge. For example, in Table 1, the Guessing Entropy of RTA equals to 22.94, while the Guessing Entropy of RTA-128 equals to 8.53. Moreover, if the priori knowledge is more accurate, the classification performance of Reduced Template Attacks with priori knowledge will be better. For example, in Table 1, the Guessing Entropy of RTA-16 equals to 17.50, while the Guessing Entropy of RTA-128 obviously reduces to 8.53.

Table 2. The simulated experiment results for different levels of noises

$np = 2,000, ne = 20$	$\sigma = 2$	$\sigma = 3$	$\sigma = 4$
RTA	1.31	7.80	22.94
RTA-128	1.03	2.14	8.53

Table 2 shows the Guessing Entropy of RTA and RTA-128 for different levels of noises when np is fixed to 2,000 and ne is fixed to 20. From Figure 1 and Table 2, we find that, when the noise level is higher, Reduced Template Attacks with priori knowledge will achieve larger advantage over Reduced Template Attacks without priori knowledge. For example, in Table 2, the Guessing Entropy of RTA and RTA-128 is almost equal when σ equals to 2 (1.31 and 1.03). However, when σ equals to 4, the Guessing Entropy of RTA-128 (8.53) is much lower than that of RTA (22.94).

When more simulated traces can be obtained from the reference device (e.g. $np = 6,000$) in the profiling stage, the advantages of Reduced Template Attacks with priori knowledge over Template Attacks without priori knowledge will be smaller. For Classical Template Attacks, we computed the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Classical Template Attacks (CTA, CTA-16, CTA-32, CTA-64, and CTA-128) similarly. The simulated experiment results show that Classical Template Attacks with accurate priori knowledge have advantages over Classical Template Attacks without priori knowledge.

4.3 Practical Experiments

We tried to attack the output of all the S-boxes in the first round of an unprotected AES-128 software implementation on a typical 8-bit microcontroller STC89C58RD+ whose operating frequency is 11MHz. The actual power traces were acquired with a sampling rate of 50MS/s. The average number of actual power traces during the sampling process was 10 times.

We generated two sets of actual power traces, Set A and Set B. The Set A captured 10,000 actual power traces which were generated with a fixed main key and random plaintext inputs. The Set B captured 100,000 actual power traces which were generated with another fixed main key and random plaintext inputs. We used the same device as that was used to generate the prior distribution in Section 4.1 to generate the two sets of actual power traces, which provides a good setting for the focuses of our research. For our device, the condition of equal covariances does not hold. For each S-box of the unprotected AES-128 software implementation, we used CPA based method (Chapter 6 in [9]) to choose 4 interesting points in 4 continual clock cycles, one in each clock cycle. Both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks were conducted based on the same 4 interesting points. We only show the practical experiment results of the first and the second S-box in this paper. For other S-boxes in the first round of the unprotected AES-128 software implementation, similar evaluation results were obtained by us.

For Classical Template Attacks, we respectively chose 5,000, 7,500, and 10,000 different actual power traces from Set A to build the 256 templates¹ (This means that the attacker respectively obtained 5,000, 7,500, and 10,000 actual power traces from the reference device in the profiling stage.). For Reduced Template Attacks, we respectively chose 2,000, 4,000, and 6,000 different actual power traces from Set A to build the 256 templates (This means that the attacker respectively obtained 2,000, 4,000, and 6,000 actual power traces from the reference device in the profiling stage.). The 100,000 actual power traces of Set B were used in the extraction stage for both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks. For fixed np , we tested the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Classical Template Attacks (CTA, CTA-16, CTA-32, CTA-64, and CTA-128) when one uses ne actual power traces in the extraction stage as follows. We repeated the five kinds of Classical Template Attacks 1,000 times. For each time, we chose ne actual power traces from Set B uniformly at random. The five kinds of Classical Template Attacks were conducted with the same ne actual power traces. We respectively computed the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Classical Template Attacks with the results of the 1,000 times of attacks. The Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Classical Template Attacks for the first S-box are shown in Figure 2.

For Reduced Template Attacks, we computed the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks (RTA, RTA-16, RTA-32, RTA-64, and RTA-128) when one uses ne actual power traces in the extraction stage similarly.

¹ Numerical obstacles will arise when we used less than 5,000 actual power traces to build the 256 templates.




Fig. 2. The experiment results of Classical Template Attacks for the first S-box

The Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks for the first S-box are shown in Figure 3. The Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks for the first S-box when np is fixed to 2,000 and ne is fixed to 20 is shown in Table 3.




Fig. 3. The experiment results of Reduced Template Attacks for the first S-box

From Figure 3 and Table 3, we find that the classification performance of Reduced Template Attacks with accurate priori knowledge will be obvious better than that of Reduced Template Attacks without priori knowledge. For example, in Table 3, the Guessing Entropy of RTA equals to 15.16, while the Guessing Entropy of RTA-16 reduces to 5.78.

Table 3. The experiment results of Reduced Template Attacks for the first S-box

$np = 2,000$	RTA	RTA-16	RTA-32	RTA-64	RTA-128
$ne = 20$	15.16	5.78	5.03	4.73	4.65

The practical experiment results show that, for both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks, if the priori knowledge is more accurate, the classification performance will be better. For example, in Table 3, the Guessing Entropy of RTA-16 equals to 5.78, while the Guessing Entropy of RTA-128

reduces to 4.65. When more actual power traces can be obtained from the reference device, the advantages of Template Attacks with priori knowledge over Template Attacks without priori knowledge will be smaller.

For the second S-box, we also used the actual power traces in Set A and Set B to compute the Guessing Entropy of the five kinds of Classical Template Attacks and the five kinds of Reduced Template Attacks similarly. The practical experiment results for the second S-box which can also verify our discoveries are shown in Figure 4, Figure 5, and Table 4 in Appendix A.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we verify that if the attacker can obtain the priori knowledge (even if may not be very accurate) about the reference device (as well as the targeted device), Template Attacks (both Classical Template Attacks and Reduced Template Attacks) will be practical and more powerful than we previously think. Evaluation results exhibit that leaking this kind of priori knowledge poses serious threat to the physical security of cryptographic devices. Therefore, we suggest that the designers of a cryptographic device should take the priori knowledge into consideration when he uses Template Attacks to evaluate the physical security of the cryptographic device.

The future work is as follows. First, our discoveries show that the approach to infer (estimate) the priori knowledge as accurately as possible is crucial and is worth being researched from the attacker's view. Second, it would be interesting to research how to prevent the attacker to obtain the priori knowledge (Using countermeasures such as the method of random delays [11] may be a good choice.). We should also concern on how to exploit the priori knowledge to make other profiled side-channel attacks (such as Stochastic Model based Attacks [16]) become more powerful in a correct and feasible way. It is also necessary to further verify our discoveries in other devices such as ASIC and FPGA.

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Appendix A: The Practical Experiment Results for The Second S-box




Fig. 4. The experiment results of Classical Template Attacks for the second S-box




Fig. 5. The experiment results of Reduced Template Attacks for the second S-box

Table 4. The experiment results of Reduced Template Attacks for the second S-box

$np = 2,000$	RTA	RTA-16	RTA-32	RTA-64	RTA-128
$ne = 20$	19.05	6.64	5.76	5.34	5.25