

Adaptively Secure UC Constant Round Multi-Party Computation

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Abstract. We present a universally composable multiparty computation protocol that is adaptively secure against corruption of $n - 1$ of the n players. The protocol has a constant number of rounds and communication complexity that depends only on the number of inputs and outputs (and not on the size of the circuit to be computed securely). Such protocols were already known for honest majority. However, adaptive security and constant round was known to be impossible in the stand-alone model and with black-box proofs of security. Here, we solve the problem in the UC model using a set-up assumption. Our protocol is secure assuming LWE is hard and achieved by building a special type of crypto system we call equivocal FHE from LWE. We also build adaptively secure and constant round UC commitment and zero-knowledge proofs (of knowledge) based on LWE.

1 Introduction

Secure multiparty computation is an extremely strong and important tool for making distributed computing more secure. General solutions to the problem allows us to carry out any desired computation among a set of players, without compromising, the privacy of their inputs or the correctness of the outputs. This should even hold if some of the players have been corrupted by an adversary. An important issue in this connection is how the adversary chooses which players to target. In the static model, the adversary must choose who to corrupt before the protocol starts. A more general and also more realistic model is the adaptive corruption where the adversary may corrupt new players during the protocol.

Of course efficiency of the protocol is also important, and important measures in this respect are the number of rounds we need to do, as well as the communication complexity (the total number of bits sent). Obviously, achieving a constant number of rounds and small communication complexity, while still getting the best possible security, is an important research goal.

Unconditionally secure protocols such as [2] are typically adaptively secure. But these protocols are not constant round, and it is a major open problem if it is even possible to have unconditional security and constant number of rounds for secure computation of any function.

If we are willing to make a computational assumptions, we can achieve constant round protocols, the first example of this is Yao’s garbled circuits for two players, but on the other hand this does not give us adaptive security. Another class of protocols based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) also naturally leads to constant round protocols, where we can tolerate that a majority of players are corrupted. Here we also get very low communication complexity, that depends only on the number of inputs and outputs. But also here, we only get static security (see for instance [16], [1]).

We can in fact get adaptive security in the computational setting, as shown in [6] by introducing the notion of Non-Committing Encryption (NCE). Moreover, in [12], adaptive security was obtained as well, but much more efficiently using additively homomorphic encryption. However, neither [6] nor [12] run in constant number of rounds.

If we assume honest majority we can get both constant round and adaptive security. This was shown in several papers [9], [10], [11], [17]. The idea here is to use an unconditionally secure protocol to compute, for instance, a Yao garbled circuit, that is then used to compute the desired function in a constant number of rounds. Since the computation leading to the Yao circuit is easy to parallelise, this can be constant round as well and we inherit adaptive security from the unconditionally secure “preprocessing”. On the other hand, this requires communication that is proportional to the size of circuit to be computed securely. One may apply the IPS compiler to one of these protocols to get a solution for dishonest majority. This preserves the adaptive security and constant round, but unfortunately also preserves the large communication complexity.

The question therefore becomes whether we can have adaptive security, constant round and low communication complexity in the dishonest majority setting? In this paper we answer this in the affirmative. More specifically, we achieve an adaptive UC-secure protocol that tolerate corruption of $n - 1$ of the n players, it requires a constant number of rounds and its communication complexity depends only on the number of inputs and outputs (and the security parameter), and not on the size of the circuit computed. The protocol is secure if the LWE problem is hard.

The most important tool we use to achieve the result is something we call Equivocal FHE. An equivocal FHE scheme is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE) with additional properties. Most importantly, it should be possible to generate “fake” public keys that look

like normal keys but where encryption leads to ciphertext that contain no information on the plaintext. This is similar to the known notion of meaningful/meaningless keys, but in addition we want that fake public keys come with a trapdoor that allows to “explain” (equivocate) a ciphertext as an encryption of any desired plaintext. This is similar to (but not the same as) what is required for non-committing encryption (NCE): for NCE one needs to equivocate a ciphertext even if the decryption key is also given (say, by corrupting the receiver), here we only need to give the adversary valid looking randomness for the encryption. We give a concrete instantiation of equivocal FHE based on the LWE problem, starting from the FHE scheme by Brakerski et al. [5].

A second tool we need is constant round UC-secure commitments and zero-knowledge proofs. For the commitments we start from a basic construction in [8], which was originally based on claw-free trapdoor permutations (CFTP). We show that it can be instantiated based on LWE (which is not known to imply CFTP). Zero-knowledge then follows quite easily from known techniques.

To construct our protocol, we start from the well known blue-print for FHE-based MPC: players encrypt their inputs under a common public key, evaluate the desired function locally and then jointly decrypt the result. This is possible under an appropriate set-up assumption, which is always needed for UC security and dishonest majority. Namely we assume that a public key has been distributed, and players have been given shares of the corresponding secret key.

This approach has been used before and usually leads to static security. One reason for this is that encryptions are usually committing, so we are in trouble if the sender of a ciphertext is corrupted later. This is solved using the equivocal property of the cryptosystem we use, and this means that the input phase and evaluation phase of the protocol can be simulated, even for adaptive corruptions. Players need, of course, to prove that they know the inputs they contribute, but this is easy once we have constant round UC commitment and ZK proofs.

A harder problem is how to simulate the output phase where ciphertexts containing the outputs are decrypted. In the simulation we cannot expect that these ciphertexts are correctly formed and hold the actual outputs, so the simulator needs to “cheat”. However, each player holds a share of the secret key which we have to give to the adversary if he is corrupted. If this happens after some executions of the decryption protocol, we (the simulator) may already be committed to this share. It is therefore not clear how the simulator can achieve the desired decryption results by adjusting the shares of the secret key. To get around this, we adapt an idea from Damgård and Nielsen [12], who proposed an adaptively secure protocol based on additively homomorphic threshold encryption in the honest majority scenario. The idea is to add a step to the protocol where each ciphertext is re-randomised just before encryption. This gives the simulator a chance to cheat and turn the ciphertext into one that contains the correct result, and one can now simulate the decryption without having to modify the shares of the secret key. The re-randomisation from [12] only works for honest majority, we show a different method that works for dishonest majority.

We mention for completeness that there is also a more generic approach which will give us adaptive security based only on Equivocal FHE: namely, we follow the same blueprint as before, with input, evaluation and output phases. However, we implement the verification of ciphertexts in the input phase and the decryptions in the output phase using generic adaptively secure MPC a la [8]. This way, the communication and number of rounds do not depend on the size of circuit to be computed securely. However, it would not be genuinely constant round, as the number of rounds would depend on the circuits computing the encryption and decryption functions of the underlying cryptosystem. Hence, unlike our protocol, the number of rounds would in general depend on the security parameter.

We observe that in [18] an impossibility result was shown that suggests that if one wants to rely only on FHE, $n-1$ corruptions is the best we can do: They show that adaptively secure FHE where the receiver may be corrupted, cannot be achieved. This is based on the fact that when the receiver is corrupted, the adversary learns the private key. We get around this by assuming $n-1$ corruptions and secret sharing a private key among the players so that the adversary never learns the private key. This means that we can make do with security against sender corruption which is indeed possible. On the other hand, if all n players can be corrupted, we cannot hope to hide any private key from the adversary and the impossibility result applies.

We note that in [15], adaptive security and constant round was obtained using a non-blackbox proof in the stand-alone model. Also a solution with a blackbox proof was shown to be impossible, but this does not, of course, apply to our case, where we go for UC security, and therefore require a set-up assumption.

1.1 Roadmap

In section 3 we define our *Equivocal fully homomorphic encryption* scheme and its properties. A concrete instantiation based on the scheme of [5] is given in Appendix B. In Section 4,5 we give our construction for UC commitments and ZKPoK. Next in Section 6, we proceed presenting our arithmetic multiparty computation (AMPC) protocol. The simulator and the security proof of our protocol can be found in Section 7.

2 Notation

Throughout the paper $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ will denote the security parameter. We use $d \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ to denote the process of sampling d from the distribution \mathcal{D} or, if \mathcal{D} is a set, a uniform choice from it. We say that a function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is negligible if $\forall c \exists n_c$ s.t. if $n > n_c$ then $f(n) < n^{-c}$. We will use $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ to denote an unspecified negligible function. We often use $[n]$ to denote the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$. We write \boxplus and \boxminus to denote operation over encrypted data. If \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 are two distributions, then we denote that they are statistically close by $\mathcal{D}_1 \approx_s \mathcal{D}_2$; we denote that they are computationally indistinguishable by $\mathcal{D}_1 \approx_c \mathcal{D}_2$; and we denote that they are identical by $\mathcal{D}_1 \equiv \mathcal{D}_2$. For a randomized algorithm A , we use $a \leftarrow A(k, x; r)$ to denote running A on input x and uniformly random bits $r \in \{0, 1\}^*$, producing output a .

Invertible Sampling [20]: We recall the notion of invertible sampling, which is closely connected to adaptive security in simulation models where erasures are not allowed. We say that an algorithm A with input space X has invertible sampling if there exists a PPT inverting algorithm, denoted by Inv_A , such that for all input $x \in X$, the outputs of the following two experiments are either computationally, or statistically indistinguishable:

$$\begin{array}{l|l} y \leftarrow A(x, r) & y \leftarrow A(x, r) \\ \text{Return } (x, y, r) & r' \leftarrow \text{Inv}_A(y, x) \\ & \text{Return } (x, y, r') \end{array}$$

3 Equivocal Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

We start by recalling the notions of (fully) homomorphic encryption. Next we define the new notion of Equivocal fully homomorphic encryption and we specify the properties needed for such an instantiation. We give a concrete instantiation of our Equivocal FHE scheme from the LWE assumption, based on Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [5] FHE scheme, is described in section B.

3.1 Homomorphic Encryption

A homomorphic encryption scheme $\text{HE} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ is a quadruple of PPT algorithms. In this work, the message space M of the encryption schemes will be some (modulo 2) ring, and the functions to be evaluated will be represented as arithmetic circuits over this ring, composed of addition and multiplication gates. The syntax of these algorithms is given as follows.

- *Key-Generation.* The algorithm KeyGen , on input the security parameter 1^λ , outputs $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, where pk is a public encryption key and sk is a secret decryption key.
- *Encryption.* The algorithm Enc , on input pk and a message $m \in M$, outputs a ciphertext $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m)$.
- *Decryption.* The algorithm Dec on input sk and a ciphertext ct , outputs a message $\tilde{m} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{ct})$.
- *Homomorphic-Evaluation.* The algorithm Eval , on input pk , an arithmetic circuit ckt , and a tuple of ℓ ciphertexts $(\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell)$, outputs a ciphertext $\text{ct}' \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\text{ckt}, \text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell)$.

We note that we can treat the evaluation key as a part of the public key. The security notion needed in this work is security against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security), defined as follows.

Definition 1 (IND-CPA security). *A scheme HE is IND-CPA secure if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that:*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HE}}^{\text{CPA}}[\lambda] := |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(1)) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where, $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$.

3.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption

A scheme HE is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic with respect to a class of circuits. More formally:

Definition 2 (Fully homomorphic encryption). *A homomorphic encryption scheme $\text{FHE} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ is fully homomorphic if it satisfies the following properties:*

1. *Homomorphism: Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be the set of all polynomial sized arithmetic circuits. $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, $\forall \text{ckt} \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, $\forall (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in M^\ell$ where $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$, $\forall (\text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell)$ where $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_i)$, it holds that:*

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\text{ckt}, \text{ct}_1, \dots, \text{ct}_\ell)) \neq \text{ckt}(m_1, \dots, m_\ell)] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

2. *Compactness: There exists a polynomial $\mu = \mu(\lambda)$ such that the output length of Eval is at most μ bits long regardless of the input circuit ckt and the number of its inputs.*

3.3 Equivocal fully homomorphic encryption scheme

Our *Equivocal fully homomorphic encryption scheme* consists of a tuple $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{KeyGen}^*, \text{QEnc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ of algorithms where the syntax of the procedures $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{QEnc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ is defined as in the above FHE scheme. Further our scheme is augmented with other two algorithms $(\text{KeyGen}^*, \text{Equivocate})$ and needs to satisfy specific properties. More specifically:

Definition 3 (Equivocal fully homomorphic encryption). An Equivocal fully homomorphic encryption scheme $\text{QFHE} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{KeyGen}^*, \text{QEnc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ with message space M is made up of the following PPT algorithms:

- $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{QEnc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ is an FHE scheme with the same syntax as in section 3.1.
- The Equivocal key generation algorithm $\text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda)$, outputs ‘equivocal’ public-key secret-key pair $(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}})$.
- The Equivocation algorithm $\text{Equivocate}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}, \text{ct}, r_{\text{ct}}, m)$, given $\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}$, a plaintext m , a ciphertext ct and random coins r_{ct} , outputs a value e in the randomness space.

We require the following properties:

1. Indistinguishability of equivocal keys. We say that the scheme has indistinguishability of equivocal keys if the distributions of PK and $\widetilde{\text{PK}}$ are computationally indistinguishable, where $(\text{PK}, \cdot) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \cdot) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda)$.
2. Indistinguishability of equivocation. Let $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$ denote the distribution of randomness used by QEnc . Let $\mathcal{O}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, m)$ and $\mathcal{O}'(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}, m)$ be the following oracles:

<p>Let $\mathcal{O}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, m)$:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">$r_{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">$\text{ct} = \text{QEnc}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, m; r_{\text{ct}})$</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">Output $(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \text{ct}, r_{\text{ct}})$</p>		<p>Let $\mathcal{O}'(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}, m)$:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">$r_{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">$\text{ct} = \text{QEnc}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{m}; r_{\text{ct}})$</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">$e = \text{Equivocate}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}, \text{ct}, r_{\text{ct}}, m)$</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">Output $(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \text{ct}, e)$</p>
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There exists $\widetilde{m} \in M$ such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} with oracle access to $\mathcal{O}(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \cdot)$ and $\mathcal{O}'(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}, \cdot)$ the following holds.

$$\left| \Pr \left[(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda) \right] - \Pr \left[(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, \widetilde{\text{SK}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda) \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

In order to construct our equivocal QFHE scheme we use the following *special* FHE scheme with some additional properties.

Definition 4. [Special fully homomorphic encryption] We call a fully homomorphic encryption scheme $\text{FHE} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ special FHE scheme, if it is IND-CPA secure and satisfies the following properties:

Let $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$ denote the distribution of randomness used by Enc .

1. Additive homomorphism over random coins: $\forall r_1, r_2 \in \text{Supp}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda))$ and $\forall m \in M$, it holds that $(m \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; r_1)) \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; r_2) = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; m \cdot r_1 + r_2)$.
2. E-Hiding: There exists $\mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$ such that $\forall m \in M$, if $r^0 \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ and $r^K \leftarrow \mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ then the distribution of $(r^0 - m \cdot r^K)$ is statistically close to $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$.³
3. Invertible Sampling: The distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$, has invertible sampling via the algorithm $\text{Inv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}}$.

Recall that we defined invertible sampler of an algorithm A in Section 2 as an algorithm Inv_A that takes as inputs the input x and output y of algorithm A and output the consistent random coins. In our case, $x = 1^\lambda$ and y is a sample from the range of $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}$.

Next, in Figure 1, we show how to build an equivocal FHE scheme using a special FHE scheme.

³ Intuitively, E-Hiding can be argued in the same way as formula privacy for some FHE schemes. This requires *dwarfing* in the sense that r^0 should be large enough to dwarf mr^K where $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ are gaussian distributions. Hence, $r^K \leftarrow \mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ and $r^0 \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ where the noise of $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$ is super-polynomially larger than the noise of $\mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}(1^\lambda)$.




Fig. 1. Description of QFHE scheme

Theorem 1. *Let FHE be a special fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Then $QFHE = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{KeyGen}^*, \text{QEnc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec}, \text{Equivocate})$ in Figure 1 is an equivocal QFHE scheme.*

Proof. Indistinguishability of equivocal keys. Let $(\text{PK}, \text{SK}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\tilde{\text{PK}}, \tilde{\text{SK}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda)$, then the indistinguishability of the two pairs of public keys follows from the IND-CPA security the FHE scheme.

Indistinguishability of equivocation. We will show that indistinguishability of equivocation holds for $\bar{m} = 0$. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary that breaks indistinguishability of equivocation; then we construct a PPT algorithm R such that $R^{\mathcal{A}}$ breaks *E-hiding*. R simulates the oracle for every query m_i as follows. R invokes \mathcal{A} and receives some message m_i and forwards it to the *E-hiding* challenger. Next it receives the challenge r_{ct_i} and computes $\text{ct}_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(m_i; r_{\text{ct}_i})$ and forwards r_{ct_i} to \mathcal{A} and outputs whatever \mathcal{A} does. Now, if $r_{\text{ct}_i} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{rand}(\lambda)$ then $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(m_i)$, namely, the view of \mathcal{A} follows the distribution which corresponds to the left game in Definition 3 of indistinguishability of equivocation. On the other hand, if $r_{\text{ct}_i} = (r_i^0 - m_i \cdot r^{\tilde{K}})$; then $\text{ct}_i = (m_i \boxplus \tilde{K}) \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; r_i^0 - m_i \cdot r^{\tilde{K}}) = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; r_i^0) = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, r^{\tilde{K}}}(0; r_i^0)$ which implies that in this case the view of \mathcal{A} follows the distribution of the right game in Definition 3 of indistinguishability of equivocation. This means that the distinguishing advantage of R is the same to that of \mathcal{A} which leads to a contradiction.

Jumping ahead, we are interested in building an adaptively secure MPC protocol using an equivocal QFHE scheme and gain in terms of round and communication efficiency. A property needed for this purpose is the following:

Distributed Decryption: We assume that a common public key pk has been set up where the secret key sk has been secret-shared among the players in such a way that they can collaborate to decrypt. Notice that some setup assumption is always required to show UC security in the

dishonest majority setting. Roughly, we assume that a functionality is available, which we are going to specify later, which generates a key pair and secret-shares the secret key among the players using a secret-sharing scheme that is assumed to be given as part of the specification of the cryptosystem. Since we allow corruption of all but one player, the maximal unqualified sets must be all sets of $n - 1$ players. We point out that we could make a weaker set-up assumption, such as a common reference string, and using a general UC secure multiparty computation protocol for the common reference string model to implement the above functionality. While this may not be very efficient, one only needs to run this protocol once in the life-time of the system. The properties needed for the distributed decryption and its protocol are specified later.

4 UC Adaptive Commitments from LWE

Commitment schemes that satisfy both equivocality and extractability form useful tools in achieving adaptive security. In this section, we show how using a QFHE scheme, one can build equivocal and extractable commitments. Having realized a QFHE scheme based on the LWE assumption, we consequently get equivocal and extractable commitments assuming the hardness of LWE. Note that such commitments based on LWE can be of independent interest. We remark that any encryption scheme that satisfies the properties specified in Definition 4 would have sufficed for our purposes in this section – the multiplicative homomorphic property of our QFHE scheme will not be of use here; however, since we are using our commitment scheme as a tool in our adaptive MPC protocol based on QFHE, for simplicity of exposition we use the same QFHE scheme in our commitment scheme too.

Since we are interested in UC security against adaptive adversaries, our commitment scheme is in the CRS model. The scheme must satisfy the following two properties, polynomial equivocality and simulation extractability. The former guarantees that the simulator \mathcal{S} needs to be able to produce polynomially many equivocal commitments using the same CRS. More specifically, \mathcal{S} can open the equivocal commitments to any value of its choice and give consistent randomness to adversary \mathcal{A} . The latter property says that the simulator \mathcal{S} needs to be able to extract the contents of any valid commitment generated by adversary \mathcal{A} , even after \mathcal{A} obtains polynomially many equivocal commitments generated by \mathcal{S} . Note that there is only an apparent conflict between equivocality and the binding property and between the extractability and the hiding property, as the simulator is endowed with additional power (trapdoors) in comparison with the parties in the real world execution. In the following we elaborate how our commitment scheme satisfies the above properties.

Our Construction. Equivocation in our scheme is achieved via QFHE. In particular, the commitment algorithm is the algorithm QEnc , defined in Figure 1. In order to add extractability we must enhance our scheme in such way that we do not sacrifice equivocality. A failed attempt is to include a public key for an encryption scheme secure against CCA2 attacks to the CRS. In this case, the committer will send an encryption of the decommitment information along with the commitment itself. Then, as the simulator has the associated decryption key, it can decrypt the decommitment information and hence extract the committed value from any adversarially prepared commitment. However, notice that such an encryption is binding even to the simulator, so equivocality cannot be achieved.

The solution to the problem is to send the commitment along with two pseudorandom ciphertexts. One ciphertext is an encryption of the decommitment information and the other ciphertext is a uniformly random string. In this way, the simulator can encrypt both decommitment values and later show that it only knows the decryption to one and that the other was uniformly chosen.

For security of our construction, the encryption scheme used to encrypt the decommitment information has to be a CCA2-secure encryption scheme with the property that any produced ciphertext is pseudorandom and has deterministic decryption. To this end, the CCA2 encryption scheme of Micciancio and Peikert [19] based on LWE satisfies the above properties. They obtain their result via relatively generic assumptions using either strongly unforgeable one-time signatures [14], or a message authentication code and weak form of commitment [3]. The first assumption does not yield pseudorandom ciphertexts, thus another encryption producing pseudorandom ciphertexts on top of the scheme of [19] could have been used, resulting to a double encryption scheme. However, it turns out that their construction with the latter set of assumptions has pseudorandom ciphertexts.

The reader might have observed that this bears some resemblance with the trick used in the seminal work of [8], referred to as CLOS hereafter, to achieve extractability. In fact, CLOS forms another starting point in a way described in the following. We begin by reviewing certain aspects of their construction. Their scheme is based on enhanced trapdoor permutations, also needed in order to get double encryption CCA2 security. Moreover, in order to build equivocal commitments they need NP reduction to graph Hamiltonicity since the CRS of their commitment scheme consists of a graph G sampled from a distribution such that it is computationally hard to tell if G has a Hamiltonian cycle. Interestingly, the CLOS commitment scheme does not give an instantiation based on LWE since, and to begin with, there are no known trapdoor permutations based on LWE. On the other hand, assuming the hardness of LWE, we propose an extractable and equivocal commitment *with no need of an NP reduction*, leading to a huge improvement in efficiency. Our CRS consists of a pair of public keys for an FHE scheme.

More formally, given QFHE = (KeyGen, KeyGen*, QEnc, Eval, Dec, Equiv, Equivocate) as defined in Figure 1, a CCA2-secure scheme E_{CCA} with encryption algorithm ENC_{CCA} based on LWE [19], with the property that any ciphertext is pseudorandom and has deterministic decryption, we construct the following equivocal and extractable UC bit-commitment scheme Π_{COM} . We shall use E_{CCA} in a black box manner. We note that the scheme naturally extends to a setting where commitments are defined over strings instead of just bits.

Common Reference String: The CRS consists of the public key (pk, K) of the QFHE scheme and the public key for the encryption scheme ENC_{CCA}.

Commit Phase:

1. On input (Commit, $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, b$) where $b \in \{0, 1\}$, party P_i computes $z = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, K}(b; r)$ where $r \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}$. Next, P_i computes $C_b = \text{ENC}_{\text{CCA}}(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r; s)$ using random coins s , and sets C_{1-b} to a random string of length $|C_b|$. Then, P_i records $(sid, ssid, P_j, r, s, b)$, and sends $c = (sid, ssid, P_i, z, C_0, C_1)$ to P_j .
2. P_j receives and records c , and outputs (Receipt, $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j$). P_j ignores any later commit messages from P_i with the same $(sid, ssid)$.

Reveal Phase:

1. On input (Reveal, $sid, ssid$), party P_i retrieves $(sid, ssid, P_j, r, s, b)$ and sends $(sid, ssid, r, s, b)$ to P_j .
2. Upon receiving $(sid, ssid, r, s, b)$ from P_i , P_j checks that it has a tuple $(sid, ssid, P_i, z, C_0, C_1)$. If yes, then it checks that $z = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, K}(b; r)$ and that $C_b = \text{ENC}_{\text{CCA}}(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r; s)$. If both these checks succeed, then P_j outputs (Reveal, $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, b$). Otherwise, it ignores the message.

The above commitment scheme UC realizes the multi-session ideal commitment functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$, described in Figure 8 in Appendix C, which reuses the public string for multiple commitments.

Proposition 1. *Assuming the hardness of LWE, Protocol Π_{COM} UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model.*

The proof can be found in Appendix C.

5 Adaptive UC ZKPoK from LWE

Our UC commitment scheme serves towards the realization of a commit-and-prove functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ based on LWE. Such a functionality is generic and hence is quite useful – it allows a party to prove NP statements relative to its commitment value in the setting where parties commit to their inputs but they never decommit. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ is presented in Figure 8 and is comprised of two phases. In the first phase, a party commits to a specific value. In the second phase, this party proves NP statements in zero-knowledge relative to the committed value. It allows the committer to commit to multiple secret values w_i , and then have the relation \mathcal{R} depend on all these values in a single proof. In addition, the committer may ask to prove multiple statements with respect to the same set of secret values. Hence, once a committer gives a new $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, w)$ command, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ adds the current w to the already existing list \bar{w} of committed values. Then, on receiving a $(\text{Proof}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{R}, x)$ request, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ evaluates \mathcal{R} on x and the current list \bar{w} .

Using the power of the UC commitment scheme we constructed in Section 4, we show how it can be used to first construct UC Zero-Knowledge protocols from LWE. Canetti and Fischlin [7, Theorem 5], show that in the \mathcal{F}_{COM} -hybrid model there exists a 3-round protocol that securely realizes \mathcal{F}_{ZK} with respect to any NP relation without any computational assumptions. Using the composition theorem and [7, Theorem 5], we can instantiate \mathcal{F}_{COM} with the UC commitment protocol from LWE (see Section 4) in the CRS model and realize \mathcal{F}_{ZK} from LWE. Also, as it is noted by [7] we can replace \mathcal{F}_{COM} by the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$.

We next obtain a protocol for UC realizing functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ in the \mathcal{F}_{ZK} -hybrid model, in the presence of adaptive adversaries. In [8, Proposition 7.2], a protocol for UC realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ in the \mathcal{F}_{ZK} -hybrid model, based on any one-way function is proposed. To guarantee security against adaptive adversaries, they need equivocal and extractable commitments which they instantiate assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Using [8, Proposition 7.2] we can get such an instantiation assuming the hardness of LWE via our extractable and equivocal commitment scheme described above and instantiation of the \mathcal{F}_{ZK} functionality from LWE.

6 Our Protocol

In Figure 2 we describe our protocol Π_{AMPC} realizing the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$, see Figure 5, in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}})$ -hybrid model. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ is described in Figure 4. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ is described in Figure 3.

Output phase: As we discussed in Section 1, the simulator will not be able to cheat in the distributed decryption protocol by decrypting a given ciphertext to any desired value. The key setup for the decryption protocol fixes the shares of the private key even in the simulation. Thus, a ciphertext can only be decrypted to the value it actually contains. Of course, when decrypting the outputs, the correct results should be produced both in simulation and real life, and so we have a problem since all ciphertexts in the simulation will contain encryptions of 0. We solve this by randomizing all ciphertexts before they are decrypted. To this end, we include another fixed encryption key $R = \text{Enc}(0)$ in the public key. Then the parties will cooperate to

create the ciphertext S . In the simulation R is going to be an encryption of 1, by cheating in the rerandomization process, we can have that S is an encryption of the final output, thus ensuring that the final decryption leads to the actual output.




Fig. 2. The Π_{AMPC} Protocol.

6.1 Distributed Function Evaluation

In order to achieve distributed decryption, we assume, as a set up assumption, that a common public key pk has been set up where the secret key sk has been secret-shared between n parties in such a way that they can compute their corresponding decryption evaluation shares and then collaborate to decrypt while the sk is kept secret. We also need that to enforce honest computation of the evaluation shares of a ciphertext, commitments to the shares of the secret key




Fig. 3. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$.




Fig. 4. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$.




Fig. 5. The ideal functionality for Arithmetic MPC.

are also made public, along with pk . Using these commitments, when parties are distributedly decrypting a ciphertext, they can then prove (via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$) that the evaluation shares were computed honestly using the secret-key shares initially delegated to them.

To this end, the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ generates a key pair $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ and secret-shares the secret key sk among the players using a secret-sharing scheme that is assumed to be given as part of the specification of the cryptosystem. The validity of the evaluation shares is tested inside the protocol Π_{DDEC} calling the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. In order to describe our protocol Π_{DDEC} , we next define the following distributed sharing scheme.

Definition 5. We call $(\text{ShareSK}, \text{ShareEval}, \text{Combine})$ a distributed function sharing scheme for an encryption scheme $(\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, with construction threshold c and corruption threshold t , if $(\text{ShareSK}, \text{Combine})$ are PPT algorithms and ShareEval is a PPT function, and the following hold:

Key sharing: The algorithm ShareSK on input $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ and a construction threshold c , outputs a tuple $(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n) \leftarrow \text{ShareSK}(\text{sk})$.

Evaluation sharing: The evaluation function ShareEval on input (pk, sk_i) and an a ciphertext $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z)$, outputs an evaluation share $ev_i = \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z); r_{ev_i})$ for $i \in [n]$ where $r_{ev_i} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$.

Share combining: The algorithm Combine on input correctly computed evaluation shares $\{ev_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ of the same ciphertext $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z)$, constructs the output $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z)) = \text{Combine}(\{ev_i\}_{i \in [n]})$.

For our purposes, the construction threshold $c = n$ and the corruption threshold $t = n - 1$. In Figure 6, we describe our protocol Π_{DDec} , parameterized by $(\text{ShareSK}, \text{ShareEval}, \text{Combine})$.

Protocol Π_{DDec}

The protocol runs in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}})$ -hybrid model with parties P_1, \dots, P_n and it is parametrized by $(\text{ShareEval}, \text{Combine})$, as defined in definition 5. It proceeds as follows:

Key Sharing: On input $(\text{init}, 1^\lambda)$ from all parties, invoke the functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. The invocation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ results in every party P_i receiving $((\text{pk}, c_1, \dots, c_n, K, R), (\text{sk}_i, r_i))$, where, $(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n)$ are shares of the secret key sk corresponding to the public key pk and (c_1, \dots, c_n) are commitments on the corresponding shares.

Evaluation Sharing:

1. For $i \neq j$, P_i sends $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}, P_i, P_j, \text{sk}_i)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. At this point all other parties P_j receive message $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, P_i, P_j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$.
2. For $i \neq j$, P_i sends $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}, P_i, P_j, r_i)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. At this point all other parties P_j receive message $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, P_i, P_j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$.
3. For $i \neq j$, P_i samples r_{ev_i} and sends $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}, P_i, P_j, r_{ev_i})$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. At this point all other parties P_j receive message $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, P_i, P_j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$.
4. Party P_i , on input ciphertext $\text{enc}(z)$, computes its evaluation share $ev_i \leftarrow \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{enc}(z); r_{ev_i})$ where $r_{ev_i} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}(\lambda)$ and broadcasts ev_i via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}$.
5. For $j \neq i$, P_i sends $(\text{Prover}, \text{sid}, P_i, P_j, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eval}}, (c_i, \text{pk}, \text{enc}(z), ev_i))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{eval}} = \{((c_i, \text{pk}, \text{enc}(z), ev_i), (\text{sk}_i, r_i, r_{ev_i})) : c_i = \text{Com}(\text{sk}_i; r_i) \wedge ev_i = \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{enc}(z); r_{ev_i})\}$, where $\text{sk}_i, r_i, r_{ev_i}$ are the values committed as above by P_i , and Com is the commitment scheme used in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$.
6. For $i \neq j$, P_j sends the message $(\text{Proof}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eval}}, (c_i, \text{pk}, \text{enc}(z), ev_i))$.
7. For every P_j , P_i calls $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}$ to broadcast whether it accepts the proof by P_j or not.

Share Combining: If any party P_i outputs reject for a proof given by any party P_j , then output **Abort**. Otherwise, output $\text{Combine}(\{ev_i\}_{i \in [n]})$.

A concrete instantiation of the protocol Π_{DDec} based on LWE is given in Appendix B.

Fig. 6. The threshold decryption protocol.

Definition 6. A sharing scheme $(\text{ShareSK}, \text{ShareEval}, \text{Combine})$ for an encryption scheme $(\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is called a statistically secure distributed scheme for corruption threshold $n - 1$ if there exist PPT algorithm, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{KeyDist}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$ such that the following hold:

Key distribution simulation: The algorithm $\mathcal{S}_{\text{KeyDist}}$ on input (pk, C) , where $C \subseteq [n]$, outputs $(\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C})$. We require that $\forall C$ with $|C| \leq n - 1$, the following two experiments are statistically close.

$$\begin{array}{l|l}
 (\text{pk}, \cdot) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda) & (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda) \\
 \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{KeyDist}}(\text{pk}, C) & \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{ShareSK}(\text{sk}) \\
 \text{Return } (\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}) & \text{Return } (\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C})
 \end{array}$$

Evaluation simulation: The algorithm $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$ on input $\{\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z), z, \{ev_i\}_{i \in C}\}$, where $C \subseteq [n]$, outputs $\{ev_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus C}$. We require that $\forall C$ with $|C| \leq n - 1$, the following two experiments are statistically close.

$$\begin{array}{l|l}
 (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda) & (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda) \\
 \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{ShareSK}(\text{sk}) & \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{ShareSK}(\text{sk}) \\
 \{ev_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z)) & \{ev_i\}_{i \in C}, \leftarrow \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z)) \\
 & \{ev_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus C} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}(\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z), z, \{ev_i\}_{i \in C}). \\
 \text{Return } (\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z), z, \{ev_i\}_{i \in [n]}) & \text{Return } (\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z), z, \{ev_i\}_{i \in [n]})
 \end{array}$$

Remark 1. The existence of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{KeyDist}}$ in essence says that the values seen by at most t ($n - 1$ corrupted) parties could have been generated from pk alone.

Remark 2. The existence of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$ in essence says that if one knows the values that $n - 1$ parties are entitled to see, and if one knows $z = \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z))$, then one can compute the evaluation share of all parties. It is of course trivial to compute $ev_i \leftarrow \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z))$ for the $n - 1$ values $\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}$ one knows; but what the evaluation simulation property says is that $ev_i \leftarrow \text{ShareEval}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_i, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z))$ can be computed even for $i \notin C$, provided, the plaintext z , the rest of the secret-key shares $\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}$, and the rest of the decryption shares $\{ev_i\}_{i \in C}$ are known.

7 Proof of Security

Theorem 2. Let $\text{QFHE} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{KeyGen}^*, \text{QEnc}, \text{Equiv}, \text{Equivocate})$ be the equivocal fully homomorphic encryption scheme described in Figure 1; let it be associated with a distributed function sharing scheme $(\text{ShareSK}, \text{ShareEval}, \text{Combine})$. Then the constant-round protocol Π_{AMPC} UC-securely realises the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$ in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}})$ -hybrid model with computational security against any adaptive, active adversary corrupting at most all-but-one parties.

Proof. We begin by giving a high-level intuition for the proof. As we shall see, the crucial aspects of our protocol that we exploit in the proof are the properties listed in Definitions 3,4 and Theorem 1.

The proof is carried out by a sequence of hybrids. We shall begin with a hybrid that is identical to the ideal-world execution. Note that the main difference from the real-world execution is that, while in the real world the keys K, R are encryptions of 1, 0, respectively, in the ideal world, these keys are encryptions of 0, 1, respectively. Naturally, when we start from one world, in order to move to the other, we would need to employ the CPA security of the underlying FHE scheme. Hence, the natural direction would be to eliminate the steps which use the secret key and, roughly speaking, somehow simulate these steps without the secret key. To this end, firstly, we rely on the simulatable evaluation property of the FHE scheme. Here, the simulator first learns the evaluation shares that the corrupted parties might send by intercepting the commit commands sent by the corrupted parties. Then, as a function of these evaluation shares and the supposed output, the hybrid would compute the evaluation shares of honest parties. Observe that there is a possibility that the corrupted parties may not send the evaluation shares consistent with the randomness it would have sent earlier through $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$; however, in this case, by the security of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$, the corrupted party could not have given convincing proofs, leading to an abort. Thus, whenever conditioned on no abort, with this modification of simulating the evaluation shares of honest parties, the deviation introduced in the view of the adversary is computationally indistinguishable, by applying the simulatable evaluation property. Next, we can

also sample all the secret-key shares sk_i to be uniformly random. This introduces no deviation in the view of the adversary for the following reason: the commitments made to the secret-key shares are using a statistically hiding scheme; furthermore, no longer at any point in the execution do we use the secret key. With this, we can switch to R being an encryption of 0. With this, we can switch to a hybrid where we can start executing as prescribed by the protocol, except for simulating the evaluation shares. Next, we move to a hybrid which is given the actual inputs of parties; therein, the hybrid would load the actual inputs. Next, we may switch to K being an encryption of 1 and switch to loading the random coins used to distributedly decrypt the ciphertext honestly. In this step, we need to deploy the indistinguishability of equivocation and the indistinguishability of equivocal keys in various steps. Finally, we additively secret share the secret key instead of choosing all shares at random and performing the distributed decryption as prescribed by Π_{DDec} . We now proceed to provide a formal proof. We shall provide our proof at a low level for clarity, while implementing certain generic algorithms such as **ShareSK** (with additive secret sharing of the secret key).

Let \mathcal{A} be an adaptive adversary who operates against the Protocol Π_{AMPC} in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}})$ -hybrid model. Our objective is to construct an ideal-process adversary, called simulator, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ such that no environment \mathcal{Z} can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with \mathcal{A} and parties running Protocol Π_{AMPC} in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}})$ -hybrid model or with $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ in the ideal process for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$. Generally, the challenging aspect in constructing a simulator for an adaptive adversary is the following. Since \mathcal{A} corrupts parties adaptively as the protocol progresses, the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ must deal with instructions from \mathcal{A} to corrupt parties also as the simulation progresses. More specifically, to begin with, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ must simulate to the adversary the messages generated by honest parties, without knowing the inputs of the honest parties. Then, if and when an honest party gets corrupted, the simulator learns the input (and possibly the output also) of this party; then, it needs to be able to equivocate and generate the state of the corrupted party in a way that is consistent with the revealed input/output and with the already simulated messages. Below, we construct our simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$.

At a high level, the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ will run a simulated copy of \mathcal{A} and will use \mathcal{A} in order to interact with $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$. For this purpose, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ will “simulate for \mathcal{A} ” an interaction with parties running Protocol Π_{AMPC} , where the interaction will match the inputs and outputs seen by \mathcal{Z} in its interaction with $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ in the ideal process for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$.

More specifically, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ behaves as follows. In the following we use Π_{AMPC} as a shorthand of $\Pi_{\text{AMPC}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}}$.

Simulating the communication with \mathcal{Z} : Every input value that $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ receives from \mathcal{Z} is written on \mathcal{A} 's input tape (as if coming from \mathcal{A} 's environment). Likewise, every output value written by \mathcal{A} on its output tape is copied onto $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$'s own output tape (to be read by $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$'s environment \mathcal{Z}).

Simulated CRS: The common reference string is chosen by \mathcal{S} in the following manner (recall that \mathcal{S} chooses the CRS for the simulated \mathcal{A} as we are in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ -hybrid model):

- $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ simulates the **Key-Generation** phase of the QFHE scheme as follows. It samples $(\tilde{\text{PK}}, \tilde{\text{SK}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda)$ where $\tilde{\text{PK}} = (\text{pk}, \tilde{K})$ and $\tilde{\text{SK}} = (\text{sk}, r^{\tilde{K}})$. Recall that in QFHE (see Figure 1), $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ and $\tilde{K} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; r^{\tilde{K}})$ where $r^{\tilde{K}} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}$.
- $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ computes additive secret shares $(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n)$ of sk .^(sk1) For $i = 1, \dots, n$, compute $c_i = \text{Com}(\text{sk}_i; r_i)$.
- It also simulates the key R used for the re-randomization of the **Output** phase as follows. $R = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(1; r^R)$ where $r^R \leftarrow \mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}$.

- Moreover, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ generates randomness $(r_1^0, \dots, r_{2n}^0) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}$ which may be used in the **Load** commands for equivocation.

$\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ sets the CRS equal to $(\widetilde{\text{PK}}, R)$ and locally stores $(\widetilde{\text{SK}}, r^{\widetilde{K}}, r^R, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$.

Simulating actual protocol messages in Π_{AMPC} : Note that there might be multiple sessions executing concurrently. Let sid be the session identifier for one specific session. We will specify the simulation strategy corresponding to this specific session. The simulator strategy for all other sessions will be the same. Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ be the set of parties participating in the execution of Π corresponding to the session identified by the session identifier sid . Some of the parties may be corrupted. Also, recall that we are in the setting of adaptive corruption so more parties could be corrupted as the protocol proceeds. At any point \mathcal{S} only generates messages on behalf of the honest parties.

Simulation of the Load stage: Note that we describe how to simulate the **Load** stage only for key \widetilde{K} , since for all loads with key R , the simulator actually would be knowing the values to load, and hence, loading into R can be performed honestly as per the protocol.

Load stage messages $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$: In this stage the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ must generate messages on behalf of the honest parties. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ for every honest party proceeds as follows:

X_i : If P_i is honest then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ computes $X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}}(0; r_i^0)$ (where, r_i^0 was generated by $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ in the Initialize stage) and broadcasts X_i .

Commitment phase in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$: Recall that in the protocol, if P_i is honest then, for every $j \neq i$, it would send $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j, x_i)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ upon which P_j receives $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j)$; $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ simulates this interaction simply by sending $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j)$. Furthermore, P_i would also send $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_2, P_i, P_j, r_{x_i})$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ upon which P_j receives $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_2, P_i, P_j)$; $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ simulates this interaction too simply by sending $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_2, P_i, P_j)$ to P_j . For $j \neq i$, P_i sends $(\text{Prover}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}}, (\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}, X_i))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}} = \{((\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}, X_i), (x_i, r_{x_i})) : X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}}(x_i; r_{x_i})\}$.

Prove phase in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$: Recall that if P_i is honest, then, for every $j \neq i$, it would send $(\text{Prover}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}}, (\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}, X_i))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$, such that $X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}}(x_i; r_{x_i})$, upon which P_j receives $(\text{Proof}, \text{sid}, P_i, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}}, (\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}, X_i))$. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ simulates this interaction by thus sending $(\text{Proof}, \text{sid}, P_i, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}}, (\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}, X_i))$ to P_j .

Load stage messages $\mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$: Also in the load stage the adversary \mathcal{A} generates the messages on behalf of corrupted parties. For each corrupted party P_i our simulator proceeds as follows: Let us consider the case when P_i is corrupted before the honest parties output $(\text{cid}, X_i, \text{Defined})$. If some proof is not accepted, then input $(\text{cid}, X_i, \text{Fail})$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$. On the other hand, if the proofs are accepted, P_i must have sent to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ the messages $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j, x_i)$. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$, which intercepts these messages, learns x_i and inputs $(\text{Input}, P_i, X_i, x_i)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$.

Simulating corruption of parties in Load stage: When \mathcal{A} corrupts a real world party P_i , then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ first corrupts the corresponding ideal world party P_i and obtains its input x_i . Next $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ prepares the internal state on behalf of P_i such that it will be consistent with the message X_i that it had provided to \mathcal{A} earlier. In particular, it needs to present to \mathcal{A} the random coins $r_{\text{state}_i} \leftarrow \text{Inv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}}(r_i^{\text{blind}})$ that it can claim as the ones used in generating X_i and that is consistent with x_i as plaintext, e.i. $X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}}(x_i; r_i^{\text{blind}})$. Specifically, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ proceed as follows:

X_i : $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ runs the algorithm $\text{Equivocate}((\text{pk}, \tilde{K}), (\text{sk}, r^{\tilde{K}}), X_i, r^0, x_i)$ where $X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(0; r_i^0)$ in order to obtain r_i^{blind} and r_{state_i} . Furthermore, if P_i is corrupted before **Load** begins, then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ inputs $(\text{Input}, P_i, X_i, 0)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$ on behalf of P_i and simulates the honest parties for this **Load** by following the protocol. If any of the simulated honest parties outputs $(\text{cid}, X_i, \text{Defined})$, then the simulator must at the end of the **Load** input (Change, x'_i) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$ to define X_i . The value of x'_i is determined as follows: Since $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$ has output $(\text{cid}, X_i, \text{Defined})$, P_i must have input $(\text{Input}, P_i, X_i, s)$. The interface $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ thus learns s and sets x'_i to be s .

Commitment phase in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$: If P_i gets corrupted after $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ sends $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j)$ to P_j , then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ learns x_i , and sends x_i to \mathcal{A} . If P_i gets corrupted before $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ sends $(\text{Receipt}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j)$ to P_j , then \mathcal{A} specifies x'_i , and $(\text{sid}, \text{cid}_1, P_i, P_j, x'_i)$ is recorded. Furthermore, if P_i gets corrupted after $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ sends $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_2, P_i, P_j)$ to P_j , then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ would run the algorithm Equivocate to patch r_{x_i} and sends r_{x_i} to \mathcal{A} . If P_i gets corrupted before $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ sends $(\text{Receipt}, \text{sid}, \text{cid}_2, P_i, P_j)$ to P_j , then \mathcal{A} specifies r'_{x_i} , and $(\text{sid}, \text{cid}_2, P_i, P_j, r'_{x_i})$ is recorded. For $j \neq i$, P_i sends $(\text{Prover}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}}, (\text{pk}, \tilde{K}, X_i))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$ for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}} = \{((\text{pk}, \tilde{K}, X_i), (x_i, r_{x_i})) : X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(x_i; r_{x_i})\}$.

Prove phase in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$: If P_i gets corrupted after $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ sends $(\text{Proof}, \text{sid}, P_i, \mathcal{R}_{\text{eq}}, (\text{pk}, \tilde{K}, X_i))$ to P_j , then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ would learn x_i and run the algorithm $\text{Equivocate}((\text{pk}, \tilde{K}), (\text{sk}, r^{\tilde{K}}), X_i, r^0, x_i)$ to obtain r_{state_i} . Here, it would send $(x_i, r_{\text{state}_i})$ to \mathcal{A} .

Simulation of the Evaluation stage: Recall that the **Evaluation** stage does not require any interaction among the parties. Let ckt be the arithmetic circuit to be computed on the n inputs of the parties. On behalf of every honest party, the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ computes $\text{enc}(z) \leftarrow \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\text{ckt}, X_1, \dots, X_n)$.

Simulation of the Output stage: Firstly, observe that the ciphertext $\text{enc}(z)$ computed by every corrupted party using Eval is an encryption of 0, for the following reason. Since the simulator has simulated \tilde{K} as an encryption of 0 (i.e., $\tilde{K} \in \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0)$), and since the input x_i by every corrupted party P_i is encrypted using \tilde{K} as a key, (i.e., $X_i = (x_i \boxplus \tilde{K}) \boxplus \text{ct}_i^{\text{blind}}$, where also $\text{ct}_i^{\text{blind}} \in \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0)$), X_i is an encryption of 0. On the other hand, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$ outputs (Output, z) , and z is not necessarily 0. Now, in order for the simulator to be able to enforce the final output to be z , the simulator exploits the rerandomization step. More specifically, the simulator will cheat in the randomization step in such a way that the resultant ‘rerandomized’ ciphertext is an encryption of z . With this, the simulator can then simulate the distributed decryption protocol by simply behaving honestly. In detail, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ proceeds as follows.

Output stage messages $\mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$: On behalf of every corrupted party P_i , the simulator sends $(\text{Output}, \text{enc}(z))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$. Then, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}$ returns $(\text{enc}(z), z)$. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ thus learns z .

Output stage messages $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ proceeds as follows.

1. For every honest party P_i , compute $Y_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(0; r_{n+i}^0)$ (where, r_{n+i}^0 was generated in the Initialize stage).

Simulating corruption of parties in this step: If P_i gets corrupted soon after, then $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$ patches P_i ’s state to y_i running the algorithm $\text{Equivocate}((\text{pk}, \tilde{K}), (\text{sk}, r^{\tilde{K}}), Y_i, r_{n+i}^0, y_i)$. Also, from the **Load** performed by every corrupted party P_j , learn y_j as in the simulation of the **Load** stage.

2. Let P_k be an honest party. For every other honest party, assign $y_i \leftarrow M$. Then for P_k , set $y'_k = z - \sum_{i \in [n] \setminus \{k\}} y_i$. Then, for every honest party P_i , proceed as per the protocol to load $\text{enc}(y_i)$.

Simulating corruption of parties in this step: If any honest party gets corrupted, then the random coins used for generating the encryption using key R are patched running the algorithm `Equivocate` so that the value encrypted is y_i .

3. Now compute the randomizer S and randomize the ciphertext $\text{enc}(z)$ from the **Evaluation** stage as per the protocol. That is, compute $S = \boxplus_{i \in I} \text{enc}(y_i)$ and set $T \leftarrow \text{enc}(z) \boxplus S$, where $\text{enc}(z)$ is the resultant encryption from the **Evaluation** stage.
4. Run Π_{DDDEC} as in the protocol to decrypt T . At a high level, note that as every party is required to prove the correctness in computing the evaluation shares, then with high probability, all the evaluation shares correspond to being computed using a set of valid shares of the secret key. This ensures towards correctness of the value decrypted and output at the end.^(sk2)

This completes the description of our simulator. We shall now prove via a hybrid argument that the environment's view generated by the simulator is indistinguishable from its view in the real world. We begin by giving a high-level intuition of the proof.

Let us begin with the ideal world and then via hybrids migrate to the real world. In other words, we will modify the simulator hybrid-by-hybrid such that we finally reach a modified simulator that, on behalf of the honest parties, just honestly runs the protocol. Before we embark on actual proof, we shall first list the obstacles in this migration that shall guide us in designing the sequence of the hybrids. Firstly, observe the fact that, while in the real-world the randomizing key R is an encryption of 0, the simulator sets R to be an encryption of 1. Also, recall that the final ciphertext is randomized using R . This implies that an honest execution of **Output** stage is not possible with R being an encryption of 1. In other words, it is pertinent that before we get to a hybrid where the **Output** stage is performed honestly, we need a hybrid where R turns into an encryption of 0. However, with both the keys K and R as encryptions of 0, the final (rerandomized) output can also just be an encryption of 0, hence we can not hope to get the final output to decrypt to the actual output value. Thus, even before turning R into an encryption of 0, we need a hybrid where we can cheat in the final decryption. That is, we first need to have a hybrid that, instead of running the distributed decryption protocol, runs what we abstract as the simulator for distributed decryption. Finally, in order to ensure indistinguishability between the hybrid where R is an encryption of 1 and the hybrid where R is an encryption of 0, we need a reduction to IND-CPA security of the FHE scheme. In light of this, we also need to ensure that, by the time we reach the hybrid where R turns into an encryption of 0, the modified simulator does not crucially use the secret key in any part of the execution. With this as our guide, we have the following sequence of hybrids.

Hyb₀: This hybrid is identical to the ideal-world. Trivially,

Lemma 1. $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}} \equiv \text{Hyb}_0$.

Hyb₁: This hybrid is the same as **Hyb₀**, except for the following modification in the way the hybrid computes the evaluation shares for the final rerandomized ciphertext. Recall that in **Hyb₀**, Π_{DDDEC} was run. Now, we introduce certain changes in the steps of execution of Π_{DDDEC} . Recall that every party P_i is first required to commit through $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$, the secret-key share sk_i and the commitment information r_i , where $c_i = \text{Com}(\text{sk}_i; r_i)$.

The hybrid first intercepts these commit messages from the corrupted parties and learns sk_i, r_i . If these values do not correspond to the actual values provided to the corrupted party P_i during the onset of the execution, then, the hybrid aborts. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows. Recall that every party P_i is also required to commit to r_{ev_i} through $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. The hybrid intercepts this commit command from every corrupted P_i and learns r_{ev_i} . Then it computes by itself the evaluation share that would result by using sk_i and randomness r_{ev_i} on the final ciphertext. Let these values be $\{ev_i\}_{i \in C}$. Having also learnt the output z of loaded inputs of all the parties, the hybrid computes $\{ev_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus C} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}(\text{pk}, \{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in C}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(z), z, \{ev_i\}_{i \in C})$, where, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$ simulates the evaluation in distributed decryption as per Definition 6 where an actual implementation of it can be derived since we are using additive secret sharing and the adversary can corrupt at most $n - 1$ parties. In the meanwhile, it simply simulates the commit messages it needs to send by sending to the adversary, the corresponding Receipt messages. Then, $\{ev_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus C}$ is presented as the evaluation shares of the honest parties.

Lemma 2. $\text{Hyb}_0 \approx_s \text{Hyb}_1$.

Proof. Before we proceed, we shall analyze the potential abort by Hyb_1 when it intercepts the commit messages by a corrupted party P_i to sk_i, r_i . Recall that if these values do not match the corresponding values provided to P_i at the onset of the execution, then the hybrid aborts. We argue that even in Hyb_1 , this would have resulted in a premature abort, since, applying the security of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$, the corrupted party P_i could not have provided a convincing proof as the statement would be invalid. Here, we note that until this point in the course of execution, both the hybrids in question are identical. Next, note that if the corrupted parties provide the evaluation shares computed indeed using the randomness r_{ev_i} committed via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$, then, we have the following by applying the property of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$. The evaluation shares of the honest parties computed using $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$, jointly with the evaluation shares of the corrupted parties, are distributed statistically close to their values in Hyb_0 . On the other hand, that is if the evaluation shares computed by the corrupted parties do not correspond to the values it had committed earlier through $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$, then the execution would anyway have aborted, again by applying the security of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}$. Thus, the modification introduced in hybrid Hyb_1 introduces only statistical distance in the view generated by the simulator, thus proving the lemma.

Hyb₂: This hybrid is the same as Hyb_1 , except for the way public key and the secret-key shares are computed. Before we proceed, recall that this is performed in the same way as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ in Hyb_1 . Now in the current hybrid, the public key and the secret-key shares are computed as follows. Firstly, run $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ ⁴. Then sample $\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ of appropriate length. Then, the hybrid commits to these secret-key shares, as in Hyb_1 , using Com to obtain c_1, \dots, c_n . The rest of the hybrid remains the same as Hyb_1 .

Lemma 3. $\text{Hyb}_1 \approx_s \text{Hyb}_2$.

⁴ Recall that $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ is part of the $\text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda)$ algorithm.

Proof. Recall that the adversary can corrupt at most $n-1$ parties. Hence, the values received by an adversary from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ in Hyb_1 are: $((\text{pk}, c_1, \dots, c_n), \{(\text{sk}_i, r_i)\}_{i \in C})$. Firstly, we observe that $(\text{pk}, \{(\text{sk}_i)\}_{i \in C})$ as output by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ are distributed identically to the output of the following process: $(\text{pk}, \cdot) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ and $\forall i \in C, \text{sk}_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ of appropriate length. Furthermore, we recall that Com is a statistically hiding commitment. Thus, clearly, the distribution of $((\text{pk}, c_1, \dots, c_n), \{(\text{sk}_i, r_i)\}_{i \in C})$ as output by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ is statistically close to the joint distribution of these values as generated by Hyb_2 . Hence, the lemma.

Hyb₃: This hybrid is the same as Hyb_2 , except that the simulator sets the rerandomizing key R as an encryption of 0, instead of setting it as an encryption of 1.

Lemma 4. $\text{Hyb}_2 \approx_c \text{Hyb}_3$.

Proof. Note that in an earlier hybrid, we have introduced the modification from crucially using the fact that R is an encryption of 1 (to be able to cheat in rerandomizing of the final ciphertext) to just running $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$ for which the actual value of the plaintext in R will not matter. Furthermore, we have also introduced the modification from obtaining the secret-key shares by simply sampling them uniformly at random, a process that does not need the secret key. Thus, in the current hybrid Hyb_3 , the simulator does not make use of the secret key anywhere in its execution. Thus, an algorithm that distinguishes hybrids Hyb_2 and Hyb_3 is directly reducible to an adversary against threshold IND-CPA security of the FHE scheme. Hence, the lemma.

Hyb₄: This hybrid is the same as Hyb_3 , except that the simulator is given the actual inputs of the honest parties and the simulator simply executes the protocol to compute the messages that the honest parties are supposed to send to the adversary.

Lemma 5. $\text{Hyb}_3 \equiv \text{Hyb}_4$.

Proof. Observe that in both the hybrids Hyb_3 and Hyb_4 , both the keys \tilde{K} and R are encryptions of 0. Hence, no matter what the input values of the parties are, the **Loaded** variables all contain 0. Hence, the views generated by the simulator in these two hybrids are identical.

Hyb₅: This hybrid is the same as Hyb_4 , except that the simulator now runs the algorithm KeyGen instead of KeyGen^* . In particular, the key \tilde{K} , which is an encryption of 0, is changed to K which is an encryption of 1. Furthermore, in computing the loaded variables X_i in the **Load** stage, the simulator honestly follows the protocol; namely, for every honest party P_i , it samples $r_{x_i} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}$ and computes $X_i \leftarrow \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, K}(x_i; r_{x_i})$, where x_i is the input of P_i . Also, when an honest party P_i gets corrupted, unlike Hyb_4 which patched the state of P_i in the computation of X_i by running the algorithm Equivocate , the simulator in this hybrid simply presents $r_{\text{state}_i} \leftarrow \text{Inv}_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}}(r_{x_i})$ as the state of P_i .

Lemma 6. $\text{Hyb}_4 \approx_c \text{Hyb}_5$.

Proof. The proof of this lemma immediately follows from Theorem 1 and more specifically, the *indistinguishability of equivocal keys* and the *indistinguishability of equivocation*.

In particular:

- In hybrid Hyb_4 , X_i is computed as: $X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(0; r_i^0)$ where $\tilde{K} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0; r^{\tilde{K}})$ and $R = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(1; r^R)$. Then for patching the state of P_i for input x_i , the simulator runs the algorithm $\text{Equivocate}((\text{pk}, \tilde{K}), (\text{sk}, r^{\tilde{K}}), X_i, r^0, x_i)$ to obtain r_i^{blind} and r_{state_i} . Furthermore, in the output phase, while loading the random coins used to rerandomize the final ciphertext, Y_i is computed as $Y_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(0; r_{n+i}^0)$. Then for patching the state of P_i for y_i , the simulator runs the algorithm $\text{Equivocate}((\text{pk}, \tilde{K}), (\text{sk}, r^{\tilde{K}}), Y_i, r_{n+i}^0, y_i)$ to obtain r_{n+i}^{blind} and the corresponding $r_{\text{state}_{n+1}}$.
- On the other hand, in hybrid Hyb_5 , X_i is computed as: $X_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, K}(x_i; r_{x_i})$ where $r_{x_i} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}$. Furthermore, here, the simulator uses the key K where $K = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(1; r^K)$, $r^K \leftarrow \mathcal{D}'_{\text{rand}}$ obtained running the algorithm KeyGen . Also, Y_i is computed as: $Y_i = \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, K}(y_i; r_{y_i})$ where $r_{y_i} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rand}}$.

Now to show indistinguishability between the two hybrids, we can immediately use the proof of Theorem 1 and the *indistinguishability of Equivocation*.

Next, to argue indistinguishability of \tilde{K} and K , where the former is an encryption of 0 and the latter is an encryption of 1 we again directly use Theorem 1 and the *indistinguishability of equivocal keys*. In detail, we need to be able to obtain a reduction to threshold IND-CPA security of the FHE scheme. Thus, we need to ensure that the reduction does not need the secret key in simulating either of the hybrids Hyb_4 and Hyb_5 . To see this, we recall the aspects of Hyb_4 due to which the secret key will not be needed by the reduction. Observe that in the hybrid Hyb_4 , R is an encryption of 0. Thus, the randomizer, computed by the parties by loading their shares of random coins using R as the base key, is an encryption of 0, just like in the protocol Π_{AMPC} . Furthermore, in both the hybrids Hyb_4 and Hyb_5 , the only way in which K is used is as a key for encryption. We also emphasize that the simulator does not use the secret key for FHE anywhere in its execution. Hence, given an adversary that distinguishes the hybrids Hyb_4 and Hyb_5 with some non-negligible property ϵ , we have an adversary that breaks threshold IND-CPA security of the FHE scheme with probability negligibly close to ϵ . Hence, the lemma.

Hyb₆: This hybrid is the same as Hyb_5 , except that, in computing the shares of the secret key at point $(\text{sk}1)$, the simulator now switches back from using $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}$ and uniformly sampling the secret-key shares to using $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}$ and additively secret-sharing the secret key like in $\mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}$.

Lemma 7. $\text{Hyb}_5 \equiv \text{Hyb}_6$.

Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of the hybrids Hyb_1 and Hyb_2 (Lemma 3), where the simulator switched the other way; i.e., from using $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}$ ⁵ and additively secret-sharing the secret key to using $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}$ and uniformly sampling the secret-key shares. On the same lines as in Lemma 3, we have Lemma 7.

⁵ Recall that now $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ is part of the $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ algorithm.

Hyb₇: This hybrid is the same as Hyb₆, except that, in decrypting the final rerandomized ciphertext at point (sk₂), the simulator at this hybrid switches back to decrypting as in Π_{DDEC} .

Lemma 8. $\text{Hyb}_6 \equiv \text{Hyb}_7$.

Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of the hybrids Hyb₀ and Hyb₁ (Lemma 2), where the simulator switched the other way; i.e., from using Π_{DDEC} to using $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$. Namely, the property of simulatable evaluation ensures that the evaluation shares for the honest parties generated using $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Eval}}$ are distributed statistically close to the evaluation shares generated using Π_{DDEC} , thus proving the lemma.

Observe that the view in the final hybrid Hyb₇ is identical to the real-world view. Hence, we have that $\text{Hyb}_7 \equiv \text{REAL}_{\Pi_{\text{AMPC}}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}}$. In summary, we have that,

$$\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_{\text{AMPC}}, \mathcal{S}_{\text{AMPC}}, \mathcal{Z}} \approx_c \text{REAL}_{\Pi_{\text{AMPC}}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{BROADCAST}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{COM-ZK}}}$$

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A Universally Composable Security

The universally composable (UC) security framework was introduced by Canetti [Can01]. The strength of this framework relies on the universally composable theorem, which states that if a protocol is secure in the UC model, then this protocol will preserve the same security even if composed with an arbitrary number of copies of itself or with other protocols. The UC framework gives us also a way to design our protocols in a modular way: we can design sub-protocols for simpler tasks and then combine them in more complex protocols, and still we can prove the security of the sub-protocols independently. In order to develop interesting protocols in the UC model we need some kind of setup assumptions, like a common reference string (CRS) available to the parties, or a key registration authority, that checks that the parties know their secret keys and the public keys are well-formed, or many other different assumptions.

Adversarial model. A *static* adversary \mathcal{A} chooses the set of corrupted parties before the protocol starts, as opposed to an *adaptive* adversary that can corrupt the players during the protocol. We say that the adversary is *passive* or *semi-honest* if \mathcal{A} follows the protocol but tries to extract some information about the other parties’ inputs from his view of the protocol. We say that the adversary is *active* or *malicious* if \mathcal{A} is allowed to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specifications. We will say that a protocol is *passive-secure* if it is secure against a passive adversary and *active-secure* (or *malicious secure*) if it is secure against an active adversary. In the UC model the adversary, as well as all the other parties involved, are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) interactive Turing machine (ITM). In this paper we consider *active-security* against an *adaptive* adversary.

The real world. We model a real world execution of a cryptographic protocol in the UC model by defining a PPT ITM \mathcal{Z} called the environment, that gives inputs and gets outputs from the parties P_1, \dots, P_n running the protocol. Moreover, \mathcal{Z} communicates with \mathcal{A} giving instructions on how to attack the protocol. The parties and the adversary usually also have access to some ideal functionality \mathcal{H} .

The ideal world. We define also an ideal world, where the parties P_1, \dots, P_n interact with an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} , that captures the properties we expect from our protocol. Here the parties get their inputs from the environment \mathcal{Z} and simply forward them to \mathcal{F} , therefore they are usually referred as the dummy parties. There is also an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} , called the simulator, that communicates with the environment \mathcal{Z} and with the ideal functionality.

Indistinguishability. At the beginning of the protocol all parties, the environment and the adversary are given a security parameter λ . The environment is also given an auxiliary input z . At some point the environment stops and outputs a bit. We use $\text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{H}}(\lambda, r, z)$ to denote the output of \mathcal{Z} in the real world and $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{H}}(\lambda, r, z)$ in the ideal world where we take r to be uniformly random. This defines the Boolean distribution ensembles $\{\text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{H}}(\lambda, z)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}$ and $\{\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{H}}(\lambda, z)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}$

Definition 7. We say that π securely implements \mathcal{F} in the \mathcal{H} -hybrid model if \forall PPT \mathcal{A}, \exists PPT \mathcal{S} such that $\text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{H}}$ and $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}^{\mathcal{H}}$ are computationally indistinguishable in λ .

B Concrete Instantiation of our Equivocal QFHE Scheme

In this section we describe the concrete QFHE scheme, which is based on the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan (BV) [5]. The scheme is secure under the polynomial LWE (PLWE) assumption, which is a simplified version of the Ring-LWE assumption.

Definition 8 (PLWE Assumption). For all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, let $F(X) = F_\lambda(X) \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ be a polynomial of degree $N = N(\lambda)$, let $q = q(\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}$ be a prime integer, let $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle F(X) \rangle$ and $R_q = R/qR$, and let χ denote a distribution over the ring R . The polynomial LWE assumption $\text{PLWE}_{f,q,\chi}$ states that for any $l = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ it holds that

$$\{(a_i, a_i \cdot s + e_i)\}_{i \in [l]} \approx_c \{(a_i, u_i)\}_{i \in [l]}$$

where s is sampled from the distribution χ , and a_i, u_i are uniformly random in R_q . We require computational indistinguishability to hold given only l samples, for some $l = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Now we present the fully homomorphic encryption scheme QFHE and its threshold decryption procedure. Later we show that it indeed satisfies the properties listed in Definition 3. To begin with, the scheme is associated with the following parameters:

- A cyclotomic polynomial $F(X) := \Phi_m(X) = X^N + 1$ of degree $N := \phi(m)$, where $m = 2N$ and where the dimension N is a power of 2 and lower bounded by some function of the security parameter λ .
- The modulus q , which is a prime such that $q \equiv (\text{mod } 2N)$. Together, N, q and $F(X)$ define rings $R := \mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle F(X) \rangle$ and $R_q := R/qR = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/\langle F(X) \rangle$. Addition in these rings is done component-wise in their coefficients (thus, their additive group is isomorphic to \mathbb{Z}^N and \mathbb{Z}_q^N , respectively). Multiplication is simply a polynomial multiplication modulo $F(X)$ (and also modulo q , in the case of the ring R_q). The two operations in R will be denoted by $+$ and \cdot .

- The error parameter σ , which defines a discrete Gaussian error distribution $\chi = \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^N, \sigma}$ over the ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/\langle F(X) \rangle$ with standard deviation σ . We usually refer to $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^N, \sigma}$ as $\mathcal{D}_{rand}(\lambda)$ used by the encryption algorithm to select the random coins needed during the encryption.

The parameters λ, F, q and χ are public and we assume that given λ , there exist *PPT* algorithms that output F and q , and sample from the error distribution χ .

- A prime $p < q$, for some integer $p = p(\lambda)$ and rel. prime to q , which defines the message space M of the scheme as $R_p = \mathbb{Z}_p[X]/\langle F(X) \rangle$, i.e. the ring of integer polynomials modulo $F(X)$ and modulo p . Moreover, we encode messages from M to R_q . Namely, we encode our messages as elements in R_q with coefficients modulo p . More specifically, to transform a message $\mathbf{m} \in M$ into some $\mathbf{x} \in R_q$, we assume that there is an injective encoding function $\text{encode} : M \rightarrow R_q$ which takes elements in M to elements in a ring R_q which is equal \mathbb{Z}^N (as a \mathbb{Z} -module). We also assume a decoding function $\text{decode} : R_q \rightarrow M$ which takes an *arbitrary* element in \mathbb{Z}^N and returns an element in M . We require that the following conditions hold:
 1. $\forall m \in M : \text{decode}(\text{encode}(m)) = m$.
 2. $\forall x \in R_q : \text{decode}(x) = \text{decode}(x \bmod p)$.
 3. $\forall m \in M : \|\text{encode}(m)\|_\infty \leq \tau$ where $\tau = p/2$.
 4. $\forall m_1, m_2 \in M : \text{decode}(\text{encode}(m_1) + \text{encode}(m_2)) = m_1 + m_2$ and $\text{decode}(\text{encode}(m_1) \cdot \text{encode}(m_2)) = m_1 \cdot m_2$.
- A number $D > 0$, which defines a bound on the maximum number of multiplications that can be performed correctly using the scheme.

The above parameters depend on the security parameter λ in a way to guarantee correctness and security. Our *special* FHE scheme consists of a tuple $(\text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ of algorithms defined below, and parametrized by a security parameter λ .

KeyGen_{FHE}(1^λ): Sample ring elements $a \leftarrow R_q$ and $s, e \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{rand}(\lambda)$, s, e are rounded such that they can be seen as $s, e \in R_q$. Then compute $b \leftarrow ((a \cdot s) + (p \cdot e))$. The public and private keys are then set to be $\text{pk} \leftarrow (a, b)$ and $\text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbf{s}$ where $\mathbf{s} = (1, s, s^2, \dots, s^D) \in R_q^{D+1}$.

Enc_{pk}($x; r$): On input $x = \text{encode}(m)$ where $m \in M$, and $r \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{rand}(\lambda)$, we proceed as follows: The element r is parsed as $(u, v, w) \in R_q^3$. Then it computes $c_0 \leftarrow (b \cdot v) + (p \cdot w) + x$ and $c_1 \leftarrow (a \cdot v) + (p \cdot u)$ and returns the ciphertext $\mathbf{ct} = (c_0, c_1) \in R_q^2$. The algorithm only generates ciphertexts $\mathbf{ct} \in R_q^2$, but homomorphic operations might add more elements to the ciphertext. Thus the most generic form of a decryptable ciphertext in our scheme is $\mathbf{ct} = (c_0, \dots, c_d)$ for $d \leq D$.⁶ When applying this algorithm one would obtain $x = \text{encode}(m)$. This is what we mean when we write $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m, r)$, where $m \in M$.

Dec_{sk}(\mathbf{ct}): Given a secret key $\text{sk} = \mathbf{s}$ and a ciphertext $\mathbf{ct} = (c_0, \dots, c_D) \in R_q^{D+1}$, the decryption algorithm computes $\tilde{t} = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{ct} \rangle = \sum_{i=0}^D c_i s^i \bmod q \in R_q$. Then the decryptor simply reduces $t = \tilde{t} \bmod p$, which can then be decoded to m . Note that the condition for correct decryption is that $\|\tilde{t}\|_\infty$ is smaller than $q/2$.

Eval_{pk}($\text{ckt}, \mathbf{ct}, \mathbf{ct}'$): To compute an arbitrary function homomorphically, we construct an arithmetic circuit ckt (made of addition and multiplication operations over \mathbb{Z}_t), and then use Add and Multiply to iteratively evaluate ckt on encrypted inputs. To this end, we show how to homomorphically add and multiply two elements in \mathbb{Z}_t .

- **Add_{pk}($\mathbf{ct}, \mathbf{ct}'$):** Let $\mathbf{ct} = (c_0, \dots, c_\delta)$ and $\mathbf{ct}' = (c'_0, \dots, c'_\gamma)$ be the two ciphertexts (If $\gamma \neq \delta$, we pad the shorter ciphertext with zeroes). Then compute and output $\mathbf{ct}_{\text{Add}} = (c_0 + c'_0, \dots, c_{\max(\gamma, \delta)} + c'_{\max(\gamma, \delta)}) \in R_q^{\max(\gamma, \delta) + 1}$

⁶ Padding with zeros does not effect the ciphertext. More specifically, $(c_0, \dots, c_d) \equiv (c_0, \dots, c_d, 0, \dots, 0)$.

- Multiply_{pk}(ct, ct'): Let $\mathbf{ct} = (c_0, \dots, c_\delta)$ and $\mathbf{ct}' = (c'_0, \dots, c'_\gamma)$ be the two ciphertexts. Here, we do not pad either of the ciphertexts with zeroes. Let h be a symbolic variable and consider the expression $(\sum_{i=1}^{\delta} c_i h^i) \cdot (\sum_{i=1}^{\gamma} c'_i h^i)$ over R_q . We can (symbolically, treating h as an unknown variable) open the parentheses to compute $\hat{c}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_{\delta+\gamma}$ such that $(\sum_{i=1}^{\delta} c_i h^i) \cdot (\sum_{i=1}^{\gamma} c'_i h^i) = (\sum_{i=1}^{\delta+\gamma} \hat{c}_i h^i)$. Therefore, output $\mathbf{ct}_{Mult} = (\hat{c}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_{\delta+\gamma})$.

In order to achieve full homomorphism one can use Gentry’s “bootstrapping” and “squashing”. Another way, as an alternative to squashing, is the “re-linearization” technique. See [5, 4] for more details.

Distributed Decryption: We now extend the scheme above to enable distributed decryption. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{KEY-DIST}}$ generates a key pair and secret-shares the secret key among the players using an additive secret-sharing scheme. Hence, each party P_i will receive a share $\mathbf{sk}_i = s_i$, chosen uniformly such that $s = s_1 + \dots + s_n$. More specifically, the decryption protocol is described in Figure 7.




Fig. 7. The threshold decryption protocol.

Equivocal FHE: Given the above *special* FHE scheme, we can define our QFHE = (KeyGen, KeyGen*, QEnc, Eval, Dec, Equivocate) scheme where the algorithms (KeyGen, KeyGen*, QEnc, Equivocate) are as described in Figure 1. Note that *indistinguishability of equivocation* and *indistinguishability of equivocal keys* are shown in Theorem 1.

E-Hiding: We should point out that the scheme of [5] enjoys formula privacy. The idea is that adding to a given ciphertext an encryption of zero with an error super-polynomially larger than the error used in usual ciphertexts results in a ciphertext that still decrypts to the same result but statistically hides which ciphertext was initially given. Such a property is typically used to blind a ciphertext after a computation so that the final ciphertext only provides information about the result of the computation and not about how this result is obtained. Hence, it is easy to show that the *E-Hiding* property defined in Definition 3 can be argued as formula privacy for the above scheme.

Next, the only thing we need to argue is privacy and correctness of the distributed decryption protocol. In particular, we need to guarantee correct and private distributed decryption computing the bound B_{dec} as a function of all the other parameters. In order to make a choice for B_{dec} one can follow the line of analysis in [13], however, in our case a simpler analysis can be followed since we do not need the SIMD approach, used by [13], to handle many values in parallel in a single ciphertext.

Invertible Sampling: It is known how to do invertible sampling for Gaussian distributions suitable for our case using rejection sampling over the effective support of the distribution [20, 21].

Homomorphism over random coins. Next we prove the property of *homomorphism over random coins* property defined in definition 4.

Lemma 9. (Homomorphism over random coins). $\forall (x_0, x_1, x_2) \in R_q^3, \forall (r_1, r_2) \in \mathcal{D}_{rand}^2$ and $\forall \text{pk} = (a, b) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\text{FHE}}(1^\lambda)$ it holds that:

$$(x_0 \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_1; r_1)) \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_2; r_2) = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_0 \cdot x_1 + x_2; x_0 \cdot r_1 + r_2)$$

Proof. By definition $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_i; r_i) = (c_{0,i}, c_{1,i}) = (b \cdot v_i + p \cdot w_i + x_i, a \cdot v_i + p \cdot u_i)$ for $i = 0, 1$ where r_i is parsed as $(u_i, v_i, w_i) \in R_q^3$.

$$\begin{aligned} & (x_0 \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_1; r_1)) \boxplus \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_2; r_2) \\ &= (x_0 \boxplus (b \cdot v_1 + p \cdot w_1 + x_1, a \cdot v_1 + p \cdot u_1)) \boxplus (b \cdot v_2 + p \cdot w_2 + x_2, a \cdot v_2 + p \cdot u_2) \\ &= (x_0 \cdot b \cdot v_1 + x_0 \cdot p \cdot w_1 + x_0 \cdot x_1, x_0 \cdot a \cdot v_1 + x_0 \cdot p \cdot u_1) \boxplus (b \cdot v_2 + p \cdot w_2 + x_2, a \cdot v_2 + p \cdot u_2) \\ &= (b \cdot (x_0 \cdot v_1 + v_2) + p \cdot (x_0 \cdot w_1 + w_2) + x_0 \cdot x_1 + x_2, a \cdot (x_0 \cdot v_1 + v_2) + p \cdot (x_0 \cdot u_1 + u_2)) \\ &= \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x_0 \cdot x_1 + x_2; x_0 \cdot r_1 + r_2). \end{aligned}$$

C Security Proof of the UC Adaptive Commitments from LWE

Proposition 2. *Assuming the hardness of LWE, Protocol Π_{COM} UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an active, adaptive adversary that interacts with parties running the protocol Π_{COM} in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model. We construct a simulator \mathcal{S} (the ideal world adversary) with access to the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$, which simulates a real execution of Π_{COM} with \mathcal{A} such that no environment \mathcal{Z} can distinguish the ideal world experiment with \mathcal{S} and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ from a real execution of Π with \mathcal{A} .

\mathcal{S} interacts with the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ and with the environment \mathcal{Z} . The ideal adversary \mathcal{S} starts by invoking a copy of \mathcal{A} and running a simulated interaction of \mathcal{A} with the environment \mathcal{Z} and the parties running the protocol. We refer to the interaction of \mathcal{S} in the ideal process as external interaction. The interaction of \mathcal{S} with the simulated \mathcal{A} is called *internal interaction*. The committing party is denoted by P_i and the receiver party P_j . Moreover, let *sid* be the session identifier and *ssid* the sub-session identifier.

Our simulator \mathcal{S} proceeds as follows:

Simulating CRS: The common reference string is chosen by \mathcal{S} in the following manner (recall that \mathcal{S} chooses the CRS for the simulated \mathcal{A} as we are in the \mathcal{F}_{CRS} -hybrid model):

1. \mathcal{S} runs the setup algorithm $\text{KeyGen}^*(1^\lambda)$ of the equivocal QFHE encryption scheme obtaining a public key $\widetilde{\text{PK}} = (\text{pk}, \widetilde{K})$ and secret key $\widetilde{\text{SK}} = (\text{sk}, r^{\widetilde{K}})$.
2. \mathcal{S} runs the setup algorithm for the CCA2-secure encryption scheme E_{CCA} , obtaining a public key pk_{cca} and a secret key sk_{cca} .

\mathcal{S} sets the CRS to be $(\widetilde{K}, \text{pk}, \text{pk}_{\text{cca}})$ and locally stores $(r^{\widetilde{K}}, \text{sk}, \text{sk}_{\text{cca}})$.

Simulating the communication with \mathcal{Z} : Every input value that \mathcal{S} receives from \mathcal{Z} is written on \mathcal{A} 's input tape. Similarly, every output value written by \mathcal{A} on its own output tape is directly copied to the output tape of \mathcal{S} .

Simulating Commit commands where the committer P_i is uncorrupted : The honest committer P_i on input $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, b)$ from the environment, writes this message on its outgoing tape for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$. Then \mathcal{S} simulates P_i writing the Commit message of Protocol Π_{COM} on its outgoing tape for P_j . In particular, \mathcal{S} knowing $\widetilde{\text{SK}}$ computes $z \leftarrow \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \widetilde{K}}(0)$ along with two strings r_0 and r_1 (running the algorithm *Equivocate*) such that r_b constitutes a decommitment of z to b . Next, \mathcal{S} computes $C_0 \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{\text{CCA}}(P_i, P_j, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, r_0)$ using random coins s_0 , and $C_1 \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{\text{CCA}}(P_i, P_j, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, r_1)$ using random coins s_1 . Then, \mathcal{S} stores (c, r_0, s_0, r_1, s_1) and simulates P_i writing $c = (\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, z, C_0, C_1)$ on its outgoing tape for P_j . When \mathcal{A} delivers c from P_i to P_j in the internal simulation, then \mathcal{S} delivers the message from the ideal process P_i 's outgoing tape to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$. Furthermore, \mathcal{S} also delivers the $(\text{Reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, b)$ message from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ to P_j . If \mathcal{A} passively corrupts P_i , then \mathcal{S} carries out the simulation as described here. If \mathcal{A} corrupts P_i before delivering c and then changes c before delivering it, then \mathcal{S} proceeds by following the instructions for a corrupted committer.

Simulating Reveal commands where the committer P_i is uncorrupted : The honest committer P_i on input $(\text{Reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ from the environment, writes this message on its outgoing tape for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$. \mathcal{S} then delivers this message to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ and gets the message $(\text{Reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, b)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$. Then \mathcal{S} given the value b , generates a simulated decommitment message $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, r_b, s_b, b)$, where r_b and s_b are as generated above. \mathcal{S} then internally simulates for \mathcal{A} the event where P_i writes this message on its outgoing tape for P_j . When \mathcal{A} delivers this message from P_i to P_j in the internal interaction, then \mathcal{S} delivers the $(\text{Reveal}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, b)$ message from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ to P_j .

Simulating corruption of parties : When a command 'corrupt P_i ' is issued, \mathcal{S} first corrupts P_i and obtains the values of all its unopened commitments and prepares the internal state of P_i to be consistent with these commitment values in the same way as shown above.

Simulating Commit commands where the committer P_i is corrupted : When a corrupted party P_i sends a commitment message $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, z, C_0, C_1)$ to an uncorrupted party P_j in the simulated interaction, then \mathcal{S} checks if the commitment with identifiers $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ was sent before. If this is the case then \mathcal{S} ignores the message. Otherwise, \mathcal{S} must extract the commitment bit committed to by \mathcal{A} . To this end, \mathcal{S} decrypts C_0 and C_1 and acts as follows depending on the decrypted values:

- If C_b for some $b \in \{0, 1\}$ decrypts to $(P_i, P_j, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, r)$ such that r is the decommitment information for z as a commitment to b , and C_{1-b} does not decrypt to a decommitment of $1 - b$, then \mathcal{S} stores the value b and sends $(\text{Commit}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P_i, P_j, b)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$, and sends $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$'s Receipt message to P_j .

- If neither of C_0 and C_1 decrypt to $(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r)$ such that r is the decommitment information for z , then \mathcal{S} does not store the value b since it will never be opened correctly, sends $(\text{Commit}, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, 0)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ and sends $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$'s Receipt message to P_j .
- If C_0 decrypts to $(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r_0)$ and C_1 decrypts to $(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r_1)$, where r_0 and r_1 are the decommitment information for z for the values 0 and 1, respectively and the identifiers in the decryption information are the same then \mathcal{S} outputs a special *failure* symbol.

Simulating Reveal commands where the committer is corrupted : When a corrupted party P_i sends a Reveal message $(sid, ssid, r, s, b)$ to an uncorrupted party P_j in the simulated interaction, then \mathcal{S} checks if $(sid, ssid, P_i, z, C_0, C_1)$ is stored and that r and s are the decommitment information to b . If this is the case, then \mathcal{S} sends $(\text{Reveal}, sid, ssid, P_i, P_j)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ and the Reveal message from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ to P_j . Otherwise, \mathcal{S} ignores the message.

Via a sequence of hybrids, we will prove that no environment can distinguish an interaction of Π_{COM} with \mathcal{A} from an interaction in the ideal world with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ and \mathcal{S} (as defined above). The sequence of hybrids follows the lines of [8] proof since in place of their trapdoor commitment scheme we use our equivocal scheme Π_{COM} and we also send along with the commitment ciphertexts C_0 and C_1 containing the decommitment information. For more details we refer the reader to [8].

Hyb₀: This hybrid is identical to the real world.

Hyb₁: This hybrid is similar to the real world except that we consider partially fake commitments. In particular, the secret key is not revealed upon corruption and in honest party commitments, a commitment to b is generated as in the simulator by computing $z \leftarrow \text{QEnc}_{\text{pk}, \tilde{K}}(0)$ and strings r_0, r_1 such that r_0 and r_1 are correct decommitments to 0 and 1, respectively. Then, C_b is computed as an encryption to $C_b \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{\text{CCA}}(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r_b)$. On the other hand, C_{1-b} is still chosen as a uniformly distributed string where this modification is not revealed upon corruption.

Hyb₂: This hybrid is similar to Hyb₁ except that in commitments generated by honest parties, the ciphertext C_{1-b} equals $C_{1-b} \leftarrow \text{ENC}_{\text{CCA}}(P_i, P_j, sid, ssid, r_{1-b})$ as generated by the simulator, rather than being chosen uniformly. So in this hybrid we consider completely fake commitments

Hyb₃: This hybrid is identical to the ideal world.

The indistinguishability between Hyb₀ and Hyb₁ follows immediately from the pseudorandomness/ CPA-security of the underlying commitment scheme.

The indistinguishability between Hyb₁ and Hyb₂ follows from the pseudorandomness of encryptions under E_{CCA} .

Next, the only difference between hybrids Hyb₂ and Hyb₃ is that in Hyb₂ the checks causing the simulator to output failure are not carried out. If the simulator never outputs failure then the two hybrids are identical. However considering the failure, the proof is carried out based on the CCA2 security of the E_{CCA} and assuming that the simulator is given the true values of the inputs for all honest parties.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$ runs with parties P_1, \dots, P_n and an adversary \mathcal{S} . It proceeds as follows:

Commit Phase:

Upon receiving a message (Commit, $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, b$) from P_i , where $b \in \{0, 1\}$, record the tuple $(ssid, P_i, P_j, b)$ and send the message (Receipt, $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j$) to P_j and S . Ignore any future commit messages with the same $ssid$ from P_i to P_j .

Prove Phase:

Upon receiving a message (Reveal, $sid, ssid$) from P_i : If a tuple $(ssid, P_i, P_j, b)$ was previously recorded, then send the message (Reveal, $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j, b$) to P_j and S . Otherwise, ignore.

Fig. 8. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MCOM}}$.