

Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscation and Its Applications

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Abstract

Differing inputs obfuscation (diO) is a strengthening of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) that has recently found applications to improving the efficiency and generality of obfuscation, functional encryption, and related primitives. Roughly speaking, a diO scheme ensures that the obfuscations of two efficiently generated programs are indistinguishable not only if the two programs are equivalent, but also if it is hard to find an input on which their outputs differ. The above “indistinguishability” and “hardness” conditions should hold even in the presence of an auxiliary input that is generated together with the programs.

The recent works of Boyle and Pass (ePrint 2013) and Garg et al. (Crypto 2014) cast serious doubt on the plausibility of general-purpose diO with respect to general auxiliary inputs. This leaves open the existence of a variant of diO that is plausible, simple, and useful for applications.

We suggest such a diO variant that we call *public-coin* diO. A public-coin diO restricts the original definition of diO by requiring the auxiliary input to be a public random string which is given as input to all relevant algorithms. In contrast to standard diO, we argue that it remains very plausible that current candidate constructions of iO for circuits satisfy the public-coin diO requirement.

We demonstrate the usefulness of the new notion by showing that several applications of diO can be obtained by relying on the public-coin variant instead. These include constructions of *succinct* obfuscation and functional encryption schemes for Turing Machines, where the size of the obfuscated code or keys is essentially independent of the running time and space.

1 Introduction

General-purpose obfuscation refers to the concept of transforming an arbitrary program so that its functionality is preserved, but otherwise rendering the program “unintelligible.” This concept has intrigued cryptographers for decades, and led to multiple attempts at formalization (most notably [BGI⁺12]). A critical goal in obfuscation research has been to identify the strongest notions of obfuscation that are *plausible* and have wide applicability. General-purpose obfuscation, however, has proven to be perched precariously between possibility and impossibility.

On the one extreme, *virtual black-box obfuscation* (VBB) is an ideal form of obfuscation that captures the intuitive notion of obfuscation and often can be directly used in applications. Unfortunately, this notion is impossible in the sense that it provably cannot be realized for certain contrived classes of programs [BGI⁺12], or for quite large classes of programs under contrived auxiliary inputs [GK05].

On the other extreme, the most liberal notion of general-purpose obfuscation is *indistinguishability obfuscation* (iO) [BGI⁺12, GR07]. An iO scheme for a class of “programs” is an efficient randomized algorithm that maps any program P into a functionally equivalent obfuscated program P' such that if P_1 and P_2 compute the same function then their obfuscations P'_1 and P'_2 are computationally indistinguishable.

The first plausible construction of a general-purpose iO scheme was given in 2013 by Garg et al. [GGH⁺13b]. This construction and similar ones from [BR14, BGK⁺14] render the existence of an iO scheme a *plausible assumption*, since there are currently no attacks or other evidence suggesting that these constructions fail to meet the iO requirements. In particular, no theoretical impossibility results are known for iO schemes even for contrived classes of programs and auxiliary inputs.

On the downside, the security guarantee of iO appears to be too weak for most natural applications of obfuscation. A recent line of work, originating from [GGH⁺13b, SW14], has made impressive progress on applying iO towards a wide array of cryptographic applications. However, these applications are still not as broad as one might expect, and the corresponding constructions and their analysis are significantly more complex than those that could be obtained from an ideal obfuscation primitive. Indeed, this may be the case because the definition of iO seems to capture only a quite minimal property of obfuscation.

In search of the “strongest plausible assumption.” The above limitations of iO motivate the search for stronger notions of obfuscation that support more applications and give rise to simpler constructions and security proofs. Such a stronger notion should be *plausible*, in the sense that current candidate obfuscation constructions can be conjectured to satisfy the stronger requirements without contradicting other theoretical or empirical evidence. Another important feature is *succinct description*, ruling out contrived notions whose security requirements refer separately to each application. This leads to the following question, which is at the center of our work:

Is there a plausible, useful, and succinctly described notion of obfuscation that captures stronger security requirements than indistinguishability obfuscation?

Differing inputs obfuscation. A seemingly promising positive answer to our question was given by the notion of *differing inputs obfuscation* (diO). First proposed in [BGI⁺12] and recently revisited in [ABG⁺13, BCP14], diO has found a diverse array of applications that do not seem to follow from traditional iO (see below for more details). Roughly speaking, a diO scheme ensures that the obfuscations of two efficiently generated programs P_1 and P_2 are indistinguishable not only if they compute the same function, but also if it is hard for an adversary to find an input x on which the two programs differ, namely x such that $P_1(x) \neq P_2(x)$. The above “indistinguishability” and “hardness” conditions should hold even in the presence of an auxiliary input aux that is generated together with

the programs and is given as input both to the adversary trying to find an input x as above and to the distinguisher who tries to distinguish between the two obfuscated programs. Indeed, different applications give rise to different distributions of aux .

However, the recent works of [BP13, GGHW14] cast serious doubts on the plausibility of general-purpose diO with respect to general auxiliary inputs. In particular, [GGHW14] showed that the existence of diO with respect to arbitrary auxiliary inputs contradicts a certain “special-purpose obfuscation” conjecture. At a high level, the impossibility result of [GGHW14] proceeds as follows: Consider a pair of programs P_1 and P_2 that produce different one-bit outputs only on inputs $x = (m, \sigma)$ that consist of valid message-signature pairs with respect to a fixed unforgeable signature scheme verification key. Now we consider another program D which takes a program P as input, and then hashes P to compute $m = h(P)$ together with a signature σ on m . It then feeds $x = (m, \sigma)$ as input to P , and outputs the first bit of $P(x)$. Now, the auxiliary input given to the adversary will be a “special-purpose obfuscation” of this program D . The special-purpose obfuscation conjecture of [GGHW14] is that even given this auxiliary input, it is still hard for the adversary to obtain any valid message-signature pair. This assumption seems quite plausible, for instance if D is obfuscated using the obfuscators of [GGH⁺13b, BR14, BGK⁺14]. Now, it is evident that the adversary can distinguish between any obfuscations of P_1 and P_2 using the auxiliary input, and yet by the special-purpose assumption, the adversary cannot compute any valid message-signature pair, and therefore cannot find a differing input.

What causes impossibility for diO? If we would like to consider general notions of obfuscation that capture security requirements beyond indistinguishability obfuscation, it is imperative that we understand the roots of impossibility for diO. Indeed, it is not difficult to evade the impossibility results of [BP13, GGHW14] by simply assuming that diO only holds with respect to *specific* auxiliary input distributions, as has been suggested in [ABG⁺13, BCP14, BP13]. However, this approach would yield disparate special-purpose variants of the diO assumption for each potential application scenario, with little clarity on why any particular such assumption should be valid. This would defeat our goal of obtaining a general and *succinctly described* assumption. Therefore, we seek to understand the essential flaw that the works of [BP13, GGHW14], and others like it, can exploit using auxiliary inputs.

Our starting point is the suggestion, made in several previous works [BCP14, BP13, BCCT13, BCP14], to specifically consider an auxiliary input that is *uniformly random*, since at least some applications of diO and other suspect primitives seem to work with just uniformly random auxiliary inputs. This certainly seems a great deal safer, and does avoid the specific impossibility results known. However, our starting observation is that even a uniformly random auxiliary input could potentially be problematic in that the auxiliary input could be chosen so that it is the output of a one-way permutation – thus there would still be a secret about the auxiliary input that is hidden from the adversary. Although we don’t currently see a way to exploit this to obtain an impossibility result, could this eventually lead to trouble?

Indeed, in the negative results of [BP13, GGHW14], and indeed in other impossibility results using auxiliary inputs (e.g. [GK05]), it is critical that the auxiliary input can contain *trapdoor information*. In other words, secrets can be used to choose the auxiliary input, and these secrets are not themselves revealed to the adversary. (In the case of [GGHW14], this trapdoor information includes the secret signing key of the signature scheme, and the randomness used to obtain the obfuscation of the program D .) Our objective, then, is to formulate a notion of diO that avoids this possibility altogether.

Public-coin differing inputs obfuscation. Building upon the observations above, we introduce the notion of *public-coin* diO. A public-coin diO restricts the original definition of diO by requiring

the auxiliary input aux to be the *actual random coins* that were given to the program that sampled P_1 and P_2 . Thus, in public-coin diO, the auxiliary input is not chosen by a sampling algorithm, but rather the auxiliary input is simply a set of public coins that are made available to all algorithms. In particular, this means that it must be hard to find an input x such that $P_1(x) \neq P_2(x)$ even given all information about how P_1 and P_2 were generated. This rules out the possibility of planting a trapdoor in the auxiliary input, an option that was critical for proving the negative evidence against diO [BP13, GGHW14].

Indeed, we know of no evidence of impossibility for public-coin diO. The public coin restriction appears to cut a wide path around the impossibility result of [GGHW14]. Intuitively, public-coin diO requires that even “nature” – which is computationally bounded but all-seeing – cannot find any inputs on which the two programs P_1 and P_2 will differ. This is important because not only [BP13, GGHW14], but also all previous impossibility results on VBB obfuscation (e.g [BGI⁺12, GK05]) used the input/output behavior of the program to plant hidden inputs on which the output of the program is too revealing. But in public-coin diO, the existence of such planted inputs would automatically rule out any security guarantee from diO, since given knowledge of these planted inputs it is easy to find a differing input. Thus, intuitively speaking, this suggests that an impossibility result for public-coin diO would need to find actual weaknesses in the obfuscation mechanism itself – some way to distinguish obfuscations that does not use the input/output behavior of the underlying programs in any way. Existing security proofs in generic¹ models [BR14, BGK⁺14] offer strong evidence that such an impossibility result is unlikely to exist.

We also view our public coin restriction as being a natural limitation to place on diO. Indeed, while our notion is novel in the context of obfuscation, it is reminiscent of (but also quite different from) other scenarios in cryptography where the public-coin restriction was introduced in order to prevent the existence of trapdoor information. For example, in the context of trapdoor permutations, it was observed that allowing the input sampler to use general auxiliary information can lead to problematic constructions technically satisfying the definition of a trapdoor permutation but rendering applications of trapdoor permutations insecure [GR13]. To prevent this, the notion of enhanced trapdoor permutations limits the input samplers to be given only public coins as input. Separately, in the context of collision-resistant hash functions, the distinction between secret-coin and public-coin collision-resistant hash families was studied in [HR04], where it was noted that some applications of collision-resistant hashing require public coins, since secret coins may enable the party picking the key to know impermissible trapdoor information. While these other public-coin primitives are quite different in nature from ours, we view our notion of public-coin diO to be as natural a variant as enhanced trapdoor permutations or public-coin collision resistant hash functions.

On non-uniformity. Often, because auxiliary input can also capture non-uniformity, the issues of auxiliary input and non-uniformity are treated jointly in definitions. However, since we are introducing nontrivial constraints on auxiliary inputs, we deal with non-uniformity separately. We formulate our definitions to separate out the contributions of auxiliary input (which is a public coin input to the potentially non-uniform sampler), and non-uniform advice. Specifically, we take care to ensure that no secrets can be embedded in the non-uniform advice provided to the sampler, by allowing the non-uniform advice given to the differing-input finding algorithm to depend arbitrarily on the non-uniform advice given to the sampler. Thus, in particular, the non-uniform advice given to the differing-input finding algorithm can contain all secrets present in the non-uniform advice given to the sampler.

¹The idealized adversary model considered in [BR14, BGK⁺14] is a generic model for multilinear maps [GGH13a, CLT13].

Applications of public-coin diO. While the public-coin limitation allows us to give a general definition that avoids all known techniques for proving impossibility, one may wonder whether this limitation also rules out known applications of diO. Indeed, at first glance, the situation may seem quite problematic, since an auxiliary input is typically used to capture the partial progress of a security reduction, which will almost always contain various secrets that must be kept from the adversary. Indeed, existing security proofs for applications of diO [ABG⁺13, BCP14] proceed along these lines, and therefore do not carry over for public-coin diO.

In order to make use of public-coin diO, we need to ensure that a stronger property is true in the application scenario and throughout the hybrids in the security proof where the diO property is being used: We need to ensure that whenever the diO property is used, the two programs P_1 and P_2 being considered have the property that it is infeasible to find a differing input between P_1 and P_2 even given all the randomness used in the entire description of the hybrid experiment (except for the random coins of the obfuscation itself). This is sufficient: When using the diO property across two hybrids, we need that the obfuscations are indistinguishable to an all-knowing adversary that is privy to all randomness in these hybrids (except for the random coins of the obfuscation itself). But if the obfuscations are indistinguishable to an all-knowing adversary, then they are also indistinguishable to a more ignorant adversary. Thus, even if some secrets need to be hidden from the adversary in other hybrid experiments, the proof of security can go through.

Despite the flexibility of the above approach, there are still applications of diO in the literature where we do not know how to use public-coin diO in a similar way, because of the nature of the programs being obfuscated. For example, in [BCP14], diO is used to obtain full security for functional encryption by obfuscating programs that deal explicitly with signatures, where a secret verification key of a signature scheme is hidden within obfuscated programs, and given the signing key it is possible to discover differing inputs. Since trapdoors are crucial in this approach, we do not know how to apply public-coin diO. The fact that public-coin diO does not generically replace diO for all applications illustrates the nontrivial nature of our restriction.

Nevertheless, we can use public-coin diO to obtain several interesting applications, as we now detail. Separate from the applications below, building on our work, public-coin diO has been used to replace the need for diO to achieve constant-round concurrent zero knowledge based on obfuscation [PPS13].

Obfuscating Turing Machines / RAMs with unbounded inputs. Generally, obfuscation has been studied in the context of circuits [BGI⁺12, GGH⁺13b]. Of course, given a bound on both (1) the input length and (2) the running time, any Turing Machine or RAM program can be converted to an equivalent circuit. However, if either or both of these variables can be unbounded, then obfuscating Turing Machines presents new feasibility questions beyond obfuscating circuits. Using indistinguishability obfuscation alone, there has recently been exciting progress towards obfuscating Turing Machines: The recent work of Koppula, Lewko, and Waters [KLW14] presents a novel construction of indistinguishability obfuscation for Turing Machines with *bounded input length*, based only on iO for circuits and standard assumptions. In other words, the size of the obfuscated TM in the [KLW14] construction is polynomial in the maximum *input length* to be accepted by the obfuscated TM, the description-size of the TM M to be obfuscated, and the security parameter. (Note that, in particular, it is independent of the maximum space of the computation. This is a strict improvement over recent prior works of [LP14, CHJV14, BGT14].) While this is a remarkable result, the dependence upon the maximum input length is still a drawback of this work – a drawback that our work does not encounter. In applications of iO for TMs such as non-black-box simulation [PPS13], it is crucial that there is no a-priori polynomial upper bound on the input length of the obfuscated TM. Furthermore, we note that our construction is significantly simpler than the iO-based construction of [KLW14], which we also see as a primary motivation for the study of our notion.

In [BCP14, ABG⁺13], diO for circuits, together with SNARKs [BCCT12, BCCT13, BCC⁺14], was

shown to imply diO for Turing Machines with *unbounded* inputs, running time, and space complexity (we will refer to this setting as the setting of *general* Turing Machines). However, given the evidence of impossibility for diO, prior to our work, there was no method known to bootstrap from obfuscation for circuits to obfuscation for general Turing Machines based on a plausible and general obfuscation definition. We show that the construction and proofs of [BCP14, ABG⁺13] can be adapted to the setting of public-coin diO: Specifically, we show that public-coin diO for NC^1 , together with fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in NC^1 , and public-coin SNARKs, imply diO for general Turing Machines. We note that our formulation of public-coin SNARK also avoids all known impossibility results for SNARKs and other extractability assumptions [BCPR14].

Functional Encryption for Turing Machines / RAMs with unbounded inputs. We next tackle the problem of (selectively secure) functional encryption for Turing Machines or RAM programs with unbounded inputs. Here, we are able to show that public-coin diO for general Turing Machines together with standard cryptographic assumptions, implies selectively secure functional encryption for general Turing Machines. As mentioned above, the approach given in [BCP14] achieves full security for functional encryption, but does not adapt to the setting of public-coin diO. The starting point for our scheme is the functional encryption construction given by [ABG⁺13], however in the case of functional encryption, we must make several adjustments to both the construction and the proof of security in order to make use of public-coin diO, and avoid the need for security with respect to general auxiliary inputs.

REMARK. We note that functional encryption is strict strengthening of many cryptographic notions, such as garbling schemes. Thus, our results for functional encryption imply results for garbling schemes and other notions that are implied by functional encryption.

OTHER RELATED WORK. Another general and plausible notion of obfuscation that strengthens iO is *virtual gray box* (VGB) obfuscation [BC14, BCKP14]. While conceptually appealing, this notion does not seem as useful as diO for natural applications.

As briefly discussed above, current iO obfuscation candidates can be backed by security proofs in a generic multilinear model [BR14, BGK⁺14]. One can draw an analogy between the broad challenge addressed in the present work and earlier works on instantiating random oracles. Similarly to the practical use of the random oracle model [BR93], provable constructions in the generic multilinear model can give rise to heuristic real-world constructions by plugging in multilinear map candidates such as those from [GGH13a, CLT13]. This may be a reasonable heuristic leap of faith in the context of concrete natural applications. However, similarly to the negative results on instantiating random oracles [CGH04], this methodology is provably not sound in general. Thus, one is left with the challenge of formulating a *succinct* and *plausible* assumption that can be satisfied by an explicit random oracle instantiation and suffices for a wide array of applications. Despite some partial progress (e.g., [Can97, BHK13]), this challenge is still quite far from being fully met.

2 Our Definitions

Notation. We denote by \mathbb{N} the set of all natural numbers, and use $n \in \mathbb{N}$ to denote the security parameter. An efficient non-uniform algorithm A is denoted by a family of circuits $A = \{A_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and an associated polynomial s such the size of A_n is at most $s(n)$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

We denote by $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ a parameterized *collection* of circuits such that \mathcal{C}_n is the set of all circuits of size at most n . Likewise, we denote by $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ a parameterized collection of *Turing machines* (TM) such that \mathcal{M}_n is the set of all TMs of size at most n which halt within polynomial

number steps on all inputs. For $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, if M halts on input x , we denote by $\text{steps}(M, x)$ the number of steps M takes to output $M(x)$. Following [ABG⁺13], we adopt the convention that the output $M(x)$ includes the number of steps M takes on x , in addition to the “official” output. When clear from the context, we drop $n \in \mathbb{N}$ from the notation.

2.1 Circuits

We first define the notion of a public-coin differing-inputs sampler.

Definition 2.1 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Sampler for Circuits). An efficient non-uniform sampling algorithm $\text{Sam} = \{\text{Sam}_n\}$ is called a *public-coin differing-inputs sampler* for the parameterized collection of circuits $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}$ if the output of Sam_n is distributed over $\mathcal{C}_n \times \mathcal{C}_n$ and for every efficient non-uniform algorithm $A = \{A_n\}$ there exists a negligible function ε such that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\Pr_r [C_0(x) \neq C_1(x) : (C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), x \leftarrow A_n(r)] \leq \varepsilon(n). \quad \square$$

The definition insists that the sampler and the attacker circuits both receive the same random coins as input. Therefore, Sam cannot keep any “secret” from A . We now define the notion of public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator. The crucial change from existing diO definitions is that the distinguisher now gets the actual coins of the sampler as the auxiliary input.

Definition 2.2 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscator for Circuits). A uniform PPT algorithm \mathcal{O} is a *public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator* for the parameterized collection of circuits $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}$ if the following requirements hold:

- **Correctness:** $\forall n, \forall C \in \mathcal{C}_n, \forall x$ we have that $\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) : C' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, C)] = 1$.
- **Security:** for every public-coin differing-inputs samplers $\text{Sam} = \{\text{Sam}_n\}$ for the collection \mathcal{C} , every efficient non-uniform (distinguishing) algorithm $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_n\}$, there exists a negligible function ε s.t. for all n :

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}_n(r, C') = 1 : (C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), C' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, C_0)] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}_n(r, C') = 1 : (C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), C' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, C_1)] \right| \leq \varepsilon(n)$$

where the probability is *taken over r and the coins of \mathcal{O}* . □

2.2 Turing machines

We now present our definitions for the case of Turing machines.

Definition 2.3 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Sampler for TMs). An efficient non-uniform sampling algorithm $\text{Sam} = \{\text{Sam}_n\}$ is called a *public-coin differing-inputs sampler* for the parameterized collection of TMs $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n\}$ if the output of Sam_n is always a pair of Turing machines $(M_0, M_1) \in \mathcal{M}_n \times \mathcal{M}_n$ such that $|M_0| = |M_1|$ and for all efficient non-uniform (attacker) algorithms $A = \{A_n\}$ there exists a negligible function ε such that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\Pr_r \left[\begin{array}{l} M_0(x) \neq M_1(x) \quad \wedge \\ \text{steps}(M_0, x) = \text{steps}(M_1, x) = t \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} (M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), \\ (x, 1^t) \leftarrow A_n(r) \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon(n). \quad \square$$

Remark. By requiring A_n to output 1^t , we rule out all inputs x for which M_0, M_1 may take more than polynomial steps.

Definition 2.4 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscator for TMs). A uniform PPT algorithm \mathcal{O} is a *public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the parameterized collection of TMs* $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n\}$ if the following requirements hold:

- **Correctness:** $\forall n, \forall M \in \mathcal{M}_n, \forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ we have $\Pr[M'(x) = M(x) : M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M)] = 1$.
- **Security:** for every public-coin differing-inputs samplers $\text{Sam} = \{\text{Sam}_n\}$ for the collection \mathcal{M} , for every efficient non-uniform (distinguishing) algorithm $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_n\}$, there exists a negligible function ε s.t. for all n :

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}_n(r, M') = 1 : (M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M_0)] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}_n(r, M') = 1 : (M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M_1)] \right| \leq \varepsilon(n)$$

where the probability is *taken over r and the coins of \mathcal{O}* .

- **Succinctness and input-specific running time:** there exists a (global) polynomial s' such that for all n , for all $M \in \mathcal{M}_n$, for all $M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M)$, and for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $\text{steps}(M', x) \leq s'(n, \text{steps}(M, x))$. \square

Remark. The size of the obfuscated machine M' is always bounded by the running time of \mathcal{O} which is polynomial in n . More importantly, the size of M' is independent of the running time of M . This holds even if we consider TMs which always run in polynomial time. This is because the polynomial bounding the running time of \mathcal{O} is independent of the collection \mathcal{M} being obfuscated.

It is easy to obtain a uniform formulation from our current definitions.

3 Preliminaries

Succinct non-interactive arguments. The universal relation [BG02] is defined to be the set $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ of instance-witness pairs (y, w) such that y is of the form (M, x, t) , $|w| \leq t$, and M is a TM which accepts (x, w) within t steps where t is an arbitrary number in \mathbb{N} . For constant $c \in \mathbb{N}$, we define \mathcal{R}_c to the subset of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ consisting of those pairs $\{(y, w) = ((M, x, t), w)\}$ for which $t \leq |x|^c$. The language corresponding to a relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ will be denoted by $L_{\mathcal{R}}$.

We recall the definitions of *succinct non-interactive arguments* (SNARG) and *succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge* (SNARK) below. We require that these systems be *publicly verifiable* and work in the common *random* string model where any uniformly random string of sufficient length can act as the CRS. Our definition follows the standard formulations [BCCT12, BCP14].

Definition 3.1 (SNARG). A pair of algorithms (P, V) is a (publicly verifiable) SNARG for a relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ in the common *random* string model if there exist polynomials p, q, ℓ (independent of \mathcal{R}) such that the following conditions are satisfied:

- **Completeness:** $\forall (y, w) \in \mathcal{R}$, $\Pr[V(\text{crs}, y, \pi) = 1 : \text{crs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}, \pi \leftarrow P(\text{crs}, y, w)] = 1$, and for every crs , $P(\text{crs}, y, w)$ halts within $p(n, |y|, t)$ where $y = (M, x, t)$.
- **Succinctness:** for every $(\text{crs}, y, w) \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)} \times \mathcal{R}$ the size of $\pi \leftarrow P(\text{crs}, y, w)$ is bounded by $\ell(n, \log t)$ and the running time of $V(\text{crs}, y, \pi)$ is bounded by $q(n + |y|) = q(n + |M| + |x| + \log t)$.

- **Adaptive soundness:** for every polynomial-size prover $P^* = \{P_n^*\}$, there exists a negligible function ε such that for all n :

$$\Pr \left[V(\text{crs}, y, \pi) = 1 \wedge y \notin L_{\mathcal{R}} : \text{crs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}, (y, \pi) \leftarrow P_n^*(\text{crs}) \right] \leq \varepsilon(n). \quad \square$$

Observe that the soundness condition is not required to hold with respect to *common auxiliary input* of any kind. This notion suffices for the restricted cases where obfuscation size grows with the maximum supported input length (a.k.a. bounded-input case). To deal with inputs of unbounded polynomial length, we need the following stronger notion.

Definition 3.2 (SNARK). A pair of algorithms (P, V) is a (publicly verifiable) SNARK for the relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ in the common *random string* model if it satisfies the *completeness* and *succinctness* conditions of definition 3.1 (above) and the following argument-of-knowledge property:

- **Adaptive argument of knowledge:** for every polynomial-size prover $P^* = \{P_n^*\}$, there exists a polynomial-size extractor $\mathcal{E}_{P^*} = \{\mathcal{E}_n\}$ and a negligible function ε such that for all n :

$$\Pr \left[(V(\text{crs}, y, \pi) = 1) \wedge ((y, w) \notin \mathcal{R}) : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{crs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}, \quad z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}, \\ (y, \pi) \leftarrow P_n^*(\text{crs}, z), \quad (y, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_n(\text{crs}, z) \end{array} \right\} \right] \leq \varepsilon(n). \quad \square$$

Observe that in this definition a uniformly distributed auxiliary input z is allowed. As noted in [BCCT12], none of the existing implausibility results regarding the existence of SNARKs or extractable one-way/collision-resistant-hash functions apply to the case where auxiliary input a uniformly random string.

We remark that the above definition requires the extraction to succeed with probability almost 1. Our results do not require this strong form of extraction, and work with a weaker notion as well where extraction probability is only required to be negligibly close to the success probability of the cheating prover.

We shall also use full homomorphic encryption and non-interactive strong witness indistinguishable proofs, e.g., [FLS99]. We discuss them in appendix A.

4 Bootstrapping Obfuscation from NC^1 to Turing Machines

In this section, we show that given a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class NC^1 , we can construct a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the parameterized collection \mathcal{M}_n of all polynomial-time TMs. The construction is a slightly simplified version of [ABG⁺13] where we get rid of the hash functions. We shall prove the following theorem.

Theorem 4.1. *If there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for circuits in the class NC^1 , a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with decryption in NC^1 , and a publicly verifiable SNARK for $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ in the common random string model, there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class of all polynomial-time Turing machines accepting inputs of unbounded polynomial length.*

We first present the construction, and then prove the theorem. Let $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a parameterized collection of polynomial-time TMs that accepts inputs of unbounded polynomial length, i.e., there exists a constant $c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that every $M \in \mathcal{M}_n$ is of size n , takes inputs of length at most n^c , and halts within n^c steps. We adopt the convention that c is included in the description of M . Let $\text{FHE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval})$ be a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with decryption in NC^1 and $\Pi = (P, V)$ be a SNARK for the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{U}}$ defined earlier. The description of our obfuscator for \mathcal{M} , and its evaluation algorithm, are as follows.

Obfuscator $\mathcal{O}(1^n, M \in \mathcal{M}_n)$: By convention, description of M includes a constant c bounding the running time of M on all inputs by n^c . Let U_n be an *oblivious* universal TM which on input the description of a TM B , and a string x executes B on x for no more than n^c steps. The obfuscator proceeds in the following steps:

1. Generate two FHE public-keys $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_1)$ and $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_2)$.
2. Encrypt M under both FHE public-keys: $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M; v_1)$ and $g_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M; v_2)$. Here M is assumed to be encoded as a bit string of length n for use by the universal TM U_n .
3. Uniformly sample $\text{crs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}$ of sufficient length (for the SNARK Π).
4. Generate an obfuscation of the NC^1 -program $P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$ given in figure 1:

$$P' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}(1^n, P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}).$$

5. Output $M' = (P', \text{crs}, pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2)$.

Program $P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$:

- **Input:** a tuple (e_1, e_2, t, π, ϕ) , **Constants:** $\text{crs}, sk_1, g_1, g_2, pk_1, pk_2$.
- Check that $t \leq 2^n$ and ϕ is a valid low-depth proof for the **NP**-statement:

$$1 = V(\text{crs}, (\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, (e_1, e_2), t), \pi)$$
 where $\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}$ is defined as follows. Let M_{Eval} be the computation that takes x as input, has (pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2) hardcoded, and homomorphically evaluates $U_n(\cdot, x)$ on g_1 and g_2 to produce e_1 and e_2 respectively. I.e.,

$$e_1 = \text{Eval}_{pk_1}(U_n(\cdot, x), g_1) \text{ and } e_2 = \text{Eval}_{pk_2}(U_n(\cdot, x), g_2).$$
 $\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}$ takes as input an instance of the form (e_1, e_2) and a witness x ; it accepts if and only if $M_{\text{Eval}}(x)$ outputs (e_1, e_2) within 2^n steps.
- If the check fails, output \perp ; otherwise output $\text{Dec}_{sk_1}(e_1)$.

Program $P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$:

- Same as $P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$ except that if the check is successful, it outputs $\text{Dec}_{sk_2}(e_2)$.

Figure 1: The programs $P1$ and $P2$

Evaluation of M' : Evaluate $M' = (P', \text{crs}, pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2)$ on input x as follows:

1. Compute $(e_1, e_2) = M_{\text{Eval}}(x)$. This takes at most n^{2c} steps. See fig. 1 for M_{Eval} .
2. Compute a SNARK proof π using x as the witness and $t = n^{4c}$ as the time-bound:

$$\pi \leftarrow P(\text{crs}, (\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, (e_1, e_2), t), x)$$

3. Compute a low-depth proof ϕ for the **NP**-statement $1 = V(\text{crs}, (\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, (e_1, e_2), t), \pi)$. This can be done by providing the entire computation of V on these inputs.
4. Execute $P'(e_1, e_2, t, \pi, \phi)$ and output the result.

The construction is now analyzed in the proof below. We denote by $a||b$ the concatenation of two bit strings a and b .

Proof of theorem 4.1. The correctness and succinctness of this construction are relatively straightforward to verify, and in particular, closely follow the analyses in [ABG⁺13, BCP14]. We analyze its security.

Security. Fix any public-coin differing-inputs sampler $\text{Sam} = \{\text{Sam}_n\}$ for the family \mathcal{M} and any efficient distinguisher $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_n\}$. For a bit b , let $\mathcal{X}_n(b)$ denote the output of the following experiment over a random choice of r and the coins of \mathcal{O} :

$$\mathcal{X}_n(b) := \{(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M_b), \text{ output } \mathcal{D}_n(r, M')\}$$

We need to show that $\mathcal{X}_n(0) \approx_c \mathcal{X}_n(1)$. Consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.

- H_0 : This hybrid corresponds to an honest sampling of $\mathcal{X}_n(0)$. In this case, M' creates two FHE encryptions of M_0 , namely g_1 and g_2 (where M_0 is the first output of Sam_n).
- H_1 : Same as H_0 except that the second FHE ciphertext is now generated as an encryption of M_1 , i.e., $g_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M_1)$ (where M_1 is the second output of Sam_n).
- H_2 : Same as H_1 except that the obfuscated program P' is now generated as an obfuscation of $P_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$ which decrypts the *second* ciphertext using sk_2 , i.e., $P' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}(1^n, P_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}})$.
- H_3 : Same as H_2 except that the *first* FHE ciphertext g_1 is now also generated as an encryption of M_1 , i.e., $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M_1)$.
- H_4 : Same as H_3 except that the obfuscated program P' is once again generated as an obfuscation of $P_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$, i.e., $P' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}(1^n, P_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}})$. Note that H_4 is identical to $\mathcal{X}_n(1)$.

We now prove that each hybrid in this sequence is indistinguishable from the previous one.

Step 1: $H_0 \approx_c H_1$. This follows from the IND-CPA security of FHE. Formally, consider an adversary A_{FHE} , who receives a challenge public-key pk , then samples $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r)$ for a random r , and receives an honestly generated ciphertext g to either M_0 or M_1 under pk . A_{FHE} then generates an obfuscation of M_0 following the instruction of \mathcal{O} except that it sets $pk_2 = pk$ and $g_2 = g$. Note that all instructions of \mathcal{O} can indeed be performed efficiently knowing only (pk_2, g_2) . Let M' denote the resulting obfuscation which includes an NC^1 -obfuscation P' of program $P_{sk_1, g_1, g_2=g}^{\text{crs}}$. A_{FHE} outputs whatever $\mathcal{D}_n(r, M')$ outputs. The output of A_{FHE} is distributed identically to that of H_b when g is an encryption of M_b where $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Because Sam_n and \mathcal{D}_n are of polynomial-size, it follows that A_{FHE} is a polynomial-size circuit violating IND-CPA security of FHE unless $H_0 \approx_c H_1$.

Step 2: $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. We use the soundness of SNARK and diO-security of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ to argue that $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. Suppose that H_1 and H_2 are not computationally indistinguishable. We use Sam_n and \mathcal{D}_n to construct a public-coin differing-inputs sampler $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ along with a distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ such that $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ outputs circuits in NC^1 and $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ violates the security of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ w.r.t. $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$. We start by constructing $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$.

Sampler $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$.

1. Parse ρ as $\rho = (r, \rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$.
2. Sample $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r)$. // comment: this is the given sampler.
3. Set $\text{crs} = \rho_1, (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_1), (pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_2)$.

4. Set $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M_0; v_1)$ and $g_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M_1; v_2)$.
5. Output (C_0, C_1) corresponding to the programs $(P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}, P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}})$.

Note that input to the circuits C_0, C_1 above are of the form $m = (e_1, e_2, t, \pi, \phi)$.

Claim 4.2. $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$ $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ is a public-coin differing-inputs sampler for a family $\mathcal{C} \in \text{NC}^1$.

Proof. We have to show that every non-uniform PPT attacker $\{A_n^{\text{NC}^1}\}$ fails to find a differing-input for circuits sampled by $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$. Given an attacker $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ which succeeds against our sampler, we construct an attacker A_n which will succeed against the given sampler Sam_n . We shall rely on the soundness of SNARK to prove this.

Formally, suppose that the claim is false, and there exists a polynomial-size attacker family $\{A_n^{\text{NC}^1}\}$, a polynomial p , and infinitely many n s.t.

$$\Pr_{\rho} \left[C_0(x) \neq C_1(x) : (C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho), x \leftarrow A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho) \right] \geq 1/p(n).$$

We start by defining a prover family which receives a uniformly random auxiliary input, denoted by z , and then use it to define an attacker \tilde{A}_n which also receives a uniform auxiliary input. Later on, this auxiliary input will be completely removed from \tilde{A}_n .

Prover $P_n^*(\text{crs}, z)$: String z is of the form (r, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2) and the circuit has adversary $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ hardcoded in it. The circuit proceeds as follows:

1. Define $\rho := (r, \text{crs}, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$ using z and crs .
2. Compute $m \leftarrow A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ which is of the form $m = (e_1, e_2, t, \pi, \phi)$. Recall that $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ defines a TM \tilde{M}_{Eval} and π is a SNARK proof for the statement $y := (\tilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, (e_1, e_2), t)$.
3. Output (y, π) .

Let $\{\mathcal{E}_n^*\}$ be a family of extractor circuits w.r.t. the prover family $\{P_n^*\}$ defined above. Now we define the following attacker circuit \tilde{A}_n which receives a uniformly random auxiliary input z^* and outputs a differing input for the given sampler Sam_n . Later we will choose an appropriate z^* and hardcode it as part of the circuit description to achieve an attacker circuit without auxiliary input.

Circuit $\tilde{A}_n(r, z^*)$: String z^* is of the form $(\rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$ and extractor circuit \mathcal{E}_n^* is hardcoded in this circuit. The circuit computes as follows:

1. Define $\text{crs} = \rho_1$ and $z = (r, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$ using r and z^* .
2. Compute $(y, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_n^*(\text{crs}, z)$ where y is of the form $y := (\tilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, (e_1, e_2), t)$.
3. Output $x = w$ as the differing input.

For any given r, z^* , the concatenation $\rho = r \| z^*$ is of the form $(r, \rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$, and defines a valid random string for $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}$. We say that a fixed string z^* is **good** if, the success probability of $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ is at least $\frac{1}{2p}$ over the choice of r . Formally, a string z^* is **good** if for a randomly chosen r , defining the tape $\rho = r \| z^*$, the probability that $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ outputs m such that $C_0(m) \neq C_1(m)$ where $(C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ is at least $1/2p$. By simple averaging, at least $\frac{1}{2p}$ fraction of z^* are good.

Now let us define **sound strings**. Roughly speaking, we say that z^* is **sound** if the probability that the output of $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ contains a valid proof π but the output of the extractor (in step 2 above) is not a valid witness, is less than $1/4p$.

Formally, we say that a fixed string $z^* = (\rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$ is **sound** if for a randomly chosen r , defining the tape $\rho = r||z^*$, the probability of the following event, taken over r , is at most $1/4p$: the output of $\mathcal{E}^*(\text{crs}, z)$ (in step 2 of $\tilde{A}_n(r, z^*)$) is (y, w) and output of $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ is $m = (e_1, e_2, t, \pi, \phi)$ such that V accepts the proof π for the statement y but w is not a valid witness, i.e. $(y, w) \notin \mathcal{R}_{2c}$.

A randomly chosen z^* contains a uniformly distributed crs string; therefore, it follows that at least $1 - \varepsilon'$ fraction of z^* are **sound** where ε' is the soundness error of SNARK.

Therefore, at least $\frac{1}{2p} - \varepsilon' \geq \frac{1}{4p}$ fraction of z^* are both **good** and **sound**. Fix such a z^* . By definition of **good** it follows that w.r.t. this z^* , at least $1/2p$ fraction of inputs r are such that $A_n^{\text{NC}^1}(r||z^*)$ outputs a differing-input for C_0, C_1 . Further, by definition of **sound**, at most a $1/4p$ fraction of such inputs r are such that the extractor \mathcal{E}_n^* (in step 2 above) will not output a valid witness w . Therefore, at least $\frac{1}{2p} - \frac{1}{4p} \geq \frac{1}{4p}$ of inputs r result in a differing-input where the extractor's output is a valid witness. We call such inputs **nice**.

By construction, for nice r , we have that:

$$C_0(m) \neq C_1(m) \implies P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}=\rho_1}(m) \neq P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}=\rho_1}(m) \implies M_0(x) \neq M_1(x)$$

where $x = w$ is the differing-input output by \tilde{A}_n , and the last implication follows because x is a valid witness, i.e. if m contains ciphertexts e_1, e_2 then the values in these ciphertexts will indeed be $M_0(x)$ and $M_1(x)$ respectively. Here M_0, M_1 are the TMs sampled in (step 2 of) the execution of $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(r||z^*)$. We now observe that, by construction, (M_0, M_1) are also the output of $\text{Sam}_n(r)$. Therefore, the output of \tilde{A}_n outputs a differing input x for the outputs of Sam_n whenever z^* is **good** and **sound** and r is **nice**.

To have a deterministic attacker A_n which on input r outputs a differing-input x , we choose a z^* that is **good** and **sound**, and hardcode it in the description of \tilde{A}_n . It follows that, since the fraction of nice strings r is at least $1/4p$, A_n violates the public-coin differing-input property of Sam_n with noticeable property. The proof is completed by observing that circuits output by $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ are indeed in the complexity class NC^1 . \blacksquare

We now present distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ which violates the security of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ w.r.t. sampler $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$.

Distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho, C')$. The input consists a string ρ and an obfuscated circuit C' . C' is an obfuscation of either C_0 or C_1 which are output by $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$. The distinguisher attempts to create a valid obfuscation M' of the TM implicitly present in C' . Since entire string ρ is available, it can be efficiently done as follows.

1. Parse ρ as $\rho = (r, \rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$, and set $\text{crs} = \rho_1$, $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_1)$, $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_2)$, $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M_0; v_1)$ and $g_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M_1; v_2)$, where $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1^n; r)$.
2. Define $M' = (C', \text{crs}, pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2)$, and output whatever $\mathcal{D}_n(r, M')$ outputs. (Recall that \mathcal{D}_n is the given distinguisher).

By construction of $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$, we can see that if C' is a correctly generated obfuscation of C_b , then M' is distributed as in hybrid H_{b+1} . It follows that if outputs of H_1 and H_2 are distinguishable then $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ is a good distinguisher against $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ w.r.t. $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$.

Final step: $H_2 \approx_c H_3$ and $H_3 \approx_c H_4$. Proof for the claim $H_2 \approx_c H_3$ is nearly identical to step 1. The proof for $H_3 \approx_c H_4$ is nearly identical to step 2. We omit the details. \blacksquare

5 Functional Encryption for Turing Machines

In this section, we shall construct a functional encryption scheme. The scheme can encrypt messages of arbitrary polynomial length. The secret key SK_M is given corresponding to a TM \mathcal{M} of polynomial size which can accept inputs of arbitrary polynomial length and halts in polynomial time. The holder of SK_M can learn the value of $M(x)$ given an encryption of x . The size of the public-parameters of our scheme is polynomial in the security parameter, and the size of secret-keys, say SK_M , is polynomial in the security parameter, $|M|$, and $\log t$ where t is an arbitrary polynomial bounding the worst case running time of M .

We assume familiarity with the definition of functional encryption (FE) schemes. Our scheme will satisfy indistinguishability based notion of security in the selective model of security which we recall here. In this model, we consider the following experiment Expt between an attacker A and a challenger. The experiment takes a bit b as input, and proceeds as follows:

Init A sends two messages x_0^*, x_1^* such that $|x_0^*| = |x_1^*|$.

Phase 1 The challenger samples $(\text{pp}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{F.Setup}(1^n)$ and sends pp to A .

Phase 2 A adaptively asks polynomially secret-key queries where in each query it sends the description of a TM $M \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $M(x_1^*) = M(x_2^*)$.² The challenger responds with $SK_M \leftarrow \text{F.KeyGen}(\text{pp}, \text{msk}, M)$.

Challenge The challenger sends an encryption $e = \text{F.Enc}(\text{pp}, x_b^*)$.

Phase 3 Phase 2 is repeated.

Output The output A is the output of the experiment, which is a bit without loss of generality.

The scheme is said to be selectively secure if Adv_A is negligible in n where we define $\text{Adv}_A := |\Pr[\text{Expt}(0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}(1) = 1]|$.

Our construction. Let \mathcal{O} be a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation for the class of polynomial-size and polynomial-time TMs taking inputs of arbitrary polynomial length. Let $\Pi = (\text{CRSGen}, P, V)$ be a statistically sound, non-interactive, *strong* witness-indistinguishable proof system for \mathbf{NP} where CRSGen simply outputs its own random coins—therefore, we are in the common *random* string model where any random string of sufficient length can act as the CRS. Let $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_n\}$ be a family of collision-resistant hash functions such that every $h \in \mathcal{H}_n$ maps strings from $\{0, 1\}^*$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$.

Let $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an ordinary, semantically secure public-key encryption scheme, and com be a statistically binding commitment scheme.³ We assume that PKE (resp., com) encrypts (resp., commits) to a string of unbounded polynomial length by individually encrypting (resp., committing) to each bit. We assume w.l.o.g. that PKE (resp., com) uses randomness of length n to encrypt (resp., commit) to a single bit (and therefore sn random bits for a string of length s will be needed).

The algorithms of our functional encryption scheme are as follows. Recall that $a||b$ denotes the concatenation of two bit strings a and b .

- $\text{F.Setup}(1^n)$: Generate $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$, $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$, and $(pk_3, sk_3) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$. Generate two commitments $\alpha_1 = \text{com}(0^n; u_1)$ and $\alpha_2 = \text{com}(0^n; u_2)$. Sample $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{CRSGen}(1^n)$ and $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n$. Output (pp, msk) where:

$$\text{pp} := (pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \text{crs}, h), \quad \text{msk} := sk_1.$$

²Recall that according to our convention, the output of M on an input x includes its running time as well.

³We view com as a non-interactive algorithm; we can also use two-round schemes where the first message is fixed as part of the public-parameters by the setup algorithm and then com is viewed w.r.t. such a fixed message.

- **F.Enc(pp, x)**: On input a message $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ of arbitrary polynomial length, generate two ciphertexts $c_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(x; r_1)$ and $c_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(x; r_2)$. Define string $a := x \| r_1 \| 0^{n^2} \| x \| r_2 \| 0^{n^2}$ and encrypt it under the third public-key to get ciphertext $c_3 = \text{Enc}_{pk_3}(a; r_3)$. Finally, compute a proof π for the statement that $y \in L_{\text{FE}}$ using $w = (a, r_3)$ as the witness where $y = (c_1, c_2, c_3, pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$: i.e., $\pi \leftarrow P(\text{crs}, y, w)$.⁴ Here L_{FE} is the language corresponding to the relation R_{FE} defined below.

Relaton R_{FE} :

Instance: $y' = (c'_1, c'_2, c'_3, pk'_1, pk'_2, pk'_3, \alpha'_1, \alpha'_2)$

Witness: $w' = (a', r'_3)$ where $a' = x'_1 \| r'_1 \| u'_1 \| x'_2 \| r'_2 \| u'_2$

$R_{\text{FE}}(y', w') = 1$ if and only if the following condition holds:

1. $c'_3 = \text{Enc}_{pk_3}(a'; r'_3)$; AND
2. The OR of the following two statements is true:
 - (a) c'_1, c'_2 encrypt the same message which is one of x'_1 or x'_2 , i.e.:
 $(c'_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk'_1}(x'_1; r'_1) \text{ AND } c'_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk'_2}(x'_1; r'_2)); \text{ OR}$
 $(c'_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk'_1}(x'_2; r'_1) \text{ AND } c'_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk'_2}(x'_2; r'_2));$
 - (b) c'_1, c'_2 encrypt x'_1, x'_2 respectively, which may be different but then the hash of one them is committed in α'_1, α'_2 ; i.e.,
 - i. $(c'_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk'_1}(x'_1; r'_1) \text{ AND } c'_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk'_2}(x'_2; r'_2)); \text{ AND}$
 - ii. $(\alpha'_1 = \text{com}(h(x'_1); u'_1) \text{ OR } \alpha'_1 = \text{com}(h(x'_2); u'_1)); \text{ AND}$
 - iii. $(\alpha'_2 = \text{com}(h(x'_1); u'_2) \text{ OR } \alpha'_2 = \text{com}(h(x'_2); u'_2)).$

Proof π is computed for the AND of statements 1 and 2(a) of R_{FE} . The algorithm outputs $e = (c_1, c_2, c_3, \pi)$ as the ciphertext.

- **F.KeyGen(pp, msk, M)**: The secret-key SK_M corresponding to a TM M is an obfuscation of the program $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}$, i.e., $SK_M \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, \text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}})$, where $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}$ is the following program.

Program $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}$:

- Input: a ciphertext e of the form $e = (c_1, c_2, c_3, \pi)$.
 - Constants: $\text{msk} = sk_1$ and $\text{pp} = (pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \text{crs}, h)$.
 - The program checks that $1 = V(\text{crs}, y, \pi)$ where $y = (c_1, c_2, c_3, pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$.
 - If the check fails, output \perp ; otherwise output $M(\text{Dec}_{sk_1}(c_1))$.
- **F.Dec(SK_M, e)**: Evaluate the program SK_M on input e and output whatever it outputs.

Theorem 5.1. *Let \mathcal{M} be the class of all polynomial-time Turing machines accepting inputs of unbounded polynomial length. If there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class \mathcal{M} , a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (i.e., with statistical soundness) for **NP** in the common random string model, a public-key encryption scheme, a non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment scheme, and a family of collision-resistant hash functions with publicly samplable index, then there exists a selectively-secure functional encryption scheme with indistinguishability-based security for Turing machines in the class \mathcal{M} .*

⁴Observe that here no a-priori bound is known on $|x|$; any multi-theorem proof system such as [FLS99] is capable of proving statements of unbounded polynomial length.

Proof of theorem 5.1. The correctness and succinctness of our scheme is easy to verify, and in particular, is similar to analyses in [GGH⁺13b, ABG⁺13]. We shall provide this analysis in the full version. We now analyze the security of this construction. We prove that the scheme satisfies indistinguishability based security for FE in the selective security model. We prove this by considering the following sequence of hybrid experiments:

- Hybrid H_0 : This hybrid is identical to experiment $\text{Expt}(0)$. The public-parameters pp in Phase 1 are of the form $\text{pp} := (pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \text{crs}, h)$ where $\alpha_1 = \text{com}(0^n; u_1)$ and $\alpha_2 = \text{com}(0^n; u_2)$.
- Hybrid H_1 : This hybrid is identical to H_0 except that α_1 and α_2 are computed as commitments to $h(x_0^*)$ and $h(x_1^*)$ respectively: $\alpha_1 = \text{com}(h(x_0^*); u_1)$ and $\alpha_2 = \text{com}(h(x_1^*); u_2)$. We recall that the challenge ciphertext is of the form (c_1, c_2, c_3, π) where both c_1, c_2 encrypt x_0^* , c_3 encrypts $a_0 = x_0^* \| r_1 \| 0^{n^2} \| x_0^* \| r_2 \| 0^{n^2}$ using randomness r_3 , and π is computed using $w = (a_0, r_3)$ as the witness. This is identical to how these values were computed in the previous hybrid.
- Hybrid H_2 : Identical to H_1 except that string a_0 is now changed to $a^* = x_0^* \| r_1 \| u_1 \| x_1^* \| r_2 \| u_2$. Consequently, ciphertext c_3 is an encryption of a^* which we denote by c_3^* . Since a^* has changed, the witness used in computing the proof π has also changed, and we shall denote the new proof by π^* . The challenge ciphertext is therefore (c_1, c_2, c_3^*, π^*) where both c_1, c_2 still encrypt x_0^* .
- Hybrid H_3 : Same as H_2 except that c_2 now encrypts x_1^* . Furthermore, π^* is computed w.r.t. the AND of statements 1 and 2(b) (see the description of R_{FE}). That is, the witness corresponding to condition 2(b.i) will now be (x_0^*, r_1, x_1^*, r_2) , and for 2(b.ii) and 2(b.iii) it will be (x_0^*, u_1) and (x_1^*, u_2) respectively. Note that a^*, c_3^* and everything else remains the same.
- Hybrid H_4 : Same as H_3 except that the keys are generated differently. The challenger sets $\text{msk} = sk_2$ and answers the secret-key queries corresponding to a TM M by obfuscating the following program $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}^*$:

Program $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}^*$: The program is identical to $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}$ except that it decrypts the second ciphertext using $\text{msk} = sk_2$ if the check succeeds. That is, the input to the program is a ciphertext $e = (c_1, c_2, c_3, \pi)$, the constants are (msk, pp) . The program outputs \perp if π is not a valid proof; otherwise it outputs $M(\text{Dec}_{sk_2}(c_2))$.

- Hybrid H_5 : Same as H_4 except that c_1 is now changed to encrypt x_1^* . Furthermore, π^* is computed by using the witness corresponding to condition 2(a), i.e., using (x_1^*, r_1, r_2) .
- Hybrid H_6 : Same as H_5 except that all secret-key queries are now switched back to using $\text{msk} = sk_1$ and the key for TM M is an obfuscation of the program $\text{Prog}_{M, \text{msk}}$.
- Hybrid H_7 : Same as H_6 except that a^* is changed to string $a_1 = x_1^* \| r_1 \| 0^{n^2} \| x_1^* \| r_2 \| 0^{n^2}$. The witness corresponding to 2(a) does not change, but corresponding to statement in 1 changes (see R_{FE}). Therefore, proof π also changes.
- Hybrid H_8 : Same as H_7 except that α_1, α_2 are switched back to the commitments of 0^n . Observe that H_8 is identical to the experiment $\text{Expt}(1)$.

We now prove the indistinguishability of every two consecutive hybrids in this experiment.

Step 1: $H_0 \approx_c H_1$. This follows from computational hiding of the commitment scheme. Formally, we consider the following adversary A_{com} , which internally executes the hybrid H_0 except that it does not generate commitments (α_1, α_2) on its own. Instead, after receiving values (x_1^*, x_2^*) during **Init** phase from A , it sends two sets of strings, namely $(0^n, 0^n)$ and $(h(x_1^*), h(x_2^*))$, to the outside challenger and receives in return two commitments (α_1, α_2) corresponding to either the first or the second set of strings. It is clear that A_{com} is a polynomial time machine, and violates the hiding of **com** unless $H_0 \approx_c H_1$.

Step 2: $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. The proof of this claim relies on the semantic security of PKE and the *strong* witness indistinguishability of the proof system Π for polynomially many statements.⁵ Recall that strong WI asserts the following: let \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_1 be distributions which output an instance-witness pair for an **NP**-relation \mathbf{R} and suppose that the first components of these distributions are computationally indistinguishable, i.e., $\{y : (y, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_0(1^n)\} \approx_c \{y : (y, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_1(1^n)\}$; then $\mathcal{X}_0 \approx_c \mathcal{X}_1$ where $\mathcal{X}_b : \{(\text{crs}, y, \pi) : \text{crs} \leftarrow \text{CRSGen}(1^n); (y, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_b(1^n); \pi \leftarrow P(\text{crs}, y, w)\}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Strong WI for polynomially many statements is implied by any multi-theorem NIZK proof such as [FLS99].

Suppose that H_1 and H_2 can be distinguished with noticeable advantage δ . Observe that both distribution internally sample the following values in an identical manner: $z := (h, pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, c_1, c_2, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ which is all but crs, c_3 and π . By simple averaging, there are at least $\delta/2$ fraction of string st s.t. the two hybrids can be distinguished with advantage at least $\delta/2$ when $z = st$. Call such a z *good*. Fix one such z , and denote the resulting hybrids by $H_1^{(z)}, H_2^{(z)}$. Note that the hybrids have inbuilt into them all other values used to sample z namely: (x_0^*, x_1^*) received from A , randomness u_1, u_2, r_1, r_2 for $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, c_1, c_2)$ respectively, and $\text{msk} = sk_1$.

Define distribution $\mathcal{D}_0^{(z)}$ as follows: set $a_0 = (x_0^* \| r_1 \| 0^{n^2} \| x_0^* \| r_2 \| 0^{n^2})$, compute $c_3 = \text{Enc}_{pk_3}(a_0; r_3)$, and let statement $y = (c_1, c_2, c_3, pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$, witness $w_0 = (a_0, r_3)$; output (y, w_0) . Note that y has identical to z except that h has been removed and c_3 has been added. Now define a second distribution $\mathcal{D}_1^{(z)}$ which is identical to $\mathcal{D}_0^{(z)}$ except that instead of string a_0 , it uses string $a^* = (x_0^* \| r_1 \| u_1 \| x_0^* \| r_2 \| u_2)$, sets $c_3 = \text{Enc}_{pk_3}(a^*; r_3)$, and $w = (a^*, r_3)$. It follows from the security of the encryption scheme that the distribution of y sampled by $\mathcal{D}_0^{(z)}$ is computationally indistinguishable from when it is sampled by $\mathcal{D}_1^{(z)}$. Therefore, we must have that $\mathcal{X}_0 \approx \mathcal{X}_1$ w.r.t. these distributions. We show that this is not the case unless $H_1^{(z)} \approx_c H_2^{(z)}$.

Consider an adversary for strong WI who incorporates A and z (along with sk_1 and all values for computing z described above), and receives a challenge (crs, y, π) distributed according to either $\mathcal{D}_0^{(z)}$ or $\mathcal{D}_1^{(z)}$; here y has a component c_3 (and all other parts of y are identical to the respective parts of $z \setminus \{h\}$). The adversary uses crs to completely define pp and feeds it to A ; it uses sk_1 to complete phase 2 and 4, and (c_3, π) to define the challenge ciphertext $e = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$. The adversary outputs whatever A outputs. We observe that the output of this adversary is distributed according to $H_1^{(z)}$ (resp., $H_2^{(z)}$) when it receives a tuple from distribution \mathcal{X}_0 (resp., \mathcal{X}_1). A randomly sampled z is *good* with probability at least $\delta/2$, and therefore it follows that with probability at least $\delta^2/4$ the strong WI property will be violated unless δ is negligible.

⁵Strictly speaking, we only need strong WI w.r.t. a single statement y of *unbounded polynomial* length. Any multi-theorem NIZK proof system such as [FLS99] generically yields a strong WI proof system for unbounded polynomial length statements.

Step 3: $H_2 \approx_c H_3$. The proof of this part follows exactly the same ideas as in step 2, and relies on the semantic security of encryption and strong WI property of Π . Roughly speaking, changing c_2 to encrypt x_1^* results in a computationally indistinguishable distribution over the statement (to be proven by proof π). Due to this, although the resulting proof π will use a different witness, strong WI guarantees that the joint distribution of statement and proof (present in the challenge ciphertext) remains computationally indistinguishable in these two hybrids. The details are omitted.

Step 4: $H_3 \approx_c H_4$. This is the key part of our proof where we shall rely on the indistinguishability security of public-coin diO. Suppose that the claim is false and A 's output in H_3 is noticeably different from its output in H_4 . Suppose that A 's running time is bounded by a polynomial t so that there are at most t secret-key queries it can make in phase 2 and 3 combined. We consider a sequence of t hybrid experiments between H_3 and H_4 such that hybrid H_3^i , for $i \in [t]$ is as follows.

Hybrid H_3^i is identical to H_3 except that it answers the secret-key queries as follows. For $j \in [t]$, if $j \leq i$, the secret-key corresponding to the j -th query, denoted M_j , is an obfuscation of program Prog_{M_j, sk_1} ; otherwise, for $j > i$, it is an obfuscation of program $\text{Prog}_{M_j, sk_2}^*$. We define H_3^0 to be H_3 and observe that H_3^t is the same as H_4 .

By simple calculation, we see that if A 's advantage in distinguishing H_3 and H_4 is δ , then there exists an $i \in [t]$ such that A distinguishes between H_3^{i-1} and H_3^i with advantage at least δ/t . We show that if δ is not negligible then we can use A to violate the indistinguishability of \mathcal{O} . To do so, we define a sampling algorithm Sam_A^i and a distinguishing algorithm \mathcal{D}_A^i and prove that Sam_A^i is a public-coin differing-input sampler outputting a pair of differing-input TMs yet \mathcal{D}_A^i can distinguish an obfuscation of left TM from that of right output by Sam_A^i . The description of these two algorithms is as follows:

Sampler $\text{Sam}_A^i(\rho)$:

1. Receive (x_0^*, x_1^*) from A .
2. Parse ρ as (crs, h, τ) .
3. Proceed identically to H_4 using τ as randomness for all tasks except for sampling the hash function which is set to h , and the CRS, which is set to crs . This involves the following steps:
 - (a) Parse $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2, \tau_3, r_1, r_2, r_3, u_1, u_3)$.
 - (b) Use τ_i as randomness to generate $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; \tau_i)$ for $i \in [3]$, r_1, r_2 to generate $c_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(x_0^*; r_1)$, $c_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(x_1^*; r_2)$, and u_1, u_2 to generate $\alpha_1 = \text{com}(h(x_0^*); u_1)$, $\alpha_2 = \text{com}(h(x_1^*); u_2)$.
 - (c) Use $a^* = x_0^* \| r_1 \| u_1 \| x_1^* \| r_2 \| u_2$ and r_3 to compute $c_3^* = \text{Enc}_{pk_3}(a^*; r_3)$, and then use $w = (a^*, r_3)$ to compute proof π^* corresponding to conditions 1 and 2(b) in R_{FE} .
4. Define $\text{pp} = (pk_1, pk_2, pk_3, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \text{crs}, h)$ and challenge $e = (c_1, c_2, c_3^*, \pi^*)$.
5. Send pp to A and answer its secret-key queries as follows. For all queries M_j until $j < i$, send an obfuscation of Prog_{M_j, sk_1} .
6. If i -th secret-key query comes in phase 2, send ciphertext e in the challenge phase.
7. Upon receiving the i -th secret-key query M_i , output (M_0, M_1) and halt where:

$$M_0 := \text{Prog}_{M_i, sk_1}, \quad M_1 := \text{Prog}_{M_i, sk_2}^*.$$

Distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_A^i(\rho, M')$: on input a random tape ρ and an obfuscated TM M' , the distinguisher simply executes all steps of the sampler $\text{Sam}_A^i(\rho)$, answering secret-keys for all $j < i$, as described above. The distinguisher, however, does not halt when i -th query is sent, and continues the execution of A answering secret-key queries for M_j as follows:

- if $j = i$: send M' (which is an obfuscation of either M_0 or M_1)
- if $j > i$: send an obfuscation of $\text{Prog}_{M_j, sk_2}^*$

The distinguisher outputs whatever A outputs.

It is straightforward to see that if M' is an obfuscation of M_1 , the output of \mathcal{D}_A^i is identical to A 's output in H_3^{i-1} ; and if M' is an obfuscation of M_0 , it is identical to A 's output in H_3^i . We have that \mathcal{D}_A^i distinguishes H_3^{i-1} and H_3^i with at least δ/t advantage. All that remains to prove now is that Sam_A^i is a public-coin differing-inputs sampler.

Claim 5.2. Sam_A^i is a public-coin differing-inputs sampler.

Proof. We show that if there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} who can find differing-inputs to the pair of TMs sampled by Sam_A^i with noticeable probability, say μ , we can use \mathcal{B} and Sam_A^i to construct an efficient algorithm $\text{CollFinder}_{\mathcal{B}, \text{Sam}_A^i}$ which finds collisions in h with probability $\mu - \text{negl}(n)$. The algorithm works as follows:

$\text{CollFinder}_{\mathcal{B}, \text{Sam}_A^i}(h)$:

The algorithm incorporates $\mathcal{B}, \text{Sam}_A^i$. On input a random hash function $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_n$, the algorithm works as follows:

- sample uniformly random strings (crs, τ) to define a random tape $\rho := (\text{crs}, h, \tau)$.
- sample $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_A^i(\rho)$ and $e \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\rho)$.
- recall that e is of the form (c_1, c_2, c_3, π) where c_3 is an encryption under pk_3 where (pk_3, sk_3) are sampled using parts of the randomness τ .
- let $x_0^* \neq x_1^*$ be the strings output by A during the **Init** phase in the execution of Sam_A^i .
- if π is a valid proof, compute $a = \text{Dec}_{sk_3}(c_3)$ and let $a = x'_1 \| r'_1 \| u'_1 \| x'_2 \| r'_2 \| u'_2$.
- if $h(x_0^*) = h(x_1^*)$, output (x_0^*, x_1^*) as the collisions; otherwise, if $\exists m_1 \in \{x'_1, x'_2\}$ and $\exists m_2 \in \{x_0^*, x_1^*\}$ s.t. $m_1 \neq m_2$ and $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$ output (m_1, m_2) as collisions; if none of the two conditions hold, output \perp .

Let us now analyze the success probability of this algorithm. Since h is uniformly sampled, ρ is a uniform random tape, and therefore with probability μ , \mathcal{B} outputs an e such that $M_0(e) \neq M_1(e)$. Recall that $M_0 = \text{Prog}_{M_i, sk_1}$ and $M_1 = \text{Prog}_{M_i, sk_2}^*$ for some TM M_i such that $M_i(x_0^*) = M_i^*(x_1^*)$. Furthermore, both of these programs output \perp if proof π is not valid. Since the output these two programs differ on e , it must be that π is a valid proof so that $M_0(e) = M_i(\text{Dec}_{sk_1}(c_1))$ and $M_1(e) = M_i(\text{Dec}_{sk_2}(c_2))$. By construction, since π is a statistically sound proof, except with negligible probability it holds that $x'_1 = \text{Dec}_{sk_1}(c_1)$ and $x'_2 = \text{Dec}_{sk_2}(c_2)$ where x'_1, x'_2 are part of the string a obtained by the collision finding algorithm by decrypting c_3 above. Therefore, we have that $M_0(e) = M_i(x'_1)$ and $M_1(e) = M_i(x'_2)$. However, we also have that $M_0(e) \neq M_1(e) \implies M_i(x'_1) \neq M_i(x'_2) \implies x'_1 \neq x'_2$. Since $M_i(x_0^*) = M_i(x_1^*)$ it holds that the sets $\{x'_1, x'_2\} \neq \{x_0^*, x_1^*\}$.

Since π is valid, and c_1, c_2 are encryptions of (unequal strings) x'_1, x'_2 , from the statistical soundness of π statements 2(b.ii) and 2(b.iii) must be true. That is, α_1 (likewise α_2) must be a commitment to one of $h(x'_1)$ or $h(x'_2)$. But α_1 is a commitment to $h(x_0^*)$ and α_2 is a commitment to $h(x_1^*)$ and commitment is statistically binding. Since at least one of x'_1, x'_2 is not equal to any of x_0^*, x_1^* the collision must occur on one of the four possible pairs of these strings. \blacksquare

Step 5: Indistinguishability of H_4 – H_8 . Hybrids H_4 to H_8 are applying changes very similar to the first four hybrids except in the reverse order. The proof of their indistinguishability can be obtained by following previous proofs in a near identical fashion. In particular we can prove $H_4 \approx_c H_5$ by relying on the security of encryption and strong WI (following the proof in step 2 or 3), $H_5 \approx_c H_6$ following the proof in step 4, $H_6 \approx_c H_7$ following the proof in step 2, and $H_7 \approx_c H_8$ following the proof in step 1.

This completes the proof of security of our functional encryption scheme. ■

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A Other primitives

Fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in NC^1 . A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme is a public-key encryption scheme with an additional evaluation algorithm *Eval*. Formally, given a public-key pk , ciphertexts c_1, \dots, c_m corresponding to the bits b_1, \dots, b_m (under pk), and a circuit $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, algorithm *Eval* outputs a ciphertext c' such that except with negligible probability over the randomness of all algorithms, the decryption of c' is the bit $f(b_1, \dots, b_m)$ where $m = m(n)$ is an arbitrary polynomial.

The encryption of a long message $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ under pk consists of encrypting each bit of x under pk , and will be denoted by $c = \text{Enc}_{pk}(x)$. Given c , the homomorphic evaluation of an *oblivious Turing machine* M with known running time t consists of t homomorphic evaluations of the the circuit corresponding to the transition function of M where in the i -th iteration the transition function is applied on the contents of the encrypted input/work tape (containing x at the start) and an encrypted state; it results in a new encrypted state as well as new encrypted contents on the work tape.

A FHE scheme has decryption in NC^1 if there exists a constant $c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ the depth of the circuit corresponding to the decryption function $\text{Dec}(1^n, pk, \cdot)$ is at most $c \log n$.

Strong non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs for NP. As a tool for our functional encryption application, we need non-interactive proofs for **NP** in the common random string model. We require that the proof system be capable of proving statements of unbounded polynomial length. In terms of soundness, we require the system to be a *proof* system where the soundness guarantee is

statistical: i.e., even unbounded provers cannot prove a false statement with noticeable probability. In terms of prover security, we only require the proof system to satisfy *strong* witness indistinguishability [Gol01] which is implied by the zero-knowledge property. The NIZK proof system of Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [FLS99] satisfies all of these requirements.

B Bounded-Input Case

In this section we consider the ℓ -bounded-input case, in which we consider the class of TMs whose input is bounded by a polynomial ℓ , and the size of the obfuscation is allowed to depend on ℓ ; however it does not depend on the running time of TMs in the class, which could be much larger than ℓ . To emphasize that a class is a bounded-input TM class, we will explicitly include ℓ in the notation.

Definition B.1 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscator for ℓ -Bounded-Input TMs). For every polynomial $\ell : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, let $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n^\ell\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote the class of all TMs such that every $M \in \mathcal{M}_n^\ell$ is of size n , accepts inputs of length at most $\ell(n)$, and halts within a polynomial, say $t(n)$, number of steps on all inputs. A uniform PPT algorithm \mathcal{O} is a *public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class of all bounded-input TMs* if it satisfies the *correctness* and *security* conditions of definition 2.4 and the following modified succinctness condition: there exists a (global) polynomial $s' : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that for all n , for all $M \in \mathcal{M}_n$, and for all $M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M)$, the size of M' is bounded by $s'(n, \ell(n))$ and its running time is bounded by $s'(n, t(n))$ for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\leq \ell(n)}$.

We show that given a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class NC^1 , we can construct a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for *bounded-input Turing machines'* class.

Theorem B.2. *Suppose that there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for circuits in the class NC^1 . Then, assuming the existence of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with decryption in NC^1 and a (publicly verifiable) SNARG system for \mathbf{P} (alternatively, a \mathbf{P} -certificate) in the common random string model, there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for bounded-input Turing machines as defined in B.1.*

We first present the construction, and then prove the theorem. Let ℓ and t be polynomials, and let $\mathcal{M} = \{\mathcal{M}_n^\ell\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be the family of bounded-input TMs where every $M \in \mathcal{M}_n^\ell$ is of size n , accepts inputs of length at most $\ell(n)$ and halts within $t(n)$ steps on every x . Let $\text{FHE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval})$ be a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with decryption in NC^1 , and $\Pi = (P, V)$ be a SNARG for the relation \mathcal{R}_c defined earlier where c is a constant such that $t(n) \leq n^c$ for all n . The description of our obfuscator and its evaluation algorithm, are as follows.

Obfuscator $\mathcal{O}(1^n, M \in \mathcal{M}_n^\ell)$: By convention, description of M includes the bounds t and ℓ . Let U_n be an *oblivious* universal TM which on input the description of a TM B , and a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^{\leq \ell(n)}$ executes B on x for no more than $t(n)$ steps. The obfuscator proceeds in the following steps:

1. Generate two FHE public-keys $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_1)$ and $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_2)$.
2. Encrypt M under both FHE public-keys: $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M; v_1)$ and $g_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M; v_2)$. Here M is assumed to be encoded as a bit string of length n for use by the universal TM U_n .
3. Uniformly sample $\text{crs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}$ of sufficient length for SNARG Π .
4. Generate an obfuscation of the NC^1 -program $P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$ given in figure 2:

$$P' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}(1^n, P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}).$$

5. Output $M' = (P', \text{crs}, pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2)$.




Figure 2: The programs $P1$ and $P2$

Evaluation of M' . Evaluate $M' = (P', \text{crs}, pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2)$ on input x as follows:

1. Let $(e_1, e_2) = M_{\text{Eval}}(x)$. Recall that (fig. 1): $e_1 = \text{Eval}_{pk_1}(U_n(\cdot, x), g_1)$, $e_2 = \text{Eval}_{pk_2}(U_n(\cdot, x), g_2)$
2. W.l.o.g, the running time of $M_{\text{Eval}}(x)$ is at most $2t \log t \leq t^2$. Compute the proof π :⁶

$$\pi \leftarrow P \left(\text{crs}, (\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, \langle x, e_1, e_2 \rangle, t^2), \perp \right)$$

3. Compute a low-depth proof ϕ that π is a valid SNARG, i.e., $V(\text{crs}, (\widetilde{M}_{\text{Eval}}, \langle \sigma, e_1, e_2 \rangle, t^2), \pi) = 1$. This can be done by providing the entire computation of V on these inputs.
4. Execute $P'(x, e_1, e_2, \pi, \phi)$ and output the result.

The construction is now analyzed in the proof below.

Proof of theorem B.2. The correctness and succinctness of this construction are relatively straightforward to verify, and in particular, are identical to the analyses in [ABG⁺13, BCP14].

Security. Fix any public-coin differing-inputs sampler $\text{Sam} = \{\text{Sam}_n\}$ for the family \mathcal{M} and any efficient distinguisher $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_n\}$. For a bit b , let $\mathcal{X}_n(b)$ denote the output of the following experiment over a random choice of r and the coins of \mathcal{O} :

$$\mathcal{X}_n(b) := \{(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r), M' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}(1^n, M_b), \text{output } \mathcal{D}_n(r, M')\}$$

We need to show that $\mathcal{X}_n(0) \approx_c \mathcal{X}_n(1)$. Consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.

- H_0 : This hybrid corresponds to an honest sampling of $\mathcal{X}_n(0)$. In this case, M' creates two FHE encryptions of M_0 , namely g_1 and g_2 (where M_0 is the first output of Sam_n).
- H_1 : Same as H_0 except that the second FHE ciphertext is now generated as an encryption of M_1 , i.e., $g_2 = \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M_1)$ (where M_1 is the second output of Sam_n).

⁶No witness is necessary as this is computation in \mathbf{P} .

- H_2 : Same as H_1 except that the obfuscated program P' is now generated as an obfuscation of $P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$ which decrypts the *second* ciphertext using sk_2 , i.e., $P' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}(1^n, P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}})$.
- H_3 : Same as H_2 except that the *first* FHE ciphertext g_1 is now also generated as an encryption of M_1 , i.e., $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M_1)$.
- H_4 : Same as H_3 except that the obfuscated program P' is once again generated as an obfuscation of $P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}$, i.e., $P' \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}(1^n, P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}})$. Note that H_4 is identical to $\mathcal{X}_n(1)$.

We now prove that each hybrid in this sequence is indistinguishable from the previous one.

Step 1: $H_0 \approx_c H_1$. This follows from the IND-CPA security of FHE. Formally, consider an adversary \mathcal{A}_{FHE} , who receives a challenge public-key pk , then samples $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r)$ for a random r , and receives an honestly generated ciphertext g to either M_0 or M_1 under pk . \mathcal{A}_{FHE} then generates an obfuscation of M_0 following the instruction of \mathcal{O} except that it sets $pk_2 = pk$ and $g_2 = g$. Note that all instructions of \mathcal{O} can indeed be performed efficiently knowing only (pk_2, g_2) . Let M' denote the resulting obfuscation which includes an NC^1 -obfuscation P' of program $P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2=g}^{\text{crs}}$. \mathcal{A}_{FHE} outputs whatever $\mathcal{D}_n(r, M')$ outputs. The output of \mathcal{A}_{FHE} is distributed identically to that of H_b when g is an encryption of M_b where $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Because Sam_n and \mathcal{D}_n are of polynomial-size, it follows that \mathcal{A}_{FHE} is a polynomial-size circuit violating IND-CPA security of FHE unless $H_0 \approx_c H_1$.

Step 2: $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. We use the soundness of SNARG and diO-security of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ to argue that $H_1 \approx_c H_2$. Suppose that H_1 and H_2 are not computationally indistinguishable. We use Sam_n and \mathcal{D}_n to construct a public-coin differing-inputs sampler $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ along with a distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ such that $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ outputs circuits in NC^1 and $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ violates the security of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ w.r.t. $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$. We start by constructing $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$.

Sampler $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$.

1. Parse ρ as $\rho = (r, \rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$.
2. Sample $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n(r)$. // comment: this is the given sampler.
3. Set $\text{crs} = \rho_1$, $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_1)$, $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_2)$.
4. Set $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M_0; v_1)$ and $g_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M_1; v_2)$.
5. Output (C_0, C_1) corresponding to the programs $(P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}}, P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}})$.

Note that input to the circuits C_0, C_1 above are of the form $m = (x, e_1, e_2, \pi, \phi)$.

Claim B.3. $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$ $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ is a public-coin differing-inputs sampler for a family $\mathcal{C} \in \text{NC}^1$.

Proof. We have to show that every non-uniform PPT attacker $\{\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}\}$ fails to find a differing-input for circuits sampled by $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$. We prove this by using (any) given $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ to construct an attacker-family $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}$ against the given sampler $\{\text{Sam}_n\}$. We then use the soundness of SNARG to argue that if $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ “succeeds” against our sampler then \mathcal{A}_n succeeds against the given sampler.

Formally, suppose that the claim is false, and there exists a polynomial-size attacker family $\{\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}\}$, a polynomial p , and infinitely many n s.t.

$$\Pr_{\rho} \left[C_0(x) \neq C_1(x) : (C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho) \right] \geq 1/p(n).$$

For every sufficiently large string $z_n = (\rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$ define the following circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{(z_n)}$:

Circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{(z_n)}(r)$: String z_n and adversary $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ are hardcoded in this circuit.

1. Define $\rho := r \circ z_n = (r, \rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$.
2. Compute $m \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$ which is of the form $m = (x, e_1, e_2, \pi, \phi)$.
3. Output x .

We say that a (fixed) string z_n is **good** if, the success probability of $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ in step 2 above is at least $\frac{1}{2p}$ (over the choice of r). I.e., in step 2, $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ outputs m such that $C_0(m) \neq C_1(m)$ where $(C_0, C_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$. By simple averaging, at least $\frac{1}{2p}$ fraction of z_n are **good**.

Now let us define **sound strings**. Roughly speaking, we say that z_n is **sound** if the the output of $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ (in step 2 above) results in a valid proof for a false statement with less than $1/4p$ probability w.r.t. $\text{crs} = \rho_1$ contained in z_n . Formally, we say that a fixed string z_n is **sound** if the probability that $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ outputs $m = (x, e_1, e_2, \pi, \phi)$ (in step 2 above) such that V accepts the proof π w.r.t. $\text{crs} = \rho_1$ but (e_1, e_2) is not the output of computation M_{Eval} within $2t \log t$ steps is at most $1/4p$ where the probability is taken over r . Since a random choice of z_n results in a uniformly distributed crs string, it follows that at least $1 - \varepsilon'$ fraction of z_n are **sound** where ε' is the soundness error of SNARG.

Therefore, at least $\frac{1}{2p} - \varepsilon' \geq \frac{1}{4p}$ fraction of z_n are both **good** and **sound**. Fix such a z_n . By definition of **good** it follows that w.r.t. such a fixed z_n , at least $1/2p$ fraction of inputs r are such that a differing-input will be found in step 2. Further, by definition of **sound**, at most a $1/4p$ fraction of such inputs r can ever lead to a valid SNARG proof for a false statement. Therefore, at least $\frac{1}{2p} - \frac{1}{4p} \geq \frac{1}{4p}$ of inputs r result in a differing-input where the statement for SNARG is actually true. We call such inputs **nice**.

By construction, for nice r , we have that: $C_0(m) \neq C_1(m) \implies P1_{sk_1, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}=\rho_1}(m) \neq P2_{sk_2, g_1, g_2}^{\text{crs}=\rho_1}(m) \implies M_0(x) \neq M_1(x)$. Here M_0, M_1 are the TMs sampled in (step 2 of) the execution of $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ (on randomness $\rho = r \circ z_n$). But, again by construction, (M_0, M_1) are also output of $\text{Sam}_n(r)$. Therefore, $\mathcal{A}_n^{(z_n)}$ outputs a differing input x for the outputs of Sam_n whenever z_n is **good** and **sound** and r is **nice**. This happens with probability at least $1/4p \times 1/4p = 1/16p^2$ which is non-negligible.

Finally, observe that circuits output by Sam_{NC^1} are indeed in the complexity class NC. ■

We now present distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ which violates the security of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ w.r.t. sampler $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$.

Distinguisher $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho, C')$. The input consists a string ρ and an obfuscated circuit C' . C' is an obfuscation of either C_0 or C_1 which are output by $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}(\rho)$. The distinguisher attempts to create a valid obfuscation M' of the TM implicitly present in C' . Since entire string ρ is available, it can be efficiently done as follows.

1. Parse ρ as $\rho = (r, \rho_1, u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)$, and set $\text{crs} = \rho_1$, $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_1)$, $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n; u_2)$, $g_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_1}(M_0; v_1)$ and $g_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk_2}(M_1; v_2)$, where $(M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1^n; r)$.
2. Define $M' = (C', \text{crs}, pk_1, pk_2, g_1, g_2)$, and output whatever $\mathcal{D}_n(r, M')$ outputs. (Recall that \mathcal{D}_n is the given distinguisher).

By construction of $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$, we can see that if C' is a correctly generated obfuscation of C_b , then M' is distributed as in hybrid H_{b+1} . It follows that if outputs of H_1 and H_2 are distinguishable then $\mathcal{D}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$ is a good distinguisher against $\mathcal{O}_{\text{NC}^1}$ w.r.t. $\text{Sam}_n^{\text{NC}^1}$.

Final step: $H_2 \approx_c H_3$ and $H_3 \approx_c H_4$. Proof for the claim $H_2 \approx_c H_3$ is nearly identical to step 1. The proof for $H_3 \approx_c H_4$ is nearly identical to step 2. We omit the details. ■