

On a new fast public key cryptosystem

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February 3, 2015

Abstract

This paper presents a new fast public key cryptosystem namely : a key exchange algorithm, a public key encryption algorithm and a digital signature algorithm, based on the difficulty to invert the following function : $F(x) = (a \times x) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$.

Mod is modulo operation , Div is integer division operation , a , p and q are known natural numbers while $(p > q)$.

In this paper it is also proven that this problem is equivalent to SAT problem which is NP complete .

Keywords : key exchange, public key encryption, digital signature, boolean satisfiability problem, NP complete .

1 Introduction :

Since its invention by Withfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [1] , Public key cryptography has imposed itself as the necessary and indispensable building block of every IT Security architecture. But in the last decades it has been proven that public key cryptosystems based on number theory problems are not immune againt quantum computing attacks [3]. The advent of low computing ressources mobile devices such wirless rfid sensors, smart cellphones, ect has also put demands on very fast and lightweight public key algorithms .

Public key cryptosystem presented in this paper is not based on number theory problems and is very fast compared to Diffie-Hellman [1] and RSA algorithms [2]. It is based on the difficulty to invert the following function : $F(x) = (a \times x) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$.

Mod is modulo operation , Div is Integer division operation , a , p and q are known natural numbers while $(p > q)$. In this paper we construct three public key algorithms based on this problem namely a key exchange algorithm, a public key encryption algorithm and a digital signature algorithm.

We prove its efficiency compared to Diffie-Hellman and RSA, and that the problem which it is based on is equivalent to SAT which is a NP complet problem [4] .

2 Secret key exchange algorithm :

Before exchanging a secret key, Alice and Bob shared a knowledge of :

Natural numbers $[l, m, p, q, Z]$ satisfying following conditions :

$q = l + m - p$, $p > m + q$, Z is l bits long.

To exchange a secret key :

- 1 Bob chooses randomly a natural number X . $[X]$ is m bits and a private knowledge of Bob.
- 2 Computes number $U = (X \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$, and sends it to Alice.
- 3 Alice chooses randomly a natural number Y . $[Y]$ is m bits and a private knowledge of Alice.
- 4 Computes number $V = (Y \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$, and sends it to Bob.
- 5 Bob computes number $W = (X \times V) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(m+q)})$.
- 6 Alice computes number $W = (Y \times U) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(m+q)})$.

The secrete key exchanged by Bob and Alice is the number :

$$W = (X \times V) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(m+q)}) = (Y \times U) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(m+q)})$$

The size of W in bits is egal to $p - (m + q)$.

3 Public key encryption algorithm :

3.1 Encryption :

In order to send an encrypted message to Bob, Alice performs the following steps :

- 1 She gets his public key composed by natural numbers $[l, m, p, q, Z, U]$, satisfying :

$$q = l + m - p, p > m + q, U = (X \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q), Z \text{ is } l \text{ bits long.}$$

$[X]$ is the m bits long private key of Bob.

- 2 She chooses randomly natural number Y which is m bits long .
- 3 She computes number $V = (Y \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$, then the secret key

$$W = (Y \times U) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(m+q)}).$$

- 4 She encrypts with secret key W her plaintext and sends corresponding ciphertext and number V to Bob.

3.2 Decryption :

In order to decrypt the ciphertext received from Alice, Bob performs the following steps :

- 1 With his private key X and number V received from Alice,

$$\text{he computes secret key } W = (X \times V) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(m+q)}).$$

- 2 With secret key W , he decrypts the ciphertext received from Alice.

4 Digital signature Algorithm :

4.1 Signature :

In order to sign a Message Msg, Bob performs the following steps :

- 1 Hashes Msg by a hash function HF and gets a digest H which length in bits is the same as elements Z of his public key . with his private key $[X]$, he computes a signature :

$$S = (X \times H) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$$

- 2 Sends Message Msg and signature S to Alice.

4.2 Verification :

In order to verify that Message Msg is sent by Bob, Alice performs the following steps :

- 1 She gets his public key composed by natural numbers $[l, m, p, q, Z, U]$, satisfying :

$$q = l + m - p , p > l + q, U = (X \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q), X \text{ is } m \text{ bits whereas } Z \text{ is } l \text{ bits long.}$$

- 2 Hashes Msg by HF and gets a digest H which the length in bits is l the same as Z s.
- 3 From digest H , signature S and the elements $[U, Z]$ of Bob's public key,

$$\text{She computes } Wx = (H \times U) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(l+q)}) \text{ and } Wy = (Z \times S) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^{(l+q)}).$$

- 4 Compares Wx to Wy , Msg is sent by Bob if $Wx = Wy$

5 Efficiency :

In comparison to the standardised key exchange algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman in the multiplicative group and RSA which needed in average N multiplications modulo operations to exchange a secret key (N being private key's length).

The key exchange algorithm presented in this paper needed just 4 multiplications ,
Meaning that presented public key cryptosystem is very fast and efficient compared to Diffie-Hellman and RSA cryptosystems.

6 Security :

The Security of presented public key cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of finding X and Y while knowing $Z, l, m, p, q, U = (X \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q), V = (Y \times Z) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$
 $l + m = p + q, p > m + q, Z$ is l bit long , X and Y are m bits.

To get X from U and Y from V , an attacker should :

- 1 - Invert $F(X) = U = (Z \times X) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$
- 2 - Invert $F(Y) = V = (Z \times Y) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$.

Putting it otherwise, presented public key cryptosystem is based on the difficulty to invert the following function :

$$F(x) = y = (a \times x) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q).$$

a, x, p and q are known natural numbers, while a and x are respectively n and m bits long, ($n > m$) and ($p > q$) .

At first glance we can notice that it is easy to verify a solution but it is difficult to find one, implying that this problem is in NP.

6.1 Proof of equivalence to SAT :

Let the binary representation of A be $a_{(n)} \dots a_{(i+1)} a_{(i)} \dots a_{(0)}$.

The binary representation of X be $x_{(m)} \dots x_{(i+1)} x_{(i)} \dots x_{(0)}$.

The binary representation of Y be $y_{(n+m)} \dots y_{(i+1)} y_{(i)} \dots y_{(0)}$.

Y is the arithmetic product of A and X, our problem consists then on solving this system of equations :

If $(q \leq j \leq m)$:

$$y_j = \left(\left(\sum_{i=0}^j a_{(j-i)} \times x_i \right) + c_j \right) \text{Mod}(2) \quad \text{and} \quad c_j = \left(\left(\sum_{i=0}^{j-1} a_{(j-1-i)} \times x_i \right) + c_{j-1} \right) \text{Div}(2)$$

If $(m \leq j \leq n)$:

$$y_j = \left(\left(\sum_{i=j-m}^j a_{(j-i)} \times x_i \right) + c_j \right) \text{Mod}(2) \quad \text{and} \quad c_j = \left(\left(\sum_{i=j-1-m}^{j-1} a_{(j-1-i)} \times x_i \right) + c_{j-1} \right) \text{Div}(2)$$

If $(n \leq j \leq p)$:

$$y_j = \left(\left(\sum_{i=j-n}^n a_{(j-i)} \times x_i \right) + c_j \right) \text{Mod}(2) \quad \text{and} \quad c_j = \left(\left(\sum_{i=j-1-n}^n a_{(j-1-i)} \times x_i \right) + c_{j-1} \right) \text{Div}(2)$$

c_j is the retenue bit of multiplication product ($Y = A \times X$) at column j.

Solving this system of equations is equivalent to find boolean values $x_{i=0 \rightarrow m}$ satisfying the following logical functions :

$$\text{If } (j \leq m) \quad c_j = F_j(x_{(j-1)}, \dots, x_{(k+1)}, x_{(k)}, \dots, x_0, c_{(j-1)})$$

$$\text{If } (m \leq j) \quad c_j = F_j(x_m, \dots, x_{(k+1)}, x_{(k)}, \dots, x_0, c_{(j-1)})$$

$$\bigwedge_{j=q}^m \left(\left(\bigoplus_{i=0}^j (a_{(j-i)} \wedge x_i) \oplus c_j \right) = y_j \right) = \text{true}$$

$$\bigwedge_{j=m}^n \left(\left(\bigoplus_{i=j-m}^j (a_{(j-i)} \wedge x_i) \oplus c_j \right) = y_j \right) = \text{true}$$

$$\bigwedge_{j=n}^p \left(\left(\bigoplus_{i=j-n}^n (a_{(j-i)} \wedge x_i) \oplus c_j \right) = y_j \right) = \text{true}$$

It's known that every logical function can be converted into an equivalent formula that is in CNF, proving then that our problem is equivalent to the boolean satisfiability problem which is NP Complete.

7 Conclusion and open question :

In this paper we have presented a new fast public key cryptosystem based on the difficulty of inverting the following function : $F(x) = (a \times x) \text{Mod}(2^p) \text{Div}(2^q)$.

Mod is modulo operation , Div is integer division operation , A , r and s are known natural numbers while $(p > q)$.

We have proved its efficiency compared to Diffie Hellman and RSA cryptosystems. We have also proved that its security is based on a new problem equivalent to SAT.

The fact that its security is not based on number theory problems is also a proof of its resistance against quantum computing attacks.

The last decade have seen a enormous progress of SAT Solvers but they are still inefficient in solving logical statements containing a lot of xors which is the case of our problem [5].

SAT is NP complete, meaning that solving it can take exponential time. It has been found that the hardest instances of a SAT problem depends on its constrainedness which is defined as the ratio of clauses to variables [6].

This leads us to ask what forms should have the natural numbers composing public parameters of our PKCS in order to produce hard SAT instances even to a eventual SAT Solver that have not problems with xor clauses.

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