

New Proof Techniques for DLIN-Based Adaptively Secure Attribute-Based Encryption

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Abstract. We propose *adaptively secure* attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes for boolean formulas over large universe attributes from the *decisional linear (DLIN) assumption*, which allow *attribute reuse* in an available formula *without the previously employed redundant multiple encoding technique*. Thus our KP-(resp. CP-)ABE has non-redundant ciphertexts (resp. secret keys). For achieving the results, we develop a new encoding method for access policy matrix for ABE, by *decoupling linear secret sharing (LSS)* into its matrix and randomness, and *partially randomizing* the LSS shares in simulation. The new techniques are of independent interest and we expect it will find another application than ABE.

Keywords: Attribute-Based Encryption, Multi-Use Attributes in Policy, Adaptive Security, Static Assumption

1 Introduction

1.1 Backgrounds

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) introduced by Sahai and Waters [22] presents an advanced vision for encryption and provides more flexible and fine-grained access control in sharing and distributing sensitive data than traditional symmetric and public-key encryption as well as recent identity-based encryption. In ABE systems, either one of the parameters for encryption and secret key is a set of attributes, and the other is an access policy (structure) over a universe of attributes, e.g., a secret key for a user is associated with an access policy and a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. A secret key with a policy can decrypt a ciphertext associated with a set of attributes, iff the attribute set satisfies the policy. If the access policy is for a secret key (resp. for encryption), it is called key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) (resp. ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE)).

All the existing *practical* ABE schemes have been constructed by (bilinear) pairing groups, and the largest class of relations supported by the ABE schemes is (non-monotone or arithmetic) span programs [13, 14, 10, 3] (or (non-monotone) span programs with inner-product relations [19]). While general polynomial size circuits are supported [12, 9] recently, they are much less efficient than the pairing-based ABE schemes and non-practical when the relations are limited to span programs. Hereafter, we focus on pairing-based ABE with span program access structures. An example of such span program predicate over attributes is given by (Institute = Univ. A) AND ((Department = Biology) OR (Position = Professor)), which we simply denote by $\mathcal{X}_1 \wedge (\mathcal{X}_2 \vee \mathcal{X}_3)$ where $\mathcal{X}_1 := \text{Univ. A}$,

$\mathcal{X}_2 := \text{Biology}$ and $\mathcal{X}_3 := \text{Professor}$. We define attribute-multiplicity k for a predicate as the maximum number of appearances of attribute variables, i.e., $k = 2$ for predicate $(\mathcal{X}_1 \wedge \mathcal{X}_2) \vee (\mathcal{X}_1 \wedge \mathcal{X}_3) \vee (\mathcal{X}_2 \wedge \mathcal{X}_4)$ since \mathcal{X}_1 and \mathcal{X}_2 appear twice and others appear just once. While adaptive security for ABE is the standard, realistic and desirable security notion, previously, either efficiency or security is sacrificed for achieving the “multi-use” property in adaptively secure ABE. See adaptively secure ABE in Tables 1 and 2. Our aim is to achieve *short (i.e., non-redundant) ciphertexts (resp. keys)* in *adaptively secure multi-use* KP-ABE (resp. CP-ABE) from *static assumptions*.

In previous *static* assumption based schemes [15, 19, 10], for allowing reuse of attributes in a policy in the adaptive security setting, for example, in KP-ABE, multiple ciphertext components whose number is linear in the product kn' of the number n' of attributes for the ciphertext and the attribute multiplicity k for available policies are necessary, which leads to a very long ciphertext. More precisely, the same information representing attribute set Γ is duplicated over *multiple* ciphertext components depending linearly on the multiplicity k . (See OT10 and CGW15 KP-ABE schemes in Table 1.)

Lewko-Waters [17] first constructed adaptively-secure CP-ABE and KP-ABE schemes for span programs with allowing reuse of attributes in a policy *without the above redundant multiple encoding technique*. While Lewko-Waters’s (CP-)ABE scheme ([17] and subsequent work [2, 3] in Table 1) shows an interesting approach to allowing reuse of attributes in a policy, the security is proven only based on *q-type assumptions* with q the maximum number of attribute-multiplicities in access structures. However, the assumptions (and also the associated schemes) suffered a special attack which was presented by Cheon [11] at Eurocrypt 2006, which leads to inefficiency. Consequently, it is very desirable that the *q-type* assumption should be replaced by a *static* (non- q type) assumption with keeping compact ciphertexts.

Moreover, we note that there exist *no multi-use* CP-ABE scheme with short, i.e., non-redundant, secret keys *even in the selective security setting* from a *static assumption* (Table 2). Now, an important open question is:

Is there an adaptively secure KP-(resp. CP-)ABE scheme for span programs from a static (standard) assumption whose ciphertext (resp. secret key) size is not linear in kn' for the attribute number n' in ciphertext (resp. secret key) and the maximum attribute-multiplicity k of available policies ?

This work makes a significant step for addressing the problem.

1.2 Our Results

We obtain the following results.

- We propose an adaptively secure *multi-use* KP-ABE construction for boolean formulas (or span programs) over large universe attribute matching predicates *with non-redundant ciphertexts from the DLIN assumption* (in Section

Table 1. Comparison with the existing pairing-based multi-use KP-ABE schemes, where PK, SK, CT stand for public key, secret key, ciphertext, respectively, and n' represents the number of attributes in CT, n the max of n' , ℓ the number of rows in access matrix in SK, r the max of the number of columns in access matrix in SK, k (the max of) the “attribute-multiplicity” of an access matrix in SK, respectively. The fourth row describes the warm-up scheme in Appendix 5.3.

	Security	Assump.	PK size	SK size	CT size
GPSW06[13]	selective	DBDH	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $	$O(n') \mathbb{G} $
Tak14 [23]	semi-adaptive	DLIN	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(1) \mathbb{G} $
(Warm-up)				$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $
OT10[19]	adaptive	DLIN	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $	$O(kn') \mathbb{G} $
LW12 [17]		ℓ -Parallel BDHE ($+\alpha$)	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $	$O(n') \mathbb{G} $
Att15 [2, 3]		EDHE3 & 4 para- metrized by n, ℓ, r	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(1) \mathbb{G} $
CGW15 [10]		s -Lin for $\forall s$	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $ for $s = 2$	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $ for $s = 2$	$O(kn') \mathbb{G} $ for $s = 2$
Proposed	adaptive	DLIN	$O(n+r) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $	$O(n+r) \mathbb{G} $

5). The size of a ciphertext for attributes *is not linear in the product kn' of the number of ciphertext attributes n' and the attribute multiplicity k in available access structures*, but has only a linear dependence on some size parameter r of access structures. For comparison with existing ones, refer to Table 1.

- We also propose an adaptively secure multi-use CP-ABE construction for the same access structures as the above KP-ABE with short (non-redundant) keys from DLIN. The CP-ABE scheme is obtained from the above KP-ABE by the natural dual conversion, in particular, the key size *is not linear in kn' for the number n' of key attributes and the attribute multiplicity k in available access structures*. We note that it is *the first multi-use CP-ABE construction with short keys from a static assumption even including the selective secure schemes* (Table 2). For the concrete scheme, see Appendix E.

We used two techniques, decoupling of linear secret sharing (LSS) into two (dual) components, i.e., span program matrix and randomness, and the partial randomization of LSS. A new sparse matrix machinery (Section 4) underlies them. The techniques can be extended naturally to arithmetic span programs (ASP), then, our results can be extended to ASP based ABE proposed by Ishai and Wee [14].

¹ Since $k \leq \ell$, the size of secret keys of the AHY15 scheme [4] is very large compared with others. Also, in [1], a *selective-secure* constant-size ciphertext, but, large secret keys CP-ABE scheme was proposed, recently.

Table 2. Comparison with the existing pairing-based multi-use CP-ABE schemes, where PK, SK, CT stand for public key, secret key, ciphertext, respectively, and n' represents the number of attributes in SK, n the max of n' , ℓ the number of rows in access matrix in CT, r the max of the number of columns in access matrix in CT, k (the max of) the “attribute-multiplicity” of an access matrix in CT, respectively.

	Security	Assump.	PK size	SK size	CT size
Wat11[25] Scheme 2	selective	ν -BDHE	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(kn') \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $
Wat11[25] Scheme 3		DBDH	$O(nr) \mathbb{G} $	$O(kn' + r) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell^2) \mathbb{G} $
AHY15 [4] ¹		parameterized	$O((n\ell)^2\lambda) \mathbb{G} $	$O((n\ell)^4\lambda^2) \mathbb{G} $	$O(1) \mathbb{G} $
OT10 [19]	adaptive	DLIN	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(kn') \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $
LW12 [17]		ℓ -Parallel BDHE (+ α)	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $	$O(n') \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $
CGW15 [10]		s -Lin for $\forall s$	$O(n) \mathbb{G} $ for $s = 2$	$O(kn') \mathbb{G} $ for $s = 2$	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $ for $s = 2$
Proposed	adaptive	DLIN	$O(n + r) \mathbb{G} $	$O(n + r) \mathbb{G} $	$O(\ell) \mathbb{G} $

1.3 Key Techniques

Our results are related to KP- and CP-ABEs, however, for simplicity, we mainly treat on KP-ABE. According to a new framework introduced by Attrapadung, doubly selective security (i.e., selective and co-selective) leads to achieving adaptive one. Since selective security is easily obtained in KP-ABE, we should concentrate on achieving *co-selectively* secure KP-ABE below.

Based on the technique in [5, 23], we have DLIN-based, multi-use and *semi-adaptively* secure KP-ABE with short ciphertext size. We give the underlying scheme (as a warm-up)², and extend it to our adaptive one. Here, access structure \mathbb{S} is given by $\ell \times r$ matrix M and each row $M_i \in \mathbb{F}_q^r$ of the matrix is associated to an attribute value by a map ρ , i.e., labeled with attributes $v_i := \rho(i)$. An attribute set Γ satisfies \mathbb{S} iff $\vec{1} \in \text{span}\langle M_i | v_i \in \Gamma \rangle$ for a fixed special (all-one) vector $\vec{1}$. First, to achieve short ciphertexts in the underlying KP-ABE, attributes $\Gamma := \{x_j\}_{j=1, \dots, n'}$ are encoded in an n -dimensional (with $n \geq n' + 1$) vector $\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j)$. Each (non-zero) attribute value v_i (for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$) associated with a row of access structure matrix M (in \mathbb{S}) is encoded as $\vec{v}_i := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1)$, so $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i = v_i^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (v_i - x_j)$, and the value of inner product is equal to zero if and only if $v_i = x_j$ for some j , i.e., $v_i \in \Gamma$. Here, the relation between \mathbb{S} and Γ is determined by the multiple inner product values $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i$ for one vector \vec{y} which

² By the page limitation, the warm-up scheme is given in Appendix 5.3




Fig. 1. Decoupling of LSS matrix from randomness and partial LSS randomization in semi-functional parts. Here, $(M = (M_i), \rho)$ is an access structure, uniformly random $\vec{f} \leftarrow^U \mathbb{F}_q^r$, $\xi, \xi', \xi'_i, \theta'_i \leftarrow^U \mathbb{F}_q$, $\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j)$, and $\vec{v}_i := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1)$ for $v_i := \rho(i)$.

is equivalent to Γ . As in previous works (e.g., [5, 23]), a ciphertext element \mathbf{c}_1 is encoded with $\omega \vec{y}$ (for random ω), and key elements \mathbf{k}_i^* are encoded with \vec{v}_i and shared secret values $M_i \cdot \vec{f}$ ($i = 1, \dots, \ell$) for a central secret $\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}$ with uniformly random \vec{f} , respectively. We change the encoding method for our new proof method as indicated below.

Basic Idea: Decoupling of LSS matrix from randomness Secret keys in all previous KP-ABE schemes contain shared secret values $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}$ and $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$, which means that randomness \vec{f} is fixed at the key generation phase. Moreover, since, for *pre-challenge* queried keys (in simulation), the challenge \vec{y} is not yet revealed to the challenger, i.e., simulator, at the query phase, we have never had a co-selective simulation strategy for achieving compact ciphertexts together with multi-use leaf attributes v_i in the queried access matrix.

For addressing the problem, we change an encoding method of LSS (Fig. 1). First, we decouple LSS encoding into LSS matrix and randomness, and randomness is encoded on the ciphertext side. (Then, the simulation of the randomness is delayed until the challenge phase.) Precisely, in the secret key, concatenated $V_i := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ are encoded in the i -th component \mathbf{k}_i^* for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ with random θ_i, ξ . We note that the key component \mathbf{k}_i^* has no randomness for LSS (except for connecting randomness ξ), instead, LSS matrix $M := (M_i)_{i=1}^\ell$ is directly encoded in $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}$. In ciphertext, $Y := (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ is encoded. Hence,

in decryption, inner-product values are

$$Y \cdot V_i = \omega \theta_i(\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i) + \xi M_i \cdot \vec{f} = \omega \theta_i(\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i) + \xi s_i \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, \ell,$$

therefore, if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i = 0$, secret share ξs_i for central secret ξs_0 is obtained, and if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i \neq 0$, s_i is totally hidden from the decryptor since θ_i is freshly random.

New Proof Techniques: Partial LSS randomization in simulation and new underlying lemma At the top level of strategy of the security proof, we follow the dual system encryption methodology proposed by Waters [24]. The above change of encoding enables the simulator to simulate the randomness of LSS depending on both of the h -th queried access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ and attributes $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$ (equivalently, vector \vec{y}). We use the simulated randomness \vec{a}_h , which is *not fully random in* \mathbb{F}_q^r , but satisfies $M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = 0$ if $v_i \in \Gamma$ and $\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h \neq 0$. Such a vector exists since Γ does not satisfy \mathbb{S} , and it has been used for security in previous works, for example, in [13]. In ciphertext, the concatenated vector $Y' := (\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ is encoded in the semi-functional space. And, in the semi-functional space of the h -th queried key, $V'_i := (\theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ are encoded in the i -th component \mathbf{k}_i^* for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$. Since V'_i is *independent of* Γ , it can be simulated for the *pre-challenge* key. Then,

$$Y' \cdot V'_i = \omega' \theta'_i(\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i) + \xi'_i M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i = 0, \\ \omega' \theta'_i(\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i) + \xi'_i M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h & \text{if } \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i \neq 0, \end{cases}$$

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$. Here, if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i \neq 0$, $Y' \cdot V'_i$ is uniformly random and independent from other variables since θ'_i are freshly random. Let $V''_i := (\theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ with uniformly random ξ'_i which are independent of each other for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$.

$$Y' \cdot V''_i = \omega' \theta'_i(\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i) + \xi'_i M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i = 0, \\ \omega' \theta'_i(\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i) + \xi'_i M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h & \text{if } \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i \neq 0, \end{cases}$$

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$. Again, if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i \neq 0$, $Y' \cdot V''_i$ is uniformly random and independent of other variables. That is, $Y' \cdot V'_i$ and $Y' \cdot V''_i$ are equivalently distributed. Therefore, we can conceptually change V'_i which contains variable ξ' to V''_i with *no* ξ' by using the pairwise independence lemma (Lemma 3) as in the previous dual system encryption proofs. We stress that V''_i are *also independent of the challenge attributes* Γ , and then can be used in the pre-challenge key simulation. In this way, we can sequentially eliminate the randomness ξ' from all key components, \mathbf{k}_i^* for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$, *except for* \mathbf{k}_0^* , and finally, ξ' remains only in the central element \mathbf{k}_0^* , and the inner-product of the semi-functional parts of \mathbf{k}_0^* and the corresponding ciphertext component is uniformly random value $\xi' \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h$ since $\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h \neq 0$. So, the proof proceeds successfully (See Section 5.5 for proof outline).

We extend the sparse matrix technique on dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) developed in [21, 23] for achieving compact ciphertexts. Refer to Section 5.1 for the details.

1.4 Notations

When A is a random variable or distribution, $y \stackrel{\text{R}}{\leftarrow} A$ denotes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, $y \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} A$ denotes

that y is uniformly selected from A . We denote the finite field of order q by \mathbb{F}_q , and $\mathbb{F}_q \setminus \{0\}$ by \mathbb{F}_q^\times . A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over \mathbb{F}_q , e.g., \vec{y} denotes $(y_1, \dots, y_n) \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$. For two vectors $\vec{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ and $\vec{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$, $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}$ denotes the inner-product $\sum_{i=1}^n y_i v_i$. The vector $\vec{0}$ is abused as the zero vector in \mathbb{F}_q^n for any n . X^T denotes the transpose of matrix X . A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space \mathbb{V} , e.g., $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{V}$. When $\mathbf{b}_i \in \mathbb{V}$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$), $\text{span}\langle \mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n \rangle \subseteq \mathbb{V}$ (resp. $\text{span}\langle \vec{x}_1, \dots, \vec{x}_n \rangle$) denotes the subspace generated by $\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n$ (resp. $\vec{x}_1, \dots, \vec{x}_n$). For bases $\mathbb{B} := (\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_N)$ and $\mathbb{B}^* := (\mathbf{b}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_N^*)$, $(x_1, \dots, x_N)_{\mathbb{B}} := \sum_{i=1}^N x_i \mathbf{b}_i$ and $(y_1, \dots, y_N)_{\mathbb{B}^*} := \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \mathbf{b}_i^*$. \vec{e}_j denotes the canonical basis vector $(\overbrace{0 \dots 0}^{j-1}, 1, \overbrace{0 \dots 0}^{n+r-j}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ for positive integers n and r . $GL(n, \mathbb{F}_q)$ denotes the general linear group of degree n over \mathbb{F}_q .

2 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces (DPVS)

In this paper, for simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [18] constructed using symmetric bilinear pairing groups given in Def. 1. Owing to the abstraction of DPVS, the presentation and the security proof of the proposed schemes are essentially the same as those on the asymmetric version of DPVS.

Definition 1. “Symmetric bilinear pairing groups” $(q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, G, e)$ are a tuple of a prime q , cyclic additive group \mathbb{G} and multiplicative group \mathbb{G}_T of order q , $G \neq 0 \in \mathbb{G}$, and a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ i.e., $e(sG, tG) = e(G, G)^{st}$ and $e(G, G) \neq 1$. Let \mathcal{G}_{bpg} be an algorithm that takes input 1^λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing groups $(q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, G, e)$ with security parameter λ .

“Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)” of dimension N by a direct product of symmetric pairing groups $(q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, G, e)$ are given by prime q , N -dimensional vector space $\mathbb{V} := \overbrace{\mathbb{G} \times \dots \times \mathbb{G}}^N$ over \mathbb{F}_q , cyclic group \mathbb{G}_T of order q , and pairing $e : \mathbb{V} \times \mathbb{V} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. The pairing is defined by $e(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) := \prod_{i=1}^N e(G_i, H_i) \in \mathbb{G}_T$ where $\mathbf{x} := (G_1, \dots, G_N) \in \mathbb{V}$ and $\mathbf{y} := (H_1, \dots, H_N) \in \mathbb{V}$. This is nondegenerate bilinear i.e., $e(s\mathbf{x}, t\mathbf{y}) = e(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})^{st}$ and if $e(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = 1$ for all $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{V}$, then $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$.

3 Definitions of KP-ABE

3.1 Span Programs and Access Structures

Definition 2 (Span Programs [7]). $\mathcal{U} (\subset \{0, 1\}^*)$ is a universe, a set of attributes, which is expressed by a value of attribute, i.e., $v \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times (:= \mathbb{F}_q \setminus \{0\})$. A span program over \mathbb{F}_q is a labeled matrix $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ where M is a $(\ell \times r)$ matrix over \mathbb{F}_q and ρ is a labeling of the rows of M by literals from $\{v, v', \dots\}$ (every row is labeled by one literal), i.e., $\rho : \{1, \dots, \ell\} \rightarrow \{v, v', \dots\}$. A span

program accepts or rejects an input by the following criterion. Let Γ be a set of attributes, i.e., $\Gamma := \{x_j\}_{1 \leq j \leq n'} (x_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times)$. The span program \mathbb{S} accepts Γ if and only if $\vec{1} \in \text{span}(\langle (M_i)_{\rho(i)=v_i \in \Gamma} \rangle)$, i.e., some linear combination of the rows $(M_i)_{\rho(i) \in \Gamma}$ gives the all one vector $\vec{1}$.

No row M_i ($i = 1, \dots, \ell$) of the matrix M is $\vec{0}$. We now construct a secret-sharing scheme for a (monotone) span program.

Definition 3. A secret-sharing scheme for span program $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ is:

1. Let M be $\ell \times r$ matrix. Let column vector $\vec{f} := (f_1, \dots, f_r) \xleftarrow{\mathcal{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^r$. Then, $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f} = \sum_{k=1}^r f_k$ is the secret to be shared, and $\vec{s} := (s_1, \dots, s_\ell)^T := M \cdot \vec{f}^T$ is the ℓ shares of the secret s_0 and the share s_i belongs to $\rho(i)$.
2. If span program $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ accepts Γ , i.e., $\vec{1} \in \text{span}(\langle (M_i)_{\rho(i) \in \Gamma} \rangle)$, there exist constants $\{\alpha_i \in \mathbb{F}_q \mid i \in I\}$ such that $I \subseteq \{i \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \mid \rho(i) \in \Gamma\}$ and $\sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i s_i = s_0$. Furthermore, these constants $\{\alpha_i\}$ can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M .

3.2 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)

In key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE), encryption (resp. a secret key) is associated with attributes Γ (resp. access structure \mathbb{S}). Relation R for KP-ABE is defined as $R(\mathbb{S}, \Gamma) = 1$ iff access structure \mathbb{S} accepts Γ .

Definition 4 (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption: KP-ABE). A key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme consists of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec. They are given as follows:

Setup takes as input security parameter 1^λ , a bound n on the number of attributes per ciphertext and a bound r on the number of columns of an access matrix in a secret key. It outputs public parameters pk and master secret key sk .

KeyGen takes as input public parameters pk , master secret key sk , and access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$. It outputs a corresponding secret key $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}$.

Enc takes as input public parameters pk , message m in some associated message space msg , and a set of attributes, $\Gamma := \{x_j\}_{j=1}^{n'}$. It outputs a ciphertext ct_{Γ} .

Dec takes as input public parameters pk , secret key $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}$ for access structure \mathbb{S} , and ciphertext ct_{Γ} that was encrypted under a set of attributes Γ . It outputs either $m' \in \text{msg}$ or the distinguished symbol \perp .

A KP-ABE scheme should have the correctness: for all $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, n, r)$, all access structures \mathbb{S} , all secret keys $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}} \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \text{KeyGen}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}, \mathbb{S})$, all messages m , all attribute sets Γ , all ciphertexts $\text{ct}_{\Gamma} \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m, \Gamma)$, it holds that $m = \text{Dec}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ if \mathbb{S} accepts Γ . Otherwise, it holds with negligible probability.

Definition 5 (Adaptive Security). The model for defining the adaptively payload-hiding security of KP-ABE under chosen plaintext attack is given by the following game:

Setup In the adaptive security, the challenger runs the setup,

$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, n, r)$, and gives public parameters pk to the adversary.

Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of key queries, \mathbb{S} , to the challenger. The challenger gives $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}} \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \text{KeyGen}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}, \mathbb{S})$ to the adversary.

Challenge The adversary submits two messages $m^{(0)}, m^{(1)}$, and a challenge attribute set, Γ , provided that no \mathbb{S} queried to the challenger in Phase 1 accepts Γ . The challenger flips a coin $b \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \{0, 1\}$, and computes $\text{ct}_{\Gamma}^{(b)} \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m^{(b)}, \Gamma)$. It gives $\text{ct}_{\Gamma}^{(b)}$ to the adversary.

Phase 2 Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that no queried \mathbb{S} accepts challenge Γ .

Guess The adversary outputs a guess b' of b , and wins if $b' = b$.

The advantage of adversary \mathcal{A} in the adaptive game is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{KP-ABE}}(\lambda) := \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - 1/2$ for any λ . A KP-ABE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding secure if all poly-time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the game.

Remark 1 The challenge Γ is declared by the adversary just before **Phase 1** (resp. before **Setup**) in the semi-adaptive (resp. selective) game, and the corresponding security notions are defined in the similar manner as above.

4 Special Matrix Subgroups

Let $n \geq 2$ and $\tilde{n} := n + r$. Lemmas 1–3 are key lemmas for the security proof for our KP- and CP-ABE schemes.

We start by a motivational argument for introducing our new sparse matrix technique. Previous sparse matrices in DPVS [21, 23] are given by the form in Eq. (21) (in Appendix B.2), whose diagonal element except for the first one is the same denoted by u . For achieving our information theoretical change from (Y', V'_i) to (Y', V''_i) described in Section 1.3, we use one more randomness in diagonal elements, i.e., two random u_1 and u_2 , as given in Eq. (1). More precisely, random $U \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ acts on $\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} = \mathbb{F}_q^n \times \mathbb{F}_q^r$ by using different scalars u_1 and u_2 on the first \mathbb{F}_q^n and the second \mathbb{F}_q^r respectively. The new sparse matrix action is the key fact for proving Lemmas 3 and 8.

For positive integers n and r , let

$$\mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) := \left\{ \left(\begin{array}{cccc} u'_1 & & & \\ u'_2 & u_1 & & \\ \vdots & & \ddots & \\ u'_n & & & u_1 \\ u'_{n+1} & & & u_2 \\ \vdots & & & \ddots \\ u'_{n+r} & & & u_2 \end{array} \right) \mid \begin{array}{l} u_1, u_2, u'_l \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ \text{for } l = 1, \dots, n+r, \\ \text{a blank element} \\ \text{in the matrix} \\ \text{denotes } 0 \in \mathbb{F}_q \end{array} \right\}, \quad (1)$$

and $\mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times := \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) \cap GL(\tilde{n}, \mathbb{F}_q)$.

DPVS approach. An underlying construction of our proposed one is given in Section 5.3, which is a dual form of the scheme in [23] since the $5n \times 5n$ sparse basis matrix is used in a dual manner. Hence, while [23] scheme has size $O(1)$ ciphertexts and size $O(\ell n)$ keys, the underlying one has size $O(n)$ ciphertexts and size $O(\ell)$ keys (Table 1), where ℓ, n are the number of rows in access structure matrix M and the max of the number of attributes in Γ , respectively. In other words, the dual conversion of the scheme in [23] to the underlying scheme increases ciphertext size $O(n)$ -times and then decreases key size $O(n)$ -times.

As mentioned in Introduction, the top level idea of our construction is the decoupling technique of LSS encoding. The underlying scheme has a usual encoding of LSS, i.e., encoding a central secret s_0 and shares s_i . Therefore, the comprehension of the construction idea of the underlying one is necessary for understanding our proposed one. In this section, we will explain key ideas of constructing the underlying and our KP-ABE schemes. First, we will show how size $O(n)$ ciphertexts and size $O(\ell)$ keys can be achieved in the underlying scheme, where the IPE scheme given in [21] is used as a building block. Here, we will use a simplified (or toy) version of the underlying KP-ABE scheme, for which the security is no more ensured in the standard model under the DLIN assumption.

A ciphertext in the simplified KP-ABE scheme consists of two vector elements, $(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1) \in \mathbb{G}^5 \times \mathbb{G}^n$, and $c_T \in \mathbb{G}_T$. A secret key consists of $\ell + 1$ vector elements, $(\mathbf{k}_0^*, \mathbf{k}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{k}_\ell^*) \in \mathbb{G}^5 \times (\mathbb{G}^n)^\ell$ for access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$, where the number of rows of M is ℓ and \mathbf{k}_i^* with $i \geq 1$ corresponds to the i -th row. Therefore, to achieve shorter secret keys, we have to compress $\mathbf{k}_i^* \in \mathbb{G}^n$ to a constant size in n . We now employ a special form of basis generation matrix, $X := \begin{pmatrix} \mu'_1 & & & & \\ \mu'_2 & \mu & & & \\ \vdots & & \ddots & & \\ \mu'_n & & & \mu & \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{H}(n, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)$ of Eq. (1) in Section 4, where

$\mu, \mu'_1, \dots, \mu'_n \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$ and a blank in the matrix denotes $0 \in \mathbb{F}_q$. The master secret key (DPVS basis) is $\mathbb{B}^* := \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_1^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_n^* \end{pmatrix} := \begin{pmatrix} \mu'_1 G & & & & \\ \mu'_2 G & \mu G & & & \\ \vdots & & \ddots & & \\ \mu'_n G & & & \mu G & \end{pmatrix}$. Let the i -th

component of a secret key associated with $\mathbb{S} := (M := (M_i)_{i=1}^\ell, \rho)$ consists of $\mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i v_i^{n-1} + s_i, \theta_i v_i^{n-2}, \dots, \theta_i v_i, \theta_i)_{\mathbb{B}^*} = (\theta_i v_i^{n-1} + s_i) \mathbf{b}_1^* + \theta_i (v_i^{n-2} \mathbf{b}_2^* + \dots + v_i \mathbf{b}_{n-1}^* + \mathbf{b}_n^*) = \left((\theta_i (\sum_{j=1}^n v_i^{n-j} \mu'_j) + s_i \mu'_1) G, v_i^{n-2} \theta_i \mu G, \dots, \theta_i \mu G \right)$, where $v_i := \rho(i), \theta_i \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q, \vec{f} \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^r$ and $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$. Then, \mathbf{k}_i^* can be compressed to only *two* group elements $(K_{i,1}^* := (\theta_i (\sum_{j=1}^n v_i^{n-j} \mu'_j) + s_i \mu'_1) G, K_{i,2}^* := \theta_i \mu G)$ as well as v_i , since \mathbf{k}_i^* can be obtained by $(K_{i,1}^*, v_i^{n-2} K_{i,2}^*, \dots, v_i K_{i,2}^*, K_{i,2}^*)$ (note that $v_i^j K_{i,2}^* = v_i^j \theta_i \mu G$ for $j = 0, \dots, n-2$). That is, the i -th component of a secret key (excluding v_i) can be just two group elements, or the size is constant in n , then $(\mathbf{k}_i^*)_{i=0}^\ell$ can be compressed into size $O(\ell)$.

Let $\mathbb{B} := (\mathbf{b}_i)$ be the dual orthonormal basis of $\mathbb{B}^* := (\mathbf{b}_i^*)$, and \mathbb{B} be the public key in the simplified KP-ABE scheme. We specify $(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*, c_T)$ such that $e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) = g_T^{\zeta - \xi s_0}$ and $c_T := g_T^\zeta m \in \mathbb{G}_T$ with s_0 is a center secret of shares $\{s_i\}_{i=1, \dots, \ell}$ associated with access structure \mathbb{S} , which are embedded into $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=1, \dots, \ell}$ as indicated above. We also set a ciphertext for $\Gamma := \{x_1, \dots, x_{n'}\}$ as $\mathbf{c}_1 := (\omega \vec{y})_{\mathbb{B}}$ where $\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j)$, and $\omega \leftarrow^{\mathbb{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$. From the dual orthonormality of \mathbb{B} and \mathbb{B}^* , if \mathbb{S} accepts Γ , there exists a system of coefficients $\{\alpha_i\}_{\rho(i) \in \Gamma}$ such that $e(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{k}'^*) = g_T^{\xi s_0}$, where $\mathbf{k}'^* := \sum_{\rho(i) \in \Gamma} \alpha_i \mathbf{k}_i^*$. Hence, a decryptor can compute $g_T^{\xi s_0}$ if and only if \mathbb{S} accepts Γ , i.e., can obtain plaintext m . We can extend the simplified KP-ABE to a *semi-adaptively* secure KP-ABE scheme under the DLIN assumption just by enlarging the dimension of the underlying vector space, which is shown in Section 5.3. The security proof is based on the Waters's dual system technique and given in a similar manner to [23]. The provably secure scheme has the same asymptotic sizes of keys and ciphertexts, i.e., $O(\ell)$ -sized keys and $O(n)$ -sized ciphertexts.

Our goal is to construct an *adaptively* secure KP-ABE with a comparable asymptotic data sizes, i.e., $O(\ell)$ -sized keys and $O(n+r)$ -sized ciphertexts, from the underlying one. We use a decoupling technique of LSS matrix from randomness for achieving the goal. First, we enlarge the space from $O(n)$ to $O(n+r)$ dimension. As described in Fig. 1, a uniformly random vector $\vec{f} \in \mathbb{F}_q^r$ for LSS is encoded on the ciphertext component \mathbf{c}_1 . In the simplified scheme, $\mathbf{c}_1 := (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f})_{\mathbb{B}} \in \mathbb{G}^{n+r}$ where $\vec{y} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ is defined as above. For encoding each row M_i of access matrix M on \mathbf{k}_i^* , the above matrix X is extended to a $(n+r) \times (n+r)$ matrix in $\mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ (Eq. (1)), then the master secret key is given by

$$\mathbb{B}^* := \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_1^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_n^* \\ \mathbf{b}_{n+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{n+r}^* \end{pmatrix} := \begin{pmatrix} \mu'_1 G & & & & & & & \\ & \mu_2 G & \mu_1 G & & & & & \\ & & \ddots & \ddots & & & & \\ & & & \mu'_n G & & & & \\ & & & & \mu_1 G & & & \\ & & & & & \mu_2 G & & \\ & & & & & & \ddots & \\ & & & & & & & \mu_2 G \end{pmatrix} \text{ where } \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu'_1, \dots,$$

$\mu'_{n+r} \leftarrow^{\mathbb{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$. Here, note that two independent diagonal elements μ_1, μ_2 are used for the first n -dimension and the second r -dimension. (Refer to the argument given in the beginning of Section 4.) Hence, \mathbf{k}_i^* is given by $\mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i)_{\mathbb{B}^*}$. We note \mathbf{k}_i^* is compressed to three group elements as before, i.e., $K_{i,1}^* := (\theta_i (\sum_{l=1}^n v_i^{n-l} \mu'_l) + \xi (\sum_{l=1}^r M_{i,l} \mu'_{n+l})) G$, $K_{i,2}^* := \theta_i \mu_1 G$, $K_{i,3}^* := \xi \mu_2 G$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$, and the secret key size is $O(\ell)$. The pairing value of \mathbf{c}_1 and \mathbf{k}_i^* is $e(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{k}_i^*) = g_T^{\omega \theta_i \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i + \xi M_i \cdot \vec{f}} = g_T^{\omega \theta_i \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i + \xi s_i}$ where $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$. These values are equivalent to the previous underlying scheme. Therefore, the decryption algorithm is the same as before.

We then explain how our *full* KP-ABE scheme is constructed on the above-mentioned simplified KP-ABE scheme. The target of designing the full KP-ABE

scheme is to achieve the adaptive security *under the DLIN assumption*. Here, we adopt and extend a strategy initiated in [19], in which the dual system encryption methodology is employed in a modular or hierarchical manner. That is, three top level assumptions, the security of Problems 1–3, are directly used in the dual system encryption methodology and the assumptions are reduced to a primitive assumption, the DLIN assumption.

To meet the requirements for applying to the dual system encryption methodology and reducing to the DLIN assumption, the underlying vector space is five times greater than that of the above-mentioned simplified scheme. For example, $\mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, 0^{2n+2r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}^*}$ for $\rho(i) = v_i$, $\mathbf{c}_1 = (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, 0^{2n+2r}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}}$ with $\vec{\varphi}_1 \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$, and $X := \begin{pmatrix} X_{1,1} \cdots X_{1,5} \\ \vdots \\ X_{5,1} \cdots X_{5,5} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{L}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ of Eq. (3) in Section 4, where each $X_{i,j}$ is of the form of $X \in \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ in the simplified scheme. The vector space consists of four orthogonal subspaces, i.e., real encoding part, hidden part, secret key randomness part, and ciphertext randomness part. The simplified KP-ABE scheme corresponds to the first real encoding part.

A key fact in the security reduction is that $\mathcal{L}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ is a *subgroup* of $GL(5(n+r), \mathbb{F}_q)$ (Lemma 2), which enables a *random-self-reducibility* argument for reducing the intractability of Problems 1–3 to the DLIN assumption. For the reduction, see [21]. We employ a new simulation technique in dual system encryption using random vector \vec{f} in \mathbf{c}_1 . For the details, refer to the proof outline in Section 5.5.

5.2 Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator

We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator $\mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}$ below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed KP-ABE scheme.

$\mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, (n, r)) : \text{param}_{\mathbb{G}} := (q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, G, e) \stackrel{\text{R}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}_{\text{bpg}}(1^\lambda)$, $N_0 := 5$, $N_1 := 5(n+r)$,
 $\text{param}_{\mathbb{V}_t} := (q, \mathbb{V}_t, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbb{A}_t, e) := \mathcal{G}_{\text{dps}}(1^\lambda, N_t, \text{param}_{\mathbb{G}})$ for $t = 0, 1$,
 $\psi \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^\times$, $g_T := e(G, G)^\psi$, $\text{param}_{(n,r)} := ((n, r), \{\text{param}_{\mathbb{V}_t}\}_{t=0,1}, g_T)$,
 $X_0 := (\chi_{0,i,j})_{i,j=1,\dots,5} \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} GL(N_0, \mathbb{F}_q)$, $X_1 \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{L}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$, hereafter,
 $\{\mu_{i,j,\ell}, \mu'_{i,j,\ell}\}_{l=1,\dots,n+r}^{i,j=1,\dots,5;\ell=1,2}$ denotes non-zero entries of X_1 as in Eq. (2),
 $\mathbf{b}_{0,i}^* := (\chi_{0,i,1}, \dots, \chi_{0,i,5})_{\mathbb{A}} = \sum_{j=1}^5 \chi_{0,i,j} \mathbf{a}_j$ for $i = 1, \dots, 5$, $\mathbb{B}_0^* := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}^*)$,
 $B_{i,j,\ell}^* := \mu_{i,j,\ell} G$, $B'_{i,j,\ell} := \mu'_{i,j,\ell} G$ for $i, j = 1, \dots, 5; \ell = 1, 2; l = 1, \dots, n+r$,
for $t = 0, 1$, $(\vartheta_{t,i,j})_{i,j=1,\dots,N_t} := \psi \cdot (X_t^T)^{-1}$,
 $\mathbf{b}_{t,i} := (\vartheta_{t,i,1}, \dots, \vartheta_{t,i,N_t})_{\mathbb{A}} = \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} \vartheta_{t,i,j} \mathbf{a}_j$ for $i = 1, \dots, N_t$, $\mathbb{B}_t := (\mathbf{b}_{t,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{t,N_t})$,
return $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1, \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B'_{i,j,\ell}\}_{l=1,\dots,n+r}^{i,j=1,\dots,5;\ell=1,2})$.

Remark 2 Let sparse block matrix

$$\left. \begin{aligned} & \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,(i-1)(n+r)+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,i(n+r)}^* \end{pmatrix} := (X_{i,1} \cdot G \cdots X_{i,5} \cdot G) \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, 5, \\ & \text{and } \mathbb{B}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}^*), \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (4)$$

where $X_{i,j} \cdot G$ means the componentwise multiplication. \mathbb{B}_1 is the dual orthonormal basis of \mathbb{B}_1^* , i.e., $e(\mathbf{b}_{1,i}, \mathbf{b}_{1,i}^*) = g_T$ and $e(\mathbf{b}_{1,i}, \mathbf{b}_{1,j}^*) = 1$ for $1 \leq i \neq j \leq 5(n+r)$.

5.3 Warm-Up: Underlying Semi-adaptively Secure Construction

As a warm-up, we describe a semi-adaptively secure KP-ABE scheme, which is a dual construction of [23] whose secret keys are compressed by using a sparse matrix while [23] scheme has compressed ciphertexts. Namely, we use the sparse matrix in a dual manner of [23]. We refer to Section 1.4 for notations on DPVS.

Setup($1^\lambda, n$) : / * $N_0 := 5, N_1 := 5n$ */

(param $_n, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1, \{B_{i,j,l}^*, B_{i,j,l}'^*\}_{i,j=1,\dots,5; l=1,\dots,n}^{\ell=1,2}$) $\xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, (n, 0))$,

$\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0 := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5})$, $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0^* := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}^*)$,

$\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1 := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n}, \mathbf{b}_{1,4n+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5n})$,

return pk := (1^λ , param $_n$, $\{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}$), sk := ($\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0^*$, $\{B_{i,j,l}^*, B_{i,j,l}'^*\}_{i=1,4; j=1,\dots,5; l=1,2; t=1,\dots,n}$).

KeyGen(pk, sk, $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$) : $\vec{f} \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q^r$, $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}$, $\eta_0 \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q$,

$\mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, s_0, 0, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}$,

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$,

if $\rho(i) = v_i$, $\vec{v}_i := (v_{i,l})_{l=1}^n := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1)$, $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$, $\theta_i, \psi_i, \eta_i \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q$,

for $j = 1, \dots, 5$, $K_{i,1,j}^* := \sum_{l=1}^n v_{i,l} (\theta_i B_{1,j,l}'^* + \psi_i B_{5,j,l}'^*) + s_i B_{1,j,1}'^* + \eta_i B_{5,j,1}'^*$,

$K_{i,2,j}^* := \theta_i B_{1,j,1}^* + \psi_i B_{5,j,1}^*$,

return sk $_{\mathbb{S}} := (\mathbb{S}, \mathbf{k}_0^*, \{K_{i,1,j}^*, K_{i,2,j}^*\}_{i=1,\dots,\ell; j=1,\dots,5})$.

Enc(pk, m , $\Gamma := \{x_1, \dots, x_{n'} \mid x_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times, n' \leq n-1\}$) :

$\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j)$,

$\omega, \varphi_0, \zeta \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\vec{\varphi}_1 \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q^n$, $\mathbf{c}_0 := (\zeta, \omega, 0, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}$,

$\mathbf{c}_1 := (\underbrace{\omega \vec{y}}_n, \underbrace{0^{2n}}_{2n}, \underbrace{0^n}_n, \underbrace{\vec{\varphi}_1}_n)_{\mathbb{B}_1}$

$\mathbf{c}_T := g_T^\zeta m$, ct $_{\Gamma} := (\Gamma, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_T)$, return ct $_{\Gamma}$.

Dec(pk, sk $_{\mathbb{S}} := (\mathbb{S}, \mathbf{k}_0^*, \{K_{i,1,j}^*, K_{i,3,j}^*\}_{i=1,\dots,\ell; j=1,\dots,5})$, ct $_{\Gamma} := (\Gamma, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_T)$) :

If $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ accepts Γ , then compute I and $\{\alpha_i\}_{i \in I}$ such that

$\vec{1} = \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i M_i$, where M_i is the i -th row of M , and

$$\begin{aligned}
& I \subseteq \{i \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \mid [\rho(i) = v_i \wedge v_i \in \Gamma]\}. \\
& \text{for } i \in I, \quad \text{if } \rho(i) = v_i, \quad \vec{v}_i := (v_{i,l})_{l=1}^n := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1), \\
& \mathbf{k}_i^* := \left(\overbrace{K_{i,1,1}^*, v_{i,2}K_{i,2,1}^*, \dots, v_{i,n}K_{i,2,1}^*}^n, \dots, \overbrace{K_{i,1,5}^*, v_{i,2}K_{i,2,5}^*, \dots, v_{i,n}K_{i,2,5}^*}^n \right), \\
& \text{that is, } \mathbf{k}_i^* := \left(\overbrace{\theta_i \vec{v}_i + s_i \vec{e}_1}^n, \quad \overbrace{0^{2n}}^{2n}, \quad \overbrace{\psi_i \vec{v}_i + \eta_i \vec{e}_1}^n, \quad \overbrace{0^n}^n \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \\
& \mathbf{k}^{'*} := \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i \mathbf{k}_i^*, \quad K := e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) \cdot e(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{k}^{'*}), \quad \text{return } m' := c_T / K.
\end{aligned}$$

[Correctness] If $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ accepts Γ , $K = e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) \cdot e(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{k}^{'*}) = g_T^{-\omega s_0 + \zeta} g_T^{\omega \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i s_i} = g_T^\zeta$ where $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}$, $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$.

We note that secret key $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}$ consists of $5\ell + 5$ group elements and ciphertext ct_{Γ} consists of $5n + 5$ group elements (and one \mathbb{G}_T element).

The standard DLIN assumption is defined in Appendix A.

Theorem 1. *The proposed multi-use KP-ABE scheme is semi-adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.*

Theorem 1 is proven in a similar manner as in [23].

In the semi-adaptive security model, the challenge attribute set Γ is declared by the adversary at the start of the game, but after receiving the public key pk from the challenger. Therefore, for each key query $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$, the challenger can determine whether $\rho(i) \in \Gamma$ or not for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$. The challenger in the security proof makes use of this information to simulate a component \mathbf{k}_i^* of a queried key for each $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ in a refined dual system encryption proof. The main part of the game sequence is similar (but not equal) to the Game 3 sequence in the proof of Theorem 2 below.

5.4 Proposed Adaptively Secure Construction

By decoupling LSS coefficients $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f} \in \mathbb{F}_q$ to $M_i \in \mathbb{F}_q^r$ in the key side and $\vec{f} \in \mathbb{F}_q^r$ in the ciphertext side of the underlying scheme, we obtain our proposed adaptively secure KP-ABE scheme.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, (n, r)) : / * N_0 := 5, N_1 := 5(n+r) */ \\
& \left(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1, \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B_{i,j,\ell}^{*'}\}_{i=1,\dots,5; \ell=1,2}^{j=1,\dots,5; \ell=1,\dots,n+r} \right) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, (n, r)), \\
& \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0 := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}), \quad \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0^* := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}^*), \\
& \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1 := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}, \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}), \\
& \text{return } \text{pk} := (1^\lambda, \text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}), \quad \text{sk} := (\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0^*, \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B_{i,j,\ell}^{*'}\}_{i=1,4; j=1,\dots,5}^{\ell=1,2; \ell=1,\dots,n+r}). \\
& \text{KeyGen}(\text{pk}, \text{sk}, \mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)) : \quad \xi, \eta_0 \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q, \quad \mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, \xi, 0, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}, \\
& \text{for } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \quad \text{if } \rho(i) = v_i, \quad \vec{v}_i := (v_{i,l})_{l=1}^n := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1), \quad \theta_i, \psi_i, \eta_i \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q, \\
& \text{for } j = 1, \dots, 5,
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
K_{i,1,j}^* &:= \sum_{l=1}^n v_{i,l}(\theta_i B_{1,j,l}^* + \psi_i B_{5,j,l}^*) + \sum_{l=1}^r M_{i,l}(\xi B_{1,j,n+l}^* + \eta_i B_{5,j,n+l}^*), \\
K_{i,2,j}^* &:= \theta_i B_{1,j,1}^* + \psi_i B_{5,j,1}^*, \quad K_{i,3,j}^* := \xi B_{1,j,2}^* + \eta_i B_{5,j,2}^*, \\
\text{return sk}_{\mathbb{S}} &:= (\mathbb{S}, \mathbf{k}_0^*, \{K_{i,1,j}^*, K_{i,2,j}^*, K_{i,3,j}^*\}_{i=1,\dots,\ell; j=1,\dots,5}).
\end{aligned}$$

Enc(pk, m, $\Gamma := \{x_1, \dots, x_{n'} \mid x_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times, n' \leq n-1\}$):

$$\begin{aligned}
\vec{y} &:= (y_1, \dots, y_n) \text{ such that } \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j), \\
\vec{f} &\stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^r, \quad \omega, \varphi_0, \zeta \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q, \quad \vec{\varphi}_1 \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}, \quad \mathbf{c}_0 := (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, 0, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0},
\end{aligned}$$

$$\mathbf{c}_1 := \left(\underbrace{\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}}_{n+r}, \underbrace{0^{2n+2r}}_{2n+2r}, \underbrace{0^{n+r}}_{n+r}, \underbrace{\vec{\varphi}_1}_{n+r} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1}$$

$$c_T := g_T^\zeta m, \quad \text{ct}_\Gamma := (\Gamma, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, c_T), \quad \text{return ct}_\Gamma.$$

Dec(pk, sk $_{\mathbb{S}}$:= $(\mathbb{S}, \mathbf{k}_0^*, \{K_{i,1,j}^*, K_{i,2,j}^*, K_{i,3,j}^*\}_{j=1,\dots,\ell}^{i=1,\dots,\ell})$, ct $_{\Gamma}$:= $(\Gamma, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, c_T)$):

If $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ accepts Γ , then compute I and $\{\alpha_i\}_{i \in I}$ such that

$$\vec{1} = \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i M_i, \text{ where } M_i \text{ is the } i\text{-th row of } M, \text{ and}$$

$$I \subseteq \{i \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \mid [\rho(i) = v_i \wedge v_i \in \Gamma]\}.$$

for $i \in I$, if $\rho(i) = v_i$, $\vec{v}_i := (v_{i,l})_{l=1}^n := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1)$,

$$\mathbf{k}_i^* := \left(\overbrace{K_{i,1,1}^*, v_{i,2} K_{i,2,1}^*, \dots, v_{i,n} K_{i,2,1}^*, M_{i,1} K_{i,3,1}^*, \dots, M_{i,r} K_{i,3,1}^*, \dots}^{n+r}, \dots, \right. \\
\left. \overbrace{K_{i,1,5}^*, v_{i,2} K_{i,2,5}^*, \dots, v_{i,n} K_{i,2,5}^*, M_{i,1} K_{i,3,5}^*, \dots, M_{i,r} K_{i,3,5}^*}^{n+r} \right),$$

$$\text{that is, } \mathbf{k}_i^* := \left(\underbrace{\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i}_{n+r}, \underbrace{0^{2n+2r}}_{2n+2r}, \underbrace{\psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i}_{n+r}, \underbrace{0^{n+r}}_{n+r} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1},$$

$$\mathbf{k}'^* := \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i \mathbf{k}_i^*, \quad K := e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) \cdot e(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{k}'^*), \quad \text{return } m' := c_T / K.$$

[Correctness] If $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ accepts Γ , $K = e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) \cdot e(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{k}'^*) = g_T^{-\xi s_0 + \zeta} \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i s_i = g_T^\zeta$ where $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}$, $s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$.

We note that secret key sk $_{\mathbb{S}}$ consists of $5\ell + 5$ group elements and ciphertext ct $_{\Gamma}$ consists of $5(n+r) + 5$ group elements (and one \mathbb{G}_T element).

While our adaptively secure KP- and CP-ABE schemes have the maximum of size r as one of public parameters, they allow several useful class of access structures. According to the explicit construction of span programs from boolean formulas (e.g., Appendix of [16]), while appending AND gate gets r (and ℓ) larger, appending OR gate gets only ℓ larger. Therefore, for example, available access structures for our adaptive ABE include any r -CNF formula with any arbitrarily long disjunctions (for a bounded r), i.e., length r conjunctions of length t_1, \dots, t_r disjunctions for arbitrarily large t_1, \dots, t_r like $(\mathcal{X}_1 \vee \overset{\text{arb. long}}{\dots} \vee \mathcal{X}_{t_1}) \wedge \dots \wedge (\mathcal{Z}_1 \vee \overset{\text{arb. long}}{\dots} \vee \mathcal{Z}_{t_r})$, where unbounded multi-use of attributes for $\mathcal{X}_1, \dots, \mathcal{X}_{t_1}, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_{t_r}$ is allowed. The j -th column of the LSS matrix M is given by $(\underbrace{0, \dots, 0}_{\sum_{i=1}^{j-1} t_i}, \underbrace{1, \dots, 1}_{t_j}, 0, \dots, 0)^T$ with length $\ell = \sum_{i=1}^r t_i$ for $j = 1, \dots, r$ when the target is all 1 vector $\vec{1} \in \mathbb{F}_q^r$.

5.5 Security of the Proposed KP-ABE

The standard DLIN assumption is defined in Appendix A.

Theorem 2. *The proposed multi-use KP-ABE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.*

Let ν_1 (resp. ν_2) be (the maximum of) the number of pre-challenge (resp. post-challenge) key queries, and $\nu := \nu_1 + \nu_2$ the total number of key queries. ℓ is the maximum of the number of rows in access matrices (of key queries).

Outline of the Proof of Theorem 2 At the top level strategy of the security proof, the dual system encryption by Waters [24] is employed, where ciphertexts and secret keys have two forms, *normal* and *semi-functional*. The real system uses only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and semi-functional ciphertexts and keys are used only in subsequent security games for the security proof.

To prove this theorem, we employ Game 0 (original adaptive security game) through Game 4. Games proceed as follows:

```

Game 0
for  $h = 1, \dots, \nu_1$ , /* Game 1 sequence */
  Game 1- $h$ -1  $\rightarrow$  Game 1- $h$ -2
  for  $p = 1, \dots, \ell$ , /* Game 1- $h$ -3 sequence */
    Game 1- $h$ -3- $p$ -1  $\rightarrow$  Game 1- $h$ -3- $p$ -2  $\rightarrow$  Game 1- $h$ -3- $p$ -3
  Game 1- $h$ -4
Game 2
for  $h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu (= \nu_1 + \nu_2)$ , /* Game 3 sequence */
  Game 3- $h$ -1
  for  $p = 1, \dots, \ell$ , /* Game 3- $h$ -2 sequence */
    Game 3- $h$ -2- $p$ -1  $\rightarrow$  Game 3- $h$ -2- $p$ -2  $\rightarrow$  Game 3- $h$ -2- $p$ -3
  Game 3- $h$ -3  $\rightarrow$  Game 3- $h$ -4
Game 4

```

The security games consist of two main parts, Game 1 sequence for pre-challenge keys and Game 3 sequence for post-challenge keys. We follow the approach initiated by Lewko-Waters [17] and extended by Attrapadung [2, 3], namely, two *different* semi-functional forms for keys and ciphertexts are used in the two respective sequences, called *selective-policy* semi-functional and *selective-attributes* semi-functional.

Normal forms are given by Eq. (7) for ciphertexts and Eqs. (5) and (6) for keys. Notable properties of these forms are: LSS matrix $M := (M_i)$ is directly encoded in keys $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\ell$ and randomness for the LSS, \vec{f} , is encoded in ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 .

Game 1 sequence (for pre-challenge keys) The Game 1 sequence is parametrized by the pre-challenge key index $h = 1, \dots, \nu_1$.

The simulator is first given access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ for the h -th key query from the adversary, then given attributes $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$ for the challenge query. The

key task of the simulator is to embed $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$, i.e., encoded vector \vec{v}_i and rows M_i of M , into the challenge ciphertext appropriately. Since the policy \mathbb{S} is first revealed to the simulator, we use selective-policy semi-functional keys and ciphertext in the sequence.

A selective-policy semi-functional ciphertext is given by Eq. (8) and selective-policy semi-functional key is given by Eqs. (9) and (6). Temporary form keys are given by Eqs. (10)–(13). Notable properties of these forms are:

- A selective-policy semi-functional key given by Eqs. (9) and (6) and all temporary form keys in the Game 1 sequence, Eqs. (10)–(13), are all *independent from the challenge attribute set Γ* .
- (Partial) randomness for LSS matrix, \vec{a}_h , in the challenge ciphertext is selected depending on access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ in the h -th queried key (and challenge attributes Γ) such that $\vec{a}_h \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \{\vec{a}_h \in \mathbb{F}_q^r \mid M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = 0 \text{ if } v_i := \rho(i) \in \Gamma \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \text{ and } \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h \neq 0\}$.
- Randomness ξ' in Eq. (9) for \mathbf{k}_0^* and $\{\xi'_p\}_{\ell}^{p=1}$ in Eqs. (12) and (13) for $\{\mathbf{k}_p^*\}$ are independently and uniformly distributed in \mathbb{F}_q . Moreover, the variable ξ' is independent from all the other variables, and this is the goal of the Game 1 sequence.

Game 3 sequence (for post-challenge keys) The Game 3 sequence is parametrized by the post-challenge key index $h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu$.

The simulator is first given attributes $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$ for the challenge query from the adversary, then given access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ for the h -th key query. The key task of the simulator is to embed $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$, i.e., encoded vector \vec{y} , into the reply to the h -th key query, appropriately. Since the attributes Γ are first revealed to the simulator, we use selective-attributes semi-functional keys and ciphertext in the sequence.

A selective-attributes semi-functional ciphertext is given by Eqs. (14) and (15), and selective-attributes semi-functional key is given by Eqs. (18) and (6). Temporary form ciphertext is given by Eq. (17). Notable properties of these forms are:

- A selective-attributes semi-functional ciphertext given by Eqs. (14) and (15) and the temporal form ciphertext, Eq. (17), are all *independent from the h -th (and all) queried key policy \mathbb{S}* .
- Only key components \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th queried key with $v_p := \rho(p) \notin \Gamma$ are additionally randomized by using a new $\theta''_p \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$ (in Game 3- h -2- p -3), which is determined by the h -th access structure \mathbb{S} and challenge attributes Γ .
- Uniformly distributed randomness $\xi'' \in \mathbb{F}_q$ in Eq. (18) for \mathbf{k}_0^* is independent from all the other variables, and this is the goal of the Game 3 sequence.

In Game 4, the challenge ciphertext is changed to non-functional form, component c_T is independently distributed from other components (c_0, c_1) . In the final game, the advantage of the adversary is zero. As usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible, using computational problems, Problems 1–3 and information-theoretical game changes. We

have shown that the intractability of (complicated) Problems 1–3 is reduced to that of the DLIN Problem through several intermediate steps, or intermediate problems, as in [19, 21, 23].

Proof of Theorem 2 To prove Theorem 2, we consider the following $(3\ell + 3)(\nu_1 + \nu_2) + 3$ games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates positions of coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.

Game 0 : Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, \xi, \boxed{0}, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}, \quad (5)$$

$$\text{for } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{0^{2n+2r}}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (6)$$

where $\vec{v}_i := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1)$ if $\rho(i) = v_i$, $\xi, \eta_0, \eta_i, \theta_i, \psi_i \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$. The challenge ciphertext for plaintexts $(m^{(0)}, m^{(1)})$ and $\Gamma := \{x_1, \dots, x_{n'} \mid x_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times, n' \leq n-1\}$ is:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &:= (\boxed{\zeta}, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \boxed{0}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, & \mathbf{c}_T &:= g_T^\zeta m^{(b)}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \boxed{0^{2n+2r}}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (7)$$

where $\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j)$, and $b \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}; \zeta, \omega, \varphi_0 \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q, \vec{f} \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^r, \vec{\varphi}_1 \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$.

Game 1-h-1 ($\mathbf{h} = 1, \dots, \nu_1$) : Game 1-0-4 is Game 0. Same as Game 1-(h-1)-4 except that \mathbf{c}_0 and \mathbf{c}_1 in the challenge ciphertexts for $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$ are

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &:= (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \boxed{\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \boxed{\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (8)$$

where $\omega' \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, the h -th key query is for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ and $\vec{a}_h \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \{\vec{a}_h \in \mathbb{F}_q^r \mid M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = 0 \text{ if } \vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} = 0 \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \text{ and } \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h \neq 0\}$, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1-(h-1)-4.

Game 1-h-2 ($\mathbf{h} = 1, \dots, \nu_1$) : Game 1-h-2 is the same as Game 1-h-1 except all \mathbf{k}_i^* in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ are:

$$\mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, \xi, \boxed{\xi'}, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}, \quad (9)$$

$$\text{for } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{\theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i}, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (10)$$

where $\theta'_i, \xi' \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$ and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1-h-1.

Game 1-h-3-p-1 ($\mathbf{h} = 1, \dots, \nu_1; \mathbf{p} = 1, \dots, \ell$) : Game 1-h-3-0-3 is Game 1-h-2. Game 1-h-3-p-1 is the same as Game 1-h-3-(p-1)-3 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th

queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\mathbf{k}_p^* := (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, \boxed{0^{n+r}, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (11)$$

where all the variables are generated as in Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3.

Game 1- h -3- p -2 ($h = 1, \dots, \nu_1; p = 1, \dots, \ell$): Game 1- h -3- p -2 is the same as Game 1- h -3- p -1 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\mathbf{k}_p^* := (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \boxed{\xi' M_p}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (12)$$

where $\xi'_p \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$ and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1- h -3- p -1.

Game 1- h -3- p -3 ($h = 1, \dots, \nu_1; p = 1, \dots, \ell$): Game 1- h -3- p -3 is the same as Game 1- h -3- p -2 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\mathbf{k}_p^* := (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, \boxed{\theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi'_p M_p, 0^{n+r}}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (13)$$

where all the variables are generated as in Game 1- h -3- p -2.

Note that in Game 1- h -3- ℓ -3, the uniformly distributed variable ξ' in \mathbf{k}_0^* (Eq. (9)) is *independent from all the other variables*.

Game 1- h -4 ($h = 1, \dots, \nu_1$): Game 1- h -4 is the same as Game 1- h -3- ℓ -3 except \mathbf{k}_i ($i = 1, \dots, \ell$) in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ are:

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$,

$$\mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{0^{n+r}}, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (= \text{Eq. (6)})$$

where all the variables are generated as in Game 1- h -3- ℓ -3.

Game 2: Game 2 is the same as Game 1- ν_1 -4 except the challenge ciphertext is:

$$\mathbf{c}_0 := (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \boxed{\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}'}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \quad (14)$$

$$\mathbf{c}_1 := (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \boxed{\vec{f}'}, \omega' \vec{y}, \boxed{\vec{f}'}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \quad (15)$$

where $\vec{f}' \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^r$ and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1- ν_1 -4.

Game 3- h -1 ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu$): Game 3- ν_1 -4 is Game 2. Game 3- h -1 is the same as Game 3- $(h-1)$ -4 except that all the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, \xi, \boxed{\xi'}, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*},$$

$$\text{for } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{\theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i}, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*},$$

where $\xi', \theta'_i \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-($h-1$)-4.

Game 3- h -2- p -1 ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu; p = 1, \dots, \ell$) : Game 3- h -2-0-3 is Game 3- h -1. Game 3- h -2- p -1 is the same as Game 3- h -2-($p-1$)-3 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the reply to the h -th key query for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\text{if } \vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0, \mathbf{k}_p^* := (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, \boxed{0^{n+r}}, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*},$$

where all the variables are generated as in Game 3- h -2-($p-1$)-3.

Game 3- h -2- p -2 ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu; p = 1, \dots, \ell$) : Game 3- h -2- p -2 is the same as Game 3- h -2- p -1 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the reply to the h -th key query for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\text{if } \vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0, \\ \mathbf{k}_p^* := (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \boxed{\theta''_p}, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_p, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*},$$

where $\theta''_p \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\vec{v}_p^{\geq 2} := (v_p^{n-2}, \dots, v_p, 1) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-1}$ is the last $n-1$ entries of \vec{v}_p for $v_p = \rho(p)$, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3- h -2- p -1.

Game 3- h -2- p -3 ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu; p = 1, \dots, \ell$) : Game 3- h -2- p -3 is the same as Game 3- h -2- p -2 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the reply to the h -th key query for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ is:

$$\text{if } \vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0, \\ \mathbf{k}_p^* := (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, \boxed{\theta''_p, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_p, 0^{n+r}}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (16)$$

where all the variables are generated as in Game 3- h -2- p -2.

Game 3- h -3 ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu$) : Game 3- h -3 is the same as Game 3- h -2- ℓ -3 except that \mathbf{c}_1 in the challenge ciphertext for $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$, and $(\mathbf{k}_i^*)_{i=0}^{\ell}$ in the reply to the h -th key query for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ are:

$$\mathbf{c}_1 := (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \boxed{\omega', 0^{n+r-1}, \vec{z}}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \quad (17)$$

$$\mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, \xi, \boxed{\xi''}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}, \quad (18)$$

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$, if $\vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} = 0$,

$$\mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{\frac{\xi'}{\omega'} M_i \cdot \vec{f}^T}, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (19)$$

where $\xi'' \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\vec{z} \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3- h -2- ℓ -3.

Game 3- h -4 ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu$) : Game 3- h -4 is the same as Game 3- h -3 except that \mathbf{c}_1 in the challenge ciphertext for $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$, and $(\mathbf{k}_i^*)_{i=1}^{\ell}$ in the reply to the h -th key query for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ are:

$$\mathbf{c}_1 := (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \boxed{\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}^T, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}^T}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \quad (= \text{Eq. (15)})$$

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$,

$$\mathbf{k}_i^* := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{0^{n+r}}, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \quad (= \text{Eq. (6)})$$

where all the variables are generated as in Game 3- h -3.

Game 4 : Game 4 is the same as Game 3- ν -4 except that \mathbf{c}_0 in the challenge ciphertext for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix is:

$$\mathbf{c}_0 := (\boxed{\zeta'}, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}', \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0},$$

where $\zeta' \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$ (i.e., independent from all the other variables, in particular, from $\zeta \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$), and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3- ν -4.

We show lemmas that evaluate the gaps between pairs of the advantages of neighboring games. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. \square

Lemmas We will show lemmas for evaluating advantage gaps between neighboring games. Intermediate problems, Problems 1–3, whose intractability is reduced to that of DLIN (Lemmas 22–24), are used below. Problem 1 (resp. 2) is a standard decisional subspace problem for ciphertexts (resp. keys) side [19] and Problem 3 swaps coefficients in the $2\tilde{n}$ -dimensional semi-functional space (i.e., Problem 2 in [23]). All the problems are given in Appendix C.

Proofs of several key lemmas are given in Appendix D. In particular, information-theoretical changes treated in proofs of Lemmas 8 and 14 are based on our new Lemma 3 in crucial manners, respectively, and the proof of Lemma 16 uses an interesting proof technique given in (the full version of) [20].

Lemma 4. *For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-1-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_1}^{\text{P1}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.*

Proof. Lemma 4 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 4 in [19] by using a Problem 1 instance. In Game 0, all the queried keys are normal. As in a usual dual system encryption proof, we can transform a normal ciphertext to a semi-functional form Eq. (8) by using Problem 1. It is because, since all the queried keys are normal, a non-zero coefficient vector of the semi-functional part in the challenge ciphertext can be changed information-theoretically to any non-zero vector by using a random base change except with negligible probability. Full proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix D.1. \square

Lemma 5. *For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-(h-1)-4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $2 \leq h \leq \nu_1$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.*

Proof. In Game 1- $(h-1)$ -4, semi-functional parts of all key components \mathbf{k}_0^* are uniformly random or zero and \mathbf{k}_i^* for $i \geq 1$ are zero. Therefore, the semi-functional part of the challenge ciphertext $\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1$ can be conceptually changed to any vector except for negligible probability. Therefore, we obtain $\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1$ as in Eq. (8). Full proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix D.2. \square

Lemma 6. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-2)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_2}^{\text{P2}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 6 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 5 in [19] by using a Problem 2 instance. \square

Lemma 7. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_3 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-(p-1)-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_3}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 7 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 8 in [23] by using a Problem 3 instance. Problem 3 is used for swapping coefficient vectors of key \mathbf{k}_p^* in the first block in the semi-functional part to the second block. Therefore, by using Problem 3, we can change \mathbf{k}_p^* in Eq. (10) to that in Eq. (11). Full proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix D.3. \square

Lemma 8. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-2)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Lemma 8 is a basis for our new proof techniques, which are demonstrated in Introduction (Section 1.3). In the introduction's notation, coefficient vector $V'_p := (\theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi'_p M_p) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ (resp. $V''_p := (\theta''_p \vec{v}_p, \xi''_p M_p) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$) is encoded on the p -th key component for the h -th key query in Game 1- h -3- p -1 (resp. 1- h -3- p -2). Note that the variables ξ' and ξ'' differ in the expressions. The proof of this lemma gives an information-theoretical change between these two vectors. Full proof of Lemma 8 is given in Appendix D.4.

Lemma 9. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_4 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-2)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-3)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_4}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 9 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 7 by using a Problem 3 instance. \square

Lemma 10. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exist probabilistic machines $\mathcal{B}_{5-1}, \dots, \mathcal{B}_{5-3}$ whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-\ell-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-4)}(\lambda)| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} (\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_{5-i-1}}^{\text{P2}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_{5-i-2}}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_{5-i-3}}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda)) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$, where $\mathcal{B}_{5-i-i}(\cdot) := \mathcal{B}_{5-i}(i, \cdot)$ and $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. We can change Game 1- h -3- ℓ -3 to 1- h -4 by tracing the reverse transformations from Game 1- h -3- ℓ -3 to Game 1- h -1 with the one exception that \mathbf{k}_0^* remains unchanged (Eq. (9)). Therefore, by combining Lemmas 9–5 in a reverse order, we obtain Lemma 10. \square

Lemma 11. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-\nu_1-4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(2)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 11 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 5. \square

Lemma 12. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_6 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-(h-1)-4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_6}^{\text{P2}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 12 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 6 by using a Problem 2 instance. \square

Lemma 13. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_7 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-(p-1)-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_7}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 13 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 7 by using a Problem 3 instance. \square

Lemma 14. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-2)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Lemma 14 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 8 by using Lemma 3. Full proof is given in Appendix D.5.

Lemma 15. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_8 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-2)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-3)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_8}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 15 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 7 by using a Problem 3 instance. \square

Lemma 16. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-\ell-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-3)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Lemma 16 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 9 in the full version of [20] by using the technique called “one-dimensional localization of inner-product values”. Full proof is given in Appendix D.6.

Lemma 17. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine $\mathcal{B}_{9-1}, \dots, \mathcal{B}_{9-3}$, whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-4)}(\lambda)| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} (\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_{9-i-1}}^{\text{P2}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_{9-i-2}}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_{9-i-3}}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda)) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$, where $\mathcal{B}_{9-i-l}(\cdot) := \mathcal{B}_{9-l}(i, \cdot)$ and $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. We can change Game 3- h -3 to 3- h -4 by tracing the reverse transformations from Game 3- h -3 to Game 3- $(h-1)$ -4 with the one exception that \mathbf{k}_0^* remains unchanged (Eq. (18)). Therefore, by combining Lemmas 16–12 in a reverse order, we obtain Lemma 17. \square

Lemma 18. *For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-\nu-4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(4)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.*

Lemma 18 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 7 in [19]. The full proof of Lemma 18 is given in Appendix D.7.

Lemma 19. *For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(4)}(\lambda) = 0$.*

Proof. The value of b is independent from the adversary’s view in Game 4. Hence, $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(4)}(\lambda) = 0$. \square

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A Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption

Definition 6 (DLIN: Decisional Linear Assumption [8]). *The DLIN problem is to guess $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, given $(\text{param}_{\mathbb{G}}, G, \xi G, \kappa G, \delta \xi G, \sigma \kappa G, S_{\beta}) \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \mathcal{G}_{\beta}^{\text{DLIN}}(1^{\lambda})$, where $\mathcal{G}_{\beta}^{\text{DLIN}}(1^{\lambda}) : \text{param}_{\mathbb{G}} := (q, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, G, e) \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \mathcal{G}_{\text{bpg}}(1^{\lambda}), \kappa, \delta, \xi, \sigma \xleftarrow{\mathbb{U}} \mathbb{F}_q, S_0 := (\delta + \sigma)G, S_1 \xleftarrow{\mathbb{U}} \mathbb{G}$, return $(\text{param}_{\mathbb{G}}, G, \xi G, \kappa G, \delta \xi G, \sigma \kappa G, S_{\beta})$, for $\beta \xleftarrow{\mathbb{U}} \{0, 1\}$. For a probabilistic machine \mathcal{E} , we define the advantage of \mathcal{E} for the DLIN problem as: $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{DLIN}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{E}(1^{\lambda}, \varrho) \rightarrow 1 \mid \varrho \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \mathcal{G}_0^{\text{DLIN}}(1^{\lambda}) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{E}(1^{\lambda}, \varrho) \rightarrow 1 \mid \varrho \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \mathcal{G}_1^{\text{DLIN}}(1^{\lambda}) \right] \right|$. The DLIN assumption is: For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary \mathcal{E} , the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{DLIN}}(\lambda)$ is negligible in λ .*

$GL(5\tilde{n}, \mathbb{F}_q)$,

$$\mathcal{P}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) = \left\{ Y := \begin{pmatrix} Y'_1 & & & & \\ Y'_2 & Y_1 & & & \\ \vdots & & \ddots & & \\ Y'_n & & & Y_1 & \\ Y'_{n+1} & & & & Y_2 \\ \vdots & & & & & \ddots \\ Y'_{n+r} & & & & & & Y_2 \end{pmatrix} \middle| \begin{array}{l} Y'_1, Y_1, Y_2 \in GL(5, \mathbb{F}_q), \\ Y'_2, \dots, Y'_{n+r} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{5 \times 5}, \\ \text{a blank element in the} \\ \text{matrix denotes } 0 \in \mathbb{F}_q \end{array} \right\}.$$

We see that $\mathcal{P}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ is a subgroup of $GL(5\tilde{n}, \mathbb{F}_q)$. So, $\mathcal{L}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) = \Pi^{-1} \cdot \mathcal{P}(5, n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) \cdot \Pi$ is also a subgroup of $GL(5\tilde{n}, \mathbb{F}_q)$. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. \square

B.2 Proof of Lemma 3

Lemma 3. Let $\vec{e}_j := (0, \dots, 0, \overset{j}{1}, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$. For all $\vec{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n, 0, \dots, 0) \in \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \dots, \vec{e}_n \rangle \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle$, $\vec{\kappa} = (0, \dots, 0, \kappa_1, \dots, \kappa_r) \in \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_{n+1}, \dots, \vec{e}_{n+r} \rangle$ and $\pi \in \mathbb{F}_q$, let

$$W_{\vec{v}, \vec{\kappa}, \pi} := \{(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \in (\text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \vec{v}, \vec{\kappa} \rangle \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle) \times (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle^\perp) \mid \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z} = \pi\}.$$

For all $(\vec{v}, \vec{\kappa}, \vec{x}) \in (\text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \dots, \vec{e}_n \rangle \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle) \times \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_{n+1}, \dots, \vec{e}_{n+r} \rangle \times (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle^\perp)$, and $U \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$, $Z := (U^{-1})^\text{T}$, the pair $((\vec{v} + \vec{\kappa})U, \vec{x}Z)$ is uniformly distributed in $W_{\vec{v}, \vec{\kappa}, (\vec{v} + \vec{\kappa}) \cdot \vec{x}}$ except with negligible probability.

Proof. For the proof of Lemma 3, we define a subset of $\mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)$,

$$\mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q) = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} u'_1 & & & & \\ u'_2 & u & & & \\ \vdots & & \ddots & & \\ u'_{n+r} & & & u & \end{pmatrix} \middle| \begin{array}{l} u, u'_l \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ \text{for } l = 1, \dots, n+r, \\ \text{a blank element} \\ \text{in the matrix} \\ \text{denotes } 0 \in \mathbb{F}_q \end{array} \right\} \subset \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q), \quad (21)$$

and $\mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times := \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q) \cap GL(n+r, \mathbb{F}_q) (\subset \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times)$.

For the subgroup $\mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$, a sparse matrix version of pairwise independence lemma was obtained in the following form [21].

Lemma 20 (Lemma 6 in [21], Adapted). Let $\vec{e}_1 := (1, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$. For all $\vec{v} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle$ and $\pi \in \mathbb{F}_q$, let

$$W'_{\vec{v}, \pi} := \{(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \in (\text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \vec{v} \rangle \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle) \times (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle^\perp) \mid \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z} = \pi\}.$$

For all $(\vec{v}, \vec{x}) \in (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle) \times (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle^\perp)$, and $U' \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$, $Z' := (U'^{-1})^\text{T}$, the pair $(\vec{v}U', \vec{x}Z')$ is uniformly distributed in $W'_{\vec{v}, \vec{v} \cdot \vec{x}}$ except with negligible probability.

We also define a diagonal subgroup $\mathcal{K} := \{D_\gamma := \text{diag}(\overbrace{1, \dots, 1}^n, \overbrace{\gamma, \dots, \gamma}^r) \mid \gamma \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times\} \subset \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$.

Lemma 21. *For $n \geq 2$, there is a natural bijection: let $\mathcal{K} \cdot \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times := \{D_\gamma \cdot U' \mid D_\gamma \in \mathcal{K}, U' \in \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times\}$, then, it holds that $\mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times = \mathcal{K} \cdot \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$.*

More precisely, the above is a semi-direct product: $\mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times = \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times \rtimes \mathcal{K}$. However, we do not need the fact.

Proof of Lemma 21. Let $\varphi : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times \ni (D_\gamma, U') \mapsto D_\gamma \cdot U' \in \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$. Surjectivity of φ is trivial. We will show that φ is injective. Let U' be given as in Eq. (21). If $D_\gamma \cdot U' = I_{n+r}$, then $u = 1$ in U' since $n \geq 2$, and thus $\gamma (= u\gamma) = 1$, i.e., $D_\gamma = I_{n+r}$. Then, $U' = I_{n+r}$. That is, φ is injective. \square

We can prove Lemma 3 by using the product structure given in Lemma 21.

Proof of Lemma 3. From Lemma 21, $U = D_\gamma \cdot U'$ is generated as $\gamma \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^\times$ and $U' \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n+r, 0, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$. Then, $Z = (U^{-1})^T = D_{\gamma^{-1}} \cdot Z'$ where $Z' := (U'^{-1})^T$. Let $\vec{x} = \vec{x}_1 + \vec{x}_2$ where $\vec{x}_1 \in \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \dots, \vec{e}_n \rangle$ and $\vec{x}_2 \in \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_{n+1}, \dots, \vec{e}_{n+r} \rangle$. We obtain $(\vec{v} + \vec{\kappa}) \cdot U = (\vec{v} + \vec{\kappa}) \cdot (D_\gamma \cdot U') = (\vec{v} + \gamma\vec{\kappa}) \cdot U'$ and $\vec{x} \cdot Z = (\vec{x}_1 + \vec{x}_2) \cdot D_{\gamma^{-1}} \cdot Z' = (\vec{x}_1 + \gamma^{-1}\vec{x}_2) \cdot Z'$. By applying Lemma 20 to $(\vec{v}' := \vec{v} + \gamma\vec{\kappa}, \vec{x}' := \vec{x}_1 + \gamma^{-1}\vec{x}_2)$ and (U', Z') , we see that the pair $((\vec{v} + \gamma\vec{\kappa}) \cdot U', (\vec{x}_1 + \gamma^{-1}\vec{x}_2) \cdot Z')$ is uniformly distributed in $W'_{\vec{v} + \gamma\vec{\kappa}, (\vec{v} + \gamma\vec{\kappa}) \cdot \vec{x}}$ with $\gamma \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^\times$ since $(\vec{v} + \gamma\vec{\kappa}) \cdot (\vec{x}_1 + \gamma^{-1}\vec{x}_2) = (\vec{v} + \vec{\kappa}) \cdot \vec{x}$. It is equivalent to that the pair is uniformly distributed in $W_{\vec{v}, \vec{\kappa}, (\vec{v} + \vec{\kappa}) \cdot \vec{x}}$ except with negligible probability. We completes the proof of Lemma 3. \square

C Problems 1–3 for the Proof of Theorem 2

Definition 7 (Problem 1). *Problem 1 is to guess β , given*

$(\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \{\mathbb{B}_\iota, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_\iota^*\}_{\iota=0,1}, \{e_{\beta,i}\}_{i=0,\dots,n+r}) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}_\beta^{\text{P1}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n})$, where $\vec{n} := (n, r)$ and

$\mathcal{G}_\beta^{\text{P1}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n}) : (\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1, \{B_{i,j,\iota}^*, B'_{i,j,l}^*\}_{i,j=1,\dots,5;\iota=1,2}^{i,j=1,\dots,5;\iota=1,2}) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, \vec{n})$,

$\mathbb{B}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}^*)$ is calculated from $\{B_{i,j,\iota}^*, B'_{i,j,l}^*\}$,

$\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0^* := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}^*)$, $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,2(n+r)+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}^*)$,

$\omega, \varphi_0 \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\tau \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^\times$, $e_{0,0} := (0, \omega, 0, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}$, $e_{1,0} := (0, \omega, \tau, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}$,

for $i = 1, \dots, n+r$; $\vec{e}_i := (0^{i-1}, 1, 0^{n+r-i}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$, $\vec{\varphi}_i \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$,

$$\begin{aligned} e_{0,i} &:= \left(\overbrace{\omega \vec{e}_i}^{n+r}, \overbrace{0^{2n+2r}}^{2n+2r}, \overbrace{0^{n+r}}^{n+r}, \overbrace{\vec{\varphi}_i}^{n+r} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \\ e_{1,i} &:= \left(\overbrace{\omega \vec{e}_i}^{n+r}, \overbrace{\tau \vec{e}_i, 0^{n+r}}^{2n+2r}, \overbrace{0^{n+r}}^{n+r}, \overbrace{\vec{\varphi}_i}^{n+r} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned}$$

return $(\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \{\mathbb{B}_\iota, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_\iota^*\}_{\iota=0,1}, \{e_{\beta,i}\}_{i=0,\dots,n+r})$,

for $\beta \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$. For a probabilistic adversary \mathcal{B} , we define the advantage of \mathcal{B} as the quantity

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{P1}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{B}(1^\lambda, \varrho) \rightarrow 1 \mid \varrho \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \mathcal{G}_0^{\text{P1}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n}) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{B}(1^\lambda, \varrho) \rightarrow 1 \mid \varrho \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \mathcal{G}_1^{\text{P1}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n}) \right] \right|.$$

Lemma 22. *For any adversary \mathcal{B} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{F} , whose running time are essentially the same as that of \mathcal{B} , such that for any security parameter λ , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{P1}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}}^{\text{DLIN}}(\lambda) + 5/q$.*

Lemma 22 is proven in a similar manner to the security proof for Basic Problem 1 in [21], i.e., combination of proofs of Lemmas 16 and 17 in [21]. The paper [21] established the sparse matrix DPVS technique as a basic tool, and then we can adapt the above proofs in [21] to our Lemma 22 while there exist a few technical (not essential) differences as their dimensions and ways to use the sparse basis matrices (i.e., reduced key sizes in Problem 1 versus reduced ciphertext sizes in Basic Problem 1 [21]). \square

Definition 8 (Problem 2). *Problem 2 is to guess β , given $(\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_\ell, \mathbb{B}_\ell^*\}_{\ell=0,1}, \{\mathbf{h}_{\beta,i}^*\}_{i=0,\dots,n+r}, \{\mathbf{e}_i\}_{i=0,\dots,2n+2r}) \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \mathcal{G}_\beta^{\text{P2}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n})$, where $\vec{n} := (n, r)$ and*

$$\mathcal{G}_\beta^{\text{P2}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n}) : (\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1, \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B'_{i,j,\ell}\}_{\substack{i,j=1,\dots,5;\ell=1,2 \\ l=1,\dots,n+r}}) \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, \vec{n}),$$

$$\mathbb{B}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}^*) \text{ is calculated from } \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B'_{i,j,\ell}\},$$

$$\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0 := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}), \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1 := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,2(n+r)+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}^*),$$

$$\omega, \delta, \varphi_0, \delta_0 \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q, \rho \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^\times, \mathbf{h}_{0,0}^* := (0, \delta, 0, \delta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}, \mathbf{h}_{1,0}^* := (0, \delta, \rho, \delta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*},$$

$$\mathbf{e}_0 := (0, \omega, \tau, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0},$$

$$\text{for } i = 1, \dots, n+r; \quad \vec{e}_i := (0^{i-1}, 1, 0^{n+r-i}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}, \delta_i \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q, \vec{\varphi}_i \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r},$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{h}_{0,i}^* &:= \left(\begin{array}{cccc} \delta \vec{e}_i & 0^{2n+2r} & \delta_i \vec{e}_i & 0^{n+r} \end{array} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ \mathbf{h}_{1,i}^* &:= \left(\begin{array}{cccc} \delta \vec{e}_i & \rho \vec{e}_i, 0^{n+r} & \delta_i \vec{e}_i & 0^{n+r} \end{array} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ \mathbf{e}_i &:= \left(\begin{array}{cccc} \omega \vec{e}_i & \tau \vec{e}_i, 0^{n+r} & 0^{n+r} & \vec{\varphi}_i \end{array} \right)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \\ \mathbf{e}_{n+r+i} &:= \tau \mathbf{b}_{1,2n+2r+i}, \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{return } (\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_\ell, \mathbb{B}_\ell^*\}_{\ell=0,1}, \{\mathbf{h}_{\beta,i}^*\}_{i=0,\dots,n+r}, \{\mathbf{e}_i\}_{i=0,\dots,2n+2r}),$$

for $\beta \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \{0, 1\}$. For a probabilistic adversary \mathcal{B} , the advantage of \mathcal{B} for Problem 2, $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{P2}}(\lambda)$, is similarly defined as in Definition 7.

Lemma 23. *For any adversary \mathcal{B} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{F} , whose running time are essentially the same as that of \mathcal{B} , such that for any security parameter λ , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{P2}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}}^{\text{DLIN}}(\lambda) + 5/q$.*

Lemma 23 is proven in a similar manner to the security proof for Basic Problem 2 in [21], i.e., combination of proofs of Lemmas 16 and 19 in [21]. The paper [21] established the sparse matrix DPVS technique as a basic tool, and then we can adapt the above proofs in [21] to our Lemma 23 while there exist a few technical (not essential) differences as their dimensions and ways to use the sparse basis matrices (i.e., reduced key sizes in Problem 2 versus reduced ciphertext sizes in Basic Problem 2 [21]). \square

Definition 9 (Problem 3). *Problem 3 is to guess β , given $(\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbf{f}_0^*, \mathbf{e}_0, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1, \mathbb{B}_1^*, \{\mathbf{f}_i^*\}_{i=1, \dots, 2(n+r)}, \{\mathbf{h}_{\beta, i}^*, \mathbf{e}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n+r}) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{G}_{\beta}^{\text{P3}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n})$, where $\vec{n} := (n, r)$ and*

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{G}_{\beta}^{\text{P3}}(1^\lambda, \vec{n}) : (\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1, \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B_{i,j,\ell}^{\prime*}\}_{i,j=1, \dots, 5; \ell=1, 2}^{\leftarrow R} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, \vec{n}), \\ & \mathbb{B}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}^*) \text{ is calculated from } \{B_{i,j,\ell}^*, B_{i,j,\ell}^{\prime*}\}, \\ & \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1 := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}, \mathbf{b}_{1,3(n+r)+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)}), \\ & \tau, \rho \stackrel{U}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^\times, \quad \mathbf{f}_0^* := \rho \mathbf{b}_{0,3}^*, \quad \mathbf{e}_0 := \tau \mathbf{b}_{0,3}, \quad \mathbf{f}_i^* := \rho \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r+i}^* \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, 2(n+r), \\ & \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n+r; \quad \vec{e}_i := (0^{i-1}, 1, 0^{n+r-i}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}, \quad \delta_i \stackrel{U}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q, \\ & \begin{array}{cccc} & \overbrace{\hspace{2cm}}^{n+r} & \overbrace{\hspace{2cm}}^{2n+2r} & \overbrace{\hspace{2cm}}^{n+r} & \overbrace{\hspace{2cm}}^{n+r} \\ \mathbf{h}_{0,i}^* & := \begin{pmatrix} 0^{n+r}, & \rho \vec{e}_i, & 0^{n+r}, & \delta_i \vec{e}_i, & 0^{n+r} \end{pmatrix}_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ \mathbf{h}_{1,i}^* & := \begin{pmatrix} 0^{n+r}, & 0^{n+r}, & \rho \vec{e}_i, & \delta_i \vec{e}_i, & 0^{n+r} \end{pmatrix}_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ \mathbf{e}_i & := \begin{pmatrix} 0^{n+r}, & \tau \vec{e}_i, & \tau \vec{e}_i, & 0^{n+r}, & 0^{n+r} \end{pmatrix}_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{array} \\ & \text{return } (\text{param}_{\vec{n}}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbf{f}_0^*, \mathbf{e}_0, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1, \mathbb{B}_1^*, \{\mathbf{f}_i^*\}_{i=1, \dots, 2(n+r)}, \{\mathbf{h}_{\beta, i}^*, \mathbf{e}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n+r}), \end{aligned}$$

for $\beta \stackrel{U}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$. For a probabilistic adversary \mathcal{B} , the advantage of \mathcal{B} for Problem 3, $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda)$, is similarly defined as in Definition 7.

Lemma 24 (Lemmas 6 in [23], Adapted). *For any adversary \mathcal{B} , there exist probabilistic machines \mathcal{F}_1 and \mathcal{F}_2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of \mathcal{B} , such that for any security parameter λ , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}_1}^{\text{DLIN}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}_2}^{\text{DLIN}}(\lambda) + 10/q$.*

Lemma 24 is proven in a similar manner to Lemmas 6 in the full version of [23]. Since Problem 3 and the problem in [23] differ in only a few technical (not essential) details, i.e., their dimensions ($n+r$ versus n) and ways to use the sparse basis matrices (reduced key sizes in Problem 3 versus reduced ciphertext sizes in [23]), we can adapt the proof in [23] to our Lemma 24. \square

D Proofs of Lemmas in Section 5.5

We give proofs of Lemmas 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16 and 18. As for other lemmas,

1. Lemmas 6 and 12 use Problem 2 as a decisional subspace problem in a usual manner (as in Lemma 5 in [19]) and have routine proofs,
2. Lemmas 9, 13 and 15 have similar forms to Lemma 7 and the proofs are also almost similar,
3. Lemma 10 (resp. 17) deals with a combination of reverse transformations of Lemmas 9-5 (resp. 16-12) with the one exception that \mathbf{k}_0^* remains unchanged (Eq. (9) (resp. Eq. (18))) and then the proof is also the combination,
4. Lemma 11 has a similar form to Lemma 5 and the proof is also almost similar.

D.1 Proof of Lemma 4

Lemma 4. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-1-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_1}^{\text{P1}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. To prove Lemma 4, we will show distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ in Games 0 and 1-1-1 are equivalent. For that purpose, we define an intermediate game, Game 0', as

Game 0' : Game 0' is the same as Game 0 except that \mathbf{c}_0 and \mathbf{c}_1 in the challenge ciphertexts for $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$ are:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &:= (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \boxed{\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_1}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \boxed{\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_1}, 0^{n+r}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\omega' \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, the 1-st key query is for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ and $\vec{a}_1 \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} A := \{\vec{a}_1 \in \mathbb{F}_q^r \mid M_i \cdot \vec{a}_1 = 0 \text{ if } \vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} = 0 \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \text{ and } \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_1 \neq 0\}$, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0.

Claim 1 For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(0')}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_1}^{\text{P1}}(\lambda)$.

Proof of Claim 1. In order to prove Claim 1, we construct a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_1 against Problem 1 using an adversary \mathcal{A} in a security game (Game 0 or 0') as a black box as follows:

1. \mathcal{B}_1 is given a Problem 1 instance, $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\mathbb{B}_\iota, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_\iota^*\}_{\iota=0,1}, \{e_{\beta,i}\}_{i=0,\dots,n+r})$.
2. \mathcal{B}_1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary \mathcal{A} .
3. \mathcal{B}_1 provides \mathcal{A} a public key $\text{pk} := (1^\lambda, \text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1})$ of Game 0 (and 0'), where $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0' := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5})$ and $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1' := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}, \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)})$, that are obtained from the Problem 1 instance.
4. When a (pre-challenge) key query is issued for access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$, \mathcal{B}_1 answers normal key $(\mathbf{k}_0^*, \dots, \mathbf{k}_\ell^*)$ with Eqs. (5) and (6), that is computed using $\{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_\iota^*\}_{\iota=0,1}$ of the Problem 1 instance.
5. When \mathcal{B}_1 receives an encryption query with challenge plaintexts $(m^{(0)}, m^{(1)})$ and challenge attributes $\Gamma := \{x_1, \dots, x_{n'}\}$ from \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B}_1 calculates $\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} y_{n-i} z^i = z^{n-1-n'} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n'} (z - x_i)$. Then, with a uniformly random bit $b \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &:= \zeta \mathbf{b}_{0,1} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_1) e_{\beta,0} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}') \mathbf{b}_{0,2} + \eta_0 \mathbf{b}_{0,5}, & \mathbf{c}_T &:= g_T^{\zeta} m^{(b)}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= \sum_{\iota=1}^n y_\iota e_{\beta,\iota} + \sum_{\iota=1}^r (a_{1,\iota} e_{\beta,n+\iota} + f'_\iota \mathbf{b}_{1,n+\iota}) + \sum_{\iota=1}^{n+r} \eta_{1,\iota} \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)+\iota}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\zeta, \eta_0 \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\vec{a}_1 := (a_{1,1}, \dots, a_{1,r})$, $\vec{f}' := (f'_1, \dots, f'_r) \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^r$, $\vec{\eta}_1 := (\eta_{1,1}, \dots, \eta_{1,n+r}) \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$ and $(\mathbf{e}_{\beta,\iota})_{\iota=0,\dots,n+r}, \mathbb{B}_0, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1$ are a part of the Problem 1 instance.

6. When a key query is issued by \mathcal{A} after the encryption query, \mathcal{B}_1 executes the same procedure as that of step 4.
7. \mathcal{A} finally outputs bit b' . If $b = b'$, \mathcal{B}_1 outputs $\beta' := 1$. Otherwise, \mathcal{B}_1 outputs $\beta' := 0$.

We show that the view of \mathcal{A} is equivalent to that in Game 0 (resp. 0') when $\beta = 0$ (resp. $\beta = 1$). Since the public key pk and secret keys $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}$ answered by \mathcal{A} are distributed as in Game 0 and 0', we consider the distribution of challenge ciphertext $\text{ct}_T := (T, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_T)$.

When $\beta = 0$, ciphertext ct_T generated in step 5 is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &= \zeta \mathbf{b}_{0,1} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_1) \mathbf{e}_{0,0} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}') \mathbf{b}_{0,2} + \varphi_0 \mathbf{b}_{0,5} \\ &= (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot (\omega \vec{a}_1 + \vec{f}'), 0, 0, \varphi'_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &= \sum_{\iota=1}^n y_{\iota} \mathbf{e}_{0,\iota} + \sum_{\iota=1}^r (a_{1,\iota} \mathbf{e}_{0,n+\iota} + f'_{\iota} \mathbf{b}_{1,n+\iota}) + \sum_{\iota=1}^{n+r} \eta_{1,\iota} \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)+\iota} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \omega \vec{a}_1 + \vec{f}', 0^{n+r}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}'_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned}$$

where vector $\vec{f}' := \omega \vec{a}_1 + \vec{f}'$ are uniformly distributed and independent of other variables since $\vec{f}' \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^r$, and $\varphi'_0, \vec{\varphi}'_1$ are uniformly and independently distributed since $\vec{\eta}_1 := (\eta_{1,\iota})$ is so. Therefore, generated ct_T and $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}$ have the same distribution as in Game 0.

When $\beta = 1$, ciphertext ct_T generated in step 5 is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &= \zeta \mathbf{b}_{0,1} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_1) \mathbf{e}_{1,0} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}') \mathbf{b}_{0,2} + \varphi_0 \mathbf{b}_{0,5} \\ &= (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot (\omega \vec{a}_1 + \vec{f}'), \vec{1} \cdot \tau \vec{a}_1, 0, \varphi'_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0} = (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}', \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}'_1, 0, \varphi'_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &= \sum_{\iota=1}^n y_{\iota} \mathbf{e}_{1,\iota} + \sum_{\iota=1}^r (a_{1,\iota} \mathbf{e}_{1,n+\iota} + f'_{\iota} \mathbf{b}_{1,n+\iota}) + \sum_{\iota=1}^{n+r} \eta_{1,\iota} \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)+\iota} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \omega \vec{a}_1 + \vec{f}', \tau \vec{y}, \tau \vec{a}_1, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}'_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}', \tau \vec{y}, \vec{a}'_1, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}'_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned}$$

where vector $\vec{f}' := \omega \vec{a}_1 + \vec{f}'$ are uniformly distributed and independent of other variables since $\vec{f}' \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^r$, $\vec{a}'_1 := \tau \vec{a}_1$ are uniformly distributed in A and independent of other variables since $\vec{a}_1 \xleftarrow{\text{U}} A$ and $\tau \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$ (therefore nonzero random except for negligible probability), and $\varphi'_0, \vec{\varphi}'_1$ are uniformly and independently distributed since $\vec{\eta}_1 := (\eta_{1,\iota})$ is so. Therefore, generated ct_T and $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}$ have the same distribution as in Game 0'.

This completes the proof of Claim 1. \square

We will show that the distribution in Game 0' and that in Game 1-1-1 are equivalent. We will consider the distribution in Game 0'. We define new dual

orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ of \mathbb{V}_1 . First, we set $\tilde{n} := n + r$, and

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1,\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix} &:= \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,\tilde{n}+1} - \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}} - \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix} := \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,\tilde{n}+1}^* + \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}}^* + \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix}, \\ \mathbb{D}_1 &:= (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{d}_{1,\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}), \\ \mathbb{D}_1^* &:= (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}^*). \end{aligned}$$

Then, \mathbb{D}_1 and \mathbb{D}_1^* are dual orthonormal bases. Since all the key components \mathbf{k}_i^* are normal form, there are no effects from the above transformation, and the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 is expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1 &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_1, 0^{n+r}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_1, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_1, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, \mathbf{c}_1 is distributed as given in Game 1-1-1 over the basis \mathbb{D}_1 , and the distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ is the same as in Game 1-1-1 since the above changed basis vectors $\mathbf{d}_{1,\tilde{n}+1} \cdots \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}}$ are not included in $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1$. Thus, we obtain Lemma 4 from Claim 1. \square

D.2 Proof of Lemma 5

Lemma 5. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-(h-1)-4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $2 \leq h \leq \nu_1$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. To prove Lemma 5, we will show distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ in Games 1-($h-1$)-4 and 1- $h-1$ for $h \geq 2$ are equivalent. For that purpose, we define an intermediate game, Game 1-($h-1$)-4', as

Game 1-($h-1$)-4' ($h = 1, \dots, \nu_1$): Game 1-($h-1$)-4' is the same as Game 1-($h-1$)-4 except that $\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1$ in the challenge ciphertexts for $\Gamma := \{x_t\}$ are:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &:= (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \boxed{\varepsilon_0}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \boxed{\vec{\varepsilon}}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\varepsilon_0 \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q, \vec{\varepsilon} \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q^{2(n+r)}$, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 1-($h-1$)-4.

Claim 2 *The distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ in Game 1-($h-1$)-4' and that in Game 1-($h-1$)-4 (resp. 1- $h-1$) are equivalent except with negligible probability.*

Proof of Claim 2. We will show that the distribution in Game 1-($h-1$)-4 and that in Game 1-($h-1$)-4' are equivalent. The other equivalence between Game 1- $h-1$ and Game 1-($h-1$)-4' is shown in a similar manner.

We will consider the distribution in Game 1-($h-1$)-4. We define new dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{D}_0, \mathbb{D}_0^*)$ of \mathbb{V}_0 and $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ of \mathbb{V}_1 .

First, we generate $u \xleftarrow{\cup} \mathbb{F}_q^\times$ and set $\mathbf{d}_{0,3} := u\mathbf{b}_{0,3}, \mathbf{d}_{0,3}^* := u^{-1}\mathbf{b}_{0,3}^*$ and $\mathbb{D}_0 := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{d}_{0,3}, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}), \mathbb{D}_0^* := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}^*, \mathbf{d}_{0,3}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}^*)$. Then, we generate matrix $U_1, U_2 \xleftarrow{\cup} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$, $\tilde{n} := n + r$, and $U := \begin{pmatrix} U_1 & 0_{\tilde{n}} \\ 0_{\tilde{n}} & U_2 \end{pmatrix}$,

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix} := U^T \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1, \tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1, 3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix} := U^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1, \tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix},$$

$$\mathbb{D}_1 := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1, \tilde{n}}, \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{b}_{1, 3\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1, 5\tilde{n}}),$$

$$\mathbb{D}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1, \tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1, 3\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1, 5\tilde{n}}^*).$$

Then, $(\mathbb{D}_0, \mathbb{D}_0^*)$ and $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ are dual orthonormal bases.

The component \mathbf{c}_0 in the challenge ciphertext and key component $\mathbf{k}_0^{*(\iota)}$ for the ι -th key query ($\iota = 1, \dots, \nu$) are expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &= (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_{h-1}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0} = (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, u^{-1}(\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_{h-1}), 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{D}_0}, \\ \text{if } \iota \leq h-1, \mathbf{k}_0^{*(\iota)} &= (1, \xi^{(\iota)}, \xi'^{(\iota)}, \eta_0^{(\iota)}, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*} = (1, \xi^{(\iota)}, u\xi'^{(\iota)}, \eta_0^{(\iota)}, 0)_{\mathbb{D}_0^*}, \\ \text{if } \iota \geq h, \mathbf{k}_0^{*(\iota)} &= (1, \xi^{(\iota)}, 0, \eta_0^{(\iota)}, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*} = (1, \xi^{(\iota)}, 0, \eta_0^{(\iota)}, 0)_{\mathbb{D}_0^*}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\varepsilon_0 := u^{-1}(\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_{h-1}), \xi''^{(\iota)} := u\xi'^{(\iota)}$ for $\iota \leq h-1$ are uniformly distributed and independent of other variables.

Since all the key components \mathbf{k}_i^* ($i > 0$) are normal form, there are no effects from the above transformation, and the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 is expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1 &= (\omega\vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, \omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1} \\ &= (\omega\vec{y}, \vec{f}, (\omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot Z_1, (\omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot Z_2, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1} = (\omega\vec{y}, \vec{f}, \vec{\varepsilon}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1} \end{aligned}$$

where $Z_j := (U_j^{-1})^T$ for $j = 1, 2$ and $\vec{\varepsilon} := ((\omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot Z_1, (\omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot Z_2) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{\tilde{n}}$ is uniformly distributed and independent of others since $Z_1, Z_2 \xleftarrow{\cup} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^T \cap GL(n+r, \mathbb{F}_q)$ and $(\omega'\vec{y}, \vec{a}_h)$ is nonzero except with negligible probability from Lemma 3. Therefore, $(\mathbf{k}_i^{*(\iota)})_{i=1, \dots, \nu}, (\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1)$ are distributed as given in Game 1-($h-1$)-4' over the bases $(\mathbb{D}_0, \mathbb{D}_0^*), (\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$, and the distribution $(\mathbf{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\mathbf{sk}_S^{(\iota)*}\}_{\iota=1, \dots, \nu}, \mathbf{ct}_T)$ is the same as in Game 1-($h-1$)-4' since the above changed basis vectors $\mathbf{d}_{0,3}, \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1} \cdots \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}$ are not included in $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1$.

This completes the proof of Claim 2. \square

Thus, we obtain Lemma 5 from Claim 2. \square

D.3 Proof of Lemma 7

Lemma 7. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_3 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of \mathcal{A} , such that for any security

parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-(p-1)-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-1)}(\lambda)| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}_3}^{\text{P3}}(\lambda) + \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. In order to prove Lemma 7, we construct a probabilistic machine \mathcal{B}_3 against Problem 3 using an adversary \mathcal{A} in a security game (Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3 or 1- h -3- p -1) as a black box as follows:

1. \mathcal{B}_3 is given indices (h, p) and a Problem 3 instance, $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbf{f}_0^*, e_0, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1, \mathbb{B}_1^*, \{\mathbf{f}_i^*\}_{i=1, \dots, 2(n+r)}, \{\mathbf{h}_{\beta,i}^*, \mathbf{e}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n+r})$.
2. \mathcal{B}_3 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary \mathcal{A} .
3. \mathcal{B}_3 provides \mathcal{A} a public key $\text{pk} := (1^\lambda, \text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t'\}_{t=0,1})$ of Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3 (and 1- h -3- p -1), where $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0' := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5})$ and $\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1' := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}, \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5(n+r)})$, that are obtained from the Problem 3 instance.
4. When the ι -th (pre-challenge) key query for access structure $\mathbb{S}_\iota := (M, \rho)$ is issued, first set $\vec{v}_i := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1)$ for $v_i := \rho(i)$ ($i = 1, \dots, \ell$), then
 - (a) if $\iota < h$, \mathcal{B}_3 generates key components $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=0, \dots, \ell}$ as in Eq. (9) for $i = 0$ and as in Eq. (6) for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$.
 - (b) if $\iota = h$, \mathcal{B}_3 generates key components $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=0, \dots, \ell}$ as follows:
 - i. if $i = 0$, \mathbf{k}_0^* is generated as $\mathbf{k}_0^* := \mathbf{k}_0^{*\text{norm}} + \mathbf{f}_0^*$, where $\mathbf{k}_0^{*\text{norm}}$ is a normal form given by Eq. (5) and \mathbf{f}_0^* is obtained from the Problem 3 instance.
 - ii. if $0 < i < p$, \mathbf{k}_i^* is generated as $\mathbf{k}_i^* := \mathbf{k}_i^{*\text{norm}} + \theta'_i \sum_{j=1}^n v_{i,j} \mathbf{b}_{n+r+j}^* + \xi'_i \sum_{j=1}^r M_{i,j} \mathbf{b}_{2n+r+j}^*$, where $\theta'_i, \xi'_i \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\mathbf{k}_i^{*\text{norm}}$ is a normal form given by Eq. (6).
 - iii. if $i = p$, \mathbf{k}_p^* is generated as $\mathbf{k}_p^* := \mathbf{k}_p^{*\text{norm}} + \theta'_p \sum_{j=1}^n v_{p,j} \mathbf{h}_{\beta,j}^* + \sum_{j=1}^r M_{p,j} \mathbf{h}_{\beta,n+j}^*$, where $\theta'_p \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\mathbf{k}_p^{*\text{norm}}$ is a normal form given by Eq. (6) and $\mathbf{h}_{\beta,j}^*$ are obtained from the Problem 3 instance.
 - iv. if $i > p$, \mathbf{k}_i^* is generated as $\mathbf{k}_i^* := \mathbf{k}_i^{*\text{norm}} + \theta'_i \sum_{j=1}^n v_{i,j} \mathbf{b}_{n+r+j}^* + \sum_{j=1}^r M_{i,j} \mathbf{f}_{n+j}^*$, where $\theta'_i \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\mathbf{k}_i^{*\text{norm}}$ is a normal form given by Eq. (6) and \mathbf{f}_{n+j}^* are obtained from the Problem 3 instance.
 - (c) if $\iota > h$, \mathcal{B}_3 generates normal key components $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=0, \dots, \ell}$ as in Eq. (5) for $i = 0$ and as in Eq. (6) for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$.
5. \mathcal{B}_3 sends the key $\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}_\iota} := (\mathbb{S}_\iota, \{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=0, \dots, \ell})$ to \mathcal{A} .
5. When \mathcal{B}_3 receives an encryption query with challenge plaintexts $(m^{(0)}, m^{(1)})$ and challenge attributes $\Gamma := \{x_j\}$ from \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B}_3 selects (challenge) bit $b \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$. \mathcal{B}_3 computes the challenge ciphertext $(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, c_T)$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_0 &:= \zeta \mathbf{b}_{0,1} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}) \mathbf{b}_{0,2} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h) e_0 + \varphi_0 \mathbf{b}_{0,5}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= \sum_{j=1}^n y_j (\omega \mathbf{b}_{1,j} + \omega' e_j) + \sum_{j=1}^r (f_j \mathbf{b}_{1,n+j} + a_{h,j} e_{n+j}) + \sum_{j=1}^{n+r} \varphi_{1,j} \mathbf{b}_{1,4n+j}, \\ c_T &:= g_T^\zeta m^{(b)}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\omega, \omega', \zeta, \varphi_0 \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, $\vec{f} \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^r$, $\vec{a}_h \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \{\vec{a}_h \in \mathbb{F}_q^r \mid M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = 0 \text{ if } v_i := \rho(i) \in \Gamma \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \text{ and } \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h \neq 0\}$ for the h -th queried $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$,

$\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j)$, $\vec{\varphi}_1 := (\varphi_{1,j}) \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}$, and $(\mathbf{e}_0, \{\mathbf{e}_\iota\}_{\iota=1, \dots, n+r}), \mathbb{B}_0, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1$ are a part of the Problem 3 instance.

6. When a (post-challenge) key query is issued by \mathcal{A} after the encryption query, \mathcal{B}_3 executes the same procedure as that of step 4c, i.e., returns a normal key.
7. \mathcal{A} finally outputs bit b' . If $b = b'$, \mathcal{B}_3 outputs $\beta' := 1$. Otherwise, \mathcal{B}_3 outputs $\beta' := 0$.

When $\beta = 0$ (resp. $\beta = 1$), the view of \mathcal{A} is equivalent to that in Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3 (resp. 1- h -3- p -1) by Claim 3.

Claim 3 *The distribution of the view of adversary \mathcal{A} in the above-mentioned game simulated by \mathcal{B}_3 given a Problem 3 instance with $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ is the same as that in Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3 (resp. Game 1- h -3- p -1) if $\beta = 0$ (resp. $\beta = 1$) except with negligible probability.*

Proof. The distribution of the public key and secret keys except for the h -th queried one in the above-mentioned game simulated by \mathcal{B}_3 is the same as that in Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3 (and Game 1- h -3- p -1). Therefore, we examine the distribution of the h -th queried key and the challenge ciphertext below.

The h -th queried key is given as

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } i = 0, \quad \mathbf{k}_0^* = \mathbf{k}_0^{*\text{norm}} + \mathbf{f}_0^* = (1, \xi, \rho, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}, \\
& \text{if } 0 < i < p, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* := \mathbf{k}_i^{*\text{norm}} + \theta'_i \sum_{j=1}^n v_{i,j} \mathbf{b}_{n+r+j}^* + \xi'_i \sum_{j=1}^r M_{i,j} \mathbf{b}_{2n+r+j}^* \\
& \quad = (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \\
& \text{if } i = p, \quad \mathbf{k}_p^* := \mathbf{k}_p^{*\text{norm}} + \theta'_p \sum_{j=1}^n v_{p,j} \mathbf{h}_{\beta,j}^* + \sum_{j=1}^r M_{p,j} \mathbf{h}_{\beta,n+j}^* \\
& \quad \begin{cases} = (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \rho M_p, 0^{n+r}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} & \text{when } \beta = 0, \\ = (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \rho M_p, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} & \text{when } \beta = 1, \end{cases} \\
& \text{if } i > p, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* := \mathbf{k}_i^{*\text{norm}} + \theta'_i \sum_{j=1}^n v_{i,j} \mathbf{b}_{n+r+j}^* + \sum_{j=1}^r M_{i,j} \mathbf{f}_{n+j}^* \\
& \quad = (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \rho M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*},
\end{aligned}$$

where $\theta_i, \xi, \theta'_i, \xi'_i \stackrel{\cup}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$ and random $\rho \in \mathbb{F}_q$ is given in the definition of Problem 3. The challenge ciphertext $\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1$ is given as

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{c}_0 & := \zeta \mathbf{b}_{0,1} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}) \mathbf{b}_{0,2} + (\vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h) \mathbf{e}_0 + \varphi_0 \mathbf{b}_{0,5} \\
& = (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \vec{1} \cdot \tau \vec{a}_h, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}, \\
\mathbf{c}_1 & := \sum_{j=1}^n y_j (\omega \mathbf{b}_{1,j} + \omega' \mathbf{e}_j) + \sum_{j=1}^r (f_j \mathbf{b}_{1,n+j} + a_{h,j} \mathbf{e}_{n+j}) + \sum_{j=1}^{n+r} \varphi_{1,j} \mathbf{b}_{1,4n+j}, \\
& = (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \tau \omega' \vec{y}, \tau \vec{a}_h, \tau \omega' \vec{y}, \tau \vec{a}_h, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1},
\end{aligned}$$

where random $\tau \in \mathbb{F}_q$ is given in the definition of Problem 3, and $\tau \vec{a}_h$ is uniformly distributed in $\{\vec{a}_h \in \mathbb{F}_q^r \mid M_i \cdot \vec{a}_h = 0 \text{ if } v_i := \rho(i) \in \Gamma \text{ for all } i = 1, \dots, \ell, \text{ and } \vec{1} \cdot \vec{a}_h \neq 0\}$ for the h -th queried $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$.

Therefore, the distribution is the same as that in Game 1- h -3- $(p-1)$ -3 (resp. Game 1- h -3- p -1) if $\beta = 0$ (resp. $\beta = 1$) except with negligible probability. \square

This completes the proof of Lemma 7. \square

D.4 Proof of Lemma 8

Lemma 8. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(1-h-3-p-2)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $1 \leq h \leq \nu_1$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. To prove Lemma 8, we will show distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ in Games 1- h -3- p -1 and 1- h -3- p -2 are equivalent. For that purpose, we define an intermediate game, Game 1- h -3- p -1', as

Game 1- h -3- p -1' ($h = 1, \dots, \nu_1; p = 1, \dots, \ell$) : Game 1- h -3- p -1' is the same as Game 1- h -3- p -1 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ and the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 are:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{k}_p^* &:= (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \boxed{\vec{w}}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \\ \mathbf{c}_1 &:= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, \boxed{\vec{z}}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\vec{v}'_p := (\vec{v}_p, 0^r)$, $M'_p := (0^n, M_p)$ and if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_p = 0$, then $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} W'_0 := \{(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \in \text{span}(\vec{e}_1, \vec{v}'_p, M'_p) \times \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \mid \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z} = 0\}$, and if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_p \neq 0$, $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} (\text{span}(\vec{e}_1, \vec{v}'_p, M'_p) \times \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}) \setminus W'_0$.

Claim 4 The distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_{\Gamma})$ in Game 1- h -3- p -1 and that in Game 1- h -3- p -1' are equivalent except with negligible probability.

Proof of Claim 4. We will consider the distribution in Game 1- h -3- p -1. We define new dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ of \mathbb{V}_1 . First, we generate matrix $U \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) \cap GL(n+r, \mathbb{F}_q)$, and set $\tilde{n} := n+r$,

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix} &:= U^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix} := U^T \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix}, \\ \mathbb{D}_1 &:= (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}), \\ \mathbb{D}_1^* &:= (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}^*). \end{aligned}$$

Then, \mathbb{D}_1 and \mathbb{D}_1^* are dual orthonormal bases. \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ and the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 is expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{k}_p^* &= (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ &= (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, (\theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p) \cdot Z, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}, \quad (22) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1 &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h, (\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot U, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1} \quad (23) \end{aligned}$$

where $Z := (U^{-1})^T$. From Lemma 3, the pair of coefficients $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) := ((\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot U, (\theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p) \cdot Z)$ is uniformly distributed in

$$W_{\vec{v}'_p, M'_p, \pi} := \{(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \in (\text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \vec{v}'_p, M'_p \rangle \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle) \times (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle^\perp) \mid \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z} = \pi\}$$

except with negligible probability, where $\pi := \omega' \theta'_p (\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y}) + \xi' M_p \cdot \vec{a}_h$, $\vec{v}'_p := (\vec{v}_p, 0^r)$ and $M'_p := (0^n, M_p)$. In particular, if $\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0$, then π is independently and uniformly distributed since $\theta'_p \xleftarrow{\text{U}} \mathbb{F}_q$, and (\vec{w}, \vec{z}) is independently and uniformly distributed in $(\text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \vec{v}'_p, M'_p \rangle \times \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}) \setminus W'_0$ (except with negligible probability). If $\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} = 0$, then $M_p \cdot \vec{a}_h = 0$, and (\vec{w}, \vec{z}) is independently and uniformly distributed in W'_0 .

When $1 \leq i \neq p \leq \ell$, the i -th component of the h -th queried key \mathbf{k}_i^* is

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{if } i < p, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* = (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ \quad \quad \quad = (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}, \\ \text{if } i > p, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* = (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ \quad \quad \quad = (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi'_i M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}. \end{array} \right\} \quad (24)$$

In the light of the adversary's view, $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ is consistent with public key $\text{pk} := (1^\lambda, \text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1})$. Moreover, since the RHS of Eqs. (22), (23) and (24) are in the same forms in those in Game 1- h -3- p -1', namely, Game 1- h -3- p -1 can be conceptually changed to Game 1- h -3- p -1' except with negligible probability. \square

Claim 5 *The distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_S^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Game 1- h -3- p -2 and that in Game 1- h -3- p -1' are equivalent except with negligible probability.*

Proof of Claim 5. Claim 5 can be proven in a similar manner to Claim 4. Namely, we show that Game 1- h -3- p -2 can be conceptually changed to Game 1- h -3- p -1' except with negligible probability. In the proof, we consider a pair of coefficients $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) := ((\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{a}_h) \cdot U, (\theta'_p \vec{v}_p, \xi'_p M_p) \cdot Z)$ where a new randomness ξ'_p is used instead of ξ' in Claim 4. Lemma 3 shows the pair is uniformly distributed in $W_{\vec{v}'_p, M'_p, \pi}$ with the inner product value $\pi := \omega' \theta'_p (\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y}) + \xi'_p M_p \cdot \vec{a}_h$ except with negligible probability. Then, the same technique in Claim 4 is used in the rest of the proof of Claim 5. \square

From Claims 4 and 5, the distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_S^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Game 1- h -3- p -1 and that in Game 1- h -3- p -2 are equivalent except with negligible probability. This completes the proof of Lemma 8. \square

D.5 Proof of Lemma 14

Lemma 14. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-1)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-p-2)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$ and $1 \leq p \leq \ell$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. To prove Lemma 14, we will show distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Games 3- h -2- p -1 and 3- h -2- p -2 are equivalent. For that purpose, we define an intermediate game, Game 3- h -2- p -1', as

Game 3- h -2- p -1' ($h = \nu_1 + 1, \dots, \nu; p = 1, \dots, \ell$) : Game 3- h -2- p -1' is the same as Game 3- h -2- p -1 except \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ and the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 are:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1 &:= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}', \boxed{\vec{z}}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1}, \\ \text{if } \vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0, \mathbf{k}_p^* &:= (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \boxed{\vec{w}}, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\vec{v}_p' := (\vec{v}_p, 0^r)$, $M_p' := (0^n, M_p)$ and if $\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0$, then $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \stackrel{U}{\leftarrow} W'_{\neq 0} := \{(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \in \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \vec{v}_p', M_p' \rangle \times \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \mid \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z} \neq 0\}$.

Claim 6 *The distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Game 3- h -2- p -1 and that in Game 3- h -2- p -1' are equivalent except with negligible probability.*

Proof of Claim 6. We will consider the distribution in Game 3- h -2- p -1. We define new dual orthonormal bases $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ of \mathbb{V}_1 . First, we generate matrix $U \stackrel{U}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q) \cap GL(n+r, \mathbb{F}_q)$, and set $\tilde{n} := n+r$,

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix} &:= U^T \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix} := U^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix}, \\ \mathbb{D}_1 &:= (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}), \\ \mathbb{D}_1^* &:= (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,2\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{d}_{1,2\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}^*). \end{aligned}$$

Then, \mathbb{D}_1 and \mathbb{D}_1^* are dual orthonormal bases. \mathbf{k}_p^* in the h -th queried key for $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ with $\ell \times r$ matrix $M = (M_i)$ and the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{c}_1 is expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{if } \vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0, \\ \mathbf{k}_p^* &= (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, \theta_p' \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ &= (\theta_p \vec{v}_p, \xi M_p, 0^{n+r}, (\theta_p' \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p) \cdot U, \psi_p \vec{v}_p, \eta_p M_p, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}, \quad (25) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1 &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}', \omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}', 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}', (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot Z, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1} \quad (26) \end{aligned}$$

where $Z := (U^{-1})^T$. From Lemma 3, the pair of coefficients $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) := ((\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot Z, (\theta_p' \vec{v}_p, \xi' M_p) \cdot U)$ is uniformly distributed in

$$W_{\vec{v}_p', M_p', \pi} := \{(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) \in (\text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1, \vec{v}_p', M_p' \rangle \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle) \times (\mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} \setminus \text{span}\langle \vec{e}_1 \rangle^\perp) \mid \vec{w} \cdot \vec{z} = \pi\}$$

except with negligible probability, where $\pi := \omega' \theta'_p (\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y}) + \xi' M_p \cdot \vec{f}'$, $\vec{v}'_p := (\vec{v}_p, 0^r)$ and $M'_p := (0^n, M_p)$. In particular, if $\vec{v}_p \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0$, then π is independently and uniformly distributed since $\theta'_p \stackrel{U}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$, and (\vec{w}, \vec{z}) is independently and uniformly distributed in $W'_{\neq 0}$ (except with negligible probability).

When $1 \leq i \neq p \leq \ell$, the i -th component of the h -th queried key \mathbf{k}_i^* is

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{if } i < p, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* &= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta''_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ &= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta''_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}, \\ \text{if } i > p, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* &= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\ &= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \dots)_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}. \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (27)$$

In the light of the adversary's view, $(\mathbb{D}_1, \mathbb{D}_1^*)$ is consistent with public key $\text{pk} := (1^\lambda, \text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1})$. Moreover, since the RHS of Eqs. (25), (26) and (27) are in the same forms in those in Game 3- h -2- p -1', namely, Game 3- h -2- p -1 can be conceptually changed to Game 3- h -2- p -1' except with negligible probability. \square

Claim 7 *The distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Game 3- h -2- p -2 and that in Game 3- h -2- p -1' are equivalent except with negligible probability.*

Proof of Claim 7. Claim 7 can be proven in a similar manner to Claim 6. Namely, we show that Game 3- h -2- p -2 can be conceptually changed to Game 3- h -2- p -1' except with negligible probability. In the proof, we consider a pair of coefficients $(\vec{w}, \vec{z}) := ((\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot Z, (\theta''_p, \theta'_p \vec{v}_p^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_p) \cdot U)$ where a new randomness θ''_p is used instead of $\theta'_p v_{p,1}$ in Claim 6. Lemma 3 shows the pair is uniformly distributed in $W'_{\vec{v}'_p, M'_p, \pi}$ with the inner product value $\pi := \omega' \theta''_p + \omega' \theta'_p (\vec{v}_p^{\geq 2} \cdot \vec{y}^{\geq 2}) + \xi' M'_p \cdot \vec{f}'$ except with negligible probability since $y_1 = 1$. Since θ''_p is uniformly distributed, then π is also uniform, and the same technique in Claim 6 is used in the rest of the proof of Claim 7. \square

From Claims 6 and 7, the distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Game 3- h -2- p -1 and that in Game 3- h -2- p -2 are equivalent except with negligible probability. This completes the proof of Lemma 14. \square

D.6 Proof of Lemma 16

Lemma 16. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-2-\ell-3)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-h-3)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for $\nu_1 + 1 \leq h \leq \nu$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. To prove Lemma 16, we will show distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ in Games 3- h -2- ℓ -3 and 3- h -3 are equivalent. For that purpose, we define new subbases $\mathbf{d}_{1,n+r+1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3(n+r)}$ and $\mathbf{d}_{1,n+r+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3(n+r)}^*$ of \mathbb{V}_1 as follows: The first component of the target vector $\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ in the challenge ciphertext is $y_1 = 1$. Then, we set $\mu'_1 := 1, \mu'_\ell := -y_\ell$ for $\ell = 2, \dots, n$,

$$\mu'_{n+\iota} := -(\omega')^{-1} f'_\iota \text{ for } \iota = 1, \dots, r, \text{ and } Z_1 := \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \mu'_2 & \dots & \mu'_{n+r} \\ & 1 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & 1 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n+r) \times (n+r)},$$

and $U_2 \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$. Then we set $\tilde{n} := n + r$,

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1, 2\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix} &:= Z_1^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1, \tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1, 2\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1, \tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1, 2\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix} := Z_1^T \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1, \tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1, 2\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix}, \\ \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1, 2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix} &:= U_2^T \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1, 2\tilde{n}+1} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1, 3\tilde{n}} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}_{1, 2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{d}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix} := U_2^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{b}_{1, 2\tilde{n}+1}^* \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{b}_{1, 3\tilde{n}}^* \end{pmatrix}, \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

$\mathbb{D}_1 := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{d}_{1,\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}})$, $\mathbb{D}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{d}_{1,\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,3\tilde{n}}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,3\tilde{n}+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,5\tilde{n}}^*)$. We then easily verify that \mathbb{D}_1 and \mathbb{D}_1^* are dual orthonormal, and are distributed the same as the original bases, \mathbb{B}_1 and \mathbb{B}_1^* .

We have $(\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot Z_1 = (\omega', 0^{n+r-1})$, and since Z_1 is regular,

$$(\theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i) \cdot (Z_1^{-1})^T = \left(\frac{\xi'}{\omega'} M_i \cdot \vec{f}', \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i \right) \text{ if } \vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} = 0. \quad (29)$$

$$(\theta''_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i) \cdot (Z_1^{-1})^T = (\theta'''_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i) \text{ if } \vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} \neq 0, \quad (30)$$

where $\theta'''_i := \theta''_i + \theta'_i \vec{y}^{\geq 2} \cdot \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2} + \frac{\xi'}{\omega'} M_i \cdot \vec{f}'$ and θ'''_i is uniformly random and independent from other variables since $\theta''_i \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q$. Here, the first entry of the right hand side of Eq. (29) is determined by ratio of the inner product $(\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot (\theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i) = \xi' M_i \cdot \vec{f}'$ and ω' , and the rest of entries are the same in both sides by definition.

Clearly, $\vec{z} := (\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot (U_2^{-1})^T$ is independently and uniformly distributed in \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r} since $U_2 \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{H}(n, r, \mathbb{F}_q)^\times$ and all the corresponding coefficients in keys are zero.

The challenge ciphertext in Game 3-h-2-l-3 is expressed over bases \mathbb{B}_1 and \mathbb{D}_1 as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{c}_1 &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}', \omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}', 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{B}_1} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, (\omega' \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot Z_1, (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}') \cdot (U_2^{-1})^T, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1} \\ &= (\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}, \omega', 0^{n+r-1}, \vec{z}, 0^{n+r}, \vec{\varphi}_1)_{\mathbb{D}_1}, \text{ where } \vec{z} \stackrel{\text{U}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r}. \end{aligned}$$

The i -th component of the h -th queried key $\{\mathbf{k}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\ell$ in Game 3-h-2-l-3 is expressed over bases \mathbb{B}_1^* and \mathbb{D}_1^* as follows. Using Eqs. (29), (30) and (28), we have,

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$,

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{if } \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i = 0, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* &= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\
&= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{\frac{\xi'}{\omega'} M_i \cdot \vec{f}^i}, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}, \\
\text{if } \vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i \neq 0, \quad \mathbf{k}_i^* &= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \theta''_i, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*} \\
&= (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \boxed{\theta''_i}, \theta'_i \vec{v}_i^{\geq 2}, \xi' M_i, 0^{n+r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, 0^{n+r})_{\mathbb{D}_1^*}, \quad (31)
\end{aligned}$$

where θ''_i is defined after Eq. (30). Therefore, we have Eq. (19) if $\vec{y} \cdot \vec{v}_i = 0$. And, the right hand side of Eq. (31) is distributed equivalently to Eq. (16).

We have only $M_i \cdot \vec{f}^i$ for i when $\vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} = 0$. From the security of linear secret sharing, the central secret $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}^i$ is (uniformly distributed and) independent from information $\{M_i \cdot \vec{f}^i \text{ for } i \text{ when } \vec{v}_i \cdot \vec{y} = 0\}$. Since s_0 is the third coefficient of \mathbf{c}_0 , the corresponding coefficient of \mathbf{k}_0^* also becomes uniformly distributed and independent from all the other variables by the one-dimensional coordinate change. That is, we have Eq. (18).

Therefore, the distribution $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \{\widehat{\mathbb{D}}_t\}_{t=0,1}, \{\text{sk}_{\mathbb{S}}^{(j)*}\}_{j=1,\dots,\nu}, \text{ct}_\Gamma)$ is equivalent to that in Game 3-h-3. This completes the proof of Lemma 16. \square

D.7 Proof of Lemma 18

Lemma 18. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , for any security parameter λ , $|\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(3-\nu-4)}(\lambda) - \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{(4)}(\lambda)| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$, where $\epsilon(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

Proof. Lemma 18 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 7 in [19]. In Game 3- $\nu-4$, the 0-th components of all keys, $\mathbf{k}_0^{(h)*}$ for $h = 1, \dots, \nu$, are given by $\mathbf{k}_0^{(h)*} = (1, \xi^{(h)}, \xi''^{(h)}, \eta_0^{(h)}, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*}$ with independent randomness $\xi''^{(h)}$, and the 0-th component of the challenge ciphertext is given by $\mathbf{c}_0 = (\zeta, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}^i, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0}$. By setting $\mathbf{d}_{0,1}^* := \mathbf{b}_{0,1}^* + \theta \mathbf{b}_{0,3}^*$, $\mathbf{d}_{0,3}^* := \mathbf{b}_{0,3}^* - \theta \mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*$ and $\mathbb{D} := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{d}_{0,3}, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}, \mathbf{b}_{0,5})$, $\mathbb{D}^* := (\mathbf{d}_{0,1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}^*)$, we obtain $\mathbf{k}_0^{(h)*} = (1, \xi^{(h)}, \xi''^{(h)} - \theta, \eta_0^{(h)}, 0)_{\mathbb{D}_0^*}$ and $\mathbf{c}_0 = (\zeta + \theta \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}^i, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}^i, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{D}_0}$. Since $\zeta' := \zeta + \theta \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}^i$ is uniformly random and independent from all the others, we obtain the distributions in Game 4. \square

E Adaptively Secure Multi-Use CP-ABE Scheme with Short Secret Keys

E.1 Definition of CP-ABE

Definition 10 (Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption : CP-ABE). A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme consists of four algorithms.

Setup takes as input security parameter. It outputs the public parameters pk and a master key sk .

KeyGen takes as input a set of attributes, $\Gamma := \{x_j\}_{1 \leq j \leq n'}$, \mathbf{pk} and \mathbf{sk} . It outputs a decryption key.

Enc takes as input public parameters \mathbf{pk} , message m in some associated message space msg , and access structure $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$. It outputs the ciphertext.

Dec takes as input public parameters \mathbf{pk} , decryption key \mathbf{sk}_Γ for a set of attributes Γ , and ciphertext $\text{ct}_\mathbb{S}$ that was encrypted under access structure \mathbb{S} . It outputs either $m' \in \text{msg}$ or the distinguished symbol \perp .

A CP-ABE scheme should have the following correctness property: for all $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, all attribute sets Γ , all decryption keys $\mathbf{sk}_\Gamma \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \text{KeyGen}(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}, \Gamma)$, all messages m , all access structures \mathbb{S} , all ciphertexts $\text{ct}_\mathbb{S} \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}, m, \mathbb{S})$, it holds that $m = \text{Dec}(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}_\Gamma, \text{ct}_\mathbb{S})$ with overwhelming probability, if \mathbb{S} accepts Γ .

Definition 11. *The model for proving the adaptively payload-hiding security of CP-ABE under chosen plaintext attack is:*

Setup *The challenger runs the setup algorithm, $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, and gives the public parameters \mathbf{pk} to the adversary.*

Phase 1 *The adversary is allowed to issue a polynomial number of queries, Γ , to the challenger or oracle $\text{KeyGen}(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$ for private keys, \mathbf{sk}_Γ associated with Γ .*

Challenge *The adversary submits two messages $m^{(0)}, m^{(1)}$ and an access structure, $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$, provided that the \mathbb{S} does not accept any Γ sent to the challenger in Phase 1. The challenger flips a random coin $b \xleftarrow{\mathbb{U}} \{0, 1\}$, and computes $\text{ct}_\mathbb{S}^{(b)} \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}, m^{(b)}, \mathbb{S})$. It gives $\text{ct}_\mathbb{S}^{(b)}$ to the adversary.*

Phase 2 *The adversary is allowed to issue a polynomial number of queries, Γ , to the challenger or oracle $\text{KeyGen}(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$ for private keys, \mathbf{sk}_Γ associated with Γ , provided that \mathbb{S} does not accept Γ .*

Guess *The adversary outputs a guess b' of b .*

The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the above game is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CP-ABE,PH}}(\lambda) := \Pr[b' = b] - 1/2$ for any security parameter λ . A CP-FE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.

E.2 Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator

We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator $\mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{CP}}$ below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed CP-ABE scheme, where $\mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}$ is defined in Section 5.2.

$\mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{CP}}(1^\lambda, 5, (n, r)) :$
 $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \mathbb{D}_0, \mathbb{D}_0^*, \mathbb{D}_1, \{D_{i,j,\ell}^*, D_{i,j,\ell}'\}_{i,j=1,\dots,5;\ell=1,\dots,n+r}^{\ell=1,\dots,n+r}) \xleftarrow{\mathbb{R}} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{KP}}(1^\lambda, 5, (n, r)),$
 $\mathbb{B}_0 := \mathbb{D}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_0^* := \mathbb{D}_0, \mathbb{B}_1^* := \mathbb{D}_1, B_{i,j,\ell} := D_{i,j,\ell}^*, B_{i,j,\ell}' := D_{i,j,\ell}'$ for all $i, j, \ell, \ell,$
 return $(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1^*, \{B_{i,j,\ell}, B_{i,j,\ell}'\}_{i,j=1,\dots,5;\ell=1,\dots,n+r}^{\ell=1,\dots,n+r}).$

E.3 Construction

Setup($1^\lambda, (n, r)$) : $/ * N_0 := 5, N_1 := 5(n+r) * /$

$(\text{param}_{(n,r)}, \mathbb{B}_0, \mathbb{B}_0^*, \mathbb{B}_1^*, \{B_{i,j,\ell}, B'_{i,j,\ell}\}_{\ell=1,\dots,n+r}^{i,j=1,\dots,5;\ell=1,2}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{G}_{\text{ob}}^{\text{CP}}(1^\lambda, 5, (n, r)),$

$\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0 := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}, \mathbf{b}_{0,4}), \quad \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0^* := (\mathbf{b}_{0,1}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,2}^*, \mathbf{b}_{0,5}^*),$

$\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_1^* := (\mathbf{b}_{1,1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,n+r}^*, \mathbf{b}_{1,3(n+r)+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{1,4(n+r)}^*),$

return $\text{pk} := (1^\lambda, \text{param}_{(n,r)}, \widehat{\mathbb{B}}_0, \{B_{i,j,\ell}, B'_{i,j,\ell}\}_{\ell=1,2; i=1,4; j=1,\dots,5}^{i=1,4; j=1,\dots,5}), \text{ sk} := \{\widehat{\mathbb{B}}_t^*\}_{t=0,1}.$

KeyGen($\text{pk}, \text{sk}, \Gamma := \{x_1, \dots, x_{n'} \mid x_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^\times, n' \leq n-1\}$) :

$\vec{y} := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ such that $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} y_{n-j} z^j = z^{n-1-n'} \prod_{j=1}^{n'} (z - x_j),$

$\vec{f} \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q^r, \omega, \varphi_0 \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q, \vec{\varphi}_1 \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q^{n+r},$

$\mathbf{k}_0^* := (1, \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, 0, \varphi_0)_{\mathbb{B}_0^*},$

$\mathbf{k}_1^* := (\underbrace{\omega \vec{y}, \vec{f}}_{n+r}, \underbrace{0^{2n+2r}}_{2n+2r}, \underbrace{0^{n+r}}_{n+r}, \underbrace{\vec{\varphi}_1}_{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1^*}$

$\text{sk}_\Gamma := (\Gamma, \mathbf{k}_0^*, \mathbf{k}_1^*). \text{ return } \text{sk}_\Gamma.$

Enc($\text{pk}, m, \mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$) : $\zeta, \xi, \eta_0 \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q, \quad \mathbf{c}_0 := (\zeta, \xi, 0, \eta_0, 0)_{\mathbb{B}_0},$

for $i = 1, \dots, \ell,$ if $\rho(i) = v_i, \vec{v}_i := (v_{i,l})_{l=1}^n := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1), \theta_i, \psi_i, \eta_i \xleftarrow{U} \mathbb{F}_q,$

for $j = 1, \dots, 5,$

$C_{i,1,j} := \sum_{l=1}^n v_{i,l} (\theta_i B'_{1,j,l} + \psi_i B'_{4,j,l}) + \sum_{l=1}^r M_{i,l} (\xi B'_{1,j,n+l} + \eta_i B'_{4,j,n+l}),$

$C_{i,2,j} := \theta_i B_{1,j,1} + \psi_i B_{4,j,1}, \quad C_{i,3,j} := \xi B_{1,j,2} + \eta_i B_{4,j,2},$

$c_T := g_T^\zeta m, \text{ return } \text{ct}_\mathbb{S} := (\mathbb{S}, \mathbf{c}_0, \{C_{i,1,j}, C_{i,2,j}, C_{i,3,j}\}_{j=1,\dots,5}^{i=1,\dots,\ell}, c_T).$

Dec($\text{pk}, \text{sk}_\Gamma := (\Gamma, \mathbf{k}_0^*, \mathbf{k}_1^*), \text{ct}_\mathbb{S} := (\mathbb{S}, \mathbf{c}_0, \{C_{i,1,j}, C_{i,2,j}, C_{i,3,j}\}_{j=1,\dots,5}^{i=1,\dots,\ell}, c_T)$) :

If $\mathbb{S} := (M, \rho)$ accepts Γ , then compute I and $\{\alpha_i\}_{i \in I}$ such that

$\vec{1} = \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i M_i,$ where M_i is the i -th row of M , and

$I \subseteq \{i \in \{1, \dots, \ell\} \mid \rho(i) \in \Gamma\}.$

for $i \in I,$ if $\rho(i) = v_i, \vec{v}_i := (v_{i,l})_{l=1}^n := (v_i^{n-1}, \dots, v_i, 1),$

$\mathbf{c}_i := (\underbrace{C_{i,1,1}, v_{i,2} C_{i,2,1}, \dots, v_{i,n} C_{i,2,1}}_{n+r}, \underbrace{M_{i,1} C_{i,3,1}, \dots, M_{i,r} C_{i,3,1}}_{n+r}, \dots, \underbrace{C_{i,1,5}, v_{i,2} C_{i,2,5}, \dots, v_{i,n} C_{i,2,5}}_{n+r}, \underbrace{M_{i,1} C_{i,3,5}, \dots, M_{i,r} C_{i,3,5}}_{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1},$

that is, $\mathbf{c}_i := (\theta_i \vec{v}_i, \xi M_i, \underbrace{0^{2n+2r}}_{2n+2r}, \psi_i \vec{v}_i, \eta_i M_i, \underbrace{0^{n+r}}_{n+r})_{\mathbb{B}_1},$

$\mathbf{c}' := \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i \mathbf{c}_i, \quad K := e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) \cdot e(\mathbf{c}', \mathbf{k}_1^*), \text{ return } m' := c_T / K.$

[Correctness] If Γ satisfies $\mathbb{S}, K = e(\mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{k}_0^*) \cdot e(\mathbf{c}', \mathbf{k}_1^*) = g_T^{-\xi s_0 + \zeta} g_T^{\xi \sum_{i \in I} \alpha_i s_i} = g_T^\zeta$ where $s_0 := \vec{1} \cdot \vec{f}, s_i := M_i \cdot \vec{f}$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell.$

E.4 Security

Theorem 3. *The proposed multi-use CP-ABE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.*

Theorem 3 is similarly proven to Theorem 2.

F Comparison with the Existing Multi-Use ABE

We compare our KP-ABE scheme with existing pairing-based schemes (Table 1) and our CP-ABE scheme with existing pairing-based ones (Table 2). In particular, Table 2 shows that even considering selectively secure CP-ABE, our scheme is the first to realize multi-use compact secret keys from a static assumption.

Attrapadung-Yamada [6] propose a generic conversion between KP-ABE and CP-ABE, using the conversion, we have a dual ABE (e.g., CP-ABE) from some primal ABE (e.g., KP-ABE) with some properties. However, in both KP- and CP-ABE schemes, our schemes are the first to break one-use barrier, so, the above conversion made a step orthogonal to our contribution.