

# Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting

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**Abstract.** We introduce *implicit zero-knowledge* arguments (iZK) and simulation-sound variants thereof (SSiZK); these are lightweight alternatives to zero-knowledge arguments for enforcing semi-honest behavior. Our main technical contribution is a construction of efficient two-flow iZK and SSiZK protocols for a large class of languages under the (plain) DDH assumption in cyclic groups in the common reference string model. As an application of iZK, we improve upon the round-efficiency of existing protocols for securely computing inner product under the DDH assumption. This new protocol in turn provides privacy-preserving biometric authentication with lower latency.

**Keywords.** hash proof systems, zero-knowledge, malicious adversaries, two-party computation, inner product.

## 1 Introduction

**Zero-Knowledge Arguments (ZK)** enable a prover to prove the validity of a statement to a verifier without revealing anything else [GMR89, BCC88]. In addition to being interesting in its own right, zero knowledge has found numerous applications in cryptography, most notably to simplify protocol design as in the setting of secure two-party computation [Yao86, GMW87b, GMW87a], and as a tool for building cryptographic primitives with strong security guarantees such as encryption secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks [NY90, DDN91].

In this work, we focus on the use of zero-knowledge arguments as used in efficient two-party protocols for enforcing semi-honest behavior. We are particularly interested in round-efficient two-party protocols, as network latency and round-trip times can be a major efficiency bottleneck, for instance, when a user wants to securely compute on data that is outsourced to the cloud. In addition, we want to rely on standard and widely-deployed cryptographic assumptions. Here, a standard interactive zero-knowledge argument based on the DDH assumption would require at least three flows; moreover, this overhead in round complexity is incurred each time we want to enforce semi-honest behavior via zero knowledge. To avoid this overhead, we could turn to non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK). However, efficient NIZK would require either the use of pairings [GS08] and thus stronger assumptions and additional efficiency overhead, or the use of random oracles [BR93, FS87].

We would like to point out that, contrary to some common belief, there is no straightforward way to reduce the number of rounds of zero-knowledge proofs “à la Schnorr” [Sch90] by performing the first steps (commitment and challenges) in a preprocessing phase, so that each proof only takes one flow subsequently. Indeed, as noticed by Bernhard-Pereira-Warinsky in [BPW12], the statement of the proof has to be chosen before seeing the challenges, unless the proof becomes unsound.

**On the Importance of Round-Efficiency.** In addition to being an interesting theoretical problem, improving the round efficiency is also very important in practice. If we consider a protocol between a client in Europe, and a cloud provider in the US, for example, we expect a latency of at least 100ms (and even worse if the client is connected with 3g or via satellite, which may induce a latency of up to 1s [Bro13]). Concretely, using Curve25519 elliptic curve of Bernstein [Ber06] (for 128 bits of security, and 256-bit group elements) with a 10Mbps Internet link and 100ms latency, 100ms corresponds to sending 1 flow, or 40,000 group elements, or computing 1,000 exponentiations at 2GHz on one core of current AMD64 microprocessor<sup>1</sup>, hence 4,000 exponentiations on a 4-core microprocessor<sup>2</sup>. As a final remark on latency, while speed of networks keeps increasing as technology improves, latency between

<sup>1</sup> According to [ECR], an exponentiation takes about 200,000 cycles.

<sup>2</sup> Assuming exponentiations can be made in parallel, which is the case for our iZKs.

two (far away) places on earth is strongly limited by the speed of light: there is no hope to get a latency less than 28ms between London and San Francisco, for example.

**Our Contributions.** In this work, we introduce *implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments* or *iZK* and simulation-sound variants thereof or *SSiZK*, lightweight alternatives to (simulation-sound) zero-knowledge arguments for enforcing semi-honest behavior in two-party protocols. Then, we construct efficient two-flow *iZK* and *SSiZK* protocols for a large class of languages under the (plain) DDH assumption in cyclic groups without random oracles; this is the main technical contribution of our work. Our *SSiZK* construction from *iZK* is very efficient and incurs only a small additive overhead. Finally, we present several applications of *iZK* to the design of efficient secure two-party computation, where *iZK* can be used in place of interactive zero-knowledge arguments to obtain more round-efficient protocols.

While our *iZK* protocols require an additional flow compared to *NiZK*, we note that eliminating the use of pairings and random oracles offers both theoretical and practical benefits. From a theoretical stand-point, the DDH assumption in cyclic groups is a weaker assumption than the DDH-like assumptions used in Groth-Sahai pairing-based *NiZK* [GS08], and we also avoid the theoretical pitfalls associated with instantiating the random oracle methodology [CGH04, BBP04]. From a practical stand-point, we can instantiate our DDH-based protocols over a larger class of groups. Concrete examples include Bernstein’s Curve25519 [Ber06] which admit very efficient group exponentiations, but do not support an efficient pairing and are less likely to be susceptible to recent breakthroughs in discrete log attacks [BGJT14, GKZ14]. By using more efficient groups and avoiding the use of pairing operations, we also gain notable improvements in computational efficiency over Groth-Sahai proofs. Moreover, additional efficiency improvements come from the structure of *iZK* which makes them *efficiently batchable*. Conversely, Groth-Sahai *NiZK* cannot be efficiently batched and do not admit efficient *SS-NiZK* (for non-linear equations).

**New Notion: Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments.** *iZK* is a two-party protocol executed between a prover and a verifier, at the end of which both parties should output an ephemeral key. The idea is that the key will be used to encrypt subsequent messages and to protect the privacy of a verifier against a cheating prover. Completeness states that if both parties start with a statement in the language, then both parties output the same key  $K$ . Soundness states that if the statement is outside the language, then the verifier’s ephemeral output key is hidden from the cheating prover. Note that the verifier may not learn whether his key is the same as the prover’s and would not be able to detect whether the prover is cheating, hence the soundness guarantee is *implicit*. This is in contrast to a standard *ZK* argument, where the verifier would “explicitly” abort when interacting with a cheating prover. Finally, zero-knowledge stipulates that for statements in the language, we can efficiently simulate (without the witness) the joint distribution of the transcript between an honest prover and a malicious verifier, together with the honest prover’s ephemeral output key  $K$ . Including  $K$  in the output of the simulator ensures that the malicious verifier does not gain additional knowledge about the witness when honest prover uses  $K$  in subsequent interaction, as will be the case when *iZK* is used as part of a bigger protocol.

More precisely, *iZK* are key encapsulation mechanisms in which the public key  $\text{ipk}$  is associated with a word  $x$  and a language  $\mathcal{L}$ . In our case,  $x$  is the flow<sup>3</sup> and  $\mathcal{L}$  the language of valid flows. If  $x$  is in  $\mathcal{L}$ , knowing a witness proving so (namely, random coins used to generate the flow) enables anyone to generate  $\text{ipk}$  together with a secret key  $\text{isk}$ , using a key generation algorithm  $\text{iKG}$ . But, if  $x$  is not in  $\mathcal{L}$ , there is no polynomial-time way to generate a public key  $\text{ipk}$  for which it is possible to decrypt the associated ciphertexts (*soundness*).

To ensure semi-honest behavior, as depicted in Figure 1, each time a player sends a flow  $x$ , he also sends a public key  $\text{ipk}$  generated by  $\text{iKG}$  and keeps the associated secret key  $\text{isk}$ . To answer back, the other user generates a key encapsulation  $c$  for  $\text{ipk}$  and  $x$ , of a random ephemeral key  $K$ . He can then use  $K$  to encrypt (using symmetric encryption or pseudo-random generators and one-time pad) all the subsequent flows he sends to the first player. For this transformation to be secure, we also need to be sure that  $c$  (and the ability to decapsulate  $K$  for any  $\text{ipk}$ ) leaks no information about random coins used to generate the flow (or, more generally, the witness of  $x$ ). This is ensured by the *zero-knowledge*

<sup>3</sup> In our formalization, actually, it is the flow together all the previous flows. But we just say it is the flow to simplify explanations.




Fig. 1: Enforcing semi-honest behavior of Alice ( $A$ )

property, which states there must exist a trapdoor (for some common reference string) enabling to generate a public key  $\text{ipk}$  and a trapdoor key  $\text{itk}$  (using a trapdoor key algorithm  $\text{iTKG}$ ), so that  $\text{ipk}$  looks like a classical public key and  $\text{itk}$  allows to decapsulate any ciphertext for  $\text{ipk}$ .

**Overview of our iZK and SSiZK Constructions.** We proceed to provide an overview of our two-flow iZK protocols; this is the main technical contribution of our work. Our main tool is Hash Proof Systems or Smooth Projective Hash Functions (SPHF) [CS02]. We observe that SPHF are essentially “honest-verifier” iZK; our main technical challenge is to boost this weak honest-verifier into full-fledged zero knowledge, without using pairings or random oracles.

Informally speaking, a smooth projective hash function on a language  $\mathcal{L}$  is a sort of hash function whose evaluation on a word  $C \in \mathcal{L}$  can be computed in two ways, either by using a *hashing key*  $\text{hk}$  (which can be seen as a private key) or by using the associated *projection key*  $\text{hp}$  (which can be seen as a public key). On the other hand, when  $C \notin \mathcal{L}$ , the hash of  $C$  cannot be computed from  $\text{hp}$ ; actually, when  $C \notin \mathcal{L}$ , the hash of  $C$  computed with  $\text{hk}$  is statistically indistinguishable from a random value from the point of view of any individual knowing the projection key  $\text{hp}$  only. Hence, an SPHF on  $\mathcal{L}$  is given by a pair  $(\text{Hash}, \text{ProjHash})$  with the requirements that, when there is a witness  $w$  ensuring that  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ ,  $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \mathcal{L}, C) = \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \mathcal{L}, C, w)$ , while when there is no such witness (i.e.  $C \notin \mathcal{L}$ ), the smoothness property states that  $H = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \mathcal{L}, C)$  is random and independent of  $\text{hp}$ . In this paper, as in [GL06], we consider a weak form of SPHF, where the projection key  $\text{hp}$  can depend on  $C$ .

Concretely, if we have an SPHF for some language  $\mathcal{L}$ , we can set the public key  $\text{ipk}$  to be empty ( $\perp$ ), the secret key  $\text{isk}$  to be the witness  $w$ , the ciphertext  $c$  to be the projection key  $\text{hp}$ , and the encapsulated ephemeral key  $K$  would be the hash value. (Similar connections between SPHF and zero knowledge were made in [GL03, GL06, BPV12, ABB<sup>+</sup>13].) The resulting iZK would be correct and sound, the soundness coming from the smoothness of the SPHF: if the word  $C$  is not in  $\mathcal{L}$ , even given the ciphertext  $c = \text{hp}$ , the hash value  $K$  looks random. However, it would not necessarily be zero-knowledge for two reasons: not only, a malicious verifier could generate a malformed projection key, for which the projected hash value of a word depends on the witness, but also there seems to be no trapdoor enabling to compute the hash value  $K$  from only  $c = \text{hp}$ .

These two issues could be solved using either Trapdoor SPHF [BBC<sup>+</sup>13] or NIZK of knowledge of  $\text{hk}$ . But both methods require pairings or random oracle, if instantiated on cyclic or bilinear groups. Instead we construct it as follows:

*First*, suppose that a projection key is well-formed (i.e., there exists a corresponding hashing key). Then, there exists an *unbounded* zero-knowledge simulator that “extracts” a corresponding hashing key and computes the hash value. To boost this into full-fledged zero knowledge with an efficient simulator, we rely on the “OR trick” from [FLS90]. We add a random 4-tuple  $(g', h', u', e')$  to the CRS, and build an SPHF for the augmented language  $C \in \mathcal{L}$  or  $(g', h', u', e')$  is a DDH tuple. In the normal setup,  $(g', h', u', e')$  is not a DDH tuple with overwhelming probability, so the soundness property is preserved.

In the trapdoor setup,  $(g', h', u', e') := (g', h', g^r, h^r)$  is a random DDH tuple, and the zero-knowledge simulator uses the witness  $r$  to compute the hash value.

*Second*, to ensure that the projection key is well-formed, we use a second SPHF. The idea for building the second SPHF is as follows: in most SPHF schemes, proving that a projected key  $\mathbf{hp}$  is valid corresponds to proving that it lies in the column span of some matrix  $\Gamma$  (where all of the linear algebra is carried out in the exponent). Now pick a random vector  $\mathbf{tk}$ : if  $\mathbf{hp}$  lies in the span of  $\Gamma$ , then  $\mathbf{hp}^\top \mathbf{tk}$  is completely determined given  $\Gamma^\top \mathbf{tk}$ ; otherwise, it is completely random. The former yields the projective property and the latter yields smoothness, for the SPHF with hashing key  $\mathbf{hk}$  and projection key  $\mathbf{tp} = \Gamma^\top \mathbf{tk}$ . Since the second SPHF is built using the transpose  $\Gamma^\top$  of the original matrix  $\Gamma$  (defining the language  $\mathcal{L}$ ), we refer to it as a “transpose SPHF”. As it turns out, the second fix could ruin soundness of the ensuing iZK protocol: a cheating prover could pick a malformed  $\Gamma^\top \mathbf{tk}$ , and then the hash value  $\mathbf{hp}^\top \mathbf{tk}$  computed by the verifier could leak additional information about his witness  $\mathbf{hk}$  for  $\mathbf{hp}$ , thereby ruining smoothness. To protect against the leakage, we would inject additional randomness into  $\mathbf{hk}$  so that smoothness holds even in the presence of leakage from the hash value  $\mathbf{hp}^\top \mathbf{tk}$ . This idea is inspired by the 2-universality technique introduced in a very different context of chosen-ciphertext security [CS02].

Finally, to get simulation-soundness (i.e., soundness even if the adversary can see fake or simulated proofs), we rely on an additional “OR trick” (mixed up with an idea of Malkin et al. [MTVY11]): we build an SPHF for the augmented language  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ , or  $(g', h', u', e')$  is a DDH tuple (as before), or  $(g', h', \mathcal{W}_1(C), \mathcal{W}_2(C))$  is not a DDH tuple (with  $\mathcal{W}_k$  a Waters function [Wat05],  $\mathcal{W}_k(m) = v_{k,0} \prod_{i=1}^{|m|} v_{k,i}^{m_i}$ , when  $m = m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_{|m|}$  is a bitstring, the  $v_{k,0}, \dots, v_{k,|m|}$  are random group elements, and  $C$  is seen as a bitstring, for  $k = 1, 2$ ). In the security proof, with non-negligible probability,  $(g'', h'', \mathcal{W}_1(C), \mathcal{W}_2(C))$  is a non-DDH tuple for simulated proofs, and a DDH tuple for the soundness challenge, which proves simulation-soundness.

**Organization.** First, we formally introduce the notion of *implicit zero-knowledge proofs* (iZK) in Section 2. Second, in Section 3, we discuss some difficulties related to the construction of iZK from SPHF and provide an intuition of our method to overcome these difficulties. Next, we show how to construct iZK and SSiZK from SPHF over cyclic groups for any language handled by the generic framework [BBC<sup>+</sup>13], which encompasses most, if not all, known SPHFs over cyclic groups. This is the main technical part of the paper. Third, in Section 4, we indeed show a concrete application of our iZK constructions: the most efficient 3-round two-party protocol computing inner product in the UC framework with static corruption so far. We analyze our construction and provide a detailed comparison with the Groth-Sahai methodology [GS08] and the approach based on zero-knowledge proofs “à la Schnorr” [Sch90] in Appendix A. In addition, as proof of concept, we show in Appendix B that iZK can be used instead of ZK arguments to generically convert any protocol secure in the semi-honest model into a protocol secure in the malicious model. This conversion follows the generic transformation of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (GMW) in their seminal papers [GMW87b, GMW87a]. While applying directly the original transformation with Schnorr-like ZK protocols blows up the number of rounds by a multiplicative factor of at least three (even in the common reference string model), our conversion only adds a small constant number of rounds. Eventually, in Appendix F, we extend our construction of iZK from SPHF to handle larger classes of languages described by computational structures such as circuits or branching programs.

**Additional Related Work.** Using the “OR trick” with SPHF is reminiscent of [ABP14]. However, the methods used in our paper are very different from the one in [ABP14], as we do not use pairings, but consider weaker form of SPHF on the other hand.

A recent line of work has focused on the cut-and-choose approach for transforming security from semi-honest to malicious models [IKLP06, LP07, LP11, sS11, sS13, Lin13, HKE13] as an alternative to the use of zero-knowledge arguments. Indeed, substantial progress has been made towards practical protocols via this approach, as applied to Yao’s garbled circuits. However, the state-of-the-art still incurs a large computation and communication multiplicative overhead that is equal to the security parameter. We note that Yao’s garbled circuits do not efficiently generalize to arithmetic computations, and that our approach would yield better concrete efficiency for natural functions  $F$  that admit compact representations by arithmetic branching programs. In particular, Yao’s garbled circuits cannot take

advantage of the structure in languages handled by the Groth-Sahai methodology [GS08], and namely the ones defined by multi-exponentiations: even in the latter case, Groth-Sahai technique requires pairings, while we will be able to avoid them.

The idea of using implicit proofs (without the zero-knowledge requirement) as a lightweight alternative to zero-knowledge proofs also appeared in an earlier work of Aiello, Ishai and Reingold [AIR01]. They realize implicit proofs using conditional disclosure of secrets [GIKM98]. The latter, together with witness encryption [GGSW13] and SPHFs, only provide a weak “honest-verifier zero-knowledge” guarantee.

Recently, Jarecki introduced the concept of conditional key encapsulation mechanism [Jar14], which is related to iZK as it adds a “zero-knowledge flavor” to SPHFs by allowing witness extraction. The construction is a combination of SPHF and zero-knowledge proofs “à la Schnorr”. Contrary to iZK, it does not aim at reducing the interactivity of the resulting protocol, but ensures its covertness.

Witness encryption was introduced by Garg et al. in [GGSW13]. It enables to encrypt a message  $M$  for a word  $C$  and a language  $\mathcal{L}$  into a ciphertext  $c$ , so that any user knowing a witness  $w$  that  $C \in \mathcal{L}$  can decrypt  $c$ . Similarly to SPHFs, witness encryption also only has this “honest-verifier zero-knowledge” flavor: it does not enable to decrypt ciphertext for words  $C \notin \mathcal{L}$ , with a trapdoor. That is why, as SPHF, witness encryption cannot be used to construct directly iZK.

## 2 Definition of Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments

### 2.1 Notations

Since we will now be more formal, let us present the notations that we will use. Let  $\{0, 1\}^*$  be the set of bitstrings. We denote by PPT a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. We write  $y \leftarrow A(x)$  for ‘ $y$  is the output of the algorithm  $A$  on the input  $x$ ’, while  $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} A(x)$  means that  $A$  will additionally use random coins. Similarly,  $X \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{X}$  indicates that  $X$  has been chosen uniformly at random in the (finite) set  $\mathcal{X}$ . We sometimes write  $\text{st}$  the state of the adversary.

We define, for a distinguisher  $A$  and two distributions  $\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1$ , the advantage of  $A$  (i.e., its ability to distinguish those distributions) by  $\text{Adv}^{\mathcal{D}_0, \mathcal{D}_1}(A) = \Pr_{x \in \mathcal{D}_0}[A(x) = 1] - \Pr_{x \in \mathcal{D}_1}[A(x) = 1]$ .

The qualities of adversaries will be measured by their successes and advantages in certain experiments  $\text{Exp}_A^{\text{sec}}$  or  $\text{Exp}_A^{\text{sec}-b}$ :  $\text{Succ}^{\text{sec}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_A^{\text{sec}}(1^\kappa) = 1]$  and  $\text{Adv}^{\text{sec}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_A^{\text{sec}-1}(1^\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_A^{\text{sec}-0}(1^\kappa) = 1]$  respectively, where  $\kappa$  is the security parameter, and probabilities are over the random coins of the challenger and of the adversary.

### 2.2 Definition

Let  $(\mathcal{L}_{\text{crs}})_{\text{crs}}$  be a family of NP languages, indexed by a common reference string  $\text{crs}$ , and defined by a witness relation  $i\mathcal{R}_{\text{crs}}$ , namely  $i\mathcal{L} = \{x \in \mathcal{X}_{\text{crs}} \mid \exists iw, i\mathcal{R}_{\text{crs}}(x, iw) = 1\}$ , where  $(\mathcal{X}_{\text{crs}})_{\text{crs}}$  is a family of sets.  $\text{crs}$  is generated by some polynomial-time algorithm  $\text{Setup}_{\text{crs}}$  taking as input the unary representation of the security parameter  $\kappa$ . We suppose that membership to  $\mathcal{X}_{\text{crs}}$  and  $i\mathcal{R}_{\text{crs}}$  can be evaluated in polynomial time (in  $\kappa$ ). For the sake of simplicity,  $\text{crs}$  is often implicit.

To achieve stronger properties (namely simulation-soundness in Section 3.4), we sometimes also assume that  $\text{Setup}_{\text{crs}}$  can also output some additional information or trapdoor  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{crs}}$ . This trapdoor should enable to check, in polynomial time, whether a given word  $x$  is in  $i\mathcal{L}$  or not. It is only used in security proofs, and is never used by the iZK algorithms.

An iZK is defined by the following polynomial-time algorithms:

- $\text{icrs} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$  generates the (normal) common reference string (CRS)  $\text{icrs}$  (which implicitly contains  $\text{crs}$ ). The resulting CRS provides statistical soundness;
- $(\text{icrs}, i\mathcal{T}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{iTSetup}(\text{crs})^4$  generates the (trapdoor) common reference string  $\text{icrs}$  together with a trapdoor  $i\mathcal{T}$ . The resulting CRS provides statistical zero-knowledge;

<sup>4</sup> When the CRS is word-dependent, i.e., when the trapdoor  $i\mathcal{T}$  does only work for one word  $x^*$  previously chosen, there is a second argument:  $(\text{icrs}, i\mathcal{T}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{iTSetup}(\text{crs}, x^*)$ . Security notions are then slightly different. See details in Appendix C.2.



- $(\text{ipk}, \text{isk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iKG}^\ell(\text{icrs}, x, \text{iw})$  generates a public/secret key pair, associated to a word  $x \in \mathcal{I}$  and a label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , with witness  $\text{iw}$ ;
- $(\text{ipk}, \text{itk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTKG}^\ell(\text{icrs}, \text{iT}, x)$  generates a public/trapdoor key pair, associated to a word  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and a label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ;
- $(c, K) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iEnc}^\ell(\text{icrs}, \text{ipk}, x)$  outputs a ciphertext  $c$  of a value  $K$  (an ephemeral key), for the public key  $\text{ipk}$ , the word  $x$ , and the label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ;
- $K \leftarrow \text{iDec}^\ell(\text{icrs}, \text{isk}, c)$  decrypts the ciphertext  $c$  for the label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , and outputs the ephemeral key  $K$ ;
- $K \leftarrow \text{iTDec}^\ell(\text{icrs}, \text{itk}, c)$  decrypts the ciphertext  $c$  for the label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , and outputs the ephemeral key  $K$ .

The three last algorithms can be seen as key encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms. Labels  $\ell$  are only used for SSiZK and are often omitted. The CRS  $\text{icrs}$  is often omitted, for the sake of simplicity.

Normally, the algorithms  $\text{iKG}$  and  $\text{iDec}$  are used by the user who wants to (implicitly) prove that some word  $x$  is in  $\mathcal{I}$  (and we often call this user the prover), while the algorithm  $\text{iEnc}$  is used by the user who wants to (implicitly) verify this (and we often call this user the verifier), as shown in Figs. 1 and 3. The algorithms  $\text{iTKG}$  and  $\text{iTDec}$  are usually only used in proofs, to generate simulated or fake implicit proofs (for the zero-knowledge property).

### 2.3 Security Requirements

An iZK satisfies the four following properties (for any  $(\text{crs}, \mathcal{T}_{\text{crs}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}_{\text{crs}}(1^{\mathcal{R}})$ ):

- **Correctness.** The encryption is the reverse operation of the decryption, with or without a trapdoor: for any  $\text{icrs} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$  or with a trapdoor, for any  $(\text{icrs}, \text{iT}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTSetup}(\text{crs})$ , and for any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  and any  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ,
  - if  $x \in \mathcal{I}$  with witness  $\text{iw}$ ,  $(\text{ipk}, \text{isk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iKG}^\ell(\text{icrs}, x, \text{iw})$ , and  $(c, K) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iEnc}^\ell(\text{ipk}, x)$ , then we have  $K = \text{iDec}^\ell(\text{isk}, c)$ ;
  - if  $(\text{ipk}, \text{itk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTKG}^\ell(\text{iT}, x)$  and  $(c, K) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iEnc}^\ell(\text{ipk}, x)$ , then we have  $K = \text{iTDec}^\ell(\text{itk}, c)$ .
- **Setup Indistinguishability.** A polynomial-time adversary cannot distinguish a normal CRS generated by  $\text{iSetup}$  from a trapdoor CRS generated by  $\text{iTSetup}$ . More formally, no PPT can distinguish, with non-negligible advantage, the two distributions:

$$\{\text{icrs} \mid \text{icrs} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iSetup}(\text{crs})\} \quad \{\text{icrs} \mid (\text{icrs}, \text{iT}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTSetup}(\text{crs})\}.$$

- **Soundness.** When the CRS is generated as  $\text{icrs} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$ , and when  $x \notin \mathcal{I}$ , the distribution of  $K$  is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution, even given  $c$ . More formally, if  $\Pi$  is the set of all the possible values of  $K$ , for any bitstring  $\text{ipk}$ , for any word  $x \notin \mathcal{I}$ , for any label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , the two distributions:

$$\{(c, K) \mid (c, K) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iEnc}^\ell(\text{ipk}, x)\} \quad \{(c, K') \mid (c, K) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iEnc}^\ell(\text{ipk}, x); K' \xleftarrow{\$} \Pi\}$$

are statistically indistinguishable ( $\text{iEnc}$  may output  $(\perp, K)$  when the public key  $\text{ipk}$  is not well formed).

- **Zero-Knowledge.** For any label  $\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , when the CRS is generated using  $(\text{icrs}, \text{iT}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTSetup}^\ell(\text{crs})$ , for any message  $x^* \in \mathcal{I}$  with the witness  $\text{iw}^*$ , the public key  $\text{ipk}$  and the decapsulated key  $K$  corresponding to a ciphertext  $c$  chosen by the adversary, either using  $\text{isk}$  or the trapdoor  $\text{itk}$ , should be indistinguishable, even given the trapdoor  $\text{iT}$ . More formally, we consider the experiment  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-zk-b}}$  in Figure 2. The iZK is (statistically) zero-knowledge if the advantage of any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  (not necessarily polynomial-time) for this experiment is negligible.

We defined our security notion with a “composable” security flavor, as Groth and Sahai in [GS08]: soundness and zero-knowledge are statistical properties, the only computational property is the setup indistinguishability property. This is slightly stronger than what is needed, but is satisfied by our constructions and often easier to use.

We also consider stronger iZK, called simulation-sound iZK or SSiZK, which satisfies the following additional property:




Fig. 2: Experiments  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-zk-}b}$  for zero-knowledge of iZK, and  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-ss-}b}$  for simulation-soundness of SSiZK




Fig. 3: Three-round zero-knowledge from iZK for a word  $x \in \mathcal{L}$  and a witness  $\text{iw}$

- **Simulation Soundness.** The soundness holds (computationally) even when the adversary can see simulated public keys and decryption with these keys. More formally, we consider the experiment  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-ss-}b}$  in Figure 2, where the oracle  $\mathcal{O}$ , and the lists  $L$  and  $L'$  are defined as follows:
  - on input  $(\ell, x)$ ,  $\mathcal{O}$  generates  $(\text{ipk}, \text{itk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTKG}(\text{icrs}, \mathcal{IT}, x)$ , stores  $(\ell, x, \text{ipk}, \text{itk})$  in a list  $L$ , and outputs  $\text{ipk}$ ;
  - on input  $(\text{ipk}, c)$ ,  $\mathcal{O}$  retrieves the record  $(\ell, x, \text{ipk}, \text{itk})$  from  $L$  (and aborts if no such record exists), removes it from  $L$ , and adds it to  $L'$ , computes  $K \leftarrow \text{iTDec}^\ell(\text{icrs}, \text{itk}, c)$ , and outputs  $K$ .

The iZK is (statistically) simulation-sound if the advantage of any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  (not necessarily polynomial-time) for this experiment is negligible.

*Remark 1.* An iZK for some language  $\mathcal{L}$  directly leads to a 3-round zero-knowledge arguments for  $\mathcal{L}$ . The construction is depicted in Fig. 3 and the proof is provided in Appendix D.4. If the iZK is additionally simulation-sound, the resulting zero-knowledge argument is also simulation-sound.

*Remark 2.* For the sake of completeness, in Appendix E, we show how to construct iZK from either NIZK or Trapdoor SPHFs. In the latter case, the resulting iZK is not statistically sound and zero-knowledge but only computationally sound and zero-knowledge. In both cases, using currently known constructions over cyclic groups, strong assumptions such as the random oracle model or pairings are needed.

### 3 Construction of Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments

Let us first recall the generic framework of SPHFs [BBC<sup>+</sup>13] for the particular case of cyclic groups, and when the projection key  $\text{hp}$  can depend on the word  $C$ , as it is at the core of our construction of iZK. Second, we explain in more details the limitations of SPHFs and the fact they cannot directly be used to construct iZK (even with a concrete attack). Third, we show how to overcome these limitations to build iZK and SSiZK.

#### 3.1 Review of the Generic Framework of SPHFs over Cyclic Groups

**Languages.** Let  $\mathbb{G}$  be a cyclic group of prime order  $p$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  the field of integers modulo  $p$ . If we look at  $\mathbb{G}$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  as the same ring  $(\mathbb{G}, +, \bullet)$ , where internal operations are on the scalars, many interesting languages can be represented as subspaces of the vector space  $\mathbb{G}^n$ , for some  $n$ . Here are some examples.

*Example 3 (DDH or ElGamal ciphertexts of 0).* Let  $g$  and  $h$  be two generators of  $\mathbb{G}$ . The language of DDH tuples in basis  $(g, h)$  is

$$\mathcal{L} = \{(u, e) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \mid \exists r \in \mathbb{Z}_p, u = g^r \text{ and } e = h^r\} \subseteq \mathbb{G}^2,$$

where  $r$  is the witness. It can be seen as the subspace of  $\mathbb{G}^2$  generated by  $(g, h)$ . We remark that this language can also be seen as the language of (additive) ElGamal ciphertexts of 0 for the public key  $\mathbf{pk} = (g, h)$ .  $\square$

*Example 4 (ElGamal ciphertexts of a bit).* Let us consider the language of ElGamal ciphertexts of 0 or 1, under the public key  $\mathbf{pk} = (g, h)$ :

$$\mathcal{L} := \{(u, e) \in \mathbb{G}^2 \mid \exists r \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \exists b \in \{0, 1\}, u = g^r \text{ and } e = h^r g^b\}.$$

Here  $C = (u, e)$  cannot directly be seen as an element of some vector space. However, a word  $C = (u, e) \in \mathbb{G}^2$  is in  $\mathcal{L}$  if and only there exists  $\lambda = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3$  such that:

$$\begin{aligned} u &= g^{\lambda_1} (= \lambda_1 \bullet g) & e &= h^{\lambda_1} g^{\lambda_2} (= \lambda_1 \bullet h + \lambda_2 \bullet g) \\ 1 &= u^{\lambda_2} g^{\lambda_3} (= \lambda_2 \bullet u + \lambda_3 \bullet g) & 1 &= (e/g)^{\lambda_2} h^{\lambda_3} (= \lambda_2 \bullet (e - g) + \lambda_3 \bullet h), \end{aligned}$$

because, if we write  $C = (u, e) = (g^r, h^r g^b)$  (with  $r, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ , which is always possible), then the first three equations ensure that  $\lambda_1 = r$ ,  $\lambda_2 = b$  and  $\lambda_3 = -rb$ , while the last equation (right bottom) ensures that  $b(b - 1) = 0$ , i.e.,  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , as it holds that  $(h^r g^b / g)^b h^{-rb} = g^{b(b-1)} = 1$ .

Therefore, if we introduce the notation  $\hat{C} = \theta(C) := (u \ e \ 1 \ 1) \in \mathbb{G}^4$ , then the language  $\mathcal{L}$  can be defined as the set of  $C = (u, e)$  such that  $\hat{C}$  is in the subspace of  $\mathbb{G}^4$  generated by the rows of the following matrix

$$\Gamma := \begin{pmatrix} g & h & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & g & u & e/g \\ 1 & 1 & g & h \end{pmatrix}. \quad \square$$

*Example 5 (Conjunction of Languages).* Let  $g_i$  and  $h_i$  (for  $i = 1, 2$ ) be four generators of  $\mathbb{G}$ , and  $\mathcal{L}_i$  be (as in Example 3) the languages of DDH tuples in bases  $(g_i, h_i)$  respectively. We are now interested in the language  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_1 \times \mathcal{L}_2 \subseteq \mathbb{G}^4$ , which is thus the conjunction of  $\mathcal{L}_1 \times \mathbb{G}^2$  and  $\mathbb{G}^2 \times \mathcal{L}_2$ : it can be seen as the subspace of  $\mathbb{G}^4$  generated by the rows of the following matrix

$$\Gamma := \begin{pmatrix} g_1 & h_1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & g_2 & h_2 \end{pmatrix}. \quad \square$$

This can also be seen as the matrix, diagonal by blocks, with  $\Gamma_1$  and  $\Gamma_2$  the matrices for  $\mathcal{L}_1$  and  $\mathcal{L}_2$  respectively.

More formally, the generic framework for SPHF in [BBC<sup>+</sup>13] considers the languages  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$  defined as follows: There exist two functions  $\theta$  and  $\Gamma$  from the set of words  $\mathcal{X}$  to the vector space  $\mathbb{G}^n$  of dimension  $n$ , and to set  $\mathbb{G}^{k \times n}$  of  $k \times n$  matrices over  $\mathbb{G}$ , such that  $C \in \mathcal{L}$  if and only if  $\hat{C} := \theta(C)$  is a linear combination of the rows of  $\Gamma(C)$ . From a witness  $w$  for a word  $C$ , it should be possible to compute such a linear combination as a row vector  $\lambda = (\lambda_i)_{i=1, \dots, k} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1 \times k}$ :

$$\hat{C} = \theta(C) = \lambda \bullet \Gamma(C). \quad (1)$$

For the sake of simplicity, because of the equivalence between  $w$  and  $\lambda$ , we will use them indifferently for the witness.

**SPHFs.** Let us now build an SPHF on such a language. A hashing key  $\mathbf{hk}$  is just a random column vector  $\mathbf{hk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ , and the associated projection key is  $\mathbf{hp} := \Gamma(C) \bullet \mathbf{hk}$ . The hash value of a word  $C$  is then  $H := \hat{C} \bullet \mathbf{hk}$ , and if  $\lambda$  is a witness for  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ , this hash value can also be computed as:

$$H = \hat{C} \bullet \mathbf{hk} = \lambda \bullet \Gamma(C) \bullet \mathbf{hk} = \lambda \bullet \mathbf{hp} = \text{proj}H,$$

which only depends on the witness  $\lambda$  and the projection key  $\mathbf{hp}$ . On the other hand, if  $C \notin \mathcal{L}$ , then  $\hat{C}$  is linearly independent from the rows of  $\Gamma(C)$ . Hence,  $H := \hat{C} \bullet \mathbf{hk}$  looks random even given  $\mathbf{hp} := \Gamma(C) \bullet \mathbf{hk}$ , which is exactly the *smoothness* property.



*Example 6.* The SPHF corresponding to the language in Example 4, is then defined by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{hk} &= (\text{hk}_1, \text{hk}_2, \text{hk}_3, \text{hk}_4)^\top \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^4 \\ \text{hp} &= \Gamma(C) \bullet \text{hk} = (g^{\text{hk}_1} h^{\text{hk}_2}, g^{\text{hk}_2} u^{\text{hk}_3} (e/g)^{\text{hk}_4}, g^{\text{hk}_3} h^{\text{hk}_4}) \\ H &= \hat{C} \bullet \text{hk} = u^{\text{hk}_1} e^{\text{hk}_2} & \text{proj}H &= \lambda \bullet \text{hp} = \text{hp}_1^r \cdot \text{hp}_2^b \cdot \text{hp}_3^{-rb}. \end{aligned}$$

For the sake of clarity, we will omit the  $C$  argument, and write  $\Gamma$ , instead of  $\Gamma(C)$ .

### 3.2 Limitations of Smooth Projective Hash Functions

At a first glance, as explained in the introduction, it may look possible to construct an iZK from an SPHF for the same language  $\mathcal{L} = \text{i}\mathcal{L}$  as follows:

- $\text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$  and  $\text{iTSetup}(\text{crs})$  outputs the empty CRS  $\text{icrs} := \perp$ ;
- $\text{iKG}(\text{icrs}, x, \text{iw})$  outputs an empty public key  $\text{ipk} := \perp$  together with the secret key  $\text{isk} := (x, \text{iw})$ ;
- $\text{iEnc}(\text{ipk}, x)$  generates a random hashing key  $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{crs}, x)$  and outputs the ciphertext  $c := \text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, x)$  together with the ephemeral key  $K := H \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{crs}, x)$ ;
- $\text{iDec}(\text{isk}, c)$  outputs the ephemeral key  $K := \text{proj}H \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{crs}, x, \text{iw})$ .

This construction is sound: if  $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ , given only  $c = \text{hp}$ , the smoothness ensures that  $K = H$  looks random. Unfortunately, there seems to be no way to compute  $K$  from only  $c$ , or in other words, there does not seem to exist algorithms  $\text{iTKG}$  and  $\text{iTDec}$ .

**Example 6 is not Zero-Knowledge.** Actually, with the SPHF from Example 6, no such algorithm  $\text{iTKG}$  or  $\text{iTDec}$  (verifying the zero-knowledge property) exists. It is even worse than that: a malicious verifier may get information about the witness, even if he just has a feedback whether the prover could use the correct hash value or not (and get the masked value or not), in a protocol such as the one in Fig. 1. A malicious verifier can indeed generate a ciphertext  $c = \text{hp}$ , by generating  $\text{hp}_1$  honestly but by picking  $\text{hp}_2$  and  $\text{hp}_3$  uniformly at random. Now, a honest prover will compute  $\text{proj}H = \text{hp}_1^r \text{hp}_2^b \text{hp}_3^{-rb}$ , to get back the ephemeral key (using  $\text{iDec}$ ). When  $C$  is an encryption of  $b = 1$ , this value is random and independent of  $H$ , as  $\text{hp}_2$  and  $\text{hp}_3$  have been chosen at random, while when  $b = 0$ , this value is the correct  $\text{proj}H$  and is equal to  $H$ . Thus the projected hash value  $\text{proj}H$ , which is the ephemeral output key by the honest prover, reveals some information about  $b$ , part of the witness.

If we want to avoid such an attack, the prover has to make sure that the  $\text{hp}$  he received was built correctly. Intuitively, this sounds exactly like the kind of verifications we could make with an SPHF: we could simply build an SPHF on the language of the “correctly built”  $\text{hp}$ . Then the prover could send a projection key for this new SPHF and ask the verifier to XOR the original hash value  $H$  with the hash value of this new SPHF. However, things are not that easy: first this does not solve the limitation due to the security proof (the impossibility of computing  $H$  for  $x \notin \text{i}\mathcal{L}$ ) and second, in the SPHF in Example 6, all projection keys are valid (since  $\Gamma$  is full-rank, for any  $\text{hp}$ , there exists necessarily a  $\text{hk}$  such that  $\text{hp} = \Gamma \bullet \text{hk}$ ).

### 3.3 iZK Construction

Let us consider an SPHF defined as in Section 3.1 for a language  $\text{i}\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$ . In this section, we show how to design, step by step, an iZK for  $\text{i}\mathcal{L}$  from this SPHF, following the overview in Section 1. At the end, we provide a summary of the construction and a complete proof. We illustrate our construction on the language of ElGamal ciphertexts of bits (Examples 4 and 6), and refer to this language as “our example”. We suppose a cyclic group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $p$  is fixed, and that DDH is hard in  $\mathbb{G}^5$ .

We have seen the limitations of directly using the original SPHF are actually twofold. First, SPHFs do not provide a way to compute the hash value of a word outside the language, with just a projection key for which the hashing key is not known. Second, nothing ensures that a projection key has really been derived from an actually known hashing key, and in such a bad case, the projected hash value may leak some information about the word  $C$  (and the witness).

<sup>5</sup> The construction can be trivially extended to DLin, or any MDDH assumption [EHK<sup>+</sup>13] though.



**Ensuring the Validity of Projection Keys.** The above construction and trapdoor would provide zero-knowledge if we could ensure that the projection keys  $\mathbf{hp}$  (generated by a potentially malicious verifier) is valid, so that, intuitively,  $\mathbf{hp}_{t,5}$  and  $\mathbf{hp}_{t,6}$  involve the correct value of  $\mathbf{hk}_1$ . Using a zero-knowledge proof (that  $\mathbf{hp}$  derives from some hashing key  $\mathbf{hk}$ ) for that purpose would annihilate all our efforts to avoid adding rounds and to work under plain DDH (interactive ZK proofs introduce more rounds, and Groth-Sahai [GS08] NIZK would require assumptions on bilinear groups). So we are left with doing the validity check again with SPHF.

Fortunately, the language of valid projection keys  $\mathbf{hp}$  can be handled by the generic framework, since a valid projection key  $\mathbf{hp}$  is such that:  $\mathbf{hp} = \Gamma_t \bullet \mathbf{hk}$ , or in other words, if we transpose everything  $\mathbf{hp}^\top = \mathbf{hk}^\top \bullet \Gamma_t^\top$ . This is exactly the same as in Equation (1), with  $\hat{C} \leftrightarrow \mathbf{hp}^\top$ ,  $\Gamma \leftrightarrow \Gamma_t^\top$  and witness  $\lambda \leftrightarrow \mathbf{hk}^\top$ . So we can now define a smooth projective hash function on that language, where the projection key is called transposed projection key  $\mathbf{tp}$ , the hashing key is called transposed hashing key  $\mathbf{tk}$ , the hash value is called transposed hash value  $\mathbf{tH}$  and the projected hash value is called transposed projected hash value  $\mathbf{tprojH}$ .

Finally, we could define an iZK, similarly to the one in Section 3.2, except,  $\mathbf{ipk}$  contains a transposed projection key  $\mathbf{tp}$  (generated by the prover from a random transposed hashing key  $\mathbf{tk}$ ), and  $c$  contains the associated transposed projected hash value  $\mathbf{tprojH}$  in addition to  $\mathbf{hp}$ , so that the prover can check using  $\mathbf{tk}$  that  $\mathbf{hp}$  is valid by verifying whether  $\mathbf{tprojH} = \mathbf{tH}$  or not.

**An Additional Step.** Unfortunately, we are not done yet, as the above modification breaks the soundness property! Indeed, in this last construction, the prover now learns an additional information about the hash value  $H$ :  $\mathbf{tprojH} = \mathbf{hk}^\top \mathbf{tp}$ , which does depend on the secret key  $\mathbf{hk}$ . He could therefore choose  $\mathbf{tp} = \hat{C}_t^\top$ , so that  $\mathbf{tprojH} = \mathbf{hk}^\top \hat{C}_t^\top = \hat{C}_t \mathbf{hk}$  is the hash value  $H = K$  of  $C$  under  $\mathbf{hk}$ .

We can fix this by ensuring that the prover will not know the extended word  $\hat{C}_t$  on which the SPHF will be based when he sends  $\mathbf{tp}$ , using an idea similar to the 2-universality property of SPHF introduced by Cramer and Shoup in [CS02]. For that purpose, we extend  $\Gamma_t$  and make  $\hat{C}_t$  depends on a random scalar  $\zeta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  chosen by the verifier (and included in  $c$ ).

**Detailed Construction.** Let us now formally show how to build an iZK from any SPHF built from the generic framework of [BBC<sup>+</sup>13], following the previous ideas. We recall that we consider a language  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{iL}$ , such that a word  $x = C$  is in  $\mathcal{iL}$ , if and only if  $\hat{C} = \theta(C)$  is a linear combination of the rows of some matrix  $\Gamma \in \mathbb{G}^{k \times n}$  (which may depend on  $C$ ). The coefficients of this linear combination are entries of a row vector  $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1 \times k}$ :  $\hat{C} = \lambda \bullet \Gamma$ , where  $\lambda = \lambda(\mathbf{iw})$  can be computed from the witness  $\mathbf{iw}$  for  $x$ .

The setup algorithms  $\mathbf{iSetup}(\mathbf{crs})$  and  $\mathbf{iTSetup}(\mathbf{crs})$  are defined as above (page 10). We define an extended language using the generic framework:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_t(x, \zeta) &= \hat{C}_t = (g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1, g'^{-\zeta}, 1, \dots, 1) && \in \mathbb{G}^{1 \times (2n+6)} \\ \Gamma_t(x) &= \left( \begin{array}{c|c} \Gamma'_t(x) & \mathbf{1} \\ \hline \mathbf{1} & \Gamma'_t(x) \end{array} \right) && \in \mathbb{G}^{(2k+6) \times (2n+6)}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\Gamma'_t(x)$  is the matrix (initially called  $\Gamma_t(x)$  in Equation (2)),  $\mathbf{1}$  is the matrix of  $\mathbb{G}^{(2k+3) \times (2n+3)}$  with all entries equal to 1, and  $\zeta$  is a scalar used to ensure the prover cannot guess the word  $\hat{C}_t$  which will be used, and so cannot choose  $\mathbf{tp} = \hat{C}_t$ . As explained above, this language corresponds to a 2-universal SPHF for the disjunction of the language of DDH tuples  $(g', h', u', e')$  and the original language  $\mathcal{L}$ . We write:

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_t(\zeta, \mathbf{iw}) &= (\lambda(\mathbf{iw}), -1, 0, 0, \zeta \lambda(\mathbf{iw}), -\zeta, 0, 0) \\ \lambda_t(\zeta, \mathbf{iT}) &= (0, \dots, 0, r', -1, 0, \dots, 0, \zeta r', -\zeta) && \text{with } \mathbf{iT} = r', \end{aligned}$$

so that:

$$\hat{C}_t = \begin{cases} \lambda_t(\zeta, \mathbf{iw}) \bullet \Gamma_t(x) & \text{if } (g', h', u', e') \text{ is a DDH tuple, with witness } \mathbf{iT} \\ \lambda_t(\zeta, \mathbf{iT}) \bullet \Gamma_t(x) & \text{if } x \in \mathcal{iL} \text{ with witness } \mathbf{iw}. \end{cases}$$

The resulting iZK construction is depicted in Fig. 4. This is a slightly more efficient construction than the one we sketched previously, where the prover does not test anymore explicitly  $\mathbf{tprojH}$ , but  $\mathbf{tprojH}$  (or  $\mathbf{tH}$ ) is used to mask  $K$ . Thus,  $\mathbf{tprojH}$  no more needs to be included in  $c$ .

<b>iSetup(crs)</b> $(g', h') \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}^{*2}$ $(r', s') \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^2 \setminus \{(a, a) \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}$ $(u', e') \leftarrow (g^{r'}, h^{s'}) \in \mathbb{G}^2$ $\text{icrs} \leftarrow (g', h', u', e')$ <b>return icrs</b>	<b>iTSetup(crs)</b> $(g', h') \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}^{*2}$ $r' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ $(u', e') \leftarrow (g^{r'}, h^{r'}) \in \mathbb{G}^2$ $\text{icrs} \leftarrow (g', h', u', e'); \text{iT} \leftarrow r'$ <b>return (icrs, iT)</b>
<b>iKG(icrs, x, iw)</b> $\text{tk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{2k+6}$ $\text{ipk} := \text{tp} \leftarrow \Gamma_t(x)^\top \bullet \text{tk} \in \mathbb{G}^{2n+6}$ $\text{isk} := (x, \text{tk}, \text{iw})$ <b>return (ipk, isk)</b>	<b>iTKG(icrs, x, iT)</b> $\text{tk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{2k+6}$ $\text{ipk} := \text{tp} \leftarrow \Gamma_t(x)^\top \bullet \text{tk} \in \mathbb{G}^{2n+6}$ $\text{itk} := (x, \text{tk}, \text{iT})$ <b>return (ipk, itk)</b>
<b>iEnc(icrs, ipk, x)</b> $\text{tp} \leftarrow \text{ipk}; \text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{2n+6}; \zeta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ $\text{hp} \leftarrow \Gamma_t(x) \bullet \text{hk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{2k+6}$ $\text{tproj}H \leftarrow \text{hk}^\top \bullet \text{tp} \in \mathbb{G}$	$H \leftarrow \theta_t(x, \zeta) \bullet \text{hk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ $K \leftarrow H \cdot \text{tproj}H \in \mathbb{G}$ $c := (\zeta, \text{hp})$ <b>return (K, c)</b>
<b>iDec(icrs, isk, c)</b> $(x, \text{tk}, \text{iw}) \leftarrow \text{isk}$ $(\zeta, \text{hp}) \leftarrow c$ $\text{tH} \leftarrow \text{hp}^\top \bullet \text{tk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ $\text{proj}H \leftarrow \lambda_t(\zeta, \text{iw}) \bullet \text{hp} \in \mathbb{G}$ <b>return K := projH · tH ∈ G</b>	<b>iTDec(icrs, itk, c)</b> $(x, \text{tk}, \text{iT}) \leftarrow \text{itk}$ $(\zeta, \text{hp}) \leftarrow c$ $\text{tH} \leftarrow \text{hp}^\top \bullet \text{tk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ $\text{trap}H := \lambda_t(\zeta, \text{iT}) \bullet \text{hp} \in \mathbb{G}$ <b>return K := trapH · tH ∈ G</b>

Fig. 4: Construction of iZK

**Variants.** In numerous cases, it is possible to add the trapdoor in a slightly more efficient way, if we accept to use word-dependent CRS (see Appendix C.2 for details). While the previous construction would be useful for security in the UC framework [Can01], the more efficient construction with a word-dependent CRS is enough in the stand-alone setting. Independently of that improvement, it is also possible to slightly reduce the size of  $\text{hp}$ , by computing  $\zeta$  with an entropy extractor, and so dropping it from  $\text{hp}$ . Details are given in Appendix C.1.

### 3.4 SSiZK Construction

Our SSiZK construction is similar to our iZK construction, except that, in addition both iSetup and iTSetup add the CRS  $\text{icrs}$ , a tuple  $(v_{k,i})_{i=0,\dots,2\mathfrak{R}}^{k=1,2}$  of group elements constructed as follows: for  $i = 0$  to  $2\mathfrak{R}$  (with  $\mathfrak{R}$  the security parameter):  $r'_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p, v_{1,i} \leftarrow g^{r'_i}, v_{2,i} \leftarrow h^{r'_i}$ . We also define the two Waters functions [Wat05]  $\mathcal{W}_k : \{0, 1\}^{2\mathfrak{R}} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ , as  $\mathcal{W}_k(m) = v_{k,0} \prod_{i=1}^{2\mathfrak{R}} v_{k,i}^{m_i}$ , for any bitstring  $m = m_1 \parallel \dots \parallel m_{2\mathfrak{R}} \in \{0, 1\}^{2\mathfrak{R}}$ . Finally, the CRS is also supposed to contain a hash function  $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\mathfrak{R}}$  drawn from a collision-resistant hash function family  $\mathcal{HF}$ .

Next, the language  $\mathcal{L}_t$  is further extended by adding 3 rows and 2 columns (all equal to 1 except on the 3 new rows) to both the sub-matrices  $\Gamma'_t(x)$  of  $\Gamma_t(x)$ , where the 3 new rows are:

$$\left( \begin{array}{c|ccc|c|c} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & g' & h' \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & u'' & e'' \\ \hline g' & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & g' & 1 \end{array} \right) \in \mathbb{G}^{3 \times (n+5)},$$

with  $u'' = \mathcal{W}_1(\mathcal{H}(\ell, x))$  and  $e'' = \mathcal{W}_2(\mathcal{H}(\ell, x))$ . The vector  $\hat{\mathbf{C}}_t$  becomes  $\hat{\mathbf{C}}_t = (g^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1, g^{-\zeta}, 1, \dots, 1)$  (it is the same except for the number of 1's). Due to lack of space, the full matrix is depicted in Appendix D.2, where the security proof can also be found. The security proof requires that  $\text{Setup}_{\text{crs}}$  also outputs some additional information or trapdoor  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{crs}}$ , which enables to check, in polynomial time, whether a given word  $x$  is in  $\text{iL}$  or not.

Here is an overview of the security proof. Correctness, setup indistinguishability, and zero-knowledge are straightforward. Soundness follows from the fact that  $(g', h', u'', e'')$  is a DDH-tuple, when parameters are generated by iSetup (and also iTSetup actually), and so  $(g', 1)$  is never in the subspace generated by  $(g', h')$  and  $(u'', e'')$  (as  $h' \neq 1$ ), hence the corresponding language  $\mathcal{L}_t$  is the same as for our




Fig. 5: Semi-Honest and Malicious Protocols for Secure Inner Product Computation

iZK construction. Finally, to prove simulation-soundness, we use the programmability of the Waters function [HK12] and change the generation of the group elements  $(v_{k,i})$  so that for the challenge proof (generated by the adversary)  $(g', h', u'', e'')$  is not a DDH-tuple, while for the simulated proofs it is a DDH-tuple. Then, we can change the setup to iSetup, while still being able to simulate proofs. But in this setting, the word  $\hat{C}_t$  for the challenge proof is no more in  $\mathcal{L}_t$ , and smoothness implies simulation-soundness.

## 4 Application to the Inner Product

In case of biometric authentication, a server  $\mathcal{S}$  wants to compute the Hamming distance between a fresh user's feature and the stored template, but without asking the two players to reveal their own input: the template  $y$  from the server side and the fresh feature  $x$  from the client side. One can see that the Hamming distance between the  $\ell$ -bit vectors  $x$  and  $y$  is the sum of the Hamming weights of  $x$  and  $y$ , minus twice the inner product of  $x$  and  $y$ . Let us thus focus on this private evaluation of the inner product: a client  $\mathcal{C}$  has an input  $x = (x_i)_{i=1}^{\ell} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$  and a server  $\mathcal{S}$  has an input  $y = (y_i)_{i=1}^{\ell} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$ . The server  $\mathcal{S}$  wants to learn the inner product  $\text{IP} = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} x_i y_i \in \{0, \dots, \ell\}$ , but nothing else, while the client  $\mathcal{C}$  just learns whether the protocol succeeded or was aborted.

**Semi-Honest Protocol.**  $\mathcal{C}$  can send an ElGamal encryption of each bit under a public key of her choice and then  $\mathcal{S}$  can compute an encryption of  $\text{IP} + R$ , with  $R \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  a random mask, using the homomorphic properties of ElGamal, and sends this ciphertext.  $\mathcal{C}$  finally decrypts and sends back  $g^{\text{IP}+R}$  to  $\mathcal{S}$  who divides it by  $g^R$  to get  $g^{\text{IP}}$ . Since  $\text{IP}$  is small, an easy discrete logarithm computation leads to  $\text{IP}$ .

**Malicious Setting.** To transform this semi-honest protocol into one secure against malicious adversaries, we could apply our generic conversion presented in Appendix B. Here, we propose an optimized version of this transformation for this protocol. We use the ElGamal scheme for the encryption  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}$ , where  $\text{pk}$  is a public key chosen by  $\mathcal{C}$  and the secret key is  $\text{sk} = (\text{sk}_j)_{j=1}^{\log p}$ , and the Cramer-Shoup scheme [CS98] for commitments  $\text{Com}$ , of group elements or multiple group elements with randomness reuse, where the public key is in the CRS. The CRS additionally contains the description of a cyclic group and a generator  $g$  of this group. The construction is presented on Figure 5. First, the client commits to her secret key (this is the most efficient alternative as soon as  $n \gg \ell$ ) and sends encryptions  $(c_i)_{i=1}^{\ell}$  of her bits. Then, the server commits to his inputs  $(y_i)_i$  and to two random integers  $(R, R')$ , computes the encryption  $(\hat{u}, \hat{e})$  of  $g^{R \cdot \text{IP} + R'}$ , re-randomized with a randomness  $\rho$ , masked by an iZK to ensure that the  $c_i$ 's encrypt bits under the key  $\text{pk}$  whose corresponding secret key  $\text{sk}$  is committed (masking one of the two components of an ElGamal ciphertext suffices). The client replies with  $g^{R \cdot \text{IP} + R'}$ , masked by a SSiZK (this is required for UC security) to ensure that the  $\text{Com}(g^{y_i})$  contains bits, and that the masked ciphertext has been properly built. The server then recovers  $g^{R \cdot \text{IP} + R'}$ , removes  $R$  and  $R'$ , and tries to extract the discrete logarithm  $\text{IP}$ . If no solution exists in  $\{0, \dots, \ell\}$ , the server aborts. This last verification avoids the 2-round verification phase from our generic compiler: if the client tries to cheat on  $R \cdot \text{IP} + R'$ , after removing  $R$  and  $R'$ , the result would be random, and thus in the appropriate range with negligible probability  $\ell/p$ , since  $\ell$  is polynomial and  $p$  is exponential. We prove in Appendix D.5 that *the above protocol is secure against malicious adversaries in the UC framework with static corruptions, under the plain DDH assumption, and in the common reference string setting.*

**Efficiency and Comparison with Other Methodologies.** In Appendix A, we provide a detailed analysis of our inner product protocol in terms of complexity. Then, we estimate the complexity of



this protocol when, instead of using iZK, the security against malicious adversaries in the UC model is ensured by using the Groth-Sahai methodology [GS08] or  $\Sigma$ -protocols. In this section, we sum up our comparisons in a table. The notation  $>$  indicates that the given complexity is a lower bound on the real complexity of the protocol (we have not taken into account the linear blow-up incurred by the conversion of NIZK into SS-NIZK), and  $\gg$  indicates a very loose lower bound. Details are given in Appendix A. We stress that with usual parameter, an element of  $\mathbb{G}_2$  is twice as big as an element of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  (or  $\mathbb{G}$ ) and the number of rounds in the major efficiency drawback (see Section 1). The efficiency improvement of iZK compared to NIZK essentially comes from their “batch-friendly” nature (see Appendix A).

Proofs	Pairings	Exponentiations	Communication	Rounds
$\Sigma$ -proofs	0	$38\ell$	$20\ell$	5
GS proofs	$> 14\ell$	$\gg 28\ell(\mathbb{G}_1) + 6\ell(\mathbb{G}_2)$	$> 11\ell(\mathbb{G}_1) + 10\ell(\mathbb{G}_2)$	3
iZK (this paper)	0	$67\ell$	$21\ell$	3

Moreover, our iZKs do not require pairings, which allows us to use more efficient elliptic curves than the best existing curves for the Groth-Sahai methodology. With a reasonable choice of two curves, one without pairing and one with pairing, for 128 bits of security, we get the following results: (counting efficiency as a multiple of the running time of an exponentiation in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ )

Curve \ Efficiency	Pairings	Exponentiations in $\mathbb{G}_1$	Exponentiations in $\mathbb{G}_2$
Curve25519 [Ber06]	no pairings	1	$\times$
[BGM <sup>+</sup> 10]	$\approx 8$	$\approx 3$	$\approx 6$

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## A Details on the Inner Product Protocols

We will now provide a detailed analysis of the performances of our UC-secure protocol to compute the inner product. Next, we compare the performances to the performances of a similar protocol whose security is based on the Groth-Sahai methodology [GS08] to illustrate the fact that, in applications where pairings are not fundamentally required for the protocol (meaning, the semi-honest version of the protocol can be done without pairings), being able to avoid them allows us to provide way more efficient solutions. We also provide the performances of a protocol based on the Schnorr proofs ( $\Sigma$ -proofs), which implies more interactivity.

### A.1 Intuition on the Efficiency Improvements

First, let us provide an intuition of the reasons why we can expect some efficiency improvement over round-efficient protocols in the malicious setting based on NIZK.

**Avoiding Pairings Saves Computations.** Pairing are an expensive operation; on the best known curves such as [BGM<sup>+</sup>10], computing a pairing is roughly three time slower than computing an exponentiation. Moreover, not every elliptic curve has a pairing, and it turns out that the most efficient curves, such as [Ber06], have indeed no pairings. In the best curves without pairings, exponentiations in  $\mathbb{G}$  are roughly three times faster than exponentiations in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  in the best curves with pairings, and even six times faster than exponentiations in  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

**iZK Can be Efficiently Batched.** iZK are somewhat “batch-friendly”: batch techniques, which reduce computation and communication, can always be used with an iZK without requiring more interactions. To batch a proof in NIZK-based protocols a seed is needed, so the prover has to first commit to his values, then he receives the seed and computes a short NIZK from it, that he sends back. This adds two rounds compared to the classical one-flow protocol in which the prover directly sends commitments plus a NIZK. But with iZKs, things are different: the prover sends commitments and an ipk, and the verifier replies with the next flow encrypted with ipk. It turns out that the prover and the verifier can agree on a batched version of the proof before even knowing the seed, so the prover can compute ipk without knowing the seed, and the verifier can just send the seed together with the masked second flow. Consequently, we can apply batch techniques to iZK-based protocols to reduce the communication without adding interactivity.

**The Conversion of iZK into SSiZK is Efficient.** We presented in Section 3 a generic construction of SSiZK from iZK. It is worth mentioning that this construct is *efficient* as it only adds a small constant

number of group elements to the original iZK. Conversely, turning NIZK into simulation-sound NIZK comes at huge cost, a linear blow-up of the size of the proof. As soon as strong security requirements are considered, such as security in the UC framework, simulation-sound zero-knowledge proofs become, in the general case, unavoidable.

## A.2 Setup

Let us provide some details about the iZK proofs which ensure the security of the inner product protocol described in Section 4. We work in a cyclic group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $p$ , where the DDH assumption holds. We denote by  $\lambda$  the bit length of  $p$ , and by  $g$  a generator of the group. We also set the Cramer-Shoup public key to  $(g_1, g_2, a, b, (h_i)_{i=1}^{\lambda+\ell+2})$ , together with a universal hash function  $H(\cdot)$ . Since we apply the randomness-reuse technique for the Cramer-Shoup encryption, we need as many group elements  $h_i$  as the maximal size of the vector we will encrypt. The value  $\lambda + \ell + 2$  is a clear upper-bound. The group description and this key (to be used for the commitment) are in the CRS.

**Committing to the Secret Key.** As described in Section 4, the client has to commit to her secret key; such a commitment adds  $O(\lambda)$  to the communication complexity of the protocol. However, the same requirement holds for any secure variant of the inner product protocol (based on the Groth-Sahai methodology or based on  $\Sigma$ -proofs), so, for the sake of simplicity, we omit this commitment (and the proof that it is indeed the secret key) in the protocols we are going to compare. The reason is that we focus on the setting  $\ell \gg \lambda$  (for example, in the biometric setting, we can have  $\lambda = 128$  while  $\ell \approx 2000$ ) so this  $O(\lambda)$  will not affect the overall comparison, even though the constants can differ from one protocol to the other.

## A.3 Inner Product Protocol with iZK

**Equations for the Language of the First Flow ( $\mathcal{L}_C$ ).** These equations ensure that all the encrypted values are bits. the  $\epsilon_i$  denote random values (used to batch the equations) which do not appear in the matrix of the SPHF associated to the iZK, so they will be picked by the server once he received the ciphertexts.  $\mathcal{L}_C$  is the language of words  $(u_i^{\epsilon_i}, e_i^{\epsilon_i})_{i \leq \ell}$  such that there exists  $((r_i, x_i)_{i \leq \ell}, \mu)$  satisfying:

1. for  $i = 1$  to  $\ell$ ,  $u_i^{\epsilon_i} = g^{\epsilon_i r_i}$  and  $e_i^{\epsilon_i} = h^{\epsilon_i r_i} g^{\epsilon_i x_i}$
2.  $1 = (\prod u_i^{\epsilon_i x_i}) \cdot g^{-\mu}$  and  $1 = (\prod (e_i/g)^{\epsilon_i x_i}) \cdot h^{-\mu}$

The  $2\ell + 2$  equations involve  $2\ell + 1$  witnesses,  $((\epsilon_i r_i)_{i \leq \ell}, (\epsilon_i x_i)_{i \leq \ell}, \mu)$ . The witness  $\mu$  corresponds to  $\sum \epsilon_i r_i x_i$ . Omitting the constants, this lead to an iZK with public key  $\text{ipk}_C$  of size  $4\ell$  and ciphertext  $c_C$  of size  $4\ell$ .

**Equations for the Language of the Second Flow ( $\mathcal{L}_S$ ).** Let  $(d_1, d_2, (e_i)_{i \leq \ell+4}, f)$  denote the Cramer-Shoup commitments of the values  $((g^{y_i})_{i \leq \ell}, g^R, g^{R'}, \prod u_i^{y_i}, \prod e_i^{y_i})$ , and let  $(\hat{u}, \hat{e})$  denote the encryption of  $R \cdot \text{IP} + R'$ . These equations ensure that the first  $\ell$  committed values are bits, that the two last committed values are  $\prod u_i^{y_i}$  and  $\prod e_i^{y_i}$  and that  $(\hat{u}, \hat{e})$  is a randomized encryption of the inner product additively and multiplicatively randomized by two committed values. The values are committed using randomness reuse techniques, which makes the commitment four times smaller but prevents us from batching our equations as we did in the first flow.  $\mathcal{L}_S$  is the language of words  $(d_1, d_2, (e_i)_{i \leq \ell+4}, f, \hat{u}, \hat{e})$  such that there exists  $((y_i)_{i \leq \ell}, (\mu_i)_{i \leq \ell+1}, r', R, R', \rho)$  satisfying:

1.  $d_1 = g_1^{r'}, d_2 = g_2^{r'}, f = (ab^\xi)^{r'}$
2. for  $i = 1$  to  $\ell$ ,  $e_i = h_i^{r'} g^{y_i}$ ,  $1 = d_1^{y_i} g^{-\mu_i}$  and  $1 = (e_i/g)^{y_i} h_i^{-\mu_i}$
3.  $e_{\ell+1} = h_{\ell+1}^{r'} g^R$ ,  $e_{\ell+2} = h_{\ell+2}^{r'} g^{R'}$  and  $1 = d_1^R g^{-\mu_{\ell+1}}$
4.  $e_{\ell+3} = h_{\ell+3}^{r'} \prod u_i^{y_i}$ ,  $e_{\ell+4} = h_{\ell+4}^{r'} \prod e_i^{y_i}$
5.  $\hat{u} = g^\rho e_{\ell+3}^R h_{\ell+3}^{-\mu_{\ell+1}}$ ,  $\hat{e} = h^\rho e_{\ell+4}^R h_{\ell+4}^{-\mu_{\ell+1}} g^{R'}$

The  $3\ell + 10$  equations involve  $2\ell + 5$  witnesses,  $((y_i)_{i \leq \ell}, (\mu_i)_{i \leq \ell+1}, r', R, R', \rho)$ . The witnesses  $(\mu_i)_{i \leq \ell}$  correspond to the  $r' y_i$ 's and  $\mu_{\ell+1}$  corresponds to  $r' R$ .  $\rho$  is the randomness used to randomize the



ciphertext  $(\hat{u}, \hat{e})$ . Omitting the constants, the corresponding SSiZK has a public key  $\text{ipk}_S$  of size  $4\ell$  and ciphertext  $c_S$  of size  $6\ell$ .

**Communication Complexity.** omitting the constants, the total communication complexity of the protocol, counting the ciphertexts, the commitments, the iZK and the SSiZK, is  $2\ell + 4\ell + 4\ell + \ell + 4\ell + 6\ell = 21\ell$ .

**Computational Complexity.** Exponentiations are required to compute the ciphertexts, the commitments, and elements of the iZK involved in the two iZKs:  $(\text{hp}, \text{tp}, H, \text{t}H, \text{proj}H, \text{tproj}H)$ . Recall that as  $(x_i, y_i)_{i \leq \ell}$  are bits, exponentiations with these values are free.

- First iZK:  $4 \times 5\ell$  (for  $\text{hp}$  and  $\text{tp}$ ), plus  $2 \times 2\ell$  (for  $H$  and  $\text{tproj}H$ ), plus  $2 \times 2\ell$  (for  $\text{t}H$  and  $\text{proj}H$ ), plus  $2 \times 2\ell$  (for the ElGamal ciphertexts). Hence  $30\ell$  exponentiations in total.
- Second iZK:  $4 \times 6\ell$  (for  $\text{hp}$  and  $\text{tp}$ ), plus  $2 \times 2\ell$  (for  $H$  and  $\text{tproj}H$ ), plus  $2 \times 4\ell$  (for  $\text{t}H$  and  $\text{proj}H$ ), plus  $2 \times \ell$  (for the commitments). Hence  $37\ell$  exponentiations in total.

Omitting the constants, the execution of the whole protocol requires  $67\ell$  exponentiations.

#### A.4 Inner Product Protocol with Groth-Sahai NIZKs

Unlike our iZK-based protocol, we do not intend to fully construct a UC-secure protocol for the inner product with the Groth-Sahai methodology, but rather to provide a lower bound on the complexity of such a protocol, which is enough to assess our claim that iZKs provide consistent efficiency improvement over the Groth-Sahai methodology to design UC-secure protocols whose semi-honest version does not originally involve pairings. Notice that we can apply batch techniques to reduce drastically the number of equations needed for the NIZK of the first flow, as the client cannot gain knowledge from the second flow by cheating (IP is randomized by  $R$  and  $R'$ ), but the same cannot be done for the second flow because the client cannot send the decrypted value without being sure that the server was honest.

**Simulation-Soundness for Groth-Sahai NIZKs.** The inner product protocol involves quadratic equations and pairing product equations. While very efficient (quasi-adaptive) simulation-sound NIZKs have been designed for linear equations, to our knowledge, the best simulation-sound NIZKs for quadratic equations and pairing product equations are those of [HJ12]. However, the conversion of a NIZK into a simulation-sound NIZK with this method incurs a huge additive overhead (because of the signature) and a linear blow-up of the size of the NIZK. As the conversion of NIZK into simulation-sound NIZK involves precise computations and optimizations, we have *not* attempted to evaluate it in this section; as a consequence, all the estimations are (loose) *lower bounds* on the real complexity of a Groth-Sahai-based UC-secure inner product protocol.

**Communication Complexity.** To prove that all the committed values are bits, which is a quadratic equation, the  $x_i$ 's have to be committed over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , and the randomness of the ElGamal ciphertexts  $(r_i)_{i \leq \ell}$  has to be committed over  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . These commitments and the ciphertexts represent in total  $4\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $4\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . However, all the equations (checking that the ElGamal ciphertexts are well-formed, checking that values committed over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  are indeed the same, checking that all the  $x_i$  are bits) can be batched. For the second flow, the server has to send commitments of the  $y_i$ 's over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , together with encryptions of the  $y_i$ 's (required for the simulatability, but randomness reuse can be applied here to reduce linearly the number of group elements) and commitments over  $\mathbb{G}_2$  of the randomness of the encryptions of the  $y_i$ 's. Moreover, proving that the  $y_i$  are bits involves  $\ell$  quadratic equations, which represents  $2\ell$  elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $2\ell$  elements over  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . As we explained, we cannot batch those equations without adding two rounds to the protocol. The proof that the ciphertexts do indeed encrypt the committed values costs  $\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and proving that values committed over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  are indeed the same costs at least  $\ell$  elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . Thus, the second flow contains at least  $7\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $6\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

**Total.** the communication complexity of the whole execution of a UC-secure inner product protocol using the Groth-Sahai methodology is lower bounded by  $11\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $10\ell$  group elements over  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .  $\mathbb{G}_2$  being approximately twice as big as  $\mathbb{G}_1$  with usual settings, this represents roughly  $31\ell$  elements over  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , which is 50% more than the iZK-based protocol.



**Pairings and Exponentiations.** Counting the number of exponentiations of Groth-Sahai proofs is quite involved, as this number is quadratic  $O(\ell^2)$  in the general case, but linear in nearly every specific application, if the correct optimizations are used. Instead of counting the exponentiations, we focus on a loose lower bound by counting only the exponentiations required to compute ciphertexts and commitments, without even considering the computations required for the construction and the verification of the proofs. This leads to a lower bound of  $28\ell$  exponentiations over  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and  $6\ell$  exponentiations over  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . Moreover, several papers have lowered the number of pairings needed to verify the proofs; even if we consider that the verification of all the proofs can be batched into a single verification of a pairing-product equation, using the optimizations of [BFI<sup>+</sup>10], at least  $4\ell$  pairings are required for the first flow. For the second flow, which cannot be batched, verification (using [BFI<sup>+</sup>10]) of one pairing-product equation, two multi-scalar multiplication equations and one quadratic equation is lower bounded by  $(4 + 2 + 2 + 2)\ell = 10\ell$  pairings. The overall number of pairings is thus lower-bounded by  $14\ell$ . As we can choose more efficient curves, with fast exponentiations, by avoiding the need of pairings, even these very loose values represent considerably more computations than the exponentiations required by the iZK-based protocol.

### A.5 Inner Product Protocol with Schnorr $\Sigma$ -Protocols

Let us now provide an estimation of the cost of an UC-secure protocol for the inner product relying on  $\Sigma$ -Protocols (i.e., protocols with a three-move structure, namely (*commitments, challenge, response*)). There are two ways of designing such a protocol:

1. One can rely on the OR trick to prove, for each ciphertext  $(u, e)$ , that either  $(u, e)$  or  $(u, ge^{-1})$  is an encryption of 0 (a DDH tuple).
2. Alternatively, one can commit to  $(x_i^2)_{i \leq \ell}$ , prove that the commitments contains the square of the encrypted values (using a Chaum-Pedersen proof of same discrete logarithm with different bases), and then batch all the proofs by proving a statement of the form  $\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \lambda_i (x_i - x_i^2) = 0$ , for a random tuple of values  $(\lambda_i)_{i \leq \ell}$  chosen by the verifier after the prover has committed.

We will focus on the second technique for our estimation; both techniques seem roughly equivalent in terms of communication and computation. The commitment scheme used in this protocol is the Pedersen commitment scheme, which can be seen as the second part of an ElGamal ciphertext:  $c(m; r) = h^r g^m$ . The reader might refer to [Mau09] to get an intuition of the cost of the different proofs we are going to construct, as all our proofs can be seen as proving the knowledge of a preimage of a group homomorphism, which fits into the framework of [Mau09]. Moreover, all those proofs can be turned into simulation-sound ZK proofs at a small, constant additive cost, using the generic transformation of [GMV03]. The protocol goes as follows: (we omit the constants when we provide the number of elements exchanged)

#### Protocol.

1. The client sends  $\ell$  ElGamal ciphertexts  $(u_i, e_i)_{i \leq \ell}$  and  $\ell$  commitments  $(w_i)_{i \leq \ell}$  of the squares of the encrypted values. He also generates  $3\ell$  randomness for the proof, hashes them using a collision-resistant hash function, and commits to this value.
2. The server replies with a challenge  $c$ ,  $\ell$  ElGamal ciphertexts of his own values (required for the simulatability) plus the randomness  $(R, R')$  (with his key),  $\ell$  commitments of the squares of his values and an encryption (with the client key) of  $(R \cdot \text{IP} + R')$ .
3. The client sends a proof, which contains  $3\ell$  scalars and  $3\ell$  openings of the randomness whose hash value he committed to in the first flow. He also sends a challenge  $c'$ .
4. The server checks that the openings are correct, and if they are, that the proofs hold, i.e. that the values were indeed bits and that  $(\lambda_i)_{i \leq \ell}$ , the values  $\lambda_i$  being computed from the challenge  $c$  with a pseudo-random generator. Then, he sends himself a similar proof, ensuring his values are bits ( $3\ell + 3\ell$  elements), plus a proof that the randomized scalar product was correctly computed ( $2\ell$  elements).
5. If the openings and the proofs are correct, the client sends the decrypted randomized inner product to the server.

For details on how  $\Sigma$ -protocols can be built for statements such as “I know openings of commitments such that one of them opens to the product of the two other committed values”, the reader might refer to [Mau09]. We enhance the security of the original  $\Sigma$ -protocols by adding commitments to the randomness and revealing the openings after receiving the challenge; such enhanced protocols can be proven secure against malicious verifiers, and so are truly zero-knowledge.

**Efficiency.** The communication complexity can be easily counted from our description of the protocol:  $(2 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 2)\ell = 20\ell$ . The computational complexity, counted as a number of exponentiations and omitting constant values and other operations, is  $38\ell$ :

- $2\ell + \ell$  for the ciphertexts and Pedersen commitments of the first flow.
- $3\ell + 3\ell$  for the random ciphertexts and Pedersen commitments hashed and committed in the first flow.
- $2\ell + \ell$  for the ciphertexts and Pedersen commitments of the second flow.
- $3\ell + 3\ell$  for the random ciphertexts and Pedersen commitments hashed and committed in the second flow.
- $3\ell + 2\ell$  to check the opening of the random ciphertexts and Pedersen commitments hashed and committed in the first flow.
- $3\ell + 2\ell$  to check the proofs ( $3\ell$  for the commitments of squares of encrypted values,  $2\ell$  for the batched proof of bit values)
- $3\ell + 2\ell$  to check the opening of the random ciphertexts and Pedersen commitments hashed and committed in the second flow.
- $3\ell + 2\ell$  to check the proofs ( $3\ell$  for the commitments of squares of encrypted values,  $2\ell$  for the batched proof of bit values).
- $2\ell$  to check the proof that the inner product was correctly computed.

## B Semi-Honest to Malicious Transformation

In the seminal work [GMW87b], Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson have proven that there exists a compiler which, given any two-party semi-honest interactive protocol, outputs an “equivalent protocol” for the malicious model. This compiler (which we call GMW compiler) is formally described in [Gol04]. It is divided in three phases: the **Input-Commitment Phase**, where the players commit to their own inputs; the **Coin-Generation Phase**, where the players run an augmented coin-tossing protocol to generate unbiased random tapes while providing commitments on them for later validity proofs; and the **Protocol Emulation Phase**, where zero-knowledge proofs are used to ensure semi-honest behavior of all the players, from the committed inputs, the committed random tapes and the flows. This last phase is the one on which we focus in this section.

Indeed, while NIZK could be used to prove correct generation of the flows, they would either be quite inefficient (with general NIZK constructions) or require strong settings and assumptions (assumptions in bilinear groups for Groth-Sahai NIZK). On the other hand, interactive zero-knowledge proofs imply a blow-up in the interactivity of the protocol.

We present another compiler (see Figure 6) which is divided in four phases: there are still the **Input-Commitment Phase** and the **Coin-Generation Phase**, which end up with commitments of the inputs and of the unbiased random tapes of the two players, as in the GMW compiler. Note that if inputs should belong in a non-trivial language, validity of the commitments has to be proven as in the next phase. These are constant-round phases, which are then followed by the **Protocol Emulation Phase**: each flow  $x$  from the initial protocol is combined with an iZK, and so with a public key  $ipk$ , so that the other player can mask all the subsequent flows with  $K$  (or derivative masks) encapsulated in  $c$ . More precisely, from the ephemeral key  $K$ , we write  $k^{(i)}$  for  $\text{PRG}^{(i)}(K)$ , and each flow is masked by all the previous keys, and so we use the next block from the PRG for any new mask. Hence, as soon as one player tries to cheat, all the subsequent flows sent by the other player will be masked by a random value. Eventually, a **Verification Phase** provides an explicit validity check: the two players have to prove they were able to extract all the ephemeral keys, which guarantees their semi-honest behavior during the whole protocol.




Fig. 6: Semi-honest to malicious compilers

**Proof Sketch.** For the security proof, we first assume we are dealing with a deterministic function: on private inputs  $x$  and  $y$ , the first player receives  $f(x, y)$  and the second receives  $g(x, y)$ . For the sake of simplicity, we also make the assumption that the semi-honest protocol provides execution traces with formats (size and number of flows) that are independent of the inputs. Eventually, we make use of extractable commitments.

We are thus given a simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}$  for the semi-honest protocol  $\mathcal{P}$ . And we describe a simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  for the compiled protocol  $\mathcal{P}'$ : If both players are honest,  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  simply runs the simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}$  to generate all the basic flows, and generates all the iZK proofs as well as the verification flows, but using random keys  $K$  for deriving the masks. If one player is malicious,  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  first extracts its inputs and random coins from the extractable commitment, sends the inputs to the ideal functionality to learn the outcome and provides it to  $\mathcal{Sim}$  to generate the basic flows of the honest player. This time, valid iZK proofs for the flows of the honest player have to be generated since the malicious player will be able to check them, and  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  has to be able to immediately detect dishonest behavior of the malicious player in order to replace all the subsequent flows by random flows: the trapdoor for the iZK, in the CRS, allows  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  to extract the ephemeral key even without a witness, and then to get back the plaintext sent by the malicious player; from the inputs and the random tape of the malicious player, as well as the previous flows already exchanged,  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  can anticipate and check the flow that should have been generated with a semi-honest behavior. As soon as a cheating attempt is detected, in the real world, the subsequent masks would become random looking to the malicious player,  $\mathcal{Sim}'$  can thus safely send random flows (the masked parts).

## C More Efficient iZK Constructions

In this section, we describe several ways to get slightly more efficient constructions of iZK at the cost of some (very reasonable) additional requirements.

### C.1 Reducing the Size of the Ciphertext Using Entropy Extractors

In the generic framework constructed in Section 3, the ciphertext  $c$  of the iZK contains a random integer  $\zeta$ , which is fundamental to ensure the 2-universality property. However, the actual requirement on  $\zeta$  is quite simple: we want to ensure that the adversary will not be able to guess it before we send it. If the adversary was able to guess  $\zeta$ , then he could have sent a  $\text{tproj}H$  corresponding to a linear combination of the lines of the matrix, and then  $\text{tproj}H$  would contain additional information about the secret key, breaking the zero-knowledge property of the iZK. To ensure that the adversary will not guess the  $\zeta$  in advance, it is not necessary to send the  $\zeta$  among with the other elements of the ciphertext  $c$ , as it already contains a lot of entropy: one can add the description of an entropy extractor  $\text{Ext}$  in the CRS, and the value  $\zeta$  will be directly computed as  $\zeta = \text{Ext}(\text{hp})$ . This saves one element in  $c$ .

### C.2 More Efficient Construction with Word-Dependent CRS

In section 3, we have seen how to add a trapdoor in a SPHF to ensure the validity of the projection key. In many cases, it is possible to add the trapdoor in a slightly more efficient way, if we accept to use word-dependent CRS. (the trapdoor CRS only works for one word  $x^* = (u^*, e^*)$  chosen before the CRS is generated). Instead of adding three columns and three rows to the matrix  $\Gamma$  (to obtain the matrix  $\Gamma_t$ ), it may be possible to only add one row. The second part of the construction ensuring the validity of the projection keys  $\text{hp}_t$  remains the same.

For example, in Example 6, the CRS can contain a row  $R = (R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4)$  which is  $(u^{*s}, e^{*s}, 1, 1)$  in the trapdoor mode for  $x^*$ , or  $(g^s, h^s, 1, 1)$  in the normal mode (with  $s$  a random scalar in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ ). In the trapdoor mode,  $s$  is the trapdoor for  $x^*$ . The DDH (or the semantic security of ElGamal) ensures that

<b>Exp</b> <sup>iZK-zk-b</sup> ( $\mathcal{A}, \text{crs}, \mathfrak{R}$ )	
$(x^*, w, \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(\text{crs})$	▷ only for word-dependent CRS
$x^* \leftarrow \perp$	▷ only for re-usable CRS
$(\text{icrs}, \text{i}\mathcal{T}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTSetup}(\text{crs}, x^*)$	
$(\ell, \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(\text{crs})$	▷ only for word-dependent CRS
$(\ell, x^*, w, \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(\text{st}, \text{icrs}, \text{i}\mathcal{T})$	▷ only for re-usable CRS
<b>if</b> $\mathcal{R}(x^*, w, \text{st}) = 0$ <b>then return</b> 0	
<b>if</b> $b = 0$ <b>then</b>	
$(\text{ipk}, \text{isk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iKG}^\ell(\text{icrs}, x^*, w)$	
<b>else</b>	
$(\text{ipk}, \text{itk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{iTKG}^\ell(\text{i}\mathcal{T}, x^*)$	
$(c, \text{st}) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(\text{st}, \text{icrs}, \text{i}\mathcal{T}, \text{ipk})$	
<b>if</b> $b = 0$ <b>then</b>	
$K \leftarrow \text{iDec}^\ell(\text{isk}, c)$	
<b>else</b>	
$K \leftarrow \text{iTDec}^\ell(\text{itk}, c)$	
<b>return</b> $\mathcal{A}(\text{st}, K)$	

Fig. 7: Experiments  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-zk-b}}$  for zero-knowledge of iZK

the two setups are indistinguishable. We then have (if we omit the 2-universal trick at the end):

$$\hat{C}_t = \hat{C} = (u, e, 1, 1)$$

$$\Gamma_t = \left( \frac{\Gamma}{R} \right) = \begin{pmatrix} g & h & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & g & u & e/g \\ 1 & 1 & g & h \\ R_1 & R_2 & R_3 & R_4 \end{pmatrix}.$$

In normal mode, the last row  $R$  is  $s$  times the first row of  $\Gamma_t$ , and so the new element in the projection key,  $\text{hp}_{t,4} = R \bullet \text{hk}$  gives no more information than the first element  $\text{hp}_{t,1} = \text{hp}_1$  (from an information theoretic point of view). That is why the smoothness does still hold in normal mode.

In trapdoor mode, we remark that  $\text{hp}_{t,4} = R \bullet \text{hk} = (u^{*\text{hk}_1} e^{*\text{hk}_2})^s$ . This is exactly the hash value of  $x^*$  raised to the power of  $s$  (if  $\text{hp}$  is valid). So knowing the trapdoor  $s$  and  $\text{hp}_{t,4}$  enables to compute the hash value of  $C^*$ .

**Formal Construction of iZK with Word-Dependent CRS.** We suppose to have two setup algorithms:

- $\text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$  generates a row vector  $R \in \mathbb{G}^{1 \times n}$  which is linearly depend of the rows of any matrix  $\Gamma$  for any  $C$  (we recall that  $\Gamma$  may depend on  $C$ ). Then it returns  $\text{icrs} = (\text{crs}, R)$ .
- $\text{iTSetup}(\text{crs}, x^*)$  generates a row vector  $R \in \mathbb{G}^{1 \times n}$  and a trapdoor a row vector  $\lambda^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{k+1}$  so that:

$$\lambda^* \bullet \left( \frac{\Gamma}{R} \right) = \hat{C}.$$

In other word  $\lambda^*$  is a witness for the language defined by  $\left( \frac{\Gamma}{R} \right)$  and  $\theta$ . Then it returns  $\text{icrs} = (\text{crs}, R)$  and  $\text{i}\mathcal{T} = \lambda^*$ .

Then we do the same construction as in Section 3.3, except we use the following matrices  $\Gamma'_t(x)$ ,  $\hat{C}_t$ ,  $\lambda_t(\zeta, \text{iw})$ , and  $\lambda_t(\zeta, \text{i}\mathcal{T})$ :

$$\hat{C}_t = (\hat{C}, \zeta \bullet \hat{C}) \qquad \Gamma'_t = \left( \frac{\Gamma}{R} \right)$$

$$\lambda_t(\zeta, \text{iw}) = (\lambda, 0, \zeta \bullet \lambda, 0) \qquad \lambda_t(\zeta, \text{i}\mathcal{T}) = (\lambda^*, \zeta \bullet \lambda^*).$$

If the two setup  $\text{iSetup}$  and  $\text{iTSetup}$  are indeed indistinguishable, we prove the construction to be secure in Appendix D.3. The proof is very similar to the one for the generic construction in Appendix D.1.

When it is usable, this construction is slightly more efficient than the generic one with re-usable CRS, since the resulting matrix  $\Gamma_t$  has 4 less columns and 4 less rows.



## D Proofs

### D.1 Proof of the iZK Construction of Section 3

**Correctness.** Straightforward.

**Setup Indistinguishability.** The only difference between  $\text{iSetup}$  and  $\text{iTSetup}$  is that in the former  $(g', h', u', e')$  is a random tuple, while in the later  $(g', h', u', e')$  is a DDH tuple. Hence the setup indistinguishability holds under plain DDH in  $\mathbb{G}$ .

**Soundness.** Let us consider a CRS  $\text{icrs} = (\text{crs}, g', h', u', e')$  generated by  $\text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$ . We need to show that, for any  $C = \times \notin \mathcal{L} = \text{i}\mathcal{L}$  (i.e., such that  $\hat{C}$  is linearly independent of rows of  $\Gamma$ ) and any  $\text{iZK} = \text{tp} \in \mathbb{G}^{2n+6}$ , the distribution of  $K = H \cdot \text{tproj}H$  is statistically close to uniform over  $\mathbb{G}$ , even given  $c = (\zeta, \text{hp})$ . For that purpose, we will prove something stronger: with overwhelming probability over  $\zeta$ , the distribution of  $H$  is uniform even given  $\text{hp}, \zeta, \text{tproj}H$ .

The key idea for the demonstration is to apply the same argument than in the demonstration of the smoothness of the generic construction of [BBC<sup>+</sup>13] on a well chosen matrix  $\Gamma_s$  such that the projection key for this matrix is exactly  $\text{hp}_s = (\text{hp}, \text{tproj}H)$ , but the language is not changed (with overwhelming probability over  $\zeta$ ). As  $\text{hp} = \Gamma_t \bullet \text{hk}$  and  $\text{tproj}H = \text{tp} \bullet \text{hk}$ , we can set

$$\Gamma_s = \left( \begin{array}{c} \Gamma_t \\ \text{tp} \end{array} \right), \quad \text{hp}_s = (\text{hp}, \text{tproj}H) = \Gamma_s \bullet \text{hk}.$$

Let us prove that with overwhelming probability over  $\zeta$ ,  $\hat{C}_t$  is linearly independent of rows of  $\Gamma_s$ . This will prove that with overwhelming probability,  $H = \hat{C}_t \bullet \text{hk}$  looks uniformly random in  $\mathbb{G}$ , even given  $\text{hp}_s = (\text{hp}, \text{tproj}H)$ .

More precisely, let us prove that there is at most one value  $\zeta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $\hat{C}_t = (g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1, g'^{-\zeta}, 1, \dots, 1)$  is linearly dependent of rows of  $\Gamma_s$ . Let us suppose by contradiction, that there exists  $\zeta \neq \zeta'$ ,  $\lambda_s = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \mu)$ , and  $\lambda'_s = (\lambda'_1, \lambda'_2, \mu')$  such that  $(g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1, g'^{-\zeta}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda_s \bullet \Gamma_s$ , and  $(g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1, g'^{-\zeta'}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda'_s \bullet \Gamma_s$ . This implies

$$(g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda_1 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu \bullet \text{tp}_1 \tag{3a}$$

$$(g'^{-\zeta}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda_2 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu \bullet \text{tp}_2 \tag{3b}$$

$$(g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda'_1 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu' \bullet \text{tp}_1 \tag{3c}$$

$$(g'^{-\zeta'}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda'_2 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu' \bullet \text{tp}_2 \tag{3d}$$

with  $1 = g^0 \in \mathbb{G}$  and  $\text{tp}_1, \text{tp}_2 \in \mathbb{G}^{n+3}$  such that  $\text{tp} = (\text{tp}_1, \text{tp}_2)$ , and

$$\Gamma' = \left( \begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{1} & \Gamma \\ \hline g' & 1 \quad 1 \\ \hline 1 & g' \quad h' \\ \hline g' & u' \quad e' \\ \hline \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{c} \Gamma \\ \hat{C} \\ 1 \quad \dots \quad 1 \\ 1 \quad \dots \quad 1 \end{array} \right) \in \mathbb{G}^{(k+3) \times (n+3)}.$$

Then, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} (g'^{-\mu'+\mu}, 1, \dots, 1) &= (\mu' \bullet \lambda_1 - \mu \bullet \lambda'_1) \bullet \Gamma' && (\mu' \bullet (3a) - \mu \bullet (3c)) \\ (g'^{-\zeta\mu'+\zeta'\mu}, 1, \dots, 1) &= (\mu' \bullet \lambda_2 - \mu \bullet \lambda'_2) \bullet \Gamma' && (\mu' \bullet (3b) - \mu \bullet (3d)) \end{aligned}$$

If  $\mu' = \mu$ ,  $-\zeta\mu' + \zeta'\mu = \zeta' - \zeta \neq 0$ , otherwise  $-\mu' + \mu \neq 0$ . By dividing the first equation by  $-\mu' + \mu$  in the latter case, or the second equation by  $-\zeta\mu' + \zeta'\mu$  in the former case, we get that there exists some vector  $\lambda' \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{k+3}$  such that:

$$(g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1) = \lambda' \bullet \Gamma'.$$

But since  $(g', h', u', e)$  is not a DDH tuple,  $\lambda'$  has to be of the form  $(\star, \dots, \star, 1, 0, 0)$ , which means that  $\hat{C}$  is a linear combination of rows of  $\Gamma$ , i.e.,  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ , which is not the case.

Therefore, our construction is sound (and the two distributions we consider in the definition in Section 2.3).

**Zero-Knowledge.** Let  $x^* \in \mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$  be a word with witness  $iw^*$ . For the zero-knowledge property, we (the challenger playing the role of the prover) generates a public key  $\text{ipk} = \text{tp}$ , where  $\text{tp}$  is a projection key, associated to a random hashing key  $\text{tk}$ , for the language of valid  $\text{hp}$ 's. Then, the adversary (playing the role of the verifier) sends a ciphertext  $c(\zeta, \text{hp})$ . There are two cases:

- either there exists  $\text{hk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{2n+6}$  such that  $\text{hp} = \Gamma_t \bullet \text{hk}$ . In this case, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{proj}H &:= \lambda_t(\zeta, iw^*) \bullet \text{hp} = \lambda_t(\zeta, iw^*) \bullet \Gamma_t \bullet \text{hk} = \hat{C}_t \bullet \text{hk} \\ &= \lambda_t(\zeta, i\mathcal{T}) \bullet \Gamma_t \bullet \text{hk} = \lambda_t(\zeta, i\mathcal{T}) \bullet \text{hp} := \text{trap}H \end{aligned}$$

(this property actually can be seen as coming from the correctness of the SPHF with projection key  $\text{hp}$ );

- or, there does not exist  $\text{hk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{2n+6}$  such that  $\text{hp} = \Gamma_t \bullet \text{hk}$ . In this case,  $\text{hp}$  is not valid and  $\text{t}H = \Gamma_t^\top \bullet \text{tk}$  (with  $\text{tk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{2k+6}$ ) looks uniformly random for the adversary (before he sees  $\text{proj}H \cdot \text{t}H$  or  $\text{trap}H \cdot \text{t}H$  in the game), since the only information he sees about  $\text{tk}$  is  $\text{tp} = \Gamma_t^\top \bullet \text{tk}$ , but  $\text{hp}$  is linearly independent of rows of  $\Gamma_t^\top$ . This property on  $\text{t}H$  can actually be seen as the smoothness property of the SPHF with projection key  $\text{tp}$ . Then  $\text{proj}H \cdot \text{t}H$  and  $\text{trap}H \cdot \text{t}H$  looks both uniformly random to the adversary, and cannot be distinguished.

Therefore, our construction is perfect zero-knowledge.

## D.2 Details and Proof of the SSiZK Construction of Section 3.4

**Details.** Let us first write down the complete matrices  $\hat{C}_t$  and  $\Gamma_t(\mathbf{x})$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_t(\mathbf{x}, \zeta) &= \hat{C}_t = (g'^{-1}, 1, \dots, 1, g'^{-\zeta}, 1, \dots, 1) && \in \mathbb{G}^{1 \times (2n+10)} \\ \Gamma'_t(\ell, \mathbf{x}) &= \left( \begin{array}{c|ccc|ccc|cc} 1 & & & \Gamma(\mathbf{x}) & & & 1 & \\ \hline g' & 1 & 1 & \hat{C} & & & 1 & 1 \\ \hline 1 & g' & h' & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ g' & u' & e' & 1 & \dots & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ \hline 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & g' & h' \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & u'' & e'' \\ \hline g' & 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 & g' & 1 \end{array} \right) && \in \mathbb{G}^{(k+6) \times (n+5)} \\ \Gamma_t(\ell, \mathbf{x}) &= \left( \begin{array}{c|ccc} \Gamma'_t(\ell, \mathbf{x}) & & & \mathbf{1} \\ \hline \mathbf{1} & & & \Gamma'_t(\ell, \mathbf{x}) \end{array} \right) && \in \mathbb{G}^{(2k+12) \times (2n+10)}, \\ \lambda_t(\zeta, iw) &= (\lambda(iw), -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \zeta \lambda(iw), -\zeta, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \\ \lambda_t(\zeta, i\mathcal{T}) &= (0, \dots, 0, r', -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, \dots, 0, \zeta r', -\zeta, 0, 0, 0) \quad \text{with } i\mathcal{T} = r', \end{aligned}$$

with  $u'' = \mathcal{W}_1(\mathcal{H}(\ell, \mathbf{x}))$  and  $e'' = \mathcal{W}_2(\mathcal{H}(\ell, \mathbf{x}))$ .

**Proof.**

*Correctness.* Straightforward.

*Setup Indistinguishability.* The only elements added to the CRS  $(v_{1,i}, v_{2,i})_i$  have exactly the same distribution when generated by  $\text{iSetup}$  and  $\text{iTSetup}$ . So it is equivalent to the setup indistinguishability of our  $\text{iZK}$  construction (see Appendix D.1), and is implied by the DDH assumption.

*Zero-Knowledge.* The proof is exactly the same as for our  $\text{iZK}$  construction (see Appendix D.1).

*Soundness.* Both  $\text{iSetup}$  and  $\text{iTSetup}$  output a CRS  $\text{icrs}$ , such that  $(g', h', v_{1,i}, v_{2,i})$  is a DDH tuple, and so is  $(g', h', u'', e'')$ . From the definition of  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}_t$  and  $\Gamma_t$ , a word  $(x, g', h', u', e', u'', e'')$  is in the extended language corresponding to  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}_t$  and  $\Gamma_t$  if and only if  $x \in \mathcal{L}$ , or  $(g', h', u', e')$  is a DDH tuple, or  $(g', 1)$  is in the subspace generated by  $(g', h')$  and  $(u'', e'')$ . But the latter subspace is exactly the subspace generated by  $(g', h')$  (as  $(g', h', u'', e'')$  is a DDH tuple). Hence,  $(g', 1)$  is never in that subspace (as  $g'$  and  $h'$  are supposed to be generators), and the last case of the disjunction is never satisfied.

Therefore, the extended language is actually the same as for our  $\text{iZK}$  construction, and the soundness can be proved in the same way as in Appendix D.1.

*Simulation-Soundness.* Let us now prove the simulation-soundness by exhibiting a sequence of indistinguishable games. An overview of the proof is given in Section 3.4.

We consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  against the simulation soundness. In each game  $\mathbf{G}_i$ , we start by picking a random bit  $b$ , run some experiment, and output some bit  $b'$ . We denote by  $\text{Adv}_i$  the advantage of the adversary in the game  $\mathbf{G}_i$ :

$$\text{Adv}_i = 2 \cdot \Pr[b' = b] - 1.$$

Finally, we write  $\text{negl}$  any negligible quantity in  $\mathfrak{K}$ .

We recall that we suppose that  $\text{Setup}_{\text{crs}}$  also outputs some additional information or trapdoor  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{crs}}$ , which enables to check, in polynomial time, whether a given word  $x$  is in  $\mathcal{L}$  or not. This enables to perform the test  $x^* \in \mathcal{L}^*$  (at the end of the experiment  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-ss-}b}(\mathcal{A}, \text{crs}, \mathfrak{K})$ ) in polynomial time.

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_0$ :** In this first game, we pick a random bit  $b$ , run the experiment  $\text{Exp}^{\text{iZK-ss-}b}(\mathcal{A}, \text{crs}, \mathfrak{K})$ , and outputs the bit  $b'$  (output by the experiment). We use the trapdoor  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{crs}}$  to test whether  $x^* \in \mathcal{L}$  or not (at the end of the experiment). The advantage  $\text{Adv}_0$  is exactly the advantage of the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  in the simulation soundness experiments.

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_1$ :** In this game, instead of picking DDH tuples  $(g', h', v_{1,i}, v_{2,i})$  in  $\text{iTSetup}$ , we pick  $v_{1,i}$  and  $v_{2,i}$  uniformly at random in  $\mathbb{G}$ . Under the DDH assumption,  $\text{Adv}_0 \leq \text{Adv}_1 + \text{negl}$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_2$ :** Similarly to the proof in [LPJY14], in this game, we pick  $g'', h'' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$ , and set, for  $i = 0, \dots, 2\mathfrak{K}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} r'_i &\xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p & r''_i &\xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p & (4) \\ v_{1,i} &\leftarrow g^{r'_{i-1}} \cdot g^{r''_{i-1}} \cdot g^{\rho'_i} & v_{2,i} &\leftarrow h^{r'_{i-1}} \cdot h^{r''_{i-1}}, & (5) \end{aligned}$$

with  $\rho'_0 = \mu\zeta' - \rho_0$ ,  $\rho'_i = -\rho_i$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, 2\mathfrak{K}$ ),  $\mu \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \dots, 2\mathfrak{K}\}$ ,  $r'_i, r''_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ ,  $\rho_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \dots, \zeta'\}$ , for  $i = 0, \dots, 2\mathfrak{K}$ , with  $\zeta' = 2(q + 1)$  and  $q$  the number of simulated proofs (i.e., queries  $(\ell, x)$  to oracle  $\mathcal{O}$ ). This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one, as the distribution of the  $v_{k,i}$ 's is exactly the same:  $\text{Adv}_1 = \text{Adv}_2$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_3$ :** In this game, we abort if for some query  $(\ell, x)$  to  $\mathcal{O}$ ,  $\rho'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathfrak{K}} m_i \rho'_i = 0$ , with  $m = m_1 \| \dots \| m_{2\mathfrak{K}} = \mathcal{H}(\ell, x) \in \{0, 1\}^{2\mathfrak{K}}$ ; or if for  $m^* = m_1^* \| \dots \| m_{2\mathfrak{K}}^* = \mathcal{H}(\ell^*, x^*) \in \{0, 1\}^{2\mathfrak{K}}$ ,  $\rho'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathfrak{K}} m_i^* \rho'_i \neq 0$ . Using the same analysis as in [Wat05, BR09, LPJY14]:  $\text{Adv}_2^2 / (27(q + 1)(2\mathfrak{K} + 1)) \leq \text{Adv}_3$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_4$ :** In this game, we choose  $g'', h''$  so that  $(g', h', g'', h'')$  is a random DDH tuple (instead of a random tuple as before). Under the DDH assumption,  $\text{Adv}_3 \leq \text{Adv}_4 + \text{negl}$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_5$ :** In this game, we set, for  $i = 0, \dots, 2\mathfrak{K}$ :

$$r'_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p \quad v_{1,i} \leftarrow g^{r'_{i-1}} \cdot g^{\rho'_i} \quad v_{2,i} \leftarrow h^{r'_{i-1}}, \quad (6)$$

with  $\rho_i$  defined as in  $\mathbf{G}_2$ . This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one, as the distribution of the  $v_{k,i}$ 's is exactly the same:  $\text{Adv}_4 = \text{Adv}_5$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_6$ :** In this game, for any query  $(\ell, x)$  to  $\mathcal{O}$ , we generate  $\text{ipk} = \text{tp}$  as usual, but for a subsequent query  $(\text{ipk} = \text{tp}, c = (\zeta, \text{hp}))$  to  $\mathcal{O}$ , we compute  $\text{trapH}$  (in  $\text{iTDec}$ ) as  $\text{trapH} = \lambda' \bullet \text{hp}$  instead of  $\text{trapH} = \lambda_t(\zeta, \text{IT}) \bullet \text{hp}$ , where

$$\lambda' = \left( 0, \dots, 0, -\frac{r'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathfrak{K}} r'_i}{\alpha}, \frac{1}{\alpha}, -1, 0, \dots, 0, -\zeta \frac{r'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathfrak{K}} r'_i}{\alpha}, \frac{\zeta}{\alpha}, -\zeta \right),$$

and

$$m = \mathcal{H}(\ell, \mathbf{x}) \quad \alpha = \rho'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n m_i \rho'_i.$$

This vector  $\lambda'$  is well defined as  $\alpha \neq 0$  from the abort condition in  $\mathbf{G}_3$ . Furthermore:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left( \frac{r'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} r'_i}{\alpha} \quad \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) \bullet \left( \begin{array}{c} g' \\ \mathcal{W}_1(m) = v_{1,0} \prod_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} v_{1,i}^{m_i} \\ \mathcal{W}_2(m) = v_{2,0} \prod_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} v_{2,i}^{m_i} \end{array} \right) \\ &= \left( \begin{array}{c} g'^{(-r'_0 - \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} m_i r'_i)/\alpha} g'^{(r'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} m_i r'_i + \rho'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} \rho'_i)/\alpha} \\ h'^{(-r'_0 - \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} m_i r'_i)/\alpha} h'^{(r'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} m_i r'_i)/\alpha} \end{array} \right)^\top \\ &= \left( g'^{(\rho'_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{2\mathbb{R}} \rho'_i)/\alpha} \quad h'^0 \right) = (g' \quad 1) \end{aligned}$$

so that

$$\lambda' \bullet \Gamma_t = \hat{\mathcal{C}}_t.$$

Finally, a proof similar as the one for the zero-knowledge property of our iZK construction (see Appendix D.1) shows that  $\text{Adv}_5 \leq \text{Adv}_6 + \text{negl}$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_7$ :** In this game, we generate the CRS using  $\text{iSetup}$  (i.e.,  $(g', h', u', e')$  is now a random tuple instead of a DDH tuple). This is possible as  $\text{i}\mathcal{T}$  was not used in the previous game. Under the DDH assumption,  $\text{Adv}_6 \leq \text{Adv}_7 + \text{negl}$ .

In this last game, we remark that  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}_t^*$  (corresponding to the challenge  $\ell^*, \mathbf{x}^*$ ) is linearly independent of rows of  $\Gamma_t(\ell^*, \mathbf{x}^*)$ , as  $\mathbf{x}^* \notin \mathcal{L}$ ,  $(g', h', u', e')$  is not a DDH tuple, and  $(g', h', \mathcal{W}_1(\ell^*, \mathbf{x}^*), \mathcal{W}_2(\ell^*, \mathbf{x}^*))$  is a DDH tuple. Then, similarly as in the soundness proof above, we get that  $\text{Adv}_7 = \text{negl}$  (statistically).

### D.3 Proof of iZK Construction for Word-Dependent CRS of Appendix C.2

**Correctness.** Straightforward.

**Setup Indistinguishability.** This is an assumption for this construction.

**Soundness.** The proof is very similar to the one in Appendix D.1. As usual, we write  $C = \mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$ . We just need to prove that there is at most one value  $\zeta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}_t = (\hat{\mathcal{C}}, \zeta \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}})$  is linearly dependent of rows of  $\Gamma_s$  when  $C \notin \mathcal{L}$ , where  $\Gamma_s$  is defined by  $\Gamma_s = \begin{pmatrix} \Gamma_t \\ \text{tp} \end{pmatrix}$ . Let us suppose by contradiction, that there exists  $\zeta \neq \zeta'$ ,  $\lambda_s = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \mu)$ , and  $\lambda'_s = (\lambda'_1, \lambda'_2, \mu')$  such that  $(\hat{\mathcal{C}}, \zeta \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}}) = \lambda_s \bullet \Gamma_s$ , and  $(\hat{\mathcal{C}}, \zeta' \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}}) = \lambda'_s \bullet \Gamma_s$ . This implies

$$\hat{\mathcal{C}} = \lambda_1 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu \bullet \text{tp}_1 \tag{7a}$$

$$\zeta \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}} = \lambda_2 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu \bullet \text{tp}_2 \tag{7b}$$

$$\hat{\mathcal{C}} = \lambda'_1 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu' \bullet \text{tp}_1 \tag{7c}$$

$$\zeta' \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}} = \lambda'_2 \bullet \Gamma' + \mu' \bullet \text{tp}_2 \tag{7d}$$

with  $\text{tp}_1, \text{tp}_2 \in \mathbb{G}^n$  such that  $\text{tp} = (\text{tp}_1, \text{tp}_2)$ , and

$$\Gamma' = \begin{pmatrix} \Gamma \\ R \end{pmatrix}.$$

Then, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} (-\mu' + \mu) \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}} &= (\mu' \bullet \lambda_1 - \mu \bullet \lambda'_1) \bullet \Gamma' && (\mu' \bullet (7a) - \mu \bullet (7c)) \\ (-\zeta \mu' + \zeta' \mu) \bullet \hat{\mathcal{C}} &= (\mu' \bullet \lambda_2 - \mu \bullet \lambda'_2) \bullet \Gamma' && (\mu' \bullet (7b) - \mu \bullet (7d)) \end{aligned}$$

If  $\mu' = \mu$ ,  $-\zeta\mu' + \zeta'\mu = \zeta' - \zeta \neq 0$ , otherwise  $-\mu' + \mu \neq 0$ . By dividing the first equation by  $-\mu' + \mu$  in the latter case, or the second equation by  $-\zeta\mu' + \zeta'\mu$  in the former case, we get that there exists some vector  $\lambda' \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{k+1}$  such that:

$$\hat{C} = \lambda' \bullet \Gamma' = \lambda' \bullet \begin{pmatrix} \Gamma \\ R \end{pmatrix}.$$

But since  $R$  is linearly dependent of rows of  $\Gamma$ , when the CRS is generated by `iSetup`, this means that  $\hat{C}$  is also a linear combination of rows of  $\Gamma$ , i.e.,  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ , which is not the case. Hence the soundness property holds.

**Zero-Knowledge.** The proof is almost identical to the one in Appendix D.1.

#### D.4 Proof of Construction of ZK Arguments from iZK

We formally prove that the construction of ZK from iZK given in Remark 1 is correct. Let us first recall the definition of an **interactive protocol**. Let us consider a language  $\mathcal{L}$ . A  $n$ -round interactive protocol  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$  is any pair of randomized algorithms (not necessarily computationally bounded). The interaction between  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{V}$  on a word  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  is depicted in Fig. 8. The verifier can do two other actions: accept or reject the word  $x$  at any time. We write  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})(x) = 1$  if the verifier accepts during the interaction and  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})(x) = 0$  otherwise.




Fig. 8: Interactive protocol execution for a word  $x \in \mathcal{X}$

Now, we recall the definition of a zero-knowledge proof: a zero-knowledge proof on a word  $C \in \mathcal{L}$  is an interactive protocol  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$  verifying the following properties:

- **Completeness.**  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$  is complete, if for any  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ :

$$\Pr [(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})(x) \neq 1] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa);$$

- **Soundness.**  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$  is sound, if for any  $C \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}$ , for any prover  $\mathcal{P}'$ :

$$\Pr [(\mathcal{P}', \mathcal{V})(x) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa);$$



The functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}}$  is parametrized by a security parameter  $k$ . It interacts with an adversary  $\mathcal{Sim}$  and a set of parties via the following queries:

**Upon receiving a query (Client-Send, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $(x_i)_{i=1}^\ell$ ) from party  $\mathcal{C}$  (client):** Ignore the message if  $(x_i)_{i=1}^\ell \notin \{0, 1\}^\ell$ . Record the tuple  $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S}, (x_i))$  and send (Client-Sent, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ) to  $\mathcal{Sim}$ . Ignore further Client-Send-message with the same  $(\text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$  from  $\mathcal{C}$ .

**Upon receiving a query (Server-Send, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $(y_i)_{i=1}^\ell$ ) from party  $\mathcal{S}$  (client):** Ignore the message if  $(y_i)_{i=1}^\ell \notin \{0, 1\}^\ell$ . Ignore the message if  $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S}, (x_i))$  is not recorded (for some  $(x_i)$ ) and replace this record by  $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S}, (x_i), (y_i))$ ; otherwise mark the record as used and send (Server-Sent, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ) to  $\mathcal{Sim}$ . Ignore further Server-Send-message with the same  $(\text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$  from  $\mathcal{S}$ .

**Upon receiving a query (Result-Send, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ) from the adversary  $\mathcal{Sim}$ :** ignore the message if  $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S}, (x_i), (y_i))$  is not recorded (for some  $(x_i)$  and  $(y_i)$ ); otherwise remove the record and send (Result-Sent, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ , IP) to  $\mathcal{S}$  (and to  $\mathcal{Sim}$  if  $\mathcal{S}$  is corrupted), with  $\text{IP} = \sum_{i=1}^\ell x_i \cdot y_i$ . Ignore further Result-Send-message with the same  $(\text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$  from  $\mathcal{Sim}$ .

Fig. 9: Ideal Functionality for Inner Product  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}}$

- **Zero-Knowledge.**  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$  is zero-knowledge, if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary playing the role of the verifier, honestly or not, there exists a polynomial time simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}$  able to simulate the view of this adversary without using a witness. The view  $\langle \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V} \rangle(x)$  of a verifier is the tuple  $(m_1, \dots, m_n, r)$  of the exchanged messages and its random tape. More formally,  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$  is computationally zero-knowledge if, for all  $C \in \mathcal{L}$ , for any PPT  $A$ , the distributions  $\langle \mathcal{P}, A \rangle(x)$  and  $\mathcal{Sim}(x)$  are computationally indistinguishable.

Hence, the completeness and the soundness of the zero-knowledge protocol from iZK directly follows from the completeness and the soundness of the underlying iZK; the zero-knowledge is straightforward too: the existence of a simulator is ensured because a simulator is explicitly given by the underlying iZK. The simulator simply uses the trapdoor instead of the witness, and the proof of perfect simulation directly follows from the zero-knowledge property of the underlying iZK.

## D.5 Proof of Security of our Inner Product Protocol in the UC Model

In this section, we prove that (the malicious version of) our scheme in Section 4 is secure in the UC model [Can00], with authenticated channels and static corruptions.

**Details on the Scheme.** Here are some implicit details related to UC for the scheme in Section 4: all flows contains an identifier (1 for the first flow, 2 for the second flow and 3 for the third flow). Every flow not formatted correctly is ignored. Every commitment is supposed to be labeled with an identifier of the commitment (1 for the one of the first flow and 2 for the one of the second flow), the identifier of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$ , the session and sub-session identifiers sid and ssid. We use the labeled version of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CHK<sup>+</sup>05] for that purpose. We recall that this scheme is IND-CCA secure.

**Ideal Functionality.** The ideal functionality is depicted in Fig. 9. Basically, the client  $\mathcal{C}$  sends its input  $(x_i)_{i=1}^\ell \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ , then the server sends its input  $(y_i)_{i=1}^\ell$ , and finally, when the adversary or simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}$  specifies it, the server gets back the inner product IP of  $(x_i)$  and  $(y_i)$ . Corruptions of the client or the server are supposed to be static, i.e., before the first message Client-Send is sent (for a given session  $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S})$ ). The authentication and the flow identifiers above ensure that if one of the player is honest at the beginning, he remains honest during all the session and the adversary in the real world cannot modify his flow (though he may drop them as usual and attempt a denial-of-service attack).

**Proof of Security.** We exhibit a sequence of games. The sequence starts from the real game, where the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  interacts with real players and ends with the ideal game, where we have built a simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}$  that makes the interface between the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_0$ :** This is the real game, where the simulator knows the inputs of all the honest players and honestly play their role (on their behalf).

**Game  $\mathbf{G}_1$ :** We first deal with the case when  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$  are both honest. In that case, the simulator  $\mathcal{Sim}$  replaces all commitments and ciphertexts of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$  by commitments and ciphertexts of random

values. In addition, except if the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  drops some flows, the simulator  $\mathcal{S}im$  never aborts on behalf of  $\mathcal{S}$  and outputs the correct inner product  $IP = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} x_i \cdot y_i$  he can compute since he still knows the inputs  $(x_i)$  of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $(y_i)$  of  $\mathcal{S}$ .  $\mathcal{S}im$  also sends to the message **Result-Send** when required. This game is indistinguishable from the previous one under the IND-CPA property of the encryption scheme and the commitment scheme.

We remark that now, we do not need to know the exact inputs of honest players.

**Game  $G_2$ :** We now deal with sessions between a malicious client  $\mathcal{C}$  and a honest server  $\mathcal{S}$ .  $\mathcal{S}im$  first extracts the commitment of the bits of the secret keys  $sk_j$ , and recovers  $sk$ . If these commitments do not contain bit or if these bits do not correspond to a valid secret key  $sk$  (i.e., such that the sent public key  $pk = g^{sk}$ ), then  $\mathcal{S}im$  chooses  $K_C$  uniformly at random. Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}im$  uses this secret key to decrypt the ciphertexts  $c_i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ , and get bits  $x_i$ . If the corresponding plaintexts are not bits, then  $\mathcal{S}im$  chooses  $K_C$  uniformly at random. This game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the soundness of the iZK.

**Game  $G_3$ :** We now replace the CRS of the two iZK (which were generated by iSetup) by a CRS generated by TSetup and we remember the corresponding trapdoors  $i\mathcal{T}$ . This game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the setup indistinguishability of the iZK.

**Game  $G_4$ :** We now simulate all the iZK using iTKG and iTDec made by the simulator. This game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the zero-knowledge property of the iZK.

**Game  $G_5$ :** We now deal again with sessions between a malicious client  $\mathcal{C}$  and a honest server  $\mathcal{S}$  in this game and the following ones. We replace the commitment of  $g^{y_i}$ ,  $g^R$  and  $g^{R'}$  by commitments of random values. This game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the IND-CCA property of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme used for the commitment (and the fact that extractions are always done with different labels), and the fact that the random coins used by these commitments are no more necessary to decrypt the iZK ciphertexts  $c_C$  (thanks to the previous game).

**Game  $G_6$ :**  $\mathcal{S}im$  directly generates  $c$  as an encryption of  $g^{RIP+R'}$ , by computing IP as  $\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} x_i \cdot y_i$  ( $x_i$  being extracted by the encryption  $c_i$  and  $y_i$  being given as inputs to  $\mathcal{S}$ ). This is perfectly indistinguishable to the previous game.

**Game  $G_7$ :**  $\mathcal{S}im$  now aborts on behalf of  $\mathcal{S}$  if the last flow is not  $g^{RIP+R'}$  instead of just aborting when it is not such that  $g^{RIP'+R'}$  with  $IP' \in \{0, \dots, \ell\}$ . In addition, if  $\mathcal{S}$  does not abort, instead of computing IP from the last flow (and so potentially getting  $IP'$ ),  $\mathcal{S}im$  directly outputs IP. We remark that for any IP and any fixed value for  $u$ , for any value of the last flow different than  $g^{RIP+R'}$ , the probability this flow is  $g^{RIP'+R'}$  with  $IP' \in \{0, \dots, \ell\}$  (so with  $IP \neq IP'$ ), when  $R$  and  $R'$  are chosen uniformly at random conditioned by  $u = RIP + R'$ , is at most  $\ell/p$ , which is negligible. Since the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  does not know  $R$  and  $R'$  but only  $RIP + R'$ , this game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one.

**Game  $G_8$ :**  $\mathcal{S}im$  now generates  $c$  as an encryption of  $g^S$  for a random  $S$  and aborts when the last flow is not  $g^S$ . This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

**Game  $G_9$ :**  $\mathcal{S}im$  now sends (Client-Send, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $(x_i)$ ) in behalf of  $\mathcal{C}$  to the ideal functionality with  $(x_i)$  the extracted values of the malicious client  $\mathcal{C}$ . If  $\mathcal{S}$  does not abort,  $\mathcal{S}im$  also sends (Result-Send, sid, ssid,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ) to the ideal functionality. In addition  $\mathcal{S}im$  let the ideal functionality generate the output for  $\mathcal{S}$ . This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one, since both will output the same value IP.

**Game  $G_{10}$ :** We now deal again with sessions between a honest client  $\mathcal{C}$  and a malicious server  $\mathcal{S}$  in this game and the following ones.  $\mathcal{S}im$  now returns  $g^{RIP+R'}$  in the last flow (if  $\mathcal{C}$  did not abort) instead of decrypting  $c$ . This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one.

**Game  $G_{11}$ :** In this game, we now replace the commitments of  $sk_j$  by commitments of random values. This game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one under the IND-CCA property of the commitment scheme. We remark that we do not use anymore  $sk$ .

**Game  $G_{12}$ :** In this game,  $\mathcal{S}im$  now encrypts random values in  $c_i$  instead of the  $x_i$ 's. This game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one under the IND-CPA property of the commitment scheme. We remark that we do not use anymore the  $x_i$ 's.

**Game  $G_{13}$ :** *Sim* now extracts the commitment of the bits  $y_i$ , together with  $g^R$  and  $g^{R'}$ . If  $y_i$  are not bits or if the ciphertext  $c$  received by  $\mathcal{S}$  (under  $\text{pk}$  for which *Sim* knows the secret key  $\text{sk}$ ) does not contain  $g^{RIP+R'}$  (with  $\text{IP} = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} x_i \cdot y_i$ , with the extracted  $y_i$ 's and the  $x_i$  given as inputs to  $\mathcal{C}$ ), then *Sim* chooses  $K_S$  uniformly at random. This game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one, thanks to the *simulation-soundness* of the second  $\text{iZK}$ .

**Game  $G_{14}$ :** *Sim* now sends (**Server-Send**,  $\text{sid}$ ,  $\text{ssid}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $(y_i)$ ) in behalf of  $\mathcal{S}$  to the ideal functionality with  $(y_i)$  the extracted values of the malicious server  $\mathcal{S}$ . If  $\mathcal{C}$  does not abort, *Sim* also sends (**Result-Send**,  $\text{sid}$ ,  $\text{ssid}$ ,  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$ ) to the ideal functionality, and get the value of  $\text{IP}$ . This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one, since the computed value of  $\text{IP}$  (as  $\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} x_i \cdot y_i$  with  $(x_i)$  the input of  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $(y_i)$  extracted from  $\mathcal{S}$ ) is always equal to the value  $\text{IP}$  returned by the functionality.

**Game  $G_{15}$ :** In last game, *Sim* does not use anymore the inputs given to the honest parties. So this game is exactly the game in the ideal world.

## E Other Constructions of $\text{iZK}$

In this appendix, we give details on the construction of  $\text{iZK}$  from Trapdoor SPHF (TSPHF) and from  $\text{NIZK}$ , announced in Remark 2. These constructions are here for the sake of completeness and have the disadvantage to require strong assumptions such as the random oracle model or pairing (at least for currently known over cyclic groups).

### E.1 Construction of $\text{iZK}$ from TSPHF

**With the same Language  $\text{i}\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$  for the TSPHF and the  $\text{iZK}$ .** Let us suppose we have a TSPHF (see [BBC<sup>+</sup>13] for a complete description of TSPHF and notations we use in this section) on a language  $\text{i}\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$ . Then we can construct an  $\text{iZK}$  as follows:

- $\text{iSetup}(\text{crs})$  and  $\text{iTSetup}(\text{crs})$  generates  $\text{icrs} := \text{tcrs}$  as the common reference string for the TSPHF. The second algorithm also outputs the trapdoor  $\text{i}\mathcal{T}$  of the TSPHF.
- $\text{iKG}(\text{icrs}, x, \text{iw})$  outputs  $(\text{ipk}, \text{isk}) := (\perp, \text{iw})$ ;
- $\text{iTKG}(\text{i}\mathcal{T}, x)$  outputs  $(\text{ipk}, \text{itk}) := (\perp, \text{i}\mathcal{T})$ ;
- $\text{iEnc}(\text{ipk}, x)$  computes the keys  $\text{hk} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{HashKG}(\text{tcrs})$  and  $\text{hp} \leftarrow \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{tcrs}, x)$ , as well as the hash value  $H \leftarrow \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{tcrs}, x)$ . It then outputs  $(c := \text{hp}, K := H)$ ;
- $\text{iDec}(\text{isk} = \text{iw}, c = \text{hp})$  first checks  $\text{hp}$  is a valid projection key (using the algorithm  $\text{VerHP}$  for TSPHF) and aborts (by returning  $\perp$ ) if that is not the case. It then outputs  $K = \text{proj}H \leftarrow \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{tcrs}, x, \text{iw})$ ;
- $\text{iTDec}(\text{itk} = \text{i}\mathcal{T}, c = \text{hp})$  first checks  $\text{hp}$  is a valid projection key (using the algorithm  $\text{VerHP}$  for TSPHF) and aborts (by returning  $\perp$ ) if that is not the case. It then outputs  $K = \text{proj}H \leftarrow \text{THash}(\text{hp}, \text{tcrs}, x, \text{i}\mathcal{T})$ .

This scheme is not strictly speaking an  $\text{iZK}$  as we defined it in Section 2, since it only has computational soundness and computational zero-knowledge (in general). However, with TSPHF based on disjunctions of two SPHF in [ABP14], soundness and zero-knowledge would be statistical (but not with the original TSPHF in [BBC<sup>+</sup>13]). Proofs are straightforward and are left to the reader.

**For any NP Language.** Using the same methods as in Appendix F, we can also get  $\text{iZK}$  for any NP language defined by a circuit (or an ABP) by considering an augmented language  $\mathcal{L}$  where words also contain commitments of wires of the circuits or of intermediate values of the ABP. There exist TSPHF for these languages: the proof is similar to the one for the existence of such  $\text{iZK}$  (first an SPHF in the generic framework [BBC<sup>+</sup>13] is constructed, and then it is converted into a TSPHF).

### E.2 Construction of $\text{iZK}$ from $\text{NIZK}$

A TSPHF can be constructed from an SPHF and a Groth-Sahai [GS08]  $\text{NIZK}$  as explained in [BBC<sup>+</sup>13]. That gives a construction of  $\text{iZK}$  from  $\text{NIZK}$ .

## F iZK for Languages Defined by a Computational Structure

### F.1 Efficient iZK for Languages Represented by a Computational Structure

We have shown that a SPHF for some language  $\mathcal{L}$  yields an iZK for the same language  $i\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$ . However, if the class of NP languages handled by SPHFs is sufficient for many applications, there is still a large variety of useful languages which are not captured by the framework we presented above. We thus now (informally) explain how to construct iZK for any languages just from their representation through a given computational structure.

Of course, every NP language can be represented by the most general computational structure, the *circuit*. However, more efficient, but more restricted computational structures are widely used in cryptography, such as Boolean branching programs, arithmetic formulas, etc. A computational structure of particular interest is the model of *Arithmetic Branching Programs* (ABP). They provide a very compact way to represent multivariate polynomials and capture, among others, the two structure previously given.

A language  $i\mathcal{L}$  represented by a computational structure can be converted into a language  $\mathcal{L}$  which can be handled by the generic framework for SPHFs, by essentially extending the words with commitments to particular elements of the computational structure itself. Thus, on a given language, we can construct an iZK whose size is essentially the size of the most efficient computational structure which can represent the language.

In the following, we present the main ideas of how to construct an iZK for any NP language defined by a circuit, and also for any language defined by an ABP. We stress that they represent the most commonly used, and the most interesting, computational structures, but iZK can be constructed for others computational structures, depending of our need — other constructions exist for other representations of languages and these examples aim at illustrating the way such constructions can be made.

**For any NP Language Defined by a Circuit.** Let us build an iZK for an NP language  $\mathcal{L}$  defined by a (polynomial-size) circuit  $\mathcal{C}$  that evaluates a function  $F$ : a word  $x$  is in  $\mathcal{L}$  if and only if there exists a witness  $iw$  verifying  $F(x, iw) = 1$ . We remark that any NP language can be defined by such a circuit.

The idea for the iZK construction is the following: the prover sends (as part of the public key  $ipk$ ) ElGamal ciphertexts encrypting both all the bits of  $iw$  and all the values of the wires of the circuit  $\mathcal{C}$  when evaluated on  $x$  and  $iw$ . Then he uses an SPHF to implicitly prove that:

- encryption of input bits of  $iw$  indeed contain bits (which is our Example 4);
- encryption of the output wire of the circuit really contains 1 (which is similar to our Example 3);
- each gate is evaluated correctly.

All these properties are guaranteed together by the conjunction of all the languages, as in our Example 5. It is thus indeed sufficient to show how to handle every individual language with the generic framework for SPHFs. The resulting scheme is an iZK for the NP language defined by  $\mathcal{C}$ , secure under plain DDH. It is straightforward to extend it to be secure under weaker assumptions such as DLin.

**For Languages Defined by an ABP.** ABP is an efficient computational model that captures, among others, the computation of Boolean formulas, Boolean branching programs and arithmetic formulas. It also gives a very compact representation of multivariate polynomials. A branching program is defined by a directed acyclic graph  $(V, E)$  with two special vertices  $\mu, \nu \in V$  and a labeling function  $\Phi$ . An ABP computes a function  $F : \mathbb{F}_p^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_p$  ( $p$  is a prime power) as follows:  $\Phi$  assigns to each edge of  $E$  either a constant value or an affine function in any number of the input variables of  $F$ , and  $F(z)$  is the sum over all the path from  $\mu$  to  $\nu$  of the product of all the values along the path. The evaluation of  $F$  can be performed by assigning a value to each node, when nodes are sorted topologically (i.e., in such an ordering, a node appears always after its predecessors). The last node is  $\nu$  and its value is the value  $F(z)$ .

In our case, we use ABP to define an NP language in the following way: a word  $x$  is in the language  $\mathcal{L}$  if there exists a witness  $iw$  such that  $F(x, iw) = 0$ . The prover sends (as part of the public key  $ipk$ ), ElGamal ciphertexts encrypting both all the bits of  $iw$  and all the values of the nodes when  $\Phi$  is instantiated with  $x$  and  $iw$ . Then, as above, he uses a SPHF to implicitly prove that:

- encryption of input bits of  $\text{iw}$  indeed contain bits;
- encryption of the last node  $\nu$  really contains 0;
- each value for the nodes are computed correctly; the plaintext is just the sum of the values of the previous nodes multiplied by affine evaluations on the input  $(\mathbf{x}, \text{iw})$ .

Every individual language can be efficiently represented by an SPHF, and then conjunctions help to conclude, under the DDH assumption.

## F.2 iZK for any NP Language Defined by a Circuit

In every construction described below, we consider that the additively homomorphic ElGamal encryption scheme is used. We will denote  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{pk}}(a; r)$  the encryption of  $a$  under the public key  $\text{pk}$  and with randomness  $r$ .

**Notations.** Let  $F : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  be a function computed by a circuit  $\mathcal{C}$  on a basis  $B$  of boolean gates (with two input wires, without loss of generality), given by its directed acyclic graph  $(V, E)$ .  $F$  takes as input  $z = (\mathbf{x}, \text{iw})$  where  $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_x}$  and  $\text{iw} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{iw}}}$  such that  $\ell_x + \ell_{\text{iw}} = \ell$ . Nodes or gates  $v$  in  $V$  are either an input gate corresponding to some bit  $x_i$  of  $\mathbf{x}$ ,  $\text{iw}_i$  of  $\text{iw}$ , or a constant bit, or a boolean gate in the basis  $B$ . Let  $s = |V|$  be the size of the circuit. We consider the partial order on the set of gates  $V$  defined by  $u \preceq v$  if there is a path from the gate  $u$  to the gate  $v$  (the graph is acyclic). Then, we index the gates  $V = (v_i)_i^s$ , in an order-preserving way, such that for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ ,  $v_i$  corresponds to the input bit  $z_i$  of  $z$  and, if  $v_i \preceq v_j$ , then  $i \leq j$ . For each internal gate  $v_i$ , with  $i > \ell$ , we denote by  $\{i_1, i_2\} = \mathcal{P}(i)$  the indexes of the two preceding gates whose outputs are the inputs of  $v_i$ . The output bit of the gate  $v_i$  when evaluated on  $z = (\mathbf{x}, \text{iw})$  is denoted  $A_i$  (for input gates, the output bit is just the value of the input).

**Extended Language for  $F$ .** We want an iZK for  $\text{i}\mathcal{L} = \{\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_x} \mid \exists \text{iw} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{iw}}}, F(\mathbf{x}, \text{iw}) = 1\}$ . However, this language cannot be directly handled by the SPHF framework, and we have to extend it first: we consider the extended language  $\mathcal{L}$  of words of  $\text{i}\mathcal{L}$  along with the encryption of the output bits  $A_i$  of the gates  $v_i$  for  $i > \ell_x$  (hence including the input gates corresponding to the bits of  $\text{iw}$  but excluding those corresponding to the bits of  $\mathbf{x}$ , which are anyway already known). Witness for the new language will be the random coins for all the ciphertexts, together with the values  $A_i$  for  $i > \ell_x$ . We recall that  $A_i = x_i$  for  $i = 1, \dots, \ell_x$ .

Formally, for a gate  $v_i$ , let  $(\beta_i, \beta_i^+, \beta_i^\times)$  be three integers such that, on input  $(x, y)$ , the output of the gate is  $(\beta_i + \beta_i^+(x + y) + \beta_i^\times xy)$ . This models all the (symmetric) binary gates: XOR =  $(0, 1, -2)$ , OR =  $(0, 1, -1)$ , AND =  $(0, 0, 1)$ , NAND =  $(1, 0, -1)$ , while the unary gate NOT is just XOR 1. For  $i = \ell_x + 1, \dots, s$ , we consider a ciphertext  $c_i = \mathcal{E}(A_i; r_i)$  of  $A_i$  with random coins  $r_i$ . We now consider the language  $\mathcal{L}$  of the words  $C = (\mathbf{x}, (c_i)_{i=\ell_{\text{iw}}+1}^s)$  such that there exist witnesses  $(A_i, r_i)_{i=\ell_{\text{iw}}+1}^s$  satisfying:  $A_s = 1$ , for all  $i = \ell_x + 1, \dots, s$ ,  $c_i$  encrypts the bit  $A_i$  with random coins  $r_i$ , and, for  $i = \ell, \dots, s$ ,  $A_i$  verifies the appropriate relation with  $A_{i_1}$  and  $A_{i_2}$ , for  $\{i_1, i_2\} = \mathcal{P}(i)$ . However, there are quadratic relations, we thus need additional variables to linearize the system.

Now, let us show how to construct an SPHF on this language  $\mathcal{L}$  which can be automatically used to construct an iZK using the framework defined in Section 3 for the above language  $\text{i}\mathcal{L}$ . Concretely, we use an ElGamal encryption in basis  $g$ , with public key  $h$ , and we write  $c_i = (c_i^1 = g^{r_i}, c_i^2 = h^{r_i} g^{A_i})$ .  $C = (\mathbf{x}, (c_i)_{i=\ell_{\text{iw}}+1}^s)$  is in  $\mathcal{L}$  if and only if there exist  $(A_i)_{i=\ell_x+1}^s \in \{0, 1\}^{s-\ell_x}$ ,  $(r_i)_{i=\ell_x+1}^s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{s-\ell_x}$ ,  $(\mu_i)_{i=\ell_x+1}^s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{s-\ell_x}$  and  $(\mu'_i)_{i=\ell+1}^s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{s-\ell}$ , such that:

$$\begin{aligned} g^{r_i} &= c_i^1 & \text{and} & & h^{r_i} \cdot g^{A_i} &= c_i^2 \\ (c_i^1)^{A_i} \cdot g^{-\mu_i} &= 1 & \text{and} & & (c_i^2/g)^{A_i} \cdot h^{-\mu_i} &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

for  $i = \ell_x + 1, \dots, s$  and:

$$(c_{i_2}^1)^{A_{i_1}} \cdot g^{-\mu'_i} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad g^{\beta_i^+ A_{i_1}} \cdot g^{\beta_i^+ A_{i_2}} \cdot (c_{i_2}^2)^{\beta_i^\times A_{i_1}} \cdot h^{-\beta_i^\times \mu'_i} \cdot g^{-A_i} = g^{-\beta_i} \quad \text{for } i = \ell + 1, \dots, s$$

for  $i = \ell + 1, \dots, s$ , with  $\{i_1, i_2\} = \mathcal{P}(i)$ , since the second of equations ensures  $\mu_i = r_i A_i$  and  $A_i(A_i - 1) = 0$  (i.e.,  $A_i$  is a bit), while the third one ensures  $\mu'_i = r_{i_2} A_{i_1}$  and  $A_i = \beta_i + \beta_i^+(A_{i_1} + A_{i_2}) + \beta_i^\times A_{i_1} A_{i_2}$ . These linear equations (in the exponents) directly provides the matrix  $\Gamma(C)$ , while  $\theta(C)$  is defined by the right-hand sides of the relations. This then leads to an SPHF over  $\mathcal{L}$ , based on the plain DDH.



**Algorithm 1** Dynamic ABP Computation

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1: procedure DAC( $F, x$ ) ▷  $F$  is an ABP and  $x$  is its input
2:    $A_0 \leftarrow 1$ 
3:   for  $i = 1$  to  $|V|$  do
4:      $A_i \leftarrow 0$ 
5:     for all  $v_j \in \text{prec}(v_i)$  do
6:        $A_i \leftarrow A_i + \Phi((v_j \rightarrow v_i), x) \cdot A_j$  ▷  $A_0$  is set as the value of the predecessor of  $v_1$ 
7:   return  $(A_i)_{2 \leq i \leq |V|}$  ▷  $A_{|V|} = F(x)$ 

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**F.3 iZK for any NP Language Defined by an ABP**

**Notations:** Let  $F : \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  be a function computed by an ABP given by its directed acyclic graph  $(V, E)$ , two special vertices  $\mu, \nu \in V$  and a labeling function  $\Phi : E \times \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ .  $F$  takes as input  $z = (x, iw)$ , where  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_x}$  and  $iw \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_{iw}}$  such that  $\ell_x + \ell_{iw} = \ell$ . Let  $s = |E|$  be the size of the ABP. We denote by  $(u \rightarrow v)$  the edge from the vertex  $u$  to the vertex  $v$ . We consider the partial order on the set of vertices  $V$  defined by  $u \preceq v$  if there is a path from the gate  $u$  to the gate  $v$  (the graph is acyclic). Then, we index the vertices  $V = (v_i)_s$  in an order-preserving way:  $v_i \preceq v_j \Rightarrow i \leq j$ ,  $\mu = v_1$  and  $\nu = v_{|V|}$ . For each node  $v \neq \mu$ , we denote by  $\text{prec}(v)$  the set of direct predecessors of  $v$ , i.e., the vertices  $u$  such that  $(u \rightarrow v) \in E$ . Algorithm 1 describes the way the ABP is evaluated in an input  $x$ . When the input  $x$  can be seen as a pair of tuples  $x = (x, iw) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_x} \times \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_{iw}} = \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell$ , we consider the problem, for a given  $x$ , of the existence of a witness  $iw$  such that  $F(x, iw) = 0$ . We want to build an iZK on the language of the words  $x$  with such witnesses  $iw$ .


**Extended Language for  $F$ .** As above, we want an iZK for  $i\mathcal{L} = \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_x} \mid \exists iw \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_{iw}}, F(x, iw) = 0\}$ . We can extend it, as above, with the ciphertexts  $c_i$  of all the witnesses  $iw_i$  and  $a_i$  of all intermediate values  $A_i$  of the dynamic ABP computation (except the special vertices  $A_1 = 1$  and  $A_{|V|} = 0$ ). Then the witnesses are  $(r_i)_{i=1}^{\ell_{iw}}$  and  $(s_i)_{i=2}^{|V|-1}$ , the random coins for the encryption. We now consider the language  $\mathcal{L}$  of the words  $(x, (c_i)_{i=1}^{\ell_{iw}}, (a_i)_{i=2}^{|V|-1})$  such that there exist witnesses  $((r_i, iw_i)_{i=1}^{\ell_{iw}}, (s_i, A_i)_{i=2}^{|V|-1})$  satisfying: for all  $i = 1, \dots, \ell_{iw}$ ,  $c_i$  encrypts the scalar  $iw_i$  with random coins  $r_i$ , for  $i = 2, \dots, |V| - 1$ ,  $a_i$  encrypts the scalar  $A_i$  with random coins  $s_i$ , and  $A_i$  verifies the appropriate relation w.r.t. its predecessors, as well  $A_1 = 1$  and  $A_{|V|} = 0$ , which introduces again quadratic relations.

As above, using ElGamal encryption, we can write  $c_i = (c_i^1 = g^{r_i}, c_i^2 = h^{r_i} g^{iw_i})$  and  $a_i = (a_i^1 = g^{s_i}, a_i^2 = h^{s_i} g^{A_i})$ . The word  $C = (x, (c_i)_{i=1}^{\ell_{iw}}, (a_i)_{i=2}^{|V|-1})$  is in  $\mathcal{L}$  if and only if there exist  $(iw_i)_{i=1, \dots, \ell_{iw}} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_{iw}}$ ,  $(r_i)_{i=1, \dots, \ell_{iw}} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell_{iw}}$ ,  $(A_i)_{i=2}^{|V|-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{|V|-2}$ ,  $(s_i)_{i=2}^{|V|-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{|V|-2}$ , and  $\mu_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ , for  $i = 2, \dots, |V| - 1$  and  $j = 1, \dots, \ell_{iw}$  (but actually for all the values  $iw_j$  that appears in labels on edges leaving from  $v_i$ ), such that:

$$\begin{aligned}
g^{r_i} &= c_i^1 & \text{and} & & h^{r_i} \cdot g^{iw_i} &= c_i^2 & & \text{for } i = 1, \dots, \ell_x \\
g^{s_i} &= a_i^1 & \text{and} & & h^{s_i} \cdot g^{A_i} &= a_i^2 & & \text{for } i = 2, \dots, |V| - 1 \\
(a_i^1)^{iw_j} \cdot g^{-\mu_{i,j}} &= 1 & & & & & & \text{for } i = 2, \dots, |V| - 1, \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, \ell_{iw} \\
g^{\sum_{v_j \in \text{prec}(v_i)} A_j \cdot \Phi((v_j \rightarrow v_i), x) - A_i} &= 1 & & & & & & \text{for } i = 2, \dots, |V|, \text{ with } A_{|V|} = 0
\end{aligned}$$

where  $x = (x, iw)$ . We recall that  $\Phi(v_j \rightarrow v_i)$  is an affine function (or a constant) in  $x$  (known by both players) and  $iw$  (encrypted in the  $c_i$ 's). So quadratic terms  $A_i iw_j$  can be computed using the intermediate value  $\mu_{i,j}$ , as above, that implicitly corresponds to  $r_i iw_j$  to remove extra terms in  $h$  introduced by  $(a_i^2)^{iw_j}$ :  $(a_i^2)^{iw_j} \cdot h^{-\mu_{i,j}}$  is indeed  $g^{A_i iw_j}$  when the first row is enforced.

**A Concrete Example.** Let us consider the following language  $i\mathcal{L} = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2 \mid \exists iw \in \mathbb{Z}_p, (iw^2 - x_1)(iw^2 - x_2) = 0\}$  of pairs of integers modulo  $p$  such that at least one of the elements of the pair is a square. This language can be efficiently represented by the following ABP:





Applying the dynamic ABP computation algorithm, we get  $A_1 = 1$ ,  $A_2 = \text{iw}$ ,  $A_3 = \text{iw}A_2 - x_1A_1 = \text{iw}^2 - x_1$ ,  $A_4 = \text{iw}A_3$ , and  $A_5 = (\text{iw}^2 - x_2)A_3 = (\text{iw}^2 - x_1)(\text{iw}^2 - x_2)$ . Thus, we construct the extended language of words  $\mathcal{L}' = \{(x_1, x_2), (c^1, c^2), (a_i^1, a_i^2)_{i=2}^4\}$  such that there exists  $(\mu_i)_{i=2}^4 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3$  so that the plaintexts  $\text{iw}$ , and  $(A_2, A_3, A_4)$  satisfy:

$$\begin{aligned} g^r &= c^1 \quad \text{and} \quad h^r \cdot g^{\text{iw}} = c^2 \\ g^{s_i} &= a_i^1, \quad h^{s_i} \cdot g^{A_i} = a_i^2 \quad \text{and} \quad (a_i^1)^{\text{iw}} \cdot g^{-\mu_i} = 1 \quad \text{for } i = 2, 3, 4 \\ g^{\text{iw}} \cdot g^{-A_2} &= 1 \quad \text{and} \quad (a_2^2)^{\text{iw}} \cdot h^{-\mu_2} \cdot g^{-A_3} = g^{x_1} \\ (a_3^2)^{\text{iw}} \cdot h^{-\mu_3} \cdot g^{-A_4} &= 1 \quad \text{and} \quad (a_4^2)^{\text{iw}} \cdot h^{-\mu_4} = g^{x_2} \end{aligned}$$

We have 15 equations and 11 witnesses  $(\text{iw}, r, (A_i)_2^4, (s_i)_2^4, (\mu_i = s_i \text{iw})_2^4)$ . However, in this particular example, we can drop three equations and two witnesses: as the value  $A_2$  is exactly the witness  $\text{iw}$ , we can use drop  $(c^1, c^2)$  and use  $(a_2^1, a_2^2)$  instead. In addition, we can remove the two first equations and the equation  $g^{\text{iw}} \cdot g^{-A_2} = 1$ : we now have 12 equations and 10 witnesses  $((A_i)_2^4, (s_i)_2^4, (\mu_i = s_i \text{iw})_2^4)$ . We stress the fact that in particular applications with a “good” structure, it is often possible to get optimizations on the theoretical size of the corresponding iZK. This leads to a iZK with public key of size  $|\text{ipk}| = 30$  and ciphertexts of size  $|c| = 24$  (using the optimization of **C**).